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A   TREATISE 


ON 


FEDERAL  PRACTICE  IN  CIVIL  CAUSES 

WITH  SPECIAL  REFERENCE  TO 

PATENT   CASES   AND   THE    FORECLOSURE 
OF   RAILWAY   MORTGAGES. 


By    ROGER     FOSTER, 


OF    THE    NEW     lOEK     BAE, 

AUTHOR   OF    "FOSTEK'S    FEDEKAL   JUDICIAUY   ACTS"    AND    "TRIAL   BY    NEWSPAPER;' 

AND   LECTURER  ON    FEDERAL  JURISPRUDENCE   AT   THE   LAW 

SCHOOL    OF     YALE     UNIVERSITY. 


in  two   volumes. 
Vol.  L 


BOSTON: 
THE   BOSTON  BOOK   COMPANY. 

1892. 


Copyright,  1890, 
By    RoGEii    Foster. 


Copyright,  1892, 
By    Roger    Foster. 


T 

I89X 


53nibcrsitn  l!3rrss: 
John  Wilson  and  Son,  CAMiiiauGE,  U.S.A. 


TO 

C!;e  jHemorp  of  mp  jFafter, 

DWIGHT   FOSTER, 

FORMERLY    JUSTICE    OF    THE    SUPREME    JUDICIAL    COURT 
OF   MASSACHUSETTS, 

/  DEDICATE    THIS  BOOK, 

BEGUN   AT   HIS    SUGGESTION, 
ALTHOUGH    HE   DID  NOT   LIVE    TO   CORRECT   ITS    FAULTS. 


mTKd 


PREFACE  TO  SECOND  EDITION. 


The  passage  of  the  Evarts  Act  creating  the  Circuit 
Courts  of  Appeals,  which  radically  changed  the  jurisdic- 
tion and  practice  affecting  appeals  and  writs  of  error, 
and  the  many  recent  decisions  explaining  the  right  to 
and  practice  in  removals  from  the  State  to  the  Federal 
courts,  have  rendered  a  second  edition  necessary.  The 
reception  given  by  the  bench  and  bar  to  the  first  edition 
has  encouraged  the  author  to  enlarge  the  scope,  and  he 
hopes  the  usefulness  of  the  book.  Many  of  the  original 
sections  have  been  rewritten,  and  new  sections  have  been 
added  to  the  original  chapters,  including  all  material  stat- 
utes and  decisions  passed  or  reported  before  the  October 
terra  of  1891,  and  many  decisions  since  that  date  which 
have  been  added  while  the  book  was  in  the  press. 

New  chapters  have  been  added,  on  Practice  in  Admir- 
alty, by  Charles  C.  Burlingham,  Esq.,  of  the  New  York  bar  ; 
Practice  in  the  Court  of  Private  Land  Claims,  by  ex-Judge 
E.  A.  Bowers,  now  of  the  bar  of  Washington,  D.  C.  ;  and 
Practice  in  the  Court  of  Claims.  The  chapters  on  Juris- 
diction, Evidence,  Costs,  Practice  at  Common  Law,  Re- 
moval of  Causes,  and  Writs  of  Error  and  Appeals,  have 
been  entirely  rewritten  and  nearly  doubled  in  size.  A 
larsj-e  number  of  forms  and  rules,  and  a  few  recent  statutes 


Vi  PREFACE    TO    SECOND    EDITION. 

have  been  added  to  the  Appendix.  It  is  hoped  that  the 
book  will  now  serve  as  a  iuU  guide  to  the  practitioner  in 
every  branch  of  Federal  practice  in  civil  causes. 

The  author  has  been  greatly  aided  by  the  Notes  to  the 
Revised  Statutes  by  Messrs.  Gould  and  Tucker,  and  by  the 
Important  Federal  Statutes  Annotated,  by  Mr.  Russell  H. 
Curtis. 

The  references  to  the  Supplement  to  the  Revised 
Statutes   are    to    the    first   edition. 

New  York,  January  11,  1892. 


PREFACE  TO  THE   FIRST  EDITION. 


The  object  of  this  work  is  to  furnish  a  guide  to  the 
whole  field  of  practice  in  the  Federal  Courts,  except  in 
cases  of  admiralty,  criminal  prosecutions,  and  before  the 
Court  of  Claims ;  including  references  to  all  the  statutes 
and  the  principal  decisions  upon  the  subject.  Greater 
space  has  been  given  to  practice  in  equity  on  account  of 
its  importance  and  obscurity.  The  chapter  on  the  practice 
on  Writs  of  Error  and  Appeals  is  not  intended  as  more 
than  a  summary  which  may  be  of  convenience  to  the 
practitioner.  The  practice  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States  cannot  be  adequately  described  in  less  than 
at  least  one  volume.  The  author  has  used  with  great 
freedom  many  treatises  on  chancery  pleadings  and  prac- 
tice, and  collections  of  annotations  upon  statutes  of  the 
United  States.  Besides  the  great  work  of  Lord  Redes- 
dale,  he  is  especially  indebted  for  assistance  to  Daniell's 
Chancery  Practice,  with  the  notes  of  successive  editors, 
including  those  of  Chancellor  Cooper ;  Bump's  annota- 
tions of  the  statutes  regulating  Federal  Procedure ;  and 
the  manuscript  lectures  on  equity  pleading  delivered  be- 
fore the  Law  School  of  Boston  University,  by  the  late 
Judge  Dwight  Foster.  The  citations  from  Daniell  are 
taken  from  the  second  and  fifth  American  editions.  The 
writer  is  aware   that  both   these   editions  contain    manv 


viii  PREFACE, 

rules  of  modern  English  chancery  practice  which  are  not 
binding  upon  the  courts  of  the  United  States ;  but  he  has 
been  careful  to  exclude  all  such  from  this  work.  The  fact 
that  these  later  editions  are  more  accessible  to  the  profes- 
sion is  his  reason  for  referring  to  them  rather  than  to  the 
first  American  edition.  He  has  received  great  assistance 
and  encouragement  from  many  members  of  the  bench  and 
bar;  especially  from  his  teachers,  Professor  Theodore  W. 
Dwiii:ht  and  ex-Judo;e  John  F.  Dillon,  and  from  John  A. 
Shields,  Esq.,  the  Clerk  of  the  Circuit  Court  of  the  United 
States  for  the  Southern  District  of  New  York,  who  has 
very  kindly  examined  and  approved  the  chapter  on  Costs. 
He  is  fully  conscious  that  the  book  contains  many  errors 
and  omissions.  The  pressing  need  of  a  treatise  upon  the 
subject  is  his  only  excuse  for  the  publication  of  so  imper- 
fect a  work.  And  he  will  welcome  any  criticism,  w^hether 
public  or  private,  which  Avill  show  him  how,  in  a  subse- 
quent edition,  to  make  it  more  useful  to  the  profession. 


Netv  York, 

August  31,  1889. 


TABLE   OF   CONTENTS. 


Pagk 

Table  of  Cases xxix 

Table  of  Statutes cix 

Table  ok  Equity  Rules cxv 

Table  of  Rules  of  Supreme  Court cxvi 

Table  of  Rules  of  Circuit  Court  of  Appeals cxvi 

Table  of  Admiralty  Rules cxvii 

Table  of  Rules  of  Court  of  Claims cxvii 

Table  of  Rules  of  Court  of  Private  Land  Claims     ....  cxviii 


CHAPTER   I. 

jurisdiction. 


§  1.     Equitable  Jurisdiction  in  General 1 

§  2.     General  Survey  of  the  Jurisdiction  of  Courts  of  Equity    ....  3 
§  3.     Constitutional  Provisions  affecting  the  Jurisdiction  of  the  Federal 

Courts 4 

§  4.     The  Distinction  between  Law  and  Equity  in  the  Federal  Courts    .  5 
§  5.     General  Rules  affecting  the  Jurisdiction  in  Equity  of  the  Federal 

Courts 6 

§  6.     State   Statutes   cannot   impair  the  Jurisdiction  nor  regulate  the 

Practice  of  Federal  Courts  of  Equity 9 

§  7.     State  Laws  creating  new  Rights  are  enforced  by  Federal  Courts 

of  Equity 10 

§  8.     State  Statutes  of  Limitation 11 

§  9.     Property  in  the  Custody  of  a  State  Court 12 

§  10.     Property  in  the  Custody  of  a  Federal  Court 14 

§  11.     Illustrations  of  Equitable  Jurisdiction  in  the  Federal  Courts     .     .  14 
§  12.     Illustrations  of  Cases  where  the  Federal  Courts  have  refused  to 

assume  Equitable  Jurisdiction 19 

§  13.     Federal  Courts  which  have  Jurisdiction  in  Equity 27 

§  14.     Original  Jurisdiction  of  the  Supreme  Court 27 

§  14rt.  Jurisdiction  of  the  Circuit  Courts  of  Appeal 30 

§  15.     Jurisdiction  of  the  Circuit  Courts  of  the  United  States    ....  30 

§  16.     Matter  in  Dispute 32 

§  17.     Suits  arising  under  the  Constitution  or  Laws  of  the  United  States  35 

§  18.     Controversy  between  Citizens  of  different  States 37 

§  19.     Citizenship 38 

§  '20.     Under  Grants  of  different  States 41 

§  21.     Ancillary  Jurisdiction 41 


X  TABLE   OF   CONTENTS. 

Page 

§  22.     Limitations  upon  Jurisdiction  by  Residence 44 

§  23.     Special  Limitation  upon  Jurisdiction  of  Circuit  Court  for  Southern 

District  of  New  York 49 

§  24.     Suits  by  Assignees 54 

§  25.     Jurisdiction  of  the  District  Courts  of  the  United  States   ....  57 
§  26.     Territorial  Jurisdiction  and  Terms  of  the  Supreme  Court,  Circuit 
Courts  of  Appeal,  Circuit  and  District  Courts  of  the  United 

States , 58 

§  26a.  Jurisdiction  of  the  Court  of  Claims 86 

§  266.  Jurisdiction  of  the  Court  of  Private  Land  Claims 87 

§  27.     Sources  of  Federal  Equity  Practice 89 


CHAPTER  II. 

PERSONS   WHO   MAT   BE   PLAINTIFFS    OR   DEFENDANTS   IN   A   SUIT 
IN   EQUITY. 

§  28.     General  Rule  as  to  Persons  capable  of  being  Plaintiffs   ....  91 

§  29.     States  as  Plaintiffs 91 

§  30.     Alien  Enemies  as  Plaintiffs 91 

§  31.     Married  \Vomen  as  Plaintiffs 91 

§  32.     Suits  on  behalf  of  Infants 92 

§  33.     Suits  on  behalf  of  Idiots,  Lunatics,  and  Persons  of  Weak  Mind  .  94 
§  34.     Capacity  of  Foreign   Executors,  Administrators,  and  Receivers 

to  sue 95 

§  35.     Who  may  be  Defendants  to  a  Bill  in  Equity 95 

§  36.     The  United  States  as  a  Defendant 95 

§  37.     Liability  of  States  to  Suits  by  Private  Persons 100 

§  38.     Liability  of  a  State  to  a  Suit  by  another  State 107 

§  39.     Suits  against  Infants 107 

§  40.     Suits  against  Idiots,  Lunatics,  and  Persons  of  Weak  Mind  .     .     .  108 

§  41.     Suits  against  Married  Women 109 


CHAPTER   III. 

PARTIES. 

§  42.     General  Rule  as  to  Parties 110 

§  43.     Parties  with  no  Interest  in  the  Subject-Matter  of  the  Suit   .     .     .  Ill 
§  44.     Persons  who  on  account  of  their  Interest  need  not  be  made  Parties 

to  a  Suit  in  Ecjuity 112 

§  45.     Cases  where  the  Law  has  furnished  a  Representative       ....  116 
§  46.     Suits  l)y  a  Complainant  on  behalf  of  himself  and  others  similarly 

situated 119 

§  47.     Illustrations  of  Bills  filed  by  Representatives 120 

§  48.     Suits  against  one  or  more  of  a  Class 121 

§  49.     Suits  by  or  against  one  or  more  as  Representatives  of  a  Class 

claiming  a  Common  Right 122 

§  .50.     Omission  of  Defendants  not  within  the  .Jurisdiction  of  the  Court  123 
§  51.     Formal   Parties  who  may  be  omitted   when  without  the  Juris- 
diction   126 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS.  XI 

Page 

§  52.     Parties  whose  Interest  is  separable 126 

§  53.     Parties  indispensable  to  a  Decree 129 

§  54.     When  Numerous  Interests  have  been  created  for  the  Purpose  of 

preventing  the  Plaintiff  from  obtaining  Equitable  Relief     .     .  133 

§  55.     When  a  Person  consents  to  the  Relief  sought 133 

§  56.     When  the  Plaintiff  waives  his  Right  against  a  Person     ....  134 

§  57.     When  the  Interest  of  an  absent  Person  is  evidently  very  small     .  134 

§  58.     When  the  Right  of  Administration  is  in  Dispute 134 

§  59.     Relaxation  of  Rules  as  to  Parties  in  Special  Cases 135 

§  60.     Restatement  of  the  Rules  as  to  Parties 135 

§  61.     Objection  for  Want  of  Parties 136 

§  62.     Objection  for  Joinder  of  Improper  Parties 138 


CHAPTER  IV. 

BILLS. 

§  63.  Informations 139 

§  64.  Definition  and  Classification  of  Bills 140 

§  65.  Frame  of  a  Bill  in  Equity 142 

§  66.  The  Address  and  Introduction 143 

§  67.  The  Narrative  Part  of  a  Bill 144 

§  68.  Scandal  and  Impertinence 145 

§  69.  Certainty 147 

§  70.  Inconsistency  and  Bills  with  a  Double  Aspect 149 

§  71.  Multifariousness  in  General 152 

§  72.  Multifariousness  by  Misjoinder  of  Plaintiffs 153 

§  73.  Multifariousness  by  Misjoinder  of  Defendants  . 154 

§  74.  INIultifariousness  without  Misjoinder  of  Parties 157 

§75.  Objections  for  Multifariousness 159 

§  76.  Special  Provisions  of  the  Federal  Equity  Rules  and  Pi'actice    .     .  160 

§  77.  Bills  to  enjoin  the  Infringement  of  Patents 162 

§  78.  General  Rules  of  Equity  Pleading 165 

§  79.  The  Common  Confederacy  Clause 168 

§  80.  The  Charging  Part 169 

§  81.  The  Jurisdiction  Clause 169 

§  82.  The  Interrogatory  Clause 170 

§  83.  The  Prayer  for  ReUef 171 

§  84.  Waivers  and  Offers 172 

§  85.  The  Prayer  of  Process 175 

§  86.  The  Signature  to  a  Bill 176 

§  87.  Affidavits  to  Bills 177 

§  88.  Bills  of  Interpleader 178 

§  89.  Bills  in  the  Nature  of  Interpleader 181 

§  90.  Bills  of  Certiorari 181 

CHAPTER  V. 

STJBPCENAS    TO    APPEAR    AND    ANSWER. 

§  91.  Definition  and  Form  of  Subpoena 183 

§  92.  Issue  of  the  SubpcBua 185 


Xii  TABLE    OF   CONTENTS. 

Page 

§  93.     When  a  Subpoena  is  necessary 185 

§  94.     Personal  Service  of  a  Subpoena 186 

§  95.     Service  upon  Corporations 188 

§  96.     Substituted  Service  of  a  Subpoena 191 

§  97.     Statutory  Service  of  a  Subpoena 193 

§  98.     Exemptions  from  Service  of  Subpoena,  or  other  Process   Legal 

or  Equitable,  other  than  Arrest 195 


CHAPTER  VI. 

APPEARANCE. 

§  99.     Definition  of  an  Appearance 198 

§  100.     What  constitutes  an  Appearance 198 

§  101.     Effect  of  an  Appearance 199 

§  102.     When  an  Appearance  must  be  made 200 


CHAPTER  VII. 

TAKING   BILLS    PRO    CONFESSO. 

§  103.     When  a  Bill  may  be  taken  pro  confesso 201 

§104.     Practice  in  taking  a  Bill  p-o  co«/esso 202 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

DEMURRERS. 

§  105.  Definition  and  General  Characteristics  of  a  Demurrer  ....  208 

§  106.     Admissions  by  a  Demurrer 208 

§  107.     Demurrers  to  Parts  of  Bills 210 

§  108.     Classification  of  Demurrers  to  the  Relief 212 

§  109.     Demurrers  to  the  Discovery 215 

§  110.  Of  what  Defects  Advantage  should  be  taken  by  Demurrer     .     .  216 

§111.     When  a  Demurrer  should  be  Filed 217 

§  112.     Title  of  Demurrer 217 

§  113.     Protestation 217 

§114.     Statement  of  the  Extent  of  the  Demurrer 218 

§115.     Statement  of  Causes  of  Demurrer 218 

§  116.     Demurrers  ore  ten  us 220 

§117.     Prayer  of  Judgment 221 

§  118.     Certificate  of  Counsel 221 

§  119.     jMotions  to  take  Demurrers  off  the  File 221 

§  120.     Setting  Demurrer  down  for  Argument 222 

§121.     Argument  of  Demurrer 222 

§  122.     Overruling  a  Demurrer 223 

§  123.     Sustaining  a  Demurrer 225 


TABLE   OF  CONTENTS.  Xiii 
CHAPTER  IX. 

PLEAS. 

Page 

§  124.     Definition  and  Classification  of  Pleas 226 

§  125.     Pleas  in  Abatement  in  General 228 

§  126.     Pleas  to  the  Jurisdiction 229 

§  127.     Pleas  to  the  Person 229 

§  128.     Pleas  to  the  Bill 230 

§  129.     Pleas  of  Pendency  of  another  Suit 231 

§  130.     Pleas  of  AA'ant  of  Parties 23i 

§  131.     Pleas  of  Statutes 234 

§  132.     Pleas  of  Matter  of  Record   .     ; 236 

§  133.     Pleas  of  INIatter  in  Pais 238 

§  131.     Pleas  to  the  Discovery 238 

§  135.     When  a  Plea  must  be  filed 239 

§  136.     Frame  of  a  Plea 239 

§  137.     Answers  with  Pleas 241 

§  138.     Proceedings  of  the  Plaintiff  when  a  Plea  is  filed 242 

§  139.     Motion  to  take  a  Plea  off  the  File 243 

§  140.     Argument  of  a  Plea 244 

§  141.     Motion  for  a  Reference  of  a  Plea 247 

§  142.     Hearing  upon  Pleas 247 

§  143.     General  Remarks  upon  Pleas 249 

CHAPTER  X. 

ANSWERS   AKD   DISCLAIMERS. 

§  144.     Pleading  Defenses  in  an  Answer 250 

§  145.     Defenses  peculiar  to  Patent  Cases 251 

§  146.     Admissions  and  Denials  independent  of  Discovery 254 

§  147.     Impertinence  and  Scandal 255 

§  148.     Discovery 256 

§  149.     Proceedings  to  compel  Answer 260 

§  150.     Frame  of  Answer 260 

§  151.     Signature  and  Oath  to  Answer 262 

§  152.     IMotions  to  take  Answers  off  the  File 263 

§  153.     Exceptions  for  Insufficiency 264 

§  154.     Supplemental  Answers 267 

§  155.     Disclaimers 267 

CHAPTER  XL 

REPLICATIONS. 

§  156.     Definition  and  History  of  Replications 2G9 

§  157.     When  a  Replication  should  be  Filed 270 

§  I-IS.     Effect  of  a  Replication 271 

§  159.     Frame  of  a  Replication 271 


XIV  TABLE    OF   CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  XII. 

AMENDMENTS. 

Page 

§  160.     Amendments  in  General 273 

§  IGl.     When  Bills  can  be  Amended 273 

§  162.     Form  and  Effect  of  Amendment  of  a  Bill 275 

§  163.     What  Amendments  to  Bills  may  be  made 276 

§  164:.     Amendment  by  Pleading  Matters  subsequent  to  the  Filing  of 

the  Bill 279 

§  165.     Proceedings  upon  an  Amended  Bill 280 

§  166.     Amendments  of  Demurrers,  Pleas,  and  Replications      ....  281 

§  167.     Amendment  of  Answers 281 

§  168.     Practice  in  obtaining  Leave  to  Amend 284 

CHAPTER  XIII. 

CROSS-BILLS. 

§  169.     Definition  and  Origin  of  Cross-Bills 286 

§  170.     When  a  Cross-Bill  should  be  Filed 286 

§  171.     AVhen  a  Cross-Bill  should  not  be  Filed 287 

§  172.     Frame  of  a  Cross-Bill 291 

§  173.     Proceedings  upon  Cross-Bills • 293 

CHAPTER  XIV. 

BILLS    OF    REVIVOR  ;    SUPPLEMENTAL    BILLS  ;    BILLS    OF    REVIVOR   AND 
SUPPLEMENT  ;    AND    BILLS    IN   THE    NATURE    OF    THE    SAME. 

§  174.     Abatement 296 

§  175.     Effect  of  Abatement 298 

§  176.     When  a  Suit  may  be  Revived  and  Effect  of  Revivor      ....  299 

§  177.     Who  may  Revive  a  Suit 300 

§  178.     Manner  of  Revivor  in  General 301 

§  179.     Definition  of  Bills  of  Revivor  and  Parties  to  the  Same       .     .     .  302 

§  180.     Frame  of  a  Bill  of  Revivor 303 

§  181.     Proceedings  upon  Bills  of  Revivor 304 

§  182.     Bills  in  the  Nature  of  Bills  of  Revivor  in  General 307 

§  183.     Frame  of  Bills  in  the  Nature  of  Bills  of  Revivor  and  Proceedings 

upon  them 308 

§  184.     Bills  of  Revivor  and  Supplement 309 

§  185.     Supplemental  Bills  in  the  Nature  of  Bills  of  Revivor     ....  309 

§  186.     What  renders  a  Suit  defective 310 

§  187.     Supplemental  Bills 311 

§  188.     Parties  and  Frame  of  a  Supplemental  Bill 313 

§  189.     Proceedings  upon  Supplempwtal  Bills 314 

§  190.     Bills  in  the  Nature  of  Supplemental  Bills  in  General     ....  318 

§  191.     Frame  of  a  Bill  in  the  Nature  of  a  Supplemental  Bill  ....  318 

§  192.     Proceedings  upon  Bills  in  the  Nature  of  Supplemental  Bills  .     .  319 


TABLE   OF   CONTENTS.  XV 
CHAPTER  XV. 

INTERLOCUTORY    APPLICATIONS   AND   PETITIONS. 

Page 

§  193.     Definition  and  Classification  of  Interlocutory  Applications      .     .  321 

§  194.     Definition  and  Classification  of  Motions 321 

§  195.     Motions  of  Course 321 

§  196.     Special  Motions  without  Notice 322 

§  197.     Notice  of  Motion 324 

§  198.     Argument  of  Motions 327 

§  199.     Petitions  in  General 329 

§200.     Petitions  for  Leave  to  Sue  m/br?na /)aw^e/'js 331 

§  201.     Petitions  of  Intervention 332 

§  202.     Form  of  Petitions  and  Practice  upon  them 335 

§  203.     Orders ,- 336 

§  204.     Judges  -who  may  grant  Orders 338 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

INJUNCTIONS. 

§  205.     Definition,  Classification,  and  Objects  of  Injunctions    ....  341 

§  206.     Injunctions  to  enforce  Trusts  and  other  purely  Equitable  Rights  341 

§  207.  Injunctions  to  restrain  Corporations  from  violating  their  Charters  342 
§  208.     Injunctions  to  enforce  the  Specific  Performance  of  Covenants  and 

other  Contracts  affecting  Land 344 

§  209.     Injunctions  to  restrain  a  Multiplicity  of  Suits 345 

§  210.     Injunctions  to  prevent  Irreparable  Injury  for  which  the  Remedy 

at  Law  is  inadequate  ;  in  General 346 

§  211.     Injunctions  to  stay  Proceedings  in  other  Courts 346 

§  212.     Injunctions  to  restrain  the  Alienation  of  Property 352 

§  213.     Injunctions  to  prevent  Waste 353 

§  214.     Injunctions  to  prevent  the  Continuance  of  a  Nuisance       .     .     .  354 

§  215.     Injunctions  to  restrain  Trespass 356 

§  216.     Injunctions  to  restrain  the  Infringement  of  Patents       ....  3.57 

§  217.     Injunctions  to  restrain  the  Infringement  of  Copyrights      .     .     .  361 

§  218.     Injunctions  to  i-estrain  the  Unlawful  Use  of  Trade-marks       .     .  364 

§  219.     Injunctions  to  prevent  ihe  Opening  of  Letters 366 

§  220.     Injunctions  to  compel  the  Performance  or  prevent  the  Breach 

of  Contracts  not  affecting  Land 366 

§  221.     Injunctions  to   compel  the  Delivery  of  Personal  Property  tor- 

tiously  withheld 367 

§  222.     Injunctions  authorized  by  Statute 367 

§  223.     When  Injunctions  will  not  Issue 369 

§  224.     Distinction  between  the  Judicial  Writ  and  the  Writ  Remedial   .  372 

§  225.     Distinction  between  Mandatory  and  Prohibitory  Injunctions      .  372 

§  226.     Distinction  between  Provisional  and  Perpetual  Injunctions    .     .  374 

§  227.     Distinction  between  Common  and  Special  Injunctions  ....  374 

§  228.     Time  and  Place  of  Applications  for  Interlocutory  Injunctions     .  375 


XVI  TABLE    OF   CONTENTS. 

Page 

§  229.     Injunctions  not  prayed  for  in  the  Bill 375 

§  230.     Special  Practice  of  the  Federal  Courts  in  the  Issue  of  Injunc- 
tions      376 

§  231.     Notice  of  Application  for  Interlocutory  Injunction 379 

§  232.     Affidavits  upon  an  Application  for  an  Injunction 380 

§  233.     Rules  of  Decision  upon  Applications  for  Interlocutory  Injunc- 
tions      382 

§  234.     The  Writ  of  Injunction ' 383 

§  235.     Dissolution  of  Interlocutory  Injunctions  in  General 385 

§  236.     Dissolution  of  Injunctions  for  Causes  arising  after  their  Issue     .  387 
§  237.     The  Imposition  of  Terms  upon  the  Issu'e,  Denial,  Dissolution,  or 

Continuance  of  an  Injunction 388 

§  238.     Perpetual  Injunctions 391 


CHAPTER  XVII. 

RECEIVERS. 

§  239.  Definition  of  Receiver 394 

§»240.  When  Receivers  will  be  Appointed 394 

§  241.  Rules  regulating  the  Appointment  of  Receivers 398 

§  242.  Ancillary  Receivers 399 

§  243.  Terms  upon  the  Appointment  of  Receivers,  and  Preferences  in 

Foreclosure  Suits 400 

§  244.  Property  over  which  Receivers  may  be  Appointed 414 

§  245.  Powers  of  Receivers  in  General 417 

§  246.  Powers  of  Receivers  of  Railroads 420 

§  247.  Receivers'  Certificates 425 

§  248.  Advice  to  Receivers 427 

§  249.  Litigation  by  Receivers 428 

§  250.  Duties  of  Receivers 431 

§  251.  Liability  of  a  Receiver 434 

§  252.  Manner  of  applying  for  the  Appointment  of  a  Receiver     .     ,     .  440 

§  253.  Who  may  apply  for  the  Appointment  of  a  Receiver       ....  442 

§  254.  IManner  of  the  Appointment  of  a  Receiver 442 

§  255.  Who  should  be  appointed  Receiver 443 

§  256.  The  Receiver's  Security 445 

§  2.57.  Receivers'  Accounts 447 

§  258.  Compensation  of  Receivers 449 

§  259.  Removal  of  Receivers 451 

§  260.  Discharge  of  a  Receiver 452 


CHAPTER  XVIII. 

XnE    AVRIT    OF    NE    EXEAT    REPUBLTCA. 

§  261.     Definition  of  the  Writ  of  Ns  Exeat  Rcpuhlica,  and  wlien  it  will 

Lssue 455 

§  262.     Against  whom  the  Writ  will  Issue 456 

§  263.     Practice  in  obtaining  the  Writ  of  Xe  Exeat 457 


TABLE   OF   CONTENTS.  XVU 
CHAPTER  XIX. 

EVIDENCE   AT   LAW   AND   IN   EQUITY. 

Page 

§  264.     Evidence  in  General 461 

§  265.     Admissions 461 

§  266.     Constructive  Admissions 462 

§  267.     Documentary  Evidence  in  General 463 

§  268.     Federal  Statutes  regulating  Admission  of  Documentary  Evidence  465 

§  269.     Definition  and  Use  of  an  Affidavit 482 

§  270.     Manner  of  Verifying  an  Affidavit 482 

§  271.     Title  of  an  Affidavit 483 

§  272.     Form  of  an  Affidavit 483 

§  273.     Execution  of  an  Affidavit 484 

§  274.     Competency  of  Witnesses 485 

§  275.     Subpoenas  ad  Testificandum 489 

§  276.     Service  of  a  Subpoena  ad  Testificandum 490 

§  276a.  Depositions  in  the  District  of  Columbia  for  use  in  Suits  pending 

elsewhere 492 

§  277.     Compelling  a  Witness  to  testify 493 

§  278.     Testimony  taken  in  Equity  which  may  be  used  in  other  Courts  .  494 

§  279.     Bills  to  perpetuate  Testimony 494 

§  280.     Bills  to  take  Testimony  de  bene  esse 497 

§  281.     Bills  of  Discovery 489 

§  282.     Testimony  taken  before  a  Cause  is  at  Issue 500 

§  283.     Testimony  taken  after  a  Cause  is  at  Issue  within  the  Jurisdic- 
tion of  the  Court 500 

§  284.     Present  Method  of  taking  Testimony  within  the  Jurisdiction      .  502 
§  285.     Testimony  taken  after  a  Cause  is  at  Issue  and  beyond  the  Juris- 
diction of  the  Court 509 

§  286.     Depositions  de  bene  esse  under  the  Acts  of  Congress      ....  509 

§  287.     Form  of  Deposition  under  Acts  of  Congress 515 

§  288.     Commission  issued  under  a  Dedimus  Potestaiem 518 

§  289.     Proceedings  under  a  Dedimus  Potestaiem 520 

§  290.     Letters  Rogatory 523 

CHAPTER  XX. 

DISMISSING    BILLS    OTHERWISE    THAN    AT    A    HEARING. 

§  291.     Dismissal  of  Bills  by  the  Plaintiff 532 

§  292.     Dismissal  of  Bills  for  want  of  Prosecution 534 

§  293.     Dismissal  for  want  of  Jurisdiction 534 

§  294.     Dismissal  for  Failure  to  Perfect  or  Revive  a  Suit 537 

§  295.     Election 538 

CHAPTER  XXI. 

THE    HEARING. 

§  296.     Bringing  a  Suit  to  a  Hearing 540 

§  297.     Manner  of  Hearing  a  Cause 541 

VOL.  I.  —  b 


Xviii  TABLE    OF   CONTENTS. 

Page 

§  298.     Rules  of  Decision  upon  a  Hearing 542 

§  299.     Objections  which  cannot  be  made  at  the  Hearing 544 

§  300.     Action  of  the  Court  upon  a  Hearing 545 


CHAPTER  XXII. 

ISSUES   AT   LAW. 

§301.     Power  of  Courts  to  direct  Issues  at  Law 547 

§  302.     Matters  concerning  which  an  Issue  is  directed 548 

§  303.     Time  when  an  Issue  is  directed 549 

§  304.     Manner  of  Trying  an  Issue 549 

§  305.     Effect  of  tlie  Finding  of  a  Jury  upon  an  Issue 551 

§  306.     Proceedings  after  the  Trial  of  an  Issue 553 

CHAPTER  XXIII. 

PROCEEDINGS   IN   A    MASTEr's    OFFICE. 

§  307.     References  to  Masters  in  General 554 

§  308.     "Who  may  be  appointed  Master 555 

§  309.     Bringing  on  a  Reference 555 

§  310.     Parties  entitled  to  attend  a  Reference  before  a  Master  .     .     ,     •  556 

§  311.     Proceedings  before  a  Master  in  General 557 

§  312.     A  State  of  Facts 559 

§  313.     Evidence  before  a  INIaster 560 

§  314.     Masters'  Reports  and  Compensation 561 

§  315.     Exceptions  to  Masters'  Reports 562 

§  316.     Sales  by  Masters 564 

CHAPTER   XXIV. 

DECREES. 

§  317.     Definition  and  Classification  of  Decrees      ........  568 

§  318.     Final  and  Interlocutory  Decrees 568 

§  319.     Decrees  m /personam 569 

§  320.     Decrees  in  rem 570 

§  321.     Absolute  and  Conditional  Decrees 571 

§  322.     Decrees  nisi 572 

§  323.     Decrees  in  the  Nature  of  Decrees  nisi 574 

§  324.     Time  of  Entry  of  Decree 575 

§  325.     Frame  of  Decrees 575 

CHAPTER  XXV. 

COSTS    AT    LAW    AND    IN    EQUITY. 
^ 

§  326.     Definition  of  Costs  and  Distinction  between  Costs  at  Law  and  in 

Equity 580 

§  327.     Who  are  given  Costs 580 


TABLE   OF   CONTENTS.  XIX 

Page 

§  328.  Classification  of  Costs 584 

§  329.  Costs  as  between  Party  and  Party 585 

§  330.  Attorney's  Fees 585 

§  331.  Clerk's  Fees 596 

§  331a.  Commissioners'  Fees 616 

§  332.  Marshal's  Fees ' 620 

§  333.  Witnesses'  Fees 637 

§  334.  Miscellaneous  Disbursements 640 

§  335.  Costs  out  of  the  Fund 642 

§  336.  Costs  as  between  Solicitor  and  Client 644 

§  337.  Taxation  of  Costs 644 

§  338.  Security  for  Costs 645 


CHAPTER  XXVI. 

ENFORCEMENT  OF  DECREE  AND  ORDERS. 

§  339.     Enforcement  of  Decrees  and  Orders,  in  General 647 

§340.     Executions 647 

§  341.     Contempts 649 

§  342.     Notice  of  Application  for  Attachment 653 

§  343.     Hearings  upon  Applications  for  Attachments 653 

§  344.     Order  of  Commitment 655 

§  345.     Writ  of  Attachment 656 

§  346.     Execution  of  Writ  of  Attachment 656 

§  347.     Sequestration 658 

§  348.     Writ  of  Assistance 659 

^  349.     Action  by  Court  itself 660 

§  349a.  Bills  to  carry  Decrees  into  Execution 662 


CHAPTER  XXVII. 

CORRECTION  OF  DECREE  OTHERWISE  THAN  BY  APPEAL. 

§  350.     Correction  of  Decrees  in  General 664 

§  351.     Amendment  upon  Petition  without  a  Rehearing 664 

§  352.     Petitions  for  a  Rehearing 665 

§  353.     Supplemental  Bills  in  the  nature  of  Bills  of  Review      ....  668 

§  354.     Bills  of  Review 670 

§  355.     Provisions  peculiar  to  Bills  of  Review  for  Matters  of  Fact  newly 

discovered 672 

§  356.     Provisions  common  to  all  Bills  of  Review 673 

§  357.     Bills  in  the  nature  of  Bills  of  Review 677 

§  358.     Bills  to  impeach  Decrees  on  Account  of  Fraud 678 

§  359.     Bills  to  Suspend  or  Avoid  the  Operation  of  Decrees  and  Judg- 
ments    680 


XX  TABLE   OF  CONTENTS. 


VOL.   II. 
CHAPTER  XXVIII. 

PRACTICE    AT   COMMON   LAW    IN    CIVIL    ACTIONS. 

Page 

§  360.     Common-Law  Practice  in  General 683 

§  361.     Writs  and  Process  in  General 688 

§  362.     Writs  of  Prohibition 690 

§  363.     Mandamus 701 

§  363a.  Jurisdiction  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  District  of  Columbia  to 

issue  a  Writ  of  Mandamus  to  an  Officer  of  the  United  States  .  706 

§  364.     Practice  on  Application  for  Mandamus 713 

§  365.     Writs  of  Certiorari 717 

§  366.     Writs  of  Habeas  Corpus  in  General 719 

§  36Ga.  Suspension  of  Writ  of  Habeas  Corpus 736 

§  367.     Practice  on  Application  for  Habeas  Corpus 738 

§  368.     Appeals  in  Habeas  Corpus  Proceedings 751 

§  36Sa.  Writs  of  Quo  Warranto 753 

§  3686.  Writs  of  Scire  Facias 759 

§  369.     Attachment  of  Property 762 

§  370.     Arrests 764 

§  371.     Consolidation  at  Law  and  in  Equity 765 

§  372.     Evidence,  Testimony,  and  Depositions 766 

§  373.     Abatement  and  Revivor 769 

§  374.     Trials ; 771 

§  375.     Rules  of  Decision  at  Common  Law 776 

§  376.     Xew  Trials 781 

§  377.     Bills  of  Exceptions 784 

§  .378.     Judgments 787 

§  379.     Correction  of  Judgments  by  Courts  that  rendered  them     .     .     .  793 

§  380.     Executions  and  Proceedings  Supplementary  thereto 794 

§  381.     Condemnation  Proceedings 798 


CHAPTER  XXIX. 

REMOVAL    OF    CAUSES. 

§  382.     Removal  of  Causes  from  one  Federal  Court  to  another       .     .     .  803 
§  383.     Cases  which  may  be  removed  from  a  State  Court  to  a  Circuit 

Court  of  the  United  States 804 

§  .384.     Separable  Controversies 813 

§  385.     Practice  on  Removal  in  General 817 

§  385a.  Petition  for  Removal 818 

§  ZHob.    Bond  on  Removal 821 

§  385c.   Proceedings  in  State  Court  on  Removal  not  dependent  on  Preju- 
dice or  Local  Influence 822 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS.  xxi 

Page 

§  S8od.  Time  of  Removal  not  dependent  on  Prejudice  or  Local  Influence  823 
§  386.     Practice  on  Removal  for  Prejudice  or  Local  Influence  ....  825 
§  387.     Practice  on  Removals  of  Suits  containing  Controversies  between 
Citizens  of  the  same  State,  claiming  Land  under  Grants  of  dif- 
ferent States 831 

§  388.     Practice  on  Removal  of  Suits  against  Revenue  Officers,  and  Offi- 
cers of  either  House  of  Congress 835 

§  389.     Practice  on  Removal  of  Cases  arising  under  the  Civil  Rights 

Laws 836 

§  390.     Filing  of  Record 837 

§  391.     Practice  after  Removal 839 

§  392.     Effect  of  Removal 845 

§  393.     Remand 816 


CHAPTER  XXX. 

PRACTICE     IN     ADMIRALTY. 
By  Charles  C.  Buelinghaji,  of  the  New  York  Bar. 

§  394.     Libel 851 

§  395.     Security  for  Libellant's  Costs 852 

§  396.     Parties 852 

§  397.  Mesne  Process.     Joinder  of  Process  in  rem  and  in  personam   .     .  852 

§  398.     Process  in  rem 853 

§  399.     Cases  in  which  the  res  cannot  be  arrested 853 

§  400.     Process  in  personam 8.54 

§  401.     Return  of  Process  and  Defaults 855 

§  402.  Release  of  Property  from  Custody  of  Marshal.     Claim      .     .     .  855 

§  403.     Security  for  Defendant's  Costs 855 

§  401.     Stipulation  for  Value.     Sureties 856 

§  405.     Bond  to  the  Marshal 857 

§  406.     Appraisement 857 

§  407.  Petition  to  bring  in  additional  Parties  under  Rule  59    ...     .  858 
§408.  Answer,  when  filed.    Defenses  —  Contributory  Negligence,  Lim- 
itations, Laches 858 

§  409.     Tender 859 

§  410.     Exceptions.    Amendments 859 

§  411.     Cross-libel 860 

§  412.     Interrogatories 860 

§  413.     Trial 8G1 

§  414.     Evidence.     Depositions 861 

§  415.     Interlocutory  Decree  and  Reference 862 

§  416.     Final  Decree 862 

§  417.     Sales 863 

§  418.     Sales  as  Perishable 864 

§  419.     Costs 864 

§  420.     Intervenors 865 

§  421.     Petition  against  Proceeds  of  Sale 865 

§  422.     Priorities 865 

§  423.     Appeals  —  what  appealable ;  to  what  Court 866 


XXll  TABLE   OF   CONTENTS. 

Page 

§  424.  Appeals,  when  and  how  taken 86(3 

§  425.  Practice  on  Appeals 8G6 

§  426.  Petition  of  Appeal »     ....  867 

§  427.  Bond  on  Appeal 00..  867 

§  428.  Assignment  of  Errors »     .     ,     .     .     .  868 

§  429.  Bill  of  Exceptions.    Record  on  Appeal 868 

§  430.  New  Proofs  on  Appeal 868 

§  431.  Appeal  to  the  Supreme  Court 869 

§  432.  Prohibition 869 

§  433.  Mandamus ,     .  870 

§  434.  Limitation  of  Liability,  — Petition 870 

§435.  Same,  —  Monition 871 

§436.  Same,  —  Proof  of  Claims 871 

§437.  Same,  —  Answer;  Trial 872 

§  438.  Proceedings  on  Seizures 872 

§  439.  Proceedings  in  Prize  Causes 873 


CHAPTER  XXXI. 

COURT   OF   CLAIMS. 

§  440.     Organization  of  Court  of  Claims 876 

§  441.     Jurisdiction  of  Court  of  Claims 877 

§  442.     Decisions  on  Jurisdiction  of  Court  of  Claims 895 

§  443.     Statute  of  Limitations  in  Court  of  Claims 902 

§  444.     Petitions  and  Parties  Plaintiff  in  Court  of  Claims 904 

§  445.     Pleadings  by  Defendant  in  Court  of  Claims 910 

§446.     Amendments  in  Court  of  Claims 911 

§  447.     Attorneys  in  Court  of  Claims 913 

§  448.     Evidence  before  the  Court  of  Claims 913 

§  449.     Motions  and  Notices  in  Court  of  Claims 923 

§  450.     Abatement  and  Revivor 924 

§  451.     Discontinuance  and  Withdrawal  of  Papers 924 

§  452.     Trials  in  Court  of  Claims 924 

§  453.     References  by  Court  of  Claims 928 

§  451.     New  Trials  .' 929 

§  455.     Judgments  in  Court  of  Claims 932 

§  456.     Judgments  in  Court  of  Claims 933 

§  457.     Appeals  from  Court  of  Claims 935 


CHAPTER  XXXII. 

PRACTICE   P>EFORE   THE    COURT   OF   PRIVATE   LAND    CLAIMS. 

By  Hon.  E.  A.  Boweks,  of  the  Bar  of  Washington,  D.  C. 

§  458.     Introductory      ....■■ 937 

§  459.     Former  Method  of  Settlement,  and  Decisions  as  to  validity  of 

Mexican  and  Spanish  Land  Grants 939 

§  460.     Organization  of  the  Court  of  Private  Land  Claims 913 


TABLE    OF   CONTEXTS.  XXIU 

Page 

§461.  Time  and  Place  of  Holding  the  Court 943 

§  462.  Jurisdiction  of  the  Court  of  Private  Land  Claims 944 

§463.  Parties 947 

§  464.  Locality  of  Proceeding 948 

§  465.  Pleading  and  Practice 948 

§  466.  Evidence 953 

§  467.  Attorneys  and  Clerks 956 

§  468.  Limitation  of  Proceedings 957 

§  469.  Deci-ees 957 

§  470.  Preparation  for  Appeals 959 

§  471.  Practice  when  no  Appeal  is  taken 959 

§  47-2.  Appeals 961 

§  473.  Termination  of  Court  of  Private  Land  Claims 963 


CHAPTER   XXXIII. 

WRITS    OF    ERROR    AND    APPEALS. 

§  474.     Writs  of  Error  and  Appeals  in  General 964 

§  475.  Writs  of  Error  and  Appeals  to  the  Supreme  Court  from  the  Fed- 
eral Courts 965 

§  476.     Certification  to  the  Supreme  Court 971 

§  477.  Writs  of  Error  from  the  Supreme  Court  to  State  Courts    .     .     .  993 

§  478.  Writs  of  Error  from  and  Appeals  to  the  Circuit  Courts  of  Appeals.  1005 

§  479.  AVrits  of  Error  from  and  Appeals  to  the  Circuit  Courts      .     .     .  1009 

§  480.  Judgments,  Orders,  and  Decrees  which  may  be  reviewed  by  Writs 

of  Error  or  Appeals 1017 

§  481.     Value  of  the  Matter  in  Dispute 1026 

§  482.     Parties  to  Writs  of  Error  and  Appeals 1030 

§  483.  Time  within  which  Writs  of  Error  and  Appeals  must  be  taken  .  1036 

§  484.     Writs  of  Error 1040 

§  485.     Appeals 1044 

§  486.     Security  on  Writ  of  Error  or  Appeal 1046 

§  487.      Supei'sedeas 1047 

§  488.     Return  to  AVrit  of  Error  or  Appeal 1053 

§  489.     Motions  to  Dismiss  Appeals,  and  Writs  of  Error 1060 

§  490.     Printing  the  Record 1069 

§  491.     Argument  of  Appeals  and  Writs  of  Error 1072 

§  492.     Rehearings 1079 

§  493.     Further  Proof  on  Appeal 1080 

§  494.     Decisions  on  Writs  of  Error  and  Appeals 1082 

§  495.     Mandate 1001 

§  496.     Second  Writ  of  Error  or  Appeal 1098 


XXIV 


TABLE   OF   CONTENTS. 


APPENDIX. 


FORMS. 

Page 

Form  I.     Bill  in  Equity,  in  Patent  Case llul 

II.     Bill  in  Equity  to  cancel  Decree  of  Naturalization     .     .  1100 

III.  Fr?ecipe  for  Subpoena  ar/ /?es/wnc/en(/i/?H 1110 

IV.  Subpoena 1110 

V.     Fra-cipe  for  Appearance 1111 

YI.     Demurrer 1111 

VII.     Plea 1112 

VIII.     Answer 1113 

IX.     Disclaimer 1116 

X.     Replication 1116 

XI.     Bill  of  Revivor 1117 

XII.     Notice  to  take  Testimony  in  Equity 11-0 

XIII.  Notice  of  Deposition  under  Revised  Statutes  .     .     .     .  1121 

XIV.  Order  iov  Decliiints  potestatem 1122 

XV.     Letters  Rogatory 1124 

XVI.     Letters  Rogatory         1125 

XVII.     Master's  Warrant  or  Summons 1126 

XVIII.     Notice  accompanying  Draft  of  Master's  Report   .     .     .  1126 
XIX.     Order  appointing  Referee  to   try  Action  at  Common 

Law 1127 

XX.     Stipulation  for  reference  of  Action  at  Common  Law    .  1128 

XXI.     M' r'lt  oi  Ne  exeat 1129 

XXII.     Writ  of  Habeas  Corpus 1129 

XXIII.  Order  dismissing  Writ  of //a/yeas  Co?7/us 1130 

XXIV.  Order  adjudging  Party  guilty  of  Contempt      ....  1131 
XXV.      Order  fining  Defendant  for  Contempt 1131 

XXVI.     Order  of  Court  for  Receiver's  Certificates  with  Form  of 

Receiver's  Certificate 1132 

XXVII.     Petition  for  Removal  from  a  State  Court  to  a  Circuit 

Court  of  the  United  States 1138 

XXVIII.     Bond  on  Removal 1139 

XXIX.     Final  Record  in  Equity 1140 

XXX.     Bill  of  Exceptions  in  Ejectment 1142 

XXXI.     Bill  of  Exceptions 1147 

XXXII.     Appeal  and  Allowance 1152 

XXXIII.     Citation  and  Appeal 1152 

XXXI \'.     Supersedeas  Bond 1153 

XXXV.     Writ  of  Error  from  Supreme  Court  to  Circuit  Court     .  115o 
XXXVI.     Writ  of  Error  from  Supreme  Court  to  Circuit  Court  of 

Appeals 1151 

XXXVII.     Writ  of  Error  from  Circuit  Court  of  Appeals  to  Circuit 

Court 1155 

XXXVIII.     Certificate  by  Clerk  to  Transcript 1156 

XXXIX.     Citation  on  Writ  of  F:rror 1157 


TABLE   OF   CONTENTS. 


XXV 


Form  XL. 

XLI. 

XLII. 

XLIII. 

XLIV. 

XLV. 

XL  VI. 

XLVII. 

XL  VI 1 1. 

XLIX. 

L. 

LI. 

LII. 

LIII. 
LIV. 


Citation  to  Cu'cuit  Court  of  Appeals  on  Writ  of  Error  1157 

Certificate  by  Clerk  under  Supreme  Court  Rule  9    .     .  1158 

Writ  of  Error  to  State  Court 1159 

Assignment  of  Errors 1160 

Praecipe  for  Appearance  in  Supreme  Court     ....  1161 
Petition  for  Writ  of  Certiorari  to  Circuit  Court  of  Ap- 
peals       1161 

iMotion  to  Dismiss  or  to  Affirm 1172 

Notice  of  Submission  of  jNIotions  to  Dismiss  and  to  Affirm  1172 

Rule  for  Mandamus 1173 

Writ  of  Mandamus 1174 

Petition  for  Writ  of  Prohibition 1176 

Suggestion  for  AVrit  of  Prohibition llSO 

Rule  to  show  Cause  why  Writ  of  Prohibition  should  not 

Issue 1186 

Return  of  District  Judge 1186 

Mandate 1187 


ADMIRALTY     FORMS. 


I.     Libel  in  rem 1188 

II.     Interrogatories  annexed  to  Libel 1192 

III.  Libel  in  personam  with  Clause  of  Foreign  Attachment  .  1193 

IV.  Stipulation  for  Libellaut's  Costs 1198 

V.     Claim  of  Owner 1199 

VI.     Claim  of  Agent 1199 

VII.     Stipulation  for  Claimant's  Costs 1200 

VIII.     Stipulation  for  Value 1201 

IX.     Bond  to  Marshal 1202 

X.     Order  appointing  Appraisers 1203 

XI.     Notice  to  Appraisers 1203 

XI  I.     Oath  of  Ajipraisers 1204 

XIII.  Notice  of  Appraisement 1204 

XIV.  Report  of  Appraisers       '....-. 1204 

XV.     Exceptions  to  Libel 1205 

XVI.     Answer  in  Admiralty 1205 

XVII.  Petition  to  bring  in  Vessel  under  Supreme  Court  Rule 

59 1207 

XVIII.  Interlocutory  Decree  and  Default  in  Admiralty  .     .     .  1209 

XIX.     Interlocutory  Decree  in  Admiralty 1209 

XX.     Commissioner's  Report 1210 

XXI.     Exceptions  to  Connnissioner's  Report 1210 

XXII.     Final  Decree  in  Admiralty 1211 

XXIII.  Final  Decree  in  Admiralty 1212 

XXIV.  Final  Decree  in  Admiralty 1212 

XXV.  Final  Decree  in  Admiralty  for  Summary  Judgment  on 

Bond  to  Marshal 1213 

XXVI.  Final  Decree  and  Order  of  Sale  in  Admiralty      .     .     .  1214 

XXVII.     Notice  of  Appeal  in  Admiralty 1215 

XXVni.     Petition  of  Appeal 121.i 

XXIX.     Order  for  Mandate  in  Admiralty 1216 


XXVI  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 

Page 

Form  XXX.     Mandate  in  Admiralty 1217 

XXXI.     Final  Decree  on  Mandate  in  Admiralty 1218 

XXXII.     Libel  or  Petition  for  Limitation  of  Liability  ....  1218 

XXXIII.  Order  for  Transfer  to  Trustee 1221 

XXXI V.  Transfer  to  Trustee 1222 

XXXV.     Order  for  Monition 1223 

XXXVI.     JNIonition 1225 

XXXVII.     Final  Decree  in  Proceedings  for  Limitation  of  Liability 

in  Admiralty 1226 


II. 


RECENT     IMPORTANT     STATUTES. 

Judiciary  Act  of  1875  as  amended  in  1887  and  1888 1230 

Unamended  section  of  Judiciary  Act  of  March  3,  1875 1235 

Evarts'  Act  creating  Circuit  Courts  of  Appeal 1238 

Joint  Resolution  as  to  same •  1243 

Act  to  Provide  for  bringing  Suits  against  the  United  States     ....  1214 
Act  Regulating  proceeding  before  Board  of  General  Appraisers  and  Ap- 
peals therefrom 1249 

Act  to  Protect  Trade  and  Coinmerce  against  Unlawful  Restraints  and 

Monopolies 1251 


IIL 
Equity  Rules  .    .    .     • 1253 


IV. 


Admiralty  Rules 


1278 


Supreme  Court  Rules 1292 


VI. 
Rules  of  Circuit  Court  of  Appeals 1311 


VII. 
Rules  of  Court  of  Claims 1328 


TABLE   OF  CONTENTS.  XXVll 


VIII. 

Page 

Rules  of  Court  of  Private  Land  Claims 1349 


IX. 
Bankruptcy  Rules 1353 


IXDEX 1371 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


[references  are  to  pages.] 


Abbot  V.   Amer.  Hard  Rubber   Co., 

4  Blatclif.  489  128 

Abbotsford,  Tlie,  98  U.  S.  440  964 

Abbott  (•.  Curtis  &  Co.  Manuf.  Co., 

2o  Fed.  R.  402  774 

Abergavenny  (Earl  of)  v.  Powell,  1 

Meriv.  4:J4  497 

Abernetby  v.  Hutchinson,  3  L.J   Ch. 

20'J  .341 

Ablenian  v.  Bootli,  18  How.  479  1078 

r. ,  21  How.  506  736,  1058 

Abraham  v.  Nortli  German  F.  I.  Co., 

37  Fed.  R.  731  42,  102 

Acklev  School  District  v.  Hall,  103 

U.  S.  428  1059,  1002,  1068 

Adair  c.  Brimmer,  74  N.  Y.  589  3 

i:  Sliaw,  1  Sch.  &  Lef.  243  644 

Adam  r.  Norris,  103  U.  S.  501  956 
Adams  r.  Adams,  21  Wall.  1S5  254 
r.    Board  of  County  Comm'rs, 

McCahon  (Kan.),  235  34 
V.  Bridgewater  Iron  Co.,  6  Fed. 

R.  179  256 

V. ,  26  Fed.  R.  324  17,  18 

r.  Crittenden,  17  Fed.  R.  42  374,  301 

r. ,  106  U.  S.  57(i  1029 

y.  Howard,  21  Off.  Gaz.  264  ;  9 

Fed.  ]{.  .347  212,  ,'.34 

r.  Jones,  12  Pet   207  977 

r.  Keillor  Milling  Co.,  36  Fed. 

R.  212  171 

V. ,  38  Fed.  R.  281        644 

V.  May.  27  Fed.  R.  007    688,  818 

V.  St.  Leger,  1  Ball  &  B.  182    117 

IV  Spangler,  17  Fed.  R.  1.33 

781,  782 

v.  United  States,  20  Ct.  CI.  115       98 

V.  Wootls,  8  Cal.  306  448 

Adams  County  ;•.  Burlington  &  Mo. 

R.  R.  Co.,  112  U.  S.  123  1004 

Adams  Express  Co.  v.  Denver  &  R. 

G.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  Ferl.  R.  712        35,  313 
Adamson  i:  Hall,  1  Turn.  &  R.  2-58      537 

366 
Addorley  v.  Dixon,  1  Sim.  &  S.  607  344, 
Addington  v.  Burke,  125  U  S.  093  10«)5 
Addison  v.  Lewis,  75  Va.  701  406 

Adee  v.  J.  L.  Mott  Iron  Works,  46 

Fed.  R.  39  511 


Adelbert  College  v.  Toledo,  W.  &  W. 
Ry.  Co.  47  Fed.  R.  836    828,  830,  831, 

832,  833 
Adeline,  The,  9  Cranch,  244  1080,  1081 
Adriatic,  The,  107  U.  S.  512  1091 

Aetna  Ins.  Co.  v.  Weide,  9  Wall.  677  1000 
Agar  V.  Fairfax,  17  Ves.  533  573 

V.  Regents'  Canal  Co.,  1  Swanst. 


2.50 
Agawani  Co. 


oot 

583 

254,  555 
16,  662 

749,  750 
532 
818 


26  Fed. 


1068 
665 


Jordan,  7  Wall 
252,  253 
Ager  V.  Murray,  107  U.  S.  126 
Ah  Toy,  In  re'io  Fed.  R.  705 
Ainslie  v.  Sims,  17  Beav.  174 
Akers  v.  Akers,  117  U.  S.  197 
Alabama  v.  Georgia,  23  How.  505    28,  107 

r.  Wolffe,  18  Fe.l.  R.  836  38 

Alabama,  The,  and  The  Gamecock, 

92  U.  S.  605  863,  865 

Alabama  G.  L.  I.  Co.  v.  Nichols,  109 

U.  S  232  788,  1027 

Alabama  &  C.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Jones,  5 

N.  B.  R.  97  395 

«. 7  X.  B.  R.  145  451,  452 

Alaska,  The,  130  U.  S.  201 
Albany  v.  Steam  Trap  Co 

R.  3"'l8 

Albrech  v.  Sussman,  2  Yes.  &  B.  323   229 
Albright  V.  Teas,  106  U.  S.  613  36 

Aldrich  v.   Aetna   Co.,   8   Wall.  491 

1002,  1062 

r.  Cooper,  8  Ves  394  4 

Aldridire  V  Mesner,  6  Yes,  418  181 

Alert,  The,  12  Fed.  R.  343  853 

Alexander  i'.  Esten,  1  Caines  (X.  Y.), 

152  326 

V.  Roulet,  13  Wall.  386  938 

Alice,  The,  12  Fed.  R.  023  475 

Alice  Tainter,  The,  14  Blatchf.  225      607 
Alida,  The,  12  Fed.  R.  343  853 

Alire  v.  United  States,  1  Ct.  CI.  233     898 

V. 7  Ct.  CI.  27  898 

Alkan  r.  Bean,  23  Int.  Rev.  Rec.  351    370 
Allan  i:  Iloulden,  6  Heav.  148  116 

Allen,  Matter  of,  13  Blatchf.  271  d^jQ 

V.  Allen,  Hempst.  58  295 

r.  Black,  43  Fed.  R.  228  748 

V.  Blunt,  1  Blatchf.  480  187,  577 

V. ,  3  Storv,  742  551,  553 

V. ,  2  Woodb.  &  M  121    513,  515 

V.  Coffman,  1  Bibb  (Ky.),  469       172 


XXX 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  pages.] 


Allen  V.  Dallas  &  W.   R.   R.    Co.,  3 

Woods,  316    3y5,  398.  422,  441,  442,  453 

V.  Fairbanks,  40  Eed.  R.  188     762, 

709 

V. ,  45  Fed.  R.  445  154,  778 

V.  Gallowav,  30  Fed.  R.  406  3 

('.    Mavor,'  &(;.    of    N.    Y.    18 

Blatchf.  239;   7  Fed.  R.  483      203,  264, 
302,  311,  534,  544 

V.  O'Donald,  23  Fed.  R.  573  146 

V. ,  28  Fed.  H.  17  257 

r.  Pullman's  P.  C.  Co  ,  139  U.  S 

658  21,  1087 

,:.  Rvcrson,  2  Dill.  501  820 

V.  St.  Louis  Bank,  120  U.  S.  20 

990,  1084 

V.  United  States,  17  Wall.  207      900 

y. ,  5  Ct.  CI.  339  900 

V.  Wilson,  21  Fed.  R.  881  202 

Alley  V.  Nott,  111  U.  S.  472  833 

Allfrev  V.  Allfrey,  1  Macn.  &  G.  87      668 
Allin,7«  re,  8  Fed.  R.  753  449 

AUis,  Jn  re,  44  Fed.  R.  216  494 

V.  Stowell,  5  Fe<l.  R.  203  271 

c. ,  16  Fed.  R.  783         ^  352 

Alsop  V.  Commercial  Ins.  Co.,  1  Sum- 
ner, 451  523 
Alviso  l:  United  States,  5  Wall.  824     962 

(.. ,  6  Wall.  547  1069 

V, ,  8  Wall.  327       947,  948,  952, 

962,  1086 
Amato  r.   Northern  Pac.  R.  R.  Co., 

46  Fed.  R.  501  795,  842 

Ambler  r.  Clioteau,  107  U.  S.  586   23,210 

i\  F])pinn:er.  137  U.  S.  480         55,  56 

r.  Whipple,  23  Wall.  278    1079,  1080 

Amendment  to  Rules,  In  re,  44  Fed. 

R.  216  494 

America,  Tlie.  92  U.  S.  432  864 

American  Bell  Tel.  Co.  c  Southern 

Tel.  Co.,  34  Fed.  R  803  162,  165 

American    liible    Soc.  v.    Price,   110 

U.  S.  61  130 

American  Biscuit  &  M.  Co.  v.  Klotz, 

44  Fed.  U.  721  81,  398 

American  C.  B.  Co.  v.  Ligowski  C.  P. 

Co  ,  .31  Fed.  R.  466  290 

American    C.    Ry.    Co.    c.    Chicago 

"   "    R.  522     18,  361, 


City  Ry.  Co.,  41  Fed. 

—  V.  Citizens  Ry.  Co., 

484 


3»8 


44  Fed.  R. 


18 
163 


V.  Mayor,  &c.,  of  X.  Y.  43  Fed 

R.  60 

American  D.  D.  Co.  r.  Sullivan  Ma- 
chine Co.,  32  Fed.  R.  552  640,  042 
American  D.  R.  B.  Co.  v.  Rutland 

Marble  Co.,  2  Fed.  R.  355  361 

1-. ,  2  Fed.  R,  356       18,  361,  388 

V.  Sheldon,  17   IJIatchf.  208;   4 

Baim.  &  A.  551  237,  4>3 

r. ,  1  Fed.  R.870  18 

r. ,  28  Fed.  R.  217  580,  585,  588 

American    E.  C.  Co.   v.  Consumers' 


American   Fertilizer  Co.  r.  Board  of 

Agriculture  of  N.  C,  43  Fed.   R. 

609  34 

American  L.  &  T.  Co.  v.  East  &  West 

R.  Co.,  40  Fed.  ]{.  182  340 

American     M.    P.    Co.    i-.    Vail,    15 

Blatclif.  315  359 

American  N.  P.  Co.  v.  City  of  Eliza- 
beth, 4  Fisher  Pat.  Cas.  189  359,  360 
American   R.   P.   Co.   v.  Knapp,  44 

Fed.  R.  607  165 

American    Saddle    Co.   v.    Hogg,    1 

Holmes,  133;   6  Fisher  Pat.   Cas. 

67  253 

American    S.  L.    B.    Co.   i'.  Empire 

State  Nail  Co.,  47  Fed.  R.  741  820 

American  Union   Tel.  Co.  v.  Union 

Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  1  McCra.  188  382 

American    W.    P.    Co..   v.    Heft,    8 

Wall.  333  1006,  1067 

American   Zylonite   Co.  v.   Celluloid 

Manuf  Co.  32  Fed.  R.  809  532,  533 
Ames  L\  Birkenhead  Docks,  20  Beav. 

832  444 
V.  Chicago,  S.  F.  &  C.  Rv.  Co., 

39  Fed.  It.  881  "  814,816 
V.  Colorado  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  4 

Dill.  251  804 

V.  Hager,  30  Fed.  R.  129  32 

V.  Holderbaum,  42  Fed 


Gas  Co.,  47  Fed.  R.  43 


487 


V.  Kansas,  111  U.  S.  449 

r.  Quimby,  100  U.  S.  342 

Amis  r.  Smith,  16  Pet.  303 
Amory  c.  Aniory,  91  U.  S.  356 


R.  341 

46, 194 

5,  91,  758, 

811 

1090, 1099 

1022 

1061, 1068, 

1093 

818 


V. ,  95  U.  S.  186 

V.  Broderick,  Jacob,  530  53'.» 

r.  Lawrence,  3  Clifl\  523         166,  209 

Amoskeag    Manuf.    Co.    v.    United 

States,  6  Ct.  CI.  99  901 

Amsden  v.  Norwich  Union  F.  I.  Co., 

44  Fed.  R.  515  45,  841 

Anisinck   v.   Balderston,  41  Fed.  R. 

641  805,  813 

V.  Barklav,  8  Ves.  594,  4^.0 

Amy  v.  Dubuque,  98  U.  S.  470  12 

V.  Galena,  7  Fed.  R.  163  714 

r.  Manning,  38  Fed.  R.  530    827,  H28 

V. ,  38  Fed.  ]{.  868  828,  831 

c.  Shelby  County,  1  Flipp.  104     598, 

6(tl 

V.  Watertown,  1-30  U.  S.  301        687, 

090,  793 
Anderson    v.   Appleton,   32    Fed.    R. 

8.')5  814,  816,  889,  84tl 
V.  Bowers,  40  Fed.  R.  708   37,  38,814 


43  Fed.  R   321 

—  (,-.  Jacksonville,   1'.   &   M.  11. 
Co.,  2  Woods,  628 

—  r.  Lewis,  3  Bro.  C.  C.  429 

—  r.  .Mackay,  46  Fed.  R.  105 

—  V.  Moe,  1  Abb.  (U.  S.)  299 

—  V.  Santa  Anna,  116  U.  S.  356 


R. 


833 

333 
192 
767 
638 
779 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  pages.] 


XXXI 


Anderson  v.  Shaffer,  10  Fed.  K.  266     70o 

l:  Witt,  13»  U.  S.  6'J4  38 

Andes  v.  Siauson,  loO  U.  S.  4:>5    771,  773 
Andrae  i:  Redtield,  12  lilatchf.  407      7!)7, 

7!)8 
Andrews  v.  Cole,  20  Fed.  R.  410    204,  58ti 

(•.  Smitli,  5  Fed.  H.  833  13 

V.  Spear,  4  Dill.  472  7<)5 

Angel  V.  Sniitli,  0  Ves.  335     376,  480,  659 


Angell  I'.  Ans^eli,  1  Sim.  &  S   83 

V.  Davis,  4  Myl.  &  C.  360 

V.  Draper,  1  Vern.  399 

r.  iladden,  16  Ves.  202 

('.  Wcstconibe,  6  Sim.  30 

Angerstein  v.  Clarke,  1  Ves.  Jr. 


250 


496 

645 

4 

180 
49!) 

186, 
280 
386 

856 

589 

875 

1082 


Angier  v.  JNIav,  3  W.  R.  330 
Ann  Caroline.  Tiie,  2  Wall.  538 
Anna,  The,  Blatchf.  Pr.  Cas.  337 
Anna  Maria,  The,  2  Wlieat.  327 
Anne,  The,  3  Wlieat.  435 
Anonymous,  Ambl.  237  ;  2  Ves.  Sen 

497 
1  Atk.  18 

1  Atk.  521 

1  Atk.  578 

2  Atk.  14 

2  Atk.  113 

2  Atk.  469 

3  Atk. 219 

3  Atk.  530 

3  Atk.  809 

1  Barb.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  73 

5  Blatchf.  134 

1  Chan.  Cas.  269 

2  Chan.  Cas.  164 

2  Eq.  Cas.  Abr.  166 

2  Gall.  101 

Hempst.  450 

4  Hill  (N.  Y.),  597 

2  Jac.  &  W.  553 

1  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  143 

2  .Madd.  395 

6  Madd.  10 

12  Mod   522 

2  P.  Wms.  68 

2  P.  Wms.  283 

I  Vern.  104 

1  Vern.  117 

1  Vern.  351 

1  Ves.  Jr.  93 

1  Ves.  Jr.  409 

5  Ves.  656 

9  Ves.  512 

2  Ves.  Sen  497  ;  Ambl.  237 

2  Ves.  Sen.  520 

V.  Bridgewater  Canal  Co.,  9  Sim. 

378 

V.  Christopher,  11  Sim.  409 

V.  Gwillim,  6  Ves  2«5 

V.  Harrison,  4  Madd.  252 

V.  Jolland,  8  Ves.  72 

V.  Lake,  6  Ves.  171 

Anson   i:   Blue   Ridge   R.  R.  Co.,  23 

How.  1  1062 


497 

571,  572 
456 

396,  440 
581 
375 
650 
655 
224 
237 
442 
637 

122,  144 
213 
134 
621 
631 
483 
262 
325 
538 
353 
116 
551 

672,  674 
538 
111 
296 
353 
92,  331 
326 
138 
497 
376 


.  <  I  o 
485 
262 
257 
444 
262 


Antelope,  The,  10  Wheat.  66  1083 

12  Wheat.  546  633,  852,  865 

Anthony  v.  Carroll,  2  Ban.  &  A.  Pat. 

Cas.  Iu5  12 
V.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  132 

U.  S.  172  786 

Antoni  v.  Greenhow,  107  U.  S.  769  371 
Appletou  V.  Ecanbert,45  Fed.  R.281    502, 

506,  508 
Apthorp  V.  Comstock,  2Paige  (N.  Y.), 

482  ^  548,  550 

Archbishop  of  York  v.  Stapleton,  2 

Atk. 136  280 

Archer  v.  Hartford  F.  1.  Co.,  31  Fed. 

R.  660  587,  588,  638 

V.  Preston,  1  Eq.  Cas.  Abr.  133        2 

Arcot  (Nabob  of)  v.  East  India  Co., 

3  Bro.  C.  C.  292  240 

Arglasse  v.  Muschamp,  1  Vern.  75  2,  570 

V.  ,  1  Vern.  135  2 

Argo,  The,  2  Gall.  314  513 

2  Wheat.  387  511 

Arguello  v.  United  States,   18  How. 

539  956 

Arkansas  Valley  L.  &  C.  Co  v.  Mann, 

130  U.  S.  69  1084 

Arkell,  Ex  parte,  15  Blatchf.  437  18 

Armstrong  u.   Armstrong,  L.   R.   12 

Eq.  614  419 

V.  Brown,  1  Wash.  43  521 

V.  Chemical  Nat.  Bank,  37  Fed. 

R.  406  256 

V.  Ettlesohn,  36  Fed.  R.  209     30,  32, 

33  35 

V.  Lear,  8  Pet.  52  130,  251 

r.  Storer,  9  Beav,  277  533 

V.  Trautmann,  36  Fed.  R.  275        30, 

oo    or. 

V.  Treasurer  of  Athens   Co.,  16 

Pet.  281  1004 

V.  United  States,  13  Wail.  154       909 

V. ,  6  Ct.  CI.  226  909,  931 

Armstrong's      Foumlry      v.     United 

States,  6  Wall.  766  1025 

Arnold  v.  Chesebrough,  35  Fed.  R. 

16  ^  505,  509 

V.  Kearney,  29  Fed.  R.  820  846 

V.  Kempstead,  1  Amb.  466  4 

Arnoux     i-.    Steinbrenner,    1    Paige 

(N.  v.),  82.  429,  533 

Arrowsmith  v.  Gleason,  129  U.  S.  86    43, 

679,  812 
Arnndell   (Lady)  v.  Phipps,  10  Ves. 

139  353 

Asbee  V.  Shipley,  Madd.  &  Geld.  296  318 
Asid)urnham   v.  Thompson,  13   Ves. 

402  581 

Ashby  V.  White,  14  How.  St.  Tr.  814  743 
Askew  V.  Poulterers'  Co.,  2  Ves.  Sen. 

89.  .302 

V.  Townsend,  2  Dick.  471  299 

Aspen  M.  &  S.  Co.  v.  Rucker,  28  Fed. 

R.  220  11 

Aston  r.  Heron,  2  M.  &  K.  390  439 

Atalanta,  The,  3  Wheat.  409     1080,  1081 


XXXll 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  pages.] 


Atchison  v.  Morris,  11  Fed.  R.  582 


19'J, 
842 


Atcliison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.   R.  Co.  v. 

United  States.  15  Ct.  (^1.  1  915,  916 

Aihertun  i:  Fowler,  91  U.  S.  143        1003, 

1040 
Atkins  r.  Brewer,  3  Cow.  206  729 

V.  Dick,  14  Pet.  114  128 

V.  Petersburg  R.  R.  Co.,  3  Hughes, 

307  405, 40G 
r.  Wabash,  St.  L.,  &  P.  R.  R.  Co., 

2'.)  Fed.  R.  101  14,  399,  443,444,451,  452 
Atkinson   v.   Glenn,  4  Cranch  C.  C. 

134  613,  522 

V.  Ilanwav,  1  Co.\  Kq.  360  2tt0 

Atkvn  V.  Wabash  Ry.  Co  ,41  Fed.  R. 

193  438,  548 

Atlantic,  The,  Abb.  Adm.  451  475 

Atlantic  Dredjiing  Co.  v.  Bergen  Neck 

Ry.  Co.,  44  Fed.  R.  208  370 

Atlantic  (i.   P.  Co.  v.  Uittman  P.  M. 

(^o.,  9  Fed.  R.  316  652 

Atlantic  Works   v.  Bradv,  107  U.  S. 

192  "  253 

Atlantic  &  P.  Tel.  Co.  r   Union  Pac. 

Rv.  Co.,  1  Fed.  R.  745;  1  JlcCra. 

541  382 

Atocha  r.  United  States,  6  Ct  CI.  09  912 
Atterbury  v.  Gill,  13  Ofl'.  Gaz.  276        297, 

307 
Attleborough  Nat.  Bank  r.  North- 
western M.  &  C.  Co.,  28  Fed.  R.  113  13 
Attorney-Cieneral  v.  Bank  of  Colum- 
bia, 1  Paige  (N.  Y.),  511  443 
r.  Rirniingham  &  O.  J.  Ry.  Co., 

loJur.  1024  343 

V.  Brewers'  Co.,  1  P.  Wms.  376    581 

V.  Brooke,  18  Ves.  319  mG 

V.  Brown,  1  Swanst.  205  220 

r.  Bnrch,  4  Madd.  178  499 

V.  Butler,  123  Mass.  306  140 

V.  City  of  J>ondon,  1  Ves.  Jr.  24-3; 

3Bro  C.  C.  171  642,  643 
V.   Clapham,  4   I)e   G.  M.  &  G. 

591  577 
V.  Cleaver,  18  Ves.  211                   351 

r.  Corporation  of  Poole,  4  M.  & 

C.  17  155 
r.  Day,  2  Madd.  246                       444 

c.  Day,  1  Ves.  218  663 

V.  Foster,  2  Hare,  81  314,  319 

r.  (iee,  2  Ves.  &  B.  208  444 

/•.  Goddard,  1  Turn.  &  R.  .348        134 

r.  (Jreat  Northern  Ry.Co.,  1  Dr. 

&  Sm  l.J4  342,  .343 
/•.  Greonhill,  34  Beav.  174  665 

c.  Guardian   Mut.    L.  I.  Co.,  77 


N.  Y 


420 

574 


'•.  II;iniiIton,  1  Madd.  2H 

r.  lie  wit,  ('()oi)er's  Kq.  PI.  ,319  255 
'•.  .Jackson,  11  Ves.  365   122,  219,1^34 

'■  .Icaius,  1  Atk.  .355  172 

'•.  .Jolmson.  2. J.  Wils.  87  355 

r.  Lanil.inh,  5  Price,  386  2.58 

r.  London,  12  Beav.  8  215 


Attorney-General  v.  Manchester  &  L. 
Ry.  Co.,  1  By.  Cas.  (Kng.),  436         389 

f.  Marsii,  16  Sim.  572  388 

V.  Mayor  of  Galway,  1  Moll.  95    440 

V.  Montgomery,  2  Atk.  378  552 

V.  Newconibe,  14  Ves.  1  278 

V.  Nichol,  16  Ves.  338  354 

V.  North  American  L.  I.  Co.,  89 

N.  Y.  94  482,  447 
V.  Parkhurst,  1  Chan.  Cas.  112       94 

V.  Pearson,  7  Sim.  2liO  199,  464 

V.  Railroad  Cos.  35  Wis.  425         342 

V.  Ricliards,  2  Anstr.  603  355 

i:  Rumford     Chem.    Works,    2 

Bann.  &  A.  Pat.  Cas.  298  15 

l:  Shelly,  1  Salk.  162  122 

V.  Tiler,  1  Dick.  378  94 

r.  Utica   Ins.   Co.,  2  Johns.  Ch. 

(N.  Y.),  371  342 

i\  Vernon,  1  Vern.  277  759 

I--.  Vigor,  11  Ves.  563  418 

r.  Whorwood,  1  Ves.  Sen.  534       171 

r.  Worcester  Corporation,  1   C. 

P.  Coo]ier,  18  260 
V.  Wright,  3  Beav.  447  327 

V.  Wyburgh,  1  P.  Wms.  599;  2 

Eq.  Cas.  Abr.  107  122 

r.  Wynne,  Moseley,  126  116 

Atwill  V.  Ferrett,  2  Blatchf.  39    168,  173, 

175,   211,  212,  214,  215,  216,  218,  225, 

257,  2.58.  281 

Atwood  r.  Hawkins,  Rep.  /  Fincii  113  116 

Aurrecoechea  v.  Bangs,  110  U.  S.  217  1072, 

1073 
Austin  V.  Austin,  11  Jur.  N.  S.  536       577 

V.  Chambers,  6  CI.  &  Fin.  38  149 

l:  Gagan,  39  Fed.  R.  626      819,  821, 

823,  824,  845 
Austria  (Eni])cror  of)  r.  Day,  2  Giff. 

628:  3  De  G.  F.  &  J.  217  369,  582 

Avery,  Tlie,  2  Gall.  308  (i28 

Ayers,  In  re,  123  U.  S.  443    101,  106,  130, 

371,  72.5,  727 

r.  United  States,  5  Ct.  CI.  712       932 

/•.  Watson,  113  U.  S.  594        822,  844 

r. ,  137  U.  S.  584,  844  1022 

Ay les worth  f.  (iratiot  County,  43  Fed. 

R.  350  705,  706 

Avliffe  ;;.  Murray,  2  Atk.  58  484 

Avlwin  r.  Bray,  2  Y.  &  J.  518,  n.  225 

Ayres  r.  Carver,  17  How.  .591       121,  122, 

123,  286,  289,  291,  294,  295,  1023 

V.  Wis  wall,  112  U.  S.  187     115,  806. 

814,  815 

B. 

Babbitt  >:  Finn,  101  U.  S.  7  1053 

Bachrach  v.  Norton,  132  U.  S.  .337  86 

Back  "   Sierra  Nevada  C.  M.  Co.,  46 

Fed.  R.  673  804 

Bacon   r.   Bronson,  7  Johns.  Ch.  (N. 

V.)  194 

V.  Felt,  38  Fed.  R.  870  815,  817,  840, 

843 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


XXXlll 


[References 

Bacon  r.  Hart,  1  Black,  38        1043 

V.  Jones,  4  M.  &  Cr.  433    375,  392 

V.  Magee,  7  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  515   4b2 

v.   Northwestern  Mut.  L.  I.  Co., 

131  U.  S.  258  779 

r.  Rives,  106  U.  S.  99  126 

V.  Robertson,  18  How.  480  120 

V.  Spottiswootle,  1  Beav.  382        392 

Bafleau  v.  Rogers,  2  Paige  (X.  Y.), 

209  178,  180,  583 

Badger  v.  Badger,  2  Wall.  87        168,  214 

V. ,  ICliff.  211  237 

V.  Ranlett,  100  U.  S.  255  1087 

Bagley  v.  Yates,  3  McL.  465  650,  (352 

Bagsiiaw  v.  Eastern  Union  Ry.  Co.,  2 

Macn.  &  G.  389  343 

Bailey  v.  Birkenhead,  L.  &  C.  J.  Ry. 

Co.,  12  Beav.  433  209 

V.  Sewell,  1  Huss.  239  548 

V.  Tavlor,  1  R.  &  M.  73  392 

V.  Wfight,  2  Bond,  181  236,  211 

Bailev    W.    M.    Co.    v.   Young,    12 

Blatchf.  109  222,  261,  263,  283 

Baiiv  V.  Lambert.  5  Hare,  178  533 

'v.  Taylor,  1  Russ.  &  M.  73  392 

Bain,  ^.r/)a//e,  121  U.  S.  1  726 

Bainbridge  v.  Burton,  2  Beav.  539  120 
Bainbrigge  v.  Blair,  3  Beav.  421  452,  453 
Baines  v.  Baker,  Ambl.  158  355 

Baird    v.    Sliore    Line    Ry.    Co.,    6 

Blatchf.  461  387 

V.  United  States,  5  Ct.  CI.  348      909 

V. ,  8  Ct  CI.  13  909 

Baiz,  In  re,  135  U.  S.  403  698,  701,  718 
Baker  r.  Backu.s  32  111  79  443 

V.  Biddle,  Baldw.  394  17,  544 

V.  Haily,  2  Dick.  632  458 

V.  Hart,  3  Atk.  542  553 

V.  Howell,  44  Fed.  R.  113         3.5,  642 

V.  Mellish,  11  Ves.  70    211,  221,  225, 

281 

V.  Morton,  12  Wall.  150  3 

V.  Power,  124  U.  S.  167  1021 

V.  I\ogers,  Sel.  Cas.  Cli.  74  122 

V.    Wales,    14    Abb.    Pr.    N.    s. 

(N.  Y.)331  197 

V,  White,  92  U.  S.  176  1021 

V.  Whiting,  1  Story,  218  667 

Balch  V.  Tucker,  2  Cii.  Cas.  40  548 

Baldwin  v.  Ely,  9  How.  580  581 

t\  Mackown,  3  Atk.  817         314,  316 

V.   State,   129   U.  S.  52 ;  9  S.  C. 

Rep.  193  733 

Ball  V.  Tompkins,  41  Fed.  R  486    LS,  396 

V.  United  States,  140  U.  S.  118     340 

Ballance  o.  F'orsyth,  24  How.  183  6sl 

Ballard  v.  Catlhig,  2  Keen,  606  3:!2 

v.  Searls,  130  U.  S.  50         1084,  1089 

Baltimore  Car  Wheel  Co.  r.  Bemis, 

29  Fed.  R.  95  24,  372 

Baltimore  &  ().  R.  R.  Co.,  Ex  purte, 

106  U.  S.  5  1029 

,  Ex  parte,  108  U.  S.  566         702,  703, 

1018 
V.  Bates,  119  U.  S.  464  827 

VOL.    I.  —  C 


are  to  pages.] 

Baltimore  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ford,  35 

Fed.  R.  170  347,  845,  84^1 

V.  Hamilton,  16  Fed.  R.  181  687 

Baltimore  &  C.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Grant,  98 

U.  S.  398  1088 

V.  Hopkins,  130  U.  S.  210      966,  967 

'■.  Si.xth  Presbn.  Church,  91  U. 

S.  127  787,  1054 

Bampton  v.  Birchall,  5  Beav.  330  309 

r. ,  1  PliiU.  568  309 

Bancroft  r.  Warden,  2  Dick  672  2iS0 

r.  Weiitworth,  10  Ves.  285,  n.        265 

Banigan  v.  Worcester,  30  Fed  R.  392  810 
Bank   v.  Carrollton   R.  R.,  11   Wall. 

624  130,  214 

V.  McLeod,  38  Ohio  St.  174  430 

Bank    of    Ale.xandria    (;.   Young,    1 

Cranch  C.  C.  458  765 

Bank  of  British  N.  A.  v.  Borling,  44 

Fed.  R.  641  10,  688 

l: ,  46  Fed.  R.  357  55 

Bank  of  Columbia  v.  Sweeny,  1  Pet. 

567  703 

Bank  of  Danville  v.  Travers,  4  Biss. 

507  518 

Bank  of  Kentucky   v.   Adams    Exp. 

Co.,  93  U.  S.  174  778 

V.  Ashley,  2  Pet.  327  1084,  1091 

Bank  of  Lewisburg  v.  Sheffey,  140 

U.  S.  145  665 

Bank  of  Montreal  v.  Thayer,  7  Fed. 

R.  622  427,  439 

Bank  of  N.  Y.  v.  Skelton,  2  Blatchf. 

14  345,  347 

Bank  of  S.  C.  v.  Rose,   1   Rich.  Eq. 

(S.  C).  292  532 

Bank  of  U.  S.  c.  Bank  of  Washington, 

6  Pet.  8  1093 

i:  Beverly,  1  How.  134  4 

V.  Daniel,  12  Pet.  32  102(5 

i:  Green,  6  Pet.  26  981,  987 

V.  Kurtz,  2  Cranch  C.  C.  342         768 

V.  Planters  Bank,  9  Wheat.  904      29 

(•.  Ritchie,  8  Pet.  128       107,  108,  677 

r.  Swan,  3  Pet.  68  1069 

r.  Weisiger.  2  Pet.  481  1092 

r.  White,  8  Pet.  262  202,  675 

Banking  Assoc,  i:  Insurance  Assoc, 

102  U.  S.  121  1061 

Banks  V.  Miller,  1  Cranch  C.  C.  543  511 
Hannert  r.  Day,  3  Wash.  C.  C.  343  512 
Banque  Franco-Egyptienne  v.  Brown, 

24  Fed.  R.  106    "  287 

Barber  v.  Barber,  21  How.  582  16,  813 
Barclay  r.  Brown,  7  Paige  (N.  Y.),  245  576 
Barings  v.  Dabney,  19  Wall.  1  10-')9 

Barker  r.  Dixie,  Rep.  /.  Hardw.  2-52     462 

r.  Dnmaresque,  2  Atk.  119  538 

r.  Ladd.  3  Sawy.  44  770,  780 

i:.  Ray,  2  Riiss.  63  5-52 

V.  Smark.  3  Beav   64  538 

r.  Todd,  15  Fed.  R.  265         3-30,  334 

Bark  ley  v.  Levee  Conim'rs,  93  U.  S. 

258  705 

Barlow  v.  Gains,  8  Beav.  329       442 


XXXIV 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  pages.] 


Barnard  v.  Darling,  1  Barb.  Cli.  (N.  Y.) 


441 

V.  Gibson,  7  How.  650  3U2 

V.   Ht'vdrick,  49  Barb.   (N.  Y.) 

62 ;  2  Abb.  Pr.  n.  s.  (N.  Y.),  47         483 
Barnes,  Ex  parte,  1  Sprague,  133  515 

J}aniesle  f.  Powell,  1  Ves.  Sen.  120      678 
Banicsville  &  .M.  K.  K.  Co.,  Matter  of, 

2  MoCra.  210  839 

Barnet  i:  Day,  3  Wa.sli.  243  621 

Barnev  v.  Baltimore  City,  6  Wall.  280 

131,  135 

(,-.  Globe  Bank,  5  Blatcbf.  107         50 

V.  Keokuk,  94  U.  S.  324  780 

V.  Latham,  103  U.  S.  2U5         37,  135, 

159,  160,  806,  813,  817 

V.  Luckett,  1  Sim.  &  S.  419  374 

r.   Mavor,  &c.,  of  Baltimore,  1 

Huglies,  il8  38 

i:  Sclitiioider,  9  Wall.  248      405,  460 

Barns  r.  Omally,  4  McL.  570  681 

Barr  r.  Pittsburgh  P.  G.  Co.,  40  Fed. 

K.  412  27 

Barrel  v.  Transportation  Co.,  3  Wall. 

424  1044 

Barrell  v.  Simonton,  3  Cranch  C.  C. 

081  513 

Barrett  r.  Holmes,  102  U.  S.  651  778 

Barriliean  r.  Brant,  17  How.  43  1035 

Barron  r.  Bunisicle,  121  U.  S.  186         813 
Barrow  r.  Hill,  13  How.  54  1093 

1-.  Hunton,  99  U.  S.  80       13,  43,  670, 

679,811 

V.  Reab,  0  How.  3G6  1086 

Barry,  Ex  /xirtc,  2  How.  65   719,  734,  741, 

743 

,  Ex  jiarte,  7  Law  Bep.  374     741,  742 

,  Jn  re,  42  Fed.  R.  113       734,  741,  780 

,  In  r,',  136  U.  S.  597,  n.   734,  741,  780 

V.  Edmunds,  116  U.  S.  550      33,  535, 

536 

V.  Mereein,  5  How.  103  734,  735, 

1020 
V.  Mutual  L.  L   Co.,  53  N.  Y. 

536  179 

Barteis  v.  Redfield,  47  Fed.  \\.  708      1097 
Bartli  r.  Makeever,  4  Biss.  210  790 

Hartliolow  v.  Trustees,  105  U.  S.  0       980 
Barile   v.   Coleman,  3  Crancli  C.  C. 

2S3  130 

Bartiett  r.  Sultan  of  Turkey,  19  Fed. 

H.  340  191 

r.  Wood.  9  W.  l^  817  577 

Barton  r.  Barbour.  104  U.  S.  126   95,  230, 
415.  416,  417,  420,  435,  4;:9 

V.  Forsyth,  5  Wall.  P.lO       1022,  1090 

V.  I'etit,  7  Cranch,  288  108i» 

lias  ,\  Steele.  3  Wash.  381  7<)8 

]?asey  v.  Galhiglier.  20  Wall.  670    224,  551 
Bashaw  v.  United  States,  47  Fed.   K. 

40  585,Yi91 

Bashford  >•  Barstow,  4  Wis.  567  756 

Basset  v.  United  States.  9  Wall.  38       337 
Bassett  v.  Johnson,  1  Green  Ch.   (N. 

J.)  154  551 


Bast  V.  First  Nat.  Bank,  101  U.  S.  93   487 
Bate  Kefriiierating  Co.  v.  Gillett,  30 
Fed.  K.  0»3  652 

V.  Gillette,  28  Fed.  R.  673     557,  558, 

561 
Bates  ;;.  Clark,  95  U.  S.  204 


Coe,  98  U.  S.  31 


102 
253 
909 


V.  Uriited  States,  4  Ct.  CI.  569 

Batcsville  Inst.  v.  Kauffman,  18  Wall. 

151  113,  128 

Bath  (Earl  of)  v.  Sherwin,4Bro.  P.  C. 

373  4,  345 

Bath  County  v.  Amv,  13  "Wall.  244  704 
Batt  V.  Procter,  45  Fed.  R.  515  191,  195 
Battaile  v.  Fisher,  36  Miss.  321  433 

Battelle  v.  United  States,  7  Ct.  CI. 

297  903 

Battle  V.  Mutual  L.L  Co.,  10  Blatchf. 

417  277 

Bawtree  r.  Watson,  3  M.  &  K.  339  134 
Ba.x  V.  Whitbread,  16  Ves.  15  577 

Bayard  v.  Lombard,  9  How.  530        1030, 

1086 
Bav  City,  The,  3  Fed.  R.  47  586 

Baverque  v.  Cohen,  McAll.  113  222,  375 
Bayley  v.  I)e  Walkiers,  10  Ves.  441  262 
Bayliss  v.  Lafayette  M.  &  B.  Ry.  Co., 

8  Biss.  193  334 

Beach  v.  Rice,  131  U.  S.  293  287 

Beadleston  v.  Harpending,  32  Fed.  R. 

644  849,  850 

Beale  v.  Thompson,  8  Cranch,  70  517 
Beall  V.  New  Mexico,  16  Wall.  535  1053 
Bealls  >'.  Illinois  M.  &  T.  R.  R.  Co., 

133  U.  S.  290  118-463 

Bean  v.  Clark,  30  Fed.  R.  225  248 

V.  Patterson,  110  U.  S.  401  597 

V.  Smith,  2  Mason,  252  56 

Bearblock  v.  Tyler,  1  Jac.  &  W.  225  550 
Beard  v.  Bowler,  2  Bond,  13  244 

V.  Federy,  8  Wall.  478   939,  940,  946, 

949,  951,  952,  956,  957,  962 
Beardsley  i-.  Littell,  14  Blatchf.  102     401, 


Marquis  of  Huntley, 


766 
232 


Beauchamp  \ 

Jacob,  5l6 
Beautort  (Duke  of)  v.  Morris, 2  Piiill. 

683  550 

V.  Neeld.  12  Ci.  &  Fin.  248  3 

Beaumont  r.  Boultbee,  5  Ves.  485         172 
Beaupre  v.  Noyes,  138  U.  S.  397    783, 1004, 

1022 
Beauregard  v.  New  Orleans,  18  How. 

497    "  777 

Beavan  v.  Carpenter,  11  Sim   22  497 

Bechtel  v.  United  States,   101   U.  S. 

5'.i7  468 
Beckwith  v.  Easton,  4  Ben.  357  638 
r.  United  States,  16  Ct.  of  CI. 

2.-.0  593 

Heddoes  r.  Pugh,  2(5  Beav.  407  287 

Hedt'ord  ( I  )uke  of)  t'.  British  Museum, 

2  M.  &  K.  552  345 

P.eebe  r.   Louisville  N.  O.  &  T.  Ry. 

Co.,  39  Fed.  R.  481  38 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  pages.] 


XXXV 


Beebe  v.  Russell,  10  How.  283  569,  1024 
Beebees,  Exparie,  2  Wall.  Jr.  127  490,  .512 
needier  v.  Binliijier,  7  Blatciif.  170  399 
Heeile  v.  Cbeenev,  5  Fed.  H.  388  824,  84.5 
iieedle  v.  Bennett,  122  U.  S.  71  17 

Beeknian  v.  Peck,  3  Jolins,  Cli.  (N.  Y.) 

41.5  6(55 

Beer  Co.  c.  JIassacluisetts,  07  U.  S. 

25  1004 

Beers  v.  Ciielsea  Bank,  4  Edw.  (N.  Y.) 

277  451 

V.  Hauptbton,  9  Pet.  3(31  789 

V.  Wabasb,  St.  L.  &  P.  Ry.  Co., 

34  Fed.  ]{.  244  343 

Bebrens  v.  Sievekinff,  2  M.  &  Cr.  602  232 
Bein  v.  Fleatb,  142  U.  S.  704  1059 

i-.  ,  (3  How.  228  92 

V. ,  12  How.  168  9,  389 

Beine,  In  rr,  42  Fed.  R.  545  748 

Beirne  v.  Wadswortb,  36  Fed.  R.  614  534 
Belden  i'.  Devoe,  12  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 

223  483 

Belgenland,  Tbe,  108  U.  S.  153  1051, 1053 
Bell  V.  Cliapman,  10  Jolms.  183  01 

V.  Cureton,  2  M.  &  K.  503  153 

0.  Davidson,  3  Wasb.  328  521 

V.  Donoboe,  17  Fed.  R.  710  127, 129, 

130,  132 

V.  Morrison,  1  Pet.  351    511,  516,  779, 

780 

V.  Nimraon,  4  McL.  539  513 

V.  United  States  Stamping  Co., 

32  Fed.  R.  .549  560 

Belloat  V.  Morse,  2  Hayw.  (N.  C.)  1-57  279 
Bellocq  v.  United  States,  13  Ct.  CI. 


195 


932 


912 

398 
533 
909 


Bellocque  v.  United  States,  8  Ct.  CI 

493 
Belmont  Mail  Co.  r.  Columbia  I.  &  S 

Co.,  46  P^ed.  R.  8 

V. ,  46  Fed.  R.  336 

Belt  V.  United  States,  15  Ct.  CI.  92 
Benedict,  In  re,  4  West.  Law  Mo.  449  737 
V.  St.  Josepli   &   W.  R.  Co  ,  19 

Fed.  R.  173  395 

Benites  v.  Hampton,  123  U.   S.  510 

1062,  1064 
Benjamin's  Heirs  v.  Dubois,  118  U.  S. 

46  1024 

Benner  v.  Porter,  9  How.  235  804 

Bennet  v.  Going,  1  Moll.  529  64.3,  644 

V.  Vade,  2  Atk.  325  1-50 

Bennett  i:  Attkins,  1  Y.  &  C.  247  581 

V.  Bennett,  Deady,  299    479,  734,  742 

V.  Butterwortii,  11  How.  669   5,  684, 

787 

V.  Colley,  2  M.  &  K.  225 ;  5  Sim. 

.   181 

V.  Devino,  45  Fed.  R.  705 

V.  Hamill,  2  Sell.  &  Let'.  .566    573,  679 

V.  Ha'tner,  17  Blatcbf.  311 

V.  Honywood,  Amb.  708 

V.  Neale,  Wigbtwick,  324 

Bensinger  S.  A.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  National 

C.  R.  Co.,  .42  Fed.  R.  81  45 


.396 

820 


206 
121 
251,  548 


Benson  c.  Hadfield,  4  Hare,  32     159,  230, 

231 

V.  MoMabon,  127  U.  S.  457  727,  728, 

752 
Bentley  v.  Joslin,  Hempst.  218  300 

Bentlif  v.  London,  &  C.  Tr.  Co.,  44 

Fed.  R.  667  199,  841,  842 

Benton  r.  United  States,  5  Ct.  CI.  692    912 

c.  Woolsey,  12  Pet.  27  140,  1083 

Bergen,  //*  re,  2  Huglies,  513  764 

Bernards  Townsbip  v.  Stebbins,  109 

U.  S.  341  16,  536 

Berney  v.  Sewell,  1  Jac.  &  W.  647  395 
Bernbeini  v.  Blrnbaum,  30  Fed.   R. 

885  33,  56 

Bernie  r.  Vandever,  16  Ark.  616  556 

Berrv  v.  Sawyer,  19  Fed.  R.  2«6  257,  463 
Bertbold  v.  McDonald,  22  How.  334  055 
Bettes  V.  Dana,  2  Sumuer,  383      131,  303, 

307 
Betts  V.  Barton,  3  Jur.  x.  s.  154  532 

f.  Lewis,  19  How.  72  537 

Bickett  V.  Morris,  L.  R.  1  H.  L.  Sc. 

47  373 

Bickford  v.  Skewes,  8  Sim.  206  484 

Biefr.  Dver,  Chan.  Cal.  XI.  3 

Bigelow,'/!.^  parte,  113  U.  S.  328  72-5,  726 
Biggs  V.  Barry,  2  Curt.  2.59  782 

Bigler  V.  Waller,  12  Wall.  142  1043,  1046 
Bignold  v.  Audland,  11  Sim.  23  177,  179 
Billing  i:  Fliglit,  1  Madd.  230  240 

Bills  V.  New  Orleans,  St.  L  &  C.  R.  R. 

Co.,  13  Blatcbf.  227  840 

Bingbam  r.  Cabbot,  3  Dall.  19  1083 

V.  Cabot,  3  Dall.  382  144 

Bininger,  Re,  7  Blatcbf.  1.59  701 

Biiiks^'.  Binks,  2  Bligli  P.  C  593  662 

Bircb,  Re,  Shelf,  on  Lun.  146  .396 

V.  Corbin,  1  Co.x  Eq.  144  178 

Bird  V.  United  States,  45  Fed.  R.  110  592, 

594 
Birdsall    v.    Manufacturing     Co.,    1 

Hughes,  64  351 

1-.  Perego,  5  Blatcbf.  251  279 

Birdsell  v.  Hagerstown  A.  I.  M.  Co., 

1  Hugbes,  64  352 

V.  Sbaliol,  112  U.  S.  485  113 

Birdseve  v.  Heilner,  26  Fed.  R.  147      248 

v".  Shaeffer,  37  Fed.  R.  821    832,  844 

Birdsong  v.  Birdsong,  2  Head  (Tenn.), 

289  333 

Birkenbead  Docks  v.  Laird,  4  De  G. 

M.  &  G.  7.32  578 

Bischoff  y.  Wetbered,  9  Wall.  812  237 
Biscbotfsbeim  v.  Baltzer,  10  Fed  R.  1 

511,518 

V. ,  20  Fed.  R.  890  19 

r.  Brown,  29  Fed.  R.  341  768 

Bishop  r.  Willis,  2  Ves.  Sen.  113  337 

Bishop  of  Winchester  v.  Fournier,  2 

Ves.  Sen.  445  548,  579 

Bissel  V.  Canada  &  St.  Louis  Ry.  Co., 

39  Fed.  R.  225  814 

Black  r.  Henry  G.  Allen  Co.,  42  Fed. 

R.  618  151,  167,  168,  177,  280 


XXXVl 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 
[References  are  to  pages.] 


Black  V.  Lamb,  1  Beas.  (N.  J.)  108       547 

V.  Thorne,  10  Blatclif.  06        53.  '251, 

5o6,  570 
Blackburn  v.  Crawfords,  3  Wall.  175 

518,  523 

V.  Selma  R.  Co.,  3  Fed.  R.  689      566 

v.  Selma,  M.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  2 

Flipp.  520  199,  228,  229,  230 

Blaiii  V.   Home  Ins.  Co.,  30  Fed.  R. 

667  602 

Blair  v.  St.  Louis,  II.  &  K.  Ry.  Co., 

19  Fed.  R.  861  412 

v. ,  20  Fed.  R.  348  433 

v. ,  22  Fed.  R.  471  402,  403,  405, 

412 

v. ,  23  Fed.  R.  521  406 

V. ,  23  Fed.  R.  523  406 

V. ,  -Zlj  Fed.  R.  524  409 

i: ,  23  Fed.  R.  704  411 

r.  Turtle,  5  Fed.  R.  394  ;  23  Alb. 

L.  J. 435  197 

Blake  V.  Blake,  18  W.  R.  944  571 

V.    Bogle,    Macqueen's    H.   L. 

Bract.  244  n.  771,  1035 


Cemetery,    14 


002, 


009 
37 
17 


344 
444 


415 

821 


!'.    Greenwood 

Blatclif.  342 

r.  Hawkins,  19  Fed.  R.  204 

c.  McKim,  103  U.  S.  336 

Blakeley  v.  Biscoe,  Hempst.  114 
Blakemore  v.  Glamorgansliire  Canal 

Nav.,  1  M.  &  K.  154  342, 

Blakeney  v.  Dufanr,  15  Beav.  40 
Biancliard  v.  Cawtiiorne,  4  Sim.  566 

414, 
V.  Dwiglit,    12  Wend.   (N.  Y.), 

192 

V.  Putnam,  8  Wall.  420  252,  686 

Blandy  v.  Griffith,  6  Fislier  P.  C  434  673 
Blaquicre  v.  Hawkins,  Doug.  378  097 
Blease  v.  Garlington,  92  U.  S.  1  461,  502, 
506,  507,  508,  1083,  1085 
Bleecker  r.  Bond,  3  Wasii.  529  465,  466 
Bligbt  V.  Fislier,  Pet.  C.  C.  41  491,  651 
Bliss  V.  Brooklyn,  10  Blatclif.  217  615 
V.  City  of  Brooklyn,  4  Fisher's 

Pat.  Cas.  596  359 

r.  United  States,  37  Fed.  R.  191   593 

Blitz  r.  Brown,  7  Wall.  693  1051 

Block  V.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co., 

21  Fed.  R.  529  190 

V.  Darling,  140  U.  S.234      820,  1027 

V.  United  States,  7  Ct.  of  CI.  406 

465,  466,  472 
Biodgett  ?•.  Hobart,  18  Vt.  414  292 

Blois  r.  P.etts,  1  Dick.  33*;  416 

Blomficld  r.  Fvre,  8  Beav.  250  171,376 
IJlondheim  r.  Moore,  11  Md.  365  399,441 
Bloss.mi  r.  Milwaukee  &C.  R.  R.  Co  , 

1  Wall.  655  567,  1024 

'•.  Railroad  Co.,  3  Wall.  190    565,  566 

Blount  r.   Uniteil  States,  21   Ct.  CI. 

274  ^98 

V.  Walker,  134  U.  S.  607  1004 

Blow   r.  Tavlor,  4  Hen.  &  M.  (Va.) 

1-39  '  386 


Blower  v.  jMorrets,  3  Atk.  772  299 

Bloxain  r.  Metropolitan  Ry.  Co.,L.  R. 

3  Cli.  337  343 

Bluebird  Min.  Co.  v.  Murray,  45  Fed. 

R.  388  "  804 

Blumlein,  In  re,  45  Fed.  R.  236  31,  1013 
Blunti'.  Clither()w,6  Ves.  799  418 

V.  Smitii,  7  Wiieat.  248  1090 

Board  of  Commissioners  v.  Gorman, 

19  Wall.  661  048,  795,  1051 

Board  of  Education  v.   Scoville,    13 

Kan.  17  179 

Board   of    Field    Officers    v.    United 

States,  20  Ct.  CI.  18  897 

Board  of  Liquidation  v.  McComb,  92 

U.  S.  531  103, 129,  371 

Bock  r.  Perkins,  139  U,  S.  628  36 

Boddy  r.  Kent,  1  Meriv.  361  206,  538 

Bodwell  r.  Crawford,  26  Kan.  292         369 

V.  Willcox,  2  Caines  (N.  Y.),  104   325 

United  States,  20  Ct.  CI. 


900 
900 
459 
668 

898 
209 


Boelim 
142 

r. ,  21  Ct.  CI.  290 

r.  Wood,  Turn.  &  R.  332 

Boesch  V.  Graff,  133  U.  S.  097        56!: 
Bolinger  v.  United  States,  18  Ct.  CI 

148 
Bogart  r.  Hinds.  25  Fed.  R.  484 
Rohanan  r.  Nebraska,  118  U.  S.  231     1061 
Boise  County  c.  Gorman,   131  U.  S. 

cxxv  1051,  1052 

V. ,  19  Wall.  661  1051 

Boles,  In  re,  48  Fed.  R  75  736 

Bolles  r.  Town  of  Amboy,  45  Fed. 

R.  168  780 

BoUman,  Ex  parte,  4  Cranch,  75   717,719, 

727,  "■" 
Bolton  V.  Bolton,  2  Dan.  Ch.  Pr.  (2d 

Am.  Ed.)  468,  n. 

V.  ,  2  Sim.  &  S.  371 

V.  Corporation   of  Liverpool,   1 

M.  &  K.  88 

V.  Gardner,  3  Paige  (N.  Y.),273 

"  '        1, 


745 


281 

537 


216 
240 


Bond  i:  Dustin,  112  U.  S.  604 
Bondurant  r.  Watson,  103  U.  S. 


773,  774 

278 
1042 
818 
627 


,  103  U.  S.  201 
Bone  i:  The  Norma,  Newb.  533 
Bonner  v.  United  States,  9  Wall.  156    898 
Boogher  v.  Insurance  Co.,  103  U.  S. 

90  772,  1091 

Boom  Co.  V.  Patterson,  98  U.  S.  403,  799, 

808,  810 
Boon  r.  Collingwood.  1  Dick.  115  460 
Boon's  Heirs  r.  Chiles,  8  Pet.  532  113, 
126,  128,  130 
Boone  r.  Chiles,  10  I'et.  177  240.  1080 
Boone    County    v.   Burlington   &   M. 

H.  R.  Co.,  139  U.  S  684"  235 

Bootli  '•.  Booth.  2  Atk.  34;)  538 

r.  Clark,  17  How.  322  95,  430 

i\  Leycester,  1  Keen,  247  532 

r.  St!  Louis  F.  E.  Mfg.  Co.,  40 

Fed.  R.  1  .  45 


TABLE  OF  CASES. 


XXXVll 


[References 

Bootle  V.  Blundell,  19  Ves.  494    405,  5o0, 

o')2 
Rnrlaiid  r.  Haven,  37  Fed.  R.  394  ^  10 
Horiiemann  r.  Norris,  47  Fed.  li.  4.>8  790 
Biiis  V.  Preston,  111  U.  S.  252  5,  5:^0, 

1083,  1087 
Bosanauet  r.  Marsham,  4  Sim.  573       280 


osanqiiet  r.  Marsham,  4  Sim.  573 

Bostock    V.  Nortli  Staffordshire    Rv. 

Co.,  3  Sm.  &  G.  283  342,  343 

Boston  Electric  Co.  i'.  Electric  G.  L. 

Co.,  23  Fed.  R.  838  7G3 

Boston  M.  Co.  v.  Eagle  M.  Co.,  115 

U.  S.  221  1076,  1077 

Boston  \V.  H.  Co.  v.  Star  R.  C,  40 

Fed.  R.  167  111,  112 

Bostwick  V.  American  Finance  Co., 

43  Fed  R.  897  189 

V.  Brinkerhoff,  106  U.  S.  3  1002, 1018, 

1021 
Bottoniley  v.  United  States,  1  Story, 

13-3  622 

c. ,  1  Story,  153       622,  632,  645 

Boiulereau  v.  Montgomery,  4  Wash. 

186  520,  521,  522,  523 

Boudinot  V.  Svmmes,  Wall.  C.  C.  139  260 
Bouldin  r.  Phelps,  30  Fed.  R.  547  940,  941 
Boult  1-.  Blunt,  Cary,  72  372 

Bound  V.  South  Carolina  R.  R.  Co., 

43  Fed.  R.  404  407,  418 

565 
188 
447 


are  to  pages. J 

Boyert'.  Boyer,  113  U.S.  689 
Boyle  V.  Zacharie,  6  Pet.  648 
Urace  r.  Taylor,  2  Atk.  253 
Bracken  v.  Martin,  3  Yerg.  (Tenn.) 

55 
Bradford   v.   Felder,  2  McCord  Ch. 

(S.  C),  170 
v.  Union  Bank  of  Tenn.,  13  How. 


V. ,  46  Fed.  R.  315 

Bourke  r.  Amison,  32  Fed.  R.  710 
Bourne  v.  Maybin,  3  Woods,  724 
Bournonville   v.    Goodall,  10  Pa.  St. 
133 


774 

91 
97 


Boussmaker,  Er  parte,  13  Ves.  71 
Bowe  I'.  United  States,  42  Fed.  R.  761 
Bo  wen  v.  Chase,  94  U.  S.  812  27 

r. ,  7  Blatchf.  2.55  832 

Bower  B.  R.  Iron  Co.  v.  Welles  R.  1. 

Co.,  43  Fell.  R.  391  256,  265 

Bowers  r.  Supreme  Council,  Am.  Le- 
gion of  Honor,  45  Fed.  R.  81  849 
Bowie  >:  Talbot,  1  Cranch  C.  C.  247    513 
Bowman  r.  Bell,  14  Sim.  392                 440 

r.  Bowman,  30  Fed.  R.  849    16,  813, 

820 

r.  Clucago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  115 

U.S.  611  33 

r.  Sheldon,  5  Sandf.  (N.  Y.)  657    483 

Bowman's    Devisees    v.    Watlien,   2 

.McL.  376  1.59 

Bowyer  v.  Bright,  13  Price,  316     315,066 

'v.  Priicliard,  11  Price,  103  180 

Boyce  i:  Grundv,  3  Pet.  210  4,  15 

(\ ,  9  Pet.  275  1092 

V.  Tabb,  18  Wall   546  778 

Boyd,  Ex  part,',  105  U.  S.  047    6,  775,  794 

V.  Clarke.  V',  Fed.  R.  908  801 

V.  Gill,  lU  Fed.  R.  145  814,  816 

V.  Heinzelman,  1  Ves.  &  B.  381     539 

f.  Mills,  13  Ves  85  264 

V.  Nebraska,  U.  S.  S.  C.  Feb  1, 

1892  758 

i:  United  States,  116  U.  S.  016     465 

Boyden  v.  Burke,  14  How.  575  474 


209 

9,  1022 

213 


279 


288 

38 

703 


V.  Williams,  3  How.  576 

Bradley,  Ex  parte,  7  Wall.  364 

f.' Reed,  2  Pitlsb.  (Pa.),  519;  12 

Pittsb.  L.  J.  65  353,  387 

Bradstreet,  Exjiart/',4  Pet.  102  703 

,  Ex  parte,  6  Pet.  774  703 

,  Ex  parte,  7  Pet.  634  1090 

,  Ex  parte,  7  Pet.  634  703,  870 

,  Ex  parte,  8  Pet.  588  703 

V.  Neptune  Ins.  Co.,  3  Sumner, 

601  237 

Bradstreet  Co.  t\  Higgins,  112  U.  S. 

227  1U27,  1028 

r. ,  114  U.  S.  262  584 

Bradwell    /•.    Weeks,    1   Johns.    Ch. 

( .\.  Y.)  325  92 

Branihall  v.  United  States,  6  Ct.  CI. 

238  931 

Bramston  r.  Carter,  2  Sim.  458  186,  280 
Brande  r.  Gilclirist,  18  Fed.  R.  465  286 
Brandies  v.  Cochrane,  105  U.  S.  262 

1038,  1039,  1044,  1045 
Brandon  v.  Brandon,  5  Madd.  473  418 
Brandon    Manuf.    Co.    v.   Prime,    14 

Blatchf.  371;   3  Bann.  &  A.  Pat. 

Cas.  191  211,292,293 

Brandreth  v.  Lance,  8  Paige  (N.  Y.), 

24  371 

Brannen  v.  United  States,  20  Ct.  CI. 

219  915 

Brantford  City,  The,  32  Fed  R.  324  86.S 
Brashear  v.  Mason,  6  How.  92  710 

Brasher's  E.x'rs  v.  Van  Cortlandt,  2 

Johns.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  242        109,  176, 184 
Brassev  v.  New  York  &  N.  E.  R.  R. 

Co.,  19  Fed.  R.  663  25,  397 

Breeden  v.  Lee,  2  Hughes,  484  23,  3.56 
Breedlone  ;-•.  Nicolet,  7  Pet.  413  1086 

Brewer  v.  Jacol)s,  22  Fed.  R.  217  776 

Brewster  r.  Shuler,  38  Fed.  R.  549       601 

v.  Wakefield,  22  How.  118  127, 

1025,  1032 
Bridses,  Ex  parte.  2  Woods.  428  721 

r.  Sheldon,  7  Fed.  R.  17        196,  197, 

651,  6-54 
Rriges  v.  Sperry,  95  U.  S.  401  843 
Briy^gs  i\  French,  2  Sumner,  251  41 
('.    The   Light   Boats,    1 1  Allen 

(.Mass.),  157  96 

Brisjham    v.  LmMinnton,  12  Blatchf. 

237  95,  132,  195,  4.30 

Bright  r.  Milwaukee  &  St.  P.  R.  R. 

Co  ,  14  Blatchf.  214  839 

>:  United  States,  6  Ct.  CI.  118       901 

■.  ,  S  Ct.  CI.  326  901 

r.  ,  12  Ct.  CI.  646  929 


XXXVlll 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  pages.] 


Briirstocke  v.  Kock,  7  Jur.  n.  s.  63        497 
Brill  r.  Stiles.  35  111  305  1)94 

hrinckerlioff  v.  Brown,  7  Johns.  Cli. 

(X.  Y.)217  ^  541 

Brine  v.  Insurance  Co.,  9(3  U.  S.  627 

10,  542,  575,  779 
Brinkerhoff  v.   Brown,  G  Johns.  Ch. 

(N.  Y.)  139  156,  220,  225 

Briscoe   v.    Commonwealth    Bank,  9 

Pet.  85  1075 

!".   Southern  Kan.  Ry.  Co.,  40 

Fed.  R.  273  60,  66,  88 

Brison  v.  Lingo,  26  Mo.  496  755 

British    Queen    iMin.   Co.    v.    Baker 

S.  M.  Co.,  139  U.  S.  222  773 

Britton  v.  Brewster,  2  Fed.  R.  160         151 

r.  Hill,  12  C.  E.  Gr.  (X.  J)  389      357 

Biobst  i:  Brobst,  4  Wall.  2  976,  987 

Biockctt  c.  Brockett,  2  How.  238         868, 

1037,  1045,  1046,  1048 

V. ,  3  How.  691  552,  1086 

Brockwav   v.  Township   of  Oswego, 

40  Fed" R.  612  714,716 

Broderick's    Will,  Case  of,  21  Wall. 

503  10,  11.  12,24,235 

Brodhead  v.  Shoemaker,  44  Fed   R. 

518  811,  834 

Brodie  v.  Barry,  3  Meriv.  695  395 

r.   Opiiir   S.  M.  Co.,  4  Fisher's 

Pat.  Cas.  37 

V.  St.  Paul,  1  Ves.  Jr.  326 

]'>romloy  r.  Smith,  1  Sim.  8 

r.  Town  of  Jeffcrsonville,  3  McL. 

336 
Bronson  v.  Keokuk,  2  Dill.  498 
V.  La  Crosse  &  iM.  R.  R.  Co., 

1  Wall.  405  1051,  1052 

r. ,  2  Wall.  283  293,  334 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  2  Black,  524       333, 

560,  1019 
V.    St.   Croix   Lumber   Co.,  35 

Fed   R.  634 

V.  Schulten,  104  U.  S.  410 

Brook  V.  Evans,  29  L.  J.  Ch.  616  376 

Brook   (Lord)  r.  Lord  Hertford,  2  P. 

Wms.  518 
Brooke  r.  Clarke,  1  Swanst.  550 
Brooks  r.  Bicknell,  3  McL  250 

V.  Byam,  1  Story,  296 


570 

583 
119 

224 
195 


849 

rco 


—  V. ,  2  Story,  553 

—  >:  Clark,  119  U.  S.  502 

—  i\    Far  well,    2   McCra. 
F>d.  R.  167 

—  r.  Fry,  45  Fed.  R.  776 

—  r.  Jenkins.  3  McL.  432 

—  /•.  Miller.  28  Fed.  R.  015 


574 

386 
381 

254,  259, 
265 

580,  581 
816 
220:    4 

106 
763 

474,  518 
17,  18 


/•.  Mills  Couiitv,  4  Dill.  524  2.32 

/•.  Missouri,  124  U.  S.  394  1002 

r.  Xorris,  11   How.  201  1038 

r.  O'Hara,  8  Fed.  R.  529 ;  2  Mc^ 

Cra.OU  145,150,381 

Bronlatour  v.  United  States,  7  Ct.  CI. 

555  901 

Browder  v.  McArthur,  7  Wheat.  58    1079 


280 
102 


687 
514 
7!;0 
686 
687 


Brown,  Ex  parte,  116  U.  S.  401  703 

V.  Apsden,  14  How.  25  1079 

V.  Chesapeake  &  O.  Canal   Co., 

4  Fed.  U.  770  687 

V.   Clark,  3   Woodeson's   Lect. 

94 

County  of  Buena  Vista,  95 
157  214,  235 

V.  Deere,  6  Fed.  R.  484 ;  2  Mc- 
Cra. 425  391,  392,  893 

V. ,  6  Fed.  R.  489  340,  341 

V.  Dowthwaite,  1  Madd.  448  116 

V.  Evans,  18  Fed.  R.  56  795,  797 

l: ,  8  Sawy.  502  948 

r.  Galloway,  Pet.  C.  C.  219  512 

r.  Guarantee  Trust  &  S.  D.  Co., 

128U.  S.  403  157,160 

V.  Hall,  6  Blatchf.  405  252 

v.  Hazelhurst,  56  Md.  26  418 

r.  Higden,  1  Atk.  291 

V.  Huger,  21  How.  305 

V.  Lake  Superior  Iron  Co.,  134 

U.  S.  530       201,  207,  217,  397,  452,  453 

V.  Murray, 43  Fed.  R.  614  37, 822, 823 

r.  Pacific    Mail    S.    S.    Co.,    5 

Blatchf.  525  119,333 
c.  Philadelphia,  W.  &  B.  R.  Co., 

9  Fed.  R.  183 

V.  Piatt,  2  Cranch  C.  C.  253 

V.  Pierce,  7  Wall.  205 

V.  Piper,  91  U.  S.  37 

V.  Pond,  5  F\'d.  R.  31 

V.  Ricketts,  2  Johns.  Ch.  (N.  Y.) 

425  271,326 

V. ,  3  Johns.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  555  121 

V.  Robertson,  2  Phill.  173  326 

r.  Spofford,  95  U.  S.  474  487 

V.  Swann,  9  Pet.  1  1023 

V. .  10  Pet.  497  4,  499 

V.  The  Independence,  Crabbe,  54  475 

V.  Toledo,  P.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  35 

Fed.  R.  444  434 

r.  Trousdale,  138  U.  S.  389      34,  814 

V.  United  States,  5  Ct.  CI.  571      902 

V. ,  15  Ct.  CI.  392  899 

V.  Vermuden,  1  Chan.  Cas.  272    122, 

123,  156 

V.  Warner,  8  Beav.  292  298 

Browne  v.  Browne,  1  Wash.  429  38 

Brown   c.   Curtis,   10   I'aige   (X.  Y.), 

210  248,  264 

Brownsville  v.  Loague,  129  U.  S.  493 

7(  5,  712,  717 
Brownsvvord  v.  Edwards,  2  Ves.  Sen. 

243  212 

Broyles  v.  Buck,  37  Fed.  R.  137   587,  588 
Bruce  r.  Manchester  &  K.  R.  R.  Co., 

117  U.  S.  514  32,  8.3,  34,  1028,  1029 

r. ,  19  Fed.  R.  342  466 

V.  United  States,  17  How.  437      469. 

470 
Brugger  v.  State  Investment  Ins.  Co., 

5  Sawy.  304  16,  159 
Brundage  r.  Goodfellow,  4  Ilalst.  Ch. 

(X.J.)  513  205 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  pages.] 


XXXl.X 


Brunker,  Ex  parte,  3  P.  Wnis.  312       457 
Brunswick  (l)uke  of)  v.  King  of  Han- 
over, 0  Beav.  1  95 
Brush    El.  Co.  l:  Ball   E    L.  Co.,  43 

Fed.  H.  899  165 
Bryan  v.  Kennett,  113  U.  S.  179  9:i8 
V.  Parker,  1  Y.  &  C.  170                 548 

V.  Spruill,  4  Jones   Eq.  (N.  C.) 

27  147 

V.  United  States,  G  Ct.  CI.  128      89'.» 

V.  ,  21  Ct.  CI.  249  910 

Bryant  r.  Leylanii,  6  Fed.  R.  125  499,  767 
— —  V.  Tliomi)son,  27  Fed.  K.  881  844 
V.  Western  Un.  Tel.  Co.,  17  Fed. 

R  825  372 
Bufciareilo,  In  re,  45  Fed.  R.  463  728 
Buchanan  v.  Hodjjson,  11  Beav.  368  243 
r.  llowland,  2  Fisher's  Pat.  Cas. 

341  382 

Bucher  i-.  Cheshire  R.   R.  Co.,  125 

U    S.  555  779,  780 

Buck  i:  Colhath,  3  Wall.  334  36,  37 

r.  Fawcetr,  3  P.  Wms.  242  679 

r.  Hermance,  1  Blatchf.  322  .382 

I'.  Piedmont  &  A.  L.  I.  Co.,  4  Fed. 

R.  849  13,  443 

Buckeridge  v.  Glasse,  1  Cr.  &  Ph.  426  153 
Buckeve  Engine  Co.  v.  Denan  Brew- 
ing Co.,  47"Fed.  R.  6  397 
Buckingiiani  v.  Burgess,  3  McL.  368  513, 

515 

i:  McLean,  12  IIow.  1-50     570,  1023, 

1044.  1062,  1085 
Buckingham    (Duke   of)  v.  Duchess 

of  Buckingham,   2  Eq.    Cas.  Abr. 

527  ^  392 

Buckles  r.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Rv. 

Co.,  47  Fed.  R.  424  '     046 

Buckley  v.  United  States,  4  How.  251  482 
Buckner  r.  Finley,  2  Pet.  586  54 

Buddicum  V.  Kirk,  3  Cranch,  293  521,  523 
Huel  i\  Van  Ness,  8  Wheat.  312         1005, 

1041 
Buell  r.  Conn.  Mut.  L.  I.  Co  ,  1  Cin. 

L.  B.  51  768 

Buerk  c.  Iiiiliaeuser,  8  Fed.  R.  457  138, 
159,  176,  184,  186,  199,  200,  214 
Buffalo  Ins.   Co.  r.  Providence  &  S. 

S.  S.  Co.,  29  Fed.  R.  237  637 

Buffington  r.  Harvev,95  U.  S.  99  668,670, 
671,676,677 
Buford  '•.  Strother,  3  MoCra.  253;   10 

Fed.  R.  406  43,  811,  812 


Bugiiin  r.  Bennett,  4  Burr.  2035  6'.»8 

Bull  V.  Bank  of  Kasson,  123  U.  S.  105     54 
Bullen  r.  Miciiel,  2  I'rice,  399  550 

Buller  V.  Slideil,  43  Fed.  R.  116  684 

Buliinsier  i:  .^L^ckev,  14  Blatchf.  3-55   271 
Bullock  r.  Richardson,  11  Ves.  375       171 

/•.  Wailingfonl,  55  N.  H.  61'.*         473 

Bunbury  r.  Bunburv,  1  Beav.  318        352 
Bunce  v.  (;allagiier,'5  Biatciif.  481  4 

Bunker  ;■.  Stevens,  26  Fed.  R.  245        581 
Bunt  r.  Sierra  Butte  G.  M.  Co.,  138  I  Butler's 

U.  S.  483  775 1      Wasli. 


Burch  r.  Cavanaugli,  12  Abb.  Pr,  n.  s. 

(N.  Y.)  410  357 

Burck  V.  Taylor,  39  Fed.  R.  581  81.3,  821, 
823,  824,  842 
Burdell,  E.r  partp,  32  Fed.  R.  681  6.J3,  640 
Burden  r.  Johnson,  107  U.  S.  251  1033 
Burdeit,  In  re,  127  U.  S.  771  702 

Burdick  (.■.  Hale,  7  Biss.  96  821,  824,  845 
Burdsall  r.  Curran,  31  Fed.  R.  918  665 
Burt'ord,  Ex  parte,  1  Cranch  C.  C.  456    658 

V. ,  3  Cranch,  448  717 

Burgess  v.  Graffani,  10  Fed.  R.  216 
Burke  c.  Bunker  Hill  &  S.  M.  &  C 

Co.,  4()  F'ed.  R.  644 

V.  United  States,  13  Ct.  CI.  231 

V.  Seligman,  107  U.  S.  20     543,  776, 

778,  779 
Burkett  i:  Randall,  3  Meriv.  466  547 

Burlington,  The,  137  U.  S.  386  1029 

Burlinuton,   C.   R.  &  N.   Ry.  Co.  v. 

Dunn,  122  U.  S.  513 

V.  Simmons,  123  U.  S,  52       564 

Burnet  c.  Chetwood,  2  Meriv.  441 

V.  Craig,  30  Ala.  135 

Burney  v.  Morgan,  1  Sim.  &  S.  358 
Burnliam  v.  Bo  wen,  111  U.  S.  776 

403,  405.  407 

V.  Dalling,  18  N.  J.  Eq.  132 

V.  Rangelev,  1  Woodb.  &  M.  7 

V. ",  2  Wooilb.  .^  M.  417 

V.  Webster,  1  Woodb.  &  M.  172 

Burnley  c.  Town  of  Jetfersonville,  3 

McL.  336 
Burns,  The,  9  Wall  2-37 

V.  Rosenstein,  135  U  S.  449 

V.  United  States,  4  Ct.  CI.  113 

Burpee  v.  First  Nat.  Bank,  5  Biss.  405 


745 

277 


820 
912 


8.50 
.  5(i9 
364 
357 
120 
402, 
411 
251 
40 
584 
237 


250 
1031 
562 
909 
258, 
259 
703 


Burr,  Ex  prvie,  9  Wheat.  529 

r.  Des  Moines  R.  R.  &  N.  Co.,  1 

Wall.  99  773 

Burrell  r.  Hackley,  35  Fed.  R.  833        463 

r.  Pratt,  35  Fed.  R.  834  463 

Burrowcs  v.  Lock,  10  Ves.  470  582 

Burrus,  In  r?,  136  U.  S.  586    721,  734,  735 
Burton  ;;.  Burton,  79  Cal.  490  591 

V.  Simmons,  2  Cranch  C.  C.  195  516 

V.  Smith,  4  Wash.  522  116 

('.  West  Jersey  Ferry  Co.,   114 

U.  S.  474  786,  1087 

Bush  V.  Kentucky,  107  U.  S   110  837 

Buslinell  v.  Kennedv,  9  Wall.  387    55,  56, 
199.  842,  844 
Bussard  v.  Catalino,  2  Cranch  C.  C. 

421  512,  516,  640 

Butler  w.  Douglass,  3  Fed.  R.  612  543 


■.  Eaton,  141  U.  S.  210 
'.  P^reeman,  Ambl.  301 
'.  Gage,  138  U.  S.  52 
.  Poole,  44  Fed.  R.  586 

.  Shaw,  21  Fed.  R.  321 
Young,  1  Flipp.  276 


Lessee 
101 


Farnsworth, 


1089 

396 

1003 

12,  761, 

770,  780 

18 

5 

4 

39,40 


xl 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  pages.] 


Buiterfiekl  v.  Usher,  91  U.  S.  '246  10:^4 
liiutervvorth  r.  Hailey,  lo  Ves.  ^58       277 

V.  Hill,  114  U.  S.  12«       18,  187,  1U9, 

2UU,  2UG 

V.  Hoe,  112  U.  S.  50  7U7,  7Ub 

Butz  V.  City  of  Muscatine,  8  Wall. 

575  778 

Bulz  T.  E.  R.  Co.  r.  Jacobs  Electric 

Co.,  36  Fed.  K.  lUI  3(i<.) 

Bii.xton  V.  James,  5  De  G.  &  Sm.  80    2o5, 

3G2 

V.  Lister,  3  Atk.  383  300 

Buzard  v.  Houston,  119  U.  S.  347  8,  23 
Byers  v.  Fowler,  12  Ark.  218  790,  79G 
Byrne  v.  Byrne,  2  >ch.  &  Lef.  537  374 
Byron,  In  re,  18  IhhI    R.  722  727 

Bvron  (Lord)  c.  Jolmston,  2  iVIeriv. 

'29  381 


Cabrera,  Ex  parte,  1  AVash.  232  457 

Calm  c.  Qung  Wall  Lung,  28  Fed.  R. 

39G  586, 601 

Caiioon  V.  Ring,  1  Cliff.  592  551 

Calderon  v.  O'Donoliue,  U.  S.  C.  C-, 

S.  I).  N.  Y.,  June,  1891  7,  GO 

Caldwell  r.  Taggart,  4  Pet.  190     133,  135 

V.  Walters,  4  Crancli  V..  C.  577      385 

Calhoun  v.   United  States,  14  Ct.  CI. 

193  931 

California  c.  Chue  Fan,  42  Fed     R. 

8U5  807 

California  A.  S.  P.  Co.  v.  Molitor,  113 

U.  S.  609  652,  976,  979,  981,  989 

Calkins  c.  Bertrand,  8  Fed.  R.  755      581, 


United  States,  1  Ct.  CI.  382 


583 
910, 
911 
563 
1044 


Callaglian  v.  Mvers,  128  U.  S.  017 
Callan  v.  Mav,  2  Black,  541       1024, 
Callicot,  AV,  8  151atchf.  89  725 

Callowav  r.  Dobson,  1  Brock.  119  2:^8 
Calverley  c.  Williams,  1  Ves.  Jr.  211  292 
Calvert  r.  Gray,  2  Coop.  Cli.  171,  /(  379 
Camblos  v.  Philadelphia  &  R.  R.   R. 

Co,  9  Phila.  (Pa.)  411  ;  4  Brew.st. 

(l-a.)563  373,374 

Cambria   Iron    Co.   v.   Asiiburn,    118 

U.S. 54  833 

Cambuston  r.  United  States,  95  U.  S. 

285  797,  1090 

Camden  r.  Mayhew,  129  U.  S.  73  566,  650 
Camden  &  A.'R.  R.  Co.  v.  Stewart,  4 

C.  K.Cireen  (N.  J.),  (iO  533 

CauK  ron  v.  Ilodgus.  127  U.  S.  322        844 

/•.  Mclioberts.  3  Wheat.  591   120,  135 

Cam[)  '■.  Receivers  of  Niagara  Bank, 

2  Paiire  (N.  Y.).  283  429 

Campbell  r.  Boyreau,  21  How.  223   ^771. 

r.  Campliell,  2  M.&C.  25 


92 

288 


2  Ilalst.  Eq.  (N.J.)  710 

r.  City  of  New  York,  35  Fed.  R. 

14  318 


CampbelU-.Holyland,L.  R.Ch  D.  160  575 

i\  James,  3  Feil.  Rep.  513  7.t8 

f. ,  5  Fed.  K.  807  570,  10',t7 

/•. ,  31  Fed.  R.  525  lUil7 

r.  Laclede  Gas    Co.,  119   U.    S. 

445  472 

V.  Mackay,  1  M.  &  Cr.  003  152 

r.  .Mayor,  &c.  of  N.  Y.,  33  Fed. 

R.  795  ■  222,  243, 

V. ,  45  Fed.  R.  243 

V.  Rankin,  99  U.  S.  261 

V.  Seaman,  63  N.  Y.  568 

V.  Tousev,  7  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  64 

V.  United  States,  107  U.  S.  407 


541 
252 
1054 
356 
95 
899, 
909 

v.  Wilcox,  10  Wall.  421  1093 

("amprelle  r.  Balbach,46  Fed.  R.  81  818 
Canal  Co.  v.  Gordon,  6  Wall.  561  127,  130 
Canal  &  C.  Sts.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hart,  114 

U.  S.  654  794 

Candler  r.  Pettit,  1  Paige  (N.  Y.),  168  279 
Cannon  r.  Pratt,  99  U.  S.  619  905 

v.  United  States,  118  U.  S.  355     970, 

1092 
Cape    Ann    Granite   Co.    v.    United 

States,  20  Ct.  CI.  1  913 

Captain  John,  The,  41  Fed.  R.  147      0:^5, 

626,  627,  6:12 

Carey  ?^.  Brown,  92  U.  S.  171  117 

V.  Houston  &  T.  C.  Ry.  Co.,  45 

Fed.  R.  438  174 

Carlisle   v.   Cooper,   3   C.   E.  Green 
(N.  J.),  241  538 

r.  United  States,  16  Wall.  147      902 

,,. .  G  Ct.  CI.  398  9U2 

Carlisle  (Countess  of)  v.  Lord  Berk- 
lev,  Amb.  599  446 
Caril,  Ex  parte,  106  U.  S.  521  727 
Carnochan  v.  Christie,  11  Wheat.  446 


2M), 

287 


East   India 


284 


832 

463 
777 

57(t. 


Carnotic   (Nabob    of) 

Co.,   1    \'es.  Jr.  374 
Caro  ('.  Metropolitan  El.  Rv.  Co  ,  46 

N.  Y.  Super.  Ct.  138 
Carpenter  r.  (.HiieaL'o,  JI.  &  St.  P.  Rv. 

Co.,  47  Fed.  R.  535  831, 
V.  I'rovidence  Wash.  Ins.  Co.,  4 

How.  185 

V.  ,  16  Pet.  495  543,  776, 

V.  Strange,  141  U.  S.  87         237, 

578,  601 

V.  United  States,  42  Fed.  R.  264    97, 

897 
V.  Wcstinghouse  A.   B.  Co.,  32 

Fed.  R.  434  190 

Carper  r.  Fitzgerald,  121  U.  S.  87        751 
Carr  r.  Fife,  41  Fed.  R.  713  804 

)-•. ,  45  Fed   R.  209  844 

r.  United  States,  98  U.  S.  433    95,  96 

r. ,  23Ct.  CI.  118  620 

Carrinston   r.  Florida   R.   R.   Co.,  9 

Blatch.  468  844 

V.  HoUv,  1  Dick.  280  533 

r.  Lei.tz,  40  Fed.  R.  18  267 

r.  Stimson,  1  Curt.  437  513,  514 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 
[References  are  to  pages.] 


xli 


Carrington  (r.ady)  r.  Cantillon,  Buiib. 

107  '  191 

Carroll    r.    Parran,    1     Bland    (Md.), 

125,  n-  <)7o 

,..  Safford,  3  How.  441  10,  777 

Carroll  County  >\  Smith,  111  U.  S. 

5o6  7  7 'J 

Carrot)  Iron  Co.  c.  JMaclareii,  5  II.  L. 

C.  41G  570 

Carson  v.  Donaldson,  45  Fed.  R.  821     804 

/■.  Dunliani,  121  U.  S  421      818,  811), 

822,  844,  849 

r.  Hyatt,  118  U.  S.  279  37,  813 

Carson  &   1{.  Liimlier  Co.   v.   Holtz- 

claw,  3!)  Fell.  It.  578  820,  832,  833 

V. ,  3!)  Fed.  R.  885  828 

Carstairs  r    Mechanics'  &  T.  Ins.  Co  , 

13  Fed.  R.  823  191 

Cart  V.  Hodirkin,  3  vSwanst.  161  550 

Carte  v.  Hall,  3  Atk.  496  250 

Carter  v.  I)e  Brune,  1  Dick.  39  lUl 

r.  Ini;rah.ini,  43  Ala.  78  17(5,  184 

V.  New  Orleans,  19  Fed.  R.  659     833 

Carteret  (Lord)  r.  Paschal,  3  P.  Wnis. 

197  062 

Carilett  v.  Pacific  Ins.  Co.,  1  Paine, 

594  465 

Carver   i:  United    States,  111   U.  S. 

609  899 
Carwick  n.  Yonnor,  2  Swanst.  239  539 
Cary,  In  re,  10  Fed.  R.  622  337,  653 
V.  Domestic   Springbed  Co.,  2(5 

Fed.  R.  38  380 
r.  Lovell  .Manuf.  Co  ,  39  Fed.  R. 

163  588 

Casamnjor  v.  Strode,  1  Sim.  &  S.  381  37() 
Casborne  v.  Barsham,  5  M.  &  C.  113  550 
Case  V.  Beanregard,  !)9  U.  S.  119  25 

V. ,  lOlU.  S.  6S8  25,545 

V.  Clarke,  5  Mason,  70  41 

y.  Kellv,  133  U.  S.  21  542 

V.  Redfield,  4  McL.  526  158,  165 

Casey,  /•;./■  jHir/c,  18  Fed.  R.  86  793 
i;.  Cincinnati  Tvpog.  Union,  45 

Fed.  R.  135  "      ^  372,  .382 

Cassiiis,  The,  41  Fed.  R.  367  ^(W) 

Caster  r.  Wood,  Bahhv.  289  267,  284 

Castle  i'.  BuUard,  23  How.  172  774, 

775,  10s7 
Castro  r.  De  Uriarte,  12  Fed.  R.  250     687 

V.  Hendricks,  23  How.  438      946,95.3 

V.  United  States,  3  Wall.  4(5         UCjI, 

1044,  IO.'kS 
Cathcart  v.  Hewson,  1  Hayes,  173  (i4() 
Catlierwood  r.  (iiipete,  2  Curt.  94  7o4 
Cailett  f.  Pacific  Ins.   Co.,   1    Paine, 

504  41,466,475 

Catlernll  i\  Pundiase,  1  Atk.  290  677 

Catton  r.  Earl   of  Carlisle,  5  Mndd. 

427  307,317 

Causin  r.  Chid)b,  1  Cranch  C  C.  267  (124 
Cavender  r.  Cm  vender,  114  U.  S.  161     221 

r. ,  8  Fed.  i^  611  401 

r. ,  3  McCra.  DH-',  fii).") 

Cawthorn  v.  Clialie,  2  Sim.  &  S.  127     208 


Celluloid   Co.  V.   Crowe    Co.,   U.  S. 

C.  C,  3(1  Circuit  465,  489 

Celluloid    Manut.    Co.    v.    Arlington 

Maruif.  Co.,  34  Fed.  R.  324  870 
V.  Cellonite  Manuf.  Co.,  40  Fed. 

R.  476  564 

r   Chandler,  27  Fed.  R.  9  588 

'■.  Goodyear  D.  V.  Co.,  13  Blatclif. 

375  371, 372 

i:  Russell,  35  Fed.  R.  17         505,  509 

Central    Nat.    Bank    r.    Connecticut 

Mut.  L.  I.  Co.,  104  U.  S.  54  lOS'i 

c.  Hazard,  30  Fed.  R.  484       426,427 

Central  Pacific  R.  R.  v.  Dver,  1  Sawy. 

641  "  ].j4,  1-37 

Central  R.  R.  Co.  r.  Bourbon  Co.,  116 

U.  S.  538  1074 

Central  R.  R.  &  B.  Co.  >:  Pettus,  113 

U.  S.  116  119,  120,  3.33,  580, 

584,  58.3,  042,  643,  644,  645 
Central   Transp.  Co.   r.  Pullman's  P. 

C.  Co.,  139  U.  S.  24         774,  1021,  1089, 

1091 
Central    Trust   Co.   i\  Central    Iowa 

R.  R.  Co.,  38  Fed.  R.  863  584 
('.  East  Tenn  ,  Va.  &  Ga.  R.  Co., 

30  Fed.  R.  895  14,409 
r.  Grant  Locomotive  Works,  135 

U.  S.  207  671,  1020,  1038 
V.  Marietta  &  N.  G.  Rv.  Co.,  48 

Fed.  R.  850  1020 

r. ,  48  Fed    R.  8(34  1020 

/■.  Oliio  Cent.  K.  R.  Co.,  23  Fed. 

R.  .306  419,451 
n.  St.  Louis,  A.  &  T.  Ry.Co.,  40 

Fed.  R. 426  192,  435,  436 

r. ,  41  Fed.  R.  551  -39,  401, 

414,  437 
V. ,  Sheffield   &   B.  C.  I.  & 

Rv.  Co.,  44  Fed.  R.  526  427 
V.  Te.xas  &  St.  L.   Ry.  Co.,  22 

Fed.  Pv.  135  ■    399,  400,  409 

r. ,  23  Fed.  R.  673  412 

r.  ,  23  Fed    R.  703  408,  411 

r. ,  24  Fed.  It.  153  442 

r.  ,  32  Fed.  R.  448  563 

V.  Wabash,  St.  L.   &  P.   R.  R. 

Co  .  23  Fed.  R.  675  448 

r.  ,  23  Fed.  R.  803  422,  424, 

425,  428,  431 

/•. ,  26  Fed.  R.  74  435 

r. ,  27  Fed.  R.  175  5(i2 

r. ,  29  Fed.  R.  618      14,  399,  452 

V. ,  32  Fed.  R.  187  449,  450 

r. ,  .32  Fed.  R.  084   585,  586,  5S7 

r.  ,  34  Fed.  R.  259  422,  434 

V. ,  46  Fed.  R.  26  4:;4,  431 

Centre    v.    Keene,   2   Cranch   C.    C. 

198  515,516 

Cervantes  v.  United  States,  16  How. 

619  962 

Chace  r.  Vasqnez,  11  Wheat  420  1025 
Chadbourn  r.  Coe,  45  Fed.  It.  822  130 
Chadbourne   v.  German   Araer.   Ins. 

Co.,  31  Fed.  11.  625  584 


xlii 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


288 
121 


109 


[References 
Chadwick  v.  Broadwood,  3  Beav.  316     247 

V.  United  States,  3  Fed.  K.  75U     465, 

46G,  481 
Chaffee  r.  Havward,  20  How.  208       1062 

V.  United  States,  18  Wall.  516      787 

Cliaffin  1-.  Taylor,  IIG  U.  S.  567  1099 

Cliaires    v.    United   States,    3    How. 

611  109*4 

Chalie  v.  Pickering,  1  Keen,  749  430,  466 
Ciianiberlain   v.   Agar,  2   Vcs.   &  B. 

259  246 

V.  American  Nat.  L.  I.  Co.,  11 

Hun,  370  822 

/•.  Mensing,  47  Fed.  R.  435     688,  690 

Clianiberlaine    v.   Chester  &   B.   Hy. 

Co.,  1  Exch.  869  343,  344 

Ciiambers,  In  re,  44  Fed.  R.  786  790 

V.  Green,  L.  R.  20  Eq.  552     698,  699 

i:  Harrington,  111  U.  S.  350        1019 

c.  McDougal,  42  Fed.  K.  694        430, 

818,  820,  822 
Chaniley    v.    Lord  Dunsany,  2   8ch. 

&  Lef.  690  2b7, 

Ciiancey  v.  May,  Free.  Ch.  592 
Chandler  v.  Thompson,   30   Fed.  R. 

38  767,  782,  780 

Chandos  (Duke   of)  r.  Talbot,  2  P 

Wnis.  372 
Chanute  City  v.  Trader,   132   U.  S. 

210  1007,  1008 

Chapin  v.  Sears,  18  Fed.  R.  814  158 

V.  Walker,  6  Fed.   R.  794;    2 

McCra.  175  250,  286,  287 

Ciiaplin  V.  Young,  6  L.  T.  n.  s.  97  415 
Chapman  v.  Barger,  4  Dill.  557      44,  Ml, 

812 

!-.  Barnev,  129  U.  S.  677         89,118, 

284,  584,  688,  849,  1090 

V.  Borer,  1  Fed.  R.  274  13 

7-.  Derby,  2  Vern.  117  4 

r.  School  District  No.  1,  Deady, 

II 18  147,214,229,250,256 

Chap[)ede]aine      i'.      Dechenau.x,     4 

Cranch,  3(;6 
Chappell  V.  Bradshaw,  128  U.  S.  132 

n.  Purday,  4  Y.  &  C.  485 

V.  Sheard,  1  Jur.  x.  s.  996 

Charkich,  Matter  of,  L.   R.  8  Q.  B. 

197  ;  42  L.  J.  Q  B.  75 
Charles    River     Bridge    v.    Warren 

Bridge,  6  Pick.  (Mass.)  376 
Chase  V.   Dunham,  1  Paige  (N.  Y.), 

572 

V.  Edwards,  2   Wend.  (N.  Y.) 

283 

r.  Sanborn,  6  Off.  Gaz.  932 

Chateauiiav  ().  &  1.  Co.,   Petitioner, 
128  \J.  S.  544        703,  775,  784,  785,  787 

Blake,  35  Fed    P.  804  1048 

Clintfield  V  Bo  vie,  105  U.  S.  231  1029 
ChattanooL'a   H.  v^-   C.   1?.   Co.  /•.  Cin-' 

cinnati,  N.  O.  &  T.   P.    Hv.  Co.,  44 
Fed.  P.  4.-,6  ■  817,  823 

Cheang  Kce  r.  United  States,  3  Wall. 
320  1090 


56 
994 
113 
362 

685 

392 

274 

485 
362 


are   to  pages.] 

Chedworth  ( Lord)  v.  Edwards,  8  Ves. 

46  353 

Cheesman  r.  Hart,  42  Fed.  R.  98    337,  782 

Shreve,  37  Fed.  R.  36  36 

Cheney  v.  Hughes,  188  U.  S.  403         1060 
Cheong  Ah   Mov    i-.   United    States, 

113U.  S.  216"  1079 

Cherokee    Co.    Comm'rs    r.    Wilson, 

109  U.  S.  621  1079 
Cherokee   Indians    v.   Cherokee    Na- 
tion, 19  Ct.  CI.  35                        910,  912 
Cherokee  Nation  r.  Georgia,  5  Pet.  1     107 
V.  Southern  Kan.  Ry.  Co.,  135 

U.  S.  641  151,  158,  225 

Cherrey  v.  Monro,  2  Barb.  Ch.  (N.  Y.) 

618  214 

Chertsy  Market,  hi  re,  6  Price,  261       341 
Chesapeake  &  O.  Canal  Co.  v.  Union 

Bank,  8  Pet.  259  1022 

Chesapeake  &  O.  R.  R  Co.  r.  Patton, 

5  W.  Va.  234  357 

V.  United  States,  19  Ct.  CI.  300    912 

V.  ,  20  Ct.  CI.  49  898 

V.  White,  111  U.  S.  134  845 

Chester  r.   Life  Assoc,  of  /\nier.,  4 

Fed.  R.  487  2'.)9,  300,  388 

Chetwynd  v.  Lindon,2  Ves.  Sen  450    218 
Cliicago  &  A.  Rv.  Co.  r.  New  York, 

L.  E.  &  W.  R.^Co ,  34  Fed.  R  516     373 
1-.  Union  R.  M.  Co.,  109  U.  S. 

702  222,  243,  271,  295,  532 

Chicago  &  V.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Fosdick.  106 

U.  S.  47  574,  575,  1019,  1080,  1089 

Chicago,  B.  &Q.  R.  Co.  r.  Burlington, 

C.  R.  &  N.  R.  Co ,  34  Fed.  R.  481    374, 

380 
Chicago,  L  &  N  P.  R.  R.  Co.  r.  Min- 
nesota &  N.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  29  Fed 

R.  337 
Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Beck 

er,  32  Fed,  R.  849 

r.  Hartshorn,  30  Fed.  R.  541 

V.  Third  Nat.  Bank,  134  U.  S. 

276  278,  281,  289 

Cliicago,  St.  L.  &  N.  O.  R.  R.  Co.  r. 

Macomb,  2  Fed.  R.  18         171,208,  216, 

218 
Chicago,  St.  P.  ^L  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Dakota  Count  V,  28  Fed.  R.  219  39 

r.  Hoberts,"lll  U.  S.  690  850, 

1018,  1022 
Chickasaw  Nation  v.  United  States, 

19  Ct.  V\.  133 
Child  r.  United  States,  6  Ct.  CI.  44 
Cliildras  r.  Eiuorv,  8  Wheat.  642 
Childs  r.  I)istrict"of  Columbia,  19  Ct. 

CI.  332 
Chiles,  AV,  22  Wall.  157 
Chils  r.  (ironlund,  41  Fed.  R.  115 

r. ,  41  Fed.  I{.  505  782, 

Chisholm  c.  Georgia,  2  Dall.  419 


834 


813 
215 


915 

9:;2 

56 


0.''2 
(i50 

7S2 
^2,  787 
28,  29, 

]od 

Chittenden  i:  Darden,  2  Woods,  437     763 
Cholmondelev  (.Marquis)  v.  Lord  Clin- 
ton, 2  Jac.&W.l  112,115 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  pages.] 


xliii 


Cliulinondeley  (Marquis)  c.  Lord  Clin- 
ton, 2  Moriv.  71  27«,  409 
Ciiorbin  o:  Uiiitud  Suites,  6  Ct.  CI.  480  406 
Clioteau  V.   United  otates,  20  Ct.  Ci. 

2.30  910 

Cliouteau  v.  Barlow,  110  U.  S.  2;J8  1085 
Cliowick  V.  Dimes,  3  Beav.  290     208,  200, 

;;88 

Cliristenseu,  In  re,  43  Fed.  R.  243  748 
Christian   v.   Atlantic  &  N.  C.  K.  K. 

Co.,  133  U.  S.  233  106,  130 

c.  United  States,  7  Ct.  CI.  431       002 

Christie,  Matter  of,  5  Paige  (N.  Y.), 

242  482,  585 


f.  Craig,  2  Meriv.  137 

Christmas  v.  Russell,  14  Wall.  69 
Christy,  In  re,  3  How.  292 

V.  I'ri.igeon,  4  Wall.  196 

Church  V.  Ilubbart,  2  Cranch,  186 


353 
42 
008 
778 
474, 
475 


?'.  Marsh,  2  Hare,  052  337 

Ciiurcli    of   Jesus    Christ   v.    United 

States,  130  U.  S.  1  397 

Churton  v.  Frewen,  L.  K.  1  Eq.  238  284 
Circassian,  The,  6  Ben.  512  026 

City,  The,  o.  Lamson,  9  Wall.  477  778 
City  Bank  v.  Bangs,  2  Paige  (N.  Y.), 

570  180,  181 

l:  Skelton,  2  Blatchf.  14         345,  347 

City  of  Lincoln,  The,  25  Fed  R.  835  858 
City  of  Washington,  The,  13  Blatchf. 

410  625,  627 

Claasen,  In  re,  140  U.  S.  200     1047,  1050, 

1060 
Clatlin  V.  Commonwealth  Ins.  Co.,  110 

U.  S.  81  833 

Claiborne  County  c  Brooks,  111  U.  S. 

400  780 

Clare    v.    National    City    Bank,    14 

Blatchf.  445  584 

V.  Wood,  1  Hare,  314  464 

Claridge  v.  Hoar,  14  Ves.  59  227 
Clark,  Ex  parte,  128  U.  S.  395  748 
V.  American  D.  &  I.  Co.,  25  Fed. 

R.  641  639 

V.  Barnard,  108  U.  S.  436  102 

V.  Bever,  139  U.  S.  96  778,  810 

V.  Blair,  14  Fed.  K.  812  064 

V.  Fredericks,  105  U    S.  4  1086 

V.  Freeman,  11  Beav.  112  371 

V.  Hall,  7  Paige  (N.  Y.),  382         065 

y.  Hancock,  94  U.  S.  493  1007 

V.  Keith,  106  U.  S.  464  lll99 

r.  KiUian,  103  U.  S.  706  070,  (iTl 

c.  Lord  Rivers,  L.  R.  5  Eq.  91       150 

V.  Periam,  2  Aik.  337  149 

V.  Reyburn,  8  Wall.  318  574 

V.  Scott,  5  Fisher  Pat.  Cas.  245     251 

V.  Smith,  13  Pet.  li)5  10,  779 

r.  Sohier,  1  Woodb    &  M.  308       781 

y.  United  States,  99  U.  S.  493        903 

V. ,  11  Ct.  ("1   098  902 

V.  Wooster,  1 19  U.  S.  322  17,  18 

Cl.nrk's    Ex'rs   v.  Van    Rienisdvk.  9 
Cranch,  153  257,  462,  403 


Clarke,  Ex  parte,  1  Russ.  &  M.  563       376 

V. ,  100  U.  S.  399     719,  726,  729, 

750 

V.  Byne,  13  Ves.  386 

c.  Mathewson,  12  Pet.  164 


178 

42,  142, 

303,  308 

303,  308 

91 


L\ ,  2  Sumner,  262 

V:  Morey,  10  Johns.  69 

V.  Price,  2  Wils.  Ch.  Cas.  157       306, 

307 

r.  Rippon,  1  B.  &  Aid.  586  770 

r.  Tipping,  4  Beav.  588  287,  288 

u.  Tiuelkeld,  2  Crancii  C.  C.  408   6(i5 

(;.  White.  12  Pet.  178  367,  373 

Clarkhuft  r.  Wisconsin,  L  &  N.  R.  R. 

Co.,  26  Fed.  R.  465  849 

Claxton  V.  Adams,  1  MacAr.  (D.  C.) 

496  514,  518 

Clay  V.  Field,  138  U.  S.  464  34,  1020 

r.  Smith,  3  Pet.  411  1092 

Claybrook  r.  City  of  Owensboro',  23 

Fed.  R.  634  373 

Clayton  v.  Utah,  132  U.  S.  6-32       966,  970 
Cleaver  v.  Traders'  Ins.  Co.,  40  Fed. 

R.  711  844 

i\ ,  40  Fed.  R.  863  584,  580 

Clement  r.  Griffith,  C.  P.  Coop.  470      .326 
Clements  v.  Moore,  6  Wall.  299    271,  284, 

1086 
Cleveland  v.  Chamberlain,  1  Black, 

419  652,  1066.  1067 

Cleveland    F.    &    B.    Co.   v.    United 

States  R.  S.  Co.,  41  Fed.  R.  476       111, 

165 
Cleveland  Ins.  Co.  v.  Reed,   1   Biss. 

180  11,235 

Cleveland  R.  M.  Co.  v.  Rhodes,  121 

U.  S.  255  1084 

Clews  V.  Woodstock  Iron  Co.,  44  Fed. 

R.  31  191,  199 

Clifton  V.  United  States,  4  How.  242    482 
Clinch  y.  Financial  Corporation,  L.  R. 

4Ch.  117  119 

Clinton  i:  Englebrecht,  13  Wall.  434     27, 

759 
V.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  122  U.  S. 

469  787,  1076 

Clinton  Bridge,  The,  10  Wall.  454        236 
Clintonia,  The,  11  Fed.  R.  740  027 

Cliquot's  Champagne,  3  Wall.  114        482 
Clodimoro  Cota,  Ex  parte,  110  U.   S. 

:-iS5  989,  993 

Clough  V.  Curtis,  134  U.  S.  301,     19,  700 


967 
610 
386 
898 
38 


r.  United  States,  47  Fed.  R.  791 

Cluiu  r.  Hrewer,  2  Curt.  500 
CIvde  i:  United    States,  13  Wall.  38 
Cdal  Co.  r.  Blatchford,  11  Wall.  172 
Coatcs  ('.  Merrick  Thread  Co.,  41  Fed. 

R.  73  519 

Cobb  V.  Globe  Mut.  L.  I.  Co.,  3  Hughes, 

452  839 

Cobbcltiom  V.  William,  Chan.  Cal.  II.      3 
Coburn  v.  Cedar  Valley  L.  &  C.  Co., 

138  U.  S.  196  267,  291,  331 


xliv 


C()1>urn  V.  Cedar  Valley  L,  &  C.  Co., 

2o  Ft- J.  K.  791  _  822 

Cochrane  r.  Det-iier,  95  IT.  S.  355  S'-U 

r.  O'Brien,  2. Jones  &  La  T.    380  178 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 

[Refereuoes  are  to  pages.J 

Colvin,  Matter  of,  3  Md.  Cn.  279  395 

ConHnaii(ler-in-('hiet',  The,  1  Wall.  43  803 
Coniiiiercial  &  S.  Bank  y.  Corbett,  5 
Savvy.  172  839 


Cock  i:  Kvans,  9  Veri,'.  (Tenn.)  287      283    Coniinercial  IMut.  M.  I.  Co.  v.  Union 


Cockcrotr,  AV  luule,  1U4  U.  S.  578  1030 
Cocker  r.  lievis,  1  Ch.  Cas  61  080 
r.  I'lanklia  11.  >i  B.  Co.,  1  Siory, 

It;;*  519,  520 

Co(hin<;ton  r.  Houlditch,  5  Sim.  280    305 

r.  Joimsione,  1  Beav.  520  417 

Co.-  f.  Louisville  &  X.  K.  K.  Co.,  3 

Fi/d.  K.    775  373,  374 

r.  New  Jersey  Midland  Uv.  C^o  , 

27  N.  J.  Kq.  37  "  401,  425,  42G 

Coffeen  r.  Hnniton,  5  McL.  250  582 

CoflVv  f.  United  Stales,  110  U.  S.  427  872, 

873 

V. ,  110  U.  S.  4:;0  1080,  1087 

Coffin  '■•  Chattanooga  W.  &  P.  Co.,  44 

P^ed.  H.  535  334 

V.  Heath,  tj  Met.  (Ma.^s.)  76  574 

Cogswell  r.  Fordyce,  128  U.  S.  391  970 
Cohen  r.  Connnissionors  of  Goldsboro, 

77  X.  C.  2  857 

Cohens  r.  Virginia,  0  Wheat.  264  35, 

904,  995 
Cohn  l:  LonisviUe.  X.  0.  &  T.  11.  K. 

Co.,  39  Fed.  IL  L'27  833 

Coiron  r.  Millaudon,  19  How.  113         130, 

1087 
Coit  r.  Cami)l)cll.  82  X.  Y.  509  300 
r.  Xorth  Carolina  G.  A.  Co..  9 

Fed.  K.  577  464,  707,  708 

Coll)urn  '•.  l)un(;ond)e,  9  Sim.  151  113 

Cole  S.  M.  Co.  l:  Virginia  &  U.  II.  W. 

Co.,  1  Sawy.  470  373 

r. .  1  Sawy  (ks5  338,374,387,542 

Coleman  -•.  Martin',  0  Blatchf.  119         3:53 

r.  ,  0  liiatchf.  29 i  270 

r.  West  ll.artlepool  Hv.  Co  ,8  W. 

1!   734  '  376 

Colgate  )•.   Compasinie  Francaise,  23 

Fed.  ]l.  82  '  204,  404,  500,  7<:7,  768 

Collins  r.  I'eebles,  2  Fisher's  I'at.  Cas. 


Mut   Ins.  Co.,  19  How.  318  254 

Connnibsioners  i:  Aspinvvall,  24  How. 

376  705 

c.  Gorman,  19  Wall.  661        648,  795 

r.  Sellew,  99  U.  S.  624  715,  716 

Commissioners  of  Johnson  County  v. 

Thayer,  74  U.  S.  631  777 

Connnissioner  of  Patents  v.  White- 
ley,  4  Wall.  522  706,711 
Commissioners  of  Tippecanoe  County 

1-.  Lucas,  93  U.  S.  108  1002,  1018,  1019 
Commonwealth  v.  Boley,  1  W.  N.  C. 

303  '  750 

1-.  Browne,  1  S.  &  R.  (Pa  )  382 

756 
r.  Franklin  Ins.  Co.  115  Mass. 

'278 
r.  Frink,  4  Am.  Law  Reg.  n.  s. 

700  737 
('   Louisville  Bridge  Co.  42  Fed. 

R.  241  ^  819,  821 

r.  Low,  Thatch.  Cr.  Cas.  477         729 

Comstock  V.  Herron,  45  Fed.  R.  600 

143,  250 
Concannon  r.  Cruise,  2  IMoll.  332  465 

Conn  V.  Penn,  5  Wheat.  424  237,  506, 

508 
Coimecticut  Mut.  L.  I.  Co.,  Petitioner, 

131  U.  S.  App.  clxx.v  703 

i:  Cuslnnan,  108  U.  S.  51         10,  575 

r.   Union  Trust  Co.,  112  U.  S. 

250  487,  7G0 

Connecticut  &  P.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hendce, 

27  Fed.  R.  678  532 

Conner  r.  Belden,  8  Daly  (N.  Y.),  2.57 

451,  452 
r.  Skagit  Cumberland  Coal  Co., 

45  Fed.  K.  802  824 
Connolly  r.  Belt,  5  Crancli  C.  C.  405  357 
r.  kretz,  78  N.  Y.  020                     4.52 


.541 


W(dlington,  31  Fed.  R.  244 


12    Con  oil  V  r.  Taylor,  2  Pet.  556 
m    r'  Wells," 33  Fed.  H.  205 


38,  278 
121 


('ollins  Co.  r.  Coes,  8  Fed.  H.  517  Oi'iti  !  Conry  r.  Caullield,  2  Ball  ^^  B.  225      287 


(ollinson  r. ,  18  Ves.  353       323,  45' 

458 
Colrnan  r    I'aslern  Counties  Ry.  Co., 

10  P.eav.  ]  '     312,  343 

Columbian  (iovt.  r.  liothschild,  1  Sim. 

91  174 

Colonial  &  U.  S.  M.  Co.  )•.   Ilutchin- 


Consolidated  S   S.  Co.  r.  Lamson   C. 

S.  S.  Co.,  41  Fed.  K  833  45 

Consolidated    S.    V.   Co.    v.   Ashton 

Valve  Co.,  20  Fed.  R.  319  17 

Consoli<lated    T.    L.    Co.   r.    Kansas 

Ci  v  V.  Co.,  43  Fed.  R.  204  397 

Const  r.  Harris,  Turn.  &  R.  496     895,  415 


son  .M.  Co..  4  1  1-\<1.  R    219 
Colorado,  Tla-,  21   Fed.  U.  592 
Colson  '■.  I.ewi<.  2  Wheat.  377 

Thom[)<on.  2  Wheat.  336 


112  :  Continental   Ins.  Co.  v.  Rlioads,   119 
628  j      U.  S   2:;7  278,  584,  8-19 

41    Contiru'iHal     Store     Service     Co.    v. 
344  ,.     Clark,  100  X.  Y.  3»;5  30 

Colton  r.  li.iss  2  Paiue  (X.  Y.),  396     150  ,  Converse,  /„  /v,  42  Fed.  R.  217  ;  11  S. 
Columbia  College  v.  l-vnch,  70  X.  Y.  ^       |      C.  Hep.  191  729,  730,  733 

4  1'>  .3(1    r.  Michigan  Dairy  Co.,  45  Fed. 

'■    Thacher,  S7  X.  Y.  :;il  .315         R    is  155,158 

Colninbian    Ins.    Co.   c.   Stevens,   37  j  Con  vers '•.  Lord  Abergavemiy,  1  Atk. 

X.  Y.  536  429 '      285  '         122,  156 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


[References 

Cook    V.   Bamfield,    3    Swanst.   GOT 

674,  b70,  677 

V.  liny,  4  How.  (Miss.)  485  547 

V.  Bee,  2  Tenn.  Cli   344  28:J 

c.  Burnley,  11  Wall.  G-Jt)      510,  1090 

lO'.ll,  lOU'J 
V.  Manclus,  3  Johns.  Ch.  (N.  Y.) 

427  2:34 

I'.  StaMts,  18  Barb.  (N   Y.)  407  483 

V.  Uniied  States,  lo8  U.  IS.  157 

1014 

V.  Wliitney,  3  Wooils,  715  833 

Cook   ("oiiMty  i'.  Calumet  &  C.  C.  & 

D.  Co.,  138  U.  S.  635  967,  994 

Cooke  c.  Davies,  Turn.  &  II.  309         186, 


V.  Gvvyn,  3  Atk  089 

V.  ISeligaian,  7  Fed.  K.  263     818, 


280 
440 
821, 
822 
Cooley  I).  .Mc Arthur,  .35  Fed.  R.  372  813 
Coombe  v.  Stewart,  13  Beav.  11  575 

Coombs  r.  Brooks,  3  De  G.  &  S.  452  553 
Coon  *•.  Abbott,  37  Fed.  R.  98  504 

Cooper,  In  re.,  1.38  U.  S.  404  695 

V.  Galbraith,  3  Wash.  .546  40,  41 

V.  Lewis,  2  Phill.  178  532 

V.  Matthevs,  8  Law  Hep.  413;  5 

Penn.  L.  J.  38  381,  387 
V.  New  Haven  S.  B.  Co.,  18  Fed. 

R.  588  584 

V.  People,  13  Col.  337  651 

c.  Philibs,  L.  R  2  II.  L.  170  3 

V.  Richmond  &  1).  11.  Co  ,  42  Fed. 

R.  697  828 

V.  Sulilesinffer,  HI  U.  S.  148  7^6 

v.  Wood,  -5'  Beav.  391  325 

Cooper  Abinuf.  Co.  v.  Ferguson,  113 

U.  .S.  727  190 

Copeland  c.  Wheeler,  4  Bro.  C.  C.  256 

258,  264 
Copen  V.  Flesher,  1  Bond,  410  155,  279 
Corbin  r.  County  of  Black  Hawk,  105 


U.  H.  a-:)9 

Core  y.  Vina),  117  U.  S   347 
Cornelius  r.  Kessel,  128  U.  S.  456 
Cornell  r.  (jreen,  43  Fed.  K.  105 
Cornett  v.  Williams,  20  VVall.  226 
(/Orniiiu'  /•.  Troy  Iron  &  Nail  Factory, 

15  How.  451  1024,  1098 

Corsar  v.  Reed,  17  A.  B   540  775 

Clortes,  In  re,  136  U.  S.  330  728 

Cortes  Co.  v.  Tannhauser,  18  Fed  R. 

667 
Costs  in  C^ivil  Cases,  1  Blatchf.  652 
(,'ota,  Ex  parte,  110  U.  S.  385 
(^ote  V.  United  States,  3  Ct.  CI.  64 
Cottier  c.  Stimson,  18  Fed.  R.  689 

v.  ,  20  Fed.  II.  90(5 

V. ,  10  Sawy.  212 

Cottinghain  r.  Larl  of  Shrewsbury,  y 

Hare,  027 
Cottle  c.  Krenientz,  25  Fed.  R.  494 


55 
816 
9'.t4 
200 
470 


511 

5 

7.52 

912 
GST 
086 
G8G 


xlv 

are  to  pages.] 

Coulson  V.  Walton,  9  Pet.  62  108 

Counselman,  In  re,  44  Fed.  R.  268       488, 

490 
Countess  of  Carlisle  v.  Lord  Berkley, 

Amb.  599  446 

Countess  of  Plymouth  v.  Bladon,  2 

•Vern.  32  539 

Countess  of  Portland  v.  Prodgers,  2 

Vern.  104  91 

County  Court  of  Taylor  Co.  v.  Balti- 
more &  O.  R.  R.  Co  ,35  Fed.  R.  161 

814,  832 
Cousins  V.  Smith,  13  Ves.  164  375 

,,.. ,  13  Ves.  544  121 

Covell  (.:  Heyman,  111  U.  S.  176  14 

Coveny  i-.  AUiill,  1  Dick.  355  497 

Covert  V.  Sarjjent,  42  Fed.  R.  298         570 
C^ovington   Drawbridge  Co.  v.  Shep- 
herd, 21  How.  112  397 
Covinu'on  Stock  Yards  Co.  v.  Keith, 

12  lU.  S.  248  1047,  1048 

Cowdray  v.  Cross,  24  Beav.  445  657 

Cowdrey  v.  Galveston,  H.  &  H.  R.  R. 
Co.,  93  U.  S.  3-52  407,  642,  G43,  G44,  645 

l:  Railroad  Co.,  1  Woods,  331      420, 

421,443,444,449,4-50 
Cowles    V.   Mercer  County,  7  Wall. 
118  9,38,688 

V.  Whitman,  10  Conn.  121  341 

Cowslad  V.  Cely,  Prec.  in  Ch.  83  127 

Cowtan  r.  Williams.  9  Ves  107  178,  181 
Cox  r.  Barney,  14  Blatchf.  289      797,  798 

V.   Land  &   Water  Journal  Co., 

L.  R.  9  iMi.  .324  364 

f.  United  States,  6  Pet.  172  469, 

1031,  10.32 

r.  Wriglit,  9  Jur.  x.  s.  98  93,  327 

Coy  V.  Perkins,  13  Fed.  R.  Ill  585,  586 
Coyne  «   Union  Pacilic  R.  R.  Co.,  133 

U.  S.  370  778 

Cragin  v.  Lovell,  109  U.  S.  194  25,  1087 
Craig  V.  Brown,  Pet.  C  C  3-32  479 

r.  Leitensdorfer,  123  U.  S.  189        24 

V.  Smith,  100  U.  S.  226  1054 

Crampton  v.  Zabriskie,  101  U.  S.  601  17 
Cranilall  r.  Nevada,  (i  Wall.  35  1059 

Crane,  Ex  /lar/e,  5  Pet.  189     701,  702,  703 

r.  McCoy,  1  Bond,  422  23 

f.  Morris,  6  Pet.  -598  774,  775 

Crane  Iron   Co.  v.   Iloanland,  108  U. 

S.  5  ^  1069 

Crawford  r.  Points,  13  How.  11  1024 

r.  The    William    Penn,    1    Pet. 

C.  C.  lOG  91 

r.  ,  3  Wash.  484  224,  250 

Crawshay  r.  Soutter.  G  Wall.  739  1036 
Crease  r.  Babcock,  10  Met.  (Mass.) 

532  120 

Credit  Co.  r.  Ark.   Cent.  R.  R.,  128 


578 

248, 

249 

Conghlin  r.  District  of  Cobnnbia.  106 

U.  S.  7  1085,  1091,  1092 


U.  S.  258 


15  Fed.  R 


1038,  1039,  1045 
46         426 


Crehore  >:  Ohio  &  M.  Rv.  Co.,  131 
U.  S.  240  '         84 1 

Crenicn  /•.  Hawkes,  2  Jones  &  La 
T.  674  441 


xlvi 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


[References 

Crensliaw,  Ex  parte,  15  Pet.  1 19  107U,  1092 
C.'resceiU   City  L.  S.  Co.   r.  Butcher's 

Un.  L.  S.  Co.,  12  Fed.  R.  22o     211/ 232, 

24H 
Cresse\'  r.  Meyer,  138  U.  S.  525  12,  2o5 
Creiize    r.   Bisliop  of  London,  Dick. 

Ua7  440 
Crew  V.  Jolliff,  Tree,  in  CIi.  93  583 
V.  Martin,  1  Fowler's  E.xch.  Pr. 

225  193 

Crews  V.  Burcimm,  1  Black,  3-")2  154 

Crittenden,  Matter  of,  2  Flipj).  212      621, 

024,  029,  631,  632 

r.  Field,  8  Gray  (Mass.),  021         547 

Crocker  Nat.  Bank  v.  Pagensteclier, 

41  Fed.  H.  705  7().J,  840 

Crocket  v.  Lee,  7  Wheat.  522  145,  1084 
Crockett  c.  Bisliton,  2  Madd.  446  484 

Crott  c.  Dav,  7  Beav.  !s4  364 

Crofts  c.  Wortley,  1   Chan.  Cas.  241 

231,  233 
Crofut  V.  Brandt,   13  Abb.  Pr.  N.  s. 

132  027,032 

Cromwell  v.  County  of  Sac,  90  U.  S. 

51  777 

Cropper  v.  Coburn,  2  Curt.  405  350,  350 
Crosby  v.  Buchanan,  23  Wall.  420  1087 
Cross,  In  re,  20  Fed.  R.  824  727 

V.  De  Valle,  1  Wail.  5    117,  118,  290, 

291,  292,  295,  578 

r.  Morjjan,  0  Fed.  R.  241  283 

Cross  V.  United  States,  14  Wall.  479    934 

c. ,  5  Ct.  CI.  88  934 

V. ,  8  Ct.  CI.  1  9.34 

Crosse  v.  Bedingfield,  12  Sim   35  178, 

216,  462 
Crossley   v.  Derby  G.  L.  Co.  4  L.  J. 

Cii.  N.  .s.  25  18 

v.  New  Orleans,  20  Fed.  R.  352       17 

Croucli  '•.  Hickin,  1  Keen,  385  221 

V.  Kerr,  38  Fed.  R.  549  208,  250 

Crow  V.  Tyrell,  2  Madd.  397  277 
Crowell  V.  Ilopkinton,  45  N.  II.  9  466 
r.  Randall,  10  Pet.  :-'68                 1004 

r.  United  States,  0  Ct.  CI.  23 

Crowfoot  V.  Mander,  9  Sim.  390   29 


are  to  pages.] 

Cummings    r.    National    Bank,    101 

U.  S.  153  4,  10,  11,  345,  779 

Cummins  v.  Adams,  2  Ir.  Eq.  393         679 
Cumiintrliam    r.    Macon   &  B.    R.   R. 

Co.,  109  U.  S.  440        101,  102,  103.  105, 

100,  371 

V.  Neagle,  1-35  U.  S.  1  722 

V.  Otis,  1  Gall.  166         519,  520,  521, 

522,  524 
Cunynghain    v.    Cunyngham,    Anib. 

89  060,  068 

Curliiiii    r.    Marquis  Townuhend,   19 

Ves.  628  395,  445 

Curnow  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Cv>.,  44  Fed. 

K.  305  84'.l 
Curran  v.  Craig,  22  Fed.  R.  101  420,  439 
v.  St.  Ciiarles  Car  Co  ,  32  Fed. 

R.  835 
Curry  v.  Lloyd,  22  Fed.  R  258 
Curteis  v.  Gaudier,  Madd.  &  G.  123 


Crowley  v.  Ciiri.'itensen,  137  U.  S.  80 
(^ro.xon  r.  Lever,  12  W.  R.  237 
Crov  V.  Marshall,   21  Week.   L.   Bui. 

489 
Cucullu  V.  Emmcrling.  22  How.  83 


929 
305, 
318 
750 


Cudahy  r.  Mc'ticoch,  37  Feci.  R.  1 
Cudily,  Kr  purl,',  40  Fed.  l^  iVl 
, 'Petitioner,  1.31  U.  S.  280     726, 

Cuff,-.  Piateli.  4Russ  242 

('iillen    »•.    Duke   of  Queensberry,    1 

Bro.  C.  C.  101 
Culver  r.  Utte,  133  U.  S.  655 

r.  WoodrnlT.  5  Dili.  392 

('umminu's   r.   Akron  C.   &   P.  Co.,  0 

Blatcl.f.  509 
'•.  Coleman,  7  Rich.  Eq.  (S.  C), 

509 


436 

1087 

813 

745 

727, 
745 
138 

121 
473 
8,13 

490 

251 


290 
171 
642, 
643 


Curtis,  Ex  parte,  106  U.  S.  371  725,  726, 

729 

V.  Banker,  130  Mass.  355  902 

V.  Railway  Co  ,  6  McL.  401  516 

Curzon  v.  De  la  Zouch,  1  Swanst.  103  221 
Gushing  v.  Laird,  0  Ben.  408  861 

Cust  V.  Boode,  1  Sim.  &  S.  21  222 

(^uthbert  v.  Galloway,  35  Fed.  R.  400  536 
Cutting,  Ex  parte,  94  U.  S.  14      703,  lOoO 

V.  Florida  \iy.  &  N.  Co.,  43  Fed. 

R.  743  433,  562 

V. ,  45  Fed.  R.  444  334 

V.  Gilbert,  5  Blatchf.  2.59  154 

Cuykendall  v.  Miles,  10  Fed.  R.  342      95, 

430 

D. 

DaCosta  r.  DaCosta,  3  P.  Wms.  140  93 
Dailv  V.  United  States,  17  Ct.  CI.  144  898 
Dainese  r.  Kendall,  119  U.  S.  53  1023 

Dakin  v.  Union  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  5  Fed. 

R.  665  211,246 

Dakota  County  v.  Glidden,  113  U.  S. 

222  100() 

Dalby  v.  Puilen,  1  Russ.  &  M.  290  565 
Dale  i:  McEvers,  2  Cow.  (X.  Y.)  118  541 
Dale  Tile  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Hyatt,  125 

U.  S.  46  .30 

Dalglish  V.  Jarvie,  2  Macn.  &  G.  231    3K), 

387 
Dal  ton  r.  Thomson,  1  Dick.  97  496 

Dalv  c.  Kellv,  4  Dow.  417  353 

r.  Maguire,  0  Blatchf.  137  520 

Daly's  Lessee  r.  James,  S  Wiieat.  495  777 
Dancer  r.  Hastings,  4  Bing.  2  420 

Dandridire  c  Washington's  E.x'rs,  2 

Pet.  370  110,  127 

Daniel  r.  Mitcliell,  1  Story,  198  606 

Daniels  r.  liailroad  Co.,  3  Wall.  250  976 
Danville  r.  Brown,  128  U.  S.  503  1047 
Darley  r.  Nicholson.  2  I)r.&  War.  80  400 
Darlington    (Earl    of)    v.    Bowes,    1 

Eden,  271  552 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  pages.] 


xlvii 


95 


1)02 
703 


Diirnell  v.  Reyny,  1  Vern.  344  243,  264 
Dart  c.  McKiniiey,  9  Hlatclif  359  840 
Dartmoutli    Sav.  Bank   v.   Bates,  44 

Fed.  U.  54(3  789 

Darwent  c.  Walton,  2  Atk.  510.  12 F 

U'Aiibry    (l)uchesse)    v.    Porter,  41 

Fed.  U.  GS 
Dauphin  i\  United  States,  6  Ct.  CI 

221 
Davenport,  Ex  parte,  G  I'et.  00 1 
u.  County  of  Dodge,  105  U.  S. 

237  704,  705 

r.  Davenport,  6  Mad'd.  251  375 

V.  Dows,  18  Wall.  026  131 

V.  Flctclier,  10  How.  142     1040,  1040 

r.  Paris,  136  U.  8.  580  773 

V.  Stafford,  8  IJeav.  503  079 

Da  vers  v.  Davers,  2  P.  Wms.  410         404 

Davidson  v.  Lanier,  4  Wail.  447         1012, 

1043,  1046,  1048 

V.  United  States,  21  Ct.  CI.  298     8.18 

Davie  r.  Britji-s,  97  U.  S.  628  778 

r.  Hey  ward,  33  Fed.  R.  '.t3  1029 

Da  vies  o.  Corbin,  112  U.  S.  3o        34,  705, 

1018,  1029 

/'. ,  113  U.  S.  687    1059,  1008 

r.  Davies,  9  Ves.  461         299 

c. ,  3  De  G.  &  Sni.  698     462 

''.  Latlirop,  12  Fed.  li.  353         38,  50 

i:.  ,  13  Fed.  R.  565  530,  847 


r 

Quaterinan,  4  Y. 

&C 

.  257 

159 

,• 

Williams,  1  Sim. 

5 

208, 

311 

Davis, 

The,  10 

Wall.  15 

102 

Davis 

V.   American   Soi: 

P. 

C.  A.,  6 

Dai\ 

(N.  Y.). 

81 

357 

(• 

,  75 

N.  Y.  36 

2 

857 

/• 

Barrett, 

7  Beav. 

171 

325 

Braden, 

10  Bet.  286 

976,  981, 

985 

V 

(Jrouch, 

94  U.  S. 

514 

1024 

r 

Davidson.  4  McL.  13 

6        201, 

262 

r 

Davis,  2 

Atk.  21 

li03 

—  r.     Duke     of    Marlborousl),    2 
Swanst.  108  395,  414,  431,  452,  453 

—  i:  Duncan,  19  i^ed.  K.  477     435,  440, 

453,  454 

—  c.  Gaines,  104  U.  S.  386  174 

—  '•.  Grav,  16  Wall.  203     103,  129,  371, 
414,  415,"  410,  418,  420,  421,  428,  430, 

431,  442 

—  r.  James,  2  Fed.  R.  618  11 

—  V.  Leo,  0  Ves.  784  381 

—  f.  Miciielbacher,  31  N.  W.  R.  168   452 

—  V.  Packard,  8  Pet.  312  lOHO 

—  V.  Patrick,  122  U.  S.  138        784,  785 

—  '•.  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  Rv.  Co.,  25 
Fed.  R.  780  765,  700,  844,  846 

—  r.  Slierron,  1  Cranch  C    C.  287     O.'ifj 

—  r.  Speiden,  104  U.  S.  83  674 

—  V.  Symonds,  1  Cox  Kq.  402 

—  V.  United  States,  45  Fed.  R.  162 


Davison  v.  Attorney  General, 5  Price, 

398,  n. 
Davoue    r.  Fanning,    4    Johns.    Ch. 

(N.  Y.)  199 


581 
602, 
611 


258 


121 


Davy  c.  Seys,  Moseley,  204  644 

Daws  f.  Benn,  1  Jac.  &  VV.  513  134 

Dawson  v.  Raynes,  2  Russ.  466    446,  447 

V.  Sadler,  1  Sim.  &  S.  537  211 

V.  Yates,  1  Beav.  301  441 

Day,  In  re,  27  Fed.  R.  681  728 
V.  Boston    Belting   Co.,  6  Law 

Rep.  N,  s.  329  482 

V.  Crott,  2  Beav.  488  450 

0.  Hartshorn,  3  i'isher's  I'at.  Cas. 

32  360 
V.   New    England   C.  S.    Co.,  3 

Elatchf.  154  381,  386 
V.  New  Eng.  C.  S.  Co.,  3  Blatcht. 

179  686 

V.  Woodworth,  13  How.  303  770,  1090 

Dayton  v.  Melick,  27  N.  J.  Eq.  302        287 

V.  United  Stales,  131  U.  S.  Ixxx.  1025 

Deacon   v.   Sewing  Machine   Co.,  14 

Reporter,  43  186 

Deakin  r.  Stanton,  3  Fed.  R.  435  390 

De  Armas  v.  United  States,  6  How. 

103  ^  1022 

Debenham  ?'  Ox,  1  Ves.  Sen.  276  581 
Debutts  I'.  McCuUocli,  1  Cranch  C.  C. 

286  514 

De  Carriere   v.   De  Caloiine,  4  Ves. 

577  456 

Decatur  v.  Paulding,  14  Pet.  497  706,  709 
Decker  v.  Caskey,  2  Green  Ch.  (N.  J.) 

446  553 

I'.  Grote,  10  Biatchf.  331  252 

Dedekam  v.  Vose,  3  Biatchf.  77  586 

V. ,  3  Biatchf.  153  586,645 

Deeson  r.  United  States,  5  Ct.  CI.  626  931 
Defl  .rz  V.  Reynolds.  17  Biatchf.  436  474 
Detord  V.  Mehaffv,  13  Fed.  R.  481       821, 

824,  845 
DeForest  v.  Tliompson,  40  Fed.  R.  375  95 
De  Give   v.  United   States,  7  Ct.   CI. 

517  902 

DeGroot   v.    United    States.  5  Wall. 

419  1071 

De  Haro  r.  United  States,  5  Wall.  599  490 
Dehon  v.  Bernal,  3  W;ill.  774  948 

r.  F'oster,  4  Allen  (Mass.),  545     352 

Delameter  v.    Reiniiardt,  43  Fed.  R, 

75  465,  489 

Delancey  v.  The  Queen,  L.  R.  6  Exch. 

286  901 

Delancy  v.  Wallis,  3  Bro.  C.  C.  12  193 
Delano  v.  Scott,  Gilp.  489  474 

Delaware  County  Comm'rs  r.  Diebold 

S.  &  L.  Co.,  133  U.  S.  473  687,  808, 

809,  810 
Delaware  R  Co.  v.  Prettyman,  17  Int. 

Rev.  Rec.  99  370 

Delaware  River  S.  B.  Co.  v.  United 

States,  5  Ct.  CI.  55  '  901 

Delbanco  v.  Singletary,  40  Fed.  R. 

177  823,  824,  839 

Dell  r.  Hale,  2  Y.  &  C.  N.  R.  1  211.  212 
Del  Valle  >:  Harrison,  93  U.  S.  233  1037 
Dciu'lu'v    '•.    Harrisburg,  2   l^earson 

(Pa.);  330  372 


xlviii 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[Kefereuces  are  to  pages.] 


Dcming's  Appeal,  10  Wall.  251  1065.  1069 
Den  r.  Jones,  2  McLean,  78  7U0,  7'.il 

Dunuale  c.  Arclier.  8  Fet.  52f)  7tj(),  IU4U 
DiMiison  V.  Basslord,  7  Taige  (N.  Y.), 

37U  262 

Dennis    v.    County    of    Alacliu;i,    o 

Woods,  083  820,  821,  822 
r.  Eddy,  12  Blatclif.  195        OiO,  641 

r.  United  States,  2  Ct.  CI.  210      800 

Dennison  r.  Brown,  o8  Fed.R.  535  829,  831 
Denni.stoun  r.  Draper,  5  Blatclif.  330    84() 

r.  Slew-art,  18  How.  5G5         07G,  986 

Denny  i:  Piron,  Ul  U.  S.  121  278,  788 
Dent  c.  Ferguson,  131  U.  S.  397  1072 

Dental  Vulcanite  Co.  v.   Weilierbee, 

2  Cliff.  555  229 

Jlenton  r.  International  Co.  of  Mex- 
ico, 30  Fed.  K.  1  45,  189,  190 
Denver  &  N.  O.  K.  Co.  v.  Atcliison, 

T.  &  S.  F.  \i.  Co.,  13  Fed.  R.  546  373 
Denver  &  R.  G.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Denver, 

S.  1'.  &  P.  M.  Co.,  17  Fed.  H.  867      286 
Deputroa  v.  Young,  134  U.  S.  241        535, 
536,  -537,084 
l)erl)V  (Karl  of),  v.  Duke  of  Atlioi,  1 

Ves.  Sen.  203  212 

De  Saussure  c.  Gaillard,  127  U.  S.  216 

1004 
l^esbrow  r.  Cronunie,  Bunb  272  059 

Deslder  r.  Dodge,  16  ilow.  022  55 

Desuiare   r.   United   States,  93  U.  S. 

6(t5  1091 

Des  Moines  Xav.  Co.  v.  Iowa  Home- 
stead Co.,  123  U.  S.  552  814 
De  Sobry  r.  Nicliolson,  3  Wall.  420    1886 
l)e.-])laces  f.  tJoiis,   1   Fdw.   Ch.   (N. 

Y.),3.")0  25(; 

Des  Rochers,  AV  jiarte.  1  McAll.  C8    740, 

741 
DeTastet  v.  Bordenave,  Jacob,  516     548, 

549 
Detroit  r.  Dean,  106  U.  S.  537         20,  101 

r.  Osborne,  135  U.  S.  492  780 

Detweiler  v.  Holderbauni,  42  Fed.  R. 

337  1 32 

Devavnes  r.  Morris,  1  M.  &  Cr.  213  3U1 
Deveieaux  v.  Marr,  12  Wheat.  212     O.sl, 

9^4 
Devie  v.  Lord  Brownlow,2  Dick.  Gil  232 
Devlin    c.   United   Slates,   12   Ct.   CI. 

260  899,  913 

Devonslier  r.   Neweidiatn,  2  Scli.   & 

Let'.  199  218 

Devonshire's  (Karl  of)  Case,  11  Coke, 

89  17 

Dewev  )'.  West  Fairmont  G.  C.  Co., 

lL'3'U.  S.  329  42 

De  Wolf  r.  Johnson,  10  AVheat.  3(17       1  16 

r.  Kabiiiid.  1   I'd.  I7i;      774.779,  7H) 

Dexter  r.  Arnold,  5  Mason,  303    070.  ('.72. 
67L  675-<)77 
Dexterville   M.iniif.  &  B.  Co.  r.  Case, 

/'I  n:  4  Fed.  U.  H73  410 

Dev  '•.  Chic. go,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co, 

4*5  Fed.  R.  82  807 


Dial  V.  Reynods,  9G  U.  S.  340     112,  115, 

155,  347 
Dick  V.  Oil  Well  Supply  Co.,  25  Fed. 

R.  105  428 
V.  Struthers,  25  Fed.  R.  103  428 

V.  Swinton,  1  Ves.  &  li.  371  450 

Dickerson  v.  Colgrove,  100  U.  S.  578  2 
Dickinson  c.  Planters'  Bank,  16  Wall. 

250  772 

Didier  v.  Warner,  1  Code  R.  (N.  Y.) 

42  485 

Dieckerhoft',  In  re,  45  Fed.  R.  235      31, 

1012 
Dietze,  7n  re,  32  Fed.  R.  75  728 

Dietzsch  r.    Huidekoper,   103   U.   S. 

494  347 

Digby  (Lord)  />.  Meech,  1  Bunb.  195  166 
Diggs  c.  Wolcott,  4  Cranch,  179  351 

Dillon  V.  Barnard,  21  Wall.  430     209,  210, 

403 

V.  ,  1  Holmes,  386  209 

c.  Francis,  1  Dic-k.  68  170 

r.  Kansas  City  S.  B.  Rv.  Co.,  43 

Fed.  R.  1(19  '  347 

Dillon  (Lord)  r.  Alvares,  4  Ves.  357  232 
Dilly  V.  Doig,  2  ^\■s.  Jr.  486  155 

Dininiick  v.    United  States,  30  Fed. 

R.  82  COO 

Dimpfell  i\  Ohio  &  Miss.  R.  R.  Co., 

IIOU.  S.  209  26,161 

Dinsmore   r.   Central   R.  R.    Co.,   19 

Fed.  R.  153  229 
r.  Loinsville,  C.  &  L.  Ry.  Co.,  2 

Fed.  R.  4f,5  373,  374 
r.  Louisville,  N.  A.  &  C.  R.  R. 

Co.,  3  Fed.  R.  593  373 

i:  ftlaroney,  4  Blatclif.  416     517,  518 

r.  New    York    Board  of  Police, 

12  Ahb.  N.  C.  (X.  Y.)  436  357 
'•.  Philadelphia  &  R.  R.  R.  Co., 

3  Cent.  L.  J.  157  39 

District  Attorney,  //;  re,  23  Fed.  R. 

20  591 

District  of  Columbia  /-.  Gannon,  130 

U.  S.  '-27  960,  967,  1027 

Dixon  r.  Olnnus.  1  Cox  F.q.  412  240 

r.  Ramsay,  3  Cranch,  319  95 

r.  Western  Un.  Tel.  Co.,  38  Fed. 

n.  377  823 

V.  Wyatt,  4  M;.dd.  392  312 

Doane  r.  Glemi,  21  Wall.  33  523 

Dohle  r.  Potman,  Ilardres,  KJO  292 

Dobson   r.  Hartford  Car|)et    (^o.,  114 

U.  S,  439  206,  1089 
Dodtre  r.  Briggs,  27  Fed.  R.  101  4 
r   Card,  2  Fisher  Pat.  Cas.  116     36tl 

r.  Israel,  4  Wash.  323  521,  522 

r.  Knowles,  114  U.  S.  430  1043 

r.  Perkins,  4  .Mason,  4.35  22S 

r.  Woolsev,  18  How.  331        129.  161 

Doe  /•.  ilvde,  114  U.  S.  247  214 

r.  M"cFarland,  '.»  Cranch,  151  95 

ill.   Moore)   r.   Nelson,  3    McL. 

3S3  511,518 

r.  Read,  12  Fast,  57  417 


TABLE  OF  CASES. 


xlix 


[References 

Doe  V.  Roe,  31  Fed.  "R.  97  G84 
c.  Waterloo  Miii.  Co.  -13  Fed.  11. 

21!)  8 

Doj^ijett  V.  Emerson,  1  Woodb.  &  M. 

U/O  228,  230 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  99  U.  S.  72    1 16. 158 

Dolan  V.  Jennings,  139  U.   S.  385     1082, 

1083,  1035 
Dolder  v.  Bank  of  England,  10  Ves. 

284  205, 283 

Doll,  Ex  parte,  7  Phila.  595  051 

Donahue  In  re,  8  N.  B.  R.  453       623,  032 

V.  Roberts,  19  Fed.  R.  863    512,  510, 

517 
Donaldson  v.  Williams,  50  Mo.  408  3 

Doiioiioe  r.  Mariposa,  L.  &  M.   Co., 

1  I'ac.  Coast  L  J.  211  295 

Doolittle,  In  re,  23  Fed.  R.  544  431 

r.  Bryan,  14  How.  563  796 

Doo  WoMn,  Li  re,  18  Fed.  R.  898  750,751 
Doris  Eckhofi;  Tlie,  41  Fe<l.  R.  156  864 
Dormer  v.  Fortescue,  3  Atk.  124  172,  314 
Dorinitzer  v.  Illinois  &  St.  L.  Bridge 

Co.,  6  Fed.  U.  217  132 

Dorn  r.  Fox,  61  N.  Y.  264  181,  345 

Dome   '•.   Riciimond    iS.    il.   Co.,  43 

Fed.  R.  690  804 

Dorr,  Er  parte,  3  How.  103    723,  741,  1031 

u.  Gibbonev,  3  Hugiies,  382    198,  199 

Dorsey  v.  Packwood,  12  How.  126  314 
Dorslieimer  v.  Rorback,  9  C.  E.  Gr 

(N.J.)  33 

/•.  United  States,  7  Wall.  IHO 

Dos  Ilermiinos,  The,  2  Wheat.  76 

10  Wheat.  306 

Doss  i:  Tyack,  14  How.  297 
Doswell  i\  De  la  Lanza,  20  How.  29 
Doubleday  r.  Sherman,  8  Blatchf.  45  654 
Doutrlity  V.  West,  2  Fisher  Pat.  Cas. 

553  382 
V.  West,  B.  &  C.  Manuf.  Co.,  8 

Blatchf.  107  585,  580 

Douiilas  c.  Butler,  0  Fed.  R.228    91,  10'.), 

278 

V.  Cline,  12  Busli  (Kv.),  608  403 

Douglass  i;.  County  of  Pike,  101  U.  S 

677  543,  777,  778,  770 

r.  Ratbbone,  5  Hill  (N.  Y.),  143 

r.  United  States,  11  Ct.  CI   655 

Dovenbv  Hospital,  In  re,  1  M.  &  Cr. 

279 
Dow    V.  Bradstreet  Co  ,  46  Fed    R. 

824  814,  816 

i\  Chambcrlin,  5  M(-L.  281  9 

r    Memphis  &  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  20 

Fed.  R.  -M)  409.  410,413,  437 

Dowell  V.  Applegate,  8  Fed.  R.  698 ; 

7  Sawv.  232  225 

r.  Mitciiell,  105  U.  S.  430  2-3 

Dowlinu',  /"  re,  45  Fed.  R.  412  31 

'•.  Dowling,  L.  R.  1  Ch.  612  578 

Dinviiliaui    V.    Alexandria,    9     Wall. 

(;'..i  1002,  1003 

D  ,w.  -■.  Chit-ntro,  11  Wall.  108         20,  21)5 
Dowson  /•.  Ilardcastle,  2  Cox  Eq.  279    180 
vol..  I.  —  (/ 


6()5 

898 

874 

10.38 

3;7 

lO'.tO 


20'.) 
932 

337 


are  to  pages.] 

Doyle  c.  Continental  Ins.  Co.,  94  U.  S. 

535 
Drake  v.  Goodridge,  0  Blatclif.  151 
r.  The  Oriental,  9   Chic.  L.   N. 

321 
Draper  /•.  Davis,  104  U.  S.  347 

f.  Hudson,  1  Holmes,  208 

r.  Town  of  Springport,  15  Fed 

R.  328 
Dravo  v.  Fabel,  132  U.  S.  487 
Dredge  v.  Forsyth,  2  Black.  563 
Drew  u.  llarinan,  5  Price,  319 
Drexel  v.  Bernev,  14  Fed.  R.  268 

V   ,  122  U.  S.  241 

Drybutter    v.    Bartholomew,    2    P 

Wins.  127 
Dublin    Township    v.    Milford    8av 

Instn.,  128  U.  S.  510 
Dubuque   &  P.   K.  R.  Co.,  Ex  parte, 

1  Wall.  69  703, 
Duchesse  d'Aubry  v.  Porter,  41  Fed. 

R.  68 
Duden  v.  Maloy,  43  Fed.  R.  407    562, 
Dudgeon  v.  W'atson,  23  Fed.  R.  161 

•229, 
Dudley's  Case,  1  Penn.  L.  J.  302 
Duff  r.  Duff,  31  Fed.  R.  772 
Duftield  r.  Greaves,  Cary,  125 
Duke  of  Beaufort  v.  ]\lorris,  2   Phill. 

683 

r.  Xeeld,  12  CI.  &  Fin.  248 

Duke  of  Bedlord  v.  British  Museum, 

2  M.  &  K.  552 

Duke  of  Brunswick  r.  Iving  of  Han- 
over, 6  Beav.  1 

Diike  of  Buckingham  v.  Duchess  of 
Buckingham,  2  Eq.  Cas.  Abr.  527 

Duke  of  Chandos  u.  Talbot,  2  P. 
Wms.  372 

Duke  of  Somerset  r.  Cookson,  3  P. 
Wms.  389 ;  1  Lea.  Cas.  in  Eq.  821 

367, 

Dummer  v.  Corporation  of  Chippen- 
ham, 14  Ves.  245  112, 

Dumont  r.  Fry,  12  Fed.  R.  21 

Dumville  c.  Ashbrooke,  3  Russ.  98,  ?j. 

Duncan,  /;/  re  139  U.  S.  449;  11  S.  C. 
Rep.  573  780,  733, 

u.  Darst,  1  How.  301  347, 

r.  Gesfan,  101  U.  S   810 

r.   Mobile   &   U.    R.    R.    Co.,    2 

Woods.  542 

Dundee  M.  &  T.  I.  Co.  v.  Hughes,  124 
U.  S.  157 

r.  School  Dist.  No.  1,  19  Fed.  R. 

3.39 

Dungey  v.  Angove,  2  Yes.  Jr.  304 

Dunhnm  r.  Riley,  4  Wash.  126 
Dunkle  r.  Worcester,  5  Biss.  102 
Dunklev  ;•.  Van   Buren,  3  Johns.  Ch. 

(X.  Y.)  330 
Dunlap   ('.    Northeastern   R.   R.  Co., 

130  U.  S.  649 
f.  Stetson,  4  Mason,  319        142, 


813 

1015 
341 

297 

684 

9 

1022 

8 
24 

582 

992 

1096 

95 
563 

92, 
230 
378 
832 
218 

550 


345 

95 

392 

109 

23, 
373 

216 

23 

415 

779 
7(i4 
844 

406 


20 
178, 
ISO 

768 
512 

538 

775 

191 


1 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  pages.] 


Duiilevv  V  Duiilevy,  38  Fed.  R.  462  680 
Dunloirr.  llubbiirti,  19  Ves.  205  181 

c.  Munioe,  1  Craiich  C.  C.  530    517, 

020 
Dunn,  III  re,  25  How.  Pr.  467  7o7 

V.  Clarke,  8  Pet.  1    42,  142,  191,  192, 

305,  309 
Diinnogiin  r.  United  States,  17  Ct.  CI. 

240  798 

DuDiiv  c.  Filniore,  1  Vern.  135  675 

Dunton  r.  Miitli,  45  Fed.  R.  890  36,  804 
Duixiiili  r.  .Mu^#y,  4  Wiisli.  128  270 

Durand    r.   llulcdiiiisoii,   Mich.   1771, 

in  Chan  233 

Durant  v.  Essex  Co.,  7  Wall.  107    237,  545 

(.. ,  101  U.  S.  555  1094 

Durdant  r.  He<linan,  1  Vern.  78  220 

Diirsley   (Lord)   v.   Berkeley,  6  Ves. 

251  4,  495 

Dushane  v.  Benedict,  120  U.  S.  030       33, 

820,  1027 
Duy  r.  Knowlton,  14  Fed.  R.  107  620 

D wight  r.   Central    Vt.   K.  R.  Co.,  9 

Fed.  H.  785       12,  13,  214,  219,  232,  241 

V.  Humphreys,  3  McL  104    176,215, 

278 

i:  Merritt,  4  Fed.  R.  614  6b8 

invyer  >:  resiiail,  32  Fed.  R.  497  823 

Dyer  v.  Dyer,  2  Cox  Kq.  92  3 

Dvkes   V.  "United   States,  16  Ct.  CI. 

2h9  896 

Dvson  V.  Morris,  1  Hare,  413  313 


E. 


Fades  v.  Harris,  1  Y.  &  C.  N.  R.  235  138 
Fagle,  Tlie,  8  Wall.  15  1086 

Eagle    Iron   Works,  In   re,   8   Paige 

(X.  Y.),  385  443 

Eagle  Manuf.  Co  v.  Miller,  41  Fed.  R. 

351  129 

Ealer  r.  Uniied  States,  5  Ct.  CI.  708  932 
Fames  c.  Kaiser,  142  U.  S.  448  1090 

Earl    of    Abergavenny    v.  Powell,   1 

.Meriv.  434  497 

Earl  of  Bath  i:  Sherwin,  4  Bro.  P.  C. 

373  4,  345 

Earl  of  Darlington  v.  Bowes,  1  Eden, 

271  *  552 

Earl   of  Derbv   >:  Duke  of  Athol,  1 

Yes.  Sen.  203  212 

Earl  of  Devonshire's  Case,  11  Coke, 

89  17 

Earl  of  Fingal  >:  Blake,  2  Moll.  50  395 
Earl  of    llchester,   A'.r  pmie,  7    Ves. 

348  577 

Earl  of    Uciccstcr   v.   Perrv,   1   Bro 

C.  C.  305  "  227,  250 

Earl   of  Lichfield  v.   Bond,  5   Beav. 

513  >265 

Earl   of  Lonsdale  ;•.  Church,  3  Bro. 

C.  C. 41  433 

Earl    of    Xewbiirgh    v.   Countess    of 

Newburgh,  5  Madd.  364  518 


Earl  of  Suffolk  v.  Green,  1  Atk.  450       4, 

496 
East  India  Co.  v.  Boddani,  13  Ves. 

421  Q>m 

c.  Campbel,  1  Ves.  Sen.  246        247, 

266 
East  Oakland  v.   Skinner,  94  U.  S. 

255  542,  543 

East  Tennessee,  V.  &  G.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Southern  Tel.  Co.,  112  U.  S.  306     1053 

V. ,  125  U.  S.  695         1066,  1067 

Fast  &  West  India  Docks  &  B.  J.  Ry. 

Co.  V.  Dawes,  11  Hare,  363  343 

Eastman  v.  Sherry,  37  Fed.  R.  844      5b2, 

637,  638 
Easton,  Ex  parte,  95  U.  S.  68         693,  869 

r.  Hodges,  7  Biss.  324  499 

r.  Houston  &  T.  C.  Ry.  Co.,  38 

Fed.  H.  784  422,  434 

r. ,  40  Fed.  R.  189  450 

r. ,  44  Fed.  R.  718  609 

Katon  V.  Cleveland,  St.  L.  &  K.  C. 

R.  R.  Co.,  41  Fed.  R.  421  795 

Fbert  r.  The  Reuben  Doud,  3  Fed.  R. 

520  859,  860 

Fccleston  v.  Pettv,  Carth.  79  462 

Kchliff  V.  Baldwin,  16  Ves.  267  3.".3 

Kckert  i'.  Bauert,  4  Wash.  370  191 

Fddleston  i:  Collins,  3  De  G.  M.  &  G. 

1  287 

Edgell  V.  Haywood,  3  Atk.  354  8 

Edison   E.  L.   Co.    v.    United   States 

E.  L.  Co.,  44  Fed.  R.  294       32t').  464, 
487,  494,  502 

V. ,  45  Fed.  R.  55    464,  494,  502, 

769 

r.  Westingliouse,  34  Fed.  R.  2-32    297 

Edmonson  v.  Barrel,  2  Cranch  C.  C. 

228  516 

Bloomshire,  7  Wall.  306    1044,  1046, 

1098,  1099 
Fdrington    v.   Jefferson,    111     U.    S. 

770"  1085 

Edsell   V.    Buchanan,   4    Bro.    C.   C. 

2.54  208 

Edwards  i".  Connecticut -Mut.  L.  I.  Co., 

20  Fed.  R.  452  842 

r.  Cuidifle,  1  Madd.  287  574 

V.  Harve}',  (i.  Cooj).  40  643 

V.  United   Slates,  102  U.  S.  575 

10.58 
Edwin  f.  Thomas,  1  Vern.  489  553 

Edwin  Butler,  The,  32  Fed.  R.  290       8H0 
Fdye  v.  Robertson,  112  U   S   580  728 

Egbert  V.  Citizens'  Ins.  Co.,  7  Fed.  R. 

47  515,  517 

Fgremont  v.  CowcU,  5  Beav.  620  145 

Elirman  v.  Teutonia  Ins.  Co.,  1  Fed. 

R.  471  684 

EiflTert  i-.  Craps,  44  Fed.  R.  164  517 

Killert  r.  Craps,  44  Fed.  R.  792  501 

Fkiu  r.  Uniied  States,  142  U.  S.  051     750, 

751,  965 
I'.lc'tiic  'I'd.  Co.  of  Ireland,  In  re,  10 

\V.  H.  4  325 


TABLE  OF  CASES. 


Electrical  Accumulator  Co. 
El.  Co  ,  a  Fed.  K.  G02 


[References 

V.  Brush 
290,  2'Jl,  311, 
313.  5;]2 
38  Fed. 

573 


V.  Julien  Electric  Co 

K.  117 

Eley  V.  Brousfhton,  2  Sim.  &  S.  188      144 
Elgin  V.  Marshall,  lOG  U.  S.  578      32,  33, 

102G,  1028 
Elizabeth  r.  American  N.  P.  Co.,  131 

U.  S.  cxlviii  1084 

Ellice  ('.  Goodson,  3  M.  &  Cr.  6-53         2bO 

r.  Hoiipell,32  Beav.  2'.I9;  9  Jur. 

X.  .s.  530  496 

r.  ,  32    Beav.    308 ;    9   Jur. 

N.  s.  533  49(5,  497 

EUint  V.    Hayman,  2    Cranch  C.   C. 
678  514 

r.  Sinclair,  J.icob,  .545  457 

r.  Van  Voorst,  3  Wall.  Jr.  299       9() 

Elliott  V.  Eawhead,  43  Ohio  St.  171       198 

c.  Pell,  1  Paige  (N.  Y.),  263         287, 

288,  579 

516 

3 

101,  104 

168 

10,  21,  24, 


V.  Piersol,  1  Pet.  32S 

('.  Sackett,  108  U.  S.  132 

V.  Wiltz,  107  IT.  S.  711 

Ellis  r.  Colman,  35  Beav.  662 
V.  Davis,  109  U.  S.  485 


779,  808,  809,  811 

V.  Jarvis,  3  Mason,  457  682 

r.  Keynolds,  35  Fed.  R.  394  194 

Ellsworth  V.  Curtis,  10  Paige  (N.  Y.), 

105  207 

V.  United  States,  14  Ct.  CI.  382    903 

Elniendorf  v.  Delancey,  Hopk.(N.  Y.), 

555  176 

/■.  Taylor,  10  Wheat.  152      128,  135, 

777 
Elmer  v.  Creasy,  L.  R.  9  Ch.  69  258 

Elmore  v.  Grymes,  1  Pet.  4G9       774,  775, 

1021,  1091 
Eimwood  V.  Marcy,  92  U.S.  289  542,  778 
Elwell  ('.  Fosdick,  134  U.  S.  500  118 

Emack  v.  Kane,  34  Fed.  R.  46  24,  372 
Embry  v.  Palmer,  107  U.  S.  3  1067,  1091 
Emerson  v.  Davies,  3  Story,  768  364 

V. ,  1  Woodb.  &  M.  21  666 

Emma  S.  M.  Co.  v.  Emma  S.  M.  Co. 

of  N.  Y.,  1  Fed.  R.  39    227, 238, 240,  247 

V.  Parks,  14  Blatchf.  411  797 

P]mmons  v.  United  States,  42  Fed  R. 

26  97 

V. ,  48  Fed.  R.  43  908 

Emmott  r.  Mitchell,  14  Sim.  432  226,  227 
Emperor  of  Austria  v.  Dav,  2  Gift. 

(528  "  369,  582 

V. ,  3  De  G.  F.  &  J.  217    3G9,  582 

Empire,  The,  19  Fed.  R.  558  861 

Empresa  Maritima  a  Vapor  v.  North 

&  So.  Amcr.  S.  N.  Co.,  16  Fed.  R. 

502.  860 

Enfield  v.  Hills,  2  Lev.  238  715 

V.  Jordan,  119  U.  S.  680    781,  982,990 

Engel  V.  Scheiierman,  40  Ga.  206  352 
England  r.  Downs,  6  Beav.  269  432 
V.  Gebhardt,  112  U.  S.  502          1054 


are  to  pages.] 

English  V.  F'oxall,  2  Pet.  595  171 

Ensminger  v.  People,  47  111.  384  756 

i:  Powers,  108  U.  S.  292      071,  1052 

Enterprise,  Tiie,  3  Wall.  Jr.  68  704 

Equator    M.   &   S.    Co.   v.    Hall,    106 

U.  S.  86  781 

Equitable  L.    A.    Soc.   v.    Patterson, 

1  Fed.  R.  126  1-VS,  211,  220 

Eriiardt  r.  Boaro,  113  U.  S.  437  17 

Erie  Belle,  The,  20  Fed.  R  G.3  861 

Erie  Ry.  Co.  v.   Heath,  10  Blatchf. 

214  561 

i'.  Ramsey,  45  N.  Y.  637        232,  347 

Erskine  v.  Hohnbach,  14  Wall.  613    1086, 

1090 
Erstein  v.  Rothschild,  22  Fed.  R.  61  687 
Erwin  v.  Lowry,  7  How.  172  1067 
V.  Oregon  Ry.  &  N.  Co  ,  27  Fed.  R. 

625  112 
V.   United    States,   37   Fed.    R. 

470         489,  598,  600,  601,  603,  604,  60-5, 

606,  607,  610,  687 

Esdaile  v.  La  Nauze,  1  Y.  &  C.  394       353 

Eslava  v.  Mazange,  1  Woods,  623         326, 

837,  338,  353,  486,  487,  500 

Estes  V.  Belford,  22  Fed.  R.  275  190 

V.  Gunter,  121  U.  S.  183        34,  1029 

V.  Knickerbocker  L.  I.  Co.,  N.  Y. 

Daily  Reg.,  Nov.  17,  1882  199 

Estis  V.  Trabue,  128  U.  S.  225  1032,  1035 
Etheridge  >\  Sperry,  139  U.  S.  266  780 
Etting  V.  Bank  of  U.  S.,  11  Wheat. 

59  786,  1083 

V.  Marx's  Ex'r,  4  Fed.  R.  673   12,  235 

Euberweg     v.    Comp.    Gen.    Trans- 

Atlantique,  35  Fed.  R.  530  509 

Euphrates,  The,  8  Crancli,  385  1081 

Eureka  L.  &  Y.  Co.  r.  Superior  Court 


of  Yuba  Co.,  116  U.  S.  410 
Evan  V.  Avon,  29  Beav.  144 
Evans  r.  Bacon,  99  Mass.  213 

V.  Bickncll,  6  Ves.  183 

V.  Brown,  109  U.  S.  180 

V.  Coventry,  5  De  G.  M. 

911 


653 

148 

678 

149 

1042,  1068 

&  G. 

343,  397 

V.  Dillingham,  43  Fed.  R.  177         36, 

819,  824 

V.  Eaton,  3  Wheat.  454 

v.  Evans,  1  Ves.  Jr.  96 

!•.  Gee,  14  Pet.  1 

r.  Hettick,  7  Wheat.  453 

V.  Jackson,  8  Sim.  217 

V.  Phillips,  4  Wheat.  73 


676 


460 
1022 
686 
113 
775,  1021, 
1089 
50       1038, 
104.5,  1061 
State  Nat.  Bank,  19  Fed.   R. 

462 


r.  State  Bank,  1.34  U.  S. 


Everest  v.  Buffalo  L.  O.  Co.,  31  Fed. 

R.  742  683 

Everett  i\  Prythergch,  12  Sim.  363  326 
Everhart  ;•.  lluntsville  CoUesie,   120 

U.  S.  223  584,  849,  1096 

Everts,  Ex  pnitp.  1  Bond,  197  734,  742 
Evitt  V.  Price,  1  Sim.  483  373 


lii 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  pages.] 


Ewing  V.  Blight,  3  Wall.  Jr.  l?A  2-21,210, 
242,  248,  244 

r. ,  3  Wall.  Jr.  139  243 

V.  Howard,  7  Wall.  499       1080,  lOJU 

Excliange   Nat.    Bank  c.  Tiiird  Nat 

Hank, 112  U.  S. 270  1083 

E.xpress  Cases,  117  U.  S.  1  572 

E.xpress  Co.  v.  Kountze,  8  Wall.  342    8U4, 

108(i 

r.  Railroad  Co.,  99  U.  S.  191    2-5,  95, 

128,  108 
E.xton  V.  Turner,  2  Chan.  Cas.  80  552 
Eyre  i-.  Countess  of  Sliaftsbury,  2  P. 

Wnis.  102  573,  574 

V  HiL'bee,  35  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  502    342 

V.  ]^otter,  15  How.  42  151 

Eyry  v.  Hujjlies,  L.  H.  2  Cli.  D.  148  287 
Eyster  v.  Gaff,  91  U.  S.  521  310,  311 


F. 


F.  Merwin,  The,  10  Ben.  403  626 

Fagan,  In  re,  2  Spraijue,  91  737 

•?.  CuUen,  28  Fed.  \\.  843  608 

Fahie  r.  Lindsay,  8  Oreg.  474  180 

Fairbanks   c.   Anioskeag  Xat.  Bank, 

30  Fed.  K.  602  715,  710,  718 

V. ,  32  Fed   R.  572  1038 

Fairbrother  r.  Prattent,  1  Daniel,  04  180 
Fairfiix  v.  Fairfax,  5  Crancli,  10  1043 

Fairfield  r.  County  of   Gallatin,  100 

U.  S.  47  543,  777,  778 

Faitliful  ('.  Hunt,  3  Anst.  751  116 

Falcon,  The,  Blatciif.  Prize  Cas.  52  874 
Fales  V.  Chicago,   M.  &  St.  P.  Hy. 

Co.,  32  Fed    R.  673  44,  189 

Fallon  V.  Railroad  Co.,  1  Dill.  121  344 
Fallowes  r.  Williamson,  11  Ves.  300    110, 

290,  300 
Falls  of  Neuse  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Georgia 

Home  Li.s.  Co ,  26  Fed.  R.  1  700 

Fanny,  Tiie,  2  Low.  508  800 

Farez,  In  re,  7  lilatciif  31  727 

,  //(  re,  7  Blatciif  345  750 

Fargo  V.   Louisville,  N.  A.   &  C.  Rv. 

Co.,  0  Fed.  K.  787  39,  118 
V.  Southeastern  R}'.  Co.,  28  Fed. 

R.  900  582 

Farley,  Ex  parte,  40  Fed.  R.  66     726,  770 

V.  Kittson,  120  U.  S.  303       244,  248, 

249,  403 
Farlow  r.  Loa,  2  C.  L.  R.  329  38 

Farnur  ;;.  Calvert  Litli.  Co  ,  1  Flipp. 

228  175,212,  303,381,  382 

r.  Elstner,  33  Fed.  11.  494  304 

Farmers'  Bank  v.  Hooff,  7  Pet.  108  1028 
Farmers'  L.  &  T.  Co.,  Petitioner,  129 

U.  S.  200  427.  509,  714,  1019 
r.  Pwirlinpton  &  S.  W.  Ry.  Co., 

32  Fed.  11.  805  j  422 
r.  Central  R.  R.  of  Iowa,  2  Fed. 

R.  0-30  554 
V.  ,  7  Fed.  R.  537  ,  2  3>IcCra. 

181  435,  439 


Farmers'  L.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Central  R.  R. 

of  Iowa,  8  Fed.  R.  00  449,  450 

(.'. ,  17  Fed.  R.  758  435,  566 

r.  Cliicago  &  A.  Ry.  Co.,  42  Fed. 

R.  0  407,  434 

V. ,  44  Fed.  R.  053   419,  434,  000 

V.  Denver,  S.  P.  &  P.  R.  R.  Co., 

1  Ry.  &  Corp.  L.  J.  584  35 
r.  Green  Bay  &  M.  R.  R.  Co  ,  10 

Biss.  203  ;  0  Fed.  R.  100  505,  500,  671 
V.  Green  Bav,   W.  &  St.  P.  Ry. 

Co.,  45  Fed.  R.  004  400 
V.  Houston  &  T.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  44 

Fed.  R.  115  42,  195 
I'. ,  U.  S.  D.  C.  E.  D.  Tex. 

May,  1888  565 
V.  Logansport,  C.  &  S.  W.  Ry. 

Co.,  4  Fed.  R.  184  419 
;-.  Missouri,  L  &  N.  Ry.  Co.,  21 

Fed.  R.  204  333,  410 

r.  Waterman,  106  U.  S.  205         1029 

Farmers'  Nat.  Bank  v.  McKlidnne}', 

42  Fed.  R.  801  36,  39 

Farmington  v.  Pillsbury,  114  U.  S.  138  536 
Fainswortii  v.   Montana,   129    U.   S. 

104  692, 970 

Farrar  r.  Cliureliill,  135  U.  R.  009      lo;;8 

V.  United  States,  3  Pet.  459         1060 

Farwell  v.  Kerr,  28  Fed.  R.  345  581 

Fassett,  In  re,  142  U.  S.  479  853 

Faulder  r.  Stuart,  11  Ves.  296  171 

Faulkner  r.  Daniel,  3  Hare,  199  134 

F'awkes  v.  Pratt,  1  P.  \\'ms.  593  176 

Fa  voile  V.  Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  124 

U.  S.  519  1058 

Fav  V.  Krie  &  K.  R.  R.  Bank,  Ilarr. 

(Mich.)  194  453 

Featlierstone  v.  Cooke,  L.  R.  16  Eq. 

298  397 

Fechhcimer  r.  Banm,  37  Fed.  R.  107     10 

r. ,  43  Fed.  R.  719  581,  643, 

044 
Feenv,  In  re,  1  Hask.  304  ;  4  N.  B. 

R.  [70]  223  053 

Feinkuopf,  In  re.  47  Fed.  R.  447  728 

Feistel  v.  King's  College,  10  Beav.  491  415 
Felix  V.  Scliarnweber,  125  U.  S.  54  36 
Fellows  r.  Hall,  3  McL.  281  200 

United   States,  12  Ct.  CI. 


931 

718 
5,6 
7(50 
111,  112 


Fendall  f 

305 
Feneniore  r.  United  States,  3  Dall. 

357 
Fenn  r.  Holme,  21  How. -'81 
Fenner  v.  lOvans,  1  T.  R.  267 
Fenton  r.  Hughes,  7  Ves.  287 
v.   Lumberman's  Bank,   Clarke 

(N.  Y.)  300  441 

Fenwick  v.  Sears,  1  Cranch,  250  95 

Ferguson  v.  Dent,  15  Fed.  1{.  771  108,  331 

V. ,  246  Fed.  R.  88    583,  587,  041 

1072 

V.  Harwood,  7  Cranch,  408  479 

V.  O'llarra,  Pet.  C.  C.  493      241,  246 

V.  Ross,  38  Fed.  R.  101  807,  847, 

848,  849 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  pages.] 


liii 


7G5 


902 
85:3 


582 


Ch. 


Ferrand  v.  Haiiier,  4  M.  &  Cr.  14o  388 
Ferrens,  A'e,  3  Ben.  442  740,  743 

Ferrers  v.  Clierry,  1  Kq.  Cas.  Abr.  3  301 
Ferrett  t:  Atwill,  4  N.  Y.   Leg.   Obs. 

215 
Ficliera  v.    United    States,  i>   Ct.   CI. 

2.')4 
Fidelity,  The,  1(3  Blatelif.  56:) 
Fidelity  Ins.  Co.  r.   iluntiiigton,  117 

U.  S.  280  814,  81G 

Fidelity  Ins.  &  S.  D.  Co.  v.   Shenan- 
doah Iron  Co.,  42  Fed.  II.  372   414,420, 
5()2,  .j03 
Fidelity  Trust  Co.  v.  Gill  Car  Co.,  25 

Fed.  R.  737  842 

Field,  /•:,(:  fxiite,  5  Blatchf.  03  737 

n.  Holland,  G  Cranch,  8  4G2,  -547,  548 

V.  Milton,  3  Cranch,  514  717 

i:  Seaburv,  19  How   323        948,  9-52 

u.  Sehell,  4  Hlatchf.  435 

V.    Schieffelin,     7     Jolms. 

(N.  Y.)250  28G 

'\  United  States,  9  Pet.  182         1083 

Fife  v.  Clavton,  13  Ves.  54G  174,  288 

Fifth  Xat.^Bank  v.  Long,  7  Biss  502  9G 
Fiiih  r.  United  States,  3  Ct.  CI.  97  931 
Filder  r.   London,   B.  &  S.  C.  Ry.  1 

Hem.  &  .M.  489  843 

Filli  r.  Delaware,  L.  &  \V.  R.  R.  Co  , 

37  Fed.  R.  65  45, 1S9,  190 

Finance  Co.  of  Pa.  v.  Charleston  C. 

&  C.  R.  Co.,  45  Fed.  R.  430 

•^ —  r.  ,  4G  Fed.  R.  508 

Fincli  r.  Finch,  2  Ves.  Sen.  492 
r.  Lord  Winchelsea,  1  Eq.  Cas. 

Al)r.  2  298,  2'.)9,  3;)3 

Findiay  v.  Ilinde,  1  Pet.  241  178.  215. 

21G,  373 
Fingal  (Earl  of)  r.  Blake,  2  Moll.  50  395 
Fingal  (Lord)  v.  Blake,  1  .Moll.  113  548 
Fink  r.  Patterson,  21  Fed.  R.  602  16, 120 
Fnili'v  ".  Aiken,  1  Grant  (Pa.)  h3  :-lG6 
FinnV.  United  States,  123  U.  S.  227  903. 

911 
Fire    Ins.   Assoc,    v.   Wickhain,   123 

U.  S.  42,5  983,  992 

First  Nat.  Bank  r.  Corbin,  132  U.  S. 


443 

440 

4 


571 


Douglass  Coiintv,  3  Ddl.  298 


848 
20 


c.  Forest,  40  FvA    R.  705  35,  .39 

i: ,  44  Fed.  R.  216  515 

f.  Kidd,  20  Minn.  2:i4  4()7 

i\  Redick,  110  U.  S.  224       7S8,  1027 

y.  Schedd,  121  U.  S.  74  564 

V.  Smith,  6  Fed.  R.  215  132 

First  Nat.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Salisbury,  130 

Mass.  303  "  3.;3 

Fisciier  v.  Hayes,  6  Fed.  R.  03      053,  r,.JL 

G55 
". ,  6  Fed.  R.  7G  ;  19  Blatchf. 

2G  165,271 

V. ,  5  Fed.  R.  8G  503 

'•.  ,  H)  Fed.  R.  469  561,  502 

r.  ,  22  Fed.  R.  92  555 

V.  O'Shaughnessey,  G  Fed.  R.  92  216 


United   States,  36  Fed.   R. 


Fisii 

677  595 

Fisliburn  v.  Cliicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Rv. 

Va)  ,  137  U.  S.  GO  7^1,  784 

Fisher  (;.  Boody,  I  Curt.  206  151,  581 

t\  Lord,  6  West.  L.  J.  137  3o7 

y.  Mansfield,  C  &  L.  M.  R.  Co., 

3G  Fed.  R.  627  42 

i\  Mee,  3  Meriv.  45  538 

V.  Mever,  10  Fed.  R.  268  795 

i\  Owen,  L.  1{.  8  Ch.  D.  645  255 

r.  Perkins,   122  U.  S.  522  1003 

r.  Rutherford,  Baldvv.  188     278,  296 

Fishmongers'  Co.  v.  East  India  Co., 

1  Dick.  1G3  354 

Fisk,  Ex  parte,  113  U.  S.  713   461,  G55, 

725,  727,  766,  7G7,  846 

V.   Henarie,  142  U.  S.  459   827,  834 

;.. ,  32  Fed.  R.  417  827,  832,  834 

c.  Uinon    Pacific   R.   R.   Co.,  6 

Blatchf.  3G2  822 

/•. .  10  Blatchf.  518  347,  351 

Filch  y.  Chapman,  2  Sim.  &  S.  31  2-39 

r.  Creigliton,  24  How.  159      10,  159, 

779 

r.  Rochfort,  18  L.  J.  Ch.  458         387 

Fitton,  In  re,  45  Fed.  R.  471  727 
(.'.  Earl  of  ^lacclesfield,  1  Vern. 

287  579 

Fitzgerald  r.  ]\Iissouri  Pac.  Rv.  Co., 

45  Fe.l.  R.  812  37,  39,  779,847 

Fitzgerald  &  M.  C.  Co.  v.  Fitzgerald, 

137  U.  S.  98  19.5,  197,  l'.)9,  200 

Fitzpatrick   c.  Domingo,  14    Fed.  R. 

216  299,  302 

V.  Hannagan.  106  U.  S.  648         1085 

Flack  r.  Holm,  1  Jac.  &  \V.  405  456 

Flaniang's  Case,  7  Ves.  305  356 

Flanders  i\  Seelye,  105  U.  S.  718  798 

Flash  ;'.  Dillon,  22  Fed    R.  1    43,811,812 

y.  Wilkerson,  22  Fed.  R.  689  10 

Fleming,  Ex  parte,  2  Wall.  759  713 

f.  Insurance  Co.,  Brightly  (Pa.), 


102 
Fletcher,  Ex  parte,  6  Ves.  427 

r.  Bealey,  33  W.  R.  745 

0.  Hamlet,  116  U.  S.  408 


4 

44.3,  444 

578 

80.5,  812, 

814,  824 

6 

R.  Co., 


V.  Morev,  2  Storv,  555 

V.  New  Orleans  N.  E.  R 

•M  Fed.  R.  315 

V.  Peck,  6  Cranch,  87 

V.  United  States,  45  Fed.  R.  213 

621,  623,  ()28,  629,  630,  m\ 
Flint  r.  Board  of  (^oinm'rs,  5  Dill.  481  767 

i:  Russell,  5  Dill.  151 

Flijjpin,  Ex  parte,  94  U.  S.  348 
Florence  S.  M.  Co.  v.  Grover  &  B.  S. 

M.  Co.,  110  Mass.  1 
u.  Singer  Manuf.  Co.,  8  Blatchf. 

113;  4  Fisher's  Pat.  Cas.  329 
Flores  r.  United  States,  18  Ct.  CI.  352  931 
Florida  v.  Anderson,  91  U.  S.  667    29,  596 

V.  Georgia,  17  How.  478         28,  107, 

140,  334 


1059 


l.')4 
704 


1.30 


liv 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  pages.] 


Florifl?.  V.  Gleason,  14  Fla.  109  755 

Kloris,  In  re,  4-i  Fed.  K.  114  728 

I'lour  Citv  Nat.  Hank  f.  Weciiselberg, 

45  Feci  R.  547  11 
Flournay  i-.  Lestrapes,  1.31  U.  S.  clxi  1086 
Fogg  V.  Blair,  l:Jy  U.  S.  118  210 
r.  St.  Louis  H.  &  K.  H.  R.  Co., 

17Fed.  R.  871  12,  2.']5 

Folev  r.  Hill,  3  .M.  &  Cr.  476  242 

Foils  Appeal,  91  Pa.  St.  4:-]4  16,  25,  372 
FoUansbee  r.  Ballard  Paving  Co.,  25 

Lawyers'  U.  S.  S.  C.  Rep.  802  1024 

FoUaiid  V.  Lamotte,  10  Sim.  486  '.',21 

Folsom  r.  Marsh,  2  Storv,  100  36M 

Fdiida.  Ex  parte,  117  U.  "S.  516  748 

Fontain  c.  Ravenel,  17  How   309  6 

Foote  V-  Cunard  Min.  Co.,  17  Fed.  E, 

40  102 

Forbes  v.  Memphis,  E.  P.  &  P.  R.  R. 

Co.,  2  Woods,  32:3  119,  293,  33«,  334 
Foril  V.  Douglas,  5  How.  143         250,  256, 

286,  287 
V.  Louisville,  N.  0.  &  T.  Ry.  Co. 

45  Fed.  R.  210  611 

V.  United  States,  18  Ct.  CI.  62      932 

Forgay  v.  Conrad,  6  How.  201  338,  568, 
569,  1019,  1032 
Forrest  v.  Manchester,  S.  &  L.  Ry.  Co., 

4  l)e  G.  F.  &  J.  126  843 
V.  Union   Pacific   R.    R.    Co.  47 

Fed.  R.  1  842,  849 

Forster  v.  Forster,  4  B  &  S.  187  O'.tS 

Forsyth  r    Pierson,  9  Fed.  R.  801  195 

'v.  United  States,  9  How.  571         804 

Forsvthe  r.  Kimball,  91  U.  S.  291  778 

Fort'Scott  r.  Hickman.  1 12  U.  S.  150  1084 
Fortuna,  The.  2  Wheat.  161  1081 

3  Wheat.  236  1081 

Fosdick  i:  Car  Co.,  99  U.  S.  256  402,407, 

418 

r.  Schall,  99  U.  S.  235   173.  401,  402, 

403,  405,  407,  408 
Foss   V.   First  Nat.    Bank,  1  ]McCra. 

474  293 

Fossat  Case,  2  Wall.  049  953 

Foster  r.   Chesapeake  &  N.  Rv.  Co., 

47  Fed.  ]{.  369  "  815 

V.  Deacon,  Madd.  &  G.  59  311 

r.  Goddard.  1  Black,  506        562,  563 

V.  Kansas,  122  U.  S.  201        758,  759, 

1048, 1051,  1052 

r.  Lind.sav,  3  Dill.  126    238,  290,  577 

V.  Moore,"  1  Curt.  279  359,  383 

V.  Swasev,  2  Woodb.  &  M   217     645 

;-.  Vassall,  3  Atk.  587     231,  232,  240 

Fougeres  v.   Murbarger,  44  Fed.  R. 

292  24,  158,  165,  289,  .372 

Fourniqnet  v.  Perkins,  16  How.  ';2  542 
Fourth  Nat.  Bank  v.  Francklyn,  120 

U.  S.  747  11,  1087 

V.  Stout,  113  U.  S.  684  >  1029 

Fouvergne  c.  New  Orleans,  18  How. 

470  811 
Fowle  r.  Lawrason,  5  Pet.  491  17 
V.  Spear,  7  Penn.  L.  J.  176            365 


Fowler,  In  re,  4  Fed.  R.  303 
V.  Ham  ill,  139  U.  S.  519 


727 

569,  1020, 

1023 

717 

511,  513, 


r.  Lindsey,  3  Dall.  411 

V.  Merrill,  11  How.  375 

515,  519,  520,  521,  522,  523 

i\  Wyatt.  24  Beav.  232  573 

Fox  V.  Blew,  5  Madd.  147  646 

V.  Suwerkrop,  1  Beav.  583  93 

Foxwell  I'.  Webster,  10  Jur.  n.  s.  137  156 
Frances,  The,  8  Cranch,  348  1082 

Francis  v.  Flinn,  118  U.  S.  385  24^  372 
Franco  v  Franco,  3  Ves.  76  "117 

Frank  r.  Denver  &  R.  G.  Ry.  Co.  23 
Fed.  R.  123  407,  408 

V. 23  Fed.  R.  757    427,  428,  443 

Frankle  v.  Jackson,  30  Fed.  R.  398  428 
Franklin  r.  llersch,  3  Tenn.  Cli.  467  538 
Fraser  v.  Jennison.  106  U.  S.  191    806,  814 

r.  Whalley,  2  Hem.  &  M.  10         386 

Fraj-ser  !•.  Russell,  3  Ihiahes,  227  370 
Frearson  v.  Loe,  L  R.  9  I'h.  D.  48  370 
Freeborn  v.  Smith,  2  Wall.  160  1090 

Freeman,  In  re.  2  Curt.  491  764 

V.  Butler,  39  Fed.  R.  1    818,  844.  846 

v.  Clav,  48  Fed.  R.  819  1062 

V.  Holmead,  5  Cranch  C.  C.  162     611 

V.  Howe,  24  How.  450  42,  142 

r.  Pontrell,  Chan.  Cal.  XIIL  4 

Free  Trader,  The,  1  Brown's  Adm. 

72  625 

199 


Pollock,    5    Coldw. 


Freidlander    v. 

(Tenn.)  490 
Freliiighuvsen  v.  Baldwin,  12  Fed.  R. 

395    '  591 

r.  Baldwin,  19  Fed.  R.  49      833 

r.  Key,  110  U.  S.  63  712 

Fremont  v.  Merced  Min.  Co.,  1  McAU. 

267  375 

V.  United  States.l7  How.  542  940,941 

French,  Kx  parte,  100  U.  S.  1     1050,  1051, 

1052 

r.  Brewer,  3  Wall.  Jr.  346  382 

V.  Dear,  5  Ves.  547  176 

V.  Gapen,  105  U.  S.  509         334,  335 

V.  Hav,  22  Wall.  2-50  212,  347 

r.  Rainev,  2  Tenn.  Cli.  640  258 

r.  Roe,  13  Ves.  593  193 

V.  Shoemaker,  12  Wall.  86    569,1019, 

1020 

V. ,  14  Wall.  314       130,  151,  251 

Frerichs  v.  Coster,  22  Fed.  R.  637    797,  798 

V.  United  States,  21  Ct.  CI.  16       935 

Fretz  V.  Stover,  22  Wall.  198        271,  306, 

1086 
Frevall  v.  Bache,  5  Cranch  C.  C.  403 

519,  522 
Friday,  Ex  parte,  43  Fed.  R.  916  59 

Friedman  r.  Israel,  26  Fed.  U.  801        816 
Friend  v.  Wise,  111  U    S.  797  1029 

Friezen  i-.  Allemania  F.  I  Co.,  30  Fed. 

R.  349  842 

Frishman  v.  Insurance  Co.,  41  Fed. 

R.  449  348 

Frost  V.  Spitley,  121  U.  S.  552  19,  22 


TABLE   OF   CASES, 
[References  are  to  pages.] 


Iv 


Frow  r.  De  la  Vega,  15  Wall.  552  206 
Frowd  V.  Lawrence,  1  Jac.  &  W.  055  376 
Frv  V.  Feiin,  2  Bro.  V.  C.  2«0  499 

—1-  r.  Quinlan,  lo  Bhitclif.  205  31G 

Fueiites  v.  United  States,  22  How.  443 

941,  954,  955 
Fulen welder  v.  United  States,  9  Ct. 

CI.  4013  904 
FuUiani  v.  McCarthy,  1  H.  L.  C.  703  113 
FuUagar  r.  Clark,  18  Ves.  481  549 
Fuller  V.  Claflin,  93  U.  S.  14  1018 
V.  County  of  Colfax,  14  Fed.  R. 

177  810 

V.  Fletcher,  44  Fed.  K.  34  782 

V.  Metropolitan  L.  L  Co.  31  Fed. 

R.  690  537 

V. 37  Fed.  R.  163  35,  537 

FuUerton  v.  Bank  of  United  States,  1 

■Pet.  604  777 

Fulton  ';.  Rosevelt,  1  Paige  (N.  Y.), 

178  92 
Fulton  Bank  v.  Beacli,  2  Paige  (N.Y.), 

307  262, 264 
V.  New  York  &  S.  Canal  Co.,  4 

Paige  (N.  Y.),  127  314 

Furbush  v.  Bradford,  1  Fisher's  Pat. 

Cas.  317  389 

Furlong  v.  Edwards,  3  Md.  99  452 

Furnian  v.  Nichol,  8  Wall.  44  452, 1004 
Furtado  v.  Furtado,  0  Jur.  227  93,  327 
Fussell  V.  Gregg,  113  U.  S.  550  19 


G. 


Gaffney  r.  Gillette,  4  mil.  264,  n.         804 
Gage  V.  Kaufman,  133  U.  S.  471  100 

— -  V.  Kellosig,  26  Fed.  R.  542  065 

r.  Pumpelly.  108  U.  S.  164  1061 

V. ,  115  U.  S.  454  174,  1079 

Gaines  v.  Agnellv,  1  Woods,  238  270 

v.  Chew,  2  IIow.  619      150,  156,  157, 

IGO,  172 

V.  Fuentes,  92  U.  R.  10      10,  43,  542, 

543,  679,  779,  808,  809,  811 

r.  Maussoaux,  1  Woods,  118         226 

V.  New  Orleans,  17  Fed.  R.  16; 

i.   4  Woods,  213  17 

V.  Relf,  15  Pet.  9  703 

V.  Thompson,  7  Wall.  347  711 

Gait  V.  Osbaldeston,  1  Uuss.  158  499 

Galena  v.  Amy,  5  Wall.  705  705 

Gallagher's  Ex'rs  v.  Roberts,  1  Wash. 

320  244 

Galpin  v.  Page,  18  Wall.  350  726 

V.  Sage,  3  Sawy.  93  419 

Gait  r.  Galloway,  4"Pct.  331  472 

Gallon  V.  Hancock,  2  Atk.  425  4 

Galveston   Railroad   v.    (^owdrey,  11 

Wall.  459  119,  120,  333,  334 

Gamber  (;.  Atlee,  2  De  G.  &  Sm.  745      91 
Game  well  F.  A.  Tel.  Co.  r.  City  of 

Chillicothe,  7  Fed.  R.  351  l.iS,  165 
r.  Mayor,  &c.,  of  N.  Y.,  31  Fed. 

R.  312  9 


Gandy  v.  Marble,  122  U.  S.  432    164, 168 
Garcias  v.  Ricardo,  14  Sim.  265  238 

Gardiner  v.  Mason,  4  Bro.  C.  C.  478     192 

t'.  Howe,  4  Madd.  236  549 

Gardner  r.  Bhine,  1  Hare,  381  444 

V.  Collins,  2  Pet.  58  777 

V.  Gardner,  87  N.  Y.  14  338,  392 

V.  Lindo,  1  Cranch  C.  C.  78  479 

V.  London  C.  &  1).  Ry.  Co.,  L. 

R.  2  Ch.  App.  201  410 

V.  Ogden,  22  N.  Y.  327  2,  670 

Garey  r.  Union  Bank,  3  Cranch  C.  C. 

91  511 

Garland  v  Davis,  4  How.  131      1087,1088 

r.  Garland,  2  Ves.  -Jr.  137  443 

Garneau  v.  Dozier,  100  U.  S.  7  1054 

Garrett  v.  City  of  Memphis,  5  Fed.  R. 

860  41f^ 
V.  Woodward,  2   Cranch   C.   C. 

190  512, 514 

Garrison  r.  United  States,  2  Ct.  CI. 

382  931 

V. ,  7  Wall.  088  931 

Garth  v.  Cotton,  1  Dick.  183;  1  Lea. 

Cas.  in  Eq.  (0th  ed.)  800  353,  354 

Gartside   Coal    Co.    v.    Maxwell,    20 

Fed.  R.  187  512,  517 

Gason   v.   Wordsworth,   2  Ves.  Sen. 

336  524 

Gass  V.  Stinson,  3  Sumner,  98  521 

Gause  v.  Perkins,  3  Jones'  Eq.  (N.  C.) 

177  3.57 

Gavin  v.  Vance,  33  Fed.  R.  84       44,  813. 

824 
Gay  V.  Parpart,  101  U.  S  391    1048,  1068 

r. ,  106  U.  S.  679  003 

Gayler  v.  Wilder,  10  How.  477      113,  114 
Gaylord  v.  Fort  Wayne,   M.  &  C.  K. 

K.  Co.,  6  Biss.  286  25 

Gaylords  v.  Kelshaw,  1  Wall.  81    130,  545 
Gee  V.  Pritchard,  2  Swanst.  402  342 

Geilinger  r.  Philippi,  133  U.  S.  246        14 
Geldard  v.  Hornby,  1  Hare,  251  575 

Gelpcke  r.  Dubuque,  1  Wall.  175         543, 

778,  779 
Gelston  v.  Hoyt,  3  Wheat.  246  1003 

Generes  v.  Campbell,  11  Wall.  193       964 
Geortre  i".  St.  Louis  C.  &  W.  Ry.  Co., 

44  Fed.  R.  117  333,405 

Georgeanna,  The,  31  Fed.  R.  405        622, 

625 
Georgetown  v.  Alexandria  Canal  Co., 

12  Pet.  91  3.55 

Georgia,  The,  7  Wall.  32  1086 

Georgia  v.  Atlantic  &  G.  R.  R.  Co., 

3  Woods,  434  431 

V.  Brailsford,  2  Dall.  402  27 

V.  Grant,  6  Wall.  241       19,  107,  185, 

714 
1031 
19,  29,  107, 
172,369 
Georgia  (Governor  of)  v.  INIadrazo,  1 

Pet.  124  105 

Germain  v.  Mason,  12  Wall.  259  1032 


,Iesup,  106  U.  S.  458 
Stanton,  0  Wall.  50 


Ivi 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[Relereuces  are  to  pages.] 


Gernon  v.  Boecaline,  2  Wash.  loO       4.55, 

459,  460 

y.  ___,  2  Wash.  199  248 

Gest  V.  Packwood,  o9  Fed.  R.  525  55 

Geyger  v.  Geyger,  2  Dall.  332  708 

Giant  Powder  Co.  v.  Calit'ornia  V.  P. 

Co.,  5  Fed.  R.  197  6G5,  666,  667 
V.  Safety  N.  P.  Co.,  19  Fed.  R. 

509  226,  281 

Gibbins  v.  Mainwaring,  9  Sim.  77         442 
Gibbons  &  Otidfn,  6  Wlieat.  448  1002 

V.  United  States,  8  Wall.  269         896 

Gibbs  V.  Clairett,  2  Gill  &  J.  (Md.)  14    159 

c.  David,  L.  U.  20  Eq.  o7o     400, 483, 

443 

V.  Diekma,  131  U.  S.  clxxxvi      1093 

Gibson  v.  Bruce,  108  U.  S.  561  818 

V.  Chouteau,  13  Wall.  92  235 

V.  Lewis,  11  Phila.  (Pa.)  476  353 

V.  Martin,  8  Paige  (N.  Y.),  481     442 

V.  Memphis    &c.   R.   R.  Co.,  31 

Fed.  R.  553  582 

V.  Peters,  35  Fed.  R.  721  591 

y. ,  36  Fed.  R.  487  591 

V.  Shuleldt,  122  U.  S.  27  33,  34, 

1028,  1029 

V.  Smith,  2  Atk.  182  381 

V.  Van  Drcsar,  1  Blatchf.  532        383 

V.  Whitehead,  4  JMadd.  241  226 

Gier  v.  Gregg,  4  McL.  202  267,  281 

Gilbert  v.  Endean,  L.  R.  9  Ch.  D.  259 

674,  679 

V.  Gilbert,  2  Paige  (N.  Y.),  603     646 

V.  Lewis,  1  De  G.  J.  &  S.  38 

Gilbert  &  B,  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Bussing, 

12  Blatclif.  426 
Gilchrist  v.   Helena  H.  S.  &  S.  R.  R. 

Co.,  47  Fed.  R.  593 
Giles  r.  Little,  134  U.  S.645 

V.  Paxson,  36  Fed.  R.  882 

Gillespie  v.  Moon,  2  Johns.  Ch.  (N.  Y.) 

585 
Gillet  V.  Moody,  3  N.  Y.  479 
Gillis  V.  United  States,  12  Ct.  CI.  704 


147 

383 

256 
994 
502 

158 
429 


908 
13 


Gilman  v.  Perkins,  7  Fed.  R.  887 
Gilplns  V.  Consequa,  Pet  C.  C.  85;  3 

Wash.  184  521,  522, 

Gindrat  v.  Dane,  4  Cliff.  260 
Ginter   v.   Riiiney    Tobacco   Co.,    12 

Fed.  R.  782 
Gist  /;.  Davis,  2  Hill  Ch.  (8.  C.)  835 
Gittings  r.  Crawford,  Taney's  Dec.  1 
Ghiddon  i\  Stoncinan,  1  Madd.  143,  m. 
Glaspell  V.  Northern  Pac.  R.  R.  Co. 

4  5  Fed.  R.  900 
Glassington  v.  Thwaites,  2  Russ.  458 

264,  267 
Glnzhrook  >:  Gillatt.  9  Benv.  492  385 

(ileason  r.  Florida,  9  Wail.  779  1008 

Glegg  »;.  Legh,  4  .Madd.  193  211,  21(i, 

225, 281 
Glen  V.  Fant,  124  U.  S.  123  1072 

V.  Gibson,  9  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  634      570 

Glenn  v.  Dinimock,  43  Fed.  U.  550       665 


523 
15 

365 

237 

5 

395 

782 


Glenn  >:  Fant,  134  U.  S.  398  773 

V.  Nuonan,  43  Fed.  R.  403  665 

V.  Soule,  22  Fed.  R.  417  430 

v.  Sumner,  132  U.  S.  152       774,  775 

V.  United  States,  4  Ct.  CM.  501       902 

Glenny  v.  Lnngdon,  94  U.  S.  604         1069 
Glossop  v.  Harrison,  G.  Cooper,  61 ; 

3  Ves.  &  B.  134  447 

Gloucester  Ferry  Co.  v.  Pennsylvania, 


114  U.  S.  196 
Gloucester    Ins.    Co.  v.  Younger,   2 

Curt.  322 
Glyn  V.  Scares,  1  Y.  &  C.  644 
Glynn  v.  Houston,  1  Keen,  329 
Godbolt  r.  Watts,  2  Anst.  543 
Goddard  r.  Ordway,  94  U.  S.  672 

V.  Wilde,  17  Fed.  R.  845 

Godden  y.  Kimmell,  99  U.  S.201 


813 

2 

1015 

111 

498 

174 

1052 

367 

11,  12, 

214,  235 

Godfrey  v.  Terry,  97  U.  S.  171  213 

Gold  W.  &  W.  Co.  V.  Keyes,  96  U.  S. 

199  818,  810 

Gold   &   Silver  0.  S.  Co.   i-.  United 

States  D.  O.  Co.,  6  Blatchf.  307  257 

Gold  &  Stock  Tel.  Co.  v.  Pearce,  19 

Fed.  R.  419  2-34 

Golden  v.  Morning  News,  42  Fed.  R. 

112  "  199,  842 

Goldsmith   v.   Gilliland,   22   Fed.   R. 
865  166,  215 

V.  Holmes,  36  Fed.  R.  484  56 

Goldstein  i\  New  Orleans,  38  Fed.  R. 

626  843 

Goldworthy  r.  Chicago  M.  &  St.  P. 

Ry.  Co.,  38  Fed.  R.  769  828 

Good  V.  Blewitt,  13  Ves.  397  121,  278 

Good  Hope  Co.  v.  Railwav  B.  F.  Co., 

22  Fed.  R.  635  '  190,  841 

Goodman  v.  Wliitcomb,  1  Jac.  &  W. 

395,  441 
Litchfield,   47   Fed.    R. 

816 
r.  Pendleton,  3  Johns.  Ch. 
.520  646 

United   States,  35  Fed.  R. 
193  599,  fill 

_  ,,. ,  39  Fed.  R.  267  598 

—  V. ,  42  Fed.  R.  3!'2     602,  610,  611 


589 
Goodnow 

753 
Goodrich 

(N.  Y.) 


Goodwin 


-,  47  Fed.  R.  267 

Fox,  120  U.  S.  775 
-,  129  U.  S.  601 
'\  Allen,  3  Fisher's 


599,  600, 

(i04 

1044 

487 


Pat. 


113 

276 
199 


Goodvear 

Cas.  284 

V.  Bourn,  3  Blatchf.  266 

r.  Chatfoe,  3  Blatchf.  268 

r.  MuUee,  3  Fisher's  Pat.  Cas. 

420 
V.    Providence    Rubber    Co.,   2 

Cliff.    351;     2   Fisher's    Pat.    Cas. 

499  547,  510 

V.  Sawver,  17  Fed.  R.  2  585,  586 

V.  Toby,  6  Blatchf.  180     2.34,  241, 244 

Goodvear  D.  V.  Co.  u.  Folsom,  3  Fed. 

R.  609  336,  377 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


Ivii 


1 


563 

132 

3 

105 


[References 

Goodvenr  DV.  Co.  i".  Osgood,  2  Bann. 

&  A.  Tat.  Cas.  52U ;    13  Oti".  (iaz. 

825  I'.'H,  585,  5S0,  587 

V.  Wliite,  46  Fed.  R.  278  770 

Gordon,  Ex  parte,  1  Black,  503      698,  993 

,  Ex  parte,  104  U.  S.  515         096,  869 

V.  Calvert,  2  Sim.  2->>  446 

V.  Cheltenliam  Hy.  Co.,  5  Beav. 

229  383 

V.  Gilfoil,  99  U.  S.  168  232 

V.  Gordon,  3  Svvanst.  400         145,  577 

V.  Hol)art,  2  Sumner,  401  6 

V. ,  2  Story,  243  554 

V.  St.  Paul  Harvester  Works,  23 

Fed.  H.  147  222 

Gorliam    v.    Gorhara,    3    Barb.   Ch. 

(N.  Y.)  24  94 

Gorman  i-.  Havird,  141  U.  S.  206    37,  759, 

1028 

Gormley  v.  Bunyan,  138  U.  S.  623      461, 

479,  513,  515,  1085,  1090 

V.  Clark,  134  U.  S.  338  11,  662 

Gorse  V.  Parker,  36  Fed.  R.  840  587 

Gottfried    v.   Crescent   Brewing  Co., 

22  Fed.  R.  433 
Gould  V.  Heade,  41  Fed.  R.  240 

V.  Okeden,  4  Bro.  P.  C.  198 

Governor  of  Georgia  v.  Madrazo 

Pet.  124 
Grace  v.  American  Cent   Ins.  Co.,  109 

U.  S.  278  5:]6,  818,  1083,  1087 

Graffam  c.   Burgess,  117   U.  S.   180 

277 
Graham,   Ex  parte,  3   Wash.    C 

156 

,  Ex  parte,  10  Wall.  541 

V.  Bayne,  18  How.  60 

V.  Boston,   H.  &  E.  R.  R.  Co., 

118  U   S.  161  39,679,  812 
V.  Coape,  9  Sim.  93 ;  s.  c.  3  .M. 

&  Cr.  638 

r.  Mason,  4  Cliff.  88 

V.  .Meyer,  4  Blatchf.  129 

r.  Norton,  15  Wall.  427 

('.  Railroad  Co.,  3  Wall.  704 

r.  Stucken,  4  Blatchf.  -JO 

i\  Teter,  25  Fed.  R.  555 

V.  United  States,  4  Wall.  259 

953,  956 
Or  hame  v.   Cooke,  1  Cranch  C.   C. 

116  209 

Grand   Chute  v.  Winegar,  15  Wall. 

373  7,  24 

Grant  r.  Grant,  3  Russ.  598 

r. ,  5  Russ.  189 

V.  Henry  Clay  Coal  Co.,  80  Pa 

St.  208 

V.  Phcrnix  Ins.   Co.,  106  U.  S. 

429  1018,  1023 

r.  Phcrnix   L.  I.   Co.,   121    U.   S. 

105  156,  216.  .504 

V. .  121  U.  S.  518  1024 

V.  Pvaymond,  6  Pet.  218         253,  686, 

984,  985,  986 
V.  United  States,  1  Ct.  CI.  41        897 


C. 


657 

698 

1084 


267,  268 
251 
231 
704 

578 

,  45<5 

18 

941, 


459 
46(1 


480 


are  to  pages.] 

Grantlaud  v.  Memphis,   12  Fed.   R. 

287  297,  7tjO,  797 

Gratiot  v.  United  States,  13  Pet.  336  469 
Grattan  l:  Appleion,  o  Story,  755       581, 

582 
Graveley  r.  Graveley,  42  Fed.  R.  264  366 
Graves  v.  Boston  M.  1.  Co  ,  2  Cranch, 

419  24 
V.  Corbin,  132  U.  S.  571 ;  10  S.  C. 

Rep.  196  816,  848,  971 

Gray  v.  Brignardello,  1  Wall.  627  576 

(;.  Campbell,  1  Huss.  &  M.  323       276 

r.  Chaplin,  2  Sim.  &  S.  267  120 

r.  Chicago,  I.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  1 

Woolvv.  63  322,  323,  325,  338, 

378,  653 

V.  Haig,  13  Beav.  65  294 

V.  Howe,  108  U.  S.  12  965 

r.  James,  Pet.  C.  C.  394  253 

r.  Larrimore,  2  Abb.  C  C.  542      130 

V.  Munroe,  1  McL.528  764 

Grav  Jacket,  The,  5  Wall.  342  1081 

-,  5  Wall.  370  1078 

Grayson  r.  Virginia,  3  Dall.  320  28,  188 
Great  Falls  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Attorney 

Genl.  124  U.   S.  581  897 

Greatrex  v.  Greatrex,  1  De  G.  &  Sm. 

(■)92  373 

Greeley  v.  Commissioner,  6  Fisher's 

Pat.  Cas.  675;  1  Holmes,  284  18 

V.  Smith,  3  Story,  658  297 

Green,  In  re,  141  U.  S.  325  702 

V.  Barney,  19  Fed.  R.  420  235 

r.  Custard,  23  How.  484  843 

V.  Elbert,  137  U.  S.  615      1058,  1076 

V.  Fisk,  103  U.  S.  518  1023 

I'.  French,  5  N.  J.  L.  J.  228    587,  588 

V.  Hanberry,  2  Brock.  403  353 

V.  Neal's  Lessee,  6  Pet.  291  777 

i:  United  States,  9  Wall.  6-55        486 

V. ,  17  Ct.  CI.  174  903 

f. ,  18  Ct.  CI.  93  934 

V.  Van  Buskerk,  3  Wall.  448       10-52 

V.  Watkins,  6  Wheat.  260  770 

I.:  Winter,  1  Johns.  Ch.  (N.  Y.) 

(;0  418.  428 

Greene  r.  Bishop,  1  Cliff.  186        363,  562 

V.  Darling,  5  Mason,  201  4 

V.  Sisson,  2  Curt.  171      117,  127,  135 

Greene  County  v.  Daniel,  102  U.  S. 

187  704 

Greenleaf  r.  Queen,  1  Pet.  138  310 

Greenlee  v.  McDowell,  4   Ired.   Fq. 

(N.  C.)  481  672 

Greenough  r.  Gaskell,  1  M.  &  K.  100  215 
(ireenwalt  v.  Duncan,  16  Fed.  R.  35    167, 

292,  293 
Greenwood  v.  Atkinson,  5  Sim.  419      313 

V.  Churchill,  1  M.  &  K.  559  1-59 

V.  Freiiiht  (^o..  105  U.  S.  13    26,  161 

Greer  v.  Mezes,  24  How.  268  952,  953,  950 
Gregor  v.   Molesworth,  2   Ves.   Sen. 

1(")9  670,  671 
Gregory  v.  Hartley.  1 1 3  U.  S.  742  833 
y.  McVeigh,  23  Wall  294    1002, 1003 


Iviii 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[Refereuces  are  to  pages.] 


Gregory  v.  Moles  worth,  3  Atk.  62(j       574 

f. "Stetson,  loo  U.  S.  579  130 

Gregory  C.  M.  Co.  v.  Starr,  141  U.  S. 

•222  1093 

Grejison  v.  Oswald,  1  Cox  Eq.  343  209 
Grent'ell  v.  Dean  ot  Windsor,  2  Beav. 

544  453 

Gresley  v.  Mouslev,  4  De  G.  &  J.  78  578 
Grew  V.  Breed,  12  Met.  (Mass.)  369  309 
Gridley  v.  Wvnant,  23  How.  500  118,  126 
Gritlin,  The,  4  Blatchf.  203  521 

r.  iNIerrili,  10  Md.  3G4  156 

r.  United  States,  13  Ct.  CI.  257    910, 

911,  912,  913 

V.  Wilcox,  21  Ind.  370  737 

Gritfing  v.  Gibb,  2  Black,  519  236 

Griffith  r.  Griffith,  2  Ves.  Sen.  400       446 

V.  Truckhonier,  Pet.  C.  C   166      472 

Grimes  v.  Frencii,  2  x\tk.  141  171 

Grimley,  In  re,  137  U.  S.  147  727 

Grisar  v.  McDowell,  6  Wall.  303  102, 

942,  945,  958,  962 
Griswold  v.  Hazard,  141  U.  S.  260        460 

V.  Hill,  1  Paine,  483  298,  302,  305, 576 

Groom  V.  Chambers,  2  Mont.  &  A. 

742  550 

Gross  V.  United  States  Mortgatre  Co., 

108  U.  S.  477  ^  1004 

Gross  &  P.  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Gerhard,  8 

Reporter,  136  045 

Grote  r.  Bury,  1  W.  R.  92  442 

(iroves  r.  Shiughter,  15  Pet.  449  777 

(iruhb  r.  Clayton,  2   Hayw.  (N.  C.) 

378  237 

Grundv  v.  Young,  2  Cranch  C.   C. 

114  '  390 

Guilbert  r.  Hawlcs,  1  Ch.  Cas.  40  533 

(Juion  r.  Liverpool  L.  &  G.  Ins.  Co., 

10'.)  U.  S.  173  1030 

Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Rv.  Co.  V.  James,  48 

Fed.  R.  148    '  689 

Gumbel  v.  Pitkin,  113  U.  S.  545    1018, 

1032,  1041,  1059,  1062 

r. ,  124  U.  S.  131  42 

(iunnell  v.  Bird,  10  Wall.  304  306 

(iunthor  r.    Liverpool,   L.   &  G.   Ins. 

Co.,  10  Fed.  II.  830  640 

Gupp  r.  Brown,  4  Dall.  410  521 

(jurnee  v.  Patrick  County,  137  U.  S. 

141  850 

(Jurney  r.  Atlantic  &  G.  W.  Ry.  Co., 

58  N.  Y.  358  407 

Guttman  v.  United  States,  6  Ct.  CI. 

Ill 
Guv  V.  Guy,  2  Beav.  460 
(iuyon  I'.  Serrell,  1  Blatchf.  244 
(iuyot  v.  Hilton,  32  Fed.  H.  743 


Gwin  !•.  Brcedlove,  15  Pet.  284 


909 
93,  327 

570  I 
464,  7i;7, 
768  i 
1069 


II. 

Hack  V.  Chicago  &  G.  S.  Ry.  Co. 
Fed.  K.  356 


814 


Hadlev  v.  Baxendale,  9  Excli.  341  .390 
Hatif"  Spicer,  3  Caines  (N.  Y.),  190  484 
Hagan  v.  Lucas,  10  Pet.  400  12 

V.  Walker,  14  How.  29  112,  113 

Hasar,  Ex  jiarie,  104  U.  S.  520  696 

Hagood  v.  Southern,  117  U.  S.  52  101 

105,  106 
Haight  r.  Proprs.  of  Morris  Aqueduct, 

4  Wash.  601  262,  482 

Haines  v.  Carpenter,  1  "Woods,  262       155 

c. ,  91  U.  S.  254  347 

V.  McLaughlin,  29  Fed.  R.  70       637 

Hake  v.  Brown,  37  Fed.  I{.  783  573 

V. ,  44  Fed.  R.  734  587,  639, 

640,  641 
Hakes  v.  Burns,  40  Fed.  R.  .33  814,  824 
Halderman    v.    Halderman,  Henipst. 

407  224 

Hale  V.  Aker,  132  U.  S.  554  1004 

V.  Continental  L.  I.  Co.,  12  Fed. 

R.  359  199 

V.  ,  16  Fed.  R.  718  259 

r. ,  20  Fed.  R.  344  201,  259 

V.  Frost,  99  U.  S.  3b9     402,  405,  407 

Hales  V.  Sutton,  1  Dick.  2(5  191 

Hall  V.  Hoddesdon,  2  P.  AVms.  162       497 

V.  Jordan,  19  Wall.  271  1093 

V.  Maltby,  6  Price,  240  149 

r.  I'itrat,  45  F\'d.  H.  94  16 

V.  Union  Pacific  R.  R.  Co.,  3  Dill. 

515  713 

i:  United  States,  9  Ct.  CI.  270     9U0, 

901 

r.  Wcare.  92  U  S.  728         766,  1090 

Hallctt  V.  Hallett,  2  Paige  (N.  Y.),  15 

119 
.333 
191 

371 
325 
278 
353 

847 

91 

397 

582 

446 

12 

663 
762 

283 
8(14 
347 

560 

482 

675 


r. ,  2  Paige  (N.  Y.),  432 

V.  Sutton,  12  Sim.  145,  ii. 

llalscv  V.  Brotherhood,  45  L.  T.  n.  s. 

640"' 

r.  Carter,  6  Rob.  (N.  Y.)  535 

Halsted  r.  Buster,  119  U.  S.  341 
Haly  V.  (joodson,  2  Meiiv.  77 
Hamblin  r.  Chicago,  B   &  Q.  R.  Co., 

43  Fed.  R.  401 
Ilamerslev  v.  Lambert,  2  Johns.  Ch. 

(N.  Y.)"508 
Hamilton   c.  Accessory  Transit  Co., 

26  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  46 

I'.  Baldwin,  41  Fed.  R.  429 

v.  Brewster,  2  Moll.  407 

r.  Chouteau,  6  Fed.  R.  339 

V.  Houghton,  2  Bligh   P.  C.  169 


r.  .Tones,  2  Havw.  291 

i:  Nevada,  G.  &  S.  M.  Co.,  33  Fed. 

K.  5<')2 

/..  Walla  "Walla,  44  Fed.  R.  4 

>:  Walsh,  23  F'ed.  H.  420 

Hammacher  r.  Wilson,  32  Fed.  R.  796 

Hammerschlag  Manuf.  Co.  r.  Judd, 

26  Fed.  R.  292 
Hammock  v.  Loan  &  Trust  Co.,  105 

U.  S.  77 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  pages.] 


lix 


Hammond  v.  Cleaveland,  23  Fed.  R.  1     5(3 

V.  Jolinston,  142  U.  S.  7:5  1004 

Hancock  v.  Walsh,  o  Woods,  351  129 

Hand    i\   Hagood,  lol   U.   S.  cl.KX.\i 

1022 
Ilandford  a.  Storie,  2  Sim.  &  S.  lOB 

120,  5:1:3 
Handley  v.  Stutz,  137  U.  S.  ;360     34,  1028, 

102'J 
Handy  v.  Cleveland  &  M.  R.  R.  ("<>., 

31  Fed.  R.  689  4o;J,  451 

Hanna  v.  Maas,  122  U.  S.  24  785 

Hannah  v.  Hodgson,  :30  Beav.  19  294 

Hannauer  v.  Woodruff,  10  Wall.  482 

987 
Hannewinkle  v.  Georgetown,  15  Wall. 

548  20 

Hanover    Nat.    Bank    v.    Smith,    13 

Blatchf.  224  813 

Hanrick  u.  Barton,  16  Wall.  1G6  473 

V.  Patrick,  119  U.  S.  156  1032 

Hans  V.  Louisiana,  134  U.  S.  1  106 

Hanson  v.  Gardiner,  7  Ves.  305  381 

Hapgood  V.  Hewitt,  119  U.  S.  226  24 

Hardcastle  v.  Smithson,  3  Atk.  246      122 
Hardeman  v.  Anderson,  4  How.  640 

1100 

V.  Harris,  7  How.  726  257 

Hardenberg  l:  Ray,  33  Fed.  R.  812        44 
Hardin  v.  Boyd,  113  U.  S.  756      150,  27:5, 

276,  277 
Harding,  E.r  parte,  120  U.  S.  782  726 

V.  Cass  County,  42  Fed.  R.  652      35 

v.  Handy,  11  Wheat.  103      110,  547. 

562 

V.  Pingey,  10  Jur.  n.  s.  872 

Hare  v  Rose,  2  Ves.  Sen.  558 
Hargrave  v.  Hargrave,  8  Heav.  289 
Harkness  v.  Hyde,  98  U.  S.  476 
Harland  v.  Bankers'  &  M.  Tel.  Co.  32 

Fed.  R.  .305  217,  581 

V. ,  33  Fed.  R.  199  428 

V.  United  Lines  Tel.  Co.  40  Fed. 

R.  308  763 

Harman  v.  Jones,  Cr.  &  Ph.  299  356 

Harmon,  Ex  parte,  131   U.    S.,  App. 

l.wii  714 

V.  United  States,  43  Fed.  R.  560 

98,  623,  624,  628,  629,  6:30,  631 

V. ,  43  Fed.  R.  817  971,  1017 

Harold  v.  Iron  S.  M.  Co.,  :33  Fed.  R. 

529 
Harpending  v.  Reformed  P.D.  Churcli, 

16  Pet.  455 
Harper  r.  Hill,  35  Miss.  63 
V.  Norfolk  &  M.  R.  Co.,  36  Fed. 

R.  102 

w.  United  States,  21  Ct.  CI.  -56 

Harris  v.  Barber,  129  U.  S.  366     718,  l(i2S 

1-.  Barnett,  4  i'.latchf.  369  473 

V.  Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co., 

18  Fed.  R.  833  824,  845 

V.  Dennie,  3  Pet.  292  853 

r.  Elliott,  10  Pet.  25 

■ V.  Hess,  10  Fed.  R.  263 


174 
643 
550 
200 


813 


117 


38 
617 


Harris  v.  Ingledew,  3  P.  Wms.  91         465 

V.  Johnston,  3  Cranch,  311  1 13 

V.  Pollard,  3  P.  Wms.  348  305 

V.  Wall,  7  How.  693      511,  513,  516, 

518 
Harrington  v.  Holler,  111  U.  S.  796  1022 
Harrison  v.  Hogg,  2  Ves.  Jr.  323     167,  220 

V.  Ni.xon,  9  Pet.  483  145,  1078 

V.  Rowan,  4  Wash.  202      16,  94,  108, 

109,  117,  1:38 

r.  United  States,  20  Ct.  CI.  175    903 

V.  Urann,  1  Story,  64  535 

Harrison's  Case,  1  Cranch  C.  C.  159  744 
Harshman  0.  Knox  County,  122  U.  S. 

306  716 

Hart  x\  Barney  &  S.  Manuf.   Co.,  7 

Fed.  R.  543  429 
V.  City  of  New  Orleans,  12  Fed. 

R.  292  714,  794,  795 

V.  Small,  4  Paige  (N.  Y.),  551       323 

r.  United  States,  118  U.  S.  62       901 

Hartell  c.  Tilghman,  99  U.  S  547     36,  515 
Harter  v.  Kernochan,  103  U.  S.  562       37, 
38,  126,  1:32 
Hartford   F.  I.  Co.  v.  Bonner  Merc. 

Co.,  44  Fed.  R.  151  16,  156,  684 

Hartland  v.  Dancocks,  5  De  G.  &  Sm. 

561  5.50 

Hartman  v.  Greenhow,  102  U.  S.  672 

1002 
Hartog  V.  Memory,  116  U.  S.  588        5:3-5, 

5:36 
Hartshorn  v.  Day,  18  How.  28  10-59 

Hartwell  v.  Townsend,  6  Bro.  P.  C. 


107 


670 
134 
396 
215 
899 
9:33 


Harvey  v.  Cooke  4  Russ.  35 

V.  Lord,  10  Fed.  R.  236 

V.  Morris,  Rep.  t.  Finch,  214 

V.  United  States,  3  Ct.  CI.  38 

V. ,113  U.S.  243 

Harwood  r.  Dieckerhoff,   117   U.  S. 

200  1050 

V.  Raild.  Co.,  17  Wall.  78       131,  679 

Haskins  v.  St.  Louis  &  S.  E.  Ry.  Co., 

109  U.  S.  106  1046 

Hassall  v.  Wilcox,  115  U.  S.  598        1029, 

10:30 

V. ,  1.30  U.  S.  493  412 

Hatch  V.  Dana,  101  U.  S.  205  129 

r.  Eustis,  1  Gall.  KiO  760,  762 

r.  Indianapolis  &  S.  R.  R.  Co., 

9  Fed.  R.  8.56  561,  562 

Hatfield  r.  Bushnell,  1  Blatchf.  ;393      770 
Hathaway  v.  Roach,  2  Woodb.  &  M. 

63  580,  637,  638,  639 

V.  Scott,  11  Paige  (N.  Y.),  173      263 

Hat  Sweat  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Reinoehl, 

102  N.  Y.  167  ;36 

V.  Waring,  46  Fed.  R.  87  5:32 

Hat  Trimmings  Case,  U.  S.  I).  C.  E. 

D.  Pa.,  Dec.  8,  1891  783 

Havemever  v.  Iowa  County,  3  Wall. 

294      ■  778,  779,  976,  977.  987,  988 

978  ]  Havilali.  The,  48  Fed.  R.  684  ;  1  Cir. 
Gb7  '      Ct.  App.  1  689,  1009 


Ix 

[References 

Hawes  v.  Baniford,  9  Sim.  653  483 

c:  Oakland,  1U4  U.  S.  450       26,  101, 

343 
Hawke  v.  Kemp,  3  Beav.  288  327 

Hawkins  c.  Blake,  108  U.  S.  422  lO'JG 

V.  Crook,  2  P.  Wins.  556         201,  203 

'•.  Glenn,  131  U.  !S.  ^19  TT'J 

r.  Lus(M)inbe,  2  Swanst.  375  108 

r.  Willbank,  4  Wash.  285  046 

Havvley  v.  Bennett,  4  Paige  (N.  Y.), 

103  298 
V.  Donnelly,  8   Paige    (N.  Y.), 

415  483 

Hax  v.  Caspar,  31  Fed.  R.  499      814,  816. 

817,  850 
Harden  v.  Androscoggin  Mills,  1  Fed. 

ll  93  190 

V.  Oriental  Mills,  15  Fed.  K.  605     12 

Haves  v.  Dayton,  8  Fed.  K.  702  158,  165, 
211,  212,  240 

i:  Fischer,  102  U.  S.  121       509,  653, 

655,  1023 

r.  Leton,  5  Fed.  11.  521  393 

Hayne  v.  llayiie,  3  Rep.  in  Ch.  19  291 
Hay  ward  v.  Andrews,  106  U.  S.  672      24, 

114 
Hazard  i\  Credit  Mobilier  of  Amer., 
38  Fed.  K.  195  453 

i:  Durant,  19  Fed.  R.  471        95,  127, 

430 
Hazard  (The)  «•.  Campbell,  9  Cranch, 

205  1081 

Head  v.  Godlee,  Johnson,  536  667 

r.  Porter,  48  Fed.  R.  481  897 

Headman  v.  United  States,  5  Ct.  CI. 

640  909 

Hearn  v.  Tenant,  14  Ves.  136  053 

Heath,  In  re,  Petitioner,  144  U.  S.  92  965, 

960 

V.  Erie  Ry.  Co.,  8  Blatchf.  347     127, 

128,  129,211,  212 

r. ,  9  Blatclif.  316   4,  8,  192,  2Stl, 

294,  499,  523 

.  Wrigiit,  3  Wall.  Jr.  141  365 

Ileatlicote  r.  Nortli  Staffordsliire  Rv. 

Vo,  2  Macn.  &  G.  100  "     371 

Heathfield  r.  United  States,  8  Ct.  CI. 

213  899 

Hel)ert  r.  Mutual  L.  I.  Co.,  12  I-Vd. 

R.  807  10,  159 

Hcckman  c  Mackey,  32  Fed.  R.  574  331 
•Hedley  v.  Bates,  L.  R.,  13  Ch.  1).49S  093 
Hefner  r.  Nortii western  L.  I.  Co.,  123 

U.  S.  747  115,  160 

Heidecker  v.    Red   Star   Line    S.    S. 

Co.,  32  Fed.  R.  706  840,  841 

Ileidritter  v.  Klizabetli  Oil  Clotli  Co., 

112  U.  S.  294  12,  13,  14 

Ileilman   ;;.  Union  Canal  Co.,  37  Pa. 

St    100  357 

Heine  '•.  Levee   Comm'rs,   19   Wall. 

655  '    20 

Hemingway    i".   Stansell,    lOf!    U.    S. 

399  297,  302.  ;^.  11,  1041 

Heinnicnway  v.  Fisiier,  20  How.  255  1083 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


are  to  pages.] 

Henderson  c.  Cabell,  43  Fed.  R.  257   839, 

843 

r.  Carbondale  C.  &  C.  Co.,  140 

U.  S.  25  337 

i:  Meggs,  2  Bro.  C.  C.  127  192 

V.  Moore,  5  Cranch,  11  1090 

Hendrickson  v.   Ciiicago,   R.  I.  &  P. 

R.  R.  Co.,  22  Fed.  R.  569  842 

Heningi'.  United  States   Ins.  Co.,  2 

Dill.  26  776,  778 

Henley  r.  Philips,  2  Atk.  48  643 

Heimessy  v.  Sheldon,  12  Wall.  440  1093 
Henning  v.  Western   Union  Tel.  Co., 

40  Fed.  R.  658  084 

r. ,  43  Fed.  R.  97  45 

Henry    v.  Ricketts,  1    Cranch  C.  C. 

580  490,  657 

V.  Snttle,  42  Fed.  R.  91  145 

V.  Travelers'  Ins.  Co.,  34  Fed.  R. 

258  064 

V. ,  35  Fed.  R.  15  494 

i: ,  45  Fed.  R.  299  315,  310 

c.  United  States,  22  Ct.  of  CI.  75  680 

llenshaw  r.  Miller,  17  How.  212  770 

r.  Wel.s,  9  Humph.  (Tenn.)  508  442 

Ilenthorn  ;;.  Doe,  1  Blackf.  (Ind.)  157  480 

569 
373 
373 
38 
784 
785 
4 
864 


llentig  V.  Page,  105  U.  S.  219 
Hei)burn  v.  Auld,  5  Cranch,  2()2 

V.  Dunlop,  1  Wheat.  179 

V   Fllzey,  2  Cranch,  445 

Herbert  v.  Butler,  14  Blatchf.  357 

r.  ,  97  U.  S.  319 

V.  Wren,  7  Cranch,  370 

Hercules,  Tlie,  20  Fed.  R.  205 

Heriot  v.  Davis,  2  Woodb.  &  M.  229    130, 

132 
Herman  v.  McKinney,43  Fed.  R.  689  804 
Herndon  r.  Ridgway,  17  How.  424      180, 

192 
Ilerrick  v.  Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co.,  7 

U.  C.  L.  J.  240  343,  397 

Herring  v.  Clobery,  Cr.  &  Ph.  251         608 
Hersch  v.  United  States,  15  Ct.  CI.  385 

897 

395 


Hervey  r.  Fitzpatrick,  Kay,  421 
)\  Illinois  Midland  Ry.  Co.,  28 

Fed.  R.  Ki.) 
r. ,   U.  S.  C.  C,  S    D 

June   10,  188() 

r.  Smitli,  1  Kav  &  J.  389 

Hess  c.  Revnolds,  113  U.  S.  73 


420 


Rl., 

565 

373 

808,  809, 

810,  817 

310 

1043 


Ilewett  V.  Norton,  1  Woods,  G8 
Hewitt  r.  Filbert,  HO  U.  S.  142 
Ilevman  r.  Uhlman,  34  Fed.  R.  680  200 
Heyn  r.  Hevn,  Jacob,  49  202,  205,  557 
lleys  r.  Ast'ley,  9  L.  T.  n.  s.  356  236 

Hcvworth  V.  London,  1  Cab.  &  Kll. 

3"  12  700 

Ilibbcrt  r.  Ilibbert,  3  .Aleriv.  681  446 

llibernia,  The,  1  Sprague,  78  625 

Hichens  v.  Congreve,  4  Russ.  562         120 
Hickman  v.  Fort  Scott,  141  U.  S.  415 

771,  793,  794 
/•.  Jones,  9  Wall.  197  785 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


[References 

Hickox  V.  Elliott,  28  Fed.  T?.  117        1010 
Hicks  V.  C()in[)t()n,  18  Cal.  200  337 

V.  Hicks,  3  Atk.  274  396,  433 

V.  Otto,  17  Fed.  K.  539  283 

V. ,  22  Blatclif.  ]22  606 

V.  Raincock,  1  Cox  Eq.  40  218 

V.  Wrench,  Madd.  &  G.  93  643 

Hickson  v.  Lombard,  L.  K.  1  H.  L. 

326  151 

Hide  V.  Haywood,  2  Atk.  126  643 

Hier  v.  Abrahams,  82  N.  Y.  519  365 

Hiern  v.  xMill,  13  Ves.  118  171 

Hijrhy  v.  Columbia  Eubber  Co.,  18 

Fed.  R.  601  234 

Hi-si'is,  In  re,  27  Fed.  R.  443  431 

i\  Jeiiks,  3  \7are,  17  353 

Hijiinbotiiam  v.  Burnet,  5  Johns.  Cli. 

(N.  Y.)  Iri4  211,499 

Hisneras   v.   United  States,  5  Wall. 

827  9-38,  961,  963 

Hildvard  v.  Cressv,  3  Atk.  -303  277 

Hiles  V.  Case,  14  Fed.  R.  141;  9  Biss. 
549  410 

V.  Moore,  15  Beav.  175  442 

Hill  u.  Binnev,  6  Ves.  738  462 

r.  Bcmalfon,  2  W.  N.  C.  (Pa.)  356   214 

V.  Chicago  &  E.  Ry.  Co.,  129  U. 

S.  170  1046 

V. ,  140  U.  S.  52   569, 1020, 1038, 

1085 

V.  Glasgow  R.  Co.,  41  Fed.  R. 

610  34 

r.  Gordon,  45  Fed.  R.  276  180 

r.  Hnrdinir,  107  U.  S  631  1078 

r.  Rinu'll,  8  Sim.  632  325 

r.  Smith,  32  Fed.  R.  753  583 

r.  State,  1  Ala.  5-39  7-56 

V.  Tiioinpson,  SMeriv.  622    3.58,  359, 

361,  379 

V.  United  States,  9  How.  386        370 

r. ,  8  Ct.  Ci.  470  909,  911 

Hiller  r   Wailroad  Co.,  70  N.  Y.  223       841 
Hills  V.  Exchange  Bank.  105  U.  S.  319  315 

r.  Uiciinioud  &  D.  R.  R.  Co.,  33 

Fed.  R   81  827 

Hilton  r.  Barrow,  1  Ves.  Jr.  234  288 

r.  Dickinson,  108  U.  S.  165       1060, 

1061 

r.  Guvott,  42  Fed.  R.  249      237,  241 

Himely  v.  Rose,  5  Cranch,  313  1098 

Hincklev,  In  re,  3  Fed.  R.  556       450,  451 

r.  Gil  man,  C.  &  S.  R.  R.  Co.,  94 

U.  S.  467  449,  10.30 

c.  Morton,  103  U.  S.  764  1067,  1068, 

1098 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  100  U.  S   153      432 

447,  449,  4.50,  846 
llinde  r.  Longvvorth,  11  Wheat.  199    1087 

t\  Morton,  2  Hem.  &  M.  368  537 

Hipp  r.  Babin,  19  How.  271  5,  7,  2! 

Hiriart  r.  Ballon,  9  Pet.  156  1053 

IPrschl  V.  J.   I.   Case,  T.  M.  Co.,  42 

Fed.  R.  803  45,  819 

Hitner  v.  Sucklev,  2  Wash.  465     191, 192 


Ixi 


are  to  pages.] 

Iloadiey  v.  San  Francisco,  94  U.  S.  4  702 
Hobbs  r.  McLean,  117  U.  S.  567  581 

V.  United  States,  17  Ct.  CI.  189    900. 

902 

V. ,  19  Ct.  CI.  220  933,  935 

Hobhouse  v.  Courtney,  12  Sim.  140     191, 

192 
Hobson  c.  Mc  Arthur,  16  Pet.  182  311 

Hodge  V.  Hudson  River  R.  R.  Co.,  6 

Blatcht".  85;    3  Fisher's  Pat.  Cas. 

410  570 
V.  North  Mo.  R.  R.  Co.,  1  Dill. 

104  213,219 

Hodges  r.  Mulliken,  1  Bland  (Md.), 


403 


678,  57'.» 
480 
787 
212 
138 
385 


tlitz,  Ex  parte,  111  U.  S.  766 


718 


i;.  Smith,  1  Cox  Eq.  3-57 

;•.  Easton,  106  U.  S.  lOS 

Hodgkin  v.  Loiigden,  8  Ves.  2 
Hudson  t:  Ball,  11  Sim.  4-39 

V.  Coppard,  29  Beav.  4 

Hoe  V.  Boston  Daily  Advertiser  Co., 

14  Fed.  R.  914  383 

r.  Kaiiler,  27  Fed.  R.  145  1054 

V.  Wilson,  9  Wall.  501  119,  131, 

135,  136,  1087 
Hoey  V.  Coleman,  46  Fed.  R  221  23,  688 
Hoffman  v.  Duncan,  18  Jur.  69  1144 

I--.  Postill,  L.  R.  4  Cii.  App.  673     266 

Hogan  V.  Koss,  11  How.  294  1100 

Hogg  V.  Kirby,  8  Ves.  215  357 

V.  Scott,  L.  R.  18  Eq.  444  362 

Hoggart  V.  Cutts,  1  Cr.  &  Ph.  197  178 

Holiorst  r.  Hamburg  Amer.  Packet 

Co.,  38  Fed,  R.  273       45,  189,  190,  zOO 

V.  Howard,  37  Fed.  R.  97  297 

Holbrook  v.  Worcester  Batik,  2  Curt. 

244  _        2-55 

Holcombe  v.  Johnson,  27  Minn.  353      434 

V.  McKusick,  20  How.  5-32  1021 

Holden  v.  Hearn,  1  Beav.  445  262 

Holderness  v.  Rankin,  2  De  G.  F.  &  J. 

2.38  287 

Hole  V.  Barlow,  4  C.  B.  n.  s.  334  356 

Holford  u.  Yate,  1  K.  &  J.  677  575 

Holkirk  V.  Holkirk,  4  Madd.  50  533 

Holladav  Case,  The,  28  Fed.  R.  117     1049 
Holland  w.  Brown,  35  Fed.  R.  43  780 

t:  Challen,  110  U.  S.  15  10,  779 

c.  Hyde.  41  Fed.  R.  977  36 

Hollander  v.  B;iiz,  40  Fed.  R.  6-59  519 

r. ,  43  Fed.  R.  35  519 

Hollen,  The,  1  Mason,  431  1015 

Hollidav  v.  Piekhardt,  29  Fed.  R.  853 

165 
Hollingshead's  Case,  1  P.  Wms.  742  396 
Hoilingsworth  v.  Duane,  Wall.  C.  C. 

77  050, 654 

r. ,  Wall.  C.  C.  141  653 

Hollister  r.  Benedict  &  B.  Mannf.  Co. 

113U.  S.  59  96.370,897 

Holnnn  v.  United  States,  11   Ct.  CI. 

642  902 
Holmes  r.  Jennison,  14  Pet  .540  808.  1083 
r.  Oregon  &  C.  R.  Co.,  5  Fed.  R. 

75  780 


Ixii 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


[References 

Holmes  v.  Oregon  &  C.  R.  Co.,  5  Fed. 

K.  523  780 

V.  Sheridan,  1  Dill.  351  7G5 

V. ,  1  Dill.  421,  n.  638 

V.  Sherwood,  Itj  Fed.  R.  725;  3 

McCra.  405  480 

V.  Trout,  7  Pet.  171  1080 

Homan  v.  Siiiel,  2  Jones  (Irish),  104     234 
Home  lus.  Co.  v.  Barton,  13  Wall.  003 

1000 

V.  Stanchfield,  1  Dill.  424 

V.  United  States,  8  Ct.  CI.  419 


8,24 
008, 
911 
8.j3 
353 
2«8 


Hone  V.  Dillon,  29  Fed.  R.  4(35 
Hood  V.  Aston,  1  Kuss.  412 
V.  Clapham,  19  Beav.  90 

V.  Inman,  4  Johns.  Ch.  (N.  Y.) 

437  146,  256 

Hook  v.  Dorman,  1  Sim.  &  S.  227        216, 

220 

V.  Payne,  14  Wall.  2-52  135 

Hooper  v.  Winston,  24  111.  353  447 

Hoover  c.    Montclair  &  G.  L.  R    R. 

Co.,  29  N.  J.  Eq.  4  425,  426 

Hop  Bitters  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Warner, 

28  Fed.  R.  577  664 
Hope  V.  Hope,  4  De  G.  M.  &  G.  328  325 
Hopkins  v.  xMcLure,  133  U.  S.  380  1004 
V.  Orr,  124  U.  S.  510                     1084 

V.   Worcester  &  B.    Canal  Co., 

L.  R.  6  Eq.  437  416 

Hopkirk  f.  Page,  2  Brock.  20  116 

Horn  V.  Lockharl,  17  Wall.  570  126 

Horner  i'.  United  States,  143  U.  S.  570  965 
Hornor  v.  Henning,  93  U.  S.  228  8,  129 
Hornsley  i'.  United  States,  10  Wall. 

224  938,  940,  941,  955 

Horsburg  r.  Baker,  1  Pet.  232  277,  299 
Horton  v.  White,  84  N.  C.  297  395 

Hosford  V.  Gerniania  F.  I.  Co.,  127 

U.  S.  399  983,  992 

Hottenstein  v.  Conrad,  9  Kan.  4.35  441 
Hottentot  Venus,  The,  13  East,  194  740 
Hough  V.  Railway  Co.,  100  U.  S.  213  777, 

778 
Houghton  V.  West,  2  Bro.  Pc.  88  29-3,672 
Houiditcli    V.  Marquis    Donnegall,  1 

Sim.  &  S.  491  312 

House  V.  Mullen.  22  Wall.  42  138,  237,  545 
Houser  v.  Clayton,  3  Woods,  273  820 

Houston  V.  Moore,  3  Wheat.  433  10U2 
Houston  &  T.  C.  It.  Co.  v.  Shirley, 

111  U.  S.  358  805,  812,  818,  824 

Houth  V.  Owens,  30  Fed.  R.  910  290 

Hovey  v.  McDonald,  109  U.  S.  l-'iO      4  10, 

10.30.  1050,  1051 

V.  Stevens,  3  Woodb.  &  M.  17       580 

Howard  v.  Bates  County,  43  Fed.  R. 

276  35 

V.  Rail  wav  Co,  101  U.  S.  837  127,600 

V.  Rhodes,  1  K.-on.  •'iSl  j  643 

Stillman  B.  M.  Co.,  1.39  U.  S. 


199 
Howards  v. 


Selden,  5  Fed.  R.  465 


Howe  V.  Deuel,  43  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  504   397 


are  to  pages.] 

Howe  V.  Duppa,  1  Ves.  &  B.  511  218 
V.  Morion,  1  Fisher's  Pat.  Cas. 

586  358 

Howe  Machine  Co.    v.  Edwards,  15 

Blatchf.  402  774 

Howell  V.  Lord  Coningsby,  1  Fowl. 

Ex.  Pr.  161  659 

V.  United  States,  7  Ct.  CI.  512       902 

V.  Western  R.  R.  Co.,  94  U.  S. 

463  574 

Howland  v.  Soule,  Deady,  413  370 

Hoxie  V.  Carr,  1  Sumner,  173  3, 127,  150 

298,  299,  318 

Hoyle,  In  re,  12  Chic.  L.  K  279  ;  9 

Am.  L.  Rec.  65  740,  743 

V.  United  States,  21  Ct.  CI.  300     902 

Hoyt,  Ex  parte,  13  Pet.  279  703,  704 

V.  Hammekin,  14  How.  346  522 

V.  Hovt,  27  N.  J.  Eq.  309  151 

v.  United  States,  10  How.  109       469 

Hubbard  v.  Bellew,  3  Fed.  R.  447      12,  13 

V.  Turner,  2  McL.  519  2.50,  293 

Hubbell  r.  De  Land,  14  Fed.  R.  471    227, 

238 

V.  Warren,  8  Allen,  173  120 

Hudgins  v.  Kemp,  18  How.  530  1046, 10.59, 

1061 
Hudson,  The,  15  Fed.  R.  162  858 

Hudson  V.  Guestier,  6  Cranch,  281      1083 

V. ,  7  Cranch,  1  1079 

V.  Hudson,  3  Rand.  (Va.)  117       291 

i\  Maddison,  12  Sim,  416        154,  385 

Huffman  v.  United  States,  17  Ct.  CI. 

55  898 

Hugcr  V.  South  Carolina,  3Dall.  339  28 
Huggins  r.   York   Bldg.  Co.,  2  Atk. 

44 ;  2  Eq.  Cas.  Abr.  3  233,  300,  312 

Hugh  V.  JNlcRae,  Vh;\s-e'f  Dec.  466  25,  397 
Hughes,  Ex  parte.  114  U   S.  548  641 

V.  Blake.  6  Wheat.  453  248,  249,  271 

V. ,  1  Mason,  515  248 

V.  Clerk,  6  Hare,  195  4'.)9 

r.  Jones,  3  De  G.  F.  &  J.  307         545 

r. ,  26  Beav.  24  664 

V.  Morden  College,  1  Ves.  Sen. 

188  345, 

/■.  Northern  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  18 

Fed.  R.  106 

V.  United  States,  4  Ct.  CI.  64 

V. ,  4  Wall.  232 

Huguenin  v.  Baseley,  15  Ves.  180 
Huidekojier  v.  Locomotive  Works,  99 

U.  S.  258  403,  408 

Hull  V.  Dills,  19  Fed.  R.  657  9,  13 

IluHett  V.  King  of  Spain,  2  Bligh  N 

R.  31 
Hulme  V.  Tenant,  1  Bro.  C.  C.  16 
Humes  v.  Scruggs,  94  U.  S.  22 
Hummel  )•.  Moore,  25  Fed.  R.  380 
Huniphrcv,  /•>  parte.  2  Blatchf.  228 

r.  Baker,  103  U.  S.  736 

Hiimnhrevs  v.  Humphreys,  3  P.  Wms. 

348        '  -'79,  280 

,,. ,  3  P.  Wms.  395  243 

V.  liigledon,  1  P.  Wms.  752  167 


346 

177 

918 

140 

4 


95 
109 
271 
842 
490 
1099 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


Ixiii 


[References 

Humphreys  v.  Roberts,  Setou's  De- 
crees (4th  ed),  173  384 

f.  Tate,  4  Ired.  Eq.  (N.  C.)  220     16(5 

Humphrys  v.  Moore,  2  Atk.  108  643,  (344 
Hung  Hang,  Ex  parte,  108  U.  S.  552  719 
Hunnicutt  v.  Teyton,  102  U.  S.  333  784, 
785,  942,  947 
Hunt  V.  Blackburn,  127  U.  S.  774      1076, 

1077 

V.  Danforth,  2  Curt.  592  15 

V.  Jackson,  5  Blatchf.  349        95,  430 

V.  Lever,  5  Ves.  147  325 

V.  Oliver,  109  U.  S.  177  1051 

V.     Rousmanier's     Adni'rs,     8 

Wheat.  174  3 

V. ,  1  Pet.  1  3,  4 

0.  Wickliffe,  2  Pet.  201  137 

Hunter  v. ,  6  Sim.  429  337 

V.   International   R.   I.    Co.,  28 

Fed.  R.  842  587 

V.  Le  Conte,  6  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  728   485 

V.  Town  of  Marlboro',  2  Woodb. 

&  M.  108  580 

V.  United  States,  5  Pet.  172  15 

Huntington,  In  re,  137  U.  S.  63  748 

V.  Palmer,  104  U.  S.  482  2G,  101 

i-. ,  8  Fed.  R.  449  389 

Huntress  v.  Epsom,  15  Fed.  R.  732  586, 

642,  684 
Hurd  V.  Case,  32  111.  45  293 

V.  Elizabeth,  41  N.  J.  L.  1        95,  430 

V.  Gere,  38  Fed.  R.  537  824 

V.  Moiles,  28  Fed.  R.  897  14 

Hurlburd  v.  Freelove,  3  Wis.  537  666 

Hurst,  Ex  pane,  1  Wasli.  186  197 

V.  Hollingworth,  94  U.  S.  Ill      10.58 

Hurt  V.  Hollingsworth,  100  U.  S.  100   840 
Huskins  v.  Cincinnati,  N.  O.  &  T.  P. 

Ry.  Co.,  37  Fed.  R.  504      824,  827,  832 
Hutciiinson  v.  Brock,  11  Mass.  119         91 

V.  Green,  6  Fed.  R.  833  12,  13 

;;.  Horner,  9  Jur.  615  325 

Hy.le  V.  Fulger,  4  McL.  2-55  133 

-^  r.  Forster,  1  Dick.  102  191 

V.  ,  1  Dick.  132  300 

n  Ruble,  104  U.  S.  407    806,  814,  815 

(,-.  Woods,  94  U.  S.  523  515 

Hylton  v.  Morgan,  6  Ves.  293  374 

Hyman  r.  Chales,  12  Fed.  K.  855  690 

V.  Fames,  41  Fed.  R.  676  782 

V.  Wlieeler,  33  Fed.  R.  329  156 

llynes  v.  Biiggs,  41  Fed.  R.  468  33 

Hyslop  V.  lloppock,  5  Beu.  447  187 


lasigi  V.  Brown,  1  Curt.  401  768 

Idaiio   &  O.    L.  I.  Co.  V.   Bradbury, 

132  U.  S.  509     11,  969,  970,  1026,  10-54, 

1060 
Ide  V.   Ball  Engine   Co.,  31  Fed.  R. 

i.t01  289,  290,  372 

Ilchester  (Earl  of),  Ex  parte,  7   \'es. 

348  577 


are  to  pages.] 

lUingworth  v.  Atha,  42  Fed.  R.  141       18, 

19,371 
Illinois  V.  Illinois   Cent.  R.  Co.,  33 

Fed.  R.  721  758,811 

Illinois  G.  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Wade,  140 

U.  S.  65  235 

Imperial  Refining  Co.  v.  Wyman,  38 

Fed.  R.  574  684,  849 

Independent,  Tiie,  9  Ben.  489  625 

India  Kul>ber  Comb  Co.  v.  Phelps,  8 

Blatclif.  85  283 

Indiana  Southern  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Liver- 
pool, L.  &  G.  Ins.  Co.,  109  U.  S 

168  290,  1079 

Indianapolis  &  St.  L.  R.   R.   Co.    i: 

Ilorst,  93  U.  S.  291     683,  773,  774,  778, 

781,  801 
Infanta,  The,  Abb.  Adm.  263  522 

Ingall,  In  re,  1-39  U.  S.  548  1002 

Ingham  v.  Pierce,  37  Fed.  R.  G17  587 

Ingilby  v.  Siiafto,  33  Beav.  31  499 

Ingle  V.  Jones,  9  Wall.  486  504 

Inland  &  S.  Coasting  Co.  v.  Tolson, 

136  U.  S.  572  _  1032 

Innes  v.   Lansing,  7  Paige   (N.    Y.), 

583  120 

Insurance   Co.   v.  Bailey,    13    Wall. 

616  7,24 

V.  Barton,  18  Wall.  603  1090 

V.  Boon,  95  U.  S.  117  771 

V.  Boykin,  12  Wall.  433  787 

w.  Brune,  9t)  U.  S.  588  231,  232 

i:  Comstock,  16  Wall.  2-58  702 

V.  Dunn,  19  Wall.  214  822 

/'.  Huchbergers,  12  Wall.  164       1093 

V.  Lanier,  95  U.  S.  171  785 

V.  Morse,  20  Wall.  445  813 

V.  Weide,  9  Wall.  677  1090 

Insurance  Co.  of  Va.  Valley  v.  Mor- 

decai,22  How.  Ill  1086 

Intermingled  Cotton  Cases,  92  U.  S. 

651  929 

International  T.  C.  C.  v.  Carmichael, 

44  Fed.  R.  350  158,  289,  293,  372 

International  T.  C.  L.  Co.  v.  Maurer, 

44  Fed.  R.  618  209,  210 

Interstate  Commerce  Commn.  v.  Bal- 
timore &  U.  R.  R.  Co.,  43  Fed.  R. 

37  G39 

Interstate  Land  Co.  v.  Maxwell  Land 

Co,  139  U.  S.  569  209 
V.  Maxwell,  L.  G.  Co.,  41  Fed. 

R.  275  941 

Investment  Co.  v.  Ohio  &  N.  W.  R. 

Co.,  36  Fed.  R.  48  425 

V. ,  41  Fed.  R.  738  422 

Iowa  V.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co., 

33  Fed.  R.  391  819 

Iowa  Homestead  Co.  v.  Des  Moines 

N.  &  R.  R  Co.,  8  Fed.  R.  97  2;(2,  335, 
817,  843,  844 
Iowa  &  Minn.  Construction  Co  ,  In  re, 

10  Fed.  R.  401  13 

Irons  r.   Manufacturers'  Nat.  Bank, 

17  Fed.  R.  308  144 


Ixiv 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  pages.] 


Bank, 


Irons  V.  Manufacturers'  Xat 

6  Biss.  361 
Irvine  r.  The  Hesper,  122  U.  S.  256 
Irving  r.  Sutton,  1  Crancii  C.  C.  5t)7 
Irwin  r.  Cummins,  Henipst.  708 

V.  Dixion,  9  How.  10  355,  356 

i-.  Meyrose,  7  Fed.  R.  533      (iTO,  671 

Isnard  v.  Cazeaux,  1  Paige  (N.  Y.), 


39o 
867 
513 
623 


89 
Ives  V.  Grand  Trunk  Ry 

R.  176 
Ivinson  v.  Hutton,  98  U 


J. 


323 
Co.,  35  Fed. 

781,  782 


S.  79 


17 


Jacklin  L-.  Wilkins,  0  Beav.  607  325 

Jackson,  In  re,  9  Fed.  R.  493  387 

,  In  re,  40  Fed.  R.  372  82 

V.  Allen,  132  U.  S.  27     818,  844,  849 

1-.  Ashton,  8  Pet.  148  144,  145 

V. ,  10  Pet.  480  1069 

r.  Catur,  5  Ves.  688  881 

r.  Cliew,  12  Wheat.  153  777 

c.  Ivimey,  L.  E.  1  Eq.  693  5.34 

V.  Jackson,  2  Hogan,  238  420 

V.  Oglander,  2  Hem.  &  M.  465      236 

V.  Petrie,  10  Ves.  164  455,  458 

V.  Stiles,  1  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  134         326 

V.  Strong,  1  McClel.  245  277 

;-.  Virgil,  3  Johns.  (N.  Y.),  540     484 

Jacob  V.  United  States,  Brock.  520  689 
Jacob  Brandon,  Tiie,  33  Fed.  R.  160  509 
Jacobs  V.  liichards,  18  Beav.  300  287 

Jacobson  v.  Allen,  12  Fed.  R.  454  25, 429 
Jacques  v.  Collins,  2  Blatchf.  23  768 

JafEray,  Ex  parte,  1  Low.  321  643,  644 
Jaffrey  v.  Brown,  29  Fed.  R.  476         563, 

566 
James  v.  Atlantic  Delaine  Co.,  3  Cliff. 

614 
r.  Campbell,  101  U.  S.  3.56     90, 


486 
370, 
897 
466 


r.  Cordon,  1  Wash.  333 

V.  London  &  S.  W.  Co.,  41  L.  J. 

Excli.  187  694 

V  ,  L.  R.  7  Kxcb.  287  694 

V.  McCorniack,  105  U.  S.  265      1069 

r.  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  40 

Fed.  R.  47  39 

Jamieson  t-.  Willis,  1  Crancli  C.   C. 

566  513 

Janeway  J'.  Green,  16  Abb.  Pr.  (NY.), 

215,;/.  395 

Jarmon  v.  Wiswall,  9  C.  F.  Gr.  (N.  J.), 

68  0(;5 

Jarrold  )-.  Houlston,  3  Kav  &  J.  708  363 
Jeanie  Landles,  The,  17  Fed.  R.  91  626 
Jecker  v.  Montgomerv,  18  How.  110  874 
Jefferson  v.  Driver.  l"l7  U.  S.  272  833 
Jefler.-;on    Branch   Bank   r.  Skelly,  1   . 

Pdack,  4:;6  513 

Jcffervs  r.  P.aldwin,  Ambl.  164  212 

r.  Smith,  1  Jac.  &  W.  298      39.'),  415 

Jeffries  v.  Laurie,  27  Fed.  R.  195    650,  652 


Jenkins,  Ex  parte,  2  Wall.  C.  C.  521     727 

V.  Banning,  23  How.  455     1090, 1093 

V.  Eldredge,  3  Story,  181       149,  232, 

463 

I'. ,  3  Story,  299      311,  314,  666, 

668,  670 

V.  Greenwald.   1  Bond,  120 ;  2 

Fisher  Pat.  Cas.  37 

V.  Smith,  57  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y^ 

171 
Jenkinson  v.  Royston,  5  Price,  490 
Jennings  v.  Carson,  4  Cranch,  2 

V.  Dolan,  29  Fed.  R.  861 

V.  Nugent,  1  Molloy,  134 

V.  Pearce,  1  Ves.  Jr.  447 

r.  Philadelphia  &  R.  R.  R.  Co., 

29  Fed.  R.  569 

V.  Pierce,  15  Blatchf.  42 

V.  Simpson,  1  Keen,  404 

Jenour  r.  Jenour,  10  Ves.  562 
Jerman  v.  Stewart,  12  Fed.  R 

618,  642,  644 

Jerome  v.  McCarter,  94  U.  S.  734        112, 

113,  230,  4-/5,  426,  427 

V. .  21  Wall.  17  1050 

r.  Ross,7  Jolms.  Ch.  (N.  Y^.),  315   356 

Saunders,  2  Ves.  Jr.  187 
— .  2  Ves.  Jr.  454 
Berridge,  L.  R.  8  Ch.  App. 


271 


370 


196 

250 

1051 

501,  562 

181,  296 

223 


399 
2c2 

578 
577 

588, 


Jerrard 


227 
216 


288 
538 


Jervis 

357 
Jessup  V.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  36 

Fed.  R.  735 
Jesuj)  V.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  43 

Fed.  R.  483  289,  292,  295 
V.  Wabasli,  St.  L.  &  P.  Ry.  Co., 

44  Fed.  R.  663  347 
i; ,  u.   S.   C.  C,  N.  D.  111. 

1889  565 

Jesus  College  r.  Gibb.s  1  Y.  &  C.  145  250 
Jeter  v.  State,  1  RIcCord  (S.  C),  233  756 
Jewell  (.-.  Knight,  123  U.  S.  426     976,  978, 

980,  991 
Jewett   V.  Bradford,  S 

45  Fed.  R.  801 

r.  Garreit,  47  Fed 

John  Crosslev  Sons  v. 

20  Fed.  li.  352 
John   E.   Mulford,   The,  18    Fed.   R. 

455  624,  627, 

John  Griffin,  The,  15  Wall.  29 
John  Wells,  Jr.,  The,  1  Sprague,  178 
Johnasson  v.  Boniiote,  L.  R.  2  Ch.  D. 

298 
Johns  V.  Jolins,  23  Ga.  31 
Johnson,  hi  rr,  46  Fed.  R.  477 
r.  Accident  Ins.  Co.  of  X.  A.,  35 

Fed.  R.  374 
V.  Hunker  Hill  &  S.  M.  &  C.  Co., 

4()  Fed.  R.  (i44 

V.  Christian,  125  U.  S.  642 

r.  C()nii)ton,  4  Sim.  47 

r.  Donaldson,  IS  Blatchf.  287 

r.  Harmon,  94  U.  S.  371        64 


B.  &  T.  Co. 

45,  55 
R.  625  690 
New  Orleans, 

17 


632 
482 
626 

224 
441 
748 

849 


Ilobart,  45  Fed.  R.  542 


804 
42,  812 
120 
405 
551, 
552 
782 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 
[References  are   to  pages.] 


Ixv 


Jolinson  V.  Johnson,  lo  Fed.  U.  I'Jo  IG,  813 

r.  Jumel,  o  Woods,  tit)  7oS 

V.  Keith,  117  U.  S    l'.»l)      ^        ^  1021 

r.  Mississippi  &  T.    K.  Co.,    31 

Fed.  K.  ool  582 

i:  Monell,  Woohv.  390  833 

V.  Northey,  Preo.  in  Ch.  134  ;  2 

Vern.  407  liti2,  0G3 
r.  r.  VV.  &  B.  R.  II.  Co.,  1   Am. 

L.  J.  457  3y 

y-  Feck,  2  Ves.  Sen.  405  299 

V.  Powers,  139  U.  S   156  95 

V. ,  13  Fed.  R.  315  209 

V.  Risk,  137  U.  S.  300         1004,  1005 

V.  St.  Louis,  L  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co., 

141  U.  S.  G02  681 
v.  vSlirewsbury  &  B.  Ry.  Co.,  3 

De  G.  iM.  &  G.  914  307 

V.  The  Coriolanus,  Crabbe,  239     475 

V.  United  States,  4  Ct.  CI.  248      897 

V.  Waters,  111  U.  S.  640  16,  34, 

556,  679,  812 

r.  Watkins,  40  Fed.  R.  187  582 

r.  Wilkins,  118  U.  S.  228  1069 

V.  Wyatt,  2  De  G.  J.  &  8.  18         3li3 

Jolinson    County    (Comni'rs    of)    v. 

Thayer,  94  U.  S.  631  777 

Johnson  R.  R.  Signal  Co.  v.  Union  S. 

&  S.  Co  ,  43  Fed.  R.  331  192,  289,  2:14 
Johnson  S  S.  R.  Co.  v.  North  Brancli 

S.  Co.  48  Fed.  R.  191  769 

Joimston  I'.  Donvan,  30  Fed.  R.  895; 


Jones  r.  Lewis,  1  Cox  Kq.  199  113 

r.  Massey,  3  Beav.  292  298 

r.  Morehead,  1  Wall.  155  255 

V.  Neale,  1  Hujihes,  268  517 

V.   Oregon   Cent.   R.  R.   Co.,  3 

Sawy.  523  518,  521,  522,  523 

r.  1^0 well,  2  Mer.  141  93 

r.  Roberts,  12  Sim.  189  330 

V.  Segueira,  1  PhiU.  82  241 

V.  Slauson,  33  Fed.  R.  6-32     156,  209 

V.  Smith,  40  Fed.  R.  314       453,  780, 

781 

,,. ,  14  111.  229  293 

V.  United  States,  1  Ct.  of  CI.  383 

486,  912,  916 


-,  4  Ct.  of  CI   197 
-,  21  Ct.  of  CI.  1 
-,  39  Fed.  R.  410 


929 

609 

598,  599, 

603,  605 

S5        171 

985 


V.  Van  Dusen,  130  U.  S.  6: 

r.  Van  Zandt,  5  How.  215 

Jopp  ,y.  Wood,  2  De  G.  J.  &  S  323       667 
Jordan,  Ex  parie.  94  U.  S.  248      119,  333, 
335,  702,  1030 
r.  Agawani  Woollen  Co.  3  Cliff. 

239  640 

V.  Cass  County,  3  Dill.  185  705 

V.  Wells,  3  Woods,  527  435 

Jorjiensen    r.   Casks   of    Cement,  40 

Fed.  R.  606  626 

Josslyn  V.  Phillips,  27  Fed.  R.  481        585, 

821,  849 


24  Blatehf.  274 

r.  Jones,  1  Black,  209 

r.  Roe,  1  Fed.  R.  692 

V.  Todd,  5  Beav.  394 

r.  United  States,  17  Ct.  CI.  157 

Joilie  r.  Jaques,  1  Blatchf.  618 
Joll>*i;.  Arbuthnot,  4  DeG   &  J.  224 
Jones,  Matter  of,  4  Sandf.  Ch.  (N.  Y.) 

015 

V.  Alephsin,  16  Ves.  470 

l:  Andrews,  10  Wall.  327 


814    Jov  V.  St.  Louis,  138  U.  S.  1 
101)9   Judah  i-.  Iowa  B.  W.  Co.  32  Fed.  R 
235        561 

329  I  Judson^  Ex  parte,  3  Blatchf.  89 
899 
363 


17 


79 


V.  Barker,  11  Fed.  R.  597 
V.  Boiles,  9  Wall.  364 
r.  Brittan,  1  Woods,  667 
V.  Buckell,  104  U.  S.  554 
v.  Collier,  2  Anih.  730 
V.  Earl  of  Strafford,  3  P. 


578 

43:] 

460 

142, 

201) 

276,  316 

3 

271 

1091 

4 


42, 

199 


Wm 
R.   Co.- 


41 


V.  Florida  C.  &  I 

Fed.  R.  70 

V.  Frost,  3  Madd.  0 

V. ,  1  Jacob,  466 

V.  Garcia  del  Rio,  1  Turn.  &  R. 

297  119 
;•.  Great  Western  Ry.Co.,  1  Ry. 

Cas.  (Eng.)  684 
I'.  Greenolds,  1  Cranch  C.  C.  3;]9 

V.  Howells,  2  Hare,  342 

'•.  Jones,  3  Atk   217 

c.  Knowles,  1  Cranch  C.  C 

'•.  Lamar,  ;^9  Fed.  II  585 

V.  La  Vallette,  5  Wall.  579 

VOL.  1.  —  e 


539 

3(5 
220 
220 

120 


389 
512 
313 

310,  31:; 

523  Air. 

5(11 

1025 


813 

494 

,  Ex  parte,  3  Blatchf.  148       511 

Jugiro,  Ex  parte,  44  Fed.  R.  754  745,  753 

In  re,  140  U.  S.  291      753,  1094 

Julia,  The,  2  Sprague,  164  874 

Juneau  Bank   v.  McSpedan,  5  Biss. 
64  196,  491 


Junker  v.  Fobes,  45  Fed.  R.  840 


K. 


97 


1041 


Knil  r.  Wetmore.  6  Wall.  451 

Kain  r.  Smith,  80  N.  Y.  458  5:]5 

Kaine.  Ex  parte,  3  Blatchf.  1  740,  745 

,  In  re,  14  How.  103  745,  749,  750 

Kaiser  v.  Kellar,  21  Iowa,  95  434 

Kaitel  v.  Wylie,  38  Fed.  R.  865    814,  823, 
824,  827,  832 
Kalanvizoo   Wagon   Co.  v.  Snavelv, 

34  Fed.  R.  823  811,  812 

Kanawha  Coal  Co.  ?•.  Kanawha  &  O. 

Coal  Co.,  7  Blatchf.  391  115 

Kane  v.  Northern  Cent.  R.  H.  Co.  128 

U.  S.  91  775 

Kanouse  v.  Martin,  14  How.  23  850 

r. ,  15  How.  198  84:^,  100:5 

Kansas  r.  Bradley,  26  Fed.  R.  289  35 

Kansas  City  &  T.  Ky.  Co.  r.   Inter- 
State  Lumber  Co.,  36  Fed.  It.  9         839 


Ixvi 


TABLE  OF  CASES. 


565 
22(3,  227 
()5;J 
772 
551 
8115 
302 


280 
705 


[References 

Kansas  City  &  T.  Rv.  Co.  v.  Interstate 

Lumber  Co.,  37  Fed.  K.  3     810,  818,  842 
Kansas  City,  F.  S.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Dauglitry,  138  U.  S.  298     820,  824,  850 
Kansas  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v.  Twombly, 

100  U.  S.  78  1088,  1090 

Karr  v.  Jackson,  28  Mo.  310  480 

Kauffman  v.  Kenuedy,  25  Fed.  R.  785 

190,  842 

V.  Walker,  9  Md.  229 

Kay  V.  Marsliall,  1  Keen,  190 
Kearnev,  AV  pur/c,  7  Wheat.  38 

V.  Case,  12  Wall   275 

Kebel  v.  I'liilpot,  '.»  Sim.  614 
Keenan  v.  Shannon,  9  N.  B.  R.  441 
Keene  v.  Clarke,  5  l\ob.  (N.  Y.)  38 

V.  Meade,  3  Pet.  1  522, 

V.  Wheatley,  9  Am.  L.  Reg.  33 

Keep  V.  Indianapolis  &  St.  L.  II.  R. 

Co.,  10  Fed.  R.  4-54 
Keiley    i'.    Dusenbury,    10   J.   &    S. 

(N.  Y.)  238 

v.. ,  77  N.  Y.  597 

Keithsburif  Bridge  Co.  r.  McKay,  42 

Fed.  R.427 
Keller  v.  Ashford,  133  U.  S.  610   131, 137, 

1020,  1027 

V.  Stolzenbacb.  20  Fed.  R.  47        237 

Keiley,  In  re,  25  Fed.  R.  268  727 
V.  Miss.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  1  Fed. 

R.  564  ;  2  Flipp.  581 
V.  Ypsilanti  D.  S.  Manuf.  Co.,  44 

Fed.  R.  19  .351, 

Kellner  *•.  Mutual  L.  I.  Co  ,  43  Fed. 

R.  023 
Kellogg  V.  Forsvth,  2  Black,  571 
Kelly,  Jn  re,  5  Fed.  R.  840  405,  411 

'r.  Mutton,  17  W.  R.  425  415 

i:  lieceiver  of  Green   Bay  &  M. 

li.  R.  Co.,  5  Fed.  R.  846  405,  411 
r.  Viruinia  Protection   Ins.  Co., 

3  Hughes  449  843 

Kelsey  i:  Hobby,  16  Pet.  209        2G7,  291, 

3:U,  504 
Kemmler,  /»  re,  130  U.  S.  436  748,  1002 
Kemna  v.  Brockbaus,  5  Fed.  R.  702  3!t 
Kemp  r.  Mackrell.  3  Atk.  812  299 

' r.  State,  10  Wis.  359  737 

Kenipe's  Lessee  c.  Kennedv,  5  Crancli, 

173  "  726 

Kenadny  v.  Edwards,  134  U.  S.  117    1028 
Kendall  >:  Beckett.  1  Russ.  152     186,  280 

V.  Stokes.  3  How.  87  102,  706 

v.  United  States,  12  Pet.  524        706. 

707,  808 

V. ,  107  C.  S.  123  904 

Kendig  v.  Dean,  97  II.  S.  423        1.32,  537, 

.545 
Kennedy  t-.  Baylor,  1  Wash.  ( Va  )  162 

46-_> 

r.  Creswell,  101  (J   S   041  248 

r.  Georgia  State   Bank.  8   How. 

580  285,  Oi  2,  1000 

'•   Gibson.  8  Wall.  498  .591 

t.  Green,  3  M.  &  K.  099  287 


429 

429 


23 


230 


244 

786 


are   to   pages.] 

Kennedy  t:  Indianapolis,  C.  &  L.  R. 

Co.  3  F'ed.  R.  97  435 
V.  St.  Paul  &  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  2  Dill. 

448  2,  422,  42-5,  427 

Kennington  v.  Hougbton,  2  Y.  &  C.  N. 

R.  630  288 

Kennon  v.  Gilmer,  131  U.  S.  22  6ti8, 

1084 
Kennosba  &  R.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Sperrv,  3 

Biss.  309  760,  702 
Kensett  v.  Stivers,  10  Fed.  R.  517  370 
Kent  V.  Burgess,  11  Sim.  301  549 
Kentucky  v.  Dennisun,  24  How.  GO  27, 
28,  29,089,  702,  713 
>:  Louisville  Bridge  Co.,  42  Fed. 

R   241  35,  819,  821 

Kenyon  v.  Knipe,  46  Fed.  R.  309  804 

Kentucky  S.  i\l.  Co.  v.  Day,  2  Sawy. 

408  144,  199 

Kenwortliv  v.  Accunor,  3  Madd.  550  193 
Keppell  r.'Bailey,  2  M.  &  K.  517  138 

Kern  v.  Huidekoper,  103  U.  S.  485        13, 

822 
Kerosene  L.  II.  Co.  v.  Fisber,  1  Fed. 

R.  91  555, 556,  558 

Kerr  v.  Clampitt,  95  U.  S.  188  1090 

V.  Moon,  9  Wheat.  505  95 

V.  South  Park  Comm'rs,  117  U. 

S.  379  550,  551 

Kerr'son  v.  Stewart,  93  U.  S.  155  118 

Kershaw  v.  Matbews,  1  Russ.  301        440, 

441 
Kessinger  v.  Vannatta,  27  Fed.  R  890  848 
Kessler  ?'.  Continental  C.  t^  I.  Co.,  42 

Fed.  R.  258  351 

Ketcbuni,  /n  re.  1  Fed.  R.  840  415 

V.  Driggs,6  McL.  13  222,  375 

V.  Farmers'  L.  &  T.  Co.,  4  McL. 

1  070 

Ketland  v.  Bissett,  1  Wash.  144  521,  522 
Kettle  r.  Crary,  1  Paige  (N.Y.),  417,  ii.  121 
Kettler  v.  United  States,  21   Ct.  CI. 

175  897 

Key  City,  Tlie,  14  Wall,  053  859 

Keves  r.  Eureka  C.  M.  Co.,  45  Fed.  R. 

199  18 

Keystone  Iron  Co.  v.  Martin,  132  U  S. 

91  50'.),  1020 

Kidd  V.  Horry.  28  Fed.  R.  773  372 

Kidwell  r.  Masterson,  3  Cranch  C.  C. 

52  385 

Kieffer,  'E.r  j^nrto,  40  Fed.  R.  .399  748 

Kitfin  /•.  Kittin,  1  P.  Wnis.  705  396 

Kilbourn  v.  Sunderland,  130  U.  S.  505 

217,  22v. 

V.  Tbompson,  103  U.  S.  168  807 

(,. ,  MacAr.  &  M.  401  807 

Kilbourne  v.  State  Sav.  Inst.,  22  How. 

503  1093 

Kiluour  r.  New  Orleans  G.  L.  Co.,  2 

Woods,  144  15,  150.  172,  195,  215 

Killian  /■   Clark,  111  IT.  S.  784  1063 

V.  Ebbintihaus,  110  U.  S.  508     7,  21. 

178 
V. ,111  U.S.  798  1079,1092 


TABLE   OF  CASES. 


Ixvii 


[References 

Kimherlv  v.  Arms,  129  U.  S.  512  563 
t: ,  l;JtJ  U.  S.  629     670,  671,  675, 

676,  680 
r. ,  40  Fed  R.  548    670,671,  675. 

676,  680 
Kine,  Tn  re,  46  Fed.  R.  905  730 

i:  Eryant,  3  M.  &  C.  191  557 

r.  Dale,  2  111.  513  480 

r.  Dundee  M.  &  T.  I.  Co.,  28  Fed. 

R.  33  671,  675 

V.  King,  6  Ve.s.  172  ol)5 

V.  Ohio  &  M.  Ky.  Co.,  7  Biss.  529 


431 

593 
759 
755 


713 


r.  United  States,  99  U.  S.  229 

KiiiiT  (The)  r.  Butler.  3  Lev.  220 

I'.  Fniiicis,  2  V.  R.  484 

V.  Lonl  Conini'rs  of  Treasury,  4 

Ad  &  Kl.  286 
Kiii<T  Bridge  Co.  v.  Otoe  Countv,  120 

U.  S.  225  '    584,  849 

King  of  Spain  v.  Machado,  4  Rus.s.  225  138 
King  of  Two  Sicilies  y.  Willcox,  1  Siin. 

N.  s  .301  216 

Kingsbury  v.  Buckner,  1-34  U.  S.  650    192 
287,  294,  462,  574,  671 
Kirbv  V.  Lake  Siiore  &  iM.  S.  R.  R.  Co., 

120  U.  S.  130  11,  12 

Kirbv  Bung  Manuf.  Co.  v.  White,  1 

Fed.  R.  6()4  359,  360,  382,  389 

Kirk  V.  Clark,  Free,  in  Ch.  275  1-34 

r.  DuBois,  28  Fed.  R.  460  297 

r. ,  46  Fed.  R.  486  583 

V.  .Milwaukee  D.  C.  M.  Co.,  26 

Fed.  R.  501 
Kirkley  u.  Burton,  5  Madd.  378 
Kirkpatrick  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  R. 

Co.,  24  Pittsb.  L.  J.  51 

V.  White,  4  Wash.  595 

Kissinger  v.  Bean,  7  Biss.  60 
Kitchen  v.  Randolph,  93  U.  S.  86 
Kittle  V.  De  Graaf,  30  Fed.  R.  6S':) 
Kittredge  v.  Claremont  Bank,  3  Sforv, 

590 ;  1  Woodb.  &  M.  244   228,  230,  254, 

258,  259,  264,  276 

Klein  v.  Fleetford,  35  Fed.  R.  98  387 

V.  Russell,  19   Wall.  433  1086 

Klinger  v.  Missouri,  13  Wall.  257 
Knapp  V.  Banks,  2  How.  73 

/■.  Williams,  4  Ves.  4.30,  n. 

Kneeland  >:.  American  L.  &  T.  Co.,  136 

U.  S.  89      40.5,  407,  408,  434,  567,  1030, 
1084,  1095 

V. ,  138  U.  S.  509  1084,  1095 

V.  Bass  F.  &  M.  Works,  140  U. 

S.  592  40.3,  408 

Knickerbackcr  v.  De  Freest,  2  Paige 

(N.  Y.),  304  108 

Knickerbocker  L.  I.  Co.  v.  Pendleton, 

115U.  S.  339  10.35 

Knight  V.  Knight,  3  P.  Wms.  331         110, 

111 
V.  Lord  Plimouth,  3  Atk.  480 ;  1 

Dick.  120  432,  434 

r.  Mattliews,  1  Madd.  566      259,  280 

c.  Watts,  Coop. /.Cottenham,  257  458 


846 
176 

514 

246 

370 

1047 

17 


1004 

1026 

415 


are  to  pages.] 

Knode  v.  Williamson,  17  W.all.  586     514, 

520,  521 

Knote  v.  United  States,  95  U.  S.  149     896 

Knott  V.  Burleson,  2  (i.  Gr.  (la.)  600    209 

Kno.x  (•.  Columbia  L.  I.  Co.,  22  Fed.  11. 

378  671 

V.  Exchange  Bank,  12  Wall.  379 

1069 

V.  Smith,  4  How.  298  23 

Knox  County  v.  Harshman,  132  U.  S. 
14  669,  1050 

V. ,  133  U.  S.  152  25 

V.  United  States,  131  U.  S.  clxvi 

1047,  1053,  1061 
Koehler,  Ex  parte,  23  Fed.  R.  529        427, 

428 
Kohl  V.  United  States,  91  U.  S.  367     799, 
800,  808,  809 
Koontz  V.  Northern  Bank,  16  Wall. 

196  418,  419,  4.34 

Korn  V.  Wiebusch,  33  Fed.  R.  50  227 

Koshkonong  v.  Burton,  104  U.  S.  668   542 
Kountze    ;•.    Omaha   Hotel   Co.,    107 

U.  S.  378  1049 

Kreager  r.  Judd,  5  Fed.  R.  27  582 

Kring  v.  Missouri,  107  U  S.  221     724,  725 
Krippendorf  v.  Hyde,  110  U.  S.  276      42, 
141,  142,  335,  1030 
Kurtz  V.  Moffitt,  115  U.  S.  487      736,  807, 

1002 


Laher  v.  Cooper,  7  Wall.  565  1086,  1090 
Labette  County  Comm'rs  v.  United 

States,  112  U.  S.  217  716 

Lacey,  E.v  parte,  6  Ves.  625  3 

Lackett  v.  Rumbaugh,  45  Fed.  R.  23  200 
Lacroix  r.  Lyons,  27  Fed.  R.  403  840,  849 
La  Crosse  R.  R.  Bridge,  2  Dill.  465  419 
Lady  Arundell  v.  Phipps,  10  Ves.  139  353 
Lady  Carrington  v.  Cantillon,  Bunb. 


107 


191 


R. 


Ladv  Langdale   v.  Briggs,  4  W, 

703  578 

Ladv  Pike,  The,  21  Wall.  1  1080 

,  96  U.  S.  461  1099 

Lafavette  Co.  v.  Neely,  21  Fed.  R. 

738  14.5,148,161,447 

Lafayette  Ins.  Co.  v.  French,  18  How. 

404  144,  479 

Laidly  v.  Huntington,  121  U.  S.  179  814 
Laimbeer  v.  Allen,  2  Sandf.  (N.  Y.) 

648  485 

Laird    r.    Indemnity  M.    M.   Co.,  44 

Fed.  R.  712  65 
(;.  Mayor  of  De  Soto,  25  Fed.  R. 

76  714 

Lake  v.  Austwick,  4  Jnr.  314  309 

V.  Philips,  1  Rep.  in  Ch.  110  463 

Lake  Superior  Iron  Co.  v.  Brown,  44 

Fed.  R.  539  297,  298,  665,  566 

Lamaster  v.  Keeler,  123  U.  S.  376       648, 

794 
Lamb  v.  Briard,  Abb.  Mm.  367  476 


Ixviii 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


[References 

Lamb  v.  Starr,  Deady,  350     208,  241,  247 
La  Motlie  Mamif.  Co.  v.  National  T. 

W.  Co.,  15  Blatchf.  4:]2  840 

Lancashire  v.  Lancashire,  9  Beav.  259  549 
Lancaster,  In  re,  187  U.  S.  39^  748 

V.  Collins,  115  U.  S.  222       776,  1090 

v.  Lancaster,  (3  Sim.  4o9  497 

Land  Co.  of  N.  M.  v.  Elkins,  20  Fed. 

K.  545  114,  128, -.^77,  .381 

Lane,  Ax  parte,  6  Fed.  R.  34  727 

V.  Hardwicke,  9  Beav.  148  2(J2 

V.  Morse,  6  How.  I'r.  (N.  Y.)  394    483 

V.  Newdigate,  10  V'es.  192  37o 

;;.  Vick,  o  How.  464  777 

La  Nereyda,  The,  8  Wheat.  108  1081 

Lancshorough  (Lord)  v.  Jones,  1  P. 

Wms.  325'  4 

Lanford  c.  United  States,  101  U.  S. 

341  896,  897 

Langdale  v.  Briggs,  4  W.  R.  703  578 

Langdon  v.  Branch,  37  Fed.  R.  449       153 

V.  Goddard,  3  Story,  13         147,  2-55, 

25(5 
r.  Hillside  C.  &  L  Co.,  41  Fed 

R.  609 
Lange,  Ex  parte,  18  Wall.  163       72S 
Langlcy  r.  Hawk,  5  Madd.  46 

r.  Overton,  10  Sim.  345 

Langston  v.  Boylston,  2  Ves.  Jr.  101 


480 

397 

351 
3(i4 
471 
130 


608 
778 
749 
040 


V.  Wetherell,  14  M.  &  W.  104 

Lanier  v.  Alison,  31  Fed.  R.  100     11, 


820 
726 

395 
306 
178, 
180 
483 


354 


V.  Nash,  121  U.  S.  404  537 

Lansdale  v.  Smith,  106  U.  S.  .391  214 

Lansing  v.  County  Treasurer,  1  Dill. 

522  •  714 

Lanz  V.  Randall,  4  Dill.  425  39 

Larison  v.  linger,  44  Fed.  R.  49  792 

Larman  r.  Tisdale,  142  U.  S.  705  1063 
Larned  r.  GrilKn,  12  Fed.  R.  590  196,  229 
Latliam  r.  Chafee,  7  Fed.  R.  520  232 

/•.  ,  7  Fell.  R.  525  440 

.  Northern  Fac.  R.  R.  Co.,  45 

Fed.  H.  721  357 

Latham's  Appeal,  9  Wall.  145  1044,  106.-J 
Latlirop  V.  Judson,  19  How.  66  1086 

La  Touclie  v.  Lord  Dunsany,  1  Sch. 

&Lef.  1:17  288,295 

Lau  Ow  Bew,  I'etitioner,  141   U.  S. 

583  718,973,974 

V.  United  States,  144  U.  S    47 

968,  969,  973,  975,  1026.  1045 
Laurens,  The,  I  Al)b.  Adm.  .508  650,  652 
Lautz  c.  Gordon.  28  Fed.  R.  26)4  295 

La  Vega  v.  Lapslcy,  1  Woods,  428      266. 


Lavender,  9  Ir.  Eq.  R. 
Cheves'   Law   (S. 


452 

481 


Lavend 

593 
Law  V.  Gaultnev 

C.),7  "  , 

Lawrence  r.  Berney,  2   Rep.  in  Ch. 

127  ■  663 

V.  Bowman,  1  .McAll.  419  374 

V.  Dana,  4  Cliff.  1  302,  363 


are  to  pages.] 

Lawrence  v.  Gaultney,  Cheves'  Law 

(S.  C.),7 
V.  Greenwich  F.  I.  Co.,  1  Paige 

(N.  Y.)  587 
V.  Morgan's  R.  R.  &  S.  S.  Co., 

121  U.  S.  634 

V.  Smitli,  Jacob,  471  302,  3(i4 

r.  United  States,  2  McL.  581         471 

V.  Wiriz.  1  Wasli.  417 

Lawrence   Manuf.  Co.    r.   Janesville 

Cotton  Mills,  138  U.  S.  552         062,  663 
Law  ton  v   Blitch,  30  Fed.  R.  641  847 

Layer  v.  Nelson,  1  Vern.  450  4 

Lazensky  v.   Knigiits   of    Honor,   .32 

Fed.  R.  417  847,  849 

Lea  V.  Deakin,  13  Fed.  R.  514  389 

Leach  r.  Chandler,  18  Fed.  R.  262        165 

V.  Kay,  2  FHpp.  590 

League  v.  Egery,  24  How.  264 
Leaiy,  Matter  of,  10  Ben.  197 

i\  Miranda,  40  Fed.  R.  607 

Leatherberry  v.  Radclitfe,  5  Cranch 

C.  C.  550  512,  515,  517 

Leather  Cloth  Co.  r.  American  L.  C. 

Co.,  10  Jur.  N.  s.  81  364,365 

{•. ,  11  H.  L.  C.  523  365 

Leatlier  Manufacturers'  Bank  v.  Coop- 
er, 120  U.  S.  778  37,  133,  816 
Leavenworth  v.  I'epper,  32  Fed.  R. 

718  143,  145 

Leavenworth   County   r.   Barnes,  94 

U.  S.  70  770 

Leavenworth  Conntv  Comm'rs  '■.  Chi- 
cago, R.  I.  &  P.  liy.  Co.,  134  U.  S. 

688  25,  118 

Leddel's  Ex'r  v.  Starr,  19  N.  J.  Fq 

159 
Lee,  Ex  parte,  4  Cranch  C.  C.  197 

V.  Blaiidy,  1  Bond,  3(Jl 

V.  Brown,  4  Ves.  362 

V.  Lee,  1  Hare,  617  298,  299,  388 

V. ,  8  Pet.  44  1026 

r.  Milner,  2  Y.  &  C.  611  344 

V.  Simpson,  42  Fed.  R.  434     640,  645 

V.  Watson,  1  Wall.  337  33 

Lee  County  v.  Rogers,  7  Wall.  181 
Leech  v.  Bailev,  6  Price,  504 

V.  Kay,  4'Fed.  R.  72 

Leeds  v.  Marine  Ins.  Co.,  2  Wheat. 

380 
Leepcr  r.  Texas,  139  U.  S.  462;   11 

S.  C.  Rep.  577  542,  730,  73;; 

LelHngwell  r.  Warren,  2  Black,  599 
Leftwich  V.  Lecann,  4  Wall.  187 
Lcgard  ;;.  Dalv,  1  Ves.  Sen.  192 
— -  V.  Shefiield,  2  Atk.  377 
Legrand  v.  Whitehead,  1  Russ  .30'.) 
Leliigli  Coal  &  Nav.  Co.  v.  (\iitral  R. 

H.of  N.  J.,  35N.  J.  Kq.  ■526 
Lehigh  Zinc  &  I.  Co   r.  N.  J.  Zinc  & 

I.  Co.,  43  Fed.  R.  545  34,  157,  162, 

388 
Lehman  r.  McQuown,  31  Fed.  R.  1.38  391, 

440,  453 
Leicester  r.  Leicester,  10  Sim.  87    538 


442 
602 
474 
581 


778 
250 
609 

462 

1001 
778 
785 
548 
108 
545 

422 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  pages.] 


Ixix 


Leicester  (Earl  of)  v.  Perry,  1  Bro. 

C.  C.  305  227,  250 

Leigh  V.  Leigh,  Daiiiell's  CIi.  Pr.  Sti'J    14;J 

v.  Tlioiiiiis,  2  V'es.  Sen.  312    ll'J,  ooo 

c.  Ward,  2  Vent.  72  102 

Leiper  v.  Biukley,  1  Cranch  C.  C.  2!)  613 
Leitch  V.  Cumpston,  4  Paige  (N.  Y.), 

47G  6(55 

Leitensdorfer  v.  Webb,  20  How.  17G  937, 

10«5 
Lem  Iling  Dun  v.  United  States,  49 

Fed.  11.  145  1063 

Leo  V.  Union  Pacific  liy.  Co.,  17  Fed. 

K.  273  101,381 

r. ,  19  Fed.  R.  283  146 

Leo  Hem  How,  In  re,  47  Fed.  R.  302  719 
Leonard  v.  Ozaik  Land  Co.,  115  U.  8. 

465  1050 

V.  United  States,  18  Ct.  CI.  382     903 

Le  Texier  v.  iVIargravine  of  Anspacii, 

15  Ves.  159  172 

Letters  Rogatory,  In  re,  36  Fed.  R.      306, 

531 
Levi  V.  Columbia  Ins.  Co.,  1  Fed.  R. 

200  12,  13 

Levine  v.  Taylor,  12  Mass.  8  91 

Leving  i\  Caverlj',  Prec.  in  Ch.  229  109 
Levy  i\  Buriey,  2  Snmn.  355  475 

Lewarne  v.  Mexican  Int.  Imp.  Co.,  38 

Fed.  R.  029  155,  157 

Lewis  ('.  Baird,  3  McL.  56  241,  240 

r.  Bridgman,  2  Sim  465         305,  306 

u.  Cocks,  23  Wall.  46(3  7,  21,  25, 

217,  229,  1087 

V.  Darling,  16  How.  1  132,  135 

V.  Fullarton,  2  Beav.  6  363 

V.  Sliainwald,  7  Sawy.  403     90,  455, 

457,  458 
Lewisburg  Bank  v  Slieffey,  140  U.  S. 

445  569,1019,1020 

Liciifield  (Earl  of)  v.  Bond,  5  Beav. 

513  265 

Life   Insurance    Co.    v.   Bangs,   103 

U.  S.  780  25,  237 

Life  &  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Adams,  9  Pet. 

571  703 

f.  Wilson,  8  Pet.  291  703,  712, 

1021,  1090 
Lilientlial  v.  Wallach,  37  Fed.  R.  241  652 

V.  Washburn,  8  Fed.  R.  707  248 

Lillia  y.  Airev,  1  Ves.  Jr.  277  582 

Lincoln  c.  Baltelle,  6  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 

475  524 

r.  CI  all  in,  7  Wall.  132  786 

Lincoln  County  v.  Luning,  133  U.  S. 

529  9,  106,  688 

Linder  u.  Lewis,  1  Fed.  R.  378  206 

Lindsay  v.  Lynch,  2  Sch.  &  Lef.  1  278 
Lingan  v.  Henderson,  1  Bland  (Md.) 

236  578,  579 

Linn  v.  Green,  17  Fed.  R.  407  1<)8 

Linton  v.  Mosgrove,  14  Fed.  R.  543  3.50 
Lip]iiiicott  r.  Shaw  Carriage  Co.,  34 

Fed.  R.  570  581 

Litchfield  v.  Ballou,  114  U.  S.  190  23 


Little  V.  Bowers,  134  U.  S.  547  1066 
V.  District  of  Columbia,  19  Ct. 

CI.  323  911 

V.  Giles,  118  U.  S.  596  536,  816 

V.  Gould,  2  Blatciif.  165  362,  363 

V.  Merrill,  62  iMe.  328  288 

Littleficld  r.  Perry,  21  Wall   205     17,  113 
Little   Miami    &   C.    &  X.  R.   Co.   v. 

United  States,  108  U.  S.  277  1083 

Liverpool  Ins.  Co.  v.  Massachusetts, 

10  Wall.  566  39,  118 

Liverpool,   N.  Y.  &  P.  S.  S.  Co.  t-. 

Comm'rs  of  Emigration,  113  U.  S. 

33 
Livingston  v.  Dorgenois,  7   Cranch, 


236 
703 
199 


V.  Gibbons,  4  Johns.  Ch.  (N.  Y.) 

94 
V.  Kane,  3  Johns.  Ch.  (N.  Y.) 

224  538,  539 
V.   Pettigrew,   7   Lans.  (N.    Y.) 

405  434 

0.  Story,  9  Pet.  632  499 

V. ,  11  Pet.  351  228 

V.  Woodworth,  15  How.  546  138,  570 

Lloyd,  In  re,  10  Beav.  451  653 

V. ,  2  Dick.  460  109 

Brewster,    4    Paige   (N.    Y.) 


537 


V.  Gurdon,  2  Swanst.  180 
V.  Heatii,  Busb.  Eq.  (N.  C. 
V  Johnes,  9  Ves.  37        117 


150 
353 

I  39  357 
312,  314, 
317,  319 

—  r.  Loaring,  6  Ves.  773  120 

—  y.  London,  C.  &  D.  Ry.  Co.,  2 
De  G.  J.  &  S.  568 ;  1 1  Jur.  n.  s. 
380  344,  345 


r.  Smith,  13  Sim.  457 

r.  Spiliat,  3  P.  Wms.  .344 

Lobsiger  v.  United  States,  5  Ct.  CI. 

687 
Locke   V.    Covert,  42   Hun    (N.  Y.), 

484 

V.  United  States,  7  Cranch,  3-39 

Lockhart  v.  Horn,  3  Woods,  542 
Lock  wood  r.  Cleaveland,  6  Fed.   R. 

721 
Locomotive  E.  S.  T.  Co.  v.  Erie  Ry. 

Co.,  10  Blatchf.  292 
Loder  t;.  Phelps,  13  Wend.  48 
Lodge  r.  Stoddart,  9  Reporter,  137 
■'  V.  Twell,  135  U.  S.  232 


116 
643 

902 

429 

482 
206 

290 

570 

729 

364 

1023 

Loewcnstein  v.  Biernbaum,  8  W.  N. 

C.  (Pa.)  163  455 

Logan  V.  Patrick,  5  Cranch,  288     142,  191 
Loker  v.  Rolle,  3  Ves.  4  498,  499 

London  v.  Bolt,  5  Ves.  129  331,  375 

V.  Corporation  of  Liverpool,  3 

Anst.  738  226 

V.  Cox,  L.  R.  2  H.  L.  239      692,  697, 

698,  699 

V.  Levy,  8  Ves.  398  224,  498 

v.  Perkins,  3  Bro.  P.  C.  602    123,  157 

London  Packet.  The,  2  Wheat.  371    1081 
Loney,  In  re,  134  U.  S.  372  729 


Ixx 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  pages.] 


Lon<?  V.  Purvi?,  15  Moo.  P.  C.  .385  099 
Lung  Island,  N.  S.,  F.  &  F.  T.  Co., 

In  re,  5  Fed.  R.  69!)  350 

Longworth  v.  Taylor,  1  JIcL.  514        18(5, 

280 
Lonsdale  r.  Brown,  .3  Wash.  404  521 

Lonsdale  (Earl  of)  v.  Church,  3  Bro. 

C.  C.  41  433 

Lonsdale  Co.  v.  Moies,  2  Cliff.  538  654 
Lookout  Mountain  K.  It.  Co.r.  Hous- 
ton, 32  Fed.  K.  711  884 

l: ,  44  Fed.  R.  449  844 

Loom  Co.  r.  Hiirgins,  105  U.  S.  580  253 
Looniis  V.  Carrington,  18  Fed.  R.  97  844 
v.  ^■ew  York  &  C.  G.  C,  Co.,  33 

Fed.  R.  353  45 
Lord  V.  Venzie,  8  How.  251  652,  1066 
V.  Whitehead  &  A.  Machine  Co., 

24  Fed.  K.  801  17 

Lord  Brook  r.  Lord   Hertford,  2  P. 

Wms.  518  574 

Lord  Byron  v.  Johnston,  2  Meriv.  29  381 
Lord  Carteret  v.  Paschal,  8  P.  Wms. 

197  602 

Lord  Chedworth  v.  Edwards,  8  "\'es. 

46  353 

Lord  Digby  v.  Meech,  Bnnh.  195  1('.6 

Lord  Dillon  ;•.  Alvares,  4  Ves.  357  232 
Lord  Dursley  r.  Berkeley,  6  Ves.  251     4, 

495 
Lord  Fingal  r.  Blake,  1  Moll.  113  548 
Lord    Lanesborough   r.  Jones,   1    P. 

Wms.  325  4 

1-ord  Planners  r.  Johnson,  L.  R.  1  Ch. 

I).  073  ^       344 

Lord    Montague  v.   Dudman,  2  Ves. 

Sen.  396  851 

Lord  iloiitford  v.  Lord  Cadogan,  17 

Ves.  4S5  .396 

Lord  Pelliam  v.  Duchess  of  New- 
castle, 3  Swanst.  289,  n.      334,  659,  660 

V. ,  3  Swanst.  293,  n.  659 

I'.  Lord  Harley,  8  Swanst.  29],  ?i.    659 

Lord    Shijihrooke  v.   Lord   llinchin- 

bronk,  13  Ves.  887  330 

Lord  U.xbridge  v.  Staveland,  1  Ves. 

Sen.  56  145,  175,  216,  258 

Lorillard  v.  Standard  Oil  Co.,  2  Fed. 

R.  902  92,  109,  296 

Loring,  Jix  partp,  94  U.  S.  418  704 

V.  Marsh,  2  Cliff.  811  232,  247 

1-. ,  2  ClifT.  469  6 

Lornian  i'.  Clarke,  2  McL.  568  10,  779 
I,orton  V.  Seaman,  9  Paige  (N.  Y.), 

009  887 

Lottawanna,  The,  21  Wall.  578  865 

J>oudoni!.Ta.xingI)ist.l04  U.  S.  771  1079 
Louisiana  v.  Jurnel,  107  U.  S   711         104, 

871,  704 

V.  New  Orleans,  102  U.  S.  203       794 

V. ,  108  U.  S.  521  1073 

V.  Pilsburv,  105  U.  S.  278  '779 

V.  Steele,  "^184  U.  S.  230  105 

Louisiana  Bank  v.  Whitnev,  121  U.  S. 

284  '  568,  1023 


Louisiana   Ins.   Co.  v.  Nickerson,  2 

Low.  810 
Louisiana  S.  L.  Co.  r.  Clark,  16  Fed. 
R.  20  ;  4  Woods,  169 

V.  Filzpatrick,  3  Woods,  222 

Louisville  P.  W.  Co.  v.  Collector,  49 
Fed.  R.  561  970, 

Louisville    Underwriters,  In   re,   184 
U.  S.  488  46, 

Louisville,  C.  &  C.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Let- 
son,  2  How.  497 
Louisville,  E.  &  St.  L.  R.  R.  v.  Wil- 
son, 138  U.  S.  501  406,  407, 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ide,  114 
U.  S.  52  816, 

V.  Palmes,  109  U.  S.  244 

1-.  Wangelin,  132  U.  S.  599 

V.  Woodson,  134  U.  S.  614 

Louisville,  N.  O.  &  T.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Mississijipi,  133  U.  S.  587 
Lousada  ?'.  Templer,  2  Russ.  565 
Love  V.  Baker,  1  Ch.  Cas.  67 
Lovejoy  r.  Murray,  8  Wall.  1 

r.  United  States,  128  U.  S.  171 

775, 
Lovell  V.  Cragin,  1.36  U.  S.  130      38, 

Loveridge  v.  Earned,  7  Fed.  R.  294 
Lovett  r.  Prentice,  44  Fed.  R.  459 
Loving  r.  Fairchild,  1  McL.  333 
Low  V.  Durfee,  5  Fed.  K.  256 

V.  Hauel,  1  Wall.  Jr.  345 

Lowe  V.  Farlie,  2  Madd.  101 

V.  Lowe,  1  Tenn.  Ch.  515 

('.  Richardson,  3  Madd.  277 

Lowell  V.  Lewis,  1  Mason,  182 
Loweustein  v.  Glidewell,  5  Dill.  325 

294 
Lowndes  r.  Bettle,  33  L.  J.  Ch.  461 
Lowther  /•.  Andover,  1  Bro.  C.  C.  396 
Loyd  r.  Cardy,  Prec.  in  Ch.  171 
Lubiere  ?•.  Genou,  2  Ves.  Sen.  579 
Lucas  V.  Brooks,  18  Wall.  486 

V.  Lucas,  18  Ves.  274  2-58 

Lucille,  The,  19  Wall.  73  867, 

Luco  V.  United  States,  23  How.  515 
Lull  V.  Clark,  20  Fed.  R.  454         558, 
Lumbrozo  v.  White,  1  Dick.  150 
Luminary,  The,  8  Wheat.  407 
Lumley  r.  Wagner,  1  De  G.  M.  &  G. 

604 
Lung  Chung  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  R. 

Co  ,  19  Fed.  R.  254 
Lundberg  v.  Albany  &  R.  I.  &  S.  Co., 

82  Fed.  R.  501 
Lunt  V.  Davison,  104  Mass.  498 
Lupton  V.  Stephenson,  11  Ir.  Eq.  484 

Luther  v.  Borden,  7  How.  1 

V.  The  Merritt  Hunt,  Newh.  4 

Lutterel's  Case,  Prec.  in  Ch.  50      93, 
Lu.xton  r\  Stephens,  3  P.  Wms.  373 
Lyell  V.  Goodwin,  4  McL.  29 
Lyman  v.  Brown,  2  Curt.  559 


855 

345 

357 

1010 

687 

88 

1030 

816 
210 
814 


542 

277 

352 

787 

774, 

,  776 

820, 

1027 

581 

84 

247 

764 

384 

225 

447 

178 

253 

192, 

,  295 

356 

573 

457 

294 

486 

,264 

1023 

959 

,561 

483 

482 

360 

687 

769 
715 

443, 
444 
986 

514, 
518 
354 
683 
197 
237 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  pages.] 


Ixxi 


LyiiKin  V.  &  R.  Co.  v.  Southard,  12 

Bhitclif.  405.  645 
Lyiicli  i^.  Bernal,  9  Wall.  315  942,  945, 
952,  958,  1103 
Lyon  V.  Donaldson,  34  Fed.  H.  789  570 
Lyster  v.  Stickney,  12  Fed.  K.  609  279, 
^  584 
Lytle,  In  rf,  3  Paige  (N.  Y.),  251  451 
V.  Arkansas,  22  How.  193              994 


M. 


McAleer  v.  Clay  County,  42  Fed.  R. 

655  714 

McAllister  v.  Kuhn,  96  U.   S.  87        1087, 

1091 

r.  United  States,  141  U.  S.  174     750 

McArtiiur  v.  Kellv,  5  Oiiin,  130  370 

V.  Scott,  113  U.  S.  340  121,  123 

Macaulay  v.  White  S.  M.  Co.,  9  Fed, 

R.  608 
Macauley  r.  United  States,  11  Ct.  CI. 

r. ,  11  Ct.  CI.  693 

McBrntney  v.  Usher,  1  Dill.  367 
McBride  r.  Comm'rs  of  Pierce  County, 

44  Fed.  R.  17  354,  856 
V.  Grand  de  Tour  Plow  Co.,  40 

Fed.  R.  102  200 

IVIcCabe  v.  Bellows,  1  Allen  (Mass.), 

209  160 

McCall  V.  McDowell,  1  Abb.   U.   S. 

212  737 

I'.  Towers,  1  Cranch  C.  C.  41        520 

McCardle,  E.r  parte,  6  Wall.  318     722,  723 

Ex  parte,  7  Wall.  50(5  1088 

McCargo  v.  Chapman,  20  How.  555    1022 
McCartv  &  H.  Trading  Co.  v.  Glaen- 

zer,  30  Fed.  R.  387  36 

McCauley  v.  Kellogg,  2  Woods,  13       373 
McCauU  V.  Braham,  16  Fed.  R.  37 
McCIane  v.  Boon,  6  Wall.  244 
McClaskev.  r.  Barr,  42  Fed.  R.  609 

r. ,  45  Fed.  R.  151 

V   ,  48  Fed.  R.  130 


301 

915 
900 
839 


36(5 

1100 

779 

186,  187 

781 


McCloskey  v.  Barr,  38  Feil.  R.  165      220, 

227,  228,  230,  236,  240,  244 

McClung  V.  SiUinian,  6  Wheat.  598     704, 

706 
McCluny  v.  Silliman,  3  Pet.  270  12 

McClure  v.  United  States,  116  U.  S. 

145  898,  1091 

McCollum  V.  Eager,  2  How.  61  1023 

McCorab  V.  Chicago,  St    L.  &  N.  O. 

R.  R.  Co.,  7  Fed.  R.  426  111 
V.  Commissioners  of  Knox  Co., 

91  U.  S.  1  1002,  1021 

McConihay  v  Wright,  121  U.  S.  201  8,  9 
McCunville  v.  Gilmour,  36  Fed.  R.  227   30, 

32,  35 
McCormick  r.  Chamberlin,  11  Paige 

(N.  y.),  543  2(54 

V.  Gray,  13  How.  26  3:5 

V.  Jerome,  3  Blatchf.  486  383 


McCortnick  v.  Knox,  105  U.  S.  122      572 

V.  Sullivant.  10  Wiieat.  192  72(5 

McCormick  H.  M.  Co.  v.  Walthers, 

134  U.  S.  41  44,  45,  189,  687 

McCosker  v.  Brady,  1  Barb.  (X.  Y.) 

329  395 

McCoy  V.  Cincinnati,  I.,  St.  L.  &  C. 

R.  R.  Co.,  13  Fed.  R.  3  342,  373 

V.  Nelson,  121  U.  S.  484  163, 164, 165 

V.  Rhodes,  11  How.  131  128 

McCrary  v.  Pennsylvania  Canal  Co., 

5  Fed.  R. 307  389,  393 

McCulloh   V.    Association   H.   S.,  45 

Fed.  R.  479  420 

McDonald.  The,  4  Blatchf.  477  8(35 

McDonald  d.  Edmonds,  44  Cal.  328      472 

y.  Hovey,  llOU.  S.  619       904,1037 

V.  Salem  C.  F.  M.  Co.,  31  Fed. 

R.  577  40,  228,  240,  849 

V.  Whitney,  39  Fed.  R.  466  071 

McDonnell  v.  Eaton,  18  Fed.  R.  710    131, 

158 

V.  White,  11  H.  L.  C.  570  417 

McElmurray  v.  Loomis,  31  Fed.  R. 

395  811 

McElrath  v.  Mcintosh,  1  Law  Rep. 

N.  s.  399  370 
V.  Pittsburg  &  S.  R.  R.  Co.,  5 

Pa.  St.  189  571 

V.  United  States,  102  U.  S.  426    900, 

901 

v. ,  12  Ct.  CI.  312  901 

McElroy  v.  Kansas  City,  21  Fed.  R. 

257  357 

McElwain  v.  Willis,  3  Paige  (N.  Y.), 

505  ^      225 

McEvers  v.  Lawrence,  Hoffm.  (N.  Y.), 

1 72  429 

McFaul  V.  Ramsey,  20  How.  523        1090, 

1091 
McFerran  v.  Taylor,  3  Cranch,  281  3 

McGahey  v.  Virginia,  135  U.  S.  662     104 
McGarralian  v.  Mining  Co.,  96  U.  S. 

316  472 

McGehee  v.  Polk,  24  Ga.  406  458 

McGintus  v.  Erie  County,  45  Fed.  R. 

1  12 

McGoon  V.  Scales,  9  Wall.  23  542 

McGowan  v.  United  States,  20  Ct.  CI. 

147  899 

McGowin  v.  Remington,  12  Pa.  St.  56 

307,  373 
McGregor  v.  McGillis,  30  Fed.  R.  388  839 
Macgregor  v.  Macgregor,  9  Iowa,  05  570 
Mc(iuire   v.  Commonwealth,  3  Wall. 

382  1003,  1065,  1066 

V.  Eames,  15  Blatchf  312  3(;0 

McHenry  r.  New  York,  P.  &  ().  R.  R. 

Co.,  25  Fed.  R.  65  834 

Mclntire  r.  Wood,  7  Cranch,  504  704 

Mack  )•.  Jones,  31  Fed.  H.  189       453,  846 
Mackall  r.  Casilear,  137  U.  S.  550         171 

r.  Richards,  112  U.  S.  369  1098 

V. ,  110  U.  S.  45         1089,  1096, 

1097, 1099 


Ixxii 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to   pages.] 


McKay  v.  Dibert,  5  Fed.  II.  587 

McKean    v     Delancy's    Lessee,     t 

Cranch,  22 
McKee  v.  Travellers'  Ins.  Co.,  41  Fed 

R.  117 

V.  United  States,  10  Ct.  CI.  208 

V. ,  10  Ct.  CI.  231 

McKeen  v.  Ives,  35  Fed.  H.  801 
McKedin  v.  Northern  Pac.  li.  Co.,  45 

Fed.  K.  4(U 
Macker  v.  Tliomas,  7  Wheat.  530 


3.59, 

382 

777 

147 

'.)33 
'j33 

823 

461 
770, 
1032 
Mackett  r.  Comni'rs  of  Heme  Bay, 

24  W.  K.  845  376 

Mclvevvan  v.  Sanderson,  L.  R.  16  Eq. 

316  243,  247 

MoKim  V.  Voorhies,  7  Cranch,  249       347 
Mackin  r.  United  States,   117  U.  S. 

318  72(j,  981 

McKinistry  v.  United  States,  34  Fed. 

R.  211  610,617,618,619,620 

McKiniiey  v.  Carroll,  12  Pet.  66  770 

Mackintosh  v.  Flint  &  P.  K.  R.  Co., 

34  Fed.  R.  582  315 

McKnight  r.  Craig's  Admr.  6  Cranch, 

183  7G0,  762 

V.  United  States,  98  U.  S.  179       900 

V.  ,  13  Ct.  CI.  292  900,  901 

Mackretii  r.  ¥ox,  4  Bro.  P.  C.  2-58  3 

1-.  Nicholson.  19  Ves.  367  188 

McLaanlian  c.  Universal  Ins.  Co.,  1 

Pet.  170  1090 

McLauglilin  r.   Bank  of  Potomac,  7 

How.  220  1086 

V.  Swann,  18  How.  217  315 

r.  United  States,  107  U.  S.  526       15 

McLean,  In  re,  37  Fed.  R  648  490 

,  In  re  9  Cent.  L.  J.  425  611 

V.  Clark,  23  Fed.  R.  861  585 

V.  Lafayette  Bank.  3  McL.  185     347 

i-. ,3  McL.  415  156 

y. _  3  McL.  503  322,  323 

McLennan   >:  Kansas  City,  St.  J.  & 

C.  B.  R.  Co  ,  22  Fed.  R.  198  767 

McLish  V.  RolT,  141  U.  S.  661     905,  1008, 

1009,  1018 
McMicken  r.  Perrin,  18  How.  .507         665 

V.  United   States,  97   U.  S.  204 

041,  946,  947 
McMillin  r  St   Louis  &  M.  V.  T.  Co., 

18Fed.  R.  260  163,164,165 

McMuUen  v.  United  States,  24  Ct.  CI 

394 
McNaniara  >•.  Dwyer,  7  Paige  (N.  Y.) 

239 
McNeill  ".  Cahill,  2  Bligh,  228 
V.  Town  of  Andes,  40  Fed.  R 

45 
McNiel  i:  Ilolbrook,  12  Pet.  84 


629 


95 
545 


462 
487,  766, 
,    1092 
McNulta  V.  Locliridge,  12  S.  C.  Rep. 

11  .  439,452 

McNulty  V.  Conn.  Mut.  L.  I.  Co.,  46 
Fed.  R.  305  814 


McQuillon,  Ex  parte,  3  West.  Law  Mo. 

440 ;  9  PiHsb.  L.  J.  29  737 

McRea  r.   Branch  Bank  of  Ala.,  19 

How.  376  130,  132 

McWiUianis  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Blundell, 

11  Fed.  R.  419  383 

Mabey,  The,  10  Wall.  419  1078,  1081 

Maddux  v.  United  States,  20  Ct.  CI. 

193     '  899 

Magniac  i;.   Thompson,  2  Wall.  Jr. 

209  210 

Maguire  v.  Tyler,  8  Wall.  650  963 

Malian  v.  United  States,  14  Wall.  109 

1091 
Mabon  v.  Justice,  127  U.  S.  700  744 

Mahoney    Min.    Co.    v.    Bennett.    4 
Sawy.  289  '        453 

V. ,  5  Sawy.  141  830 

Maine  v.  Oilman,  11  Fed.  R.  214  843 

Mair  v.  Himalaya  Tea  Co.,  L.  R.  1 

Fq.  411  366 

Malarin  v.  United  States,  1  Wall.  282 

952,  953,  961, 
Malcolm  v.  Montgomery,  2  Moll.  500  441 
Mallack  v.  Gallon,  3  P.  Wms.  352  573 
xMallory  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Fox,  20  Fed. 

R.  409  455, 562,  650 

Mallow  V.  Hinde,  12  Wheat.  193   126,  I28, 

130,  137 
Malone  v.  Richmond  &  D.  R.  R.  Co., 
35  Fed.  R.  625  827,  831,  832 

r.  United  States,  5  Ct.  CI.  486      902 

Maloy  r.  Duden,  25  Fed.  R.  673      39,  834 
Maltby  V.  Bobo,  14  Blatchf.  53  375 

Maltz  V.  American  Exp.  Co.,  3  Cent. 

L.  J.  784  39 

Manaton  v.  Moleswortb,  1  Eden,  18     172, 

673 
Manby  r.  Robinson,  L.  R.  4  Ch.  347  180 
Manchester   F.  A.   Co.  i".   Stockton, 

C.  H.  &  A.  Works,  38  Fed.  R.  378     499 
Mandeville  v.  Holev,  1  Pet.  136  1089 

V.  Riggs,  2  Pet.  482  121,  1062 

Manhattan  (^o.  v.  Evertson,  4  I'aige 

(N.  Y.),  276  556 

Manhattan  I.  W.  Co.  r.  French,   12 

Abb.  N.  C.  (N.  Y.)  446  357 

Maniiattan    L.   I.   Co.  v.  Broughton, 

109  U.  S.  121  5.37 

Mann  v.  King,  18  Ves.  297  326 

Manners  i\  R()wlej%  10  Sim.  470  154 

Maimers  (Lord)  u.  Johnson,  L.  R.  1 

Ch.  D.  673  344 

Manning.  In  re,  44  Fed.  R.  275      65.3,  657 

V.  Amy,  140  U.  S.  137  819 

V.  San  Jacinto  Tin  Co.,  9  Fed. 

R.  721  941 

r.  Weeks,  1.39  U.  S.  504  340 

Mansfield,    C.   &   L.  M.    Ry.   Co.   v. 

Swan,  111  U.  S.  379    536,  584,  847,  849 
Manufacturing   Co.    v.  Bradiev,   105 
U.  S.  175     '  8,  50,  129,  156 

V.  S.iliers,  6  Cent.  L.  J.  82  638 

r.  United  States,  17  Wall.  592       901 

Many,  Ex  parte,  14  How.  24  703 


TABLE    OP    CASES. 
[Refereuces  are  to  pages.] 


Ixxiii 


Many  v.  Beekman  Iron  Co.,  9  I'aige, 
189  111 

V.  Sizer,  1  Fisher's  Pat.  Cas.  31    3.j'.>, 

3150 
Marbury  v.  Madison,  1  Cranch,  lo7         5, 

102,  702 
Marcliand  v.  Freilsen,  105  U.  S.  42J 

105:] 

i:  Livandais,  127  U.  S.  775  lu:]2 

Mare  r.  Malacliy,  1  M.  &  C.  559  1 12 

Margrave  v.  Le  Hool<e,  2  Vern.  207     214 
Marin  v.  Lalley,  17  Wall.  14       509,  1019, 

1025 
Marine  Bank  v.  Fulton  Bank,  2  Wall. 

252  10.^  G 

Marine  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hodgson,  6  Cranch, 

206  1096 

Market  Co.  v.  Hoffman,  101  U.  S.  112    34, 

1028,  1029 
Markey  v.  Mutual  Benefit  L.  I.  Co., 

6  Ins.  L.  J.  5:]7  8,  158,  214,  499 

Markle     v.     Markle,    4    Johns.    Ch. 

(N.  Y.)  1G8  109 
Marks  v.  Fo.y,  18  Fe  1.  R.  713             .    503 
Marquis  Ciiolniondeley  v.  Lord  Clin- 
ton, 2  Jac.  &  W.  1                         112,  115 
V. .  2  Meriv.  71                 278,  499 


Mason    v.    Codwise,    6    Jolins.    Ch. 
(N.  Y.)  183 

c.  Crosby,  3  Woodb.  &  M   2-58 

V.  Gardiner,  4  Bro.  C.  C.  430 


643 
503 
173, 
2y3 
181 


M. 


302 


Marriott  v.  Tarpley,  9  ISini.  279  312 

Marrow,  In  re,  O.  &  Ph.  142 
Marsh,    Matter   of,    MaoArth.  & 

(1).  C.)32  G55 

c.  Xichols,  120  U.  S.  598  1007 

r.  Sihbald,  2  Ves.  &  B.  375  650 

t:  Whitmore,  21  Wall.  185  214 

MarslinJl  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  K.  R.  Co., 

16  How.  314  38 

c.  Holmes,  141  U.  S.  589       679,  811, 

812,  820,  850,  1085 

V.  Mellersh,  5  Beav.  49G  322 

c.  Turiibuil,  34  Fed.  R.  827  100 

r.  United  States,  21  Ct.  CI.  307     898 

Marstin  i\  McHae,  Hempst.  088  510 

Martin,  f,i  re,  5  Blatclif.  303   717,  727,  745 

f.  Cole,  104  U.  S.  30  778 

Haz.trd  Powder  Co.,  93  U.  S. 

1050 

■ V.  Hunter's  Lessee,  1  Wheat.  304 

9'.)5,  104G,  1097,  1098,  1099 

r.  Nicolls,  3  Sim.  458  237 

Martinetti  r.  .Magtiire,  Dcady,  21G        304 
Martinius  r.  Helinutii,  G.  Cooj)er,  248  ; 

2  Ves.  &  B.  412.  >i.  180,  192,  583 

Marvin  i>.  Aultmaii,  46  Fed.  R.  338      686, 

707 
r.  Unitwl  States,  44  Fed.  R.  405  5'.)9, 

001,  004,  005,  GOT,  008,  GIO,  611.  616, 

617,  019 
Mary,  The,  8  Cranch,  388  lOSO 

Marye  v.  Parsons,  114  U.  S.  325     20,  369 

t:  Strouse,  6  Sawy.  201  326 

Maryland  r.  Baldwin,  112  U.  S.  490       37 
.Marv  Lord,  The,  31  Fed.  K.  416  871 

.Mason,  Ex  p'nie,  105  U.  S.  090  7.39 

,  In  re,  43  Fed.  R.  510  651 

V.  Bogg,  2  Myl.  &  C.  443  120 


V.  Hamilton,  5  Sim.  19 

t.  Hartford,  P.  &  F.  R.  R.  Co., 

10  Fed.  R.  334      242,  209,  270,  279,  280 

L-. ,  19  Fed.  R.  53       95,  305,  306 

r.  Lake,  2  Bro.  P.  C.  495  21(5 

i:  Muncasier,  3  Cranch  C.  C.403  G24 

V.   Northwestern   Ins.    Co.,    106 

U.  S.  103  575 

V.  Rollins,  2  Biss.  99  367 

f.  United  States,  136  U.  S.  581  1032, 

1035 
Massa  v.  Cutting,  30  Fed.  R.  1  34 

Massauiiusetts    v.    Rhode   Island,    12 

Pet.  755  28,  29 

Massachusetts  Mut.  L.  I.  Co.  r.  Chi- 
cago &  A.  R.  Co.,  13  Fed.  R.  857     2-32, 

233 

Massachusetts    &    S.    Const.    Co.    v. 

Township  of  Cherokee,  42  Fed.  R. 

750  1049 

Massie  v.  Graham,  3  McL.  41       665,  670, 

671,  672,  673,  674 

V.  Watts,  6  Cranch,  148     2,  352,  571 

Massingill  v.  Downs,  7  How.  760  789,790 
Masterson  c.  Herndon,  10  Wall.  416  1031, 

1032 

v.  Howard,  18  Wall.  99         206,  1082 

Matcalm  v.  Smith,  6  McLean,  416         115 
iVlatteson  u.  Scofiehl,  27  Wis.  671  572 

Matiiiaei  v.  Galitziti,  L.  R.  18  Eq.  340  571 
Matthews  v.  Green,  19  Fed.  R.  049  17 

V.   Ironclad  Manuf.  Co.,  19  Fed. 

R.  321  382 

V.  Lalance  &  G.  Manuf.  Co.,  2 

Fed.  R.  232  231,  248,  271 

t:  Offley,  3  Sumner,  115  475 

V.  Puffer,  10  Fed.  R    006  196 

r.   Tufts,  87  N.  Y.  568  196,  491 

c.  Warner,  6  Fed.  R.  4<31 

r. ,  112  U.  S.  600 

Mattliewson  v.  Stockdale,  12  Ves.  270  363 
Mattocks    ('.   Tremarn,  3  Johns    Ch. 

(N.  Y.)  75 
Maury  «.  Mason, 8  Port.  (Ala.)  213 

V.  Van   Arnum,  1   Hill  (\.  Y.), 

370  483 

Ma.'t  .Morris,  The,  137  U.  S.  1  859 

Maxwell  v.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R. 
Co.,  34  Fed.  R.  280  33,  190,  191 

f.  Kennedy,  8  How.  210  214 

Maxwell  Land  Grant  Case,  121  U.  S. 
325  940 

,  122  U.  S.  .305  946,  lOHO 

May,  In  re,  1  Fed.  R.  737  652 

I}.  County  of  Fond  du  Lac,  27 

Fed.  R.  61)1  12 

/•.  County  of  Logan,  30  Fed.  R. 

2.50  12,  770 

v.  Junean  Countv,  137  U.  S.  408  680 

(;.  Mercer  County,  30  Fed.  R.  246  686 


10,  173 
10,  173 


4-57,  4-58 
251 


Ixxiv 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


843 

10b8 
726,  745 


566 
313 

21)2 
715 


[Refereuces 

May  1-.  St.  John,  38  Fed.  R.  770  814 
Mavberry  v.  Thompson,  5  How.  121  1U21 
iMaver,  In  re,  L.  K.  3  I'.  &  M.  39  415 
r.  Denver,  T.  &  F.  VV.  K.  Co., 

41  Fed.  K.  723 

V.  Foiilkrt)d,  4  Wasli.  349 

V.  Walsh,  108  U.  S.  17 

Mayfield,  In  re,  141  U.  S.  107 
MaVliew  r.  West  Virginia  U.  &  O.  L 

Co.,  24  Fed.  U.  205 
Mavnard  i*.  Green,  30  Fed.  R.  643 

i:  Poml'ret,  3  Atk.  468 

Mayor,  The,  v.  Lord,  9  Wall.  409 
Mayor  of  London  v.  Bolt,  5  Ves.  129   331, 

375 

I'.  Cox,  L.  H.  2  H.  L.  239      692,  697, 

698,  699 

r.  Levy,  8  Ves.  398  224,  498 

Mayor  ot  New  York  v.  Miln,  9  Pet. 

85  1075 

I^Iavor  of  York  v.  Pilkhigton,  1  Atk. 

282  123,  157 

V. ,  2  Atk.  302  351 

Mays  i\  Rose,  Freem.  Cli.  (Miss.)  703  399 
ALizarredo  v.  Maitland,  3  Madd.  66  257 
Meach  v.  Chappell,  8  Paige  (N.  Y.), 

135  484 

Mead  v.  Lord  Orrery,  3  Atk.  235  445 

Meade  v.  Beale,  Taney's  Dec.  339    5,  6,  7 

r.  Keanc,  3  Cranch  C.  C.  51  522,  523 

V.  United  States,  18  Ct.  CI.  281  ; 

109  U.  S.  146 
Meath     v.    Board    of    Miss. 

Conim'rs,  109  U.  S.  268 
V.    Phillips    County,  lOS 

553 
Mechanics'    Bank    r.    Seton, 

299 
'Medley,  Petitioner,  134    U.  S.  160       724, 

729,  751 
Med.sker  v.  Bonebrake,  108  U.  S.  66 
Meier  r.  Kansas  Pac.  R.  K.  Co  ,  5  Dill. 

4V6 
Meigs  I'.  McClung,  9  Cranch.  11 
Meissner  r.  Buck,  28  Fed.  H.  161 
Melius  i;.  Thompson,  1  t;iifE.  125  244,298, 

301,  305 

Mempliis  r.  Brown,  94  U.  S.  715         1018, 

1037,  1048,  1051 

V.  United  States,  97  U.  S.  293       705 

JNIemphis  Citv  i-.  Dean,  8  Wall.  64  228,  231 
Mendenhall  r.  Hall,  131  U.  S.  5-59       lo-^i, 

174,  10:;8 
Menzies  r.  Rodriguez,  1  Price,  92  385 
Mercantile  Trust  Co.  c  Kanawha  & 

O.  Ry.  Co.,  39  Fed.  U.  337  14,  399 
i\  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Uv.  Co.,  3(3 

Fed.  R.  22  '  .397 

V. ,  41  Fed.  R.  8      398,  407,  424, 

765 
?vIercor  County  >:  Hacket,  1  Wall.  8.'\  778 
^'prchants'  Exchange  Co.  v.  United 

States,  1  Ct.  CI.  332  909 

Merchants'  Ins.  Co.  r.  Allen,  121  U.  S. 

67  904 


Levee 


98 


U.   S. 

11,  235 
1    Pet. 
16,  134,  523 


563 


451 
102 

287 


are   to  pages.] 

Merchants'   Nat.    Bank    v.    Glendon 

Co.,  120  xMnss.  97  467 

r.  State  Nat.  Bank,  3  Cliff.  201     768 

Merchants'  &  M.  Nat.  Bank  v.  Kent 

Circuit  Jildge,  43  Mich.  292  440 

V.  Wheeler,  13  Blatchf.  218  840 

Merriwether  v.  Garrett,  102  U.  S.  472  20, 
278,  414,  415,  416,  705 
r.  Muhlenberg  Countv,  120  U.  S. 

354  "  780 

V.  United  States,  13  Ct.  CI.  2-59     008 

Merrill  v.  Dawson,  Henipst.  563  511,  513, 
515,  519,  520,  521,  522,  523 
Merryfiekl  v.  Jones,  2  Curt.  300  889 

i\lerryman,  E.r  jiarte,  Taney,  246  737 

Mersman  r.  Werges,  112  U.  S.  139  55 

Merwin  r.  Smith,  1  Green  Ch.  (N.  J.) 

182  565 

Mesa  V.  United  States,  2  Black,  721  961 
Metal   Stamping  Co.  v.  Crandall,  18 

Off.  Gaz.  1:361  309 

Metcalf  v.  Hervey,  1  Ves.  Sen.  248      177, 

178,  179,  211 

V.  Watertown,  128  U.  S.  586    37,  42, 

56 

V.  Williams,  104  U.  S.  93  16 

Metcalfe  v.  Metcalfe,  1  Keen,  74  305 

V.  Pulvertoft,  1  Ves.  &  B.  180       440 

Metier  r.  Metier,  19  N.  J.  Eq.  457  499 
Metropolitan  G.  &S.  Exch.  v.  Chicago 

Board  of  Trade,  15  Fed.  R.  847  385 
Metropolitan  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Moore,  121 

U.  S.  558  782 

Meux  V.  Bell,  6  Sim.  175  179 

Mexican   Ore  Co.  '■.  Mexican  G.  M. 

Co.,  47  Fed.  R.  351  42,  319 

Mever  v.  Cadwalader,  U.  S.  D.  C.  E. 

D.  Pa.,  Dec.  8,  1891  783 

V.  Ilerrera,  41  Fed.  R.  658  44 

V.  Johnston,  53  Ala.  237         425,426 

Meyers  v.  Block,  120  U.  S.  206  9,  391 

'-  V.  Busbv,  32  Fed.  U   670       254,  686 

Micas  r.  Williams,  101  U.  S.  5.56  1067 
Michoud  r.  (iirod,  4  How.  503  569,  1019 
IMii'klethwaite    v.  Atkinson,    1    Coll. 

173  2.J8,  264 

Middleton  r.  Bankers'  &  M.  Tel.  Co  , 

32  Fed.  H.  524  561 

V.  Dodswell,  13  Ves.  266  441 

V.  Sherburne,  4  Y.  &  C.  3.58  549 

Migliorucci   v.   Migliorucci,   1    Dick. 

147  645 
Milburn,  /s.r  /xtrte,  9  Pet.  704,  ti.  745,  746 
Miller  r.  Biichan;in,  5  Fed.  R.  366  255 
r.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  17 

Fed.  R.  97  83.3 
V.  Clark,  138  U.  S.  223           34,  1028 


Fed. 


,47 

Fed. 

R.  850 

674 

Gotten, 

5Ga. 

311 

145 

Dale,  92  U.  S 

.473 

956 

Eastern 

Oregon  G.  M.  Co 

,45 

45 

227 

Fenton, 

11  P; 

ige  (X.  Y.). 

18 

Jamisoi 

,9C. 

E.  Green  (N 

J.). 

41 


160 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  pages.] 


Ixxv 


.Miller  c.  JoseF»li,  17  Wall.  0-35    10U2,  1003 

V.  Kent,  IS  Fell.  K.  uiJl  84y 

c.  lAg'rett  &  M.  Tobacco  Co.,  7 

Fed.  R.  01  533 

V.  Mc Kirov,  1  Am.  L.  Keg.  198     362 

i:  McKeiizie,  10  Wall.  5!S2  1040 

t:  Soott,  6  Phila.  (Pa.)  4«4    490,  690 

('.  Tobin,  18  Fed.  11.  609  839 

c.  Younsi,  2  Cranch  C.  C.  53  512 

Miller's  Adm.  v.  Norfolk  &  W.  It.  Co., 

41  Fed.  11.  431  687 

Miller-Magee    Co.    v.   Carpenter,    34 

Fed.  R.  433  32,  208 

Milligan,  Ex  parte,  4  Wall.  2        737,  739, 

808,  978 
r.  Lalance  &  G.  Manuf.  Co.,  21 


Blatchf.  407  ;  17  Fed.  H.  46.3 
f.  Milledge,  3  Cranch,  220    127 

V.  Mitchell,  1  M.  &  K.  446 

Milliken  v.  Ross,  9  Fed.  R  8.55 

V.  Selye,  3  Den.  (N.  Y.)  54 

Millington  v.  Fox,  3  M.  &  C.  338 


844 

228, 
246 
353 
781 
483 
580, 
581 
331 


Mills,  In  re,  135  U.  S.  263 

V.  Dennis,  3  Johns.  Ch.  (N.  Y.) 

367  201,  262,  573 

r.  Duryee,  7  Cranch,  481  479 

V.  Fry,  3  Ves.  &  B.  9  538 

V.  Hard,  32  Fed.  R.  127  126,  157 

V.  Newell,  41  Fed.  R.  529       805,  839 

!'.  Northern  Ry.  of  13.  A.  Co  ,  23 


L.  T.  N.  s.  719 

—  r.  Scott,  9.3  U.  S.  25 

—  c.  United  States,  19  Ct.  CI. 


343,  397 

10,  77y 

rO     8'.t7, 

901) 

1033 


Milner  v.  Meek,  95  U.  S.  2-52 
Miltenberger  r.  Logansport  Ry.  Co., 
106  U.  S.  286       112,  402,  403,  40-5,  407, 
408,  425,  426,  427,  441,  442,  443,  1045 
Milvvard  o.  Wel-len.  Tothill,  101  272 

Milwaukee  v.  Koelfler,  116  U.  S.  219      20 
Milwaukee   R.    R.    Co.,  Ex  p'lr/c.  5 

Wall.  188  703,  704,  1052 

Milwaukee  &  M.  R.  R.  Co  v.  Soutter, 
2  Wall.  440  5ti9,  1019 

(•. ,  2  Wall.  510        397,  399,  453 

Milwaukee   &   R.    1{.    Canal    Co.    v. 

United  States,  1  Ct.  CI.  187  902 

Mineau,  /«  re,  45  Fed.  K.  188     .  744 

Miner  v.  Markham,  28  Fed.  R.  387       196, 

199,  491,  842 

Miners'    Rank    r.    United    States,   5 

How.  213  1022 

Mining  Co.  r.  Taylor,  100  U.  S.  37       771 
Minnesota  Co.  v.  St.  Paul  Co.,  2  Wall. 

609  42,  141,  142.  308,  31:;,  319 

Minturn  v.  Larue,  Mc.\ll.  370  362 

Minuse  r.  Cox,  5  Johns.  Ch.  (N.  Y.) 

441  644 

Mirzan.  E.r  pnrtp,  119  U.  S,  584  748 

Mississippi  I'.  Johnson,  4  Wall.  475  19.  95, 

18.").  I'.m,  370 

Mi.<.<!issippi  Mills  c.  Cohn,  39  Fed.  R. 

865  56 


Mississippi  &  Mo.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Crom- 
well, 91  U.  S.  643  16,  25,  344 

c.  Ward,  2  Black,  485     34,  128,  130, 

140,  35.5,  1028 
Missouri  v.  Andriano,  138  U.  S.  496     995 

r.  Iowa,  7  How.  660  28,  29,  107 

V.  ,  10  How.  1  28 

f.  Kentucky,  1 1  Wall.  395  28 

Missouri,  K.  &   T.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Dins- 
more,  108  U.  S.  30  569,  1020,  1021, 
1054,  1059 

V.    Scott,    13    Fed.   R.    793;    4 

Woods,  386  347 

V.  Texas  &  St.   L.   Ry.   Co.,  10 

Fed.  R.  497  357 

Missouri  Pacific  Rv.  Co.  v.  Chicago  & 
A.  Rv.  Co.,  I.i2  ij.  S.  191  783 

r.  Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  30  Fed. 

R.  2  433 

V. ,  31  Fed.  R.  862  427 

,: ,  33  Fed.  R.  701  420 

V. ,  38  Fed.  R.  775  586,  587 

V. ,  41  Fed.  R.  311  436,  439 

V. ,  41  F\'d.  R.  319  420,  436 

Mitchel  c.  United  States,  9  Pet.  711 

1080 

1097 

426 

456 


V.  ,  15  Pet.  52   - 

Mitchell,  E.r  parte.  12  S.  C.  83 

V.  Bunch,  2  Paige  (N.  Y.),  606 

o.  Burlington,  4  Wall.  270  778 

0.  Great  Works  M.  &  M.  Co.,  2 

Storv.648  17 

r.' Harmony,  13  How.  115  102 

c.  Hawlev,  16  Wall.  544  114 

Mix  r.  An.les  Ins.  Co.,  74  N.  Y.  53       822 
Moan  r.   Wilmarth,  3  Woodb.  &  M. 

399  764 

Mobile  &  M.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Jurev,  111 

U.  S. 584  "  786 

Mobile  Countv  v.  Kimball,  102  U.  S. 

G91  '  171 

Moffat  V.  United  States,  112  U.  S.  24     15, 

140,  175 
Mohawk  &  H.  R.   R.  Co.  v.  Clute,  4 

Paise  (N.  Y.),  384  178,  181 

Molina  v.  United  States,  6  Ct.  CI.  269  902, 

912 
Moline  Plow  Co.  v.  Webb,  141  U.  S. 

616  787 

Mollan  V.  Torrance,  9  Wheat.  .537  56 

IMolstein  v.  Welch.  42  Fed.  R.  566         153 
Monk    (.'.   United    States,   12  Ct.  CI. 

293  909 

Monkhouse  '-.  Corporation  of  Bedford, 

17  Ves.  380  575 

Monroe,  Tn  re,  46  Fed.  R.  52  730 

.Montague  (Lord)  i'.  Dudraan,  2  Ves. 

Sen.  396  351 

Montana,  The,  22  Fed.  R.  715  867 

,  22  Fed.  R.  730  ^  867 

Montana  Ry.  Co.  r.  Warren,  137  U.  S. 

348  776 

Monte  A..  The.  12  Fed.  R.  331  853 

Montford  (Lord)  v.  Lord  Cadogan,  17 
Ves.  485  396 


Ixxvi 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  pages.] 
Anderson,  21    Ho 


1025 

86 
G1S4 
420 
4 
325 
547 


232,  233 


Montgoiiierv 

3S(J 
MoMtijoniery  P.   S.  C.  Co.  v.  Street 

Cable  Car  Line,  43  Fed.  R.  329 
Montijo  V.  Owen,  14  Blatclif.  324 
Moiitro.ss  r.  Mabie,  oU  Fed.  K.  284 
Moodalav  r.  Morton,  1  Hro.  C.  C.  469 
Moody  r.  Hebberd,  11  Jur.  941 
Moons  r.  De  Bernales,  1  Hiiss.  301 
Moor  V.  Welsh  Copper  Co.,  1  Eq.  Cas. 

Abr.  39,  pi.  14  232 

Moore  v.  Chicago,  St.  P.,  M.  &  O.K.  U. 

Co.,  21  Fed.  K.  817 

r.  Crawford,  130  U.  S.  122 

r.  Ed-efield,  32  Fed.  H.  498     35,  719 

V.  Hudson,  Madd.  &  Geld.  218      456 

V.  Huntington,  17  Wall.  417 

V.  Lyttle,  4  Johns.  Ch.  (N.  Y.) 

183 

V.  Marsh,  7  Wall.  515 

V.  Meynell,  2  Vern.  614,  n, 

V. ,  1  Dick.  30 

• /'.  Moore,  25  Beav.  8 

V. ,  2  Ves.  Sen.  596 


39 
572 


294 


r.  Nelson,  3  McL.  383 

r.  Sinionds,  100  U.  S.  145 

V.  United  States,  4  Ct.  CI.  139 

Mora  V.  Nunez,  10  Fed   R.  634 


213 
113 

109 
456 
389,  657 
G68,  670, 
676 
514,  518 
1010 
898 
956 


Moran  v.  Citv  of  Elizabeth,  9  Fed.  R. 

72  '  714 

More  V.  Steinbach,  127  U.  S  70     940,  941 
Morgan,  Ex  pdrte,  114  U.  S.  174 

V. ,  1  Atk  408 

r.  Curtenius,  19  How.  8 

c. ,  20  How.  1 

i\  Tipton,  3  McLean,  339 

V.  United  States,  14  Ct.  CI. 

r. ,  14  Ct.  CI.  442 

Jlorgan's  La.  &  T.  R.  R.  &  S.  S.  Co. 

)•.  Texas  Cent.  Ry.  Co.,  137  U.  S. 
171  42,  292,  405, 411 

Moriran   County  ?•.   Allen,  103  U.  S. 
515  1080 


702 

,703 

662 

718, 

1059 

778 

2.50 

,  293 

319 

908 

909 

Morison  v.  Moat,  9  Hare.  241 
Mormon  Cliurch  r.  United  States,  136 

U.  S    1 
Moi-rali  r.  Prichard,  11  Jur.  N.  s.  969 
Morrell  v.  United  States,  7  Ct.  CI.  421 
Morrill  v.  Jones,  106  U.  S.  4t)6 


341 

397 

325 

898 

108(5 

10; '3 

727 

415 

41,536,  SI  9 

657 


Morris,  Ex  pmip,  9  Wall.  (iOiJ 

,  In  re,  40  Fed.  R.  824 

r.  Eline,  1  Ves.  Jr.  139 

V.  (iiimer,  129  U.  S.  315 

V.  Hay  ward,  (i  Taunt.  5H9 

r.  liowell  Manuf.  Co.,  3  Fisher's 

Pat.  Cas.  t;7 

V.  Morris,  2  Pliill.  205 

V.  Shelbourne.  8  Blatchf.  266 

Morris's  Cotton,  S  \V;dl.  507 
Morrissey,  In  re,  137  U.  S.  157     72 


Morrison  v.  Arnold,  19  Ves.  670 

r.  Bernards  Township,  35  Fed 

R.  400  60; 


358 
495 
383 

1093 
,  753, 

i(V26 
497 

J,  788 


Morsell  i-.  Hall,  13  How.  212  762,  1022 
Mortimer  v.  Eraser,  2  M.  &  Cr.  173  220 
Moses  V.  Macferlan,  2  Burr.  1005  2 

V.  Mayor,  15  Wall.  387  569 

V.  WJoster,  115  U.  S.  285     770,  771, 

1033,  1035 
Mosgrove  v.  Kountze,  14  Fed.  R.  315  311 
Moslier  v.  Heydrick,  45  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 

549  ;  30  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  161  483 

Mosley  v.  Taylor,  2  Y.   &  J.   520 ;  1 

Keen,  601  138 

Moss  V.  Baldock,  1  Phill.  118  668 

Mossman  v.  Higginson,  4  Dall.  12  38 

Mott  V.  United  States,  3  Ct.  CI.  218  912 
aiotte  V.  Bennett,  2  Fisher's  Pat.  Cas. 

642  358 

Motteux  V.  London  Assur.  Co.,  1  Atk. 

545  2 

Mounsey  v,  Burnham,  1  Hare,  15  267 
Mouseley  v.  Basnett,    1   Ves.   &    B. 

382,  n.  638 

Mower  v.  Fletcher,  114  U.  S.  127  1018 
Mowrv  V.  Grand    St.  &  N.  R  Co.,  10 

Blatchf.  89;  5 Fisher's  Pat.  Cas.  586  360 

v.  Whitney,  14  Wall.  434  759 

Moy  Chee  Kee,  In  re,  33  Fed.  R.  377  606 
MuUan  r.  United  States,  118  U.  S.  271  15 
Mullee,  In  re,  7  Blatchf.  23  654,  655 

Muller  c.  Dows,  94  U.  S.  277  1072 

r. ,  94  U.  S.  444    12,  38,  39,  144, 

452,570,571 

r.  Elders,  91  U.  S.   249  784 

Mumford  v.  Mumford,  1  Gall.  366  91,  229 

r.  Wardwell,  6  Wall.  423       938,  940 

Mumm  V.  Owens,  2  Dill.  475  486 

Munima  ;'.  Potomac  Co.,  8  Pet.  281  297 
Mundy  v.  Kendall,  23  Eed.  R.  591  383 
Munns  v.  Dupont,  3  Wash.  31  521 

Munson   v.   The  Mayor,  19  Fed.  R. 

313  392 

Murdock    v.    City    of    Memphis,  20 

Wall.  590  1004,  1005 

Murphy  In  it,  1  Woolw.  141  737 

V.  Oidis,  2  Moll.  475  332 

r.    East    Portland,    42   Fed.  R. 

308  .34,  162 

r.  I'nited  States,  3  Ct.  CI.  212      902 

r. 15  Ct.  CI.  217  931 

Murray  r.  Benbow,  6    Petersd.   Abr. 

559  '  364 
r.  Bluebird  Min.  Co.,  45  Fed.  R. 


385 


36 
363 
823 
350 


r.  Bogue,  1  Drew.  3.53 

r.  lloldcn,  2  Fed.  R.  740 

r.  Overstoltz,  8  Fed.  R.  110 

r.   Vanderbilt,  39  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 

140  397 

Murtaijl:  >:  Piiiladelphia,  1   W.  N.  C. 

(Pa.)  .37  356 

Muscan  H.  M.Co.  ?•.  American  II.  M. 

Co.,  1  Fisher  I'at.  Cas.  320  360 

Musurave  v.  Parry.  2  Vern.  710  9-3,  354 
Mnss(dr  Morgan!  3  Hro.  C.C.  74  678,679 
Musselman  y.  Marquis,  1  Bush  (Ky.), 

463  357 


Mussina    v.    Cavazos,    6    Wall.  355 

784,  1038,  1040,  1041,  1042,  1053,  1054 
Mutual  L.  I.  Co.  V.  Champlin,  21  Fed. 

R.  85  805,  824 

Myers   v.  Cunningham,  44  Fed.  K. 

346  686 

r.  Dorr,  13  Bktclif.  22  248,  271 

r.  Fenn,  5  Wall.  205  3:J3,  385 

V.  Murray,  43  Fad.  K.  695        45, 819 

V.   State,  21    W.   L.  Enl.  404; 

24  N.  E.  Hep.  43  651 

Myrick  v.  Mioiiigan  Cent.  R.  R.  Co., 

107  U.  S.  102  777,  778 


N. 


Nabob  of  Aroot  v.  East  India  Co.,  3 

Bro.  C.  C.  292  240 

Nabob  of  the  Carnatic  i".  East  India 

Co.,  1  Ves.  Jr.  374  284 

Nalder  i-.  Hawkins,  2  M.  &  K.  243     92,  93 
Nanney  r.  Tottey,  11  Price,  117  306 

Napier  r.  Lady  Effingham,  2  P.  Wms. 

401  574 

Nash  c.  Williams,  20  Wall.  226      485,  513 
Nashua  &  L  R.  R.  Co.  v.   Boston  & 

L.  R.  R.  Co.,  136  U.  S.  356  39 

Nashville  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  i'.  United 

States,  113  U.  S.  261  898 

National  Bank  c.  Bank  of  Commerce, 

99  U.  S.  608  1043 

t:  Carpenter,  101  U.  S.  567  214, 

274,  284,  1085 

l:  Colby,  21  Wall.  609  297 

0.  Insurance  Co.,  95  U.  S.  673     1084 

V. ,  104  U.  S.  54      3,  16,  216,  221, 

2211,  227,  240,  244,  297.  544,  1086 

r.  Kentucky,  9  Wall.  353  1086 

v.  Kimball,  103  U.  S.  732       174,  389 

v.  .McGahan.  45  Fed.  R.  280        1049 

IV  Omaha,  96  U.  S.  737  1046 

National   C   K.   Co.  r.  Boston  C.   I. 

&  H.  Co.,  41  Fed.  R.  51  352 

National  Furnace  Co.  /;.  Moline  M.  I. 

Works,  18  Fed.  R.  863  198, 199 

National  Home  v.  Butler,  33  Fed.  R. 

374  340 

National    Manuf.    Co.    v.   Meyers,   7 

Fed.  R.  355  250 

National    Mech.   Banking    Assoc.   >: 

Mariposa    Co.,  60    Barb.    (N.    Y.) 

423  453 

National  Trust  Co.  v.  Miller,  33  N.  J. 

Eq.  155  429 

National    Typographic    Co.    v.   New 

York  Typog.  Co.,  44  Fed.  R.  711 
Nations  v.  Johnson,  24  How.  195 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are   to  pages.] 

Neal  V.  Foster,  34  Fed.  R.  496 


Ixxvii 


45 

1043, 

]08(» 

Nauvoo  i\  Ritter,  97  U.  S.  389  1086 

Nazro  v.  Cragin,  3  1)111.  474  763 

Neafie  v.   Cheesbrough,    14   Blatchf. 

313  772 

Neagle,  In  re,  135  U.  S.  1      648,  752,  753. 

796,  836,  964,  1026 

,  39  Fed.  R.  833  G48,  796 


287,  290. 
291,  295 
Neale  v.  Foster,  31  Fed.  R.  53        827,  831 

V.  Neales,  9  Wall.  1  277 

Nebraska  City  Nat.  Bank  v.  Ne- 
braska City  H.  G.  L.  Co.,  14  Fed. 

R.  763  213 

Neediiam  v.  Smith,  2  Vern.  463  668 

Neilson  v.  Lagow.  7  How.  772  994 

Nellie  Peck,  The,  25  Fed.  K.  463  626 

Nellis  r.  McLanahan,  6  Fisher's  Pat. 

Cas.  286  158,  165 
V.  Pennock  Manuf.  Co.,  38  Fed. 

11.  379  27.3 

Nelson  v.  Barker,  3  McL.  379  337 

r.  Hennessey,  33  Fed.  R.  113         817 

V.  Hill,  5  How.  127  156,  159 

i\  United  States,  Pet.  C.  C.  235     621, 

524 

V.  Woodruff,  1  Black,  156    515, 1087 

Nereyda,  La,  8  Wheat.  108  1081 

Nesmith  v.  Calvert,  1  Woodb.  &  M. 

34  126,  464 

V.  Sheldon,  6  How.  41  985,  993 

V. ,  7  How.  812  542,  777 

Nessle  v.  Reese,  19  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.) 

240  357 

Nevada,  The,  106  U.  S.  514  1029 

Neve  V.  Weston,  3  Atk.  557  234 

Neves  v.  Scott,  13  How.  268  10,  779 

Newall  V.  Wilson,  2  De  G.  M.  &  G. 

280  359 

Newbery  v.  James,  2  Meriv.  446  341 

Newburgh   (Earl  of)  v.  Countess  of 

Newburgh,  5  .Madd.  364  548 

Newbury  v.  Marten,  15  Jur.  166  573 

Newby    v.  Oregon  Cent.  Rv.  Co.,  1 

Sawv.  63  '229,  243,  244 

Newcomb  v.  Wood,  97  U.  S  581  781, 1090 
New  England,  The,  3  Sumn.  495         704, 

870 
New  England  Mut.  L.  I.  Co.  v.  Odell, 

50  Hun  (N.  Y.),  279  181 

New    Hampshire   v.    Louisiana,    108 

U.  S.  76  29,  107 

New  Hampshire  Land  Co.  v.  Tilton, 

29  Fed.  R.  764  642,  684 
New  Jersey  v.  New  York,  3  Pet.  461  28 
V. ,  5  Pet.  284  28 

V. ,  6  Pet.  323  28.  199 

New  Jersey  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Mills, 

113  U.  S.  249  131 

Newman,  Ex  parte,  14  Wall.  152  703 

y.  Davenport,  9  Baxt.  (Tenn.) 

538  434 

V.  Moody,  19  Fed.  R.  858       229,  336 

New   Orleans  v.   Gaines'  Admr.,  138 

U.  8.  595  56,  1095 
V.  Louisiana   Construction    Co., 

129  U.  S.  45  1025,  1068 

V.  Morris,  105  U.  -S.  600  3,  15,  23 

V. .  3  Woods,  103  714 

V. ,  3  Woods,  115  795 

y.  New  Orleans,   M.  &  T.  R.  R. 

Co.,  108  U.  S.  15  1066 


Ixxviii 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  pages.] 


New   Orleans  v.    Steamship   Co.,  20 

Wall.  387  05^,  656 

V.  Winter,  1  Wheat.  91  38 

New  Orleans  V.  &  B.  Co.  v.  Stafford 

12  How.  343  126,  127,  133,  134 

New  Orleans  G.  L.  &  B.  Co.  v.  Dudley, 

8  Paijie  (X.  Y.),  452  549 

New  Orleans  Ins.  Co.  v.  Albro  Co., 

112  U.  S.  506  1047 

New  Orleans  N.  B.  Assoc,  v.  New  Or- 
leans Mut.  Ins.   Assoc,   102   U.  S. 

121  1001 

New  Orleans  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Morgan,  10 

Wall.  256  1018 

New  Orleans  W.  W.  Co.  v.  Southern 

Brewing  Co.,  36  Fed.  R.  833  779 

New  Orleans  &  IS.  E.  liy.  Co.  v.  Jopes, 

142  U.  S.  18  786 

Newport  v.  Bury,  23  Beav.  30  444 

New  Providence  v.  Halsey,  117  U.  S. 

336  536,  581 

Newton  v.  Askew,  6  Hare,  319  196 

V.  Earl  of  Egnioni,  4  Sim.  574      120 

New  York  r.  Coimecticut,  4  Dail.  1      385 
New  York  (Mayor  of)  v.  Miln,  'a  Bet. 

85  1075 

New  York  B.  &  P.  Co.  '•.  Magowan, 

27  Fe<l.  R.  Ill  18 
V.  New  Jersey  C.  S.  &  R.  Co.,  32 

Fed   R.  755  586,  642 

New  York  Consol.  Card  Co.  r.  United 

States,  20  Ct.  CI.  174  899 

New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Fifth  Nat. 

Bank,  118  U.  S.  608  788,  1027 

New  York  G.  S.  Co.  v.  Buffalo  G.   S. 

Co.,  20  Fed.  R.  505  276 

New   York  G.  &  I   Co.   v.  Memphis 

Water  Co.,  107  U.  S.  205  7,  24 

New  York  I.  &  P.  Co.  r.  Milburn  G. 

&  M.  Co.,  .35  Fed.  R.  225  820 

New  York  &  B.  C.  P.  Co.  v.  New  York 

C.  P.  Co.  9  Fed.  R.  578       495,  496,  500 
New  York,  L.  E.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Winter,  143  U.  S.  60  1091 

New   York.  N.   H.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

(\)ckcroft,  46  Fed.  R.  881  810 

Nihlock  r.  Alexander,  44  Fed.  R.  306 

828,  833 


_.'2 

229 

347 

3 

520, 

522 

640 

10,  779 

197 

380 

641 

896, 

909 

Nicholson  v.  Squire,  10  Ves.  259    326,  330 

Ni(;kerson  r   Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R. 

R.  Co.,  30  Fed.   R.  85;   1   MeCra. 

383  9,  511 


Niccol  V.  Wiseman,  2  Vcrn.  46 
Nicholas  v.  Murray,  5  Sawy.  320 

V.  Nicholas,  Prec.  in  (/h.  540 

NichoUs  V.  NichoUs,  1  Atk.  409 
V.  White,  1   Cranch   C.  C.  58 

Nichols  V.  Brunswick,  3  Cliff.  88 

IK  Eaton,  91  U.  S.  716 

r.  Morton,  14  Fed.  R.  .327 

V.  Kearsly,  2  Dick.  645 

r.  Marsh,  131  U.  S.  401 

V.  United  States,  7  Wall.   122 


Nickerson  v.  Cook,  45  Fed.  R.  658        804 
Nickle  V.  Stuart,  111  U.  S.  776  670 

Nickles  v.  United  States,  i'j,  Fed.  R. 
757  1094 


909 
726 


462 

898 


515 
11 

153 
639 
771 
672 

210 
113 
356 

836 


Nicoll  V.  United  States,  1  Ct.  CI.  70 
Nielsen,  Petitioner,  131  U.  S.  176 
Nixon  V.  Albion  M.  I.  Co.,  L.  R.  2  Ex. 
338 

y.  United  States,  18  Ct.  CI.  448 

Noble   V.   United    States,   Uevereux, 

135  910 

Noe  V.  Gibson,  7  Paipe,  513  430 

Noel  V.  King,  2  Madd   392  294 

Non-Mairnetic  Watch  Co.  v.  Associa- 
tion H.  S.  of  Geneve,  44  Fed.  R.  6    194 

V  .  45  Fed.  R.  210  201 

Noonan  v.  Bradley,  12  Wall.  121         1035 

V.  Lee,  2  Black.  499  9 

Normandie,  The,  40  Fed.  R.  590 
Norris  v.  Haggin,  136  U.  S.  380 

V.  Ilassler,  22  Fed.  R.  401 

V. ,  23  Fed.  R.  581 

V.  Jackson,  9  Wall.  125 

V.  Le  Neve,  3  Atk.  26 

North  V.  Earl  of  Strafford,  3  P.  Wms. 

148 

V.  Kershaw,  4  Blatchf.  70 

V.  Peters,  138  U.  S.  271  2^, 

North  Carolina  r.  Kirkpatrick,  42  Fed. 

R.  689 

r.  Temple,  1-34  U.  S.  22         105,  106 

North  Carolina  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Drew,  3 

Woods,  691  505,  509,  521,  522 

Northcote  >:  Northcote,  1  Dick.  22  265 
Northern  Indiana  R.  R.  Co.  ;•.  Mich. 

Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  How.  233  130 

Northern  Pacific  R.  R.  Co.  i-.  Aniato, 

U.    S.   S.   C.    April    11,  1892,    144 

U.  S.  968,  1007, 1026- 
i: ,  N.  Y.  L.  J.,  Feb.  2,  1892 

(U.  S.  C.  C,  2d   Cir.  Jan  ,    1892) 

1008,  1026,  1040 
V.  Burlington  &  Mo.  R.  R.  Co., 

2  McCra.  203  ;  4  Fed.  R.  298     345,  357 

>:  Glaspel,  49  PVd.  R.  482 

r.  Herbert,  116  U.  S.  642 

V.  Mares,  123  U.  S.  710 

V.  Paine,  119  U.S.  561 

V.  Roberts,  42  Fed.  R.  734 

r.  St.  Paul.  M.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co., 

2  McCra.  260  ;  4  Fed.  R.  688      389 

r. ,  47  Fed.  R.  530        237 

Northern  R.  R.  Co.  r.  Ogdensburg  & 

L  C.  R.  R.  Co..  18  Fed.  R.  815  288,  291 

V. ,  20  Fed.  R.  347  288,  291 

Northov  r.  Pearce,  1  Sim.  &  S.  420  374 
Northinan  v.  Wade,  77  Ga.  651  37 

North  Star,  The,  106  U.  S.  17  8.')9,  863 
Northwestern  Fuel  Co.  r.  Brock,  139 

U.  S.  216  1093 
Norton,  /■:>•  parlfl,  108  U.  S.  237  1018,  1021 
r.  European  &  N.  A.  Ry.  Co.,  32 

Fed.  R.  865  5.36 

r.  Hepwortli,  1  Hall  &  Tw.  158    192, 

305,  309 


965 

10V)0 

778 

684,  840 

211 


TABLE  OF  CASES. 


Ixxix 


[References 

Norton  v.  Slielby  County,  118  U.  S. 

425 
Norway,  The,  1  Ben.  4'J:j 

,2  Ben.  121 

Norwood,  J^jc  parte,  3  Biss.  504 
Nougue  V.  Clapp,  101  U.  S.  551 


840,  780 

51 'J 

520 

95,  430 

430,  BT'J, 

812 

158,  105 


Nourse  v.  Allen,  4  Blatclif.  370 
Novello  V.  James,  5  De  G.  M.  &  G. 

876  390 

Novelty,  The,  0  Ben.  195  625,  626 

Noyes  *•.  Canada,  :^0  Fed.  K.  665  200 

V.  W.illard,  1  Woods,  187       241,  241 

Niidd  V.  Burrows,  91  U.  S.  426      773,  774 
Nuestra    Senora   de  liegla,  The,    17 

Wall.  29  875,  1036 

Nussbauni    '•.  Northern  Ins.  Co.,  40 

Fed.  R.  337  687,  843 

o. 

Oaks  V.  Hill,  8  Pick.  (Mass.)  40  713 

Gates   V.   National    Bank,  100  U.  S. 

23'J  543,  778 

Ober  f.  Gallagher,  93  U.  S.  199        41,  56, 

778,  843 
O'C^ilhighan  r.  Cooper,  5  Ves.  117  613 
Odorless  Excavating  Co.  i'.  Launian, 

12  Fed.  K.  788  360 

O'Dowd  V.  liussell,  14  Wall.  402         1018, 

1019,  1031,  1032.  1041 

Oelrichs  v.  Spain,  15  Wall.  211    217.  229, 

1087 
Offeley  I'.  Morgan,  Cary,  153  218 

Ogilen  V.  Gibbons,  Ilalst.  Dig.  (N.  J.) 

172  27'J 
Ogilvie  r.  Ilerne,  13  Ves.  563  2-37 
v.  Knox  Ins.  Co.,  2  Black,  539      119, 

V.  ,  18  How.  577  988 

i: ,  22  How.  380       119,  129,  33:! 

Ogle  i:  Cook,  1  Ves.  Sen.  177  550 

V.  Lee,  2  Cranch,  33  1098 

V.   Morgan,    1  De    G.  M.    &  G. 

359  668 

Oglesby  v.  Attrill,  12  Fed.  R.  227  676 

V.  ,  14  Fed.  R.  214  277,  3.;8 

Ogsbury  r.  LaFarge,  2  N.  Y.  113  545 

O'lLira  r.  MacCoiuiell, 93  U.  S.  l-'^O       92, 

107,  109,  130,  187,  201,  202,  205,    20r,, 

1089 
V.    Shcplierd,    3    Md.   Ch.    Dec. 

306  314 

Oiiio  V.  Ellis,  10  Ohio,  456  159 

V.  Frank,  103  U.  S.  697  780 

Oiiio  Cent.  R.  R  Co.  i'.  Central  Trust 

Co.,  133  U.  S.  83  206,  575 

Ohio  Life  Ins.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Debolt,  16 

How.  416  ,543,  777,  779 

Ohio  &  Miss.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Wheeler, 

1  Black, 286  39 

Olcott  V.  Ilendrick,  141  U.  S.  543;  12 

S.  C.  Rep.  81  .567 

• V.  Supervisors,  16  Wall.  678         777, 

778 


are  to  pages.] 

Oldfield  IK  Cobbett.  1  Phill.  013  331 

Oldham  c.  Eboral,  Coop.  Sel.  Cas.  27 

308,  662 

V.  Oldham,  7  Ves.  410        458 

Oleson  V.    Northern  R.  R.  Co.,  43 

Fed.  R.  112  162 

i: ,  44  Fed.  R.  1  34 

Oliver  V.  Decatur,  4    Cranch   C.    C. 

458  217, 243 

V. ,  4  Cranch  C.  C.  592  304 

r.  Hamilton,  2  Anstr.  453  395 

V.  Piatt,  3  How.  333       117,  156,  159, 

160 

V. ,  2  McL.  208  117 

V.  Rumford  Chem.  Works,  109 

U.  S.  75  114 

Olney  v.  Tanner,  10  Fed.  R.  101     95,  430, 

439 
Olyphant  v.  St.  Louis  O.  &  S.  Co.,  22 

Fed.  R.  179  405,  406 

V. ,  28  Fevl  R-  729  412 

Omaha    Horse    Rv.    Co.  v.  Cable  T. 

Co.,  32  Fed.  R.  727 

(;. ,  33  Fed.  R.  689 

O'.VIahoney  v.  Belmont,  62  N.  Y.  133 


847 
313 


V,  ,  37  N.  Y.  Super.  Ct.  223 

Onderdonk  v.  Fanning,  2  Fed.  R.  568 
O'Neil  r.  Kansiis  City^S.  &  M.  R.  Co., 

31  F\nl.  R.  663 
Ord  V.  Huddieston,  2  Dick.  510 

V.  Noel,  6  Madd.  127 

Oregon  Iron  Works,  In  re,  4  Savvy. 

169 ;   17  N.  B.  R.  404 
Oregon    &  T.   Co.  v.  Northern   Pac. 

\iy.  Co  ,  32  Fed.  R.  428 
O'Reilly  v.  Campbell,  116  U.  S.  418 


451 
451 

652 

639 
229 
672 

23 


Edrington,  96  U.  S.  724 


315 
771, 

1086 
1046, 
1062 

212 
602 


Orendorf  v.  Budlong,  12  Fed.  R.  24 
Organ  v.  G;)r<liner,  1  Ch.  Cas.  231 
Origet  V.    United    States,  125  U.  S. 

240  784 

Ormsby   v.   Union  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  4 

Fed.  R.  706  373 

r.  Webb,  1.34  U.  S.  47  1025 

Orr  V.  Littlefield,  1   Woodh.  &  M.  13 

359,  386 

V.  Merrill,  1  Woodh.  &  M.  376      386 

Ortley    v.     Messere,    7    Johns.    Ch. 

(N.  Y.)  1.39  04 

Orton  V.  Smith,  18  How.  203  840 

Orvis  V.  Powell,  98  U.  S.  176  10,  575 

Osborn  V.  Bank  of  U.  S.,  9  Wheat. 

738  4,  3^  104,  129,  352,  371,  402 
V.    United    States,    131    U.    S. 

cxxxvii  598 

V. ,  9  Ct.  CI.  153  934 

Osborne  v.  Barge,  30  Fed.  R.  805        287, 

290,  292 

V.  Harvey,  1  Y.  &  C.  N.  R.  110 

440,  441 
)'.  Wisconsin  Cent.  R.  Co.,   43 

Fed.  R.  824  154,  157 


Ixxx 


TABLE  OF  CASES. 


[References 

Osbiirne   v.   Barter,  Choyce  Cas.  in 

Ch.  176  o55 

Osuaiiyan  v.  Arms  Co.,  103  U.  S.  261    775 
Osgood   r.   Chifago,  D.  &  V.  R.    K. 

Co.,  G  Biss.  330  822,  823 

Oswald  (.-.  New  York,  2  Dall.  415  29 

Overman   Wheel  Co.  v.  Pope  Mfg. 

Co  ,  40  Fed.  li.  577  45 

Overton  r.  Memphis  &  L.  R.  R.  Co., 

10  Fed.  R.  800  442 

Owen  V.  Curzon,  2  Vern.  237         300,  312 

V.  lloman,  4  H.  L.  C.  997  399 

V.  Thomas,  3  M.  &  K.  353  462 

Owens  V.  IJanney,  9  Craneli,  180         1054 
V.  Missouri  Fac.  Ky.  Co.,  38  Fed. 

It.  571  776 
V.  Ohio  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  Fed. 

R.  10 
Owing's  Case,  1  Blawd  (Md.),  370 


are   to   pages.] 

Paine  v.  Warren,  33  Fed.  R.  .357  500 

Palk  V.  Lord  Clinton,  12  Ves.  Go  172 

Palliser,  In  re,  13G  U.  S.  257  751 

,  Matter  of,  U.  S.  D.  C,  D.  Conn. 

Nov.  1889  488 

Pahiier  r.  Foote.  7  Paige  (N.  Y.),  437    120 

V.  Low,  98  U.  S.  1  942,  947 

V.  Parkhurst,  1  Chan.  Cas.  112       94 

V.  Stevens,  100  Mass.  4G1       123,  129 

V.  'J'raverse,  20  Fed.  R.  501    372, 415 

V.  United  States,  24  IIow.  125       955 

V.  Vauyhan,  3  Swanst.  173    372,  415 

V.  Walesbv,  L.  R.  3Cli.  732    414,  533 

Palmyra,  The,  10  Wheat.  502    "  1025 

12  Wheat.  1  942,  947,  1098 


13 
94, 

578 
Owings  >•.  Hull,  9  Pet.  G07  4G1,  479 

c.  Kiiicannon,  7  Pet.  399  1031 

f.  Norwood,  5  Cranch,  344  994 

c.  Tiernan,  10  Pet.  447  10G3 


P. 


Paca  V.  Dutton,  4  Mo.  371  480,  481 

Pacific  Bank  v.  Mixter,  114  U.  S.  463 

1047,  1062 
I'acific  F.xpress  Co.  v.  Malin,  132  U. 

S.  531  786,  788,  1027 

r.  Seibert,  44  Fed.  R.  310  20,  23 

Pacific  Nat.  Bank  v.  Mi.xter,  124  U.  S. 

721  764 

Pacific  R.  R.  V.  Ketchum,  101  U.  S. 

289  37,  126.535,  5:16,  813 

Pacific  Railroad  Removal  Cases,  115 

U.  S.  1  35,  808,  810,  1086 

Pacific  R.  R.  of  Mo.  v.  Atlantic  &  P. 

R.  R.  Co.,  20  Fed    R.  277      17,  118,  1-59 

r.  Ketchum,  95  U.  S.  1    285,  1080 

r.  ,  101  U.  S.  289        1089 

r.  Missouri  Pac.  R   R.  Co.,  Ill 

U.  S.  505  42,  141,  142,  147,  192,  209, 
210,  215,  219,  2.37,  463,  678,  680 
r. ,3  Fed.  R.  772;  1  McCra. 

647  192,  193 

Pacific  Railway   Comm'n,   In  re,  32 

Fed.  R.  241  448,  490 

Packer  r.  Boyd,  137  IT.  S.  661  780 

r.  Ni.xon,  10  Pet.  408  981,  985 

Packet  Co.  v.  Catlettsburg,  105  U.  S. 

559  210 

Packington   v.  Packington,   1    Dick. 

101  .386 

Pagan  v.  Sparks,  2  Wasli.  •)25  116 

Page  V.  Fall  River,  W.  &  P.  K.  Co  , 

31  Fed.  R.  257  39 

V.   Holmes   R.   A.  Tel.   Co.,    18 

Blatchf.  118;  2  Fed.  U.  330      333,  m\, 

359,  666,  667,  G72 
Paine  .-.  Central  Vt.  R.  R.  Co.,  118 
U.  S.  152  772 


Pannell  i-.  Tayler,  Turn.  &  R.  96 
Pannill  d.  Eiiason,  3  Cranch  C. 

358 
Paper  Bag  Cases,  105  U.  S.  766 
Parcels  v.  Johnson,  20  Wall.  663 


459 

'"  615 

113 

1002, 

1021 


Pargoud  v.   United   States,  13  Wall. 
156  909 

V. ,  13  Ct.  CI.  .337  909 

V. ,  13  Ct.  CI.  349  909 

Paris,  Ex  parte,  3  Woodb.  &  M.  227     621, 

624,  628 
Parish  v.  Ellis,  16  Pet.  451  1025 

V.  United  States,  8  Wall.  489        909 

V. ,  1  Ct  CI.  345  POO 

Bark  o.  Willis,  1  Cranch  C.  C.  357 
Parker,  Kx  parte,  120  U.  S.  737 
,  Petitioner,  131  U.  S.  221 


512 

702 

702,  71.3, 

il6 


Bigler,  1  Fisher's   I'at.  Cas. 
Browning,   8   Paige  (N.  Y.), 


638 


4.30 

575 

325 

12 


—  V.  Dacres,  120  U.  S.43 
V.  Francis,  9  Jur.  616,  n. 

—  r.  Hall,  2  Fisher's  Pat.  Cas.  62 

—  r.  Hal  lock,  2  Fisher's  Pat.  Cas. 
543,  //.  12 

—  V.  Hawk,  2  Fisher's  Pat.  Cas.  58      12 

—  v.  llaworth,  4  Me.  L.  370  474 

—  r.  llotclikiss,  1  Wall.  Jr.  269  196 

—  V.  Judges  of  Circuit  Court,   12 
Wheat.  561  378,  681,  1052 

—  I'.  Leigh,  6  Madd.  115  2!'3 

—  V.  Morrell,  2  Pliill.  453  650 
Nightingale,  6  Allen  (Mass.) 


341 


Hep 

718 


154 

519 

56 


.  Nixon,  Baldw.  291 

.  Ornisby,  141  U.   S.  81 

.  Sears,  1  Fisher's  I'at.  Cas.  93 

;:60,  382 

State,  16  Lea,  476;  1  S.   W. 

202 

Town  of  Concord,  39  Fed.  R. 


733 
541 


V.  Winnipiseoijee  Lake  C.  &  W. 

Co,  2  Black,  54o  229,355 
I'arkersbiirg  r.  Brown,  106  U.  S.  487  23 
Parkhurst  r.  Kinsman,  2  Bhitchf.  72  315 
a. ,  Blatchf.  78                 383,  398 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  pages.] 


Ixxxi 


Parkinson  v.  Laselle,  3  Sawy.  330        W'l 

V.  Went  worth,  11  Mass.  26  91 

I'arks,  Ex  jKirte,  'Jo  U.  S.  18  725,  72tJ 

V.  Booth,  11)2  U.  S.  W  25:],  564 

V.  Tenner,  12  How.  ;W  U«9 

Tarniley  v.  Railroad  Cos.,  o  Dill.  25  3S'J 
Parrot  c.  Treby,  Prec.  in  Ch.  254  581 

Parrott  *;.   Alabama  G.  L.  I.  Co  ,  5 

Fed.  U.  3ltl  lUJ,  842 

Parsons  r.  Bedford,  3  Pet.  433  5 

c.  Charter  Oak  L.  I.  Co.,  31  Fed. 

R.  305  399 

1-.  Denis,  7  Fed.  K.  317  684 

r.  Howard,  2  Woods,  1  127,  135 

('.  Lyman,  4  Blatclif.  432         115,  153 

r.  Robinson,  122  U.  S.  112    569,  1023 

Partee  r.  Thomas,  11  Fed.  R.  769  277 
Partridge  v.  Hayeraft,  11  Ves.  570      169, 

265,  206 

r.  Usborne,  5  Russ.  195  672,  674 

Paschal,  />i  re,  10  Wall.  483  650,  652 

Patapsuo,  The.  12  Wall.  451  1027 

Patapsco  Ins.  Co.  v.  Southgate,  5  Pet. 

601  511,512 

Patch  v.  Ward,  L.  R.  3  Ch.  208  575 

Patchin  i'.  Hunter,  3S  Fed.  R.  51  816,  817 
Patents  Comm'r  y.  Wliiteley,  4  Wall. 

522 
Paton  r.  Majors,  46  Fed.  R.  210 
Patrick  V.  Isenhart,  20  Fed.  R   339 
Patriotic   Bank  c.  Bank  of  Washing- 
ton, 5  Crancii  C.  C.  602  256,  264 
Patterson   v.  Stapler,  7  Fed.  R.  210 

113,278 

V.  United  States,  2  Wheat.  221 

r. ,  21  Ct.  CI.  322 

Paul  r.  Baltimore  &  O.  &  C.  R.  Co., 
44  Fed.  R.  513 

/;.  Lowry,  2  Cranch  C.  C.  628 

V.  Virginia,  8  Wall.  168 

Paving  Co.  V.  Mulford,  100  U.  S.  147 

1029 
Pawlet  v.  Clark,  9  Cranch,  292  41 

Pa.xton  V.  Douglas,  8  Ves.  520  376 

,..  ,  19  Ves.  225  215 

Payan  v.  United  States,  15  Ct.  CI.  56 

931 

Payne  v.  Hook,  7  Wall.  425  9,  1.3,  15. 

127.  135,  156 

V.  Niles,  20  How.  219  1030,  1032 

Peabody  v.  Norfolk,  98  Mass.  4.52  341 

Peachie  v.  Twyeerosse,  Carv,  113  218 
I'eake  o.  Highfield,  1  Russ.  559  4,  548 
Peale  v.  Phipps,  8  How.  256  1043 

V. ,  14  How.  368  .    12 

I'earne  v.  Lisle,  Atnbl.  75  455,  456 

Poarse  v.  Brook,  3  Beav.  3.37  481 

Pearson  v.  The  Alsaf  a,  44  Fed.  R.  385 

188 

,:  Ward,  1  Cox  Eq.  177  4 

Pease  v.  Peck,  18  How.  .595  777 

Peaslee  r.  Haberstro,  15  Blatclif.  472   6>;8 
Peav  '•.  Schenck,  Woolw.  175        292  294 
Peck,  Ex  parte,  3  Blatchf.  113       490,  494. 
511,  514,  515,  719 
VOL.  I.  — / 


706 
4 '19 
213 


717 
903 

39 
517 
813 


Peck 


,  Frame,  9  Blatchf.  194  570 

L\  Jenness,  7  How.  624  347 

u.  Peck,  Mosely,  45  255,  261 

r.  Sanderson,  18  How.  42  1079 

Pedrick  v.  While,  1  Met.  (Mass.)  76     317 
Pence  v.  United  States,  1  Ct.  CI.  195 

909,  911 

1-.  West's  Exrs.,  Pet.  C.  C.  351      271 

r. ,  3  Wash.  354  275 

Pelham  i-.  Rose,  9  Wall.  103  978,  988 

Peiham  (Lord)  v.  Duchess  of  Kew- 
caslle,  3  Swanst.  289,  n.      334,  659,  660 

i\ ,  3  Swanst.  293,  n.  659 

L\  Lord  Harley,  3  Swanst.  291,  n. 


659 
345 


Pel  ton    V.  National  Bank,  101  U.  S. 

143 
Pelzer  Manuf.  Co.  v.  St.  Paul  F.  &  M. 

I.  Co.,  40  Fed.  R.  185  841 

Pendleton  v.  Evans,  4  Wash.  336         204 

V. ,  4  Wash.  391  205 

V.  Fay,  3  Paige  (N.  Y.),  204    309,  314 

Penfold  V.  Ramsbottom,  1  Swanst.  552  223 
Penhallow  v.  Doane,  3  Dall.  54  1083 

Peninsular  Iron  Co.  r.  Stone,  121  U. 

S.  631  684,  849 

Penn  v.  Calhoun,  121  U.  S.  251  403 

r.  Ingraham,  2  Wash.  C.  C.  487   512 

V.  Klyne,  Pet.  C.  C.  446         761,  762 

V.  Lord  Baltimore,  1  Ves.  Sen. 

444  2,  571 

Pennington  v.  Gibson,  16  How.  65         756 
Pen  nock  r.  Dialogue,  2  Pet.  1      686,  1087 

u. ,  4  Wash.  538  686 

V.  Gilleland,  1  Pittsb.  37  762 

Peimoyer  v.  Neff,  95  U.  S.  714  841 

V.   McConnaughy,   140   U.  S.   1 

103,  104,  105,  106 

V. ,  43  Fed.  R.  196  103,  104 

V. -,  43  Fed.  R.  339  103,  104 

Pennsylvania,  The,  15  Fed.  R.  814       864 
Pennsylvania,  .£x/jay<e,  109  U.  S.  174 

696,  700,  869 

v.  Boley,  1  W.  N.  C.  303  759 

r.  Quicksilver  Co.,  10  Wall   553     29 

r.  Wheeling  &  B.  Bridge  Co.,  13 

How.  518  355 

Pennsylvania  Co..  In  rp,  137  U.  S.  451 

702,  704,  827,  828,  833,  8-50 

r.  Rov,  102  U.  S.  451  769 

V.  UuUed  States,  7  Ct.  CI.  401      911 

Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.  r.  Alleghany 

Vallev  R.  Co  ,  42  Fe<l   R.  82  562 
V.  St.  Louis,  A.  «i  T.  H.  R.  R. 

Co.,  116  U.  S.  472  1077,1087 

r.  .  118  U.  S.  290  17,  39 

Penny  /•.  Watts,  2  Pliill.  149  135 

Pentlarge  v.  Beeston,  1  Fed.  R.  862      382 

V.  Kirbv,  20  Fed   R.  898  684 

V.  Pentlarge,  19  Fed.  R.  817   2.38.  577 

V. ,  22  Fed.  R.  412  238,317, 

577 

r. ,  14  Reporter,  570  372 

Pentleton  v.  Forbes,  1  Cranch.  C.  C. 

507  614,  515 


Ixxxii 


TABLE    OF   CASES.  • 
[References  are  to  pages.] 


2o5 
(355 

756 
713 

453 

mo 

74(3 
488 
72U 
743 
734 


485 
70U 

434 

750 
756 


People  r.  Albany  &  Vt.  K.  K.  Co.,  24 
N.  Y.  261  343 

V.  Brower,  4  Paige,  405         337,  653 

c  Culorailo  Cent.  H.  Co.,  42  Fed. 

K.  638  7U5,  713,  714,  715,  710,  811 

u.  Cooper,  22  Hun,  515 

i;.  Cratt,  7  Pai;:e,  325 

V.  Ferguson,  8  Cow.  102 

V.  Forijuer,  1  III.  68 

I'.  Globe  Alut.  L.  1  Co ,  57  How. 

Pr.  481 

V.  Grant,  45  Cal.  97 

f.  Jugigo,  128  N.  Y.  589 

1-.  Keilv,  24  N.  Y.  74 

V.  iMcLeod,  1   Hill  (N.  Y.),  377 

V.  Meri-ein,  3  Hill  (X.  Y.),  399 

V. ,  8  Paige,  47 

V.  National  Trust  Co.,  82  N.  Y. 

283  432,  434 

V.  Norton,  1  Paige  (N.  Y.),  17   ^  441 

(;.  Kens.selaer  Common  Pleas,  G 

Wend.  (N.  Y.)  543 

V.  SewanI,. 7   Wend.  518 

V.  Universal  L.  I.  Co.,  30  Hun 

(N.  Y.),  142 

V.  Vail,  20  Wend.  12 

V.  Van   Sl\  ck,  4   Cow.  297 

People's  Bank  V.  Calhoun,  102  U.  S. 

2.50  530,  813 

Peper  v.  Fordvce,  119  U.  S.  469  584,  814, 

849 
Peralta  v.  United  States,  3  Wall.  434  911, 

955 
Perine  r.  Duini,  4  Johns.  Cli.  (N.  Y.) 

140  574 

Perkins,  In  re,  cited  43  Fed.  R.  515     651 

V.  Fourniquet,  6  How.  206  1023 

V. ,  14  How.  328  797,  1092, 

1099 

V.  Hart,  11  Wheat.  237  990 

V.  Hendrvx,  28  Fed.  R.  418  840 

(,'. ,  31  Fed.  R.  522  317 

i: ,  40  Fed.  R.  057  199,  842 

Perry,  Ex  jMute,  102  U.  S.  183  703 

V.  Carr,  41  N.  H.  371  174 

V.  Clift,  32  Fed.  R.  801  817.  843 

V.  Corning,  7   Blatchf.  195     158,  105 

V.  Jenkins,  1  M.  &  Cr.  122  306 

V.  Mechanics'  Mut.  Ins.  Co.,  11 

Fed.  R.  478  687 

V.  Parker,  1  Woodb.  &  M.  280    374, 

377 

V.  Phclips,  17  Ves.  173  067,  6()8, 

669,  670,  671,  072,  676 

V.  Sharpe,  8  Fed.  \i.  15  315 

V.  Truefit,  0  Beav.  60  304 

V.  Walker,  4   Beav.  452  325 

Perseverance,  The,  22  Fed.  R.  462       622, 

625,  620 
Person  v.  Grier,  66  N.  Y.  124  190 

Persons  v.  United  States,  10  Ct.  CI. 

502  929 

Peters  r.  Bain,  133  U.  S.  670  542 

(,-.  Prevost,  1   Paine,  64      8,  518,  519 

V.  Robinson,  1  Dick.  IIG  298 


Pettibone  c.  Derringer,  4  Wash.  215  473, 
512,  513,  516 
Peugh  V.  Davis,  110  U.  S.  227  1047 

1-eychaud  v.  United  States,  16  Ct.  CI. 

001  983 

Peyton  v.  Heinekin,  131  U.  S   ci        1093 

V.  Robertson,  9  Wheat.  527         1028 

V.  Veitch,  2  Cranch  C.  C.  123     512, 

515 
Pfanschmidt  v.  Kelly  Mercantile  Co., 

32  Fed.  R.  6(37  605,  666 

Phelps  i:  Canada  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  19 


Fed. 

R.  801 

846 

—   V 

Elliott,  26  Fed.  R.  881 

840 

—    V 

,  30  Fed.  R.  390 

284 

—    V 

Harris,  101  U.  S.  730 

237 

—  r 

Mayer,  15  How.  160 

775 

7fG 

—   c. 

McDonald,  99  U.  S.  298 

168 

—   I- 

Oaks,  117  U.  S.  236 

41 

683 

—    V 

O'Brien  County,  2  Dill. 

618 

9, 

688 

Pheni.x  Ins.  Co.  i\  Liverpool  &  G.  W. 

S.  S.  Co.,  22  Blatchf.  372 
Philadelphia  Fire  Assoc,  r.  New  York, 

119  U.  S.  110  813,  1004 

Philadelphia  &  T.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Stimp- 

son,  14  Ret.  448  1090 

Philippi  r.  Philippe,  115  U.  S.  151  214 
Phillips,  /«  re,  2  Am.  L.  T.  154 

V.  Carew,  1  P.  Wnis.  117       177, 

V.  C()mbstO(;k,  4  McLean,  525 

V.  Derbie,  1   Dick.  98 

c.  Langhorn,  1   Dick.  148 

V.  United    States,    11     Ct.    CI. 

570 

Phillips  r.  Negley,  117  U.  S  665 

V.  Prentice,  2  Hare,  542 

Phtt'iiix  Ins.  Co.,  Ex  parte,  117  \j.  S 

307 
,  118  U.  S.  010 

V.  Wnlf,  1  Fed.  R.  775 

Piatt  V.  ()liver,  1  McL.  295 

V.  A'attier,  9  Pet.  405 

Pickard  r.  JNlattheson,  7  Ves.  293 
Pickering  i'   Bishop  ot  Ely,  2  Y.  &  C. 

Ch.  Cas.  249  367 

Pickett  V.  Tiler  &  S.  Co.,  40  Fed.  R. 

313  14 

Pickett's  Heirs  v.  Ledgerwood,  7  Pet. 

144  794, 1022,  1043,  1053 

Pico  V.  United  States,  2  Wall.  279  9-55 
Picquet  y.  Swan,  5  Mason,  35       188,  195 

V.  ,  5  Mason,  501  115,  538 

Pictet  A.  I.  Co.  r.  Xevv  York  I.  M.  Co., 

12  Fed.  R.  81G  534 

Piek  V.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  6 

Biss.  177  370 

Pierce  r.  Cox,  9  Wall.  786  1044,  1062 

V.  Feagans,  39  Fed    R   587  250 

r.  Indseth,  106  U.  S   546  766 

('.   Union    Pacific    Rv.    Co..  47 

Fed.  R.  709  '  767,  846 

i:  Webb,  3  Bro.  C.  C.  l-'),  >,.  4 

Pierpont  c.  Fowle,  2  Woudb.  &  M.  23  358, 

360 


867 


488 
496 
086 
800 
388 


793 
484 


1029 
094 
180,  187 
241 
275 
004 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are   to  pages.] 


Ixxxiii 


Pierson  v.  Robinson,  3  Swanst.  139,  n.  115 
Pieters  v.  Thompson,  G.  Coop.  29i  588 
Pii-ot  r.  Stace,  2  Dick.  4'.)(5  243 

Pike  V.  Niciiolas,  L.  R.  5  Cli.  251  3Go 

Pilla   V.   German    iScliool   Assoc,  23 

Fed.  R.  700  840 

Pillow  V.  Pillow,  5  Yers-  (Tenn.)  420  172 
IMiR'ers  r.  Robertson,  24  N.  J.  Kq.  348  203 
Pimlar  v.  Smith,  Madd.  &  G.  48  5.')1 

Pine  Grove  v.  Talcott,  lU  Wall.  606   777, 

778 
Pins-on,  The,  v.  Bletlien,  11  Fed.  R. 

(i07  ;   7  Sawy.  483  1013 

Pinkerton   v.  Barnsley  Canal  Co  ,  3 

Y.  &  ,J.  277,  H.  483 

V.  Ledou.x,  129  U.  S.  346     949,  952, 

955 
Pinkiis  V.  Peters,  5  Beav.  258 
Pioneer,  The,  Biatchf.  Prize  Cas   61 
Piquijinot  '•.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co., 

10  How.  104 
Pirie  r.  Tvedt,  115  U.  S.  41 
Pitclier  V.  Helliar,  Dick.  580 

u.  Hennessey,  48  N.  Y.  415 

Pitkin  Conntv  Mining  Co.  v.  Markell, 

33  Fed.  R.'386 
Pitman,  Re,  1  Curt.  186  650,  652,  653 

v.  Uniteil  States,  45  Fed.  R.  159  610 

Pitt  0.  Earl  of  Arglass,  1  Vern.  441     675 

V.  Snowden,  3  Atk.  750 

Pitts,  In  re,  9  Fed.  R.  542 

V.  Edmonds,  2  Fislier's  Pat.  Cas 


116 
875 

964 
816 
396 


44 


418 
387 


252 

287 

1065 

415 

148,  210 

Fed. 

820 


V.  Powledge,  56  Ala.  147 

Piatt  0.  Jerome,  19  How.  384 

V.  Jones,  96  N.  Y.  24 

V.  Mead,  9  Fed.  R.  91 

V.  Plioeni.x  Assur.  Co.,  c 

R.  730 

Pleasants  i'.  United  States,  35  Fed. 

R.  270  610 

Plitt,  E.r  parte,  2  Wall.  Jr.  453     609,  643, 

644 
Phinket  v  Penson,  2  Atk.  51  135 

Plymouth  (Countess  of)  v.  Bladon,  2 

Vern.  32  539 

Plymouth  G.  M.  Co.  v.  Amador  &  S. 

Canal  Co.,  118  U.  S.  264  814,  816,  1058 
Poe,  Matter  of,  5  Barn.  &  Adol.  681  693 
Pdinde.xter  v.  Greenhow,    114   U.  S. 

270  101 

Polk's  Lessee  v.  Wendul,  9  Crancli, 

87  542,  777 

Pollard  V.  Bailey,  20  Wall.  526  129 

V.  Vinton,  105  U.  S   7  777 

Pollers  V.  Black  River  Imp.  Co.,  113 

U.  S.  81  1003,  1037 

Pomeroy's  Lessee    v.   State  Bank  of 

Ind.,  1  Wall.  592  785,  787,  1090 

Pomroy  v.  Harter,  1  McL.  448  623 

Pond  r.  Vermont  Valley   R.  R.  Co., 

12  Biatchf.  2S0  40,  535 

Poole,  In  re,  2  McArthur  (D.  C),  683 

740, 743 
V.  Franks,  1  Moll.  78  643 


Poole  V.  Thatchcrdeft,  19  Fed.  R.  49    43, 

811,812 
Poor  ('.  Carleton,  3  Sumn.  70       382,  385, 

386 
Pope  ('.  Manufacturing  Co.,  87  N.  Y. 

137  841 

Poppenhusen  v.  Falke,  4  Biatchf.  493 

156,  165,  300 
V.  New  York  G.  P.  Comb.  Co.,  4 

Biatchf.  184;  2  Fisher's  Pat.  Cas. 

74  259,  370 
Porter  v.  Foley,  21  How.  393  1060 
V.  Pittsburgh  B.  S.  Co.,  120  U.  S. 

649  403, 1085 

V.  Sabin,  .36  Fed.  R.  475  95,  131 

V.  United  States,  20  Ct.  CI.  307 

934 
Porter   L.   &  W.    Co.  v.  Baskin,   43 

Fed.  R.  323  194,  199 

Portland  (Countess  of)  v.  Prodgers,  2 

Vern.  104  91 

Portland  Co.  v.  United  States,  5  Ct. 

CI.  441  899 

Port  Royal  R.  R.  Co.   v.  Hammond, 

58  Ga.  523  571 

Portugal  (Queen  of)  v.  Glyn,  7  CI.  & 

F. 466  498 

Post  u.  Supervisors,  105  U.  S.  667        542, 

779 
V.  Toledo,  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  R.  Co., 

144  Mass.  341  ;  4  New  Eng.  Rep.  221  8 
Postmaster-General  c.  Rice,  Gilp.  554    471 

r.  Trigg,  11  Pet.  173  713 

Potter  V.  Gardner,  12  Wheat.  499  116 

V.  Mack,  3  Fisher's  Pat.  Cas.  428   392 

V.  National  Bank,  102  U.  S.  163    486, 

487 

V.  Potter,  1  Ves.  Sen.  274  462 

t'.  Whitnev,  1  Lowell,  87  3-59 

Potts  V.  Hahn,'32  Fed.  R.  660  156 

V.  Leighton,  15  Ves.  273  447 

V.  Warwick  &  B.  C.  N.  Co.,  Kav, 

143  "     444 

Poultnev  ('.   City   of  Lafayette,    Ex 

parteju  Pet.  472   90,  200,  248,  534,  713, 

714 
Powder  Co.  u.  Powder  Works,  98  U.  S. 

126  224 

Powell  V.  Kane,  5  Paige  (N.  Y.),  265    484 

r.  Powell,  Madtl.  &  G.  53  573 

V.  Waldron,  89  N.  Y.  328  415 

V.  Wright,  7  Beav.  449  116 

Power  i:  Baker,  112  U.  S.  710  1052 

0.  Semmes,  1  Craneh  C  C.  247    490 

Powys  r.  Blagrave,  18  Jur.  462  444 

Poydras  de  la  Laude  v.  Treasurer  of 

La.  17  How.  1  1043 

Pratt  V.  Fitzhugh,  1  Black,  271  1026 

V.  Northam,  5  Mason,  95      8,  11, 15, 

235 
Preble  v.  Bates,  40  Fed.  R.  745  784 

Prentice  v.  Pickersgill,  6  Wall.  511     1093 
Prescott,  E.r  parte,  2  Gall.  146  609 

President  r.  Maver,  &c.  of  Elizabeth, 

40  Fed.  R.  799  716 


Ixxxiv 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


[References 

Preston  v.  Walsh,  10  Fed.  R.  315      _  TiO, 

387,  5 1*2 
Preston's  Heirs  v.  Bowmar,  6  Wlieat. 

580  "77 

Prevost  V.  Gorrell,  5  W.  N.  C.  (Pa) 

151  04U,  706 

Price  V.  Abbott,  17  Fed.  R.  500  394 

V.  Berrington,  3  Macn.  &  G.  486 

151,  548 

V.  Coleman,  21  Fed.  R.  357  147, 

157,  160 

V. ,  22  Fed.  R.  694  585 

V.  Morris,  5  McL.  4  517 

V.  Price,  2  Smith's  Ch.  Pr.  76       548, 

549 

V.  State,  8  Gill  (Md),  295  701 

V.  Yates,  19  Alb.  L.  J.  295      770,  780 

Prime  v.  United  States,  3  Ct.  CI.  209   002 
Prince  v.  Towns,  33  Fed.  R.  161  645 

Prince  Albert  v.  Strange,  1  Macn.  & 

G.  25  "  342,  363,  307 

Pritchard  v.  Fleetwood,  1  Meriv.  54      396 

V.  Quinchaiit,  Ambl   147  273 

Proctor  V.  Brill,  16  Fed.  R.  791 
Protector,  Tlie,  20  Fed.  R.  207 

,  11  Wall.  82 

Prout  V.  Roby,  15  Wall.  471 
Prouty  V.  Draper,  2  Story,  199 
Providence  &  N.  Y.  S.  S.   Co.  i 

Manuf.  Co.,  109  U.  S.  578   350.  871,  872 
Provident  Savings  L.  A.  Soc.  r.  Ford, 

114  U.  S.  635  37,  42,  199,  200 

Prudential  Assur.  Co.  v.  Knott,  L.  R. 

10  Ch.  142 

V.  TlH.nias,  L.  R.  3  Ch.  74 

Pruen  v.  Lunn,  5  Russ.  3 

Public  G.  &  S.  E.x-change  v.  Western 

Un.  Tel.  Co.,  16  Fed.  R.  289;  11 

Biss.  568 
Public   Schools  v.  Walker,   9  Wall. 

603 
Puetz  V.  Bransford,  31  Fed.  R.  458 


are  to   pages.] 

Putnam  c.  Ingraham,  114  U.  S.  57         813, 

816 

r.  New  Albany,  4  Biss.  365      2,  263, 

289,  292,  298 

Q. 

Quackenlush  v.  Leonard,   10  Paige 

(N.  Y.),  131  298 

Quarles   i'.  Quarles,  2   Munf.    (Va.) 

321  579 

Quebec  S.  S.    Co.  v.  Merchant,  133 

U.  S.  375  778,  1026 

Queen  v.  Twiss,  L.  R.  4  Q.  B.  407       698, 

699 
Queen  of  Portugal  v.  Glyn,  7  CI.  &  F. 

466  498 

Quincy  v.  Steel,  120  U.  S.  241        26,  161, 

162 
Quirolo  V.  Ardito,  1  Fed.  R.  610  544 


584 

853 

1010 

128,  131 
637 

Hill 


371 
179 
307 


821 


(). ,  32  Fed.  R.  318 

Pullan  V.  Kinsingcr,  2  Abb.  U.  S.  91 
Pullen  V.  United  States,  7  Ct.  CI.  507 
PuUiam  v.  Christian,  6  How.  209 


r.  Puliiam,  10  Fed.  R.  53 


1079 
253. 

295 
36 

370 

909 
5f,9, 
1023 
12,  235, 

542 


Pullman  P.  C.  Co.  v.  Speck,  113  U.  S 

84  a-s-i 
i;.  Texas  &  P.  Rv.  Co.,  11  Fed. 

R.  625;  4  Woods,  317  372 

Pulteney  v.  Shelton,  5  Ves.  147  325 

Purcell  V.   British  L.  &  M.    Co.,  42 

Fed.  R.  405  45 

V.  Miner,  4  Wall.  519  672 

Purdy  V.  Rapalye,  N.  Y.  Chancery, 

1835  451 

Purefoy  v.  Purefov,  1  Vern.  29  213 

Pusev  r.  Piisev,  rVorn.  273  23,  36Y,373 
Putnam  r.  Dav,  22  Wall.  60  670 

V.  Hollander,  6  Fed.  R.  882  1-.9, 

105,  216 


R. 


40 


Rabaud  r.  De  Wolf,  1  Paine,  580 
Rachel,    The,    r.    United    State.*,    6 

Craiich,  529  1088,  1093 

Radcliffe,  Ex  parte,  1  Jac.  &  W.  639     396, 

440 
Radford  v.  Folsom,  14  Fed.  R.  97  232 

V.  ,  123  U.  S.  725         1037,1043, 

1044,  1002,  1063 
Raffety  v.  King,  1  Keen,  601  138 

Haht  V.  Attrill,  106  N.  Y.  423  414 

IJailroad  v.  Johnson,  15  Wall.  8  1032 

Railroad  Comm'rs  v.  Chicago,  M.  & 

St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  45  Fed.  R.  82  807 

Railroad  Co.,  E.r  parte,  95  U.  S.  221    294, 

295,310,311,633,  702,  870,  1023,  1044 

V.  Barron,  5  Wall.  90  780 

V.  Blair,  100  U.  S.  661  1043 

V.  Bradleys,  7  Wall.  575      569,  1019, 

1044 
V.  Ellerman,  105  U.  S.  106 


25,  343, 
344 
543 

778 

1088 

39 

121 

839 

777,  778 


V.  Falconer,  103  U.  S.  821 

V.  Gladmon,  15  Wall.  401 

V.  Cirant,  98  U.  S.  398 

r.  Harris,  12  Wall.  65 

i:  Howard,  7  Wail.  392 

V.  Koontz,  104  U.  S.  5 

V.  Lockwood,  17  Wall.  357 

V.  National  Bank,  102  U.  S.  14     643, 

777,  778 

V.  Orr,  18  AVall.  471  120,  135 

V.  Pollard,  22  Wall.  341  486 

V.  Schutte,  100  U.  S.  644  10-30 

V.  Swasey,  23  Wall.  405       509,  1023 

V.  Trook,  100  U.  S.  112  1027 

V.  Wiswall,  23  Wall.  507  _      702 

Railroad  Companies  r.  Chamberlain, 

6  Wall.  748  42,  662 

Railway  Co.,  AV  parte,  101  U.  S.  711     703 

— .  103  U.  S.  794  702,  763 

c.  Ailing,  99  U.  S.  463  533,  1065 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


[References 

Railway  Co.  v.  Heck,  102  U.  S.  120      fi68 

V.  Ramsey,  -22  Wall.  322  818 

r.  Twoinbly,  100  U.  S.  78    1088,  lU'JU 

r.   Wliittoii's    Adiiir.,    lo    Wall. 

■     270  y,  39 

Railway  R.  M.  Co.  v.  North  Hudson 

Co.  K.  Co.,  2(5  Fed.  K.  411  GG5 

Raimond  v.  Terrebonne  Parish,  132 

U.  S.  192  773 

Rainerf.  Haynes,  Hempst.  GS9     512,  514, 

51(3 
Raines  v.  United  States,  11  Ct.   CI. 

648  909 

Ralston,  Ex  parte,  119  U.  S.  613         1003, 
1048,  1053,  1061 
Ramsdell  v.  United  States,  2  Ct.  CI. 

508  908 

Ramsay  v.  United  States,  21  Ct.  CI. 

443  898 

Rand  v.  United  States,  36  Fed.  R. 

671  617 

V.  Walker,  117  U.  S.  340       814,  817 

Randall  n.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  R.  Co., 

109  U.  S.  478  775 

V.  Howard,  2  Black,  585        1R8,  21 4, 

236,  4:'.6 
767 


V.  Venable,  17  Fed.  R.  163 

Rando!j)h,  Ex  parte,  2  Brock.  41 

c.  Barrett,  16  Pet.  138 

V.  Dickerson.  5  Paige  (N.  Y.), 

517 

V.  Robinson,  2  N.  J.  L.  J.  171 

Randolph's  Kx'r  v.  Qiiidnick  Co.,  135 

U.  S.  457  16,  25,  314,  780 

Ranliin  r.  Hiiskisson,  4  Sim.  13  389 

V.  State,  11  Wall.  380         1002,  1021 

Ransom  v.  Davis,  18  How.  295       119,  334 
Rantin  c.  Robertson,  2  Strobli.  Law 

(S.  C),  36lJ 
Rashleigh  v.  Master,  1  Ves.  Jr.  201 
Ratclift'e  r.  Winch,  16  Bcav.  576 
Rateau  o.  Bernard,  3  Blatchf.  244 


470 
279 


309 
292 


209 
643 
376 
38, 
353 


Rattray  v.  George,  16  Ves.  232  332 

Ravosies  v.  United  States,  21  Ct.  CI. 

243  910 

Rawlings  v.  Lambert,  1  Johns.  &  H. 

45S  388 

Rawlins  v.  Dalton,  2  Y.  &  C.  447  234 

Rawson  v.  Lyon,  15  Fed.  R.  853  85  > 

Ray  V.  Knowlton,  11  Biss.  360  620 

V.  Law,  3  Cranch,  179    569,670, 1019 

(.  Smith,  17  Wall.  411  1087 

Ravner   v.   Julian,   2   Dick.   677;    5 

Madd.  144,  n.  220 

Raynes  i-.  Wyse,  2  Meriv.  472  456 

Rea  V.  Missouri,  17  Wall.  532  1090 

Read  v.  Bertrand,  4  Wash.  558  512 

V.  Consequa,  4  Wash.  174     191,  202, 

276,  384,  387,  388 

V. ,  4  Wasli.  335  263,  264 

I'.  Miller,  2  Biss.  12  12 

V.  Read,  1  Ch.  Cas.  115  456 

Reay  v.  Berlin  &  J.  Env.  Co.,  30  Fed. 

R.  448  276 


Ixxxv 


are  to  pages.] 

Reay  <;.  Ravnor,  19  Fed.  R.  308    27G,  277, 

316 
Rector  v.  Lipscomb,  141  U.  S.  557  1029 
Rfdding  V.  Wilkes,  3  Bro.  C.  C.  401  168 
Hedlield  r.  Parks,  130  U.  S.  623  1054 

Red   River  Cattle   Co.  v.   Needliam, 

47  Fed.  R.  358  1098 

Reed  v.  Carusi,  Taney,  72  362 

r.  Holliilay,  19  Fed.  R.  325  363 

c.  Reed,  31  Fed.  R.  49  811,  814 

Reeder  v.  Seely,  4  Cow.  548  42.) 

Reedy  v.  Scott,  23  Wail.  352  316,  317 

Rees  V.  Watertown,  19  Wall.  107  20 

Reese    River    S.    i\l.    Co.    v.    iVtwell, 

L.  R.  7  ICq.  347  278 

Reeve  v.  Parkins,  2  Jac.  &  W.  390        353 
Reeves  r.  Vinacke,  1  McCra.  213  11 

Reifsnider  v.  American  I.  P.  Co.,  45 

Fed.  R.  433  190,  199,  842 

Reily  v.  Lamar,  2  Cranch,  344  1045 

Reineman  v.  Ball,  33  Fed.  R.  692  814 

Reinitz,  In  re,  39  Fed.  R.  204  748 

Reinstadler  v.  Rehls,  33  Fed.  R.  308     208 
Reissner  v.  Anness,  12  Off.  Gaz.  842; 

3  Bann.  &  A.  Pat.  Cas.  148       226,  227, 
241,  244,  248 

,,.  ,  13  Off.  Gaz.  7  248 

Relief  F.  L  Co.  v.  Sliaw,  94  U.  S.  574     3 
Removal  Cases,  100  U.  S.  457        37,  126, 
813,820,  822,834 
Remsen    v.   Remsen,   2    Johns.    Cii. 

(N.  Y.)  495  432 

Renard  v.  Levinstein,  2  Hem.  &  M. 

628  114 

Renaud  r.  Abbott,  116  U.  S.  277  1043 

Rentier   v.   Howland,  2   Cranch  C.  C. 

441  513 

Rensselaer  &  S   R.  R.  Co.  ".  Benning- 
ton &  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  Fed.  R.  617  347, 

349 
Republican  River  Bridge  Co.  v.  Kan- 
sas Rac.  R.  Co.,  92  if  S.  315  1090 
Reubens  v.  Joel,  13  N.  Y.  488  5 
Rex  V.  Francis,  2  T.  R.  484  755 
Reyburn  ;'.  Consumers'  G.  F.  &  L. 

Co.,  29  Fed.  R.  561  406,  414 

Reynes  v.  Dumont,  130  U.  S.  354         217, 

220,  1087 
Reynolds,  In  re,  Slielf.  on  Lun.  417        94 

('.  Adden,  136  U   S.  348  39,  40 

V.    Crawfordsville    First    Nat. 

Bank,  112  U.  S.  405      10,  270,  271,  534, 

779 

V.  Iron  S.  M  Co..  33  Fed.  R.  354    387 

V.  Stockton,  140  U.  S.  254        14,  400 

Reynoldsdii  /■.  Perkins,  Ambl.  564         117 
Rhine  v.  United  States,  15  Ct.  CI.  59 

931 
Rhinelander  y.  Sanford,  3  Day  (Conn.), 

279  108 

Rhoades  v.  Selin,  4  Wash.  715     519.  520, 

521,  522 
Rhode   Island   r.   Massachusetts,   12 

Pet.  657  107 

13  Pet.  23  28.  200,  273 


Ixxxvi 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  pages.] 


Rlioile  IslanJ  r.  Massachusetts,  14  Pet. 
'no  i'2t),  "^27,  243,  245,  2:48,  250 

t-. ,  1.-,  IVt.  2;!o  28 

i-. ,  4  11uw.  51)1  28 

Kibon  L\  Kailiuad  Cos.,  10  Wall.  446    130, 

131 
Kicard  v.  New  rrcvidence,  5  Fed.  R. 

433  687 

Ricardo  v.  Gareias,  12  CI.  &  Fin.  368  238 

V.  Marileiiliead   Local  Board  of 

Healtli,  2  H.  &  N.  257  698 

Kite  V.  Minnesota  &  H.  W.  R.  R.  Co., 
21  How.  82  1060,  1069 


Rich 


R. 


—  V. 


Brav,  37  Fed.  R.  273 

r.  Kicketts,  7  Blairhf.  230 

Riciiards  v.  Ciiesapeake  &  O.  R 

Co.,  1  Hiiglies,  28 

V.  Evans,  1  \'es.  Sen.  39 

V.  Mackall,  113  U.  S.  539 

V. ,  124  U.  S.  183 

V.  Rock  Uapids,  31  Fed.  R  505 

/•.  Salter,   6  Johns.   Cii.   (N.  Y.) 

445 
Richardson  r.  Boston,  1  Curt.  250 

l:  Golden,  3  Wash.  109 

Green,  130  U.  S.  104 
Hardwick,  106  U.  S   252 
Richard.-<on,  5  Faitre  (N.Y.),  58 

r.  Ward,  6  Ma<ld.  ^HtG 

Richmond,  The,  9  Fed.  R.  863 

I'.  Brookings,  48  Fed.  R.  241 

V.  Irons,  121  U.  S.  27 

V.  Tayleur,  1  F.  Wins.  734 

V.  Hichniond  &  1).  R.  Co.  v.  Find- 
ley,  32  Fed.  R.  1541 

f .  Thouron,  134  U.  S.  45 

Richter  v.  Jerome,  25  Fed.  R.  679 

V.  Union  Trust  Co.,  115  U.  S.  55 

Kico  f.  Giiahicr,  3  Atk.  501 
Riddle  >:  Mnn<levilie,  6  Cranch,  86 
r.  New  York,  L.  E.  &  W.  R.  Co., 

39  Fed.  R.  290  45,  189,  190 

c.  Whitehill,  135  U.  S.  021  284, 

1084,  1085 
Hideout  c.  Earl  of  Flvmouth,  1  Dick. 

68  '  446 

Ridgway  V.  Wharton,  3  De  G.  M.  & 

G.  677  236 

Rigby  V.  Rigby,  9  Beav.  311  261 

lliu'gs  r.  Joimson  County,  6  Wall.  166  705, 

714,716 
Kike  V.  Flovd,  42  Fed.  R.  247  828,  833 
Rindskopf,7»  /v,  21  Fed.  R   512  515 

V.  Plalto,  29  Fed.  K.  130  499 

Ringgold  V.  Glover,  2  Oanch  C.  C.  427  621 

i\  Lewis,  3  Crancli  C.  C.  367         624 

Ringo  V.  Binns,  10  Pet.  2fi9  131 

Rio  Grande,  The,  19  Wall.  178    717, 1027 
Rio  Grande  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Gomila,  132 

U.  S.  478  14 
Ritcliie  I'.  Avlwin,  15  Ves.  79  280 
Roach  V.  Hillings,  16  Pet.  319  68» 
Rol.b  r.  (\)nnollv,  HI  U.  S.  624  736 
Robl>ins  /•.  Denis,  1  IJhitchf.  238  4'-.5 
V.  Freeland,  14  Int.  Rev.  Rec  28  371 


333 
145 
1044 
168 
845 

178 
804 
521 
1002 
487 
332 
451 
442 
849 
278 
678 

811 
850 
511 
495 

458 
580 


Roberdeau  v.  Rous,  1  Atk.  544      210 
Roberts,  Ex  parte,  6  Pet.  216    703,  704 

,  15  Wall.  384  1045 

,  In  re,  24  Fed.  R.  132  727 

u   Chicago,  St.  P.,  M.  &  O.  Ry. 

Co.,  45  Fed.  R.  433  822 
V.   Cooper,  lU  How.  373       1049 

L-. ,  20  How.  467    1097,  11)98, 

1099 
t:  Graham,  0  Wall.  578  1086 

r.  Harnbv,  3  M.  &  W.  120  698 

c.  Nelson,  8  Blatclif.  74  843 

c.  Reilly,  116  U.  S.  80  736,  753, 

1086 

V.  United  States,  92  U.  S.  41  931 

v.  Williams,  12  East,  33  145 

Robertson  v.    Carson,    19    Wall.   94 ; 
Chase's  Dec.  475     41, 113, 115, 132,  135 

V.  Hill,  6  Fisher's  Pat.  Cas.  465    360 

Robinson,  Ex  parte,  19  Wall.  505  650,  703 

,  6  McL.  3-55  7^15 

V.  Anderson,  121  U.  S.  522  537 

V.  Bags  of  Sugar,  35  Fed.  R.  603  627 

V.  (Campbell,  3  Wheat.  212  6 

V.  Cathcart,  2  Cranch  C.  C.  590  187, 

366,  373 
V.  Hadley,  11  Beav.  614 

c.  Iron  Ry.  Co.,  135  U.  S.  522 

V.  Lorti  Byron,  1  Bro.  C.  C.  588 


442 

174 

4, 

373 

486 


r.  Mandell,  3  Cliff.  169 

('.  Mutual    Ben.    L.    I.    Co.,  16 

Blatcht.  194  772 

r.  Nati(mal  S.  Y.  Co  ,  12  Fed.  R. 

361  ;  20  Blatchf.  513  199 

V.  Norton,  10  Beav.  484  538 

V.  Phiiadelpliia,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.,  28 

Fed.  R.  340  494 

c.  Satterice,  3  Sawy.  134       270,  321, 

0-J2 
V.  Taylor,  42  Fed   R.  803       395,  444 

/•.  Thompson,  2  Ves.  &  B.  118       218 

Robison  v.  Hardv,  38  Fed.  R.  49  827, 

828,  829 
Robson  V.  Dodds,  L.  R.  8  Eq.  .301  343 

Roche  V.  Morgell,  2  Seh.  &  Lef.  72]  226 
liochester  c.  Lee,  1  Macn.  &  G.  467      53.'> 

1-. ,  2  De  G.  M.  &  G.  427        553 

Roddam  v.  Hetiierington,  5  Ves.  91     458, 

460 
Roddin  V.  United  States,  6  Ct.  CI.  308  912 
Rodgers  v.  Rodgers,  1  Paige  (N.  Y'.), 

424  284 

Roemer  ;;.  Bernheim,  132  U.  S.  103      668 

c.  Newman,  19  Fed.  R.  98  234 

V.  Simon,  91  U.  S.  149  1060 

V. ,  95  U.  S.  214  252 

Rogers  r.  Durant,  10(1  U.  S.  644  1097 

V.  Goore,  17  Ves.  i:'.0  271 

V.  Law,  21  How.  526  1099 

r.  Muiiiner,  6  \\\'w\   597  729 

r.  Oxford,  W.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  2 

De  G.  &  J.  662  34.3 

'.•.  Reissner.  31  Fed.  R.  592  287,  295 

V. ,  31  Fed.  R.  270        665 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are   to  pages.] 


Ixxxvii 


Rogers  v.  Ritter,  12  Wall.  317  108G 

V.  United  States,  141  U.  S.  548      773 

v.  Van  North  wick,  45   Fed.  R. 

513  i:J2,  814 
V.    Vosburgh,    4    Joiins.     (Jli. 

(N.  Y.)  84  370,  538,  539 

Rogers  L.  &  M.   Works  v.  Erie  Ry. 

Co.,  20  N.  J.  Eq.  379  373,  374 

Rollins  i:  Chaffee  County,  34  Fed.  R. 

91  55 

Rolston  I'.  Missouri  Fund  Comtn'rs, 

120  U.  S.  390  102 

Roniaine  v.   Union  Ins.  Co.,  28  Fed. 

R.  (i2o  199,  200 

Roman  i\  United  States,  11  Ct.  CI. 

7G1  901 

Romero  v.  United  States,  1  Wall.  721 

955 
Roosevelt  v.  Columbus,  C.  &I.  C.  Ry. 

Co.,U.  S.  C.  C.,N.  D.  111.,  Nov.  15, 

1882  565 

Root  V.  Railway  Co.,  105  U.  S.  189     6,  7, 

17,  18,  114 
Roscius,  Tlie,  1  Brown's  Adm.  442  517 
llnse  V.  Calland,  5  Ves.  186  582 

•  V.  Gannel,  3  Atk.,  439  496 

Woodruff,  4  Johns.  Ch.  (N.  Y.) 


547 
Rosenbach  v.  Dreyf  uss,  1  Fed.  R.  371 

V. ,  2  Fed.  R.  23 

Rosenbaura  c.  Bauer,  120  U.  S.  450 

r.   Council  Bluffs  Ins.    Co.,   37 

Fe<l.  R.  724 
Rosenstein  v.  Burns,  41  Fed.  R.  841 
Ross,  In  re,  140  U.  S.  453 
Duval,  13  Pet.  64 


204 

687, 
689 
687 

705, 
811 

42 

159 

1014 

790 


'■.  Prentiss,  3  How.  771  32,  1028 

i:  ^— ,  4  McL.  106  672 

V.  Triplett,  3  Wheat.  600  984 

c.   Union   Pacific  R.  R.   Co.,  1 

Woolw.  26  341 

Rosse  I'.  Rust,  4  Jolins.  Ch.  (N.  Y.) 

300  545 

Rothschild  V-  United  States,  6  Ct.  CI. 

201  902 

Roundel!  i'.  Currer,  6  Ves.  250  298 

Roundtree  v.  McLain,  Ilempst.  245  344 
Rourke  v.  McLaughlin,  38  Cal.  196  572 
Rowan  v.  Runnels,  5  How.  134  548,  777 
Rowell  u.  Hill,  28  Fed.  R.  433  839 

Rowland,  Ex  parte,  104  U.  S.  604         725, 

727,  736 
Rowlaft  V.  Cattell,  2  Hare,  186  325 

Rowley  u.  Eccles,  1  Sim.  &  S.  511         144, 

214,  224 
Rowth  V.  Howell,  3  Ves.  .565  432 

Roy  /•.  Louisville,  N.  0.  &  T.  R.  Co. 

34  Fed.  R.  276  ,331 

Royal  Exchange  Ins.  Co.  r.  Ward,  1 

Fowler's  E.xch.  Pr.  225  103 

Royall,  E.r  parte.  117  U.  S.  241  718 

,  117  U.  S.  254  748 

,  In  re,  125  U.  S.  696  1098 


Rovle  V.  Wynne,  1  Craig  &  Ph.  252      232 
Ruhber  Co.  u.  Goodyear,  6  Wall.  153  1037 

V. ,  9  Wall.  788  17,  228,  229 

V. ,  9  Wall.  807         192,  290,  291 

294 
Rubel  V.  Beaver  Falls  Cutlery  Co.,  22 

Fed.  R.  282  684 

Rucker  v.  Wheeler,  127  U.  S.  85    774,  775 
Rudge  V.   Hopkins,  2  Eq.  Cas.  Abr. 

170  151 

Ruggles  V.  Bucknor,  1  Paine,  358         617 

V.  Eddy,  11  Blatchf.  524  283 

Rugheimer,  In  re,  36  Fed.  R.  369  799 

— -,  In  re,  36  Fed.  R.  376  799 

RuUo,  In  re,  43  Fed.  R.  62  728 

Rumbly  v.  Stainton,  24  Ala.  712  533 

Rumbold  v.  Forteath,  2  Jur.  n.  s.  686   244 
Rumford  Chemical  Works  v.  Hecker, 

5  Off  Gaz.  644  352 

V. ,  11  ( )ff.  Gaz.  330  391 

V.  Vice,  14  Blatchf.  179         235,  362 

Rumsey  v.  Call,  28  Fed.  R.  769  849 

Rundell  v.  Murray,  Jacob,  311  362 

Runsteller  v.  Atkinson,  23  O.  G.  1025    18 
Russell,  Ex  parte,  13  Wall.  664   932,  1066, 

1067 

V.  Ashley,  Hempst.  546         512,  690 

(.'.  Clark,  7  Cranch,  69  23,  132 

V.  Farley,  105  U.  S.  433    9,  388,  389, 

390 

V.  Kearney,  27  Ga.  96  480 

V.  McLellan,  3  Woodb.  &  M.  157  519 

V.  Post,  U.  S.  C.  C,  S.  D.  N.  Y. 

1891  770 

V.  Sharpe,  1  Jac.  &  W.  482 

v.  Stansell,  105  U.  S.  303 

V.  United  States,  15  Ct.  CI 


92,  108 
1029 
168 
689,  934 
627 
586 
1076 
4 


Russia,  The,  5  Ben.  84 

Ryan  r.  Gould,  32  Fed.  R.  754 

r.  Koch,  17  Wall.  19 

V.  iMackmath,  3  Bro.  C.  C.  15 

Rvckman  v.  Parkins,  5  Paige  (N.  Y.), 

'543  433 

Ryder  v.  Holt,  128  U.  S   .525  1083 

Rye  &  Rock  Case,  82  N.  Y.  630  365 

Rylands  v.  Latouche,  2  Bligh,  566        134, 

276,  308,  662 


s. 


R.  C.  Tryon,  The,  105  U.  S.  267  1068 

Sackett  r.  Smith,  46  Fed.  R.  .39  641 

Sadler  r.  Hoover,  7  How.  646  986,  990 
Sadlier  r.  Fallon.  2  Curt.  579  763 

Sase  V.  Central  R.   R.  Co.,  93  IT.  S. 

412  1047,  1051 
V.  Memphis  &  L.  R.  R.  R.  Co., 

125  U.  S.  .301  396,  .397 

V. .  18  Fed.  R.  571  4-52 

r.  Railroad  Co.,  96  U.  S.  712      1019, 

1043,  1014,  1062 

V.  Tauszkv,  6  Cent.  L.  J.  7   512,514, 

516 
Sablgard  v.  Kennedv,  2  Fed.  R.  295       13 


Ixxxviii 


TABLE  OF  CASES. 


[References 

St.  Clair  v.  Cox,  106  U.  S.  359  ;  1  S.  C. 

I^ep.  354  188,  189,  190,  2:J7,  841 

St.  ciiiir  Co.  V.  Loringston,   18  Wall. 

028  1021 

St.  Helen's  Smelting  Co.  v.  Tipping, 

11  II.  L.  C.  042  800,356 

St.  John  V.  Denison,  9  How.  Pr.  (N. 

Y.)  343  429 

St.  Lawrence,  The,  8  Cranch,  434  1081 
St.  Louis  V.  Knapp  Co.,  104  U.  S.  658  210, 

355,  309 

r.  Myers,  113  U.  S.  566  780 

r.  Kutz,  138  U.  S.  220  780 

St.   Louis,  A.  &  T.  H.  K.  R.  Co.  v. 

Cleveland.  C.  C.  &  L  Ky.  Co.,  125 

U.  S.  658 ;  8  S.  C.  Rep.  1011   4C3,  404, 

410 
St.  Louis,  L  M.  &  S.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Southern  Exp.  Co.,  108  U.  S.  24   669, 
1018,  1020,  1021 

V.  Vickers,  122  U.  S.  360   773,  774, 

775 
St.  Louis,  K.  C.  &  C.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Dewees,  23  Fed.  R.  519         417 

V. ,  23  Fed.  R.  691  326,  .357,  441 

St.  Louis  (Si  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Johnson, 

133  U.  S.  566  148 

V.  McBride,  141  U.  S.  127  200 

V.  Wilson,  114  U.  S.  60  814,  816 

St.  Louis  Type  Foundry  r.  Carter  & 

G.  P.  Co.^31  Fed.  R.524  881 

St.  Louis,  V.  &  T.   H.  Co.  v.  Terre 

Haute  &  L  R.  Co.,  33  Fed.  R.  385     44, 

189 

V. ,  .33  Fed.  R.  440  150 

St.    Luke's    Hospital    r.    Barclay,   3 

Clatchf.  259  5 

St.  Mary  ^Lagdalcn's  College  v.  Sib- 
thorp,'  1  Russ.  154  273,  279 
St.  Paul  Plow  Works  v.  Starling,  127 

U.  S.  ;570  36 

St.  Paul  &  C.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  McLean, 

108  U.  S. 212  839,  844 

St.  Paul's  r.  Kettle,  2  Ves.  &  B.  1  548 
Sahiinaiider  Co.  c.  Haven,  3  Dill.  131  252 
Sale  r.  Sale,  1  Beav.  586  92,  93 

Salkeld  v.  Science,  2  Ves.  Sen.  107      218, 

240 
Salomon  v.  Stalman,  4  Reav.  243  325 

Saltn.arsh  (.-.  Tutiiill,  12  How.  387  1047 
Saltus  ('.  Tobias,  7  Johns.  Cli.  (N.  Y.) 

214  226 

Snlvidge  v.  Hyde,  5  Madd.  1.38  155 

Salway  r.  Salway,  4  Huss.  60  4-32 

r. ,  2  Huss.  &  >L  215  432 

Sampeyreac  v.  United  States,  7  Pet. 

222  073 

Sampson  r.  .Tohnson,  2  Cranch  C.  C. 

107  768 

Samuel,  The,  I  Wheat.  0  512,  1080 

r.  Jones,  2  Hare,  246  043 

San  Antonio  v.  Mehafl'y,  96  U.  S.  312 

10*)0 
San  Antonio  &  A.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  /»  rp, 

44  Fed.  R.  145  814,  815 


are  to  pages.] 

Sanders  v.  King,  6  Madd.  61  247 

Sandford  v.  Sinclair,  8  Paige  (N.  Y  ), 

373  441 

Sandilands  r.  Innes,  3  Sim.  263  95 

Sands  v.  Smith,  1  Dill.  290  833 

San  Jacinto,  The,  30  Fed.  R.  2G6  625 

San  Jose  Indiano,  The,  2  Gall.  311        628 
San  Mateo  Co.  v.  Southern  Pac.  R.  R. 

Co.,  116  U.  S.  138  1066 

Santa  Maria,  The,  10  Wheat.  431      1093, 

1095,  1099 
Sanxter  v.  Foster,  Cr.  &  Ph.  302  356 

Sapphire,  The,  11  Wall.  164  302,  811 

,  18  Wall.  51  1099 

Sarah  &  Caroline,  The,  Blatchf .  Prize 

Cas.  123  875 

Sargant  v.  Read,  L.  R.  1  Ch.  D.  600     442 
Sargent  v.  Larned,  2  Curt.  310  257 

Sargent  Manuf.   Co.  v.   Woodruff,  5 

Biss.  444  360 

SauU  V.  Browne,  L.  R.  10  Ch.  64  851 

Saumarez  v.  Saumarez,  4  M.  &  C.  331 

112,  115,  153 
Saunders,  The,  23  Fed.  R.  303  869 

Saunders  r.  Gould,  4  Pet.  392        978,  985 

V.  Logan,  2  Fisher,  167  570 

V.  Smith,  3  M.  &  Cr.  711  362 

Savacool  r.  Boughton,  5  Wend.  170      729 
Savage,  Petitioner,  134  U.  S.  170  751 

V.  Carroll,  1  Ball  &  B.  548  108, 

462,  548 

V.  Carter,  9  Dana  (Ky.),  409         291 

Savannah  Nat.  Bank  i\  Haskins,  101 

Mass.  370  3 

Savin,  Petitioner,  131  U.  S.  267    651, 654. 

655,  727 
Sawin  v.  Kenny,  93  U.  S.  289  775,  787 
Sawyer,  In  re,  124  U.  S.  200     24,  351,  725, 

727 

r.  Gill,  3  Woodb.  &  M.  97  192 

r.  Kellogg,  9  Fed.  R.  601  582 

r.  Uakman,  11  Blatchf.  65  804 

Saxby  v.  Easterbrook,  L.  R.  3  C.  P. 

1)   339  371 

Sayle  v.  Graham,  5  Sim.  8  317 

Savlcs  V.  Dubuque  &  S.  C.  Rv.  Co., 

OFed.  R.  516  '  12 

r.  Erie  By.  Co.,  2  N.  J.  L.  J.  212  271 

r.  Lake  Snore  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co., 

9  Fed.  R.  515  12 
V.  Northwestern  Ins.  Co.,  2  Curt. 

212  199,  200,  842 
V.  Oregon    Central   Rv.    Co.,   6 

Sawy.  31  "  12 

Saylors  v.  Saylors,  3  lleisk.  (Tenn.) 

525  333 

Scaldewell   v.  Stormesworth,   1   Cal. 

Ch.  5  183 

Scarborough  f.  Pargoud,  108  U.  S. 

5(57  1038 

Scatterwood  v.  Edge,  1  Salk.  229  854 

Schandler  Bottling  Co.  v.  Welch,  42 

Fed.  R.  561  24,  351 

r. ,  45  Fed.  R.  283  351 

Scharff  v.  Levy,  112  U.  S.  711  83 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  pages.] 


Ixxxix 


909 
G35 

586 


Sclieile  r.  Brakell,  11  TV.  R.  706  341,  366 
Schell  V.  Cocliran,  1U7  U.  S.  6'2.j  798 

V.  ])()(lye,  1U7  U.  S.  629  1U92 

Scliell's   Exrs.  v.  Touclie,  138  U.  S. 

562  619 

Sclierraehorn  v.  L'Espenasse,  2  Dall. 

360  353,  375,  379,  382,  387 

Sclilesinger   v.  United    States,  1    Ct. 

CI.  16 
Schloss  V.  Hewlett,  81  Ala.  266 
Suhmieder  v.  Barnev,  19  Blatchf.  143 ; 

7  Fed.  R.  451 
Sclinadig  v.  Flesclier,  29  Fed  R.  465  833 
Schneider  t>.  Lizardi,  9  Beav.  461  388 

Solioerken  v.   Swift  &  C.   &  B.  Co., 

7  Fed.  R.  469  474 

Scliollenberger,  Ex  parte,  96    U.   S. 

369  189,  702,  713 

School  District  v.  Insurance  Co.,  101 

U.  S.  472  1073 

School    District   of   Ackley  v.  Hall, 

106  U.  S.  428  10.59,  1062,  1068 

Schreiber  i\   Siiarpless,    17    Fed.   R. 

589  12 

V. ,  110  U.  S.  76  770 

Schreiner  v.  United  States,  6  Ct.  CI. 

359  909 

Schuchardt  v.  Babbidge,  19  How.  239  865 
Schulenburg,  Ex  parte,  25  Fed.  R.  211  197 
Schwab,  Ex  parte,  98  U.  S.  240  703,  704 
Schwabacker  v.  Reilly,  2  Dill.  127       490, 

690 
Schwanzel  v.  Holenshade,  3  Fisher's 


Pat.  Cas.  196 
Schwarz,  In  re,  14  Fed.  R.  787      347, 


570 
352, 
387 
1029 
779 
860 
871 


Schwed  V.  Smith,  106  U.  S.  188 
Scipio  V.  Writrht,  101  U.  S.  665 
Scobel  i;.  Giles,  19  Fed.  R  224 
Scotland,  The,  105  U.  S.  24 
Scotland   County  v.   Hill,  112  U. 

183 
Scotson  V.  Gaury,  1  Hare,  99 
Scott  V.  Beclier,  4  Price,  34G 

r.  Dunbar,  1  Moil.  442 

v.  Neely,  140  U.  S.  106 

V.  Platel,  2  Phill.  229 

r.  Texas  L.  &  C.  Co.,  41  Fed.  R. 

225  45,  805 

V.  United  States,  18  Ct.  CI.  1         902 

Scottish  Anier.  .Mortgai^e  Co.  i^  Fol- 

lansbee,  14  Fed.  R.  125  4 

Scratch nier  v.  Foulkard,  1  Eq.  Cas. 

Abr.  125 
Sea  Ins.    Co.   v.    Stebbins,   8  Paige 

(N.  y.),  565 
Seaman,  lie,  Shelf,  on  Lun.  146 
Searl  v.   School  District,  124  U.  S. 

197  808,  810 

Searles  v.  Jacksonville,  P.  &  M.  R.  R. 

Co.,  2  Woods,  621        3.33,  337,  378,  442 
Searls  v.  Worden,  13  Fed.  R.  716        654, 

655 
Seat  V.    United    States,   18    Ct.    CI. 

458  898 


785 
381 
341,  395 
581 
10,  11 
444 


332 


484 
396 


Seaver  v.  Bigelows,  5  Wall.  208  1029 

Seavey  v.  Seymour,  3  Cliff.  439     749,  752 
Secombe,  Ex  parte,  19  How.  9  703 

V.  Campbell,  18  Blatchf.  108         238 

Secor  V.  Singleton,  9  Fed.  R.  809 ;  3 

McCra.  230  221,  222,  244 

V. ,  41  Fed.  R.  725         311,314, 

315,  318 
V.  Toledo,  P.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  7 

Biss.  513  431 

Secretary    v.    McGarrahan,   9   Wall. 

298  716 

Secretary  of  Treasury,  In  re,  45  Fed. 

R.  396  799,  801 

Seddon  V.  Virginia  T.  &  C.  S.  R.  Co., 

36  Fed.  R.  6  813 

Sedgwick     v.     Cleveland,     7    Paige 

(N.  Y.),  290  318 

V.  Place,  3  N.  B.  R.  35  395 

Segee  i-.  Thomas,  8  Blatchf.  11     175,  192, 

199,  200 
Seibert,  C  O.  C.  Co.  v.  Manning,  32 

Fed.  R.  625  36 

Seitz  r.  Mitchell,  94  U.  S.  580       257,  463 
Sellers  r.  Corwin,  5  Ohio,  .398  7«8 

V.  Dawson,  2  Dick.  738  538 

Sellon  V.  Lewen,  3  P.  Wms.  239  264 

Selma  &   M.    R.    Co.    v.    Louisiana 

Nat.  Bank,  94  U.  S.  2-53  1069 

Semmes  v.  United  States,  91   U.  S. 

21  1017 

Senhouse  i'.  Earl,  2  Ves.  Sen.  450         574 
Seraphis,  The,  37  Fed.  R.  436  861 

Sere  v.  Pitot,  0  Cranch,  332       55,  56,  461 
Serensen  v.  Is'orthern  Pac.  R.  R.  Co., 

45  Fed.  R.  407  780 

Sergeant  v.  Biddle,  4  Wheat.  508  523 

Serle  v.  St.  Floy,  2  P.  Wms.  386  273 

Serrano   v.    United    States,  5    Wall. 

451  940,  941 

Sessions  v.  Johnson,  95  U.  S.  347  787 

V.  Romadka,  21  Fed.  R.  124 

Seventh   Nat.  Bank   v.   Shenandoah 

Iron  Co.,  35  Fed.  R.  436 
Se.xton  V.  Seelye,  39  Fed.  R.  705 
Seybert  v.  Pittsburg,  1  Wall.  272 
Seymour  v.  Freer,  5  Wall.  822 


573 

414 

814 

778 

1046 

8  Wall.  202  131, 138 

V.  Hazard,  1  Johns.  Ch.  (N.  Y.) 

1  455,  4.56 

r.  Phillips  &  C.  Constr.  Co.,  7 

Biss.  460  42 

Shaft   (.-.  Phoenix  Mut.  L.  I.  Co.,  67 

N.  Y.  544  .321 

Shaftoe  r.  Sliaftoe,  7  Ves.  171  4-56 

Shainwald  i-.  Lewis,  6  Fed.  R.  766       148, 

376,  377,  397,  759 

V. ,  8  Fed.  R.  878     4-33,  443, 444 

V. ,  108  U.  S.  1.58  814 

Shales  v.  Barrington,  1  P.  Wms.  481  582 
Shampeau  r.  Comiecticiit  River  Lum- 
ber Co..  37  Fed.  R.  771  687 
Shankwiker  ;•.  Reading,  4  McL.  240  517 
Sharon  v.  Hill,  20  Fed.  R.  1  15 
V. ,  22  Fed.  R.  28    232,  244,  248 


xc 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  pages.] 


Sliaron  v.  Hill,  23  Fed.  K.  353  144 

V. ,  24  Fed.  K.  720  051 

V.  Terry,  3G  Fed.  K.  837    14,  34,  213, 

3U5,  300,  307,  347,  820 
Sharp  V.  Asliton,  3  Ves.  &  15.  144  388 

V.  Carter,  3  P.  Wins.  375  660 

V.  Keissiier,  20  Biatclif.  10  244 

Shaver  v.  Hardin,  30  Fed.  H.  801  816 
Shaw  V.  Bill,  95  U.  S.  10  314,  315 

r.  Coster,  8  I'aige  (N.  Y.),  339      178 

r.  Railroad  Co.,^100  U.  S.  605,      118, 

426 

. ,  101  U.  S.  657  1060 

c.  Rhodes,  2  Russ.  539  433 

l:  United  States,  9  Ct.  CI.  301       912 

Shaw  Stocking  Co.  v.  Mack,  12  Fed. 

R.  707  345,  364 

Shedd  V.  Fuller,  36  Fed.  R.  009  822,  823 
Sheffield  v.  Duchess  of  Buckingham, 

1  West,  682  573,  574 

Sheffield  Canal  Co.  v.  Sheffield  &  R. 

Ry.  Co.,  1  Phill.  484  070 

Sheffield  Water  Works  v.  Yeonians, 

L.  R.  2  Ch.  8  122,  345 

Shell ty  i:  Bacon,  10  How.  56  977 

V.  Guy,  11  Wheat.  361  777 

Siieldon    V.    Fortescue    Aland,   3   P. 

Wnis.  104  679 

r.  Gill,  8  How.  441  55 

V.  Keokuk  N.  L.  Packet  Co.,  8 

Fed. R.  769  160,  209 

Shtldrick    v.  Cockcroft,   27   Fed.    R. 

579  821 

Shelton  v.  Piatt,  139  U.  S.  591    '  20 

V.  Pepper,  133  U.  S.  626      579,  1046 

r.  Tiffin,  6  How.  163  39,  40 

V.  Vankleeck,  106  U.  S.  532  677 

Siiejiherd  v.  C(>inuiis.>iioners  of  Ross 

Count V,  7  Ohio,  271  661 

Shephard,  In  /^  3  Fed.  R.  12  465,490,  769 

r.  Morris,  4  Beav.  252  149 

Sheppard  v.  Akers,  1  Tenn.  Ch.  326  2(J5 
Sheriff  v.  Sparks,  West,  130  574 
Shernuin,  In  re,  124  U.  S.  304  702 
r.   Champlain    Tr.   Co.,  31    Vt. 

162  474 

V.  Nutt,  35  Fed.  R.  149  369 

Sherwood  v.  Ray,  1  Curt.  Fee  173  699 
Sheward    v.   Sheward,  2    Ves.   &   B. 

116  497 

Shickle  v.  South  St.  Louis  Foundry 

Co.,  22  Fed.  R.  105  158,165 

Shields  v.  Barrow,  17  How.  130      23,  124, 

125,  130,  149,  150,  172,277,292,  333 

/•.  McCluiig,0  W.  Va.  79  385 

r.  Thomas,  17  How.  3  34,  1029 

V. ,  18  How.  253  16, 152, 

153,  200 
Shiphrooke  (Lord)  >•.  Lord  Hinchin- 

brook,  13  Ves.  387  330 

Shirley  r.  Karl  Ferrers,  3  P.  Wms. 


Short  V.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co., 

33  Fed.  R.  114        44,  189,  827,  828,  832 

V. ,  34  Fed.  R.  225  827,  832 

Shreveport  v.  Holmes,  125  U.  S.  694  1079 
Shrewsbury   r.  United  States,  9  Ct. 

CI.  263  911,  934 

Shutte  V.  Thompson,  15  Wall.  151       511, 
514,  516,  518 
Shuttleworth    v.  La3'cock,   1    Vern. 

245  213 

Sibbald    v.    United    States,   12  Pet. 

488  1079,1094,1097 

Sichel  V.  Kaphael,  4  L.  T.  n.  s.  114       460 
Sickels  V.  Borden,  4  Blatchf.  14  384 

V.  Mitchell,  3  Blatchf.  548  370 

Sickles  V.  Gloucester  Co.,  3  W^all.  Jr. 

186 
Sidnev  v.  Perry,  2  Dick.  602 
Sieboid,  Ex  parte,  100  U.  S.  371   725, 


506 
243 
726, 
729 
686 
904 


Shoecraft  )•.  Blnxham,  121  U.  S.  730 
Shoemaker  *-.  National  Mech.  Bank, 
1  Hughes,  101 


496 
55 

386 


1-. ,  1  Biatclif.  445 

Sierra  v.  United  States,  9  Ct.  CI.  224 
Sieveking   r.    Behrens,  2    M.  &   Cr. 

581  180 

Sifford's  Case,  5  Am.  L.  Reg.  659  649 
Sigel  r.  Phelps,  7  Sim.  239  92 

Silliman  v.  Hudson  River  Bridge  Co., 

1  Black,  582  988 

Silsby  V.  Foote,  14  How.  218         686,  774, 

775,  1090 

V. ,  20  How.  290  1038 

Silver  v.  Bishop  of  Norwich,  3  Swanst. 

112  414 

v.  Ladd,  6  \VaII.  440  1048 

Silverhill  v.  United  States,  5  Ct.  CI. 

610  908 

Silvey  v.  United  States,  7  Ct.  CI.  305  931 
Simmons,  In  re,  45  Fed.  R.  241  748 

i:  Saul,  138  U.  S.  429  24 

Simms  V.  Guthrie,  9  Cranch,  19  126, 128 
Simons,  E.r  parte,  32  P^ed.  R.  681  633 

V.  United  States,  19  Ct.  CI.  601     899 

Simonson  r.  Jordan,  30  Fed.  R.  721  823 
Simpson,  E.r  jxtrte,  15  Ves.  476  147 
Siiujison  V.  Brooks,  3  Blatchf.  456  587 
V.  Fogo,  1  J.  &  H.  18 ;   6  Jur. 

N.  s.  949  209 

V.  Sadd,  10  C.  B.  26  639 

Sims  (■.  Hundley,  6  How.  1    487,  766,  1090 

r   Schult,  40  Fed.  R.  143         637,  638 

Sinclair  v.  James,  1  Dick.  277  268 

Singer  Co.  v.  Union  Co.,  1   Holmes, 

253  367 

Siniier  Manuf.    Co.    v.   Wright,    141 

U.  S.  696  lOGO 

Sin^'leton    r.    Singleton,   8   B.    Mon. 

(Kv.)340  678 

r.  Touchard,  1  Black,  342      952,  959 

Sioux  City  &  I).  M    R.  R.  Co   r.  Chi- 
cago M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  27  Fed. 

R.  770  37 

Sioux  City  &  St.   P.    R.   R.   Co.  v. 

United  States,  30  Fed.  R.  610  711 

Sire  ;;.  EUithorpe  A.  B.  Co.,  137  U.  S. 

679  1093 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References   are   to  pages.] 


XCl 


Siren,  The.  7  Wall.  152  95,  9(3,  102 

.sir  William  Peel,  The,  5  Wall.  ol7  874 
S  zlm-  /•.  Many.  IG  How.  98  1098,  10'J9 

SkL-ffiniiton  i\  ,  4  Ves.  6Q        18(3,  280 

I^kerrett's  Minors,  2  Uogan,  192  3o4 

!Skiii>lv  r.  Atlantic,  i\I.  &  O.  K.  II.  Co., 

8  Hughes,  320  33.3,  405,  40(3,  425 

Skillern's    Exrs.   v.   May's   Exrs.,   (3 

Cranch,  267  977,  1095 

Skip  V.  Harwoo.l,  3  Atk.  564  (353 

Skriiie  v.  Powell,  15  Sim.  81  ;  9  Jur. 

1054  497 

Slack  V.  Walcott,  3  Mason,  508  307,  308 
Slacum  I'.  Pomery,  0  Crancli,  221  1087 
Slaughter-House  Cases,  10  Wall.  273  347, 
511,  1050,  1052 
Slavers,  The,  2  Wall.  383  1078 

Slessinger  c.  Buckingham,  17  Fed.  R. 

454  257,  3G9 

Slidell  V.  Grandjean,  111  U.  S.  412  941 
Sliiigsby  V.  Hale,  1  Ch.  Cas.  122  G70 

Sloane  v.  Anderson,  117  U.  S.  275       813, 

814,81(5 
Sloo  c.  Law,  3  Blatchf.  450  341 

Smale  v.  ilitchell,  143  U.  S.  99  109(3 

Small  v.  Attwood,  1  Younge,  407  121 

I'.  Montgomery,  17  Fed.  K.  865    199; 

842 
('.  Northern  Pacific  R.  R.  Co., 

134  U.  S.  514  •  1058 

Smart  v.  Flood,  49  L.  T.  n.  s.  467  446 
Smelting  Co.  v.  Kemp,  108  U.  S.  666  1073 
Smitii,  Ex  parte,  1  Atk.  139  484 

c.  Adams,  130  U.  S.  167       970,  1021 

i;.  Babcock,  3  Sumner,  583  267, 

282,  283 

r.  Black,  115  U.  S.  308  566 

i:  Bryon,  3  Madd.  428  217 

V.  Burnham,  2  Sumii.  612      149,  463 

r.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ky.  Co.,  38 

Fed.  R.  321  638 

*;.  Clarke,  2  Dick.  455  380 

r.  Coleman,  2  Cranch  C.  C.  237     515 

V.  Craft,  123  U.  S.  486    976,  981,  991 

c.  Crosby  Lumber  Co.,  46  Fed. 

R.  819  828,  831 
r.   Cummings,    1    Fisher's    Pat. 

Cas.  152  360,-382 

r.  Dav,  L.  R.  13  Ch.  D.  651  392 

c.  ,  L.  R.  21  Ch.  D.  421  390 

r.  Earl  Brownlow,  L.  R.  9  Eq. 

241  122,  154 

V.  East  India  Co.,  1  Phill.  50         215 

r.  Elv,  15  How.  137  992 

r.  Ga'le,  137  U.  S.  577  1087 

i:  Green,  37  Fed.  R.  424  112 

c.  Greenhow,  109  U.  S.  669  33 

V.  Jackson,  1  Paine,  453  704 

r.  Johnson.  4  Blatchf.  252  363 

r.  Kernochen,  7  How.  198        55,  777 

>:  Lvon,  138  U.  S.  315  46,  813 

i:  Marshall,  2  Atk.  70  187 

i:  McCullough,  104  U.  S.  25         418. 

419,  422,  425,  42(5 


V.  Potter,  3  Wis.  432 


461 


19 


36 
121 


Smith  V.  Railroad  Co.,  99  U.  S.  398    9,  24 

V.  Redden,  5  llarr.  (Del.),  321       4»1 

1-.  St.  Louis   Mut.   L.   I.  Co.,  2 

Tenn.  Ch.  599  258 

V.  Schwed,  6  Fed.  R.  455       351,  381 

V.  Searle,  14  Ves.  415  263 

r.  Skogit  Co.  Comm'rs,  45  Fed. 

R.  725 

V.  Smith,  L.  R.  20  Eq.  500 

V.  Standard  L.  M.  Co.,  19  Fed.  R. 

825 

Swormstedt,  16  How.  288 

(;.  The  Wm.  L.  Norman,  49  Fed. 

R.  285  854 

>\  Trabue,  9  Pet.  4  1022 

f.  United  States,  5  Pet.  291    466,  469 

V. ,  94  U.  S.  97  1079 

r. ,  19  Ct.  CI.  690  915 

V.  Vaughan,  10  Pet.  366  985 

V.  Ridg.  t.  Hardw.  251  451 

c.  Whitney,  116  U.  S.  167    692,  693, 

700,  701,  869,  1028 

l:  Woolfolk,  115  U.  S.  143     277,  287, 

330 
Smith  M.  P.  Co.  v.  I\[cGroarty,  186 

U.  S.  237  780,  1029 

Smvth  V.  Craig,  3  Watts  &  S.  14  774 

V.  Strader,  12  How.  327  1040 

Snavely  c.  HarkraJer,  29  Gratt.  (Va.) 

112  160 

Snead  v.  McCoull,  12  How.  407  276,  2«4 
Snell  V.  Hyat,  1  Dick.  287  109 

V.  Insurance  Co.,  98  U.  S.  85  3 

Snow,  In  re,  120  U.  S.  274  726 

y.  United  States,  118  U.  S.  346    807, 

967,  970 
Snyder  v.  Fiedler,  139  U.  S.  478  486 

r.  Marks,  109  U.  S.  189  20 

V.  Sickles,  98  U.  S.  203  953 

('.  Wise,  10  Pa.  St.  157  480,  481 

Socie'te'  Anonyme,  &c.  v.  Western  Dis- 
tilling Co.,  42  Fed.  R.  96 
Socie'te  Fonciere,  &c.  v.  Milliken,  135 

U.  S.  304 
Socola  V.  Grant,  15  Fed.  R.  487 
Soden  v.  Soden,  13  Ves.  118 
Sohier  r.  Williams.  1  Curt.  479 
Somerset  (Duke  of)  v.  Cookson,  3  P. 

Wms.  389;  1  Lea.  Cas.  in  Eq.  821 

3(37,  373 
Sommerville    v.    French,    1    Cranch 

C.  C.  474  656,  657 

Somerville's    Exrs.    v.    Hamilton,    4 

Wheat.  230  978 

Sonstiby  r.  Keeley,  7  Fed.  R.  447  543 
Soulard  v.  United  States,  4  Pet.  511  987 
Soule  V.  Chase,  1  Rob.  (N.  Y.)  222        484 

V.  Corning.  11  Paige  (N.  Y.).  412    588 

V.  United  States.  100  U.  S.  8         470 

Southard  v.  Bradv.  36  Fed.  R.  560        8-59 

i:  Russell,  1(3  How.  547  671,673 

Southern   Express   Co.    r.   St.   Louis, 

I.  M.  &  S.  liv.  Co.,  10  Fed.  R. 

210         '         378,  .893.  572 
V.  ,  10  Fed.  R.  869    373,  393 


652 

687 
150 
171 
116 

28. 


xcu 


Southern  Pacific  R.  U.  Co.  v.  Califor- 
nia, 118  U.  S.  109  35,  819 

V.  Wijrjrs,  44  Fed.  K.  333        _      ^  15 

Southey  v.  Sherwood,  2  Meriv.  435      341, 

364 
South  Ottawa  v.  Perkins,  94  U.  S. 

•JbO  5-42,  778,  779 

Southwestern  Brush  E.  L.  &  P.  Co. 
c.  Louisiana  E.  L.  Co.,  45  Fed.  R. 
893  359,  383 

Southworih  r.  Howard,  11  Rep.  46       811 

V.  Keid,  3(5  Fed.  li.  451  814,  827, 

849 
Sowles,  In  re,  41  Fed.  R.  752  652 

V.  First  Nat.  Bank,  46  Fed.  R. 

513  36 

V.  Witters,  43  Fed.  R.  700       8(3, 819, 

823,  824 

r. ,  46  Fed.  R.  497  649 

Si):ieth  v.  Barney,  22  Fed.  R.  828  164 

Si)aii'ord  i:  Goodell,  3  McL.  97  658 

Spain  (King  of)  v.  Macliado,  4  Russ. 

225 
Spalding  v.  Keely,  7  Sim.  377 

r.  Manasse,  131  U.  S.  65 

V.  People,  2  How.  66 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  pages.] 
Stacy 


138 

381 

771 

1047 


Spanish    Consul,  Matter  of,  1    Ben. 

225  531 

Spangier  !-•.  Atcheson,  T.  &  S.  F.  R. 

Co.,  42  Fed.  Rep.  305  816,  823 

Si)arliawk  v.  Union  Pac.  R.  R.  Co., 

54  Pa.  St.  401  369 

Spark  ('I'lie)  v.  Lee   Cliio  Chum,   1 

Sawy.  713  1013 

Sparkman  v.  Higgins,  1  ^?latchf.  205  387 
Si)aulding  v.  Tucker,  2  Sawy.  50         585, 

G40,  641 
Spearing  i^.  Lvnn,  2  Vern.  376  664 

Spccht,  c  Howard,  16  Wall.  564  778 

Spiegle  V.  ^Mereilith,  4  Biss.  120  21 

Spencer  v  Lapsley,  20  How.  264  1090 
Siierry   v.  Erie   Rv.  Co.,  6    Blatchf. 

425  '  229, 251 

Spicer  v.  United  States,  5  Ct.  CI.  :!4  934 
Spies  V.  Illinois,  123  U.  S.  131      339,  997, 

1000,  1002 
Spill  V.  Celluloid  Manuf.  Co., 28  Fed. 

R.  870  587,  639 

Si)ink  V.  Francis,  19  Fed.  R.  670  351 

r. ,  20  Fed.  R.  5(;7  351 

Spooner  r.  McConnell,  1  McL.  337        19, 

355,  369 
Spottiswoode  r.  Clarke,  2  Piiill.  154  .363 
Spratt  i:  Binkes,  5  Ves.  587  116 

Sprague  v.  Jones,  9  Paige  (N.  Y.), 

395  665 

Spring  r.  South  Carolina  Ins.  Co.,  6 

Wiieat.  519  1051 

,;. ,  8  Wheat.  268  179 

Spring  Co.  v.  Knowlton,  103  V.  S.  49  844 
Springer  v.  United  States,  102  U.  S. 

586  "1086 

Sqiiair  r.  Lookout  Mt.  Co.,  42  Fed. 

R.  729  162 

Stace  V.  Mabbot,  2  Ves.  Sen.  552         552 


Farnham,  2  How.  Pr.  (N.Y.) 

26  483 

Stafford  r.  Brown,  4  Paige  (N.  Y.), 

360  337,  483,  655 

V.  Bryan,  2  Paige  (X.  Y.),  45        674 

V.  Howlett,  1  Paige  (N.  Y.),  200    316 

V.  Union  Bank,  16  How.  135        703, 

1050 

V. ,  17  How.  275  1050,  1052 

Staines  v.  Morris,  1  Ves.  &  B.  8  580 

Stallings  c.  Goodloe,  3  Murph.  (N.  C.) 

159  674 

Stanbrough  v.  Cook,  38  Fed.  R.  369    806, 
814,  816,  817 
Standard   Oil   Co.  v.   Southern  Pac. 

R.  R.  Co.,  42  Fed.  R.  295 
Standen  v.  Edwards,  1  Ves.  Jr.  133 
Stanley   v.   Robinson,  1   Russ.  &  M. 

527 

V.  Sullivan,  71  Wis.  585 

Stanton  v.  Alabama  &  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  2 

Woods,  506  395,  425,  426,  562 


224 
552 


251 
660 


31  Fed.  R.  585 

Embrey,  93  U.  S.  548 
United  States,  4  Ct.  CI 


419,  425, 
426,  427 
232 
456  908, 
912 

V. ,  37  Fed.  R.  252  594,  595 

Stapilton  v.  Stapilton,  1  Atk.  2  172 

Stapleton  i'.  Foreign  Vineyard  Assoc, 

12  W.  R.  976  341 

Stapylton  v.  Scott,  13  Ves.  425  174,  288 
Starin  v.  New  York,  115  U.  S.  248         35, 

816,819 
Starr  v.  Stark,  1  Sawy.  270  237 

Starten  v.  Bartholomew,  6  Beav.  143  92 
State  (,'.  Barstow.  4  Wis.  567  756 

1-.  Buller,  47  Fed.  R.  415  237 

V.  Chandler,  2  Ilarr.  (Del.)  553    732 

V.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co., 

27  Fed.  R.  497  807 
r.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co., 

33  Fed.  R.  391  819 

V.  Chue  Fan,  42  Fed.  R.  865  807 

V.  Coosaw  Min.  Co.,  45  Fed.  R. 

804  822,  823,  843 

V.  Davis,  100  U.  S.  257  979 

V.  Day  L.  &  C.  Co.,  41  Fed.  R. 

228  807 
V.  Delaware  &  A.  Tel.  &  P.  Co., 

47Fed.  R.  6.33  705,811 

V.  (ileason,  14  Fla.  109  755 

V.  Illinois  Cent.    R.  R.   Co.,  33 

Fed.  R.  721  758,811 

r.  Kirkpatrick.  42  Fed.  R.  689      836 

V.  Kupfurle,  44  Mo.  154  755 

V.  Lorry,  7  Haxt.  95  733 

r.  Weed,  21  N.  H.  262  729 

State  Bank  v.  St.  Louis   R.  F.  Co., 

122  U    S    21  991 

f.  State,  1  Blackf.  (Ind.)  272         755 

State  Railroad  Tax  Cases,  92  U   S. 

575  20,  174,  175,  389,778 

State  Savings  Assoc,  v.  Howard,  31 

Fed.  R.  433  40 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


XClll 


[References 

Stead's   Exrs.   v.  Course,  4  Cranch, 

403  244,  248,  249 

SteHiii  Gaujie  &  L.  Co.  v.  McUoberts, 

2(5  Fed.  H.  705  146,  1G2 

Steamship  Co.  o.  Tugmaii,  106  U.  S. 

118  38,144,818 

Stearns  r.  Pa^v,  1  Story,  204         23(3,  24() 

V.  United  States,  6  Wall.  589         938 

Stebbiiis  v.  Duncan,  108  U.  S.  32  515 

V.  St.  Anne,  11(3  U.  S.  886  151 

Steel  V.  Katliburn,  42  Fed.  K.  390  54 

V.  Smelting  Co.,  10(5  U.  S.  447        24 

Steever  y.  Rickman,  109  U.  S.  74  597,  Oil 
Stegner  v.  Blake,  30  Fed.  R.  183  5U9,  510 
Steiger  v.  Bonn,  4  Fed.  R.  17  197,  491 
V.  Heidelberger,  4  Fed.  R.  455  ; 

18  Blatclif.  420  232 

Stein  V.  Bowman,  13  Pet.  209  475,  511 
Steinbach  r.  Stewart,  11  Wall.  5(56  958 
Steines  v.  Franklin  County,  14  Wall. 

15  668 

Steplien  v.  Beall,  22  Wall.  329  128 

v.  ('iiii,  4  Ves.  359  193 

Stephen  Morgan,  Tiie,  94  U.  S.  599  1079 
Stephens  r.  Bernavs,  42  Fed.  R.  488     486 

V. ,  44  Fed.  R.  042         32,  30,  57 

V.  Monongahela  Bank,  111  U.  S. 

197  964 

V.  Overstolz,  43  Fed.  R.  771  9 

V.  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  47 

Fed.  It.  530  840,  850 

Stephenson  v.  Wilson,  2  Vern.  325  3 

Stevens    v.    Cooper,    1    Johns.    Ch. 

(N.  Y.)425  463,494 

V.  Davison,  18  Gratt.  (Va.)  819  415, 

416 

V.  Fuller,  136  U.  S.  468  655,  727 

V.  Guppy,  Turn.  &  R.  178  079 

V.  Niciiols,  130  U.  S.  230  818 

(;.  Railroads,  4  Fed.  R.  97      532,  533 

v.  Richardson,  20   Blatchf.   53 ; 

9  Fed.  R.  191  821 

i\  Sharp,  6  Saw  v.  993  12 

v.  Westwood,  25  Ala.  716  406 

Stevenson   v.  Anderson,  2   Ves.  &  B. 

407  180.  182,  192 

V.  Barbour,  140  U.  S.  48     1070,  1077 

i:  Magowan,  31  Fed.  R  824  253 

Stewart  r.  Chesapeake   &   O.    Canal 

Co.,  1  Fed.  R.  361  126,  171 

u. ,  5  Fed.  R.  149  546,  643 

V.  Drasl.a,  4  McL.  5(53    171,  175,  215 

i'.  Dunham,  115  U.  S.  61         41,  119, 

333,  843,  1029 

V.  Graham,  19  Ves.  313  456 

V.  Gray,  llempst.  94  479 

(K  Ingle,  9  Wiieat.  526  718 

V.  Justices  of  St.  Clair  Co.  Court, 

47  Fed.  R.  482  684,  089,  714 

V.  Salmon,  97  U.  S.  861       1099 

V.  The  Sun,  36  Fed.  R.  307     645 

c.  Townsend,  41  Fed.  \i.  121        512, 

516,  .517,  518 
r.  Wyoming  C.  R.  Co.,  128  U.  S. 

383  786 


729 

371 

522 

942 

8 

473 


are  to  pages.] 

Stillwell  &  B.  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Phelps, 

130  U.  S.  520  776 

Stimpson  r.  Brooks,  3  Blatchf.  456       587 

V.  Rogers,  4  Blatchf.  333  113 

('.  Westchester  R.  R.  Co.,  3  How. 

553  718 

Stirrat   v.  Excelsior  Manuf.  Co.,  44 

Fed.  R.  142  102, 211 

Stitt  V.   Huidekopers,  17  Wall.   384 

1059 
Stockdale  v.  Onwhyn,  5  Barn.  &  C. 

173  364 

Stocksdale  v.  United  States,  39  Fed. 

R.  62  632 

Stockton  V.  Bishop,  2  How.  74  1052 

Stockton  Laundry  Case,  26  Fed.  R. 

611 
Stockton  &  H.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Leeds  &  T. 

Ry.  Co.,  2  Fhill.  666 
Stockwell  V.  United  States,  3  Cliff. 

284 
Stoddard  v.  Ciianibers,  2  How.  284 
Stone  0.  Chisolm,  113  U.  S.  302 

V.  Palmer,  28  :Mo.  539 

V.  South  Carolina,  117  U.  S.  430  814, 

822,  850 

V.  Wishart,  2  Madd.  64  443,  444 

Stoiiehouse   v.  Starishaw,  Chan.  Cal. 

xxix  3 

Stonemetz  P.  M.  Co.  v.  Brown  F.  M. 

Co.,  40  Fed.  R.  72  163,  165,  211 

Stoner  v.  Ellis,  0  Ind.  152  473 

Stonington,  The,  25  Fed.  R.  621  869 

Storms   V.   Kansas   Pac.   Ry.  Co.,   5 

Dill.  486  224,  250 

Story,  Ex  parte,  12  Pet.  339         298,  1096 

V.  Derby,  4  McL.  100  363 

V.  Holcombe,  4  McL  306  304 

V.  Jersey  City  &  B.  P.  P.  R.  Co., 

16  N.  J.  Eq.  13  371 
V.  Livingston,  13  Pet.  359     138,  501, 

5(52,  1097 
Stovall  V.  Banks,  10  Wall  583  509,  1019 
Strachan  v.  District  of  Columbia,  20 

Ct.  CI.  484  899 

Strafer  i^.  Carr,  6  Fed.  R.  466  586 

Strange  v.  Collins.  2  Ves.  &  B.  163       284 
Stranger,  The,  1  Brown's  Adm.  281 
Strasburger  v.  Beecher,  44  Fed.  R 

209 
Strauss  v.  Meyer,  22  Fed.  U.  467 

642,  645 
Strawberry  Hill  r.  Chicago,  M.  &  Sts. 

Ry.  Co.,  41  Fed.  R.  5(58  215 

Streat  r.  Steinam,  38  Fed.  R.  548         504 
Street  i:  Ferry,  119  U.  S.  38o  1029 

V.  Street;  1  Turn.  &  R.  322 

Striblev  v.  Hawkie,  3  Atk.  275 
Stringfellow  v.  Cain,  99  U.  S.  010 
Strode  v.  Stafford  Justices,  1   Brock. 

162  1039 

Strong  V.  United  States,  34  Fed.  R. 

17  61(5,  617,  618,  619,  620 

;;. ,  40  Fed.  R.  183  100,  969 

V.  Willey,  104  U.  S.  512       229 


487 

804 

587. 


456 

4 

965 


XCIV 


TABLE    OF   CASES, 


[References 

Strothcr  c.  Hutcliinson,4  Bing.  N.  C. 

80;  5  Scott,  :J40  ;  G  Dowl.  288  775 

Siuait  f.  liuulwaie,  loo  U.S.  78   448,449, 

042,  645 

f.  Gay,  127  U.  S.  518  5tj(i,  507 

r.  Lairil,  1  Crancli,  200  804 

V.  United  States,  18  Wall.  84         909 

Stubbs  c.  Sar^'on,  o  Beav.  408  328 

Studd  r.  Acton,  1  H.  HI.  408  657 

Stupp,  In  re,  12  BlatcUf.  501  717,  745 

Sturgess  v.  Cary,  2  Curt.  50  19 

r.  llarrold,  18  How.  40  1058 

Sturr  f.  Beck,  i;];]  U.  S.  541  905 

Sturt  r.  Mellisb,  2  Atk.  010  3 

Stnrz  l:  De  La  Hue,  5  Kuss.  322  361,  379 
Stuwesant  Bank,  In  re,  5  Ben.  50i5; 

o'n.  B.  R.  272  445 

Suess  V.  Noble,  31  Fed.  K.  855  24,  351 
Suffblk   (Earl    of  J    v.  Gfeen,  1  Atk. 

4.30  4,  406 

Sugden  r.  Hull,  28  Ik-av.  203  389 

Sugg  V.  Tliornton,  132  U.  S.  524  1008 

Sullivan  v.  Portland  &  K.  li.  K.  Co., 

94  U.  S.  806  214 

(,-.  Kedfield,  1  Paine,  441        162,  108, 

360,  361,  379 


r.  Tuck,  1  Md.  Ch.  SCO 

Sully  V.  Drennan,  113  U.  S.  287  1:;2 

Sulzer  c.  Watson,  39  Fed.  K.  414  774 

Summcrlin  v.  Fronterizac  S.  M.  &  M. 

Co.,  41  Fed.  II.  249  513 

Sunnyside,  The,  5  Ben.  162  030 

Superior  City  r.  Kipley,  138  U.  S.  93     55 
Supervisors  c.  Durant,  9  Wall.  736      715, 

794 

1099 

773 

339,  804 


r.  Kennicott.  94  U.  S.  498 

r. ,  103  U.  S.  554 

V.  Kogers,  7  Wall.  175 


r.  United  States,  4  Wall.  435  705 

V. ,  18  Wall.  71  778 

Surget  V.  Hyers,  llenipst.  715  344 

Sutro  r.  Simpson,  14  Fed.  R.  370  843 

Sutton  i\  Bancroft,  23  How.  -320  1093 

c.  .Jones,  15  Ves.  5b4  444 

Mandeville,  1    Cranch    C.  C. 


115 
Suydam  r.  Beals,  4  McL.  12 

V.  Broadna.x,  14  Pet.  07 

V.  Truesdale,  6  McL.  459 


519 
201,  260 
9 
267,  283, 
291 

v.  Williamson,  24  How.  427  778 

Swaby  r.  Dickon,  5  Sim.  029  418 

Swain  >:.  Boylston  Ins  Co.,  37  Fed.  R. 

706  813 

Swann   v.   Ringgold,  4  Cranch  C.  C. 
238  024,  627 

507, 

io:;o 


I'.  Wright's  E.xrs.  110  U.  S.  590 

Swartwout,  Ex  parfc,i  Cranch,  75 


710, 


Swatzcl  r.  Arnold,  Woolw.  383  280 

Sweeney  r.  Coffin,  1  Dill.  73  199,  8*20 

V.  Lomme.  22  Wail.  208  1050 

r.  United  States,  17  Wall.  75         9.T) 

r. ,  5  Ct.  CI.  285  935 


935 
363 
383 
105 

777, 
778 

899 


are  to  pages.] 

Sweeney  v.  United  States,  8  Ct.  CI. 

134 
Sweet  V.  Maugham,  11  Sim.  51 
Swift  V.  Jenks,  10  Fed.  R.  641 

r. ,  29  Fed.  R.  642 

V.  Tyson,  16  Pet.  1         543,  776, 

Swift  Co.  V.  United  States,  111  U.  S. 

22 
Switzer  v.  Home  Ins.  Co.,  46  Fed.  R. 

50  586 

Swope  V.  Leffingwell,  105  U.  S.  3       1007, 

1068 
856,  1049, 
1053,  1097 

Sydolph  V.  Monkston,  2  Dick.  609        265 
Syers  v.   Brighton    Brewery  Co.,  11 

L.  T.  N.  S.  500  343, 

Sykes  c.  Hastintrs,  11  Ves.  363 

V.  United  States,  8  Ct.  CI.  -3.30 

Synionds  r.  Duchess  of  Cumberland, 

2  Cox  Eq.  411 

r.  Greene,  28  Fed.  R.  834 

Syracuse,  The,  30  Fed.  R  830       637,  638 
Szvwauski's  Heirs  i".  Zunts,  20Fed.  R. 

361  374 


Sydney,  The,  47  Fed.  R.  260 


397 
444 
916 

276 
34 


T. 

Tainter  ?.'.  Clark,  5  Allen  (Mass.),  GG 

Tait  v.  United  States,  5  Ct.  CI    638 
Talbot  V.  McGee,  4  Monr.  (Kv.)  375 

287, 

V.  Scott,  4  Kay  &  J.  96 

Tallman  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  R.  Co  , 

45  Fed.  R.  150       180,  190,  842,  846, 
Talmadge  v.  Pell,  9  Paige  (N.Y.),  410 

267, 

V. ,  7  N.  Y.  .328 

Tameling  v.   United   States  F.  &  E. 

Co.,  93  U.  S    644 
Taner  v.  Ivie,  2  Ves.  Sen.  466         93, 
Tanfield  r.  Irvine,  2  Russ.  149 
Tappan  r.  Smith,  5  Biss.  73 
Tappen  r.  NoriuMU,  11  Ves.  563 
Tarble's  (\i.-e,  1.3  Wail.  397 
Tarleton  c.  Barnt'S,  2  Keen,  032 


231, 


Tarlton   v.  Briscoe,   1   A.  K.  Marsh, 

67 
Ta.-ker  r.  Small,  3  M.  &  C.  63 
Tathani  r.  Wright,  2  Russ.  &  M.  1 
Tayloe  v.  Merchants'  F.  J.  Co.,  9  How. 

390  2,  16,  171, 

Taylor,  Ex  pnit>',  14  How.  3  704, 

r.  Barclay,  2  Sim.  213  210, 

/•.  Carrvi;  20  How.  583       12,  13, 

/•.  Davis,  110  U.  S.  330 

r    Holmes,  14  Fed.  R.  408         37, 

100.  120,  214,  215,  218,  219,  220, 

r.  Life  Assoc,  of  Amer.,  3  Fed. 

R.  405  44.5, 

r.  Luther,  2  Sumner.  228        259, 

V.  Uldhani,  Jacob,  527 


541 

932 

293 
395 

849 

291 

429 

046 
583 
440 
318 
93 
736 
242, 
247 

481 
113 
652 

306 
713 
541 
854 
434 
02, 
225 

4!6 
4C.:; 
443 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


XCV 


[References 

Taylor  v.  Person,  2  Hawks  (N.C.)  2'.)8  G74 

(•.  Pliilndelpliia  &  U.  K.  R.  Co.,  7 

Fed.  H.  .ITT  405,  42'>,  428,  443 

V.  — ,  9  Fed.  II.  1         425,  426,  443 

V.  riiillips,  2  Ves.  Sen.  2."]  574 

V.  Robertson,  27  Fed.  R.  537  5G3 

Salmon,  4  .Mjl.  &  C.  134     119,  120 


V.  Savage,  1  How.  2«2  1033 

V. ,^2  How.  3'.to  10:!3 

V.  Shew,  54  N.  Y.  75  822 

V.  Trask,  7  Cow.  249  729 

f.  United  States,  3  How.  197         482 

V.  ,  45  Fed.  R.  531  599,  GOO, 

001,  602,  603,  607 

i\  Wrench.  9  Ves.  315  276 

Tavlor  County  Court  v.  Baltimore  & 

O.  R.  R.  Co.,  35  Fed.  R  1(31  814,  832 
Taylour  v.  Roehford,  2  Ves.  Sen.  281  112 
Tazaymon  v.  Twonihley,  5  Sawy.  79  1014 
Tazewell  County  v.  Farmers'  L.  &  T. 

Co.,  12  Fed.  R.  752  26,  101 

Teasdale  v.  Branton.  2  Hayw.  377        700 
Tebbetts  v.  United  States,"  5  Ct.  CI. 

607  609 

Teese  v.  Huntingdon,  23  How.  2    2-52, 686 
Tefft  r.  Sternberg.  4  Fed.  R.  2  13,  14 

Tehou  V.  First  Nat.  Bank,  39  Fed.  R 

577 
Teibeltnan  v.  Packard,  109  U.  S.  121 
Tempest  v.  Ord,  2  Meriv.  55 
Ten  Cases  v.  United  States,  34  Fed. 

R.  100  481 

Tennessee  v.  Davis,  100  U.  S.  2-37    35,  806 

979 

V.  Snced,  96  U.  S.  69 

Tennessee  C.  L.  &  T.  B.  Co.  v.  Wal 

ler,  37  Fed.  R.  545 
Terbell  ;•.  Lee,  40  Fed.  R.  40 
Terre  Haute  &  I.  R.  R.  u.  Struble,  109 

U.  S.  381  1091 

Terrell  v.  Allison,  21  Wall.  289  660 

Territory  v.  Lock  wood,  3  Wall.  236      759 

Terry,  Ex  parte,  128  U.  S.  289     651,  653, 

655,  725,  727 

.  ///  re,  36  Fed.  R.  419  651,  6.53 

,  37  Fed.  R  649  6-56 

■.  Little,  101  U.  S.  216  8,  129 

r.  McLure,  103  U.  S.  412      284,  544 

V.  Sharon,   131   U.  S.  40 

V.  Tuliinan,  92  U   S.  156 

Te.xas  v.  Chiles,  21  Wall.  488 

V.  Day  L.  &  C.  Co.,  41   Fed   R. 

228 

r.  Wiiite,  7  Wall.  700  28 

Te.xas  E.xpress  Co.  r.  Te.xas  &  P.  Ry. 

Co  , 6  Fed.  R.  426 
Texas  Transp.  Co.   v.  Seeligson,  122 

U.  S.  519  817, 

Te.xas  L.  &  C.  Co.  v.  Scott,  1-37  U.  S. 

436  1068 

Te.xas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Interstate  Tr. 

Co.,  45  Fed    R.  5  ;i8i 

*•.  Kirk,  111  U.  S.  4-!6  1042 

V.  .Marshall,  13('  U.  S.  393         17,  19, 

31,  344 


819 

36 

418 


21 


824 

566 


are  to  pages.] 

Te.vas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  :Muri)hv,  111 

U.  S.  488  1037, 1048 
u.  Southern  Pac.  Ky.  Co.,  137  U. 

S.  48  1004 

Te.xas  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  ':  Rust,  17 

Fed.  R.  275  27,  4-52,  4.5.3,  844,  846 
Thackrah  v.  Haas,  119  U.  S.  499  15 
Thales,  The,  3  Ben.  327  863 
Thames  &  M.  M.  I.  Co.  i:  Continen- 
tal Ins.  Co.,  37  Fed.  R.  286  267 
Thatcher  c.  Powell,  (i  Wheat.  119  777 
Thayer  v.  Life  Assoc,  112  U.  S  717  1-30 
V.    Wales,   9   Blatchf.    170;    5 

Fisher's  Pat.  Cas.  130  187,  .359 

V. ,  5  Fisher's  Pat.  Cas,  448    199 

Theberath  v.  Rubber  &  C.  H.  T.  Co., 

5  Baiin.  &  A.  Pat.  Cas.  584  248,  271 
Third  Ave.  Sav.  Bank  v.  Dimock,  24 

N.  J.  Eq.  26  283 

Tiiomas,  In  re,  3  N.  B.  R.  7  387 

,  35  Fed.  R.  337       517,  557,  561 

,  35  Fed.  R.  822  518 

,  Matter  of,  U.  S.  1).  C,  D.  Col. 

Oct.  14,  1861  737 

V.  Brigstocke,  4  Russ.  64  453 

r.   Brownville,  F.  K.  &  P.  R.  R. 

Co.,  109  U.  S.  522  118 
y.  Chicago  &  C.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  37 

Fed.  R.  548  609 

c.  Dawkin,  1  Ves.  Jr.  452  443 

V.  Harvie's    Heirs,    10    Wheat. 

146  671,  673 

V.  Lloyd,  25  Beav.  620  578 

V.  Peoria  &  R.  I.  Ry.  Co.,  36  Fed. 

R.  808  407 

17.  United  States,  15  Ct.  CI.  335   689, 

912 

i:  Woold ridge,  23  Wall.  283       1023, 

1067 
Thomas  Huston  El.  Co.  r.  Sperrj^  El. 

Co.,  46  Fed.  R.  75  155.  .334 

Thompson,  The,  3  Wall   155  875 

Thompson,  E.r  parte,  1  Flipp.  507         729 

V.  Allen  County,  115  U.  S.  .550        8, 

19,  20,  416 
V.  Brown,  4  Johns.  Ch.  (N.  Y.) 


1021 
129 

486 

807 
i,  29 

373 

843 


619 


376 


—  i\  Butler,  95  U.   S.  694    788,  1026, 

1027 

—  V.  Geary,  5  Beav.  131  385 

—  v.  Goulding,    5   Allen    (Mass.), 

81  665 

—  V.  Maxwell,  95  U.  S.  391      670,  674, 

675 

—  I'.  Perrine.  103  U.  S.  806         543,  778 

—  V. ,  106  U   S.  589  778 

—  V.  Phoenix   Ins.  Co.,  136  U.   R. 
287  418,  432,  4.52 

—  V.  Railroad  Cos.,  6  Wall.  134     5,  9. 

537.  840 

—  V.  Riggs,  5  Wall.  633  785 

—  /-.  Scott,  4  Dill.  508  95,  4:;0 

—  c.  Selden,  20  How.  194  1090 

—  r.  Smith,  2  Homl,  320     46-5,  466,  558 

—  V.  ,  1  Dill.  458  660 


XCVl 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


[References 

Tliompson  v.  Thompson,  1  Turn.  &  V. 

Ch.  Tr.  51o  3-31 

V. ,  7  Bcav.  350  532 

t:  Took,  1  Dick.  115  298 

V.  United  States,  103  U.  S.  480    715, 

71G 
V.  Williams,  1  Jones  Eq.  (N.  C  ) 

176  357 
Tiiornson  v.  Dean,  7  Wall.  -342  569, 1010 
V.  Eastwood,  L.  U.  2  App.  Cas. 

215  151 

V.  Lee  County,  3  Wall.  327    778,  779 

V.  Wooster,  114  U.  S.  104      202,  204, 

205,  237,  1054,  1080 
Thorley's  C.  F.  Co.  v.  Massani,  L.  II. 

6  Ch.  1).  582  371 

Thornburi^h   v.  Savage    Min.   Co.,   1 

Pacific  L.  M.  2i)7  188,  199 

Thorne  v.  Towanda  Tanning  Co.,  15 

Fed.  R.  280  231,  232 

Thornhill  r.  Thornhill,  14  Sim.  600  443 
Thoroton  r.  Blackborne,  2  W.  Kel.  7  573 
Tiiorp  V.  On;  2  Cranch  C.  C.  335  517 

Tiiorpe  ;•.  Macauley,  5  Madd.  218         225 

V.  Mattingley,  1  riiill.  200     771,  1035 

V.  Simmons,  2  Cranch  C.  C.  195 

511,  515 
Thouron  v.  East  Tennessee,  V.  &  G. 

Hy.  Co.,  88  Fed.  K.  673  833 

Thring  v.  Edgar,  2  Sim.  &  S.  274  246 

Thruslon  v.  Mustin,  3  Cranch  C.   C 

335  353 

Tiernan  v.  Jackson,  5  Pet.  592  469 

Tifft   V.   Iron   Clad   Manuf.    Co.,   16 

Blatchf.  48  347 

Tilden  v.  Hlair,  21  Wall.  241  777 

Tilford  r.  Oaklev,  Ilempst.  197  16 

Tilghman  :•.  Proctor,  125  U.  S.  136       563 

r.  Work,  ;]9  Fed.  R.  680         671,  673 

Tillson  V.  United  States,  100  U.  S.  43 

898,  933 
Tilton  r.  Cofield.  93  U.  S.  163  689 

Tinsley  v.  Lacy,  1  Hem.  &  .M  747  362 
Tintsman  v.  National  Bank,  100  U.  S. 

6  1027 

Tioga   11.    R.   Co.  r.   Blossburg  &  C. 

R.  R  Co.,  20  Wall.  137  779,  780 

Tippecanoe  Countv  (Comm'rs  of)  v. 

Lucas,  93  U.  S.  f08  1002,  1018,  1019 
Tipping  r.  Eckersley,  2  Kav  &  J.  264  341 
Titterton  r.  Oshorne,  1  Dick.  350  138 
Titus  r.  United  Stales,  16  Ct.  CI.  276  903 
Tobin  V.  WalUinshaw.  McAll.  26  130 
I'.  Wilson,  3  J.  J.  Marsh.  (Ky.) 

67  179 

Tod<l  >:  D:iniel,  If,  Pet.  521  1031 

r.  (iee,  17  Ves.  273  212 

Toland  >:  .Spragiie,  12  Pet.  -300  188,  200 
Tolson  V   Lord  Fiizwilliani,  4  Madd. 

403  223 

Tome  ?•.  Dubois,  6  Wall.  548  1086 

Tomkin  v.  Letbbridge,  9  Ves.  178  "^  263 
Tomjinson  r.  Ward,  2  Conn.  396  441,  445 
Toinliiison  &  W.  Manuf.  Co.  i'.  Shatto, 

34  Fed.  R.  380  10 


are  to  pages.] 

Tom  Tong,  Ex  parte,  108  U.  S.  556       752 

988,  993 
Tonkin  v.  Lethbridge,  G.  Coop.  43     308, 

316 
Tookey  v.  Harding,  1  Fed.  R.  174  473 
Tooker  v.  Tliompson,  3  McL.  92   511,  514, 

515,  517 
Toronto  Genl.  Trust  Co.  i'.  Chicago, 

B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  123  N.  Y.  37  95 
r.  S.  K.  Martin  Lumber  Co.,  37 

Fed.  R.  727  841 

Torrey  v.  Grant  Locomotive  Works, 

14  Blatchf.  269  821,  845 

Toulmin  v.  Hamilton,  7  Ala.  362  214 

V.  Reid,  14  Beav.  499  288 

Tourton  «;.  Flower,  3  P.  Wms.  369        167, 

219,  220 
Towle  V.  Pierce,  12  Met.  (Mass.)  329    127 

130,  145 
Townley  v.  Deare,  3  Beav.  213  549 

Townsend  v.  Greeley,  5  Wall.  326  942, 945 

v.  Ives,  1  Wils.  216  550 

r.  Todd,  91  U.  S.  452  779,  7hO 

V.  United  States,  22  Ct.  CI.  207    593 

V. ,  1  U.  S.  L.  J.,  534,  h.  624 

Tracy  v.  Holcombe,  24  How.  426         1032 

V.  Torrey,  2  Blatciif.  275  383 

Ti'ade  Auxiliary  Co.  v.  Vickers,  L.  R. 

16  Eq.  303  898 

Trade  Mark  Cases,  100  U.  S.  82     365,  979 
Trafton  r.  Nougues,  4  Savvy.  178  819 

Transatlantic  Co.  v.  Pietroni,  Johns. 

604 
Transportation   Co.   v.  Parkersburg, 

107  U.  S.  691 
Trapnall  r.  Richardson,  13  Ark.  543 
Travis  v.  Waters,  1  Johns.  Ch.  (N.  Y.) 

85 
Treadwell  v.   Seymour,   41    Fed.    R. 

579  687, 
V. ,  U.  S.  C.  C,  S.  D.  N.  Y., 

Oct.  29,  1889,  N.  Y.  L.  J.,  Oct.  30, 

1889 
Treat  v.  Jemison,  20  AVall.  652 

V. ,  131  U.  S.  cx.xxv 

Trccothick  r.  Austin,  4  Mason,  16 
Tredway  i-.  Sanger,  107  U.  S.  ;>23 
Tremaine  r.  Hitchcock,  23  Wall.  518   275. 

276,  284 
Tremolo  Patent,  The,  23  Wall.  518      27(i 
Trenton,  The,  4  Fed.  R.  657 
Trenton    Banking    Co.   r.   Rossell,   1 

Green  Ch.  (N.  J.)  492 
Trevelyan  i:  Charter,  9  Beav.  140 
Trial,  The,  Blatchf.  &  H  94 
Triebcrt  r.  Burgess.  11  Md.  452 
Trigg  r.  Conway,  llenij)st.  711 
Trimmer  v.  Bayne,  9  \'es.  2tl9 
Triplett  v.   Bank   of   Wasiiington,  3 

Cranch  C.  C.  646 
Tripp    V.   Santa    Rosa  Street   R.   R. 

Co.,  144  U.  S.  126  1043 

Trotter  v.  Trotter,  Jacob,  533  057 

Trov  Iron  &  Nail  Factorv  v.  (^orning, 

6  Blatchf.  328  '        255,  257,  662 


395 

210 
790 

299 

763 


767 
1076 

1077 

128 

55 


864 

551 
664 
623 
441 
770 
4 

768 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  pages.] 
Troy  Iron  &  Nail  Factory  v.  C()ri)in<r, 


XCVU 


7  Blatchf.  16  5d6,  587,  640 

Troy  &  B.  K  R.  Co.  v.  Boston,  H   T. 
&  W.  Ky.  Co.,  86  N.  Y.  107       345,  356, 

Trua.x  v.  Detweiler,  46  Fed.  R.  117       652 
Trust  &  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Jenkins,  8 

Faifje  (N.  Y.),  589  201,  281 

Trustees    v.  Greenougli,    105    U.    S. 
527        119,  333,  569,  580,  584,  585,  642, 
643,  644,  645,  1019 
Trustees  of  Wabash  &  E.  Canal  Co. 

1-.  Beers,  2  Black,  448  120 

Trvon  v.  Westminster  Imp.  Comm'rs, 

6  Jur.  N.  s.  1324  138,  225 

Tryon  (S.  C),  The,  105  U.  S.  267       1068 
Tiihmiin    r.    Wason   Manuf.    Co.,  44 

Fed.  R.  429  311,464 

Tuchnian  v.  Welch,  42  Fed.  R.  548     106, 

350,  351 

u. ,  45  Fed.  R.  283        106,  350, 

351 
587,  042, 
645 


Tuck  V.  Olds,  29  Fed.  R.  88: 
Tucker  v.  Carpenter,  Hempst.  440 
Tufts  u.  Tufts,  3  Woodb  &  M.  426 


387, 
392 
66.5, 

Gm 

Tullock  V.  Webster  County,  40  Fed. 

R.  706  810,  833 

Tupper  V.  Powell,  1  Johns.  Ch.  (N.  Y.) 

439  173 

Turner  v.  Amer.  Bapt.  Miss'y  Union, 

5  McL.  344  153,  874 
V.  Bank  of  North  Amer.,  4  Dall. 

8  56, 213 

V.  Berry,  38  III.  541  678 

V.  Cole,  3  Beav.  292  208 

v.    Farmers'   L.   &   T.   Co.,   106 

U.  S.  552  1085 
r.  Indianapolis,  B.  &  W.  Ry.  Co., 

8  Biss.  315  401 
V.  Peoria  &  S.  R.  R.  Co.,  95  111. 


134 


Robinson,  1  Sim.  &  S.  3 


426 
2l'7, 
250 
155 
94 


V. ,  1  Sim.  &  S.  313 

V.  Turner,  2  Stra.  708 

V.  Wi^iit,  4  Beav.  40  353 

Turrell  v.  Spaeth,  9  Off.  Gaz.  1163        317 
Tuthill  r.  United  States,  38  Fed.  R. 

538  5'.t2.  595 

Twitchell  u.  Commonwealth,  7  Wall. 

321  9H7,  1000,  1002 

Two  Sicilies   (King  of)  v.  Wilcox,  1 

Sim.  N.  s.  301  216 

Tyler  v.  Bell,  2  .M.  &  Cr.  89  225 

V.  Callowav,  13  Fed.  R.  477  277 

V.  Magwire,  17  Wall.  253  109.5,1097, 

1098,  1099 
V.  Simmons,   6  Paige   (N.    Y.j, 

127  564 

Tysen  v.  Wabash  R.  R.  Co.,  8  Biss. 


247 


398,  399 


u. 


Uhle 


1 


805,  842 
514 
645 


VOL.   I.  —  ^ 


Burnliam,  42  Fed.  R 

c.  ,  44  Fed.  R.  729 

V. ,  46  Fed.  R.  600 

Uhlmann  v.   Arnholt  &  S.  Brewing 

Co.,  41  Fed.  R.  369  171,  264,  267 

Ulrich,  Ex  parte,  42  Fed.  R.  587  748 

,  43  Fed.  R.  661  726 

Union,  The,  4  Blatchf.  90 '  863 

Union    Bank   of  C.    c.   Kansas  City 

Bank,  136  U.  S.  223  394,  780,  1029 

Union  Bank  of  G.  v.  Geary,  5  Pet. 

99  257,  258,  463 

Union    Bank  of  La.  v.   Stafford,   12 

How.  327  126,  127,  133,  134 

Union  Mut.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Commercial 

Mut.  M.  I.  Co.,  2  Curt.  524        254,  373 
Union  Mut.  L.  I.  Co.  v.  Union  Mills 

Piaster  Co.,  37  Fed.  R.  286  440 
V.  Univ.  of  Cliicago,  6  Fed.  R. 

443  P2,  13 

V.  Windett,  36  Fed.  R.  838 '         1052 

Union    Pacific   Ry.   Co.  v.  Botsford, 

141  U.  S.  250  767,  768 

V.  Cheyenne,  113  U.  S.  516  20 

V.  Hall,  91  U.  S.  343        704,  713,  715 

V.  McShane,  3  Dill.  303   20,  154,  157 

1-.  Mercer,  28  Fed.  R.  9  209 

V.  Myers,  115  U.  S.  1  1086 

V.  United  Slates,  116  U.  S.  154   1091 

i: ,  116  U.  S.  402  1054 

Union  P.  B.   M.   Co.   v.  Newell,   11 

Blatchf.  549  387 

Union  Stock  Yards  Bank  v.  Gillespie, 

137  U.  S.  411  16 

Union  Sugar  Refinery  v.  Mathiesson, 

2  CliU:  304  197,  491 

*'. ,  3  Cliff.  146         555,  577,  664 

Union  Trust  Co.  v.  Chicago  &  L.  H. 

R.  R.  Co.,  7  Fed.  R.  513      426,  427,  435 
V.  Illinois  Midland  Ry.  Co.,  117 

U.  S  434  396,  405,  422,  425 

V.  Morrison,  125  U.  S.  591  406 

r.  Rockford,  R.  I.  &  St.  L.  R. 

R.  Co.,  6  Biss.  197  14 

V.  Souther,  107  U.  S.  591       402,  405 

c.  Walker,  107  U.  S.  596        402,  411 

United  N.  J.  R.  R.  &  C.  Co.  r.  Hop- 
pock,  1  Stew.  Eq.  (N.  J.)  261  498 
Union  Trust   Co.  r.  Pociiester  &  P. 

R.  R.  Co.,  29  Fed.  li.  609  088 

United  States,  E.r  p<titp,  1  Gall.  .338     803 

,  16  Wall.  699  932.  1066 

V.  Abatoir  Place,  106  U.  S.  160  1022 

V.  Acosta,  1  How.  24  4(56 

v.  Adams,  6  Wall.  101       1044,  1062, 

1091 

V- ,  9  Wall.  661  717.  718 

V.  Addison,  22  How.  174      703,  756. 

1028 

V. ,  6  Wall.  291  759 

V.  Ale.xander,  4  Cranch  C.  C.  311 

154 
V. ,  46  Fed.  R.  728  340,  782 


xcvui 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are 


United  States  v.  Ambrose,  108  U.  S. 

8;JG  980 

1-.  Amedy.  11  Wheat.  392  47"J 

V.  American  Bell  Telephone  Co., 

128  U.  S.  315  16,  158,  759 

>,. ,  29  Fed.  R.  17      190,  191,  198 

c. ,  30  Fed.  K.  523  212 

c. ,  32  Fed.  R.  591  15 

r  ,  39Fed.  R.  71(}  284 

V.  Ames,  99  U.  S.  35  20a 

V.  Anderson,  Cooke  (Tenn),  143  740 

r.  Arizona,  120  U.  S.  479  982 

V.  Armejo,  131  U.  S.,  App.  Ixxxii 

1044,  1062 

V.  Atherton,  102  U.  S.  372  147 

f.  Auditors  of  Brooklyn,  8  Fed. 

R.  473  714 

V.  Anguisolu,  1  Wall.  352     937,  941, 

955,  956,  962 

r.  Averill,  130  U.  S.  335  635 

i:  Avery,  13  Wall.  251  987 

e.  Ay  res,  9  Wall.  608  932, 1052, 1066 

r.  Babbitt,  104  U.  S.  767  1089 

V.  Bailey,  9  Pet.  267  978,  985 

c.  Barber,  140  U.  S.  164  600,  016,617, 

618,  619,  620 

v. ,  110  U.  S.  177     601,  617,  618 

c.  Bassett,  21  How.  412  940 

V.  Batchelder,  9  Int.  Rev.  Rec. 

<j8  689,  690 

V.  Bayard,  127  U.  S.  251       712 

r.  P.eebe,  127  U.  S.  338     12,  235 

r.  lieniier,  Baldw.  234    457,  465,  466 

'•.  lieiinitz,  23  How.  255  940 

r.  Berreyosa's    Heirs,    23    How. 

499  952, 955 
V.  Biebusch,  1  McCra.  42;  1  Fed. 

R.  213  479 

c.  Billinj?,  2  Wall.  444  9e)2,  963 

f.  Black,  128  U.  S.  40   706,  707,  7(  8, 

709 

r. ,  11  Blatdif.  538  370 

r.  Blaine,  139  U.  S.  306   706,  787,  712 

f.  BoUman,  1  Crunch  C.  C.  373   744, 

749 

'.155 

1058 

1003 

899 

102,  716 

1096 

984,  992 


—  V.  Bolton,  23  How.  .341 

—  r.  Booth.  18  How.  476 

—  /•.  ,  18  How.  477 

—  r.  I$()stwick,  94  U.  S.  53 

—  V.  Houtwell,  17  Wall.  604 

—  r.  Hovd,  15  I'et.  187 

—  V.  Brewer,  139  U.  S.  278 

—  V.  Bridgnian,  8  Am.  Law  Rec. 
541  196 

—  )'.  Brings,  5  How.  208  985 

—  V.  Britton,  107  U.  S.  6.55        979,  988 

—  ;•.  Brown,  1  Sawy.  531  488 

—  r.  liufbrd,  3  Pet.  12       469,  470,  10!)() 

—  V.  Bullock,  6  Pet.  485,  n.  704 

—  V.  P.iirchard,  125  V.  S.  170  9(10 

—  r.  Burns,  U  Wall.  2U;  909 

—  r.  B.1IZZ0,  18  Wall.  125  988,  !^a2 

—  r.  Cambiiston,  20  How.  59    940,  943, 

946,  947,  9.55 

—  V.  Cameron,  15  Fed.  R.  794  518 


to  pages.] 

United  States  i'.  Carll,  105  U.  S.  611    979 

c.  Carter,  3  Crancli  C.  C,  423       651 

V.  Castillero,  2  Black,  17       938,  942, 

961 

V.  Castro,  24  How.  346   941,  951,  955 

r.  Chaboya,  2  Black,  593        941,  9.55 

V.  Chaires,  40  Fed.  K.  820  776 

V.  C liana,  24  How.  131  954 

V.  Chase,  135  U.  S.  255  983,  992 

V.  Chicago,  7  How.  185  977,  983,  993 

v.  Church  of   Holy  Trinity,  36 

Fed.  R.  303  31 

V.  Cigars,  2  Fed.  R.  494  635 

V.  Circuits  Judges,  3  Wall.  673     962 

V.  City  Bank,  19  How.  385  987 

V.  City  of  Elizabeth,  42  Fed.  R. 

45  717 
V.  City  of  New  Orleans,  17  Fed. 

R.  483  714 

V.  Clark,  96  U.  S.  37  903,  1091 

V.  Clark  County,  95  U.  S.  769       705 

V.  Clarke,  8  Pet.  436  95 

V.  Cogswell,  3  Sumn.  204      022,  632 

V.  (\3laate,  21  Fed    R.  315  352 

V.  Collier,  3  Blatchf  325 

V.  Commissioners,  5  Wall.  563 


r.  Cooper,  120  U.  S.  124 
1-.  Corwin,  120  U.  S.  381 
V.  Covilland,  1  Black,  339 


470 
711, 
713 

903 

467 

942,  947, 

956,  959 

31,  728 

9.32,  1066 


—  V.  Craig,  28  Fed.  R.  795 

—  V.  Cruseil,  12  Wall.  175 

—  V.  Curry,  6  How.  106  1031, 1043,  lOiiO 

—  V.  Curtis,  107  U.  S.  671  980 

—  c.  Curtner,  26  Fed.  H.  296  156 

—  V.  Dalles  M.  L.  Co.,  140  U.  S.  599 

235,  245 

—  V.  Daniel,  0  Wheat.  542  976,  984,  985 

—  V.  Dashiel,  3  Wall.  686  ^        1031 

—  V.  Davenport's  Heirs,  142  U.  S. 
704  10.5'J,  1061 

—  r.  Davis,  5  Cranch  C   C.  622         750 

—  v. ,  130  U.  S.  334;  10  S.  C. 

Rep.  105  632 

—  V. ,  131  U.  S.  30    100,  969,  1037, 

1039 

—  r.  Dawson,  101  U.  S.  569  771 

—  V.  Delaware  L.  vi  W.  U.  R.  Co., 

40  Fed.  R.  101  704 

—  r.  Deiiicke,  35  Fed.  R.  407  465 

—  i\  Devaughan,  3  Cranch  C.  C.  84  652 

—  y.  Dodge,  2  (Jail.  313  6-54 

—  V.  Duaiie,  Wall.  C.  C.  102      650,  6-54 

—  r.  Durling,  4  Biss.  509  639 

—  y.  Ebbs,    10    Fed.    R.    369;    4 
Huiilie.s  473  621,  6.30 

—  r.  Ecksford,  1  How.  2,50  470 

—  r.  Edwards,  1  McL.  347  469 

—  r.  Ei;-^;!cson,  4  Sawv.  201  470 

—  r.  Eiiason.  16  IVt.  291  773 

—  r.  Mlizubelh.O  Reporter,  ,3.12  714 

—  V. ,  42  Fed.  R.  45  717 

—  V.  Ellsworth,  101  U.  S.  170  903 

—  v.  Emerson,  4  Cranch,  C.  C.  188   651 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  pages.] 


XCIX 


United  States  v.  Emliolt,  105  U 
414 

r.  Engeman,  45  Fed.  R.  546 

V. ,  46  Fed.  K.  »98 

c.  Estudillu,  1  Wall.  710 

V.  Evans,  5  Crancli,  280 


S. 
1025 
802 
802 
947,  948, 
902,  1091 
775,  lu21, 
1089 
776 
616,  017, 


—  V.  Ewan,  40  Fed   R.  451 

—  V.  Ewing,  140  U.  S.  142 

618,  019,  020 

—  i:  Fields,  4  Blatchf.  326        297,  30:J, 

318 

—  V.  Fiscus,  42  Fed.  R.  895 

—  y.    Five    Hundred    Barrels 
Whiskey,  2  Bond,  7 

—  r.  Fossat,  20  How.  413 

—  v.  Fossatt,  21  How.  445 


V.  Fo.x,  94  U.  S.  315 
;;.  Frazer,  22  Fed.  R.  106 
r.  Fremont,  18  How.  MO 
r.  Frericlis,  124  U.  S.  315 
r.  Fullhart,  47  Fed.  R.  802 
r.  (;albraitii,  22  How.  89 
t:  tiale,  109  U.  S.  65 
r.  Gaussen,  19  Wall.  198 

r.  Gear,  3  How.  120 
r.  Germaine,  99  U.  S.  508 
r.  Gibbons,  109  U.  S.  200 
r.  (Jillispie,  6  Fed   R.  803 
r.  Giilis,  95  U.  8.  407 
/•.  Gomez,  1  Wall.  690 


748 

of 

593 

902 

703,  962, 

1099 

779 

15 

1063,  1099 

935 

649 

941 

980 

468,  469, 

470 

353,  355 

979 

903 

234 

908,  912 

717,  1037, 


1038,  1043,  1059 

—  r.  ,  3  Wall.  752       870,  959,  9()2, 

1003,  1044,  1058 

—  r. ,  23  How.  .326     1079,  1092 

—  /■.  (ioodwin,  7  Cranch,  108  904 

—  V.  Grant,  110  U.  S  225        1024,  1037 

—  V.  Great  Falls  Manuf.  Co.,   112 

U.  S.  645  897 

—  /•.  (ireen,  3  Mason,  482   734,  740,  749 

—  /'.  Griffith,  2  Crancli  C.  C.  606      468, 

470 

—  r  ,  141  U.  S.  212  1064 

—  c.  Grimes,  2  Black,  610         942,  946, 

947,  949,  951 

—  L\  GunniniT,  18  Fed.  R.  51 1  15 

—  r.  ,  22  Fed.  R.  653  15 

—  a.  Guilirie,  17  How.  284       700,  711, 

712 
024 
978 
976,  978 
952,  953, 
958,  963 
97b,  987 
628 
460,  471 
940 
970 
983 
606,  012 
970 


Haas,  5  Fed.  R.  29 
Hall,  98  U.  S.  343 

.  131  U.  S.  50 

Ilalleck,  1  Wall.  439 

Hamilton,  109  U.  S.  63 
Harker,  3  Saw  v.  237 
llarrill,  Mc.  All.  243 
Hartnell,  22  How.  286 
Haynes,  130  U.  S.  653 
Hess,  124  U.  S.  483 
Hill,  120  U.  S.  1(59 
.  123  U.  S.  681 


Fed.  R. 

600,  612 
471 
979 
471 

700,  701 
488 
770 
132 
32 
542 
140 

466,  469 
470 
948 

12,  235 

908,  911 
979 
987 


United    States   >•.    Hill,   25 

375 

V.  Hilliard,  3  McL.  324 

V.  Hirsh,  100  U.  S.  32 

V.  Hodge,  13  How.  478 

r.  Hoffman,  4  Wall.  158 

V.  Hollis,  43  Fed.  R.  248 

V.  Houston,  48  Fed.  R.  207 

V.  Howland,  4  Wheat.  108 

r.  Huffmasier,  35  Fed.  R.  81 

r.  Huggett,  40  Fed.  R.  636 

V.  Huglies,  1 1  How.  552 

V.  Humason,  8  Fed.  R.  71 

v.  Hunt,  105  U.  S.  183 

p.  Iniieraritv,  19  Wall.  595 

V.  Insley,  130  U.  S.  203 

V.  Ins.  Cos.,  22  Wall.  99 

V.  Irvine,  98  U.  S.  450 

V.  Jackalow,  1  Black,  484 

V.  Jaeol)i,  4  Am.  L.  T.  Rep.  148    057 

V.  Jailer  of  P'ayette   Countv,  2 

Abb.  U.  8.  265  "g90,  749 
V.   Jellico  Mt.    C.   &  C.  Co.,  43 

Fed.  R.  898  31,  383,  389 

V. ,  46  Fed.  R.  432  81 

V.  Jolms,  4  Dall.  412  479 

V. ,  1  Wasii.  C.  C.  363  479 

V.  Johnson,  1  Wall.  326  955,  962 

—  V. ,  124  U.  S.  36 ;  8  S.  C. 

Rep.  446  98 

V.  Jones,  109  U.  S.  513        799 

V. ,119  U.S.  477         935 

i: ,  131  U.  S  1 ;  9  Sup.  Ct. 

Rep.  669         31,  58,  97,  98,  898 

r. ,  134  U.  S.  483         617 

V. ,  8  Pet.  375        469,  470 

r.  Jordan,  113  U.  S.  418       898 

V.  Kagama,  118  U.  S.  375      981 

V.  Kane,  23  Fed.  R.  748       431 

V.  Kaufman,  90  U.  S.  567     898,  899, 

909 
r.    Kentucky    River    Mills,    45 

Fed.  R.  273  32 

V.  King,  7  How.  833  1083 

V.  Knight,  14  Pet.  301  764 

V.  Knight's  Admr.  1  Black,  227  941, 

954,  955,  958 

V. ,  1  Black.  488  952.  1079 

V.  Knox,  128  U.  S.  230  618,  G:]Q 

V.  Kuhii,  4  Cranch  C.  C.  401         469 

Laliette    County,   7   Fed.  R. 

705,  715,  716 
-  V.  Lacher,  134  U.  S.  624        983,  992 

■  r.  Lafontaine,  4  Cranch    C.  C. 
■•^  457 

■  V.  Lamar,  116  U.  S.  423  706 

■  V.  Lancaster,  5  Wheat.  434  984 
•  V.  Larkin,  18  How.  557         941,  952, 

955,  956,  1086 

■  r.  Lawton,  110  U.  S  146  903 
V.  Le  Bris,  121  U.  S.  278  983,  991 
V.  Lee,  1()0  U.  S.  196  96,  102 
V.  Lee  County,  2  Biss.  77  716 
V.  Liddle,  2  \Vash.  205  465 
V.  Linn,  15  Pet.  290                         821 


318 


TABLE   OF   CASES 
[References  are 

u 


United  States  v.  Lippitt,  100  U.  S. 

663  901,  903 

V.  Loiiglirey,  43  Fed.  R.  449         187 

c.  Louisiana,  123  U.  S.  32       91,  902, 

y08 

r.  ,  127  U.  S.  182     902,  903,  908 

1-.  Louisville  &  C.  Canal  Co.,  4 

Dill.  601  337,  378 

V.  Lucero,  1  N.  M.  422        942 

c.  Lynch,  137  U.  S.  280       967 

V.  Lynde,  44  P>d.  H.  215       804 

V.  Macon  (\)untv,  99  U.  S.  582  705 

V.  .Mann,  2  Brock.  9       050,  (352 

V.  Marich,  44  Fed.  H.  19  398 

V.  Martin,  2  Faine,  08  469 

V.  Maxwell,  3  Dill.  275  687 

V.  McCarthy,  18  Fed.  H.  87  488 

V.  McClay,  4  Cent.  L.  J.  255  729 

V.  McDerniott,  140  U.  S.  151    97, 616, 

617,  620 
r.  McDonald,  128  U.  S.  471;  93 

C.  Kep.  117  98,899 

V.  McKee,  91  U.  S.  442  933 

V.  McLaugnlin,  24  Fed.  K.  823     258, 

264 

V.  McLemore,  4  How.  286  370 

V.  McMasters,  4  Wall  680  952 

V.  McHae,  L.  R.  4  Eq.  327  216 

V. ,  L.  R.  3  Ch.  App.  79         216 

V.  Memphis  &  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  6 

Fed.  R.  237  052,  655 
V.  Mexican  Nat.  Ry.  Co.,  40  Fed. 

R.  269  31 
/•.  Minnesota  &  N.  W.  R.  R.  Co., 

18  How.  241  1065,  1066 

V.  .Minor,  114  U.  S.  233  140,  175 

r.  Mississippi  &  R.  R.  B.  Co.,  3 

Fed.  R.  548;   1  McCra.  601.  355 

i'.  Mitchell,  2  Wash.  478  475 

r.  Moonev,  116  U.  S.  104   32,  57,872 

r.  Moore."  3  MacAr.  226  933 

>:  Moreno,  1  Wall.  400     937,  946,  955 

r.  Morjian,  11  How.  154  786 

,..  ,  lai  II.  S.  clxiv  1086 

r.  Morillo,  1  Wall.  706  946,  962 

/•.  Morrison,  4  I'et.  124  777 

r.  Mvers,  2  Brock.  516  15 

r.  Nashville,  C.  &,  St.  L.  Ry.  Co., 

118  U.  S.  120  12 

>:  Nelei-rh,  1  Black,  298  955 

r.  New  Orleans,  98  U.  S.  381         705 

>: ,  17  Fed.  R.  483  714 

r.  Norsch,  42  Fed.  R.  417         15,  147 

r.  Nortiiway,  120  U.  S.  327  982 

V.  Nve,  21  How.  408  910 

V. ,  4  Fed.  R.  888  687 

>■  O'Keefe,  11  Wall.  178  902 

I'.  One  Case,  1  I'aine,  400  518 

V.  One  Case  of  Silk,  4  Ben.  526    854 

V.  One  Horse,  7  Ben.  405  59:1 

V.  Osio,  23  How.  273  954,  955 

V.  Oswego,  28  Ked.  R.  55  714 

f.  Pacheco,  20  How.  261  062 

V.  Palmer,  128  U.  S.  262  897 

V.  I'arrott.  McAll.  271     351,  382, 380 


to  pages.] 

nited  States  v.  Parrott,  McAll.  447   321, 
322,  518,  519,  523 

—  V.  Patterson,  26  Fed.  R.  509  651 

—  V. ,  29  Fed.  K.  775     725,  750, 751 

—  V. ,  15  How.  10  942,  y47, 

948,  1078 

—  i: ,  3  McL.  53  633 

—  V.  Paxion,  40  Fed.  R.  136  776 

—  V.  Pearson,  24  Biatclif.  453  706 

—  V.  Peralta,  19  How.  343  940 

—  V.  Perchman,  7  Pet.  51  466,  937 

—  V.  Perot,  98  U.  S.  428  940,  951 

—  V.  Perrin,  131  U.  S.  55  976,  992 

—  V.  Peters,  3  Dall.  121  693,  870 

—  V. ,  5  Crancii,  115  703 

—  V.  Philadelphia  &  R.  R.  R.  Co., 
123  U.  S.  113  774,  775 

—  V.  Phillips,  6  Pet.  776  1066 

—  V. ,  121  U.  S.  254  1044 

—  V.  Pico,  22  How.  406  938,  940 

—  i: ,  23  How.  321  991 

—  f. ,  5  Wall.  536        942,  945, 953 

—  i^.  Pile,  130  U.  S.  280  991 

—  i:  Pings,  4  Fed.  H.  714  522 

—  V.  Pinson,  102  U.  S.  548  469 

—  V.  Poinier,  140  U.  S.  160  616 
V.   Port  of    Mobile,  12  Fed.  R. 

768  705 

—  V.  Pratt   Coal  &   Coke  Co.,  18 
Fed.  R.  708  92,  109,  143,  144,  159, 

162,  175,  213,  215,  820 

—  V.  Price,  2  Wash.  356  522 

V.  Pugh,  99  U.  S.  265  1091 

V.  Radowitz,  8  Hep.  263  468 

V.  Halston,  17  Fed.  R.  895     623,  631 

V.  Ramsay,  120  U.  S.  214  898 

V.  Ratlibone,  2  Paine,  578  774 

r.  Rauscher,  119  U,  S.  407  981 

V.  Ravara,  2  Dall.  297  5 

i:  Rendinsj,  18  How.  1     941,  942,947 


V.  Reid,  12  How.  ;;61 

V.  Reisinger,  128  U.  S.  398 

V.  Hepentigny,  5  Wall.  211 


Ringgold,  8  Pet.  1.50 
Ritchie,  17  How. 


687 
983 
937,941, 
942,  947 
624 
942,  945, 
947,  948,  962 
Rocha,  9  Wall.  6.39  951 

Bosiers,  23  Fed.  K.  658  727 

Rose,  23  How.  262  940 

,  14  Fed.  R  681  687 

Rosenburgh,  7  Wall.  580  987 

Russell,  13  Wall.  623  897 

St.  Charles  Co.,  31  Fed. 


442 


646 
440 


—  r.  St.  Louis,  A.  &  T.  R.  Co 
Fed.  H.  414 

—  V.  S,\mpe\reac,  Hempst.  118        072. 

673,  675,  677 

—  r.  Sanborn,  28  Fed.  R.  299    637,  638, 

640 

—  V.  Sansistevan,  1  X.  H.  583  942 

—  V.  Savings  Bank,  104  IJ.  S.  728     899 

—  V.  Schofield,  132  U.  S.  337  ;  10 

S.  C.  Rep.  106  632 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to   pages.] 


CI 


United  States  v.  Scliolfielcl,  1  Crancli 
C.  C.  \3d  656 

V.  Sclmrz,  102  U.  S.  378        102,  146, 

701,  706,  707,  708,  712,  716 

V.  Scott,  :3  Woods,  38-1  462 

V. ,  25  Fed.  \i.  470  466 

V.  Scroggins,  3  Woods,  529  658 

V.  Seton,  10  Pet.  30J  953 

V.  Slieriniin,  98  U.  S.  565        796,  798 

r.  Smith,  !)4  U.  S.  214  1091 

0. ,  3  Cranch  C.  C.  66  624 

i: ,  1  Woodl).  &  M.  184         622, 

629,  632,  636 

/•. ,  85  Fed.  R.  490  469 

,.  ,  44  Fed.  R.  405  624 

r. ,  4  Day,  121  514,  516 

V.  Snyder,  14  Fed.  R.  554  471 

I!.   Soutiierii  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  40 

Fed.  U.  611  211 

r.  Spie^'el,  116  U.  S.  270        981,  989 

V.  State  Hank,  96  U.  S.  30  900 

r.  vStetlVns,  100  U.  S.  82  979 

V.  Stephenson,  1  McL.  462  821 

V.  Stone,  14  Pet.  524  993 

r. ,  2  Wall.  525  759 

'•.  ,  100  U.  S  525  470 

V.  Strobach,  4  Woods,  592  632 

V.  Sturgis,  14  P>d.  R.  810  687 

.  Sntherland,  19  How.  363  955 

0.  Sutter,  21  How.  170    940,  947,  948, 

954,  955 

V.  Sutton,  47  Fed.  R.  129  1008 

r.  Tavlor,  44  Fed.  R.  2  804 

r.  Ten  Kyek,  4  McLean,  119         688 

V.  Teschinaker,  22  How.  392       954, 

955 

V.  Tetlow,  2  Low,  159  764 

V.  The  (Jhvmorgan,  2  Curt.  236    1015 

r.  The  Nuestra  Senora  De  Regla, 

108  U.  S.  92  1099 

V.  Tlie  Pessy,  1  Cranch,  103       1088 

V.  The  Reindeer,  2  Clitf.  57  854 

r.  Tiiotnpson,  98  U.  S.  480      12,  285, 

781 

V.  ,  Gilp.  014  702 

);.  Three  Hundred  Barrels  of  Al- 
cohol, 1  Ben.  72 
V.  Tlirockniorton,  98  U.  S.  61 


626 
162, 
947 
490 
515 


V.  Tilden,  25  Int.  Rev.  Rec.  352 

V. ,  10  Ben.  170 

V. ,  10  Ben.  566        514,  515.  719 

V.  Township  of  Oswego,  28  Fed. 

R.  55  714 

V.  Tread  well,  15  Fed.  R.  532         584 

V.  Trinidad  C.  &  C.  Co.,  187  U 

S.  160  15,  175 

V.  Tuthill,  136  U.  S.  652         592,  595 

c.  Tvler,  7  Cranch,  285  970 

V.   Union  Pacific  R.  R.  Co.,  91 

U.  S.  72 
r.  ,  98  U.  S.  569 


2  Dill.  527 
4  Dill.  479 


713 

135,  140,  KiO, 

705 

704,  714 

715 


United  States  v.  Vaca,  18  How.  556     941 

t:  Vallejo,  1  Black,  288  955 

V. ,  1  Black,  541  9-55 

V.  Van  Duzee,  140  U.  S.  109         598, 

699,  000,  601,  603,  005,  006.  607,  608 
V.  Van  Zandt,  2  Craacli   C.  C. 

338  4C9 

V.  Vigil,  13  Wall.  449  940 

V.  Vilialonga,  23  Wail.  35  933 

V.  Waddell,  112  U.  S.  76  981 

V.  Wallace,  116  U.  S.  398  618 

V. ,  40  Fed.  R.  144  632 

V. ,  46  Fed.  R.  fM)  794 

V.  Wailamet  &  C.  M.  W.  R.  Co., 

42  Fed.  R.  351  12 

V.  Waters,  133  U.  S.  208        592,  682 

V.  Watkins,  97  U.  S.  219      938.  940, 

955 

V.  Wayne,  Wall.  C.  C.  1-34  6-55 

V.  Whitcomb  M.  B.  Co.,  45  Fed. 


R.  89 


White,  23  How.  249 
,  17  F'ed.  R.  561 


729 


V.  Wiggins,  14  Pet.  334 
V.  Wilder,  13  Wall.  2-54 

V. ,  14  Fed.  R.  393 

V.  Wilkinson,  12  How.  246 

V.  Williams,  4  Cranch  C.  C.  372 

V. ,  15  Int.  Rev.  Rec.  199 

V. ,  6  Mont.  379 

V.  Williamson,  3  Am.  Law  Reg. 


57. 
947,  962 
140,  171, 
175,  215 
466 


903 
618 
471 

490 
48>s 
461 

7.50 


V. ,  4  Am.  Law  Reg.  5    734,  750 

i:  Wilson,  7  Pet.  150  987 

V. ,  1  Black,  267       938,  940,  952 

V. ,  1 18  U.  S.  86  21,  22 

r. ,  Bald w.  78  481 

V.  Windom,  137  U.  S.  6.36     706,  707, 

711,  712,  713 

V.  Yates,  6  How.  605  200,  1066 

r.  Yorba,  1  Wall.  412    938,  940,  941, 

•'62 

V.  Young,  94  U.  S.  2-38  717,  932, 

1065 
United    States    Annunciator   Co.   v. 

Sanderson,  3  Blatchf.  184  383 

United  States  M.  A.  Assoc,  v.  Barry, 

131  U.  S.  100  774 

United  States  Trust  Co.  ;;.  New  York 

W.  S.  &  B.  R.  Co  ,  25  Fed.  R.  800  403 
V.  Wabash,  St.  L.  &  P.  Ry.  (^o., 

42  Fed.  R.  343  14 

Universities  of  ().  &  C.  r.  Richardson, 

6  Ves.  689  358 

University  College  r.  Foxcroft,  2  Rep. 

in  Ch.  244  305 

Upshur   County  v.  Rich,  135  U.   S. 

467  808,  810 

Urlin  V.  Hudson,  1  Vern.  332        231,  232, 

234 
Urner  v.  Kaytoii.  17  Fed.  R.  539  562 

r. ,  17  Fed.  R.  845  662 

Utterson  v.  Mair,  2  Ves.  Jr.  95  395 

Uvedale  v.  Uvedale,  3  Atk.  117  644 


Cll 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  pages.] 


Uxbridge  (Lord)  v.  Staveland,!  Ves. 
Sen.  56  145,  175,  21G  258 


Vaigneur  v.  Kirk,  2  Desaus.  (S.  C.) 

040  548 

Vail  V.  Knapp,  49  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  299  852 
Vallandigliain,    Ex   parte,    1     Wall. 

243  5,  717 

,  Ex  parte,  U.  S.  D.  C.  D.  Oliio      737 

,  Trial  of,  45  746 

Vallette  v.  Whitewater  Valley  Canal 

Co.,  4  McL.  192  15,  115 

Van  Allen,  In  re,  37  Barb.   (N.  Y.) 

225  430 

Van    Alst   r.    Hunter    5  Johns.   Ch. 

(N.  Y.)  148  552 

Van  Antwerp  v,  Ilulburd,  7  Blatchf. 

420  199 

Van  Beil  v.  I'rescott,  82  N.  Y.  630  3G5 
Van  Brocklin  v.  Tennessee,  117  U.  S. 

151  19 

Vance  v.  Campbell,  1  Black,  427  686 

Vancouver)'.  Bliss,  11  Ves.  458  580 

Van  Duzee  v.  United  States,  41  Fed. 

K.  571     599,  GOO,  602,  603,  605,  606,  607 
Van  Uyck  v.  McQuade,  85  N.  Y.  616 

419, 429,  430 
Vane  v.  Lord  Barnard,  2  Vern.  738  354 
Van  Gelder  v.  Sovverby  Bridge  Soc. 

L.  U.,  44  Ch.  1).  374  114 

Van  Home,  Matter  of,  7  Paige,  46  453 
Van  Hook  v.  Tlirockiuorton,  8  Paige, 

83  660 

Vann  r.  Barnett,  2  Bro.  C.  C.  158  440 
Van  llooreliecke  r.  United  States,  46 

Fe<l.  R.  450  586,  592,  595 

Van  Ness  v.  Heineke,  2  Crancli  C.  C. 

259  515,  516 

r.  Van  Ness,  6  How   62  1022 

Van  Norden  v.  Morton,  99  U.  S.  378 

10,  23,  356,  537,  779 
Van  Orden,  E.r  parte,  3  Blatchf.  166  717 
Van  Beimsdyk  c.  Kane,  1  Gall.  371  116 
Van  liensselaer  v.  Kearnev,  11  How. 

297  '  777,  779 

17.   Sheriff   of   Albany,  1  Cow. 

501  713 

Van  Reynegan  v.   Bolton,  95  U.  S. 

33  953 

Vansant  v.  Gaslight   Co.,   99  U.  S. 

213  1045 

Van  Stone  v.  Stillwell  &  B.  Manuf. 

Co.,  142  U.  S.  128  1076 

Van  Stophorst  v.  Maryland,  2  Dall. 

401  520 

Van  Vechten  v.  Terry,  2  Johns.  Ch. 

(N.  Y.)  197  118 

Van  Vlect  v.  Sledge,  45  Fed  R.  743  778 
Van  Wyck  v.  Knevals,  106  U.  S.  360    n9 

V.   Reid,   10   How.   Pr.   (N.   Y.) 

800  484 


Varick   v.   Mayor  of  New   York,  4 

Johns.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  53  382 

Vasse  V.  Smith,  2  Cranch  C.  C.  31     616, 

517 
Vattier  v.  Hinde,  7  Pet.  252        134,  269, 

300,  308 
Vaughan  v.  Central  Pacific  R.  R.  Co., 

4  Sawy.  280  8 

V.  Fitzgerald,  1  Sell.  &  Lef.  316 

496,  497 

V.  Vaugli^n,  1  Dick.  90  446 

Vangiian    and    Telegraph,    The,    14 

Wall.  258  1086,  1089 

Vaughn  v.  Northrup,  15  Pet.  1  95 

Veach  v.  Rice,  131  U.  S.  293  292 

Veazie  r.  Wadleigh,  11  Pet.  55  978 

v.  Williams,  3  Story,  611  684 

Velie  V.  Manufacturers  A.  &  I.  Co.,  40 

Fed.  R.  545  823 

Venables  v.  Foyle.  1  Ch.  Cas.  2  680 

Venice   (Town  of)    v.    Murdock,   92 

U.  S.  404  777 

Venus,  The,  1  Wheat,  112  1082 

Venus,  The,  5  Wheat.  127  1081 

Verden  v.  Coleman,  18  How.  80  669 

V. ,  22  How.  192  1025 

Vermeule,  Matter  of,  10  Ben.  1  608 

Vermont  v.  Society  for  Propagation 

of  Gospel,  1  Paine,  652  760,  761 

Vernon,  The,  36  Fed.  R.  1 13    627,  637, 038 
Verplanck  v.  Mercantile  Ins.   Co.,  2 

Paige  (N.Y.),  438  441 

Verplank    v.   Caines,    1    Johns.   Ch. 

(N.  Y.)57  208,211 

Very  r.  Levy,  13  How.  345  366 

Vetterlein  v.  Barker,  45  Fed.  R.  741     673 
Vianello  v.  The  Credit  Lyonnais,  15 

Fed.  R.  637  800 

Vicksburg  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Putnam, 

118  U.  S.  545  773.  774,  775 

Vigel  V.  Hopp,  104  U.  S.  441     173,257,  463 
Vigers  v.  Lord  Audiev,  9  Sim.  72   314,319 

r. ,  9  Sim   408  317 

Vigo's  Case,  21  Wall.  648  702 

Villa  V.  Rodriguez,  12  Wiill.  323  3 

Villabolos   r.  United  States,  0  How. 

81  1046 

Villalonga  v.  United  States,  10  Ct. 

CI.  428  933 

Vinal  V.  Continental  C.  &  L  Co.,  34 

Fed   R.228  814,815 

V. ,  35  Fed.  R.  673  811 

V. ,136  U.S.  653  814 

Vipan  V.  Mortlock,  2  .Mcriv.  476  388 

Virginia,  The,  r.  We.>^t,  19  How.  182    1098 
Virginia  v.  Rives,  100  U.  S.  313    702,  807 

c.  West  Virginia,  11  Wall. 39  28, 107 

Virginia  Comni'rs,  Ex  parte,  112  U.  S. 

177  1042,  1044 

Virginia   Coupon    Cases,  114   U.   S. 

269  102,  105,  371 

,  114  U.  S.  325  369 

Voce  v.  Lawrence,  4  McL.  203     611,  515, 

516 
Von  Hoffman  v.  Quincy,4  Wall.  535    706 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  pages.] 


cm 


Von  Roy  v.  Blacknian,  3  Woods,  98  180 
Voorliees  v.  Coombs,  4  Vrooui,  -482  775 
Vose  V.  Phil  brook,  3  Story,  3o5  127 

V.  Reed,  1  Woods,  647  oUG 

Voss  I'.  Luke,  1  Cranuh  C.  C.  831       G6G, 

t)o7 


w. 


14 


Wabash  Cases,  29  Fed.  R.  161 
Wabasli  &  E.  Canal  Co.  v.  Beers,  1 
Black,  54  569,  1019 

c. ,  2  Black,  448  120 

Wabash  R.  R.  Co.  v.  McDaniels,  107 

U.  S.  454  1091 

Wabash,  St.  L.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Cen- 
tral Trust  Co.,  22  Fed.  R.  138   295,  397 

V. ,  22  Fed.  R.  269  419 

V. ,  22  Fed.  R.  272  25,  397 

V. ,  23  Fed.  R.  513         293,  397, 

705,  814 
Wade  1-.  United  States,  21  Ct.  CI.  141  931 
Wagner  u.  Baird,  7  How.  234     11,  12,  235 

V.  Drake,  31  Fed.  R.  849  845 

V.  Mears,  3  Sim.  127  332 

Wagstaff  V.  Bryan,  1  Russ.  &  M.  28     306 
W  linwriglit  v.  Waterman,  1  Ves.  Jr. 

313 
Waite,  In  re,  1  Low,  321 
Wake  V.  Parker,  2  Keen,  70 
Wakelee  v.  Davis,  44  Fed.  R.  532 
Wakelin  v.  Waltlial,  2  Ch.  Cas.  8 
Walburn  v.  Ingilby,  1  M.  &  K.  61 
Walcot  V.  Walker,  7  Ves.  1 
Walden  v.  Bodley,  14  Pet.  156       173,  175, 
237,  283,  545 

V.  Bodley's  Heirs,  9  How.  34       1099 

V.  Skinner,  101  U.  S.  577         15,  126 

Walden's  Lessee  r.  Craig's  Heirs,  14 

Pet.  147  760,  761,  762 

Wales  V.  Whitney,  114  U.  S.  564 
725, 
Walker  v.  Easterby,  6  Ves.  612 


116 
643,  644 
91,  92 
542 
680 
167 
364 


742 


Jackson,  2  Atk.  625 


722, 
748 
646 
4 
649 
813 
513, 


V.  Lea,  47  Fed.  R.  645 

V.  O'Neill,  38  Fed.  R.  374       805 

V.  Parker,  5  Cranch  C.  C.  639 

520,  523 
V.  Powers,  104  U.  S.  245       153,  160, 

214,  225 

V.  Smith,  21  How.  579  370 

• v\  State    Harbor     Comm'rs,    17 

Wall.  648  542 

V.  United  States,  4  Wall.  163       102') 

V.  Wild,  1  Madd.  528  440,  447 

Walkley  v.  Muscatine,  6  Wall  481  20 
Wall,  Ex  parte,  107  U.  S.  265  703 
V.  Thomas,  41  Fed.  R.  620     124, 127, 

129,  130 
Wallace  v.  Anderson,  5  Wheat.  291      759 

I'.  Douglas,  103  N.  C.  19  6-33 

V.  Holmes,  9  Blatchf.  65  128 

V.  Loomis,  97  U.  S.  146    2,  419,  425, 

426 


Wallace     v.    Wallace,     Halst.    Dig. 

(N.  J.)  173  2-J8 

Waller  o.  Harris,  7  Paige  (N.  Y.),  167  572 
Wallis  V.  Hodgeson,  2  Atk.  56  465 

Wallworth  v.  Holt,  4  M.  &  C.  619  116, 12U 
Walmsley  v.  Child,  1  Ves.  Sen.  343  177 
Walser  v.  Seligraan,  13  Fed.  R.  415  24 
Walsh  V.  Memphis,  C.  &  N.  W.  R.  R. 

Co.,  6  Fed.  R.  797  132 

V.  Preston,  109  U.  S.  297  129 

V.  Trevannion,  16  Sim.  178  573 

Walsington  v.  Nevin,  128  U.  S.  578  1068 
Walter  A.  Wood  Co.  v.  Skinner,  139 

U.  S.  293  1004,  1005 

Walton  V.  Coulson,  1  McL.  125  108 

V.  Crowley,  3  Blatchf.  440  364 

V.  Herbert,  3  Green  Ch.  (N.  J.) 

73  176,  184 

V.  Johnson,  15  Sim.  .352         376,  430 

V.  United  States,  9  Wheat.  651    784, 

785 
Wanata,  The,  95  U.  S.  600  856,  1053 

Warburton  v.  London  &  B.  Ry.  Co., 

2  Beav.  253  388 

Ward  V.  Arredondo,  1  Paine,  410  126 

V. ,  Hopk   (N.  Y.)  213  572 

V.  Chamberlain,  2  Black,  430        789, 

790,  978 

860 

1025 

547 


V. ,  21  How.  572 

0.  Gregory,  7  Pet.  633 

V.  Hill,  4  Gray  (Mass.),  593 

r.  Seabry,  4  Wash.  426 

Wardle  v.  Claxton,  9  Sim.  412 
Ware  v.  Grand  Junction  W.  W.  Co. 

2  Russ.  &  M.  470 
V.  Regent's  Canal  Co.,  3  De  G 

&  J.  212 

V.  Ware,  42  Ga.  408 

Waring  v.  Crane,  2  Paige  (N.  Y.),  79 


191 
375 


(1 


Warmouth,  Ex  parte,  17  Wall.  64 


344 
395 
93, 
94 
698, 
758 

Warner  v.  Norton,  20  How.  448  1090 

Warren,  The,  25  Fed:  R.  782  864 

Warren,  Ex  parte,  10  Ves.  622       390,  440 

V.  Fake,  49  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  430    897 

V.  Furstenheim,  35  Fed.  R.  691     770 

V.  Moodv,  9  Fed.  R.  673         285,  689 

V.  Younger,  18  Fed.  R.  859  707 

Warthen  v.  Brantley,  5  Ga.  571  160 

Wartnaby  v.  Wartnaby,  Jacob,  377   94,  95 
Washburn  &  M.  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Cincin- 
nati B.  W.  F.  Co.,  42  Fed.  R.  675     499 

V.  Colwell  S.  B.  F.  Co.,  1  Fed.  R. 

225  334 

V.  Freeman  Wire  Co.,  41  Fed.  R. 

410  499 

V.  Haish,  4  Fed.  R.  900  359 

V.  Scutt,  22  Fed.  R.  710  2.32,  287 

Washington  Bridge  Co.  v.  Stewart,  3 

How.  413  1079,  1083,  1099 

Washington   Co.   Nat.  Bank   v.  Lee, 

112  Mass.  521  467,468 

Washington  Ins.  Co.  v.  Slee,  2  Paige 
(N.  Y.),  365  298 


CIV 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  pages.] 


Washington  Market  Co.  v.  Dist.  of 

Col.,  137  U.   S.  62  1066 

Washington  K.   K.   v.   Bradleys,  10 

Wall.  -Am  29S,  1088 

Wasluugtou  &  G.  K.  R.  Co.,/Hre,  140 

U.  S.  yi  703,  1093 

V.  McDatle,  135  U.  S.  554  775 

Waskern  v.  Diamond.  Hempst.  701      515 
Watenuau  v.   Mackenzie,  138  U.  S. 

252  113,  114,  131 

Waters  v.  Barrill,  131  U.  S.  Ixxxiv     1043 

r.  Campbell,  5  Sawv.  17  730 

l:  Carroll,  9  Yerg.  (Tenn.)  102     445 

Waterton  v.  Croft,  5  Sim.  502  192 

Waterville  v.  Van  Sl^ke,  115  U.  S. 

290  1068 

V. ,  116  U.  S.  699    970,  978,  979, 

990 
Watkins,  Ex  parte,  3  Pet.  193      719,  726, 

727,  740 

V.  Atchison,  10  Hare,  App.  xlvi    497 

V.  Stone,  2  Sim.  49  226 

V.  United  States,  9  Wall.  759       470 

Watson  (!.  Smith,  7  Fed.  R.  350  251 

V.  Sutherland,  5  Wall.  74         23,  856 

V.  Tarpley,  18  How.  517         777,  779 

Watt  V.  Starke,  101  U.  S.  247   547,  551, 552 
Watts  V.  Waddle,  1  McL.  200  126 

y. ,  6  Pet.  389  542,  1084 

Wavelet,  The,  25  Fed.  R.  733  033 

Wayman  v.  Southard,  10  Wheat.  1      795, 

976 
Weale  v.  West  Middlesex  W.  W.  Co., 

1  Jac.  &  W.  358  123 

Weaver  v.  Alter,  3  Woods,  152    289,  291 
Webb,  The,  14  Wall.  406  856 

Webb,  In  re,  Siielf.  on  Lun.  417  94 

V.  Byng,  8  De  G.  &  M.  633  578 

V.  Dill,  18  Abb.  I'r.  (N.  Y.)  264    S25 

v.  Pell,  3  Paige  (N.  Y.),  368         676 

c.  Powers,  2  Woodb.  &  M.  497     254, 

363,  364 

V.  United  States,  20  Ct.  CI.  487    901 

V.  Vermont  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  9 

Fed.  R.  70.3  13 

Webber  v.  Bishop,  18  Fed.  R.  49    821,  845 

V.  Humphreys,  5  Dill.  223       43,  811, 

812 
Weber  v.  Lee  County,  6  Wall.  210 


655 


V.  Travelers'  Ins.  Co.,  45  Fed.  R. 


705, 
714 

820 
993 
777 
840 


13 


Webster  v.  Cooper,  10  How.  54 

V. ,  14  How.  488 

I'.  Crotiiers,  1  Dill.  301 

Webster    Loom    Co.    v.   Higgins 

Blatchf.  349  283 

V. ,  43  Fed.  R.  673  501,  OW, 

V.  Short,  10  (Jff.  Gaz.  1019  294 

Wedekind  r.  Southern  Pacific  Co.,  36 

Fed.  R.  279  82.3 

Weed  V.  Kellogg,  6  McL  44  5^2 

Weeks  v.  Weeks,  106  N.  Y.  620  419 

Weeth  V.  New  England  Mortgage  Co., 

106  U.  S.  605  976 


Weide  v.  Insurance  Co.  of  N.  A.,  3 

Chic.  L.  N.  353  765 

Welch  V.  MandeviUe,  7  Cranch,  152     1021 
Weller  v.  J.  B.  Pace  Tobacco  Co.,  32 

Fed.  R.  860  814,  816 

Welles  V.  Graves,  41  Fed.  R.  459  129 

Wellesley  v.  Welleslev,  4  M.  &   Cr. 

554  220,  225 

Wellford  v.  Miller,  1   Cranch  C.  C. 

485  519 

Welling  f.  La  Bau,  34  Fed.  R.  40         563 

V. ,  35  Fed.  R.  3U2  570 

V.  McGregor,  13  Wall.  108  1022 

Wells  V.  Oregon  Ry.  &  Nav.  Co.,  15 

Fed.  R.  561  ;  8  Sawy.  600  146 
r.   Southern  Mmn.    Ry.   Co.,  1 

Fed.  R.  270  406 

V.  Strange,  5  Ga.  22  174 

V.  Wilkins,  116  U.  S.  398  1061 

V.  Wood,  10  Ves.  401  383 

Wenberg  v.  Cargo  of  Mineral  Phos- 
phate, 15  Fed.  R.  285  865 
Werder,  In  re,  15  Fed.  R.  789  415 
Wert  ;;.  Skip,  1  Ves.  218  663 
Wescott  V.  Fairfield,  Pet.  C.  C.  45  38 
West  V.  Duncan,  42  Fed.  R.  430    115,  130 

V.  Home  Ins.  Co.,  18  Fed.  R.622    087 

V.  Randall,  2  Mason,  181       121,  122, 

127,  135,  155,  157,  224 

V.  Smith,  3  Beav.  306  337 

Westhrook's  Trusts,  In  re,  L.  R.  11 

Eq.  252  336 

Westcomb  v.  Westcomb,  1  Dick.  233    109 
Westcott  V.  Cady,  5  Johns.  Ch.  (N.  Y.) 

334  309 

Western  Air  Line  Constr.  Co.  v-  Mc- 

Gillis,  127  U.  S.  770  1053,  1061 

Western  Metropolis,  The,  12  Wall. 

389  1081 

Western  Pacific  R.  R.  Co.  v.  United 

States,  108  U.  S.  510  ^     15 

Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Atlantic 

&  P.  Tel.  Co.,  7  Biss.  367  422 

V.  Brown,  32  Fed.  R.  337        44,  814, 

817 
V.  Burlington  &  S.  W.  Ry.  Co., 

llFed.R.  1  382 

17.  Rogers,  93  U.  S.  565  1026 

v.  St.  Joseph  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  3 

Fed.  R.  430  367,  382 
V.  Union  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  3  Fed.  R. 

423  367 

V. ,  3  Fed.  R.  721  382 

W'estinghouse  v.  Carpenter,  43  Fed. 

R.  b\)4  18,  361,  388 

Westinghouse  A.  B.  Co.  v.  Carpenter, 

32  Fed.  R.  484  17,  18 

Westiev  V.  Williamson,  2  Moll.  458      643 
Weston  V.  Charleston,  2  Pet.  440         808, 

1002 
V.  Empire  Assur.  Co.,  L.  R.  6Eq. 

23  149 

(.'   Ilaggerston,  G.  Coop.  134  665 

West  Portland   Homestead  Assoc,  v. 

Lownsdale,  17  Fed.  R.  205  230 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


cv 


[References 

West  Wisconsin  Ry.  Co.  v.  Folej',  94 

U.  S.  100  lO'JS 

Wetherill  v.  New  Jersey  Zinc  Co.,  1 


Batin.  &  A.  Pat.  Cas.  485 
Wetinore  v.  St.  Paul  &  P.  R.  R.  Co. 

3  Fed.  R.  177 

V.  Scovell,  3  Edw.  (N.  Y.)  515 

V.  United  States,  10  Pet.  647 


12 

545 
342 

405, 
46(3 

Wiialen  v.  Slieridan,  10  Fed.  R.  661  784 
Wheaton  v.  Love,  1  Cranch  C.  C.  451   512, 

516 
Wheeler  v.  Cloyd,  134  U.  S.  537  1029 

V.  Harris,  13  Wall.  51  1023,  10(31 

1-.  iMcCormick,  8   Blatchf.  267; 

4  Fisher's  Pat.  Cas.  433       52,  232,  234, 

241,  244,  247,  250 

V.  Sedgwick,  94  U.  S.  1  1080 

V.  Williamson,  4  Ara.  Law  Reoj. 

5  740,  741 
Wheeling  &  B.  Bridge  Co.  v.  Wheel- 
ing Bri  Ige  Co.,  138  U.  S.  287  1019 

Whelan  v.  Kevf  York,  L.  E.  &  W.  R  R. 

Co.,  35  Fed.  R.  849  827,  832,  833,  834 
Whipple  V.  Cumberland  C.  M.  Co.,  3 

Storv,  84  037,  639 

-- —  {•."Hutchinson,  4  Blatchf.  190  384 
Wliistler  /•.  Webb,  Bunb.  53  117 

Whitbeck  v.  Edgar,  2  Barb.  Ch.  (N  Y.) 

lOG  138,  100,  213 

Whitbread  v.  Brockliurst,  1  Bro.  C.  C. 

404;  2  Ves.  &  B.  154,  «  226 
White  V.  Arthur,  10  Fed.  R.  80  798 
V.    Bishop   of    Peterborough,    3 

Swanst.  109  414 

V.  Boyce,  21  Fed.  R.  228  23 

V.  Bromley,  20  How.  235  481 

V.  Buloid,  2  Paige  (N.  Y.),  164     2.t5 

V.  Crow,  110  U.  S.  183  25 

v.  Foljambe,  11  Ves.  337  582 

V.  Hess,  8  Paige  (N.  Y.),  544         4.s3 

V.  Hillacre,  3  Y.  &  C.  597  120 

V.  Keokuk  &  D.  M.  Ry.  Co.,  52 

Iowa,  97  435,  453 

V.  Lisle,  3  Swanst.  342  548,  551 

V.  National  Bank,  102  U.  S.  658    778 

V.   St.    Guirons,    Minor    (Ala.), 

331  405,  460 

V.  Turk,  12  Pet.  238  985 

y.  United  States,  1  Wall.  660        955 

V. ,  19  Ct.  CI.  4.36  909 

r.  Wliitman,  1  Curt.  494  232 

White's   A  dm.    v.  United    States,  1 

Black,  501  703,  947 

Whitehead  v.  Shattuck,  138  U.  S.  146      7, 

10,  11 
Whitehouse  i'.  Partridge,  3  Swanst. 

365  456 

Wiiitelegg  V.  Whitelegg,  1  Bro.  C.  C. 

57  381 

Whiteside  v.  Prendergast,  2  Barb.  Ch. 

(N.  Y.)  471  453 

Wliitesides    i'.   Laffertj',    3    Humph. 

( Ten  n.)  150  '  433 

Whitfield,  Ex  parte,  2  Atk.  315  440 


are  to   pages.] 

Wliitfield  V.  Fausset,  1  Ves.  Sen.  392  177 
Whitford  V.  Clark  Co.,  119  U.  S.  522    512 
Whiting  f.  Bank  of  the  U.  S.,  13  Pet. 
6    299,  569,  574,  670,  671,  675,  677, 678, 

1019 
Whitman  v.  Hubbell,  30  Fed.  R.  81       34, 

39,  118 
Whitmore,  Ex  parte,  1  Dick.  143  456 

Whitney,  Ex  parte,  13  Pet.  404  703 

V.  Belden,  4  Paige  (N.  Y.),  140     576 

V.  Buckman,  26  Cal.  447 

V.  Cook,  99  U.  S.  607 

V. ,  131  U.  S.  cxcvii 

V.  Huntt,  5  Cranch  C.  C.  120 

V.  Schufelt,  1  Uen.  594 

V.  United  States,  18  Ct.  CI.  19 


395 

1067 

1093 

517 

729 

904, 

931 

Whitney  Nat.  Bank  v.  Parker,  41  Fed. 

R.  402  151 

Whiton  V.  Albany  Ins.  Co.,  109  Mass. 

30  467 

Whittelsey  v.  United  States,  5  Ct.  CI. 

4-52  902 

Wiiittemore  r.  Amoskeag  Nat.  Bank, 

134  U.  S.  527  35 

V.  Cutter,  1  Gall.  429  253 

;'.  Farriiigton,  76  N.  Y.  4-52  3 

Whittenton  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Memphis 

&  ().  R.  P.  Co.,  19  Fed.  R.  273  840 

Whittingham   v.  Burgoyne,  3  Anst. 

900  219 

V.  Wooler,  2  Swanst.  428,  n.  392 

Whittlesey  i\  Delaney,  73  N.  Y.  571     429 
Whorewood    v.    Whorewood,    1    Ch. 

Cas.  250  680 

Whyte  V.  Gibbes,  20  How.  541  1095 

Wickliffe  v.  Hill,  3  Litt.  ( Ky.)  .330        466 

V.  Owings,  17  How.  47         228,  1083 

Wiijgins  V.  Gray,  24  How.  303       970,  988 
Wieti^ins  Ferry  Co.  v.  Oliio  &  M.  Rv. 

t^o.  142  U.  S  396  1084,  1088 

Wight,  In  re,  134  U.  S.  136  337,  794 

Wigton  r.  Hrainerd,  28  Fed.  R.  29        586 
Wilco.x  V.  Henry,  1  Dall.  69  91 

V.  Jackson,  13  Pet.  498 

Wilde  V.  Gibson,  1  H.  L.  C.  605 
Wilder  V.  McCormick,  2  Blatchf.  31 


102 
151 

164, 
209 
V.  Virginia,  T.  &  C.  S.  &  I.  Co., 

46  Fed.  R.  676  814,  815,  816 

Wildridge  v.  McKane,  2  Moll.  545  453 
Wilkins  v.  Aikin,  17  Ves.  422  357 

r.  Fry,  1  Mer.  244  110 

('.  Jordan,  3  Wash.  226  385 

Wilkinson  v.  Belshcr,  2  Bro.  C.  C.  272   332 

V.  Culver.  25  Fed.  R.  639  430 

V.  Dobbie,  12  Blatchf.  298  3-53 

V.  Fowkes,  9  Hare,  193  313 

Willan  r.  Willan.  10  Ves.  72  675 

Willard  <•.  Tavloe,  8  Wall.  557  4.  127 

V.  Wood.'  135  U.  S.  309     11.773,779 

Willcox  r.  Bellaers,  Turn.  &  R.  491  582 
William    Bagfaioy,    The,    v.    United 

States,  5  Wall.  377  1078 

William  Cox,  The,  9  Fed.  R.  072   584,  865 


CVl 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 
[References  are  to  pages.] 


Williaflis,  Tn  re,  37  Fed.  R.  32-3     637,  638 

V.  Bank  of  U.  S.,  11  Wlieat.  4U 

1031 

V.  Bankliead,  19  Wall.  503     120,  131 

V.  Benedict,  8  How.  107  790 

V.  Boston  &  A.  K.  K.  Co.,   17 

Bhitchf.  21  252 

V.  Bruffv,  102  U.  S.  248  1098 

V.  Clatiiti,  103  U.  S.  753  1050 

V.  Consier,  131  U.  S.  390  1080 

V.  Cooke,  10  Ves.  406  301 

f.  Conwin,    Hopk.    Ch.   (N.  Y.) 

471 


203 
265 
147 


—  c.  Davies,  1  Sim.  &  S.  426 

—  V.  Douglas,  5  Beav.  82 

—  V.  Empire  Transp.  Co.,  1  N.  J. 

L.  J.  315  229,  230 


V.  Gibbes,  20  How.  535 


267 


—  V.  Hintermeister,  26  Fed.  R.  889   399 

—  V.  Jackson,  107  U.  S.  478  545 

—  V.  Massachusetts  Ben.  Assoc,  47 
Fed.  K.  533  823 

—  V.  Mellisli,  1  Vern.  117,  n.  677 

—  V.  Morgan,  111  U.  S.  684       118,  333, 

335,  450,  567,  1030 

—  V.  Nottawa,  104  U.  S.  209     635,  536, 

537 

—  V.  Price,  4  Price,  156  548 

—  r.  United  States,  137  U.  R.  113     480 

—  V. ,  138  U.  S.  514     106, 130,  150, 

151 

—  v.    Walker,  2  Rich.  Eq.  (S.  C.) 
291  179 

134 


V.  Williams,  9  Mod.  299 

Williams,  M.  &  R.  Co.  v.  Raynor,  7 

Biss.  245 
Wjlliamson  r.  Berry,  8  How.  495 

V.  (iordon,  19  \'es.  114  573, 

(•.  Suvdaiu,  6  Wall.  723 

V.  Wi'lson,  1  Bland  (Md.),  418 


846 

777 
',  574 
778 
432, 
443 


Williamsport    Bank   i-.    Knapp,    119 

U.  S.  357  976,  989 

Willings  V.  Conseqna,  Pet.  C.  C.  301  521 
Willis  r.  Bucher,  3  Wash.  C.  C.  369  472 
Wilson,  Ex  /mttf.  114  U.  S.  417     725,  726 

,  //)  jv>,  140  U.  S.  575  726 

V.  Barnov,  5  Hun  (N.  Y  ),  257       452 

),'.  Barnum,  1  Wall.  Jr.  342  550 

>: ,  8  How.  258        976,  979,  986, 

988 

V.  Blair,  119  U.  S.  387  1029 

r.  Citv  Bank,  3  Sumner,  422        1 15, 

132,  144 

V.  Daniel,  3  Dall.  401     33,  1018,  1053 

.  Everett.  139  U.  S.  616    1084,  1091 

r.  Fine,  :}8  Fed    R.  789  687 

r.  (;aines,  103  U.  S.  417  210 

V.  (iinger,  2  Dic-k.  521  550 

V.  Greenwood,  1  Swanst.  471        401, 

443,  444 

V.  Hurst,  Pet.  C.  C.  441  762 

V.  Kno.x  County,  43  Fed.  R.  481     1>5 

r.  Koontz,  7  Crancli,  202  235 

V.  Luke,  1  Vict.  L.  R.  127  363 


Wilson  V.  McNamee,  102  U.  S.  572    1086 

V.  Riddle,  123  U.  S.  608  550,  551 

V.  Rousseau,  4  How.  646  114 

V.  Sandtord,  10  How.  99  36 

V.  Seligman,  10  Rejjorter,  651        297 

V.  StoUey,  4  McL.  272  381 

V. ,  4  McL.  275  145,  275 

V.  Todd,  1  M.  &  C.  42  134 

V,  Union  Sav.  Assoc,  30  Fed.  R. 

521  816 

V.  United  States,  1  Ct.  CI.  318      9ti9 

I'.  Watson,  Pet.  C.  C.  269  762 

V.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.,  34 

Fed.  R.  561  44,  813,  822 

V.  Wilson,  1  Jac  &  W.  459  138 

Wilson    S.    M.    Co.    v.    Jackson,   1 

Hughes,  295  514 

Wilson's  Heirs  v.  Life  &  Fire  Ins.  Co., 

12  Pet.  140  1031,  1040 

Wilton  V.  Jones,  2  Y.  &  C.  244  118 

Winans  v.  Eaton,  1  Fisher's  Pat.  Cas. 

181  360 
V.  New  York  &  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  21 

How.  88  518,  522,  523 

Winherg  v.  Berkeley  Co.  R.  R.  &  L. 

Co.,  29  Fed.  R.  721  823 

Winchell  v.  Coney,  27  Fed.  R.  482  839 
Winchester  v.  Loud,  108  U.  S.  130  814 
Winchester  (Bishop  of)  r.  Fournier, 

2  Ves.  Sen.  445  548,  579 


Winder  v.  Caldwell,  14  How.  4.34 


759, 
760 

237 
588 


Windsor  i:  McVeigli,  93  U.  S.  274 
Winegar  v.  Cahn,  29  Fed.  R.  676 
Wing  V.  Fairhaven,  8  Cush.  (Mass.) 

363  379,  392 

Winn  r.  Jackson,  12  Wheat.  135  1021 

V.  Patterson,  9  Pet.  663  466 

Winnemans  r.  Edgington,  27  Fed.  R. 

324  844 

Winnisimmet  Co.   v.  United  States, 

12  Ct.  CI.  319  901,  903 

Winslow  V.  Nayson,  113  Mass.  411        392 
Winter  v.  Ludlow,  3  Phila.  (Pa.)  464  135, 

188 

r.  Simonton,  3  Cranch  C.C.  104   523 

<\  Swinburne,  8  Fed.  R.  49        37,  42 

Wintermute  i:  Smith,  1  Bond,  210       624 
Winters  v.  Etiiell,  132  U.  S.  207  1023, 

1038 
Wintliorp  r.  Royal  Exchange  Assur. 

Co.,  1  Dick.  282  ^  646 

Winthrop  r.  Murray,  7  Hare,  150  533 

r.  Union  Ins.  Co.,  2  Wash.  7  521 

Winthrop   Iron    Co.  r.   Meeker,    109 

U.  S.  1H0  1018,  1020,  1023 

Wirt  r.  Hicks,  46  Fed.  R.  71  163 

Wiscart  (;.  Dauchy,  3  Dall.  321  904 

Wisconsin   v.   Pelican   Ins.    Co.,   127 

U.  S.  265  29,  91 

Wisdom  V.  Memphis,  2  Flipp.  285         714 
Wise  V.  Allis,  9  Wall.  737  686 

Wi.«er  v.  Blachly,  2  Johns.  Ch.  (N.  Y.) 

488  674 

Wisner  v.  Barnet,4  Wash.  631  110, 127,214 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  pages.] 


evil 


Wiswell  V.  Starr,  48  Me.  401  443 

Withenbury  i-.  United  States,  5  Wall. 


819 


1025 
770 
GtJ6 
604 
Otio 
504 


il84 
818 
705 
164, 


Witters  v.  Foster,  26  Fed.  R.  737 

V.  Sowles,  31  Fed.  R.  5 

V  ,  32  Fed.  R.  130 

v. ,  32  Fed.  R.  765 

V. ,  43  Fed.  K.  405 

Woloott  V.  Aspen  M.  &  S.  Co.,  34  Fed. 

R.  821  811,  812 

I'.  Watson,  46  Fed.  R.  529  828 

Wolf  V.  Cook,  40  Fed.  R.  432         689,  763 

V.  Insurance  Co.,  1  Flipp.  377        584 

V.  Usher,  3  Pet.  269 

Wolff  V.  Arcliibald,  14  Fed.  R.  309 

V.  New  Orleans,  103  U.  S.  358 

Wollensak  c.  Reilier,  115  U.  S.  90 

168,  214 
Wolverton  v.  Lacey,  18  Law  Rep.  672  765 
Womersley  I'.  Merritt,  L.  R.4  Eq.695  277 
Wood,  Matter  of,  U.  S.  C.  C.  S.  D. 

N.  Y.,  July,  1891  199 

V.  Beadell,  3  Sim.  273  375 

V.    Cleveland    Rolling    Mill,    4 

Fisher's  Pat.  Cas.  550  12 

v.  Denis,  18  How.  407  37 

r.  Dumnier,  3  Mason,  308      121,  155 

V.  Griffith,  1  Meriv.  35  667 

V.  Guarantee  T.  &  S.  D.  Co.,  128 

U.  S.  416  403.  414 

I!.  Lide,  4  Cranch,  180        1043,  1053 

c.  Mann,  1  Sumner,  506      227,  228, 

238 

V. ,  2  Sumner,  316    464,  501,  502 

V.  Richards,  131  U.  S.  xcviii       1053 

V.  Swift,  81  N.  Y.  31  179 

i\  United  States,  10  Pet.  342         482 

V.  Weimar,  104  U.  S.  786  1086 

V.  Wood,  4  Russ.  558  440 

Wood  Count V  v.  Lackawanna  I.  &  C. 

Co.,  'jS  U.  S.  619  1086 

Wood  Paper  Co.  v.  Heft,  8  Wall  333 

1066,  1067 
Woodbury,  In  re,  7  Fed.  R.  705  608 

Woodman  r.  Missionarv  So'j.  of  M. 

E.  Church,  124  U.  S.  101  1004 

Woodruff  V.  Dubuque  &  S.  C.  R.  R. 

Co.,  30  Fed.  R.  91  250 
V.  iVorth  Bloomfield  G.  M.  Co., 

18  Fed.  R.  7.53  345,  355 

/'. ,  45  Fed.  R.  129  ().-)4 

Woodrum  v.  Clay,  33  Fed.  R.  897        814, 

817 
Woods,  Fn  re,  143  U.  S.  202  975 

V.  Lindvall,  48  Fed.  R.  73      785,  787 

V.  Monroe,  17  Mich.  238  4 

V.  Morrell,  1    Jolins.  Ch.  (N.  Y.) 

103  146,  255,  265 

V.  Woods,  10  Sim.  197  319 

i>.  Youii-r,  4  Crancl),  237  1090 

Woodward  ik  Brown,  13  Pet.  1  1059 

r.  Hall,  2  Cranch  C.  C.  235  510 

r.  Jewell,  140  U.  S.  247  1027 

V.  Woodward,  1  Dick.  .33  314 


Woodworth  v.  Edwards,  3  Woodb.  & 

M.  120  380 

V.  Hall,  1  Woodb.  &  M  389         387 

V. ,  1  Woodb.  &  M.  248  473 

v.  Rogers,  3  Woodb.  &  M.  135      387 

V.  Sherman,  3  Story,  171  045 

V.  Stone,  3  Story,  749  316 

WooUam  v.  Hearn,  7  \'es.  211  545 

Woolridge    v.    McKenna,  8  Fed.  R. 

(550  38,  107,  839 

Woolsey  v.  Judd,   4   Duer    (N.  Y.j, 

379  342 

Wooster  v.  Blake,  7  Fed.  R.  816  247 

v.  Clark,  9  Fed.  K.  851  504 

v.  Gumbirnner,  20   Fed.   R.  167 

558,  561 

V.  Handy,  23  Fed.  R.  49      680,  585, 

586,  587,588,  641,  642 

V.  Hill,  44  Fed.  K.  819  037 

V.  Sidenbergii,  U.  S.  C.  C,  S.  D. 

N.  Y.  Nov.  6.  1889  499 

Worcester  v.  Truman,  1  McL.  483  653 
Worden  v.  Searls,  121  U.  S.  14     654,  655, 

1085 
Works    V.  Junction    R.   R.,  5  McL. 

425  355,  309 

Wormald  v.  De  Lisle,  3  Beav.  18  145 

Wormley  v.  Wormley,  8  Wheat.  421 

37,  120 
Wormser    v.    Dahlman,    16   Blatclif. 

319  820 

Worswick    Manuf.    Co.    v.    City  of 

Philadelphia,  30  Fed.  R.  625  642 

Worthington  r.  Jeffries,  L.  R.  10  Ct. 

C.  P.  379  609 

r.  Scribner,  W?)  Mass.  487  215 

Wortley  v.  Birkhead,  2  Ves.  Sen.  571 

672 
Wray  v.  Hutchinson,  2  M.  &  K.  235 

279,  2^0 

('.  United  States,  19  Ct.  CI.  154     903 

Wren  v.  Kirton,  11  Ves.  377  432 
V.    Spencer  O.   M.    Co.,   18  Off. 

Gaz.  857  270 

V.  Weild,  L.  R.  4  Q.  B.  730  371 

Wright  V.  Atkyns.  1  Ves.  &  B.313        376 

r.  Castle,  3  Meriv.  12  533 

V.    Dame,    1    Met.    (Mass.)    237 

220,  499 

r.  HoUingsworth,  1  Pet.  105         1090 

V.  Howard,  1  Sim.  &  S.  190   581,  583 

;•.     Merchants'      Xat.      Bank,    1 

Flipp.  5()8  39(; 

V.  Tatliam,  2  Sim  459  497 

r.  Wells,  1  Per.  C.  C.  220  843 

Wroe  r.  Clayton,  10  Sim.  183  650 

Wrottcsley    v.    Bendish,  3  P.  Wms. 

235  402 

Wvoh  V.  Meal,  3  P.  Wms.  310  111,  112 
Wylie  v.  Coxe,  15  How.  415  229,  1087 
Wynne  r.  Lord   Newborough,  1  Ves. 

jr.  164;  3  Bro.  C.  C.  88  '  418,  428 

V. ,  15  Ves,  283  443,  444 

Wythe  V.  Palmer,  3  Sawy.  412  240 


cvm 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  pages.] 

Young  V.  Keighly,  16  Ves.  348 


Yale  Lock  Manuf.  Co.,  v.  Colvin,  14 

Fed.  K.  209  585,  586 

Yarbrough,  Er  parte,  110  U.  S.  651  726 
Yates  1-.  Arden,  5  Crancli  C.  C.  526      278 

V.  Hanibly,  2  Atk.  237  133 

V.  Hardy,  Jacob,  223  265 

Yearian  v.  Horner,  36  Fed.  R.  130  814 
Yeatnian    v.    Bradford,    44    Fed.    R. 

536  25,  42 

Yeaton  v.  Lenox,  8  Pet.  123         153,  1098 

V.  United  States,  1  Cranch,  281     1088 

Yick  Wo  t:  Crowley,  26  Fed.  K.  207    347, 

357 
Yonley  v.  Lavender,  21  Wall.  276  13 

York  V.  White,  10  Jur.  168  120 

York  (Arclibishop  of)  v.  Stapleton,  2 

Atk.  136  280 

York  (Mayor of)  v.  Pilkington,  1  Atk. 

282  123,  157 

v. ,  2  Atk.  302  351 

York  County  v.  Central  R.  R.,  3  Wall. 

107  523 

Young,  In  re,  7  Fed.  R.  855  230,  439 

V.  Brvan,  6  Wlieat.  146  56 

V.  Co'lt,  2  Blatfhf.  373  290 

V.  Cushing,  4  Biss.  456  129,  131 

V.  Davidson,  5  Craucli  C.  C.  515    513 

V.  Everest,  1  Russ.  &  M.  426  644 

V.  Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co.,  9  Fed. 

R.  348  765 

V.  Grundy,  6  Cranch,  51       254,  382, 

3«5,  569 


672 
V.  Martin,  8  Wall.  354  785,  787 

—  V.  Merchants'  Ins.   Co.,  29  Fed. 

R.  273  639,  640,  849 

—  V.  Montgomery  &  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  2 
Woods,  606  451,  452,  453 

—  V.  Parker's  Admr.,  132  U.  S.  267  833 

—  V.  Pott,  4  Wash.  521 

—  V.  United  States,  95  U.  S.  641 


295 
932, 
1090 
431 
341 
665 


V.  Wempe,  46  Fed.  R.  354 

Yovatt  V.  Winyard,  1  Jac.  &  W.  394 
Yow  r.  Townsend,  1  Dick.  59 
Yturbide's  Exrs.  v.  United  States,  22 

How.  290  961,  963 

Yuba  Countv  v.  Pioneer  G.  M.  Co.,  32 

Fed.  R.  183  41,  189 

Yuengling  v.  Joinison,  1  Hughes,  607 

323,  377,  379 
V.  Schile,  12  Fed.  R.  97  362 


Zanibrino  v.  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  Ry. 

Co.,  38  Fed.  R.  449  45,  189,  190 

Zeckendorf  v.  Johnson,  123  U.  S  617 

964,  1027 
Zeigler  v.  Hopkins,  117  U.  S.  683  1061 
Zeller  v.  Switzer,  91  U.  S.  487  1021 

Zive  ('.  Peck,  13  Fed.  R.  475  570 

Zodiac,  The,  5  Fed.  R.  220  863 

Zunkel  v.  Litciifield,  21  Fed.  R.  196    502, 

503 


CITATIONS. 


[referencks  are  to  pages.] 


U.    S.   CONSTITUTION. 


Art.     I.     §  0.  456, 4U1. 

§  0.  736. 

III.  -27. 
§  1-  5- 

^  2.  5,  100,  107,  756. 

IV.  §  1.  946. 


Page. 
Art.       V.  Amendment.     731,  981. 

XI.  "  5,9.5,100,106, 

107,  371. 
XIV.  "  31,57,730,731, 

732,  733,  754. 


U.   S.   REVISED    STATUTES. 


Page. 

Page. 

Page. 

1. 

482,  514. 

§566. 

771,  861. 

§609. 

339. 

103. 

489. 

567. 

804. 

614. 

1017. 

186. 

757. 

568. 

804. 

615. 

804. 

358. 

766. 

569. 

804. 

616. 

804. 

363. 

590,  593. 

571. 

60. 

617. 

339. 

364. 

591. 

572. 

60,  61,  62, 

63, 

64, 

618. 

339. 

365. 

590. 

66, 66, 

67 

68, 

69, 

629. 

31,  32,  872. 

366. 

591. 

71,  72, 

73 

74, 

75, 

631. 

568,  866,  1015. 

368. 

632. 

77,  78, 

80,  83,  84, 

632. 

1015,  1016. 

380. 

591. 

85. 

635. 

1016. 

531. 

60,61,62,64,66,68, 

583. 

596,  622. 

636. 

689,  1016. 

69,  73,  77,  78, 

584. 

596,  622. 

639. 

827. 

83,  85. 

687. 

803. 

641. 

720,  807,  837. 

532. 

59,  60. 

588. 

803. 

642. 

719,  837. 

633. 

60,  61. 

691. 

329,  340. 

643. 

719,  720,  806,  836, 

534. 

62. 

592. 

339,  340. 

979. 

535. 

63. 

693. 

339,  340. 

648. 

771. 

536. 

63. 

594. 

339,  340. 

649. 

771. 

538. 

69. 

595. 

339,  340. 

650. 

976. 

540. 

72. 

596. 

339,  340. 

651. 

976. 

541. 

74. 

697. 

339. 

662. 

976. 

542. 

74. 

698. 

339,  340. 

657. 

61,  670. 

543. 

75. 

699. 

339,  340. 

658. 

61,  62,  6,3,  64,  66, 

544. 

76. 

600. 

339,  340. 

68,69,71,72,7.3, 

545. 

77. 

601. 

339. 

74,  75.  77.  78, 80, 

546. 

78. 

602. 

339. 

83,  8»,  85. 

547. 

79,  80. 

603. 

3;;9, 340. 

664. 

61. 

548. 

89,  81,  83. 

604. 

58,  339. 

671. 

690,  622. 

549. 

84. 

606. 

339. 

672. 

696,  622. 

550. 

85. 

606. 

339. 

674. 

1010. 

563. 

57,  872,  873. 

608. 

59,  60. 

684. 

58. 

ex 

CITATIONS. 

Page. 

Page. 

Page. 

§685. 

58. 

§786. 

657. 

§882. 

465. 

6St). 

58. 

787. 

648,  656,  690,  ' 

•96. 

883. 

467. 

687. 

27,  28. 

7i^8. 

648,  690. 

884. 

467. 

688. 

30,  689,  694, 

702, 

793. 

192. 

885. 

467. 

869. 

798. 

602. 

886. 

466,  468. 

691. 

969. 

800  to  882.  776. 

887. 

470. 

0'.t2. 

568,  969. 

820. 

980. 

888. 

471. 

69.3. 

971,  975. 

824. 

585,  588,  594, 

889. 

471. 

695. 

969. 

825. 

588. 

890. 

471. 

696. 

969. 

826. 

589. 

891. 

472. 

697. 

971,  975. 

827. 

589. 

892. 

473. 

698. 

970. 

828. 

598,  599,  600, 

601, 

893. 

474. 

700. 

771. 

602,  603,  605,  006,  | 

894. 

474. 

701. 

1082,  1092. 

607, 608, 609, 

611. 

895. 

475. 

702. 

969. 

612,617,618 

619. 

890. 

475. 

703. 

1039. 

829. 

489,  598,  605, 

620, 

897. 

476. 

705. 

1039,  1083. 

622,  623,  624 

625, 

898. 

476. 

707. 

935,  966,  969. 

627,  628,  629 

630, 

899. 

476. 

708. 

100,  1037,  103 

9. 

631,  632. 

900. 

477. 

709. 

905,  907,  993, 

1025, 

830. 

629,  633. 

901. 

477. 

1082,  1097. 

831. 

592,  611,  634. 

902. 

477. 

710. 

995,  1073. 

832. 

620. 

903. 

478. 

716. 

30,  689,  701, 

704, 

833. 

612,  634. 

904. 

478. 

717. 

834. 

634. 

905. 

479,  481. 

1\1. 

455. 

835. 

592. 

906. 

480. 

718. 

180,  323,  377. 

836. 

692. 

907. 

481. 

719. 

336,  337,  338, 

378. 

837. 

592,  634. 

908. 

481. 

720. 

178,347,371. 

838. 

591,  593. 

909. 

482. 

721. 

12,  776. 

839. 

590,  613. 

911. 

183,  .384, 

489,  656, 

723. 

7,  372. 

840. 

596,  613. 

688, 74C 

,  1040. 

724. 

464,  768. 

841. 

596,  635. 

912. 

384,  489, 

688,  749, 

725. 

376,  482,  494 

,  650, 

842. 

596,  613,  635. 

1040. 

654. 

843. 

596,  613,  635. 

914. 

508,  603, 

683,  689 

726. 

781. 

844. 

596,  613,  635,  ( 

336. 

775,  80C 

. 

737. 

124. 

845. 

590,  613,  636. 

915. 

763. 

738. 

194,  571,  570. 

846. 

596,  604,  614, 

836. 

916. 

648,  794. 

740. 

40.  ■ 

848. 

616,  617,  618, 

619, 

917, 

89. 

741. 

46. 

620. 

918. 

90. 

742. 

40. 

848. 

637. 

919. 

872. 

743. 

47. 

849. 

640. 

921. 

765. 

744. 

47. 

850. 

640. 

922. 

180. 

745. 

48. 

854. 

604. 

923. 

658,  873. 

747. 

177,  198.  221, 

240. 

855. 

604,  007. 

938. 

873. 

751. 

30,  719,  724. 

858. 

256,  257,  486. 

939. 

873. 

752. 

719. 

859. 

489. 

940. 

873. 

753. 

720.  723,  724 

729, 

860. 

488. 

911. 

857. 

<.m.  989. 

801. 

461. 

945. 

482. 

751. 

739,  743. 

8(;2. 

461,  507. 

948. 

689. 

75."). 

745,  749. 

863. 

4,  490,  498,  50r 

,510, 

949. 

1074. 

75f). 

749. 

802,  951. 

954. 

177,  247, 

273,  281 

757. 

749. 

864. 

4,  498,  510,  86 

2. 

330.  68 

-.  689. 

758. 

749. 

865. 

4,498,504,510,862. 

955. 

302,  305, 

769. 

759. 

750. 

8()6. 

4,  495,  518. 

956. 

709,  1033 

im. 

743,  744,  750. 

867. 

4,  500,  706. 

9()6. 

796. 

7(il. 

750. 

8(58. 

491,  495. 

967. 

788,  790. 

7'i-'. 

719. 

8(i9. 

492. 

908. 

582,  805. 

7<;3. 

75'' 

870. 

492. 

969. 

583. 

701. 

75  r 

871. 

492. 

970. 

873. 

7<'.5. 

752,  753. 

872. 

493. 

983. 

585,  044, 

645. 

7t;(). 

745,  753 

873. 

493. 

984. 

644. 

768. 

753. 

874. 

493. 

985. 

649,  795, 

796. 

783. 

657. 

875. 

529  530,  581. 

986. 

649. 

784. 

657. 

876. 

490,  637. 

987. 

781,797. 

785. 

657. 

877. 

490. 

988. 

797. 

( 

CITATIONS. 

CXI 

Page. 

Page. 

Page. 

§989. 

797. 

§  1082. 

915. 

§  4627. 

873,  875. 

990. 

455,  764,  855. 

1083. 

915. 

4628. 

873. 

991. 

764. 

1084. 

915. 

4629. 

873,  875. 

992. 

764. 

1086. 

933. 

4630  to  4645.  873. 

993. 

795. 

1087. 

929. 

4646. 

589,  873. 

994. 

796. 

1088. 

929. 

4647. 

589,  873. 

995. 

609,  864. 

1089. 

100, 

935. 

4648. 

590,  873. 

997. 

1017,  1042,  1043, 

1090. 

933. 

4649. 

590,  873. 

1053,  1076. 

1091. 

933. 

4650. 

873. 

998. 

1016,  1017. 

1092. 

935 

4651. 

873. 

999. 

1003,  1043. 

1093. 

934. 

4652. 

873. 

1000. 

1003,  1017,  1046. 

1750. 

263, 

483. 

4777. 

979. 

1001. 

1047. 

1778. 

862. 

4799. 

58. 

1003. 

1005. 

1909. 

969. 

4886. 

301,  379. 

1004. 

1040. 

1979. 

850. 

4887. 

361,  379. 

1005. 

1041,  1061. 

2010. 

757. 

4W»8. 

113,  820. 

1007. 

795,  1047. 

2011. 

609. 

4'.t(i2. 

464. 

1008. 

648,  1037. 

2012. 

609. 

4915. 

18. 

1009. 

875,  1036. 

2013. 

596, 

609,  622. 

4917. 

570. 

1010. 

1092,  1093. 

2014. 

609. 

4918. 

290,  313,  577. 

1011. 

964. 

2139. 

983. 

4919. 

113,  114,685. 

1012. 

1046. 

2326. 

8,  1019. 

4920. 

252,  684,  685. 

1014. 

600,  607,  619. 

3220. 

898, 

899. 

4921. 

113,  114,345,358 

1017. 

995. 

3224. 

20,  a 

70. 

570. 

1025. 

983,  992. 

3228. 

899. 

4922. 

484. 

1030. 

602. 

3490. 

57. 

4969. 

684,  687. 

1042. 

620. 

3636. 

368. 

4970. 

345,  361. 

1044. 

979. 

3637. 

368. 

5013. 

262,  482. 

1049. 

876. 

3744. 

471. 

5141. 

396. 

1050. 

876. 

4063. 

457. 

5191. 

396. 

1051. 

876. 

4064. 

457. 

5195. 

396. 

1053. 

877. 

4065. 

457. 

51<.i7. 

990. 

1054. 

877. 

4066. 

457. 

5198. 

990.   I 

1055. 

877. 

4071. 

526, 

529,  531. 

5201. 

396,  980. 

1056. 

877. 

4072. 

52(i, 

529,  531. 

5205. 

396. 

1057. 

877. 

4073. 

526, 

529,  531. 

5209. 

979,  980,  982. 

1058. 

877. 

4074. 

526, 

529,  531. 

5219. 

151. 

1059. 

87,  878,  896,  901, 

4092. 

1013 

5234. 

394,  396. 

903. 

4093. 

1013 

5235. 

394,  396. 

lOGO. 

87,  879,  901,  903. 

4094. 

1013 

5236. 

394,  396. 

1001. 

879,  903. 

4095. 

1013 

5237. 

368,  394. 

10G2. 

879,  903. 

4096. 

1013 

5239. 

8. 

1063. 

880,  901. 

4251. 

854. 

5242. 

764. 

1004. 

880. 

4613. 

873. 

5298. 

049. 

1065. 

880. 

4614. 

873. 

5300. 

649. 

1006. 

880. 

4615. 

873. 

5339. 

981,  082. 

1067. 

87,  880. 

4(511). 

873. 

5347. 

982. 

1068. 

881,  902. 

4617. 

873. 

5392. 

980. 

10()9. 

901,  902. 

4618. 

873, 

874. 

5438. 

632,  992. 

1071. 

914. 

4619. 

873. 

5440. 

992. 

1072. 

99,  904. 

4620. 

873. 

5467. 

983,  992. 

1074. 

914,923. 

4621. 

873. 

5480. 

983. 

1075. 

914. 

4022. 

873. 

5508. 

981. 

1076. 

920. 

4623. 

873. 

5512. 

980. 

1077. 

914. 

4624. 

873. 

551.5. 

980,  993. 

1078. 

914. 

4625. 

873. 

5595. 

689. 

1080. 

915. 

4626. 

873, 

875. 

5590. 

689,  991. 

1081. 

915. 

CXll 


CITATIONS. 


U.   S.   STATUTES   AT   LARGE. 


Vol.  1. 

p.    81,  Chap.    20,  §  14.     740. 
82,  §  1<>.     720. 

88,  20.     507. 

§  30.     506. 
276,  36,  §    2.  506. 

332,  20.     609. 


Vol.  2. 

p.  156,  Cliap.    31,  §    6.     984. 

§  25.     506. 

244,  40,  §    2.     506. 

Vol.  4. 

p.  278,  Chap.    68.  794. 

632,  57.  720. 

659,  80.  760. 

728,  161.  9yi. 

Vol.  5. 

p.  518,  Chap.  188,  §  6.     506. 
539,  257.    720. 

Vol.  9. 

p.  631,  Chap.    41.    940,  946. 
922,  937,  938. 


Vol.  10. 

p.    308,  Chap.  103.     939,  944. 
1031,  937,  939. 


Vol.  11. 
p.  374,  Chap.  1.     939. 

Vol.  12. 

p.    71,  Chap.  167.  9.39. 

172,  59.  939. 

209,  83.  939. 

355,  41.  9.39. 

755,  81.  7.36. 

887,  66.  939. 

Vol.  13. 
p.  125,  Clinp.  123.     9.39. 


Vol.  14. 


p- 

385, 

482, 

Cliap. 

28. 

721, 

§1.     7 

736. 

722 
42. 

558, 

196. 

811. 

588, 

118. 

939. 

734, 

V 

736. 

OL.  15. 

p 

275, 

Chap. 

47. 

939. 

342, 

152. 

939. 

438, 

26. 

939. 

Vol.  16. 

p 

64, 

Chap. 

14. 

939. 

291, 

292. 

939. 

373, 

Res. 

38. 

9.39. 

740, 

Art. 

6. 

973. 

Vol.  17. 

p.  196,  Chap.  255.     508,  763. 

§  5.     775. 

509,  2'.6,  §  4.     704. 

Vol.  18. 


p.    15,  Chap 

24.     65. 

27, 

80.     965. 

53, 

214.     8.3. 

■72, 

285.     631. 

§  1.     629. 

75, 

286.     85. 

76, 

287.     77. 

113, 

3.33,  §  8.     482. 

157, 

130,  §8.     720. 

192, 

893.     883. 

195, 

401.     59. 

§  1.    60. 

§5.    59,60. 

§6.    60. 

251, 

463.      64. 

252, 

468.     876. 

253, 

469.     970. 

315, 

77.     547,  549,  969. 

§  1.     964. 

§  3.     869. 

816, 

80.     964. 

333, 

95.     596,  602,  631,  63 

§  1.     615. 

§  4.     704. 

§  6.     615. 

§  6.    615. 

§  7.     631. 

CITATIONS. 


CXlll 


p.  335,  Chap.  114,  §  5. 
371,  loO.     798, 


§«• 

470, 

137,  §  2. 

§3. 

§4- 

§5. 

§6. 

§7. 

§8. 

§i^- 

480, 

148.     80. 

481, 

149.     884 

970. 

807,  836. 

818,  826. 

835. 

845. 

200,  228,  535,  847. 

840. 

838. 

194,  571,  576. 

1033. 


Vol.  19. 
p.     4,  Chap.    11.     7-3,  77. 


61, 

147. 

61. 

68, 

156. 

394,  396. 

90, 

186. 

984. 

206, 

304. 

263,  482. 

230, 

44. 

60,  61. 

240, 

69. 

531.  706 
§2.     701. 

Vol.  20. 


p.    27,  Chap 

27.     85. 

30, 

37.     488. 

101, 

169.     77. 

§1.     52. 

§2.     52. 

§3.     52. 

§0.     52. 

14.5, 

263,  §  15.  649. 

166, 

269.     64. 

171, 

319.     885. 

173, 

322.     75. 

17-5, 

326.    68,  69. 

§1.    49. 

§2.    49,69 

§3.    49. 

175, 

326.  §4.     50. 

§  5.     50. 

§  6.     50. 

§7.   *50. 

§8.     51. 

§  9.     51. 

206, 

359.  §  17.  80. 

259, 

9.     85. 

263, 

20.     73. 

§1.     51. 

§2.     51. 

§  3.     52. 

§4.     52. 

§5.     52. 

277, 

39.  §1.     477. 

§  2.    478. 

§  3.     478. 

280, 

43.     63. 

318, 

97.    80,81,83 

320, 

99.     966. 

324, 

115.    884. 

p.  327,  Chap.  125.  §  12.  981,  989. 

354,  176.     1017. 

§  2.     1016,  1047. 

355,  177.     66. 

§1.     66. 
415,  183.    445,  555. 

592,  31.     939. 


Vol.  21. 


4. 

Chap. 

8.     992. 

10, 

18.  §  1.     80,  81,  83 

41, 

49.    62. 

43, 

52.    610. 

45, 

59.  §  1.     66. 

62, 

17.     63. 
§4.    47. 
§5.    47. 
§6.     47. 
§7.    47. 
§8.     47. 

63, 
155, 

18.     76,  77. 
§1.     53. 
§2.    53. 
§  3,     53. 
§4.     53. 
§7.     53. 
§  8.     53. 
120.     64,  65,  66. 
§1.    48. 
§2.     48. 

175, 

203.     79,  80. 
§1.     53. 
§2.     53,80. 
§3.     53. 
§4.     54. 
§5.     54. 
§7.     54. 
§8.     54. 
§  9.     54. 
§  10.  54. 

198, 

213.     80,  81,  83, 

252, 

234.    935. 

284, 

243.     890. 

308, 

Resol 

44.    482. 

324, 

Chap. 

45.     84. 

326, 

62.     83. 

330, 

71.     73. 

502, 

138.     32,  366. 
§7.     32. 

504, 

1.39.     894. 

507, 

144.     67,  68. 
§  5.    OS. 
§6.    68. 

511, 

154.     64. 
Vol.  22. 

32 

Cliap 

48.     74. 

58^ 

126.    974. 

101, 

218.     71. 

VOL.  I.  — h 


CXIV 


CITATIONS. 


p.  172,  Chap.  312.     64,  65. 
§  5.    65. 


176,             351. 

77. 

344,              436. 

634. 

402,                25. 

80. 

469,                95. 

890. 

48.5,              116. 

929. 

58-5,              141. 

895. 

603,              143. 

596,  597 

611. 

635,  Rcsol.     5. 

891. 

826. 

974. 

Vol.  23. 


1,  Cliap. 
18, 


22, 
35, 

48, 
50, 
57, 
72, 

75, 
115, 
242, 
280, 

283. 
332, 
437, 
443, 


52. 

64. 
102, 
106 

121.  §18. 
177.  §  8. 
§9. 
179.  §  8 
220, 
334 


46,  59,  60. 
§  2.    60. 
§4.     47. 
'  982. 

83. 

83. 

(•)3. 


870. 

00,  60,  83. 

83. 

GO.  06,  83. 
620,  974. 
893. 


7.     80. 
§  2.     80. 
25.    892,  929. 
164.     31,  728. 
353.     751. 
355.     966,  969,  970. 

Vol.  24. 


8,  Chap. 

80, 

83, 
106, 
127, 
214, 
253, 
274, 
308, 
336, 
379, 
400, 
406, 
423, 
424, 
428, 
430, 
442, 

605, 


28. 


94. 


421,  §4.     870. 


422. 

581. 
745. 
848. 
902. 
903. 
928. 
931. 
104. 
137. 
139. 
269. 
271. 
273. 
279. 
315. 

359. 


60. 

62. 

71. 

61. 

610. 

617, 

61. 

78. 

369. 

75. 

61. 

69. 


618. 


r3. 


§1- 

§2. 

§6. 


61. 
71. 

63,  64. 
3.     64. 

31,  58,  87,   004, 
929. 

96,  97. 

96. 

882. 

100. 

98. 

98,  99. 


p.  505,  Chap.  359,  §  7. 

§8. 

§^»- 
§10. 

§12. 
§  13. 
§  14. 
§  15. 


509, 
552, 


881, 


373. 


596. 


438, 


44:!, 
545, 
655, 


671, 
676, 


690, 
(•)93. 

783, 


855, 


99. 
915. 

100,  969,  1039. 
100,    602,    1037, 

1039. 
882. 
883. 
883. 

100,  583. 
610,  622,  629. 
30,  32,  189,  21.3,  228, 
805,  806,  818.  826, 
835,  838,  840,  845, 
850. 
§  1.     32,  44,  54. 
434,  804. 
2.30,  436,  584. 
35,  39. 
31. 
44.5,  555. 


§2. 
§3. 

H. 

§5. 
§7. 


p.    78,  Chap. 


151, 
357, 
857, 


388, 


389, 

392, 
433, 


Vol.  25. 

58.     71. 
127.     65. 
129,  §1.     72. 
261,  §1.     85. 
728. '  31,  58,  790,  800. 
729.     789,  791. 


§1. 


789,  §  1. 
§2. 

§3. 

§7. 


788. 

792,  793. 

67. 

50. 

50. 

50. 


792.     82,  66,  67. 

§  2.  49. 
817,  §1.  66. 
866.     32,  43,  826. 

§2.     434. 


§3- 
869.     67 


36,  430,  819. 

6S. 

4'.  I. 

49. 

49. 


§«• 

891,  §1.     7-3. 
1069.     636. 

113.  59,60.78,85. 
§  .5.     loco. 

§6.     1042.    1047,   10-50. 
1060,  1074. 

114.  970. 


§5- 


1039. 


48.  63. 

59,  73,  76,  79 

58,  339. 

804 


168. 
180. 

§21 

§22 
20,5.     6:;. 

2:-^6.     8-50,  971,  10 
333.     60. 

§17. 

§18. 
382.     369 

§10. 


85. 


80.  81,  82,  8.3. 

80,  81.  82,  83. 

704. 


CITATIONS. 


cxv 


Vol.  26. 

p.  826  Ciiap 

517 

§6. 

718,  866,  869,  966, 
968,  969,  972, 

3,  Chap 

.   5.  83. 

1007, 1026, 1036. 

14, 

23,  §  2.  79. 
§3.  79. 

§7. 

1007,  1017,  1018, 
1039,  1050. 

§4.  52. 

§10. 

1007,  1082,  1083, 

§5.  79. 

1092. 

17, 

28.  61. 

§11- 

866,  1008,  1939, 

45, 

65,  §  3.  85. 
<5  4.  52. 

1048,    1082, 
1083,  1092. 

5}  6.  85. 

§12. 

30,  689,  704,  870, 

67, 

161,  §2.  76. 

1008. 

§3.  76. 

§13. 

967,  1008,  1083. 

§4-  51. 

§14. 

969. 

71, 

165.  78. 

§15. 

58,  339,  1008, 

7:^, 

167,  §  1.  69,70. 

1010,  1083. 

§2.  51. 

851, 

680 

.  S9L 

). 

§4.  70. 

854, 

539 

.    87, 

937.  939. 

106, 

202.  72,73. 

§1- 

943,  951,  954. 

129, 

403.  66. 

§^- 

943. 

§2.  48. 

§3. 

943. 

138, 

407.  31. 

§4. 

953. 

§15.  971,  1037,  1046, 

§5- 

953. 

1074. 

§6. 

88,  944,  945,  947, 

180, 

631.  59. 

948,  949,  950, 

209, 

647.  31,  46,  368. 

967. 

§  5.  188,  189. 

§7. 

88,  944,  960,  957. 

212, 

650.  635. 

§8- 

88,  89,  945,  946, 

212, 

651.  64. 

947,  948. 

217, 

656,  §  16.  63,  339. 

§9. 

959,  961. 

225, 

C(J4,  §  16.  58,  86,  339. 

§10. 

951,  960,  961. 

316, 

664.  802. 

§11. 

94.5,947,948,949. 

369, 

818.  72,  73. 

§12. 

948,  961,  9.57. 

474, 

922.  84. 

§13. 

945,  946,  958. 

767, 

262.  64,  6-5. 

§14. 

946,946,951,957, 

826, 

517,  §  2.  598,  1040. 

961. 

<<  4.  1005,  1015. 

§15. 

944. 

§5.  875,  965,  1006, 

§19. 

943,  913. 

1042. 

1084, 

551 

31. 

1119, 

566 

.  63. 

U.   S.   EQUITY   RULES. 

[See  pages  1253-1277.] 


Page. 

P.^GE. 

Page. 

2. 

200,  322. 

15. 

186,  187,  6.58. 

27. 

146,  2.66. 

3. 

324. 

16. 

186,  188. 

28. 

274. 

4. 

322,  324,  653. 

17. 

200. 

29. 

242,  249,  274,  311, 

5. 

322,  336. 

18. 

201,202,206,217,239, 

30. 

274. 

6. 

324,  328,  3.36. 

241.  260,  463. 

31. 

221,2.34,240. 

7. 

183,  18-5,  659. 

19. 

202,  204,  463. 

.32. 

210,217,226,241,254. 

8. 

579,647,650,653,657, 

20. 

143. 

.33. 

242,  248,  271. 

659. 

21. 

143,160,168,169,171, 

34. 

220,  223,  224,  225. 

9. 

669. 

377,  441,  457,  496. 

3.5. 

245,  249,  275. 

10. 

647,  653. 

22. 

124.  161. 

36. 

211,212,246. 

11. 

185. 

23. 

176. 

37. 

211,212,246. 

12. 

183,  184,  185, 

201. 

24. 

17fi,  21.5. 

38. 

222,  243,  270,  534. 

13. 

187. 

25. 

000. 

39. 

211.  216,  228,  241,250 

14. 

186. 

26. 

116,  140,  2-56. 

258,  261. 

cxvi 

CITATIONS. 

Page. 

Paoe. 

Page. 

40. 

171. 

59. 

263. 

77. 

557,  560,  561. 

41. 

170,  171,  173,  256. 

60. 

282. 

78. 

506,  560. 

42. 

170. 

61. 

264. 

79. 

447,  558. 

43. 

171. 

62. 

261. 

80. 

560. 

44. 

216,  258,  261. 

63. 

265. 

81. 

560. 

45. 

26U,  275. 

64. 

266. 

82. 

555,  561,  562,  65( 

46. 

281. 

65. 

266. 

83. 

662,  668. 

47. 

124.  , 

66, 

242,  270,  534. 

84. 

504. 

48. 

121. 

67. 

149,  501,  503,  504,  506, 

85. 

664. 

49. 

118. 

507,  508,  517,  534. 

86. 

577. 

60. 

134. 

68. 

506,  509. 

87. 

92,  94,  107,  108. 

51. 

115,  132. 

69. 

504,  506,  534. 

88. 

667. 

52. 

137,  234,  544 

70. 

498,  500. 

90. 

601. 

53. 

137,  544. 

72. 

294. 

91. 

202,  482. 

55. 

323,  874,  377. 

73. 

554,  579. 

92. 

575,  579,  647. 

56. 

186,  304. 

74. 

555. 

93. 

1050. 

57. 

315,  319. 

75. 

555,  557,  558. 

94. 

26,  160,  177,  343. 

58. 

303,  314. 

76. 

561. 

U.   S.   SUPREME   COURT   RULES. 

[See  pages  1292-1310.] 


Page. 

Page. 

Page. 

o 
'J. 

683. 

14. 

853,  1059. 

26. 

1073,  1074,  1075. 

4. 

786. 

15. 

858,  1035,  1063. 

27. 

1072. 

5. 

183,  188,  1040. 

16. 

853,  1063,  1066,  1077. 

28. 

1064. 

6. 

321.  1067,  1068,  1069, 

17. 

853,  1077. 

29. 

1048,  1049. 

1073,  1078. 

18. 

853,  1064,  1078. 

30. 

1079. 

8. 

1040,  1043,  1054,  1055, 

19. 

853,  1064,  1075. 

81. 

1072. 

1056,  1057,  1069. 

20. 

1072,  1075,  1077,  1078. 

82. 

1073. 

9 

1040,  1057,  1058,  1063. 

21. 

1064,  1073,  1076,  1077, 

33. 

1057. 

10. 

597,  641,  650,  1058, 

1078. 

34. 

752,  753,  1051. 

1071. 

22. 

1078. 

35. 

1043,  1053, 1059,  1076 

11. 

1056. 

28. 

1092,  1093. 

36. 

1042,  1051. 

12. 

858. 

24. 

583,  596. 

37. 

973. 

13. 

4bn,  853. 

25. 

504. 

U.  S.  CIRCUIT   COURT   OF   APPEALS   RULES. 

[See  pages  1311-1327.] 


Page. 

Page. 

10. 

786. 

17. 

1064. 

11. 

868,  1076,  1077. 

20. 

1064. 

18. 

86«. 

21. 

1078. 

14. 

10.-.J,  1055,  1056,  1057, 

22. 

1063,  1064. 

10.-i8. 

28^ 

584,641,  1071. 

15. 

1056. 

24. 

1064,  1076,  1077,  107 

16. 

1058,  1075. 

Page. 

25.  1078. 

26.  1072. 
29.  1079. 

80.  1092,  1093. 

81.  588. 
34.  1057. 


CITATIONS. 


CXVll 


U.   S.   ADMIRALTY   RULES. 

[See  pages  1278-1291.] 


Page. 


1.  851. 

2.  854. 
5.  856. 
7.  854. 
9.  853. 

10.  856,  8G4. 

11.  855,  856. 
22.  851,  873. 
2.3.  851,  860. 

24.  860. 

25.  856. 


26.  855,  856. 

27.  859. 

28.  859,  860. 

29.  855. 

31.  860. 

32.  860,  861. 
34.  865. 

36.  859. 

37.  854, 855. 

41.  864. 

42.  864. 


Paqk. 

43.  865. 

47.  855. 

48.  859. 

49.  868. 

52.  868,  1056. 

53.  860. 

54.  871. 

55.  872. 

56.  872. 

57.  871. 
69.  858. 


U.   S.   COURT   OF  CLAIMS  RULES. 

[See  pages  1329-1348.] 


Page. 

1.  913. 

2.  913. 

3.  913. 

4.  913. 

5.  913. 

6.  913. 

7.  904,  905,  906. 

8.  905. 

9.  905. 

10.  905. 

11.  905. 

12.  90.5. 

13.  906. 

14.  924. 

15.  910. 

16.  910,  911. 

17.  911. 

18.  911. 

19.  923. 

20.  923. 

21.  92.3. 

22.  923. 

23.  924. 

24.  916. 
2-5.  916. 

26.  916. 

27.  916. 

28.  916. 

29.  916. 

30.  917. 

31.  917. 

32.  918. 

33.  918. 


Page. 

34.  918. 

35.  918. 

36.  918. 

37.  918. 

38.  919. 

39.  919. 

40.  919. 

41.  919. 

42.  919. 

43.  919. 

44.  920. 

45.  920. 

46.  920. 

47.  920. 

48.  920. 

49.  920. 

50.  921. 

51.  924,  925,  926. 

52.  92.5. 

53.  925. 

54.  925. 

55.  925. 

56.  92.5. 

57.  926. 

58.  926. 

59.  926. 

60.  926. 

61.  926. 

62.  926. 

63.  921. 

64.  921. 
05.  921. 
66.  921. 


Page. 


67. 

921. 

68. 

922. 

69. 

922. 

70. 

906. 

71. 

906. 

72. 

906. 

73. 

911. 

74. 

924. 

75. 

924. 

76. 

929. 

77. 

930. 

78. 

930. 

79. 

930. 

80. 

930. 

81. 

9.30. 

82. 

936. 

83. 

936. 

90. 

924. 

93. 

906. 

94. 

906. 

95. 

906. 

96. 

907. 

97. 

907. 

99. 

922. 

100. 

926. 

101. 

922. 

102. 

923. 

103. 

923. 

104. 

923. 

105. 

908. 

106. 

928. 

107. 

908. 

CXVlll 


CITATIONS. 


RULES   ON   APPEALS  FROM   COURT   OF   CLAIMS. 


Page, 


1.  9;36. 

2.  930. 


[See  pages  1328,  1329.  J 

Page. 

3.  936. 

4.  936. 


5.     936. 


RULES   OF   COURT   OF   PRIVATE   LAND    CLAIMS. 

[See  pages  13-49-1352.] 


Page. 

Page 

1. 

2. 
3. 

948,  94H,  9G0. 

949,  960. 
950. 

4. 
5. 
6. 

954. 
904. 
954. 

Page. 

7.  950. 

8.  •  950. 


FEDERAL  EQUITY  PRACTICE. 


CHAPTER   I. 

JURISDICTION. 


§  1.  Equitable  Jurisdiction  in  General.  —  Equity  is  that  system 
of  jurisprudence  wliich  was  administered  by  the  High  Court  of 
Chancery  of  England  in  the  exercise  of  its  extraordinary  juris- 
diction,^ and  which  has  been  amplified  and  extended  by  the  more 
modern  decisions  of  the  English  and  American  courts.  It  owed 
its  origin  to  a  desire  upon  the  part  of  the  English  sovereigns 
and  their  chancellors  to  supplement  the  deficiencies  and  soften 
the  rigors  of  the  common  law  ;  and  whereas  the  well-springs  of 
this  were  such  of  the  customs  of  the  German  tribes  as  had  been 
brought  with  them  from  their  Fatherland  by  the  Jutes  and 
Angles ;  ^  those  of  that,  which  was  administered  at  first  ex- 
clusively by  ecclesiastics,  are  in  the  canon,  which  was  itself 
derived  from  the  greatest  monument  of  the  genius  of  ancient 
Rome,  the  civil  law.^  Since  the  time  of  Nottingham,  before 
whom  each  succeeding  chancellor  had  decided  the  cases  brought 
before  him  in  accordance  with  his  own  notions  of  what  was 
proper,  or  in  the  language  of  Selden,*  measured  justice  out  by 
the  length  of  his  foot,  the  same  respect  has  been  paid  to  pre- 
cedent in  the  courts  of  equity  and  common  law.  But  the  rules 
regulating  the  remedies  administered  by  the  former  are  much 
more  plastic.  And  even  at  the  present  time  cases  often  occur 
where  judges  sitting  at  equity,  with  the  approval  and  assistance 
of  the  profession,  invent  and  adopt  new  remedies  suited  to  a 
state  of  society  and  of  civilization  unknown  and  not  anticipated 
when   the  procedure  in  chancery  first  assumed  the  form  that 

§1.  ^  Mitford's  Pleadings;  Bispham's  ^  Langdell's  Equity  Pleading,  Intro- 

Equity,  §  1.  dilation. 

2  Holmes'  Com.  Law.  «  Selden's  Table  Talk,  Title  Equity. 

VOL.  I.  —  1 


2  JUEISDICTION.  [chap.  I. 

it   still   substantially  retains.^      The    chronicles   of  the   growth 
and  development  of  equity  abound  with  names  well  known  to 
the  students,  as  well   of  general  history  as   of  jurisprudence. 
Among   them   Wolsey,    More,   Bacon,   Clarendon,   Somers,  and 
Erskine  are  the  most  familiar  to  the  former,  while  the  members 
of  the  profession  look  back  with  especial  admiration  upon  the 
careers    of   Nottingham,    Hardwicke,    Eldon,  Westbury,    Kent, 
Story,  and  Taney.     Although  originally  no  one  could  seek  then- 
aid  who  was  not  denied  justice  by  the  courts  of  common  law  ; 
yet  after  he  had  once  shown  a  title  to  their  assistance,  courts  of 
equity  would  almost  always  give  a  suitor  complete  relief  in  the 
matter  about  which  he  complained.^    And  now  that  since  the  time 
of  Mansfield  the  courts  of  common  law  have,  abandoning  their 
former  jealousy,  in  many  instances  of  their  own  accord  as  well  as 
under  the  compulsion  of  statutes,  accepted  doctrines  first  created 
by  courts  of  equity ,''  the  latter  have  not  felt  obliged  to  relin- 
quish the  jurisdiction  which  they  formerly  acquired.^     One  of  the 
marked  characteristics  which  distinguish  equity  from  the  common 
law,  is  that,  while  the  latter,  as  a  general  rule,  acts  against  and 
exercises  control  over  property  alone ;   has  but  a  very  limited 
and  merely  incidental  power,  mostly  borrowed  from  chancery, 
to  enforce  obedience  to  a  personal  command,  its  procedure  being 
founded  upon  the   theory  that  the  parties  to  an  action  owe  no 
obedience  to  the  court ;  ^  and  is  consequently  restricted  in  its 
operation  when  the  property  which  is  the  subject  of  a  contention 
is  beyond  the  reach  of  its  process:  equity  acts  directly  against 
and  exercises  complete  control  over  persons,  and  does  not  lose 
jurisdiction  when  the  parties  are  subject  to  its  process,  because 
the  property  over  which  it  thereby  assumes  control  is  beyond 
the    territory    under    those    laws    whence    its    own    power    is 
derived.^^ 

5  Kennedy  v.  St.  Paul  &  Pacific  Rail-  ^  Langdell's  Eq.  PI.  §  40. 

road  Company,  2  Dillon,  448;   Wallace  i*  Archer  v.  Preston,   1  Eq.  Cas.  Ab. 

V.  Looniis,  97  U.  8.  14G  ;  Joy  (;.  St.  Louis,  l."3,  pi.  3,  cited  and  followed  in  Arglasse 

138  U.  S.  1,50.  V.   Muschanip,   1    Vernon,    75;    s.    c.    1 

G  1  Fonblanque's  I^quity,  b.  i.  chap.  i.  Vernon,   135 ;    Penn  v.  Lord  Baltimore, 

§  3,  vote  (/);  Motteux  v.  The   London  1    Vesey    Sr.  444;    RLissie   v.   Watts,   li 

Assurance  Co.,   1    Atk.   545;    Tayloe  v.  Cranch,  14H ;  Muller  v.  Dows,  04  U.   S. 

The  Merchants'  Fire  Ins.   Co.,  9   How.  444,  at  pages  449-450.     The  authorities 

390"  405.  'ire  well  collected  in  a  learned  opinion  by 

^  Moses  y.  IVLacferlan,  2  Burrow,  1005;  ^udge,  subsequently  Chief  Judcc  Henry 

Dickerson  v.  Coljrrove,  100  U.  S.  578.  E.  Davies,  in  Gardner  v.  Ogden,  22  N.  Y. 

»  Putnam  v.  New  Albany,  4   Bissell,  327.     Cf.  Carpenter  r.  Strange,  141  U.  S. 

365.  87,  106  ;  cited  w/ra,  §  325. 


§  2.]      SURVEY   OF   THE   JUEISDICTION    OF   COURTS    OF    EQUITY.  3 

§  2.  General  Survey  of  the  Jurisdiction  of  Courts  of  Equity.  — 
The  jurisdiction  of  courts  of  equity  is  exercised  either  for  the 
protection  of  rights  which  the  common  law  does  not  recognize  ; 
or  for  the  prevention  or  redress  of  wrongs  for  which  the  common 
law  affords  no  adequate  remedy.  A  full  consideration  of  this 
topic  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  treatise.  The  following  sum- 
mary, although  imperfect,  may  occasionally  assist  the  reader. 
The  rights  which  a  court  of  equity  alone  respects  are :  the  rights 
of  beneficiaries  under  a  trust,^  either  express  or  implied,  —  which 
latter  term  includes  those  which  are  resulting^  or  constructive:'^ 
the  right  to  be  relieved  from  an  obligation  wliich  has  been  en- 
tered into,  or  to  recover  a  right  which  has  been  lost  by  accident, 
—  whicli  expression  is  said  to  include  the  cases  where  one  has 
become  subject  to  a  penalty  or  forfeiture,'^  or  has  lost  a  document 
the  possession  of  which  was  essential  to  his  success  in  a  legal 
action,^  and  is  also  often  used  to  bolster  up  a  weak  equity  of 
another  kind  —  ;  °  by  mistake,  —  which  must  be  mutual,  material, 
and  not  caused  by  the  negligence  of  the  part}'  seeking  relief,"  and 
which,  if  solely  of  a  point  of  law,  will  very  rarely  release  one 
from  his  contract  obligations  —  ;^  by  fraud,  whether  actual^  or 
constuctive ;  ^'^  or  by  duress  r^^  and  the  rights  of  those  who  are 
justly  entitled  to  compel  election  under  a  will,  or  an  adjustment  of 

§  2.    1  Sturt  V.  Mellish,   2  Atk.  610 ;  page    286 ;      Stephenson    v.    Wilson,    2 

New  Orleans  i'.  Morris,  105  U.  S.  600.  Vern.  325. 

2  Dyer  i'.  Dyer,  2  Cox  Eq.  Cas.  92 ;  8  Hunt    v.    Ronsmanier's    Admrs.,    8 

Hoxie  V.  Carr,  1  Sumner,  187.  Wheaton,  174,  215;   s.  c.  1  Peters,  1,  14; 

8  National    Bank    v.   Insurance    Co.,  Snell   v.   Insurance  Company,  98   U.  S. 

104  U.  S.  54,  64-71.  85;    Pitcher    v.    Hennessey,    48    N.    Y. 

*  1  Spence  Eq.  629,  630;   Bisphani's  415;   Adair  v.  Brimmer,  74   N.  Y.  539; 

Eq.     §    178.        Mortgages    are    included  Relief  Fire  Insurance  Co.   v.  Shaw,   94 

under  this  head,  Mitford's  PI.  118-276;  U.   S.  574;    Allen  v.  Galloway,  30  Fed. 

Story's  Eq.  Jur.  §  89.  R.  466 ;   Cooper  v.  Phibbs,  L.   R.  2   H. 

5  Savannah  National  Bank  v.  Haskins,  L.  170  ;  Elliott  v.  Sacket,  108  U.  S.  132, 
101  Mass.  370 ;    Donaldson  i'.  Williams,  142. 

50    Mo.    408;    Story's   Eq.    Jur.   §84;  9  Cobbeltiom  v.  William,  Chan.  Cal. 

Bispham's  Eq.  §§  176,  177.  II.:  Stonehouse  v.  Starishaw,  Chan.  Cal. 

6  Story's  Eq.  Jur.  §§90-99;  Bispham's  XXIX.;   Bief  v.  Dyer,  Chan.   Cal.  XI  ; 
Eq.  §§  182,  183.     Cases  where  this  head  Bacon  v.  Bronson,  7  Johns.  Ch.  (N.  Y.) 
of  equity  is  invoked  for  relief  against  a  194;  Jones  v.  Bolles,  9  Wall.  364. 
defective  execution  of  a  power   are  in-  lO  Mackreth  (•.  Fox,  4  Bro.  P.  C.  258; 
eluded  here.  E.r  parte  Lacey,  6  Ves.  625 ;  Villa  v.  Rodri- 

'  Bispham's  Eq.  §  191 ;  Whittemore  v.  guez,  12  Waif.  323,  .339. 
Farrington,  76  N.  Y.  452  ;    McFerran  _  r.  n  Nicholls   i'.   Nicholls,   1    Atk.   409; 

Taylor,  3  Cranch,  281;  Elliott  v.  Sack-  Gould  v.  Okeden,  4  Bro.  P.  C.  198;  Ba- 

ett.  108  U.  S.  132;    Duke  of  Beaufort  v  kcr  i\  Morton,  12  Wall.  150. 
Neeld,    12    Clark    &    Finnelly,    248,    at 


4  JURISDICTION.  [CIIAP.  I. 

liabilities,^^  —  under  which  terra  are  included  set-off,^^  contribu- 
tion,^*  exoneration,^^  and  marshalling  of  securities.^''  The  cases 
where  the  jurisdiction  of  equity  is  exercised  merely  for  the  sake 
of  the  remedy  are  where  its  interposition  is  needed  to  assist  in 
obtaining  a  judgment  at  law  by  compelling  a  discovery  from  a 
defendant,^"  or  the  perpetuation  of  the  testimony  of  witnesses,^^ 
or  their  examination  abroad,^'-*  when  it  is  feared  that,  on  account 
of  death,  illness,  or  absence,  they  cannot  be  obliged  to  attend  upon 
the  trial ;  to  satisfy  a  judgment  out  of  propert}'  of  a  debtor  which 
cannot  be  reached  by  an  execution  ;  "^^  to  prevent  a  threatened 
breach  of  a  right,^^  or  compel  the  performance  of  a  duty ,^2  the 
commission  or  omission  of  which,  respectively,  would  inflict  such 
an  irreparable  injur}^  upon  a  person,  that  a  judgment  for 
damages,  or  the  cumbrous  legal  process  of  ejectment,  replevin, 
detinue,  or  account  render,  would  be  no  adequate  remedy  for 
the  loss  thereby  occasioned  ;  to  prevent  a  needless  multiplicity 
of  suits  ;^^  and  to  compel  the  cancellation  or  execution  of  instru- 
ments,^*  the  existence  or  want  of  wliicli  is  a  cloud  upon,  or  an 
apparent  flaw  in  a  person's  title,  or  would  render  it  diflicult  for 
him  to  resist  an  unjust  demand,  or  to  dispose  of  property  by  sale. 
§  3.  Constitutional  Provisions  affecting  the  Jurisdiction  of  the 
Federal  Courts. —  The  Constitution  of  the  United  States  provides 
that,  "  The  judicial  power"  of  the  United  States  "  shall  extend  to 

1- Arnold  I'.  Kempstcad,!  Ambler,  4GG;  Dursley  r.   Berkcle.v,  6   Ves.  2ol.     See 

Jones  V.  Collier,  2  Ambler,  730;  Herbert  U.  S.  Rev.  Stat.  §§  8G3-867. 

V.  Wren,  7  Crancli,  370,  378.  i'-*  Moodalay  v.  Morton,  1  Bro.  C.C.  469. 

13  Chapman  v.  Derby,  2  Vcrn.   117;  -"  Angell  i".  Draper,  1  Vern.  399  ;  Seot- 

Lord  Lanesboroufrh  v.  Jones,  1  P.  Wms.  tisli  American  ^Mortgage  Co.  v.  Follans- 

325  ;    2   Story's    Equity    Jurisprudence,  bee,  14  Fed.  II.  125. 

§  1433;  Story,  J.,  in  Greene  v.  Darling,  -^  Robinson r.  Lord  Byron,  1  Bro. C.C. 

5  Mason,  201 '  207-213.  588  :  Osborn  v.  Bank  of  the  United  States, 

1*  Layer  v.  Nelson,  1  Vern.  45G  ;  How-  9  Wlieat.  738. 
ards  V.  Selden,  5  Federal  Reporter,  4G5,  --  Stribley   v.   Ilawkie,    3    Atk.   275; 

473.  Huguenin  I'.  Baseley,  15  Ves.  180 ;  Hunt 

15  Gallon    V.   Hancock,   2    Atk.   425;  v.  Rousmanier's  Admrs.,  1   Tot.  1;  Wil- 

Walker   v.   Jackson,  2  Atk.   G25 ;  Bank  lard  y.  Tayloe,  8  Wall.  557. 
of  U.  S.  V.  Beverly,  1  How.  134, 151.  '^^  Freeman    v.    Pontrell,    Chan.    Cal. 

!•;  Aldrich   v.    Cooper,    8    Ves.    394;  XIII.;  Earl  of  Bath  v.   Sherwin,  4  Bro. 

Trimmer  f.  Bayne,  9  Ves.  209;  1  Story's  P.  C.  373;    Woods  v.  Monroe,  17  Mich. 

Eq.  Jur.  §  G33.  238  ;  Cummings  v.  National  Hank,  101  U. 

1'  Finch   V.   Finch,   2   Ves.    Sr.    492;  8.153;  Dodge  r.  Briggs,  27  Fed.  R.  IGl. 
Moodalay  v.  Morton,  1  Bro.  C.  C.  4G9;  24  pierce  v.  Webb  &  Stalker,  note  to 

Brown    v.    Swann,    10    Pet.    497,    500:  Ryan    v.    Mackmath,  3   Bro.    C.  C.  15; 
Heath  v.  Erie  Rv.,  9  Blatchf.  316.            .,  Peake  v.  Highfield,  1  Russ.  559,  and  cases 

18  Earl  of  Suffolk  v.  Green,  1  Atk.  450  ;  cited  ;  Bunce  v.  Gallagher,  5  Blatchf.  C.C. 

Pearson  v.  Ward,  1  Cox  Eq.  177 ;  Lord  481  ;  Boyce  v.  Grundy,  3  Pet.  210. 


§  4.]    DISTINCTION  BETWEEN  LAW  AND  EQUITY  IN  FEDERAL  COURTS.    5 

all  Cases  in  Law  and  Equity,  arising  under  this  Constitution,  the 
Laws  of  the  United  States,  and  Treaties  made,  or  which  shall  be 
made,  under  their  Authority  ;  to  all  Cases  affecting  Ambassadors, 
other  public  Ministers  and  Consuls ;  to  all  Cases  of  Admiralty 
and  maritime  Jurisdiction  ;  to  Controversies  to  which  the  United 
States  shall  be  a  Party ;  to  Controversies  between  two  or  more 
States  ;  between  a  State  and  Citizens  of  another  State  ;  between 
Citizens  of  different  States ;  between  Citizens  of  the  same  State 
claiming  Lands  under  Grants  of  different  States;  and  between  a 
State,  or  the  Citizens  thereof,  and  foreign  States,  Citizens,  or 
Subjects."  1  But  "  the  Judicial  power  of  the  United  States  shall 
not  be  construed  to  extend  to  any  suit  in  law  or  equity,  com- 
menced or  prosecuted  against  one  of  the  United  States  by 
Citizens  of  another  State,  or  by  Citizens  or  Subjects  of  any 
Foreicrn  State."  ^  "  In  all  cases  affectino-  Ambassadors,  other 
public  Ministers,  and  Consuls,  and  those  in  which  a  State  shall 
be  Party,  the  Supreme  Court  shall  have  original  Jurisdiction,"  ^ 
although  "  such  inferior  Courts  as  the  Congress  may  from  time 
to  time  ordain  and  establish  "  *  may  also  have  original  juris- 
diction thereof.^  "  In  all  the  other  Cases  before  mentioned,  the 
Supreme  Court  shall  have  appellate  Jurisdiction,  both  as  to 
Law  and  Fact,  with  such  Exceptions  and  under  such  Regula- 
tions as  the  Congress  shall  make."^  In  no  other  cases  can  it 
have  original  jurisdiction.^ 

§  4.  The  Distinction  bet-wreen  Law  and  Equity  in  the  Federal 
Courts.  —  The  fact  that  those  who  framed  the  Constitution 
thought  it  necessary  to  separately  mention  law  and  equity,  when 
blocking  out  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Federal  courts,  has  caused 
many  judges  to  think,  and  even  to  say  in  their  opinions,  that  it 
was  thereby  evidently  intended  that  these  branches  of  the  law 
should    always  be   kept  apart.^     The   better  opinion,   however, 

§  3.   1  Tlie  Constitution,  art.  iii.  §  2.  "  Marbnry  r.  INIadison,  1  Cranch,  137; 

■■^  Eleventh  Amendment  to  tlie  Consti-  Ex  parte  Vallandigham,  1  Wall.  243. 

tutinn.  §  4.   1  Parsons  c.  Bedford,  3  Pet.  43.'3  ; 

3  The  Constitution,  art.  iii.  §  2.  Bennett   v.   Butterwortli,   11    How.   669, 

i  lb.  §  1.  674 ;  Hipp  v.  Babin,  19  How.  271,  at  page 

°  Ames  y.  Kansas,  111  U.  S.  440;  BiJrs  277;  Fenn  v.  Holme,  21  How.  481,480; 

I'.  Preston,  111  U.  S.  252  ;  United  States  v.  Costs  in  Civil  Cases,  1  Blatchf.  C.  C  652. 

Kavara,  2  Dallas,  297  ;  Gittings  v.  Craw-  654  ;  Butler  r.  Young,  1  Flippin,  276,  278; 

ford,   Taney's  Decisions,  1 ;    St.   Luke's  Meade  v.  Beale,  Taney,  339,  at  page  ?.61  ; 

Hospital  V.  Barclay,  3  Blatcbf.  259  ;  Gra-  Thompson  v.  Railroad  Companies,  6  Wall. 

ham  V.  Stucken,4  Blatchf.  50.  134;  Reubens  v.  Joel,  13  N.  Y.  488,  at 

6  The  Constitution,  art.  iii.  §  2.  page  497. 


6  JURISDICTION.  [chap.  I. 

seems  to  be  that  this  distinction  between  law  and  equity  is  en- 
forced by  the  Constitution  only  to  the  extent  to  which  the  Seventh 
Amendment  forbids  any  infringement  of  the  right  of  trial  by  jury, 
as  fixed  by  the  common  law.^  Yet,  although  a  great  number  of 
the  States  of  the  American  Union,  and  even  England  itself,  has 
fused  together  the  two  systems,  in  the  courts  of  the  United  States, 
w^hile  the  same  judges  have  jurisdiction  in  each,  the  common  law 
and  equity  are  still  as  distinct  as  they  were  in  the  time  of  Coke 
and  Bacon. 

§  5.  General  Rules  affecting  the  Jurisdiction  in  Equity  of  the 
Federal  Courts.  —  The  jurisdiction  in  equity  of  the  Federal  courts 
is,  subject  to  the  limitations  of  the  Constitution,  substantially  the 
same  as  that  of  the  English  Court  of  Chancery ;  ^  although,  in  the 
absence  of  special  statutory  authority,  they  do  not  exercise  those 
powers  not  judicial  which  were  exercised  over  the  persons  and 
estates  of  infants,  idiots,  lunatics,  and  charities  by  the  Lord  Chan- 
cellor, as  the  representative  of  the  sovereign  and  by  virtue  of  the 
latter's  prerogative  as  parens  j^atrice?  It  was  said  by  Chief  Jus- 
tice Taney  that  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  grants  only 
judicial  power  at  law  and  in  equity  to  its  courts  ;  that  is,  powers 
at  that  time  understood  and  exercised  as  judicial,  in  the  courts  of 
common  law  and  equity  in  England.  "And  it  must  be  construed 
according  to  the  meaning  which  the  words  used  conveyed  at  the 
time  of  its  adoption  ;  and  the  grant  of  power  cannot  be  enlarged 
by  resorting  to  a  jurisdiction  which  the  Court  of  Chancery  in  Eng- 
land, centuries  ago,  may  have  claimed  as  a  part  of  its  ordinary 
judicial  power,  but  which  had  been  abandoned  and  repudiated  as 
untenable  on  that  ground,  l)y  the  court  itself,  long  before  the  Con- 
stitution was  adopted."  2  The  same  judge  also  said  that  it  was 
undoubtedly  true,  in  regard  to  equitable  rights,  that  the  power  of 
the  courts  of  chancery  of  the  United  States  is,  under  the  Con- 

-  Mr.  Justice  Matthews  in  Root  r.  Kail-  ^  pQ^itain  ?•.  Ravenel,  17  How.  .3G9,  at 

way   Co.,  105  U.  S.  189,  206.     Compare  papc  o91  ;  Loring   t-.   Marsh,  2    Clifford, 

Ex  parti;  Boyd,  105  U.  S.  647.  409,  at  page  492;  In  re  Barry,  42  Fed.  K. 

§  5.  ^  Robinson  i\  Campbell,  .3  Wlieat.  113;  In  re  Burrus,  Petitioner,   13(5  U.  S. 

212,    at   page   221 ;    Fenn   v.   Holme,    21  580.     But   see  the  Late   Corporation  of 

How.  481,  at  page  484;  Meade  r.  Beale,  The   Church  of  Jesus  Christ   of   Latter 

Taney,  339,  at  page  ?>CA  ;  Gordon  v.  Ho-  Day  Saints  v.  United  States,  13G  U.  S. 

bart,  2  Sumner,  401,  at  page  405;  Fletcher  1,  51,  56;  s.  c.  140  U.  S.  605. 

V.  Morey,  2  Story,  5-55,  at  page  507 ;  Root  ^     ^  Chief  Justice  To.ney  in   Fontain  v. 

V.  Railway  Company,  105  U.  S.  189,  at  Ravenel,  17  How.  360,  394,  395. 
page  207. 


§  5.]  EXTENT   OF   FEDERAL   EQUITABLE   JURISDICTION.  7 

stitution,  to  be  regulated  by  the  law  of  the  English  chancery  ;  that 
is  to  say,  the  distinction  between  law  and  equity  as  recognized  in 
the  jurisprudence  of  England  is  to  be  observed  in  the  courts  of 
the  United  States,  in  administering  the  remedy  for  an  existing 
right.  The  rule  applies  to  the  remedy  and  not  the  right ;  and  it 
does  not  follow  that  every  right  given  by  the  English  law,  and 
which  at  the  time  the  Constitution  was  adopted  might  have  been 
enforced  in  the  Court  of  Chancery,  can  also  be  enforced  in  a  court 
of  the  United  States  ;  the  right  must  be  given  by  the  law  of  the 
State  or  of  the  United  States.*  The  Revised  Statutes  of  the  United 
States  provide  that :  "  Suits  in  equity  shall  not  be  sustained  in 
either  of  the  courts  of  the  United  States  in  any  case  where  a 
plain,  adequate,  and  complete  remedy  may  be  had  at  law."  ^  The 
Supreme  Court  has  construed  this  statute  substantially  as  fol- 
lows :  The  effect  of  the  provision  of  the  Judiciary  Act  is  that 
whenever  a  court  of  law  is  competent  to  take  cognizance  of  a 
right,  and  has  power  to  proceed  to  a  judgment  which  affords  a 
plain,  adequate,  and  complete  remedy,  without  the  aid  of  a  court 
of  equity,  the  plaintiff  must  proceed  at  law,  because  the  defendant 
has  a  constitutional  right  to  a  trial  by  jury.^  "  This  enactment 
certainly  means  something  ;  and  if  only  declaratory  of  what  was 
always  the  law,  it  must,  at  least,  have  been  intended  to  empha- 
size the  rule,  and  to  impress  it  upon  the  attention  of  the  courts."" 
"  It  would  be  difficult,  and  perhaps  impossible,  to  state  any  gen- 
eral rule  which  would  determine,  in  all  cases,  what  should  be 
deemed  a  suit  in  equity  as  distinguished  from  an  action  at  law, 
for  particular  elements  may  enter  into  consideration  which  would 
take  the  matter  from  one  court  to  the  other  ;  but  this  may  be 
said,  that,  where  an  action  is  simply  for  the  recovery  and  pos- 
session of  specific  real  or  personal  property,  or  for  the  recovery 
of  a  money  judgment,  the  action  is  one  at  law.  An  action  for 
the  recovery  of  real  property,  including  damages  for  withholding 
it,  has  always  been  of  that  class."  ^  Accordingly,  a  suit  in  equity 
to  enforce  a  legal  right  can  be  brought  only  when  the  court  can 

4  Meade  v.  Beale,  Tanej,  339,  361.  212  ;  Killian  v.  Ebbinghus,  110  U.  S.  568, 

6  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  723.  573. 

<*  Hipp  V.  Babin,  19  How.  271 ;  Insur-         ^  N.    Y.   Guaranty    Co.    v.   Memphis 

ance  Co.  v.  Bailey,  13  Wall.  616,  G21  ;  Water    Co.,    107    U.   S.    205,    214,    j>er 

Grand  Cliute  v.  Wine^ar,  15  Wall.  373,  Bradley,  J. 

375;  Lewis  v  Cocks,  23  Wall.  466,  470  ;         »  Whitehead  v.  Shattuck,  138  U.  S. 

Root    I'.    Railway   Co.    105    U.   S.   189,  146,  151 ;  per  Mr.  Justice  Field. 


8  JURISDICTION.  [chap.  I. 

give  more  complete  and  effectual  relief  in  kind  or  in  degree  on 
the  equity  side  than  on  the  common-law  side  ;  as,  for  instance, 
by  compelling  a  specific  performance,  or  the  removal  of  a  cloud 
on  the  title  to  real  estate  ;  or  preventing  an  injury  for  which 
damages  are  not  recoverable  at  law,  as  in  Watson  v.  Sutherland, 
5  "Wall.  74  ;  or  where  an  agreement  procured  by  fraud  is  of  a 
continuing  nature,  and  its  rescission  will  prevent  a  multiplicity 
of  suits."  ^  "  l]y  inadequacy  of  the  remedy  at  law  is  here  meant, 
not  that  it  fails  to  produce  the  money,  —  that  is  a  very  usual 
result  in  the  use  of  all  remedies,  —  but  that  in  its  nature  or  char- 
acter it  is  not  fitted  or  adapted  to  the  end  in  view."  ^'^  There  may 
consequently  be  cases  over  which  the  English  courts  of  chancery 
would  have  taken  jurisdiction,  which  are  not  cognizable  by  the 
Federal  courts  when  sitting  at  equity.'^ 

"  The  adequate  remedy  at  law  which  is  the  test  of  equitable 
jurisdiction  in  these  courts,  is  that  which  existed  when  the  Judi- 
ciary Act  of  1789  was  adopted,  unless  subsequently  changed  by 
Congress."  ^^  Whether  the  equitable  jurisdiction  is  lost  when  a 
statute  of  the  United  States  gives  the  same  or  adequate  relief 
at  law,  —  as,  for  example,  in  the  case  of  discovery,  —  has  not 
yet  been  settled. ^-"^  If  a  statute  of  the  United  States  creates  a 
new  right,  the  remedy  will  be  in  equity  if  the  relief  thereby 
afforded  is  in  analogy  with  a  species  of  relief  ordinarily  given 
by  equity  alone.^^  Thus,  it  has  been  held  that  a  suit  to  enforce 
the  individual  liability  of  stockholders  or  directors  to  creditors 
of  a  corporation,^^  or  to  determine  the  question  of  the  right  of 
possession  to  land  under  §  2326  of  the  Revised  Statutes  when 
there  are  conflicting  claims  to  patents  before  a  land  ofiice,^^ 
must  be  brought  in  equity.     A  suit  under  §  5239  of  the  Revised 

9  Buzard  v.  Houston,  119  U.  S.  347,     Berney,  14  Fed.  R.  2G8;  Post  v.  Toledo, 

351,  352 ;  per  Gray,  J.  C,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.,  144  Mass.  341 ;  4  New 
10  Thompson  v.  Allen  County,  115  U.  S.     England  Rep.  221. 

550,  5.54;  /«r  Miller,  J.  "  Edgell    v.    Haywood,    8    Atk.   354; 

'1  Buzard  v.  Houston,  119  U.  S.  347,  Ilornor  v.  Ilenning,  93  U.  S.  228;  Terry 

352.  f.  Little,  101  U.  S.  21G;  Manufacturing 
1-!  McConihay  i-.  Wright,  121  U.  S.  201,  Co.  v.  Bradley,  105   U.  S.   175;  Doe   v. 

206;  per  Mattiicws,  J.  Waterloo  Min.  Co.,  43  Fed.  R.  219. 

1^  Compare  Vauglian  v.  Central  Pacific  ^^  Ilornor  v.  Ilenning,  93   U.  S.  228 ; 

R.  R.  Co.,  4  Sawyer,  280;  Pratt  i-.  Nor-  Terry  v.  Little,  101  U.  S.  216;  Manufac- 

thani,  5  Mason,  95;  Peters  v.  Prevost,  1  turing  Co.  v.   Bradley,    105    U.   S.    175; 

Paine,  64  ;  Home  Ins.  Co.  v.  Stanclifield,  Stone  v.  Chisolm,  113  U.  S.  302. 

1  Dill.  424 ;  Markey  v.  Mut.  Ben.  Life  i''  Doe  v.  Waterloo  Min.  Co.,  43  Fed. 

Ins.  Co.,  0  Ins.  L.  .L  5-37;  Heath  v.  Erie  ^R.  219. 
Railroad  Co.,  9  Blatchf.  310;    Drexel  v. 


§  6.]     EFFECT  OF  STATE  STATUTES  ON  FEDERAL  COURTS  OF  EQUITY.      9 

Statutes  to  recover  of  a  director  of  a  national  bank  the  damages 
sustained  in  consequence  of  excessive  loans  siiould  be  brought  on 
the  common-law  side  of  the  court. ^" 

§  6.  State  Statutes  cannot  impair  the  Jurisdiction  nor  regulate 
the  Practice  of  Federal  Courts  of  Equity.  —  Xo  State  statute  giving 
one  of  its  courts  — ■  for  example,  a  court  of  probate  —  exclusive 
jurisdiction  of  a  certain  class  of  litigation  can  impair  the  juris- 
diction of  the  Federal  courts. ^  No  State  statute  enlarging  the 
powers  of  courts  of  common  law  can  impair  the  jurisdiction  of 
a  Federal  court  of  equity .^  No  State  statute  diminishing  or  de- 
stroying an  equitable  remedy,  or  in  any  way  regulating  the  prac- 
tice in  courts  of  equity,  can  have  any  effect  upon  the  jurisdiction 
or  practice  of  the  Federal  courts.'^  Such  are  statutes  requiring 
a  mortgagor  to  tender  the  debt  secured  by  his  mortgage  before 
filing  a  bill  to  redeem  the  mortgaged  premises ;  *  requiring  a  bill 
to  foreclose  a  mortgage  given  to  secure  a  judgment  to  show  that 
execution  has  been  issued  under  the  judgment  and  returned  unsat- 
isfied ;^  requiring  leave  to  be  obtained  from  a  State  court  before 
a  suit  can  be  brought  to  enforce  a  judgment  therein  entered,^  or 
the  presentation  of  a  claim  to  the  comptroller  before  a  suit  can 
be  brought  against  a  city  ; "  requiring  a  bond  to  be  given  l)efore 
an  injunction  can  be  granted  ;  ®  or  regulating  the  form  of  the 
security  then  required  or  the  proceedings  to  enforce  the  same  ;  ^ 
authorizing  persons  to  agree  upon  a  statement  of  facts,  and  to 
stipulate  that  the  court  take  jurisdiction  to  try  a  cause  and  ren- 
der a  decree  without  pleadings  ;  ^^  authorizing  the  examination  of 
a  party  before  trial  ;  ^^  providing  that  a  county  can  only  be  sued 
in  a  specified  State  court ;  ^^  forbidding  a  foreign  corporation  to 

''  Stephens  v.  Overstolz,  43  Fed.   R.  ^  Dow  v.  Cliainherlin,  5  McLean,  281. 

771.  6  riielps  V.  O'Brien  County,  2  DilL  518. 

§6.  1  Suydani  )•.  Brondnax,  14Pet.  G7  ;  "  Gamewell   Fire   Alarm   Tel.   Co.  v. 

Hull  ;;.  Dills,  19  Fed.  R.  G57.  Mayor,  &c.  31  Fed.  R.  312. 

■■^  McConiliay  v.  Wright,  121  U.  S.  201,  ^  Bein  v.  Heath,  12  How.  (U.  S.)  108, 

20G  ;  and  cases  cited.  178. 

3  Boyle  V.  Zacharie,  6  Pet.  648 ;  Bein  v.  9  Bein  v.  Heatli,  12  How.  (U.  S  )  168  ; 

Heath,  12  How.  (U.  S.)  168,  179;  Noonan  Russell  v.  Farley,  105  U.  S.  437  ;  Meyers 

V.  Lee,  2  Black,  499,  509;  Thompson  v.  v.  Block,  120  U.  S.  206,  211. 

Railroad  Companies,  6  Wall.  134  ;  Cowles  ^''  Nickerson  ;■.  Atchison,  T.,  &  Santa 

V.  Mercer  County,  7  Wall.  118;  Payne  v.  Fe  R.  R.  Co.,  1  McCrary.  383. 

Hook,  7  Wall.  425  ;  Railway  Company  r.  n  Dravo  i:  Fabel,  132  U.  S.  487. 

Whitton's  Administrator,  13    Wall.  270,  i-  Cowles    v.  Mercer   County,  7  Wall. 

285 ;  Smith  v.  Railroad  Company,  99  U.  S.  118  ;  Lincoln  County  v.  Luning,  133  U.  S 

398.  629. 

*  Gordon  r.  Ilobart,  2  Sumner,  401. 


10  JUKISDICTION.  [chap.  I. 

sue  until  it  lias  complied  with  a  statutory  condition  ;  ^^  and,  at 
least  when  the  suit  is  brought  in  a  district  not  including  the 
State  that  passed  the  statute,  one  that  permits  a  debtor  to  file 
a  bill  to  compel  the  return  or  cancellation  of  securities  for  a 
usurious  debt,  without  payment  or  the  offer  of  payment  of  the 
amount  borrowed  with  lawful  interest.^* 

§  7.  State  Laws  creating  new  Rights  are  enforced  by  Federal 
Courts  of  Equity.  —  If,  however,  the  customary  ^  or  statute  ^  law 
of  a  State  has  created  a  new  right,  the  Federal  courts  will  en- 
force the  same  at  law  or  equity,  if  it  falls  within  the  remedies 
authorized  by  either  branch  of  their  jurisdiction.  Such  are 
statutes  giving  a  mortgagor  or  his  judgment  creditors  a  certain 
time  wiihin  which  to  redeem  land  after  a  foreclosure  sale;^  au- 
thorizing a  suit  to  set  aside  the  probate  of  a  will,  or  a  will  itself, 
for  fraud  ;**  authorizing  a  person  in  possession  of  land,  and  un- 
molested,^ or  even  one  out  of  possession  of  vacant  land,^  to  sus- 
tain a  bill  to  determine  and  quiet  the  title  to  the  same ;  but  not  a 
State  statute  authorizing  one  out  of  possession  of  land  to  obtain 
possession  of  the  same  when  occupied  by  another  through  a  suit 
triable  without  a  jury ;  *"  imposing  on  stockholders  individual  liabil- 
ity to  the  creditors  of  their  corporations  ;  ^  making  an  assessment 
for  opening  streets  a  lien  upon  abutting  lands,  which  can  be  fore- 
closed by  the  city  or  its  assignee ;  ^  authorizing  the  appointment 
of  a  receiver  under  certain  conditions,  whicli  in  the  Federal  courts 
must  then  also  be  performed  ;  ^'^  authorizing  a  bill  for  a  partition 
of  an  equitable  claim  to  land  the  legal  title  to  which  is  in  the 


i'^  Bank  of  British  North   America  v.  v.    Crawfordsville    First   National   Bank, 

Barling,  44  Fed.  R.  041.  112  U.  S.  40.5. 

"  Matthews  v.  Warner,  6  Fed.  R.  461,  ^  Brine  r.  Insurance  Company,  96  U.  S. 

465;    affirmed   without  passing   on   this  627;  Orvis  r.  Powell,  08  U.S.  176,178; 

point,  112  U.  S.  600.  Connecticut  Mutual  Life  Insurance  Com- 

§  7.   1  Neves  v.  Scott,  13  How.   268,  pany  v.  Cushman,  108  U.  S.  51. 

271 ;  Gaines  c  Fuentes,  92  U.  S.  10,  20 ;  *  Broderick's  Will,  21  Wall.  503,  519, 

Ellis  V.  Davis,  109  U.  S.  485;   Lorman  520. 

V.  Clarke,  2  McLean,  568,  577  ;  Nichols  ^  ciark  r.  Smith,  13  Pet.  195. 

V.  Eaton,  91  U.  S.  716,  729.  «  Holland  v.  Challen,  110  U.  S.  15. 

2  Clark  V.  Smith,  13  Pet.  195;  Fitch  ^  Whitehead  r.  Sliattuck,  138  U.  S.  14G. 

V.  Creighton,  24  How.  (U.  S.)  159;  Brine  **  Borland  v.  Haven,  37  Fed.  R.  394. 

V.    Insurance    Company,    96   U.   S.  627  ;  ^  Fitch  v.  Creighton,  24  How.  (U.  S.) 

Mills  V.  Scott,  99  U.  S.  25 ;  Van  Norden  159. 

V.  Morton,  99  U.  S.  378;  Cummings  v.  ^''  Flash  v.  Wilkerson,  22  Fed.  R.  689; 

National  Bank,  101  U.  S.  153,  157;  Hoi-  Fechheimer  v.  Baura,   37   Fed.  R.   167; 

land  V.  Challen,  110  U.  S.  15;  ReynoWs  T.  &  W.  M.  Co.  v.  Shatto,  34  Fed.  R.  380. 

But  see  Scott  v.  Neely,  140  U.  S.  106. 


§  8.]  STATE   STATUTES   OF   LIMITATION.  11 

United  States  ;^^  authorizing  an  injunction  to  be  granted  in  a  new 
class  of  cases  ;  ^^  empowering  a  guardian  with  the  permission  of 
the  State  court  to  mortgage  his  ward's  estate,  but  not  clauses 
providing  that  such  a  mortgage  can  only  be  foreclosed  in  the 
court  which  authorized  its  execution ;  ^^  creating  and  providing 
for  the  enforcement  of  a  mechanic's  lien ;  ^^  and  authorizing  a 
court  of  equity  after  the  destruction  of  the  public  records  to  enter 
a  decree  establishing  and  confirming  the  title  of  a  landowner.!^ 
A  State  statute  cannot  give  a  Federal  court  jurisdiction  in  equity 
of  a  case  in  which  there  is  an  adequate  remedy  at  law.^'^  Thus, 
a  State  statute  cannot  authorize  a  bill  in  equity  in  a  Federal  court 
to  obtain  possession  of  land  held  adversely  to  the  complainant ;  ^" 
or  a  creditor's  bill  by  a  complainant  who  has  not  obtained  a  judg- 
ment upon  his  claim.^^  Whether  a  mortgagee  must  sue  at  law  or 
in  equity  to  recover  from  one  who  by  a  covenant  with  the  mort- 
gagor has  assumed  the  mortgage,  when  the  suit  is  brought  in  the 
District  of  Columbia,  depends  upon  the  law  of  the  forum,  not  on 
the  law  of  the  place  where  the  deed  and  mortgage  Avere  made, 
and  the  land  situated.^^  When  a  State  statute  creating  a  new 
liability  provides  a  special  remedy,  such  liability  can  be  enforced 
in  the  Federal  courts  in  no  other  manner.^^  When  a  State 
statute  creates  a  new  liability  and  provides  that  it  can  only  be 
enforced  in  a  specified  State  tribunal,  the  Federal  courts  will 
enforce  the  liability,  and  reject  the  clause  respecting  the  exclusive 
jurisdiction.-^ 

§  8.  state  Statutes  of  Limitation.  —  Federal  courts  of  equity 
usually  follow  by  analogy  State  statutes  of  limitation,^  especially 
in  foreclosure  suits  ^  and  suits  against  executors   and   adminis- 


^1  Aspen   Mining    &   Smelting  Co.   v.  2°  Fourth  National  Bank  v.  Francklvn, 

Ruckcr,  28  Fed.  R.  220.  120  U.  S.  747;  Flour  City  Nat.  Bank  v. 

1-  Cummings    v.   National    Bank,   101  Wechselberg,  45  Fed.  R.  547. 

U.  S.  153,  157  ;  Lanier  v.  Alison,  31  Fed.  ^i  Davis  v.  James,  2  Fed.  K.  G18. 

11.  100.  §  8.  1   Wagner  v.  Baird,  7   How.  234, 

13  Davis  r.  James,  2  Fed,  R.  618.  258  ;  Broderick's  Will,  21  Wall.  503 ;  God- 

1*  Idalio  &  Oregon  Land  Improvement  den  v.  Kimmell,  99  U.  S.  201 ;  Meath  v. 

Co.  V.  Bradbury,  132  U.  S.  509.  Phillips  County,  108  U.  S.  553  ;  Kirby  v. 

15  Gormley  v.  Clark,  1.34  U.  S.  338.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  K.  R.,  120  U.  S.  130 ;  Pratt 

10  Wliitehead  v.  Shattuck,  138  U.  S.  14G ;  v.  Northam,  5  Mason,  95,  112  ;  per  Story, 

Scott  V.  Neely,  140  U.  S.  100.  J. ;  Norris  v.  Haggin,  136  U.  S.  38G. 

1"  Whitehead    v.  Shattuck,  138  U.   S.  -  Cleveland    Insurance    Company    t-. 

146.  Reed,  1  Biss.  180;   Reeves  v.  Vinacke, 

1**  Scott  r.  Neely,  140  U.  S.  106.  1    McCrary,  213,  217;    per  Nelson   and 

i»  Willard  v.  Wood,  135  U.  S.  309,  31-3.  Dillon,  JJ. 


12 


JURISDICTION. 


[CIIAR  I. 


trators  ;  ^  but,  at  least  when  their  jurisdiction  is  not  concurrent 
with  courts  of  law,'*  they  do  not  consider  themselves  bound  by 
such  statutes.^  It  has  been  said  that  a  Federal  court  of  equity 
will  never  follow  a  State  statute  of  limitation  when  thereby 
manifest  wrong*  and  injustice  would  be  wrought.*^  A  State  statute 
of  limitation  cannot  bar  the  United  States."  The  rule  that  a  State 
is  not  affected  by  laches  or  a  statute  of  limitation  cannot  aid  a 
creditor  of  a  State  when  suing  one  of  its  debtors.^  Otherwise  the 
courts  of  the  United  States  in  actions  at  common  law  not  founded 
upon  Federal  statutes,  are  bound  by  State  statutes  of  limitation.^ 
The  effect  of  such  a  statute  upon  actions  at  common  law  to 
enforce  riglits  created  by  Federal  statutes,  such  as  patents  and 
copyrights,  lias  been  the  subject  of  conflicting  adjudications.^^ 

§  9.  Property  in  the  Custody  of  a  State  Court.  —  A  court  of  the 
United  States,  tlirough  a  spirit  of  judicial  comity,  will  usually 
refuse  to  interfere  with  property  in  the  custody  of  a  State  court.^ 


a  Piilliam  r.  rulliiim,  10  Fed.  R.  53  ; 
Broderick's  Will,  21  Wall.  503. 

*  Wagner  v.  Baird,  7  How.  284,  258; 
Godden  V.  Kinimell,  99  U.  S.  201. 

-  Kirby  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  H.  R.,  120 
U.  S.  inO,  137 ;  Etting  v.  Mar.x's  Execu- 
tor, 4  Fed.  R.  G73;  Stevens  v.  Sharp,  0 
Sawyer,  993. 

6  Fogg  V.  St.  Louis,  11.  &  K.  R.  R.  Co  , 
17  Fed.  R.  871,  873;  Story's  Eq.  Jur. 
§  1521. 

1  United  States  v.  Tliompson,  98  U.  S. 
486  ;  United  States  v.  Nasliville,  C.  &  St. 
L.  Ry.  Co.,  118  U.  S.  120  ;  United  States 
V.  Beebe,  127  U.  S.  3.38 ;  United  States  r. 
Insley,  130  U.  S.  203;  United  States  v. 
AValiamet  &  C.  iM.  Wagon  Road  Co.,  42 
Fed.  R.  351. 

8  Cressey  v.  Meyer,  138  U.  S.  525. 

3  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  721  ;  McCIuny  >:  Silli- 
man,  3  Pet.  270;  Amy  v.  Dubuque,  98 
U.  S.  470. 

^'  Tiiat  they  do  not  affect  such  actions 
was  held  in  Collins  v.  Peebles,  2  Fisiier's 
Pat.  Cas.  511,  per  Mr.  Justice  Swayne; 
I'arker  v.  Ilallock,  2  Fisher's  Pat.  Cas. 
5J3.  «.,  prr  Mr.  Justice  Grier ;  Read  i: 
Miller,  2  Biss.  12,  prr  McDonald,  J.  ; 
Wetherill  v.  New  Jersey  Zinc  Co.,  1  Ban. 
&  A.  485,  490,  per  McKennan,  J.  ;  An- 
tliony  V.  Carroll,  2  Ran.  &  A.  195,  1,97, 
per  Shepley,  J.;  Sayles  r.  L.  S.  &  M.  S. 
Ry.  Co.,  9  Fed.  R.  515,  j^tr  .Mr.  Justice 


Harlan  ;  Sayles  r.  Dubuque  &  S.  C.  Ry. 
Co.,  9  Fed.  R.  51G,  per  Dillon  and  Love, 
JJ. ;  Wood  V.  Cleveland  Rolling  Mill,  4 
Fisher's  Pat.  Cas.  550,  per  Mr.  Justice 
Swayne  and  Sherman,  J. ;  May  v.  County 
of  Fond  du  Lac,  27  Fed.  R.  691,  per  Dyer, 
J. ;  May  v.  County  of  Logan,  30  Fed.  R. 
250,  per  Jackson,  J. ;  McGinnis  r.  Erie 
County,  45  Fed.  R.  1,  per  McKennan 
and  Acheson,  JJ.  See  also  Schreiber 
V.  Sharpless,  17  Fed.  R.  589.  Cmitrn, 
Parker  v.  Hawk,  2  Fisher's  Pat.  Cas.  58, 
per  Leavitt,  J. ;  Parker  v.  Hall,  2  Fisher's 
Pat.  Cas.  62,  note,  j>er  McLean  and  Lea- 
vitt, JJ. ;  Rich  V.  Ricketts,  7  Blatchf.  230, 
per  Hall,  J. ;  Sayles  v.  O.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  6 
Saw.  31,  per  Deady,  J.  ;  Hayden  ??.  Ori- 
ental Mills,  15  Fed.  R.  605,  per  Lowell 
and  ('olt,  JJ.  See  McClung  v.  Silli- 
man,  3  Peters,  270;  Butler  r.  Poole,  44 
Fed.  R.  586 ;  and  infra,  §  375. 

§9.  1  Hagan  r. 'Lucas,  10  Pet.  400; 
Taylor  r.  Carryl,  20  How.  583 ;  Peale  )'. 
Phipps,  14  How.  308  ;  Levi  v.  Columbia 
Insurance  Company,  1  Fed.  R.  206;  Hub- 
bard V.  Bellew,  8  Fed.  R.  447  ;  Union  Mu- 
tual Life  Ins.  Company  v.  University  of 
Cliicago,  6  Fed.  R.  443;  Hutchinson  v. 
Green,  6  Fed.  R.  833,  8-36-839  ;  Hamilton 
V.  Chouteau,  6  Fed.  R.  3-39;  Heiilritter 
V.  Elizabeth  Oil-cloth  Company,  111  U.  S. 
294  But  see  Dwight  v.  Central  Vermont 
R.  R.  Co.,  9  Fed.  R.  785. 


§  9.]  PROPERTY   IN    THE    CUSTODY    OF    A    STATE   COURT.  13 

Even  if  tlie  custody  of  the  State  court  were  acquired  by  fraud,  a 
court  will  not  usually  interfere  so  long  as  the  State  court  retains 
its  hold  upon  the  property .^  It  has  been  held  too  late  to  raise 
this  objection  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  State  court  after  the  trial 
of  an  action  at  common  law.^  This  rule  did  not  prevent  the 
filing  of  a  bill  in  equity  against  an  administrator  or  an  executor 
durhig  the  pendency  of  probate  proceedings  in  a  State  court;"* 
nor  the  appointment  of  a  receiver  over  property  held  by  executors 
holding  letters  testamentary  from  a  State  court,  who  had  dis- 
agreed and  could  not  act  together ;  ^  nor  the  filing  of  a  bill  to  set 
aside  or  stay  proceedings  uj)on  a  judgment  in  a  State  court  ;*^  nor, 
under  the  Judiciary  Act  of  1875,  the  removal  to  a  Federal  court 
of  a  suit  in  equity  in  the  course  of  which  a  State  court  had  ap- 
pointed a  receiver,"  or  had  taken  property  into  its  possession 
under  a  common-law  writ.^  Property  is  deemed  to  be  in  the  cus- 
tody of  a  court  from  the  time  when  a  suit  or  action  seeking  to 
have  it  put  there  has  been  actually  begun,  either  by  levy  under 
a  writ  in  a  proceeding  m  rem,  or  by  the  filing  of  a  bill  ])raying 
the  appointment  of  a  receiver  and  the  service  of  process.^  Where 
the  sheriff  held  property  under  summary  foreclosure  proceed- 
ings under  the  statutes  of  Georgia,  it  was  held  to  be  in  the 
custody  of  the  State  court.^*^  Property  continues  in  the  custody 
of  the  State  court  until  tlie  cause  is  practically  terminated, 
although  no  formal  termination  is  absolutely  essential. ^^  Where 
the  trustee  of  an  insolvent  debtor  had  failed  to  claim  property  until 
a  levy  was  made  thereon  under  a  judgment  obtained  by  a  foreign 
creditor  in  a  Federal  court,  a  decree  was  entered  upon  a  petition 
of  intervention  by  the  trustee,  setting  aside  the  levy  upon  con- 

^  Attleboroiigh   National   Bank  i\  N.  583;    Heidritter    v.  Elizabeth    Oil-cloth 

W.  Manuf.  &  Car  Co.,  28  Fed.  R.  113.  Company,  112  U.  S.  291;  Levi  r.  Colum- 

3  Gilnian  v.  Perkins,  7  Fed.  11.  887.  bia  Insurance  Company,  1  Fed.  K.  20G  ; 

*  Payne  v.  Hook,  7  Wall.  425  ;  Yonley  Hubbard  v.  Bellew,  3  Fed.  R.  447  ;  Union 
V.  Lavender,  21  Wall.  27(3;  Chapman  v.  Mutual  Life  Insurance  Company  i\  Uni- 
Borer,  1  Fed.  R.  274;  Hull  v.  Dills,  19  versity  of  Chicago,  0  Fed.  R.  443;  Hutch- 
Fed.  R.  657.  inson  v.   Green,  6  Fed.  R.  833.     But  see 

6  Ball  V.  Tompkins,  41  Fed.  R.  48G.  Dwight  v.  Central  Vermont  R.  R.  Co.,  9 

See  infra,  §  240.  Fed.  R.  785 ;  Webb  v.  Vermont  Central 

6  Barrow   v.   Hunton,   99    U.    S.   80 ;  R.  R.  Co.,  9  Fed.  R.  793  ;  Owens  v.  Ohio 

Sahlgard  v.  Kennedy,  2  Fed.  R.  295.  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  20  Fed.  R.  10. 

"  In   re  Iowa  &  Minnesota  Construe-  ^''  Tefft  r.  Sternberg,  40  Fed.  R.  2. 

tion  Company,  10  Fed.  R.  401.  ii  Buck  v.  Piedmont  &  A.  Life  Insur- 

**  Kern  v.  Huidekoper,  103  U.S.  485  ance  Company,  4  Fed.  R.  849;    Andrews 

491,  492.  V.  Smith,  5  Fed.  R.  833. 

9  Taylor  v.  Carryl,  20  How.   (U.  S.) 


14  JUEISDICTION".  [chap.  I. 

Jition  that  the  trustee  pay  the  costs  of  the  seizure,  and  file  in  the 
Federal  court  an  order  from  the  State  court  authorizing  him  to 
take  possession  of  such  property.^^  It  has  been  held  that  when 
property  on  which  a  sheriff  has  levied  is  seized  by  the  marshal  in 
a  Federal  action  of  replevin,  the  sheriff's  remedy  is  a  petition  in 
the  nature  of  an  interpleader  addressed  to  the  Federal  court,  not 
a  bill  for  an  inj unction. ^^  This  rule  is  not  applicable  in  those 
cases  wdiere  the  courts  of  the  United  States  exercise  superior 
jurisdiction  for  the  purpose  of  enforcing  the  supremacy  of  the 
Constitution  and  laws  of  the  United  States.^^  If  the  suit  be  first 
begun  in  a  Federal  court,  that  court  will  maintain  and  enforce 
its  right  to  the  custody  of  the  property .^^  In  one  case,  where  a 
receiver  had  been  appointed,  in  a  suit  begun  in  a  State  court,  after 
a  bill  filed  in  a  Federal  court  praying  relief  concerning  the  same 
property  had  been  dismissed  by  a  decree,  the  Federal  court  subse- 
quently opened  the  decree,  and  a})pointed  a  receiver  of  the  prop- 
erty upon  the  filing  of  a  supplemental  bill  at  the  same  term.^^ 
Property  of  a  debtor  brought  within  the  custody  of  a  Federal  court 
by  seizure  under  process  issued  u[)on  its  judgment,  remains  in 
custody  to  be  applied  in  satisfaction  of  the  judgment,  notwith- 
standing the  death  of  the  judgment  debtor,  and  the  institution  in 
a  State  court  of  proceedings  to  administer  his  estate.^^ 

§  10.  Property  in  the  Custody  of  a  Federal  Court.  —  The  rules 
wiiicli  apply  between  State  and  Federal  courts  also  regulate  con- 
flicts as  to  jurisdiction  between  different  Federal  courts.^ 

§  11.  Illustrations  of  Equitable  Jurisdiction  in  the  Federal  Courts. 
—  The  following  instances  where  Federal  courts  of  equity  have 
assumed,  and  where  they  have  refused,  to  take  jurisdiction  in 
equity,  the  subject-matter  and  the  parties  being  within  their 
jurisdiction,  although  Ijy  no  means  exhaustive,  may  be  useful  to 

1^  Gailinger  v.  Pliilippi,  13:5  U.  S.  246,  "  Rio  Grande  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Gomila,  132 

257.  U.  S.  478,  481. 

i-i  Pickett  V.  Tiler  &  Stowell  Co.,  40  §  10.  i  Hurd  v.  Moiles,  28  Fed.  R.  897  ; 

Fed.  11.  313.  Central  Trust  Co.  v.  East  Tenn.,  Va.  & 

"  Tefft  V.  Sternberg,  40  Fed.  R.  2,  6,  (ia.  R.  Co.,  30  Fed.  R.  895.     But  see  Wa- 

prr  Mr.  Justice    Speer,  citing   Covell   v.  basil  cases,  especially  Atkins  v.  W.  St.  L. 

Heyman,  111  U.  S.  17G.  &   P.  Ry.  Co.,  29   Fed.   R.   1(51  ;  Central 

15  Ileidritteri'.  Elizabeth  Oilcloth  Co.,  Trust  Co.  v.  W.  St.  L.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  29 

112  U.   S.  294;  Covell   v.   Ileynian,   111  Fed.  R.  G18 ;   U.  S.  Trust  Co.  o.  AVabash, 

U.S.   176;  Sharon  y.  Terry,  .30  Fed.  R.  St.   L.  &  P.  Ry.   Co.,  42   Fed.  R.   343; 

337.  .,  Mercantile  Tr.  Co.  v.  Kanawha  &  O  Ry. 

'■'  Union  Trust  Company  v.  Rockford,  Co..  30  Fed.  R.  337  ;  Reynolds  v.  Stock- 

R.  I.,  &  St.  L.  K.  R.  Co.,  G  Biss.  197.  ton,  140  U.  S.  254,  272. 


^   11.]        EQUITABLE   JURISDICTION    IN    THE    FEDERAL    COURTS.  15 

the  practitioner.  It  has  been  held  that  a  bill  in  equity  will  be 
sustained  when  filed  by  the  United  States  to  enforce  its  priority 
of  payment  out  of  a  trust  fund,^  to  cancel  a  land  patent,^  or  a 
patent  for  an  invention  ^  which  had  been  obtained  by  fraud,'*  or 
a  land  patent  which  had  been  by  a  mistake  of  law  issued  in 
violation  of  a  statute,^  or,  it  seems,  a  certificate  of  naturalization 
obtained  by  fraud ;  ^  by  a  municipal  corporation  to  enjoin  the 
sale  on  execution  of  property  held  by  it  in  trust ; '  by  a  legatee 
against  an  executor,^  and  by  one  of  the  next  of  kin  against  an 
administrator  and  his  sureties,^  to  recover  the  complainant's  share 
of  a  decedent's  estate ;  by  a  married  woman  to  recover  money 
which  belongs  to  her  separate  estate  ;  ^^  by  a  single  man  to  have 
declared  null  and  void  a  paper  purporting  to  be  a  marriage  con- 
tract executed  by  him ;  ^^  to  set  aside  a  contract  obtained  by 
fraud; ^2  to  set  aside  a  land  patent  issued  in  violation  of  a  stat- 
ute ;  ^^  to  reform  an  instrument  which  was  executed  by  mistake  ;  ^^ 
to  set  aside  a  conveyance  obtained  for  a  grossly  inadequate  con- 
sideration from  a  man  in  a  state  of  intoxication,  partly  caused 
by  the  acts  of  the  defendant ;  ^^  by  the  beneficiary  of  a  trust 
against  his  trustee  and  a  debtor  of  the  trust  estate ;  ^^  by  the 
holder  of  a  corporate  bond  to  enforce  his  lien  upon  the  tolls 
pledged  to  secure  its  payment ;  ^'  by  a  stockholder  in  a  corpora- 
tion to  recover  its  money  fraudulently  misappropriated  by  its 
directors  ;  ^^  by  a  stockholder  against  a  corporation  to  compel  the 
retransfer  of  stock  fraudulently  transferred  to  another ;  ^^  and  to 

§  11.  1  Hunter  v.  United  States,  5  Pet.  ^  United  States  v.  Norscli,  42  Fed.  R. 

172.  417. 

2  Moffat  V.  United  States,  112  U.  S.  24  ;  ^  New  Orleans  v.  Morris,  105  U.  S.  600. 
United  States  >:  Trinidad  Coal  &  Coke  »  Mayer  i\  Foulkrod,  4  Wash.  C.C.  349. 
Co.,  137  U.  S.  160.  9  Payne  v.  Hook,  7  Wall.  425;  Pratt  i;. 

3  United  States  v.  Am.  Bell  Telephone  Northam,  6  Mason,  95. 

Co.,  128  U.  S.  315;  United  States  v.  Gun-         ^  Hunt  v.  Danfortii,  2  Curt.  592. 

ninpc,   18  Fed.   R.  511  :  s.  c.  22  Fed.  R.        n  Sliaron  v.  Hill,  20  Fed.  R.  1. 

653.   Contra,  Attorney-General  v.  Rumford         ^-  Boyce  v.  Grundy,  3  Pet.  210. 

Clieniical  Works,  2Ban.&  A.298;  United         is  Southern  Pac.  \i.  Co.  v.  Wiggs,  43 

States   v.    Am.    Bell   Telephone   Co.,   32  Fed.  R.  333. 

Fed.  R.  591  ;  United  States  v.  Frazer,  22         i*  Walden  v.  Skinner,  101  U.  S.  577. 

Fed.  R.  106.  i^  Thackrah  r.  Haas,  119  U.  S.  499. 

<  Moffat  I'.  United  States,  112  U.  S.  ^^  United  States  i-.  Myers.  2  Brock.  516. 
24 ;  United  States  v.  Gunning,  18  Fed.  R.         i'  Vallette  v.  White  Water  Valley  Ca- 

511  ;  s.  c.  22  Fed.  R.  053.  nal  Co.,  4  McLean,  192. 

5  Mullan  r.  United  States,  118  U.  S.         is  Gindrat  v.  Dane,  4  Cliff.  260. 
271  ;    McLaus^lin   v.    United    States,    107         i^  Kilgour  v.  New   Orleans   Gas-Light 

U.  S.  526 ;  Western  Pacific  Railroad  Co.  Company,  2  Woods,  144. 
V.  United  States,  108  U.  S.  510. 


16  JUKISDICTION.  [chap.  I. 

compel  tlie  transfer  of  stock  to  its  equitable  owner,^*^  unless  it 
has  been  acquired  unconscientiously  or  for  speculative  purposes,^^ 
or  the  stock  is  of  a  kind  that  can  be  readily  bought  in  open  mar- 
ket ;  to  compel  specific  performance  of  a  contract  for  the  sale  of 
a  i)atent-right;2^  to  compel  specific  performance  of  a  contract 
to  issue  an  insurance  policy,  and  in  the  same  suit  to  compel  pay- 
ment of  the  ])olicy ;  '-^^  in  Virginia,  a  bill  by  a  creditor  of  an  insol- 
vent firm  which  is  disposing  of  its  assets  in  fraud  of  creditors, 
filed  in  behalf  of  the  other  creditors  as  well  as  himself,  and  pray- 
ing the  appointment  of  a  receiver,  an  injunction  against  any 
interference  by  others  with  the  firm  assets,  and  the  distribution 
of  those  assets  among  the  creditors  equally  ;  -"*  a  bill  by  a  trustee 
and  his  beneficiary  to  obtain  possession  of  land  subject  to  the 
trust; 2^  to  recover  from  a  bank  money  of  the  plaintiff  deposited 
by  a  third  person  in  the  latter's  name  ;  ^^  to  enjoin  a  township 
from  setting  up  as  a  defense  to  an  action  upon  bonds  issued  by 
it  the  accidental  omission  of  the  town  seal  thereon  ;^^  to  enforce 
a  decree  for  the  payment  of  money,  at  least  when  made  by 
another  court  of  equity ;  ^^  to  enforce  tlie  payment  of  alimony 
directed  to  be  paid  in  the  final  judgment  or  decree  of  a  State 
court ;  -^  to  set  aside  a  judgment  obtained  by  accident,  mistake, 
or  fraud  ;^'^  to  set  aside  an  award  by  arbitrators  upon  allegations 
of  misconduct  not  apparent  on  the  face  of  the  award,  not  affecting 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  arbitrators ;  ^^  a  bill  by  a  creditor  of  a 
decedent  to  set  aside  a  fraudulent  conveyance  of  his  estate  made 
after  his  death  by  the  order  of  a  court  ;^'^  by  a  judgment  creditor 
to  apply  to  the  satisfaction  of  his  debt  any  interest  which  his 
debtor  may  liold  in  a  patent  or  copyright,^^  or  in  a  license  to  use 


2'  Meclianics'   Bank   v.  Seton,   1   Pet.        ^o  Union  Stock  Yard's  Bank  v.  Gilles- 

299.  pie,  i;J7  U.  S.  411,  420;  National  Bank  v. 

-'  Mississippi  &  IMissouri  Railroad  Com-  Insurance  Co.,  104  U.  S.  54. 
pany  v.  Cromwell,  01  U.  S.  643;   Foil's        -"  Bernards  Townships.  Stebbins,  109 

Ai)peal,  91  Pa.  St.  4:J4,  438;  Randolph's  U.  S.  341. 

Executor  v.  Quidnick  Company,  13-5  U.  S.         -^  Shields  r.  Thomas,  18  How.  253,  2G2. 

457.  But  see  Tilford  v.  Oakley,  Hemps.  197. 

•^■^  Hall  f.  Pitrat,  45  Fed.  11.  94.  •-•'  Barber    i-.    Barber,    21     How.    582. 

'•^  Tayloe  v.  The   Merchants'  Fire  Ins.  Cf.  Johnson  v.  Johnson,  13  Fed.  R.  193; 

Co.,  9  How.  390;   Ilibert  v.  Mutual  Life  Bowman  i-.  Bowman,  30  Fed.  R.  849. 
Ins.  Co  ,  12  Fed.  R.  807  ;  Bru^iser  v.  State        »'  Metcalf  v.  Williams,  104  U.  S.  93,  95. 
Investment  Ins.  Co.,  6  Saw.  .304.  "'  Hartford    Fire   Ins.   Co.   i\   Bonner 

-'■»  Fink  V.  Patterson,  21  Fed.  R   002.  Mercantile  Co.,  44  Fed.  R.  151,  156. 

25  Harrison  v.  Rowan,  4  Wash.  C.  C.         ^-  Johnson  v.  Waters,  111  U.  S.  640. 
202.  33  Ager  v.  Murray,  105  ^^  -=*  *2Q. 


§  11.]        EQUITABLE    JURISDICTION    IN    THE   FEDERAL   COURTS.  17 

a  patented  invention ;  ^  in  the  absence  of  any  statutory  restric- 
tions, by  the  resident  taxpayers  in  a  county  to  prevent  an  illegal 
disposition  of  the  moneys  of  the  county,  or  the  illegal  creation 
of  a  debt  which  they  in  common  with  other  property-holders  of 
the  county  may  otherwise  be  compelled  to  pay  ;^^  for  an  injunc- 
tion against  irremediable  injury  to  property  pending  an  action  of 
ejectment,  though  filed  by  a  party  out  of  possession ;  ^'^  under 
special  circumstances,  to  compel  specific  performance  of  a  rail- 
road lease  and  a  guaranty  of  the  covenants  therein  contained  ;  '^' 
and  of  an  agreement  to  allow  any  railway  company  to  use  a  rail- 
way track  on  equitable  tcrms,^'^  but  not  of  an  agreement  by  a  rail- 
way company  with  a  city  to  keep  its  principal  office  in  such  city  ;  ^^ 
to  compel  an  accounting  by  persons  standing  in  a  trust  relation 
to  the  plaintiff,'^^  and  by  those  against  whom  an  action  for  account 
render  would  lie  at  common  law,*^  namely,  guardians  in  socage, 
bailiffs,  receivers,  and  merchants  in  their  dealings  with  each 
other ;  '^^  but  not  otherwise  '^^  unless  the  accounts  are  mutual,  or 
very  complicated  and  intricate,^'^  or  the  accounting  is  supplemental 
to  some  other  equitable  relief.^^  For  example,  an  account  will 
not  be  decreed  against  the  infringer  of  a  patent  upon  a  bill 
filed  after  the  term  of  the  patent  has  expired.**^  But  a  bill  filed 
only  a  few  days  before  the  expiration  of  a  patent  may  be  sus- 
tained, if  it  is  possible  to  obtain  equitable  relief  during  the  life 
of  the  patent;'*'    unless  under  the  practice   of  the  court  no  in- 

3i  Matthews  v.  Green.  19  Fed.  R.  G49.  ^^  Root  r.  Railway  Co.,  105  U.  S.  189; 

35  Mr.   Justice   Fielil    in    Cranipton   i'.  Consolidated  Safety  Valve  Co.  v.  Asliton 

Zabriskie,  101  U.  S.  GOl,  009.  Valve  Co.,  26  Fed.  R.  319  ;  Lord  i>.  Wliite- 

3'^  Erhardt  r.  Boaro,  113  U.  S.  537.  head,  &c.  Macli.  Co.,  24  Fed.  R.  801. 

37  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.  v.  St.  L.,  A.,  **  Gaines  v.  New  Orleans,  17  Fed.  R. 
&  T.  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  118  U.  S.  290.  16  ;  s.  c.  4  Woods,  213;   John  Crossley 

38  Joy  V.  St.  Louis,  138  U.  S.  1.  Sons  v.  New  Orleans,  20  Fed.   R.  352 ; 

39  Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Marshall,  13G  Baker  v.   Biddle,  Bald.  394 ;  Blakeley  v. 
U.  S.  393.  Biscoe,   Hemps.    114.     But  see   Lord   v. 

1"  P.  R.  R.  of  Mo.  V.  A.  &  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  Whitehead,  &c.  Maeh.  Co.,  24  Fed.  R. 

20  Fed.  R.  277;  Fowle  v.  Lawrason,  5  801;  Adams  v.  Bridgewater  Iron  Co.,  26 

Pet.   494,    502 ;    Littlcfield   v.   Perry,   21  Fed.  R.  324,  and  cases  cited. 

Wall.  205.  ■^^  Rubber   Co.    v.    Goodyear,   9  Wall. 

«  Mitchell    t'.    Manufacturing    Co,   2  788;  Root  y.  Railway  Co.,  105  U.  S.  189. 

Story,  648;  Ivinson  v.  Button,  98  IT.  S.  ^(^  Root  v.  Railway  Co.,  105  U.  S.  189; 

79  ;  Fowle  v.  Lawrason,  5  Pet.  494,  502.  Brooks  v.  Miller,  28  Fed.  R.  615,  617. 

■1-2  Bispliam's  Equity,  §  481 ;  1  Co.  Litt.  «'   Beedle   v.   Bennett,    122   U.    S.    71  ; 

90b;  1  Co.  Litt.  172  a ;  Bacon's  Abridg-  Clark  v.  Wooster,  119  U.  S.  322,   324; 

ment.  Account  A ;    Buller's   Nisi  Prius,  AVestinghouse  Air  Brake  Co.  v.  Cai-pen- 

127 ;  Earl  of  Devonshire's  Case,  11  Coke,  ter,  32  Fed.  R.  484,  jxr  Brewer,  J. ;  Kittle 

89,  V.  De  Graaf,  30  Fed.  R.  689,  per  Coxe,  J. ; 

VOL.   I.  —  2 


1^  JURISDICTION.  [chap.  I. 

junction  could  possibly  have  been  obtained  before  the  expiration 
of  the  patent ;  ^^  and  also,  perhaps,  even  when  the  bill  has  been 
filed  after  the  expiration  of  the  patent,  if  the  infringing  articles 
were  made  during  its  life.'^^ 

The  Revised  Statutes  provide  that  "  Whenever  a  patent  on 
application  is  refused,  either  by  the  Commissioner  of  Patents 
or  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  District  of  Columbia  upon 
appeal  from  the  Commissioner,  the  applicant  may  have  remedy 
by  bill  in  equity ;  and  the  court  having  cognizance  thereof,  on 
notice  to  adverse  parties  and  other  due  proceedings  had,  may 
adjudge  that  such  applicant  is  entitled,  according  to  law,  to 
receive  a  patent  for  his  invention,  as  specified  in  his  claim,  or 
for  any  part  thereof,  as  the  facts  in  the  case  may  appear.  And 
such  adjudication,  if  it  be  in  favor  of  the  right  of  the  applicant, 
shall  authorize  the  Commissioner  to  issue  such  patent  on  the 
applicant  filing  in  the  patent-office  a  copy  of  the  adjudication, 
and  otherwise  complying  with  the  requirements  of  law.  In  all 
cases,  where  there  is  no  opposing  party,  a  copy  of  the  bill  shall 
be  served  on  the  Commissioner ;  and  all  the  expenses  of  the  pro- 
ceeding shall  be  paid  by  the  applicant,  whether  the  final  decision 
is  in  his  favor  or  not."  °'^  The  Commissioner  of  Patents  is  not  a 
necessary  party  when  there  is  a  party  to  oppose  the  bill,°^  but  when 
the  patent  has  been  issued  and  assigned,  the  assignee  is  a  neces- 
sary party .^^  The  Commissioner  of  Patents,  if  he  resides  in  the 
District  of  Columbia,  cannot  be  made  a  party  to  a  suit  in  a  Cir- 
cuit Court  of  the  United  States.^^  It  has  been  held  that  the 
statute  docs  not  authorize  an  injunction  against  the  issue  of  a 

Adams  i-.  Bridgewatcr  Iron  Co.,  20  Fed.  Railway  Co.,   105  U.  S.  180;  American 

R.  .324;  Brooks  (;.  Miller,  28  Fed.  R.  01.5,  1)    K.    B,    Co.  v.  Rutland  Marble  Co.,  2 

617;  Westinghouse  Air  Brake  Co.  I".  Car-  Fed.  R.  350,  Am.  1).  R.  B.  Co.  r.  Sliel- 

penter,  ;32  Fed.  R.  484.     A  bill  was  dis-  don,  1  Fed.  R.  870 ,   Crossley  r.  Derby 

missed  when  the  patent  expired  between  Gas-Light  Co.,  4  L.  J   Ch.  n.  s.  25.     But 

tlie  service  of  the  subpaMia  and  the  re-  see  Westinghouse  v.  Carpenter,  43  Fed. 

turn  (lay,  on  special  circumstances  being  R.  894;  and  infra,  §§  210.  230. 

shown.     American  Cal)le  Ry.  Co.  v.  Chi-  ='  U.   S.   R.'  S.   §  4915;  Rnnstotler  v. 

cago  City  Ry.  Co.,  41  Fed.  R.  522.  Atkinson,  23  Off.  Gaz.  1025;  Greeley  v. 

^«  Clark  r.Woostcr,  119  U.  S.. 322,  .324;  Commissioner,   0   Fisher,   075;    s.    c.    1 

American  Cable  Ry.  Co.  ?-.  Citizens'  Uy  Holmes,  284,  ./vr/wr^e'Arkell,  15  Blatchf. 

Co.,  44  Fed.   R.  484;  Keyes  v.  Eureka  437;  Butterworth  v.  Hill,  114  U.  S.  128. 

Con.  Manufacturing  Co.,  45  Fed.  R.  199  ;  ^i  Butler   (;.    Shaw,    21    Fed.    R.   321; 

American  Cable  Ry.  Co.  v.  Chicago  City  Graham  v.  Tcter,  25  Fed.  R  555. 

Ry.  Co.,  41  Fed.  R.  522.  ^-'  Graham  v.  Tetcr,  25  Fed    K.  55.5. 

•»'•»  N.  Y.  Belting  &  Packing  Co.  v.  Ma>  ^^  lUingworth  v.  Atha,  42  Fed.  R.  141, 

gowan,  27   Fed.  R.   Ill;   citing  Root  v.  145. 


§  12.]  WHEN   THERE   IS   NO   JURISDICTION   IN  EQUITY.  19 

patent  by  the  Commissioner  to  some  one  other  than  the  plaintiff.^* 
A  bill  to  take  an  acconnt  of  general  average  and  decree  contriliu- 
tion  has  been  sustained.^*^  It  has  been  held  that  the  jnrisdiction 
in  equity  to  open  a  closed  account  exists  when  equity  would 
have  had  jurisdiction  were  the  account  still  open,  notwithstanding 
a  remedy  at  law  exists.^^  "  It  is  possible  that  one  who  holds  land 
under  grant  from  the  United  States,  who  has  done  everything 
in  his  power  to  entitle  him  to  a  patent  (which  he  cannot  compel 
the  United  States  to  issue  to  him),  and  is  deemed  the  legal 
owner,  so  far  as  to  render  the  land  taxable  to  him  by  the  State  in 
which'it  lies,  may  be  considered  as  having  sufficient  title  to  sus- 
tain a  bill  in  equity  to  quiet  his  right  and  possession."  ^'  "  To 
give  a  court  of  equity  jurisdiction,  the  nature  of  the  relief  asked 
must  be  equitable,  even  when  the  suit  is  based  on  an  equitable 
title."  ^^  The  inadequacy  of  the  remedy  at  law  which  will  justify 
relief  in  equity,  does  not  consist  merely  in  its  failure  to  produce 
the  relief  sought,  —  that  is  a  not  unusual  result  of  all  remedies, — 
but  that  in  its  nature  or  character  it  is  not  fitted  or  adapted  to 
the  end  in  view.^^ 

§  12.  Illustrations  of  Cases  vrhere  the  Federal  Courts  have  refused 
to  assume  Equitable  Jurisdiction.  —  Equity  will  not  entertain  a  bill 
to  restrain  the  President  of  the  United  States  from  carrying  into 
effect  an  unconstitutional  act  of  Congress,  in  the  discharge  of 
duties  "  purely  executive  and  political."  ^  Nor  a  bill  filed  by  a 
State  to  protect  rights  which  are  purely  political,  even  though  its 
rights  of  property  may  be  thereby  incidentally  affected.'^  Nor 
a  bill  by  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  to  enforce  an  "  abstract 
right "  which  the  complainant  asserts,  and  which  he  may  never 
practically  exercise  ;  as,  for  example,  the  right  to  remove  an 
obstruction  from  a  navigable  river,  when  he  does  not  allege  that 
he  is  about  to  navigate  the  river. ^     Nor  a  bill  filed  by  a  coupon- 

5<  Illin<i\vorth  v.  Atha,  42  Fed.  R.  141,  ^i)  Miller,   J.,   in    Thompson    v.    Allen 

144  County,  115  U.  S.  550,  554.     Cf.  Texas 

55  Sturgess  v.  Gary,  2  Curt.  59.  &  V.  Ky   Co.  r.  Marsliall,  113  U.  S.  oUS, 

5«  Bischoffslieim  v.  Baltzer,  20  Fed.  R.  405. 

890.  §12.    1  Mississippi  I'.  Johnson,  4  Wall. 

57  Grny,  J.,   in   Frost  v.   Spitley,   121  475. 

U  S  552,556;  citing  Carroll  r.  Saffonl,  '^  Georgia  v.  Stanton,  6  Wall.  50.     Cf. 

3  How  441,  463;  Van  Wyck  v.  Knevais,  Georgia  r.  Grant,  G  Wall.  241;  Clongli  r. 

106  U.  S.  360,  370;  Van  BrockUn  r.  Ten-  Curtis,  134  U.   S.  361;  Smith  v.   Board 

nessee,  117  U.  S.  151,  160.  County  Comm'rs  Skogit  Count}',  45  Fed. 

5«  Fussell  V.  Gregg,  113  U.  S.  550,  554 ;  11.  725. 

per  Woods,  J.  ^  Spooner   i\  McConnell,  1   McLean, 


20 


JURISDICTION. 


[chap.  I. 


holder,  who  does  not  allege  himself  to  be  a  taxpayer,  to  enjoin  a 
State  officer  from  refusing  to  receive  his  coupons  in  payment  of 
taxes,  as  is  required  by  a  contract  between  the  coupon-holder 
and  the  State.^  Nor  a  bill  to  compel  municipal  or  State  officers 
to  levy  a  tax,  since  the  remedy  when  it  exists  at  all  is  by  man- 
damus.'^ Nor  a  bill  for  the  appointment  of  a  receiver  to  levy  ^ 
taxes,  or  to  collect  taxes  previously  levied."  Nor  a  bill  to  enjoin 
the  collection  of  an  internal  revenue  tax  imposed  by  the  United 
States  and  illegally  assessed.^  Nor  a  bill  to  restrain  the  collection 
of  a  State  tax,  no  matter  how  illegally  imposed,^  unless  its  en- 
forcement would  lead  to  a  multiplicity  of  suits,^^  or  produce' irrep- 
arable injury,  or  throw  a  cloud  upon  the  title  of  real  estate,  or 
possibly  when  its  assessment  was  uiade  by  a  fraud  of  which  equity 
would  take  cognizance,  or  when  there  is  at  law  no  means  of 
recovering  its  amount.^^     Nor  a  bill  to  compel  a  railway  corn- 


So?.     See  Marye  v.  Parsons,  114  U.  S. 
325. 

■i  Marye  v.  Parsons,  114  U.  S.  32.5. 

5  Wafkley  v.  Muscatine,  6  Wall.  481. 

6  Rees  V.  Watertown,  19  Wall.  107; 
Heine  v.  Levee  Comm'rs,  19  Wall.  655; 
Meriwetlier  v.  Garrett,  102  U.  S.  472. 

T  Thompson  v.  Allen  County,  115 
U.  S.  550. 

8  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  3224;  Snyder  v.  Marks, 
109  U.  S.  lf<9. 

'*  Hannewinkle  ii.  Georgetown,  15 
Wall.  548;  Dows  v.  Chicago,  11  WmU. 
108 ;  State  Railroad  Tax  Cases,  02  U.  S. 
575;  Milwaukee  v.  Koeffler,  IIG  U.  S. 
219. 

^''  Union  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v.  Cheyenne, 
113  U.  S.  510;  Dundee  Mortgage" Trust 
Investment  Co.  v.  School  District  No.  1, 
19  Fed.  R.  359.  "  It  is  real  and  not  im- 
aginar\'  suits,  it  is  probable  and  not  pos- 
sible danger  of  a  multiplicity  of  suits 
that  will  warrant  the  assumption  of  juris- 
diction on  that  ground.  While  it  is  true, 
as  the  plaintiff  contends,  that  the  State 
might  bring  a  separate  suit  for  each 
day's  penalty  "  for  failure  to  pay  a  ta.v, 
"  the  court  would  hardly  be  justified  in 
acting  on  the  assumption  that  it  would 
do  so.  The  State  is  not  to  be  looked 
upon  in  the  light  of  a  barrator,  and  the 
court  will  not  impute  to  it,  or  to  its  offi- 
cers acting  in  its  name,  a  litigious  or  vin- 
dictive spirit,  or  a  purpose  needlessly  to 


vex  and  harass  the  citizen  with  lawsuits. 
Whatever  tlie  rule  may  be  in  the  case  of 
natural  persons,  the  court  will  presume 
that  a  State  is  incapable  of  such  a  vulgar 
passion,  and,  until  the  fact  is  shown  to 
be  otherwise,  will  act  on  the  assumption 
that  a  State  will  not  bring  any  more  suits 
than  are  fairly  necessary  to  establish  and 
maintain  its  rights."  Pacific  Express 
Co.  V.  Seibert,  44  Fed.  R.  810,  315,  per 
Caldwell,  J. 

'1  First  National  Rank  v.  Douglass 
County,  3  Dill.  298  ;  Union  Pacific  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  ]MuShane,  3  Dill.  303,  312.  In 
Shelton  V.  Piatt,  139  U.  S.  591,  5%,  597; 
where  the  only  jurisdictional  averments 
were  "  that  the  propcrt}'  of  the  United 
States  Express  Comjiany  in  Tennessee 
is  employed  in  interstate  commerce  in 
the  said  express  business,  and  necessary 
to  the  conduct  of  it;  that  if  seized  b}'  the 
said  sheriff  it  will  greatly  embarrass  the 
company  in  the  conduct  of  such  busi- 
ness, and  subject  it  to  heavy  loss  and 
damage,  aiul  the  public  served  bj'  it  to 
great  loss  and  inconvenience  ;  "  and 
"  that  your  orator  and  the  United  States 
Express  Company  are  without  adequate 
remedy  at  hiw  in  the  premises;"  it  was 
held  tliat  no  injunction  should  issue. 

Chief-Justice  Fuller  said  (pp.  590- 
507)  :  "  The  trespass  involved  in  the 
levy  of  the  distress  warrants  was  not 
shown  to  be  continuous,  destructive,  in- 


§  12.] 


WHEN   THERE   IS   NO   JUllISDICTION    IN    EQUITY. 


21 


pany  to  maintain  its  permanent  terminus  at  a  certain  place. ^^ 
Nor  solely  for  purposes  that  could  be  accomplished  by  an  action 
in  ejectment. ^^     Nor  to  quiet  the  title  to  real  estate  when  the 


flictive  of  injury  incapable  of  being 
measured  in  money,  or  committed  by 
irresponsible  jiersons.  So  far  as  ap- 
peared, complete  compensation  for  tlie 
resulting  injury  could  have  been  had  by 
recovery  of  damages  in  an  action  at  law. 
There  was  no  allegation  of  inability  on 
the  part  of  the  express  company  to  pay 
the  amount  of  the  taxes  claimed,  nor 
any  averments  showing  that  the  seizure 
and  sale  of  the  particular  property  which 
migiit  be  levied  on  would  subject  it  to 
loss,  damage,  and  inconvenience  which 
would  be  in  their  nature  irremediable. 
The  bill  showed  the  company  to  be  doing 
a  vast  business,  and  it  was  an  unreason- 
able inference  that  it  must  submit  to  the 
sale  of  its  wagons  and  horses,  or  that 
such  sale  would  work  that  kind  of  mis- 
chief which  justifies  interference  of  equity 
in  the  application  of  a  preventive  remedy. 
Nor  did  the  mere  fact  that  its  property 
might  be  used  in  the  conduct  of  interstate 
commerce  give  jurisdiction.  But  in  addi- 
tion to  all  this,  since  1873  there  has  been 
a  statute  in  existence  in  Tennessee  pro- 
viding a  remedy  at  law,  which  has  been 
pronounced  by  this  court  simple  and 
effective.  Tennessee  v.  Sneed,  90  U.  S. 
69.  Under  that  act,  where  an  officer 
charged  by  law  with  the  collection  of 
revenue  due  the  State  takes  any  steps 
for  the  collection  of  the  same,  a  party 
conceiving  the  tax  to  be  unjust  or  illegal 
may  pay  it  uniler  protest,  and  sue  tlie 
officer  to  recover  the  money  back,  and 
if  the  court  determines  that  it  was  wrong- 
fully collected,  then  upon  its  certificate 
to  that  effect,  the  comptroller  '  shall  issue 
his  warrant  for  the  same,  wlii(;li  shall  be 
paid  in  preference  to  other  claims  on  the 
treasury.'  And  the  act  further  provides 
that  there  shall  be  no  other  remedy  in 
an}'  case  of  the  collection  of  revenue, 
and  no  writ  for  the  prevention  of  such 
collection,  or  to  hinder  and  delay  it,  shall 


in  any  wise  issue,  either  injunction,  su- 
persedeas, prohibition,  or  any  other  writ 
or  process  whatever." 

(p.  GOU).  "  While  an  unconstitutional 
tax  may,  in  the  language  of  the  learned 
judge  holding  the  Circuit  Court,  confer  no 
right,  imjjose  no  dutj',  and  support  no  ob- 
ligation, it  will  be  perceived  that,  in  our 
view,  the  trespass  resulting  from  pro- 
ceedings to  collect  such  void  taxes  can- 
not be  restrained  by  injunction,  where 
irreparable  injury  or  otiier  ground  for 
equitable  interposition  is  not  shown  to 
exist." 

In  Allen  v.  Pullman's  Palace  Car  Co., 
139  U.  S.  058 ;  two  bills  for  an  injunction 
against  the  collection  of  taxes  under  the 
laws  of  the  State  of  Tennessee  were  held 
insufficient  to  warrant  injunction.  The 
material  allegations  in  those  bills  were 
as  follows  :  — 

"  In  No.  1381,  the  bill  alleged  that  the 
comptroller  was  threatening  to  issue  his 
warrant  for  the  collection  of  the  taxes 
and  to  levy  it  upon  the  complainant's 
sleeping  cars,  'and  j'our  orator  believes 
and  fears  that  said  defendant,  unless  re- 
strained by  this  honorable  court,  will 
proceed  to  force  the  collection  of  said 
tax  so  illegally  assessed  and  claimed,  by 
distraining  and  seizing  upon  your  orator's 
cars  from  your  orator,  and  tiiat  the  pro- 
ceedings threatened  for  the  collection  of 
said  taxes  will  lead  to  a  multiplicity  of 
suits,  and  will  greatly  harass  your  orator. 
Your  orator  further  shows  that  all  the 
sleeping  and  drawing-room  cars  afore- 
said, running  in  the  State  of  Tennessee, 
are  attached  to  through  express  trains 
on  the  roads  of  said  railroad  companies  , 
that  prior  to  their  arrival  in  Tennessee 
seats  and  sleeping  berths  therein  have 
always  been  sold  by  your  orator  to  per- 
sons travelling  from  other  States  into 
Tennessee;  that  your  orator  has  at  all 
times  contracts  with  passengers  to  give 


12  Texas  &  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v.  Marshall,  100   U.  S.  48.5 ;   Killian   v.   Ebbinghaus, 
136  U.  S.  393.                 "  no  U.  S.  r>C,S;  United  States  v.  Wilson, 

13  Hipp  V.  Babin,  10  ITow.  271  ;  Lewis  118  U.  S.  8G;  Speigle  v.  jMeredith,  4  Biss. 
V.  Cocks,  23  Wall.  46G;  Ellis  i-.  Davis,  120. 


22 


JUKISDICTION. 


[chap.  I. 


complainant's  rights  are  purely  equitable,^*  or,  in  the  absence  of  a 
State  statute  authorizing  such  a  suit,  when  he  is  not  in  possession 
of  the  land.^^     Nor,  usually,  to  restrain  the  seizure  or  compel  the 


them  tlie  accommodations  furnished  by 
said  cars  while  travelling  upon  such  rail- 
roads ;  that  unless  your  orator  pays  the 
taxes  so  illegally  imposed  upon  it,  your 
orator  believes  and  fears  that  said  de- 
fendant will,  unless  restrained  therefrom 
by  this  court,  levy  upon  and  seize,  in 
order  to  force  from  your  orator  said  ille- 
gal taxes,  said  sleeping  and  drawing- 
room  cars  while  the  same  are  in  actual 
use  and  running  attached  to  said  express 
trains  ;  that  thereby  the  travelling  public 
will  be  discommoded,  the  carriage  of  pas- 
sengers interstate  will  be  prevented,  your 
orator  and  said  railroad  companies  may 
become  harassed  by  many  suits  for  dam- 
ages by  passengers  for  not  furnishing 
them  the  accommodations  they  con- 
tracted for,  tiie  credit  and  reputation  of 
your  orator  for  furnishing  comfortable 
accommodations  —  which  credit  and  rep- 
utation are  of  great  value  to  it,  and  have 
been  established  by  strict  attention  to 
business,  and  at  great  expense  and 
trouble  for  many  years  —  will  be  broken 
up,  and  tiie  goodwill  of  said  business 
greatly  impaired  ;  and  thereby  your  ora- 
tor will  suffer  great  and  irreparable 
injury.' 

"  In  No.  1082,  complainant  averred  that 
the  comptroller  had  issued  liis  warrant 
to  the  sheriff  of  the  county  of  Davidson, 
Tennessee,  and  the  sheriff  by  his  deputy, 
one  Ilobson,  '  has  by  force,  and  pre- 
tending to  act  under  said  warrant,  seized 
upon  the  sleeping  car  "  Wetumpka," 
belonging  to  your  orator,  and  now  holds 
the  same  in  their  possession  ,  that  said 
car  is  reasonably  worth  §8000  ;  that  said 
Ilobson  has  advertised  and  threatens  to 
sell  said  car  to  satisfy  said  illegal  and 
preteniled  tax ;  that  s-ild  sleei)ing  car  of 
your  orator  when  seized  was  being  usi'd 
by  your  orator  in  tiie  carrying  on  of  in- 
terstate commerce  as  aforesaid,  and  was 
in  use  as  an  instrument  of  interstate 
con)merce,  and  was  in  Tennessee  only 
by  virtue  of  such  use.  and  was  therefore 


not  liable  to  be  taken  in  satisfaction  of 
said  tax,  even  if  it  had  been  a  valid  tax. 
That  the  railroad  companies  over  whose 
lines  of  road  your  orator  operates  cars 
are  common  carriers,  and  are  obliged  by 
law  to  take  upon  their  trains  and  carry 
all  who  properly  present  themselves  for 
carriage,  whether  they  are  travelling  be- 
tween points  wholly  within  Tennessee  or 
not;  that  such  passengers,  travelling  lo- 
cally in  Tennessee,  sometimes  apply  for 
sleeping  car  accommodations  in  your  or- 
ator's cars  attached  to  such  train,  and  if 
your  orator  is  obliged  to  receive  them  on 
its  cars,  then  the  State  of  Tennessee  by 
such  tax  act  forces  your  orator  to  pay 
such  privilege  tax,  and  take  out  such 
license,  or  to  cease  carrying  on  the  in- 
terstate commerce  in  which  it  is  now 
engaged ;  that  said  defemlants  have  de- 
manded said  -SSOOO  from  your  orator, 
and  have  declared  that  they  will  force 
your  orator  to  pay  the  same ;  that  they 
now  threaten  to  sell  said  car  so  seizeil  by 
them,  and  your  orator  believes  will  do  so 
unless  restrained  by  this  honorable  court ; 
that  said  car  is  very  valuable,  but  will 
not  bring  its  full  value  at  a  forced  sale, 
and  your  orator  fears  that  it  will  be  sold 
for  a  small  amount  not  sufficient  to  pay 
said  tax,  and  your  orator  believes  and 
fears  that  said  defendants,  unless  re- 
strained by  this  lionorable  court,  will 
thereupon  proceed  to  enforce  the  collec- 
tion of  said  tax  so  illegally  claimed,  by 
distraining  ami  seizing  upon  your  ora- 
tor's other  cars,  and  that  the  proceed- 
ings threatened  by  defendants  for  the 
collection  of  said  taxes  will  greatly 
harass  your  orator.  Your  orator  fur- 
ther shows  that  all  its  sleeping  cars 
aforesaid,  running  through  the  State  of 
Tennessee,  are  attached  to  through  ex- 
])res8  trains  on  the  roads  of  the  said  rail- 
road companies  ;  that  prior  to  their  arrival 
in  Tennessee  seats  and  berths  have  al- 
ways l)een  sold  by  your  orator  to  ])ersons 
travelling  from   other    States   into  Ten- 


"  Frost  V.  Spitley,  121  U.  S.  uo2. 


-.I"  United  States  r.   Wilson,   118  U.  S. 
80 ;  Frost  v.  Spitley,  121  U.  S.  552. 


§12.] 


WHEN   THERE    IS   NO   JURISDICTION    IN    EQUITY. 


23 


return  of  personal  property,^^  unless  its  loss  by  the  owner  would 
result  in  irreparable  injury  by  the  destruction  of  his  business  and 
commercial  credit,^'^  or  by  rendering  it  impossible  for  him  to  man- 
age liis  farm,^^  or  on  account  of  its  unique  value  ,^^  or  if  it  be  held 
in  trust.2^  That  the  value  of  the  property  is  so  great  that  the 
complainant  is  unable  to  give  the  bond  required  in  an  action  of 
replevin,  affords  no  ground  for  the  interference  of  equity .^^  Nor 
can  a  bill  be  sustained  which  seeks  to  recover  damages  for  a 
conversion  ;''^^  or  for  a  fraudulent  misrepresentation ;  ^^  or  for  a 
fraudulent  conspiracy .^^  "  In  cases  of  fraud  and  mistake,  as 
under  any  other  head  of  chancery  jurisdiction,  a  court  of  the 
United  States  will  not  sustain  a  bill  in  equity  to  obtain  only  a 
decree  for  the  payment  of  money  by  way  of  damages,  when  the 
like  amount  can  be  recovered  in  an  action  sounding  in  tort  or 
for  money  had  and  received."  ^°  Nor  to  collect  a  note  from  its 
maker  26  or  an  indorsee^*"     Nor  to  collect  the  amount  of  an  in- 


nessee;  that  your  orator  has  at  all  times 
contracts  with  passengers  to  give  tlieni 
the  accommodations  furnished  by  said 
cars  while  travelling  upon  said  roads ; 
that  unless  your  orator  pays  the  taxes 
so  illegally  imposed  upon  it,  your  orator 
believes  and  fears  that  the  said  defend- 
ants will,  unless  restrained  therefrom  by 
tills  court,  sell  said  car  so  already  levied 
on,  and  if  it  does  not  bring  enough  to 
satisfy  said  tax  will  levy  upon  and  seize, 
in  order  to  force  from  your  orator  said 
illegal  tax,  its  sleeping  cars  while  they 
are  in  actual  use  and  running  attached 
to  said  express  trains;  that  thereby  the 
travelling  public  will  be  discommoded, 
tiie  carriage  of  passengers  interstate  will 
be  prevented,  your  orator  and  said  rail- 


1"'  Knox  V  Smith,  4  How.  298;  Van 
Norden  v  Morton,  99  U.  S.  878.  But  see 
Crane  v.  McCoy,  1  Bond,  422. 

1^  Watson  V.  Sutherland,  5  Wall.  74; 
North  V.  Peters,  138  U.  S.  271. 

'^  Breeden  v.  Lee,  2  Hiiglies,  484. 

1^  Pusey  V.  Pusey,  1  Vern.  27^^ ;  Duke 
of  Somerset  (;.  Cookson,  3  P.  Wins.  389; 
s  c.  1  Leading  Cases  in  Equity,  821. 

-0  New  Orleans  v.  Morris,  105  U.  S. 
600. 

■■21  In  re  Oregon  Iron  Works,  4  Saw.  1G9, 
170;  s.  c.  17  N.  B.  K.  404. 


road  companies  may  become  harassed  by 
many  suits  by  passengers  for  damages 
for  not  furnishing  them  the  accommoda- 
tions they  contracted  for,  the  credit  and 
reputation  of  your  orator  for  furnish- 
ing comfortable  accommodations  —  wiiich 
credit  and  reputation  are  of  great  value 
to  it,  and  have  been  established  by  strict 
attention  to  business,  and  at  great  ex- 
pense and  trouble  for  many  years  —  will 
be  broken  up,  and  the  good-will  of  said 
business  greatly  impaired,  and  thereby 
your  orator  will  suffer  great  and  irrep- 
arable injury.'"  See  also  Keithsburg 
Bridge  Co.  v.  McKay,  42  Fed.  R.  427  ; 
Pacific  Express  Co.  v.  Seibert,  44  Fed.  R. 
310;  Hoey  v.  Coleman,  46  Fed.  R.  221, 
223. 


22  Dumont  v.  Fry,  12  Fed.  R.  21. 

23  Russell  ('.  Clark,  7  Cranch,  09 ;  White 
V.  Boyce,  21  Fed.  R.  228. 

24  Ambler  v.  Choteau,  107  U.  S.  586. 

25  Buzard  v.  Houston,  119  U.  S.  347, 
352 ;  per  Gray,  J. ;  citing  Parkersburg  v. 
Brown,  106  U.  S.  487,  500 ;  Ambler  v. 
Choteau,  107  U.  S.  586;  Litchfield  v. 
Ballou,  114  U.  S.  190. 

26  Dowell  V.  Mitchell,  105  U.  S.  430. 
2-  Shields  v.  Barrow,  17  How.  130. 


24  JUEISDICTION.  [chap.  I. 

surance  policy.^  Nor  a  bill  filed  by  an  insurance  compan)  after 
a  loss  has  occurred,  to  obtain  the  cancellation  of  a  policy  procured 
by  fraud.^'^  Nor,  except  in  a  very  extraordinary  case,  a  bill  to 
enjoin  slanders  or  libels.^^  Nor,  it  has  been  said,  a  bill  to  enjoin 
criminal  proceedings.^^  Nor  a  bill  to  enjoin  the  removal  of  an 
officer  of  a  State  or  municipality .^2  Nor  a  bill  to  compel  a  public 
officer  to  perform  a  ministerial  duty.^s  ^or  a  bill  by  the  assignee 
of  a  cause  of  action  to  enforce  for  his  own  use  the  legal  right  of 
his  assignor,  when  he  seeks  the  aid  of  equity  merely  ujtun  the 
ground  that  he  cannot  maintain  an  action  at  law  in  his  own 
name.3*  Nor  a  bill  by  a  private  citizen  to  set  aside  a  land-patent 
of  the  United  States,  on  account  of  fraud  ujjon  the  government 
used  in  its  procurement,''^  although  if  fraud  were  then  practised 
u))un  the  plaintiff  he  might  have  relief  u])on  the  ground  of  cs- 
toppel.^*^  Nor  a  bill  filed  by  a  creditor  for  himself  alone  to  ap[)ly 
equitable  assets  to  the  ])aymcnt  of  his  debt,  unless  he  has  obtained 
a  judgment  for  his  claim  in  a  court  of  the  same  State  or  judicial 
district,  and  had  the  return  of  an  execution  issued  thereon  unsat- 
isfied,'^'—  not  even,  it  has  been  held,  when  it  is  shown  that  the 
debtor  is  insolvent,  and  has  no  property  which  can  be  reached  by 
legal  proccss,^^  —  unless  to  enforce  a  trust  or  equitable  right.^^ 
Nor,  in  the  absence  of  a  State  statute  authorizing  such  a  pro- 
ceeding, a  bill  to  set  aside  the  probate  of  a  will  on  account  of 
mistake,  undue  infiuencc,  forgery,  or  other  fraud.*^  Nor  to  enjoin 
an  action  at  law  to  which  the  complainant  has  a  clear  legal 
defense.*^     Nor  to  set  aside  or  enjoin   proceedings  to  enforce  a 

28  Graves  v.  Boston  Marine  Ins.  Co.  2  35  gteel  v.  Smelting  Co.,  lOH  U.  S.  447. 

Cranch,  419.  *;  yj^el  v   Smelting  Co.,  lOG  U.  S.  447, 

-9  Home  Ins.  Co.  r.  Stnnclifield,  1  Dill.  454. 

424;  Insurance   Co.   ;.•.  Bailey,  l:j  Wall.  3?  pagg  „    Beanregara,   90  U.   S.  110; 

016.  Smith   v.   Bailroad    Co.,   99    U.    S.  398; 

3"  Francis    v.   Flinn,    118    U.    S.    385;  Walser  r.  Seligman,  13  Feil.  R.  415. 

Baltimore  Car  Wlieel  Co.  ?;.   Bemis,  29  38  Walser  r.  Seligman,  13  Fed.  R.  415. 

Fed.  R.  95.     Contra,  Kmack  r.  Kane,   34  But  see   Case  v.  Beauregard,  101    U.  S. 

Fed.    R.  40  ;  Fougcres  v.  Murbarger,  44  688,  at  page  690. 

Fed.  R.  292.     See  §  223.  »»  Case  r.   Beauregard,  101  U.  S.  088, 

31   In  re  Sawyer,  121   U.  S.  200;   Sness  at  pnge  0!!0. 

V.  Noble,  31    Fed.    K.  855.     But   see  M.  •*'  Broderick's  Will,  21   Wall.  503;  F.l- 

Schandler  Bottling  Co.  r.  Welch,  42  Fed.  lis  v.  Davis,  109  U.  S.  485,  Sinunons  v. 

R.  501 ;  infra,  §  211.  Saul,  138  U.  S.  439. 

3-i  In  re  Sawyer,  121  U.  S.  200.  ■»'  Grand-Chute  r.   Winegar,   15  Wall. 

33  Craig  f.  Leitensdorfer,  123  U.  S.  189.  373;   Francis    r.   Flinn,    118  U.S.    385; 

3<  Ilayward  r.  Andrews,  100  U.  S.072;  Hapgood  r.   Hewitt,  119  U.  S.  220.     See 

New    York    Guaranty   Co.    ;,•.    Memphis  Dre.x<;l  c.  Bernev,  122  U.  S.  211. 
Water  Co.,  107  U.   S.  205. 


§  12.]  WHEN   THERE   IS   NO   JURISDICTION   IN   EQUITY.  25 

judgment  at  law  because  of  fraud  ;  unless  the  complainant  had 
a  defense  to  the  action  upon  the  merits,'*^  aj^(j  either  the  fraud 
was  extrinsic  to  the  matter  tried  and  not  in  issue  in  the  former 
suit,  nor  then  known  to  the  complainant,  or  some  unconscientious 
advantage  was  taken  of  the  successful  judgment  debtor  during 
the  progress  of  the  suit  without  any  fault  or  negligence  upon  his 
part.''^  Nor  to  set  aside  a  judgment  at  law^-^  or  a  decree  in 
e(iuity  ^'^  for  an  omission  to  serve  a  party  to  the  same,  except  per- 
liaps  when  the  record  shows  an  apparent  service.  It  was  held  by 
Chief  Justice  Chase  that  an  insolvent  cannot  maintain  a  bill  for 
the  ajipointment  of  a  receiver  to  distribute  his  assets  among  his 
creditors.*-*  It  has  been  said  that  a  receiver,  assignee  in  bank- 
ruptcy, or  assignee  under  a  voluntary  general  assignment,  each  of 
whom  represents  creditors  as  well  as  the  debtor,  cannot  maintain 
a  bill  to  enforce  a  collateral  obligation  given  to  a  creditor  or  to  a 
body  of  creditors  by  a  third  person  for  the  ptjyment  of  the  debts  of 
the  insolvent.*'  A  bill  was  dismissed,  which  sought  to  enforce 
specific  performance  of  a  contract  containing  a  power  of  revoca- 
tion by  the  defendant.*^  So  was  a  bill  to  compel  the  transfer  of 
corporate  stock,  which  the  complainant  obtained  for  an  inadequate 
consideration,  and  which  he  wished  to  use  for  purely  speculative 
pur{)oses  and  to  gain  thereby  an  unconscientious  advantage.*^  In 
the  absence  of  statutory  authority,  a  private  individual  cannot  file 
a  bill  to  obtain  the  forfeiture  of  a  corporate  franchise.^'^  Nor  can 
a  corporation  be  enjoined  from  acting  beyond  its  legal  powers  at 
the  suit  of  a  business  rival  not  one  of  its  stockholders.^^  Nor 
can  a  stockholder  file  a  bill,  founded  upon  rights  which  may 
properly  be  asserted  by  his  corporation,  against  it  and  other 
parties,  unless  there  exists  "as  the  foundation  of  the  suit  some 
action  or  threatened  action  of  the  managing  board  of  directors 

*-^  White  >'.  Crow,  110  U.  S.  183.     Con-  Co.  r.  Central  Trust  Co.,  22  Fed,  R.  272. 

tra,  Mills  v.  Scott.  43  Fed.  R.  452.  See  Beach  on  Receivers,  §  327, 

«  Life  Ins    Co.   r.   Banjrs,   103  U.    S.  *'  Jacobson  v.  Allen,  12  Fed.  R.  454. 

780,  782  ,  Cragin  r.  Lovell,  109  U.  S.  VM.  «s  Express  Co.  r.  Railroad  Co.,  'JU  U.  S. 

See  Kno.x  County  v.  Ilarshman,  133  U.  S.  191. 

152,    Leavenworth    County    Comm'rs  v.  «  M.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.  r.  Cromwell,  01 

Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P    R'y   Co    134  U.  S.  U.  S.  643.     See  Foil's  Appeal,  iU  I'a.  St. 

688.  434;    Randolph's   E.xecutor   v.   Quidnick 

«  Lewis  V.  Cocks,  23  Wall.  4G0.  Company,  135  U.  S.  457,  45'.). 

*s  Yeatman  t-.  Bradford,  44  Fed.  R.  536.  5'  Gaylord   v.   Fort    Wayne   M.   Ik    C 

46  Huuh  v.  McRne,  Chase's    Dec.  4(5G.  R.  R.  Co.,  6  Biss  28G. 

Cn,ifrn,  Bras,«ev  r.  N.  Y.  &  N.  K.  R.  R.  Co.,  ^i  Railroad  Co    v.  Ellcrman,  105  U.  S, 

19  Fed.  R.  GG3;  Wabash,  St.  L.  &  P.  Ry.  1G6. 


26  JURISDICTION,  [chap.  I. 

or  trustees  of  the  corporation  which  is  beyond  the  authority  con- 
ferred on  them  by  their  charter  or  other  source  of  organization  ; 
or  such  a  fraudulent  transaction  completed  or  conteniphxted  by 
the  acting  managers,  in  connection  with  some  other  party,  or 
among  themselves,  or  with  other  shareholders,  as  will  result  in 
serious  injury  to  the  corporation,  or  to  tlie  interests  of  the  other 
shareholders;  or  where  the  board  of  directors,  or  a  majority  of 
them,  arc  acting  for  their  own  interest,  in  a  manner  destructive  of 
the  corjjoration  itself,  or  of  the  rights  of  the  other  shareholders  ; 
or  where  the  majority  of  shareholders  themselves  are  oppres- 
sively and  illegally  pursuing  a  course  in  the  name  of  the  corpora- 
tion which  is  in  violation  of  the  rights  of  the  other  shareholders, 
and  which  can  only  be  restrained  by  the  aid  of  a  court  of  equity. 
Possibly  other  cases  may  ai'ise  in  which,  to  prevent  irremediable 
injury  or  a  total  failure  of  justice,  the  court  would  be  justified  in 
exercising  its  powers;  but  tlie  foregoing  may  be  regarded  as  an 
outline  of  the  principles  which  govern  this  class  of  cases.  But 
in  addition  to  the  existence  of  grievances  wliicli  call  for  this  kind 
of  relief,  it  is  equally  important  that  before  the  shareholder  is 
permitted  in  his  own  name  to  institute  and  conduct  a  litigation 
which  usually  belongs  to  the  corporation,  he  should  show  to  the 
satisfaction  of  the  court  that  he  has  exhausted  all  the  means 
within  his  reach  to  obtain,  within  the  corporation  itself,  the 
redress  of  his  grievances,  or  action  in  conformity  to  his  wishes. 
He  must  make  an  earnest,  not  a  simulated  effort  with  the  man- 
aging body  of  the  corporation  to  induce  remedial  action  on  their 
part,  and  this  must  be  made  apparent  to  the  court.  If  time  per- 
mits, or  has  permitted,  he  must  show,  if  he  fails  with  the  direc- 
tors, that  he  has  made  an  honest  effort  to  obtain  action  by  the 
stockholders  as  a  body,  in  the  matter  of  which  he  comjilains. 
And  he  nuist  show  a  case,  if  this  is  not  done,  where  it  could  not 
be  done  or  it  was  not  reasonable  to  require  it."  ^^  Analogous 
rules  regulate  a  suit  by  a  stockholder  to  set  aside  a  contract  l)y 
the  corporation  as  beyond  the  powers  conferred  in  its  charter.^-^ 

6-'  Ilawes  I'.  Oakland,  104   U.   S.  450,  752.     See  also  Equity  Kule  94,  and  infra, 

4G0,  401;  /*pr  Miller,  J.     See  also  Hunt-  §§70,87,207. 

ington  V.  Palmer,  104   U.  S.  482;  Green-  ^'^  Dimpfell  v.  Oliio  &  Mississippi  K.  R. 

wood  V.  Freight  Co.,  105  U.  S.  13;  De-  Co.,  110  U.  S.  209;  Tazewell  i-.  Farmers' 

troit   V.    Dean,    100   U.  S.    537;   Quincy  Loan    &    Trust   Co.,    12    Fe.l.    R.    752; 

V  Steel,  120  U.  S.  241  ;  County  of  Taze-  (Greenwood  v.  Freight  Co.,  105  U.  S.  13. 
well  V.  Farmers'  L.  &  Tr.  Co.,  12  Fed.  R. 


§  14.]         ORIGINAL   JURISDICTION   OF   THE   SUPREME   COURT.  27 

Where  a  stockholder  filed  a  bill  against  the  corporation,  the 
directors,  and  another  stockholder,  charging  that  the  individual 
defendants  had  entered  into  a  conspiracy  to  do  an  unlawful  and 
fraudulent  act,  in  furtherance  of  their  individual  interests,  which 
would  destroy  or  seriously  impair  the  value  of  the  property  of 
the  corporation;  that  the  individual  defendants  held  among  them- 
selves seven-tenths  of  the  stock,  and  had  procured  a  vote  of  the 
stockholders  authorizing  the  corporation  to  carry  out  the  project, 
and  prayed  an  injunction  to  prevent  this,  the  bill  was  held  good 
on  demurrer,  although  it  showed  no  previous  effort  to  obtain 
redress,  from  the  directors  or  stockholders,  when  no  outsider  was 
made  a  party  defendant.^^  It  has  been  said  that  a  court  of  equity 
has  no  power  to  seize  a  man's  property,  and  through  its  officers 
complete  a  bridge  in  pursuance  of  a  contract  Avhich  he  has 
made.^^  Nor  is  it  a  sufficient  ground  for  the  interference  of  a 
court  of  equity  that  the  evidence  in  a  cause  is  voluminous  and 
tedious.^^ 

§  13.  Federal  Courts  •which  have  Jurisdiction  in  Equity.  —  The 
equitable  jurisdiction  of  the  Federal  courts,  from  which  category 
the  courts  of  the  Territories  and  of  the  District  of  Columbia  are 
here  excluded,^  is  in  the  Supreme  Court,  the  Circuit  Courts  of 
Appeal,  the  Circuit  Courts,  the  District  Courts,  the  Court  of  Claims, 
and  the  Court  of  Private  Land  Claims. 

§  14.  Original  Jurisdiction  of  the  Supreme  Court.  —  The  Supreme 
Court  has  original  jurisdiction  both  at  law  and  equity  in  all  cases 
affecting  ambassadors,  other  ])ublic  ministers  and  consuls,  and 
those  in  which  a  State  is  a  party. ^  The  jurisdiction  of  the  Supreme 
Court  over  controversies  to  which  a  State  is  a  party  is  exclusive, 
except  as  regards  controversies  between  a  State  and  its  citizens, 
or  between  a  State  and  citizens  of  other  States.^  In  suits  to  which 
a  State  is  a  party  the  practice  in  equity  is  followed.^  The  Supreme 
Court  has  exclusively  all  such  jurisdiction  of  suits  against  ambas- 
sadors or  other  public  ministers,  or  their  domestics  or  domestic 
servants,  as  a  court  of  law  can  have  consistently  with  the  law  of 
nations  ;  and  original,  but  not  exclusive,  jurisdiction  of  all  suits 

5^  Barr  v.  Pittsburgh  Plate-Glass  Co.,  §  13.  i  See  Clinton  v.  Englebrecht,  13 
40  Fed.  R.  412.  Wall  434. 

55  Te.\as  &  St.  Louis  Ry.  Co.  c:  Rust,  §  14.  i  Const,  art.  iii. 

17  Fe<l.  R.  275.  -  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  687. 

s*^  Bovven  c:  Chase,  94  U.  S.  812,  824.  ^  Georgia  >:  Brailsford,  2  Dall,  402  ; 

Kentucky  v.  Dennisou,  24  How.  266. 


28  JUEISDICTION.  [chap.  I. 

brought  by  ambassadors,  or  other  public  ministers,  or  iu  which  a 
consul  is  a  party.* 

A  State  may  file  a  bill  against  another  State  to  settle  and  estab- 
lish a  disputed  boundary.^  In  such  a  suit  the  United  States  has 
an  interest  in  the  controversy,  and  the  attorney-general  on  his 
application  may  intervene  and  appear  on  behalf  of  the  United 
States  and  adduce  proofs  and  be  heard  in  argument  without 
making  the  United  States  a  party  in  the  technical  sense  of  the 
term  ;  but  he  has  no  right  to  interfere  in  the  pleading  or  evi- 
dence or  admissions  of  either  of  the  States  ;  and  in  such  a  suit 
the  judgment  cannot  be  either  for  or  against  the  United  States.^ 
Written  authority  from  the  governor  of  a  State  is  sufficient  to 
authorize  a  suit  on  behalf  of  the  StateJ  In  a  suit  by  a  State 
against  another  State  the  service  of  a  subpccna  sixty  days  before 
the  return  day  is  sufficient.^  Service  should  be  made  on  both 
the  governor  and  the  attorncy-g-cncral.^  In  one  case  a  subpa3na 
served  upon  the  governor  by  leaving  a  copy  at  his  house  and 
there  showing  the  original  to  the  secretary  of  state,  was  held 
sufficient.^*' 

The  filing  of  a  pleading  by  the  attorney-general  of  a  State  who 
has  been  admitted  to  practice  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States  is  an  appearance  on  behalf  of  such  State.^^  The  rules  con- 
cerning the  time  for  pleading  in  suits  between  individuals  do  not 
apply  to  suits  between  the  different  States.^^  The  State  of  Massa- 
chusetts was  allowed  to  answer  an  amended  bill  of  the  State  of 
Rhode  Island  one  year  after  the  filing  of  such  amended  bill.^^ 
If  the  State  fail  to  appear,  or  if  the  State  withdraw  its  api)ear- 
ance,  no  coercive  measures  will  be  taken  to  compel  its  appear- 

4  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  G87.  ^  New  Jersey  ?•.  New  York,  (5  Peters, 

s  State  of  New  Jersey  v.  Rtiite  of  New  323. 

York,  3  Peters,  4(31  ;  s.  c.  5  I'eters,  284  ;  ^  Ciiisholm  v.  Georgia,  2  Dallas,  419 ; 

s.    c.    (j    Peters,    323;    Massachusetts   v.  Grayson  r.  Virginia,  3  Dallas,  320 ;  New 

Klioile    Island,   12  Peters,   755;    Rhode  Jersey  r.  New  York,  3  Peters,  4fil  ;  s.  c  5 

Island    V.   Massachusetts,   13  Peters,  23;  Peters,  284;  Commonwealth  of  Kentucky 

Florichi  v.  Georgia,  17  How.  478;  Rhode  r.  Dennison,  24  How.  GO. 

Island  V.  Massachusetts,  15  Peters,  233;  i'  Huger  v.  South  Carolina,  3  Dallas, 

s.   c.   4  How.  5'.)1 ;    Missouri   v.  Iowa,  7  3.39. 

How.  fiGO;  Florida  v.  Georgia,  17  Plow.  i'  State  of  New  Jersey  i-.  State  of  New 

478 ;  Virginia  r.  West  Virginia,  11  Wall.  York,  6  Peters,  623. 

39;  Missouri  r.   Iowa,  10  How.   1;  Ala-  i-  State  of  Rhode   Island   v.   State  of 

bama  v.  Georgia,  23  How.  50-j  ;  Missouri  Massachuseits,  13  Peters,  23. 

1-.  Kentucky,  11  Wall.  .39.5.  i-'  State  of  Rhode   Island    i-.   State   of 

^  Florida  r.  Georgia,  17  How.  478.  Massachusetts,  13  Peters,  23. 

"  Te.xas  v.  White,  7  Wall.  700,  719. 


§  14.]         ORIGINAL   JURISDICTION    OF   THE   SUPREME    COURT.  29 

ance,  but  the  complainant  may  be  allowed  to  })roceed  ex  parte}^ 
A  State  cannot  maintain  a  bill  in  equity  to  protect  a  purely 
political  right. ^^  A  State  cannot  obtain  an  order  or  judgment 
compelling  the  governor  of  another  State  to  return  a  fugitive 
from  labor  or  justice.^*^  In  a  suit  to  settle  a  disfjuted  boun- 
dary, the  most  appropriate  mode  of  proceeding  is  by  bill  and 
cross-bill.^" 

A  State  cannot  sue  one  of  its  own  citizens  in  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States.^^  The  allegation  that  a  defendant 
corporation  is  "  a  body  politic  in  the  law  of  and  doing  business 
in  the  State  of  California"  is  insufficient  to  establish  that  the 
defendant  is  a  California  corporation,  and  is  insufficient  to  show 
that  the  defendant  is  not  a  Pennsylvania  corporation.^^  A  State 
cannot  sue  another  State  to  collect  bonds  and  coupons  of  the 
defendant  which  have  been  assigned  to  the  plaintiff  by  its  own 
citizens  in  order  that  it  may  collect  them  and  pay  the  proceeds 
to  the  assignors.^*^  A  suit  by  a  State  to  collect  a  judgment  for 
penalties  obtained  in  one  of  its  own  courts  against  a  foreign  cor- 
poration cannot  be  maintained  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States.-^  A  State  may  sue  for  an  injunction  against  the  collection 
by  citizens  of  other  States  of  certain  bonds  of  the  United  States 
which  are  the  property  of  such  State,  and  for  the  delivery  to  it 
of  such  bonds,  and  for  a  declaration  that  the  contract  under  which 
the  defendants  claim  a  title  to  such  bonds  is  void.'^^  A  State 
may  maintain  a  bill  against  citizens  of  other  States  to  enforce  its 
title  to  a  railroad.^'^  The  fact  that  a  State  is  a  stockholder  in  a 
corporation  by  or  against  whicli  a  suit  is  Ijrought  does  not  make 
the  State  a  party  to  such  suit.-^ 

The  appellate  jurisdiction  of  the  Supreme  Court  is  explained 
in  the  final  chapter  of  this  work.  Incidental  to  such  appellate 
jurisdiction,  the  Supreme  Court  lias  ])owcr  in  certain  limited  cases 

"  State   of  Massacliusetts  v.  State  of  ^o  Xew    Hampshire    i'.    Louisiana,    108 

Rhode  Island,  12  Peters,  755;  Oswald  i-.  U.  S.  7(3. 

New  York,  2  Dallas,  415 ;    Chisliolm  v.  -^   Wisconsin  v.  Telican  Insurance  Co., 

Georgia,  2  Dallas,  419.  127  U.  S.  2G5. 

15  Georgia  v.  Stanton,  6  Wall.  50.  --  Texas  v.  Wiiite,  7  W^-ill.  700,  741-743. 

i«  Commonwealth  of  Kentucky  v.  Den-  -^  State    of   Florida   v.   Anderson,   91 

nison,  24  How.  GG.  U.  S.  667. 

1"  Missouri  v.  Iowa,  7  How.  GOO.  -^  The  Bank  of  the  United   States   i-. 

iS  Pennsylvania  v.  Quicksilver  Co.,  10  The  Planters'  Bank  of  Georgia,  9  Wheat, 

Wall.  553.  904. 

1^  Pennsylvania  v.  Quicksilver  Co.,  10 
Wall.  553. 


30  JUEISDICTIOK  [chap.  I. 

to  issue  writs  of  prohibition,-^  mandcwius,^^  habeas  corpus^'  scire 
facias,  and  other  writs.-^ 

§  14  a.  Jurisdiction  of  the  Circuit  Courts  of  Appeal.  There 
are  nine  Circuit  Courts  of  Appeal,  one  in  each  circuit.^  Their 
jurisdiction  is  exclusively  appellate,  and  will  be  explained  in  the 
concluding  chapter  of  this  work.  Incidental  to  such  appellate 
jurisdiction,  they  have  the  power  to  issue  writs  of  scire  facias  and 
all  writs  not  specifically  provided  for  by  statute,  which  are  neces- 
sary for  the  exorcise  of  their  respective  jurisdiction  and  agree- 
able to  the  usages  and  principles  of  law.^ 

§  15.  Jurisdiction  of  the  Circuit  Courts  of  the  United  States.  — 
The  Circuit  Courts  of  the  United  States  have  original  cognizance, 
concurrently  with  the  courts  of  the  several  States,  of  all  suits  of 
a  civil  nature,  at  common  law  or  in  equity,  where  the  matter  in 
dispute  exceeds,  exclusive  of  interest  and  costs,  the  sum  or  value 
of  two  thousand  dollars,  and  arising  under  the  Constitution  or 
laws  of  the  United  States,  or  treaties  made  under  their  authority, 
or  in  which  controversy  the  United  States  are  plaintiffs  or  peti- 
tioners ;  suits  in  which  there  is  a  controversy  between  citizens  of 
different  States,  in  which  the  matter  in  dispute  exceeds,  exclusive 
of  costs,  the  sum  or  value  aforesaid  ;  or  a  controversy  between 
citizens  of  the  same  State,  claiming  land  under  grants  of  differ- 
ent States,  or  a  controversy  between  citizens  of  a  State  and  for- 
eign States,  citizens  or  subjects,  in  which  the  matter  in  dispute 
exceeds,  exclusive  of  interest  and  costs,  the  sum  or  value  afore- 
said :  1  and,  irrespective  of  the  value  of  the  matter  in  dispute, 
of  cases  commenced  by  the  United  States  or  l)y  direction  of  any 
officer  thereof  against  national  banks,  or  cases  for  winding  up 
the  affairs  of  any  such  1)ank;-  and  all  suits  authorized  bylaw 
to  be  brought  l)y  any  jjcrson  to  redress  the  deprivation,  nnder 
color  of  any  law,  statute,  ordinance,  regulation,  custom,  or  usage 
of  any  State,  of  any  right,  privilege,  or  immunity,  secured  by  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States,  or  of  any  right  secured  by  any 
law  providing  for  equal  rights  of  citizens  of  the  United  States,  or 
of  all  persons  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States,  whether 

25  U.S.  R,  S.  §  r,88.  Sce/n/5Y,.§§?>m,.3fi2.  2  u.  S.  R.  S.  §  710;   26  St.  at  L.  829, 

25  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  GS8.     See  hi/m,  §§  :^G1,  §  12.     See  infra,  §§  ;^61_S(!8. 
363,  ?AU.  §  15.     1  24  St.  at  L.  cli.  .37.1,  p.  552. 

2'  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  751.     See  infra,  §§.066,  2  04  St.  at  L.  cli.  37.'3,  §  4,  p.  552.    See 

367,  368.  Armstroiiff  r.  Ettlesohn,  36  Fed.  R.  209; 

2S  U.S.  R.S.  §  r,88.  See  /»rw.§§  HGl,  .365.  Armstronp  v.  Trautmnnn,  .36  Fed.  R.  275 ; 

§  14  a.    1  26  St.  at  L.  ^29,  §  12.  McCoiivillo  v.  Gilmour,  36  Fed   R.  277. 


§  15.]  JURISDICTION   OF   THE   CIRCUIT   COURT.  31 

such  suit  was  originally  brought  in  one  of  them  or  removed  there 
according  to  law  from  a  State  court  ;^  of  suits  against  the  United 
States,  to  collect  claims  of  more  than  $1000  and  not  exceeding 
$10,000,  for  money  only,  founded  upon  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States  or  any  law  of  Congress,  except  for  pensions,  or  upon 
any  contract,  expressed  or  implied,  with  the  government  of  the 
United  States  ;  or  for  damages,  liquidated  or  unliquidated,  in  cases 
not  sounding  in  tort  in  respect  of  which  claims  the  plaintiff  would 
be  entitled  to  redress  against  the  United  States,  in  a  court  of  law, 
equity,  or  admiralty,  if  the  United  States  were  suable, — except 
war  claims,  and  except  other  claims,  which,  before  March  3, 1887, 
were  rejected  or  reported  on  adversely  by  any  court,  department, 
or  commission  authorized  to  hear  and  determine  the  same  :  *  of 
proceedings  to  condemn  for  national  public  uses  land  within  their 
respective  districts ;  ^  of  suits  to  recover  penalties  under  the  act 
forbidding  the  importation  of  persons  under  a  contract  to  perform 
labor ;  ^  of  suits  to  enforce  and  prevent  violations  of  the  acts  to  pro- 
tect trade  and  commerce  against  unlawful  restraints, "  the  act  to 
prevent  the  unlawful  occupation  of  public  lands,  ^  and  the  act 
to  execute  provisions  of  the  treaties  with  China ;  ^  proceedings  to 
review  the  decisions  of  the  general  appraisers  ^'^  and  under  certain 
special  statutes.  Formerly  Circuit  Courts  of  the  United  States 
had  jurisdiction,  without  regard  to  the  value  of  the  matter  in  dis- 
pute, of  all  suits  at  law  or  in  e(piity  arising  under  the  patent,  trade- 
mark, or  copyright  laws  of  the  United  States,  or  under  any  act 
providing  for  internal  revenue  or  revenue  from  imports  or  ton- 
nage, or  under  the  postal  laws,  or  under  any  of  the  laws  relating 
to  the  slave  and  cooley  trade  ;  of  suits  by  the  assignees  of  debent- 
ures for  drawback  of  duties  ;  of  proceedings  by  the  writ  of  quo  tvar- 
ranto  prosecuted  by  a  district  attorney  of  the  United  States  for  the 
removal  from  office  of  any  person  holding  office  contrary  to  the 

3  U.  S.  R.  S.§629;24St.  atL.ch.373,  7  26  St.  at  L.  209;  U.    S.   v.  Jellico 

§  5.  Mountain  Coke  &  Coal  Co.,  43  Fed.  R. 

*  24  St.  at  L.  505  ;  U.  S.  v.  Jones,  131  898;  s.  c.  ■\(j  Fed.  R.  432.    See  American 

U.  S.  1.     See  infrn,  §  m.  Biscuit  &  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Klitz,  44  Fed.  R. 

°  2d  St.  at  L.  ch.  728,  p.  357.  See  infra,  721,  725,  720. 
§  381.                                                      "  8  23  St.  at  L.  321. 

6  23  St.  at  L.  3.32  ;  U.  S.  v.  MexMcan  9  24  St.  at  L.  409. 

Nat.  Ry.  Co.,  40  Fed.  R.  269.     See  U.  S.         i'>  26  St.  at  L.  138  ;  Fn  re  Rlumlein,  45 

V.  Rector  of  tlie  Cliurch  of  tiie  Holy  Trin-  Fed.  R.  236  ;  In  re  DieckerlioiT.  45  Fed. 

ity,  36  Fed.  R.  303  ;  U.  S.  v.  Craig,  28  Fed.  R.  235  ;  In  re  Dowling,  45  Fed.  R.  412. 
R.  795  :  26  St.  at  L.  1084. 


32  jURiSDicTiox.  [chap.  I. 

Fourteenth  Amendment  to  the  Constitution,  except  a  member  of 
Congress  or  of  a  State  legislature ;  and  of  suits  to  recover  posses- 
sion of  any  office  except  that  of  elector  of  President  or  Vice  Presi- 
dent, representative  or  delegate  in  Congress,  or  member  of  a  State 
legislature,  authorized  by  law  to  be  brought,  wherein  it  appeared 
that  the  sole  question  touching  the  title  to  such  office  arose  out  of 
the  denial  of  the  right  to  vote  to  any  citizen  on  account  of  race, 
color,  or  previous  condition  of  servitude. ^^  Whether  the  Act  of 
1887  has  deprived  the  Circuit  Courts  of  this  jurisdiction  is  under  the 
authorities  a  doubtful  question. ^^  It  has  been  held  at  circuit  that 
those  courts  still  have  jurisdiction,  irrespective  of  the  value  of  the 
matter  in  dispute,  of  suits  at  law  or  in  equity  arising  under  the 
patent  and  coin'right  laws ;  ^'^  of  suits  at  law  or  in  equity  arising 
under  the  revenue  laws  ;  ^^  and  of  actions  at  common  law  bj^  the 
United  States  or  an  officer  thereof,  including  in  this  term  a  re- 
ceiver of  a  national  bank  appointed  by  the  comptroller. ^'^  No  Cir- 
cuit Court  of  the  United  States  has  cognizance  of  any  suit,  except 
upon  foreign  bills  of  exchange,  to  recover  the  contents  of  any 
promissory  note  or  other  chose  in  action,  in  favor  of  any  assignee 
or  of  any  subsequent  holder,  if  such  instrument  be  payable  to 
bearer  and  be  not  made  by  any  corporation,  unless  such  suit  might 
have  been  prosecuted  in  such  court  to  recover  the  said  contents  if 
no  assignment  or  transfer  had  been  made.^*^ 

§  16.  Matter  in  Dispute.  —  The  value  of  the  matter  in  dispute 
must  ordinarily  exceed,  exclusive  of  interest  and  costs,  the  sum 
of  two  thousand  dollars, ^  This  signifies  not  the  amount  of  any 
contingent  loss  or  damage  which  one  of  the  parties  may  sustain 
by  a  decision  against  him,  but  the  amount  in  dispute  between 
the  parties  in  the  pending  suit.^  Thus,  the  reason  that,  on  ac- 
count of  its  probative  force,  the  judgment  may  operate  as  an 
estojipcl  in  a  subsequent  proceeding,  does  not  increase  the  value 

11  r.  S.  R.  S.  §§0-29,2150,  3213;  18  St.  642;  United    States    v.   Kentucky  River 

at  L.  478.  Mills,  45  Fed.    R.    273.     Contra,    United 

1-  24  St.  at  L.  552 ;  Act  of  Marcli  3,  States  v  Iluifniaster,  35  Fed.  R.  81. 

1887,  cli.  373,  §§  5  and  0.  i«  Act  of  March  3,  1887,  §  1,  24  St.  at 

1-^  Miilor-Magee    Co.  v.    Carjjenter,  34  L.  cli.  373,  p.  552,  as  amended  by  act  of 

Fed.  R.  433.  See  United  States  i'.  iMooney,  Ausrust,  13,  1888,  25  St.  at  U.  p.  433. 

116  U.  S.  104,  107.  §  10.     1  Act  of  IMarch  3,  1887,  §  1,  24 

"  Ames  V.  Ilager,  30  Fed.  R.  129.  St.  at  L.  ch.  373,  p.  552. 

15  Armstrong  f.  Kttlesohn,  36  Fed.  R.  -  Ross  v.   Prentiss,  3   How.  771,   772; 

209;  Armstrong  v.  Trautmann,  36  Fed.  Elgin  i\  Marsliall,  100  U.  S.  579 ;   Bruce  y. 

R.27o;  McConville  r.  Gilmour,  36  Fed.  M.^&  K.  R.  R.  Co.,  117  U.  S.  514. 

K.  277  ;  Stephens  v.  Bernays,  44  Fed.  R.  "^ 


§  16]  MATTER   IN    DISPUTE.  33 

of  the  matter  in  dispute.^  Where  the  suit  is  upon  a  demand  on 
which  the  law  hquidates  the  damages  for  a  default,  the  amount 
of  the  damages  as  liquidated  hy  the  law,  not  the  amount  named 
in  the; plaintiff's  pleading,  is  the  value  of  the  matter  in  dispute  ;* 
but  where  the  alleged  cause  of  action  is  one  in  which  the  law 
does  not  liquidate  the  damages,  the  amount  for  which  the  plain- 
tiff demands  judgment  is  alone  to  be  considered,^  unless  it  clearl\- 
appears  that  the  amount  named  is  merely  colorable  and  beyond 
the  amount  of  a  reasonable  expectation  of  recovery.*^  Thus,  in 
an  action  of  debt  on  a  bond  of  one  hundred  dollars,  the  prin- 
cij)al  and  interest  arc  put  in  demand,  and  no  more  can  be  recov- 
ered except  costs,  though  the  plaintiff  lay  his  damages  at  ten 
thousand  dollars.  The  value  of  the  matter  in  dispute  cannot, 
therefore,  exceed  one  hundred  dollars  with  interest  and  costs." 
But  in  an  action  for  false  imprisonment  ^  or  assault  and  battery, 
the  law  prescribes  no  limitation  to  the  amount  which  can  be 
recovered  ;  and  the  amount  claimed  by  the  ])laintif¥  is  the  sole 
criterion  to  which  resort  can  be  had  in  settling  the  question  of 
jurisdiction.^  Where  a  defendant's  counterclaim  has  been  dis- 
missed and  judgment  rendered  for  the  plaintiff,  the  amount  of 
the  counterclaim  added  to  the  amount  recovered  by  the  plain- 
tiff is  the  matter  in  dispute.^°  The  value  of  property  sued  for 
is  not  always  the  matter  in  dispute. ^^  Where  a  complaint  con- 
tains several  counts,  each  for  a  separate  sum  alleged  to  be  due, 
and  disputed  l)y  the  defendant,  the  aggregate  of  the  sums  con- 
stitutes the  value  of  the  matter  in  dispute. i-  The  value  of  the 
matter  in  dispute  in  a  suit  for  an  accounting  has  been  said  to 
be  the  amount  of  the  disputed  items  of  the  account. ^'^  In  a 
suit  for  an  injunction  the  amount  in  dispute  is  the  value  of  the 

3  Elgin   V.  Marsliall,   106   U.   S.  579 ;  9  Wilson  v.  Daniel.  3  Dall.  401,  407; 

Bruce  o.  M.  &  K.  R.  R.  Co.,  117  U.  S.  514.  Barry   v.   Edmunds,  IIG   U    S.  550,  5G0. 

i  Wilson  V.  Daniel,  3  Dall.  401,  407 ;  But  see  Maxwell  v.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F. 

Barry  v.  Edmunds,  116  U.  S.  550,  560.  R.  Co.,  3  Fed.  R.  280. 

■'  Smith  V.  Greenhow,  109  U.  S.  669;  i^  Dushane  r-  Benedict,  120  U.  S.  G30 : 

Wilson  i:  Daniel,  3  Dall.  401,  407  ;  Barry  See  Lovell  v.  Cragin,  130  U.  S.  130,  140  , 

r.  Edmunds,  IIG  U.  S.  550,  5G0 ;  Gorman  infra,  §  385. 

V.  Havird,  141  U.  S.  200.  n  Gibson  v.  Shufeldt,  122  U.  S.  27,  29  ; 

«  Lee  V.  Watson,  1   Wall.  337 ;  Bow-  per  Gray,  J. 

man  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.   Co.,  115  i-  Armstrong  v.  Ettlesohn,  36  Fed.  R. 

U.  S.  611,  61G;  Smith  v.  Greenhow,  109  209;  Bernheim   v.  Birnbaum,  30  Fed.  R. 

U.  S.  669.  885.  887. 

"  Wilson  ('.  Daniel,  3  Dall.  401,  407.  ^^  McCormick  v.  Gray,  13  How.  20. 

8  Hynes  v.  Briggs,  41  Fed.  R.  4G8. 

VOL.    I.  —  3 


34 


JURISDICTION. 


[chap.  I. 


object  to  be  gained  by  the  bill,  not  merely  the  amount  of  dam- 
ages already  suffered  by  the  complainant.^"*  Thus,  in  a  suit  to 
enjoin  the  use  of  a  trademark  and  compel  an  account  of  profits, 
the  value  of  the  matter  in  dispute  is  the  value  of  the  trade- 
mark, not  the  amount  of  profits  which  the  defendant  has  do- 
rived  from  its  iise.^°  In  a  suit  to  enjoin  the  use  of  a  railway 
by  a  party  not  its  owner,  the  value  of  the  use  of  the  railway, 
not  the  value  of  the  railway,  was  held  to  be  the  value  of  the 
matter  in  dispute. ^^  In  a  suit  to  cancel  a  paper  pur})orting  to 
be  a  marriage  contract,  the  amount  of  the  provision  which  the 
woman  would  lie  entitled  to  receive  from  her  husband,  were  thi 
contract  held  binding,  is  the  value  of  the  matter  in  dispute.^" 
In  a  suit  to  quiet  title,  the  value  of  the  property  affected  is  the 
value  of  the  matter  in  dispute. ^^  The  value  of  the  subject-mat- 
ter in  an  appeal  in  a  suit  by  a  taxjmyer  to  enjoin  the  levy  of 
tax  for  payment  of  bonds  is  the  amount  of  the  whole  tax  levy 
which  it  is  sought  to  be  enjoined.^'-'  In  a  stockholder's  suit  to 
enforce  a  cause  of  action  belonging  to  his  corporation,  the  value 
of  the  matter  in  dispute  was  held  to  be  the  value  of  the  corpo- 
rate right  sought  to  be  enforced,  not  the  value  of  the  plaintiff's 
interest  therein.-'*^  Where  a  number  of  plaintiffs,  claiming  under 
the  same  title  and  having  a  common  interest  in  the  relief  sought, 
unite  in  a  suit,  action,  or  proceeding,  their  united  interests  con- 
stitute the  matter  in  dispute.-^  Where,  however,  a  suit  is  brought 
by  one  for  himself  and  all  others  of  a  class  similarly  situated, 
the  aggregate  interest  of  all  those  who  join  with  him,  not  that 
of  the  whole  class,  constitutes  the  matter  in  dispute."    The  iu- 


»  iMississippi  &  Mo.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ward, 
2  Black,  485;  Market  Co.  r.  Hoffman, 
101  U.  S.  112;  Symonds  r.  Greene,  28 
Fed.  R.  Sai;  Wliitman  r.  llubbell,  CO 
Fed.  R.  81. 

li  Symonds  v.  Greene,  28  Fed.  R.  834. 

1''  Oleson  V.  Northern  Pac.  R.  R.  Co., 
41  Fed.  R.  1. 

'^  Sliaron  r.  Terry,  '-](>  Fed.  R.  .3.37. 

^^  Leliigh  Zinc  &  Iron  Co.  '■.  N.  J.  Zinc 
&  Iron  Co.,  4:3  Fed.  R.  545. 

13  Brown  r.  Trousdale,  V)S  U.  S.  389. 
But  see  Murpliy  r.  East  Portland,  42 
Fed.  R.  308 ;  American  Fertilizer  Co.  v. 
Board  of  Agriculture  of  North  Carolina, 
43  Fed.  li.  (;00. 

■^'>  Hill ..  Glasgow  R  Co  ,  41  Fed.  R.  GIO. 


-1  Shields  r.  Thomas,  17  IIow.  3; 
Market  Co.  v.  Hoffman,  101  U.  S.  112; 
Davies  V.  Corbin,  112  U.  S.  3();  Fstcs  r. 
Guiiter,  121  U.  S.  183  ,  Lovett  r.  Prentice, 
44  Fed.  R.  4.59.  See  Gibson  v.  Shufeldt, 
122  U.  S.  27  ;  Clay  v.  Field,  1:]8  U.  S.  404, 
479. 

--  Bruce  r.  Manchester  &  K.  R.  R.  Co  ., 
117  U.  S.  514.  51G;  IMassa  v.  Cuttinsr,  30 
¥vt\.  R.  1  ;  Adams  v.  Board  of  County 
Comm'rs,  McCahon  (U.  S.  C.  C  D.  Kan.), 
235;  Rich  v.  Bray,  37  Fed.  R.  273;  John- 
son V.  V/ators,  lli  U.  S.  G40;  Handley  r. 
Stutz,  1.37  U.  S.  300,  .309.  Miller  v.  Clark, 
188  U.  S.  223.  But  see  Brown  r.  Trous- 
tlale,  138  U.  S.  3^9;  Hill  v.  Glasgow  R. 
Co.,  41  Fed.  R  GIO. 


§  17.]      SUITS  UNDER  CONSTITUTION  OR  LAWS  OF  THE  U.  STATES. 


35 


tcrest  excluded  from  consideration  includes  interest  accrued  on 
a  demand  before  the  suit  was  brouglit.^^  Coupons  when  attached 
to  a  bond  upon  which  suit  is  brought  are  considered  as  interest, 
and  excluded  from  consideration  when  determining  the  juris- 
diction.2^  It  has  been  held  that  notarial  fees  for  presentation 
and  protest  of  a  note,  though  paid  before  suit  brought,  are 
costs,  not  damages,  and  cajinot  be  considered  in  estimating  the 
value  of  the  matter  in  dispute.^'*  The  fact  that  part  of  plain- 
tiff's claim  is  barred  by  tiio  statute  of  limitations  will  not  divest 
the  court  of  jurisdiction.'^*^  An  admission  by  the  defendant  in 
liis  pleading  of  part  of  the  plaintiff's  demand  will  not  divest  the 
court  of  jurisdiction.-'' 

§  17.  Suits  arising  under  the  Constitution  or  Laws  of  the  United 
States. — A  suit  arises  under  the  Constitution  or  a  law  of  the 
United  States  whenever  its  correct  decision  depends  on  the  con- 
struction of  either.^  "  When  a  proposition  has  once  been  decided 
by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  it  can  no  longer  be 
said  that  in  it  there  still  remains  a  Federal  question.  Move  cor- 
rectly it  is  said  that  there  is  no  question,  State  or  Federal."^ 
When  either  party  is  a  corporation  chartered  by  Congress,  the 
case  is  one  arising  out  of  a  law  of  the  United  States.^  Not,  how- 
ever, when  the  S(^le  corporate  party  derived  its  charter  from  a 
Territorial  law.*  Suits  to  which  national  banks  are  parties  are 
exempted  from  the  operation  of  this  rule,  except  cases  commenced 
by  the  United  States  or  by  direction  of  any  ofiicer  thereof,  or 
cases  for  winding  up  the  affairs  of  any  such  bank.'^     Tliis  cx- 


23  Moore  v.  Edsrefield,  32  Fed.  R.  498. 

24  Howard  v.  Bates  County,  43  Fed.  R. 
276. 

25  Baker  r.  Howell,  44  Fed.  R.  4i:] ; 
U.  S.  C.  C.  D.  Nebraska,  Caldwell  and 
Dundy,  J.I. 

20  Harding  v.  Cass  County,  42  Fed.  R. 
652. 

2'  Fuller  V.  Met.  Life  Ins.  Co.,  37  Fed. 
R.  16.3. 

§  17  1  Cohens  v.  Virginia,  6  Wheat. 
264,379;  Tennessee  r.  Davis,  100  U.  S. 
2J7,  264;  Starin  v.  New  York,  115  U.  S. 
248,  257 ;  Southern  Pacific  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
California,  118  U.  S.  109,  112.  But  see 
Commonwealth  of  Kentucky  v.  Louisville 
Bridge  Co.,  42  Fed.  R.  241. 

2  Brewer,  J.,  in  Kansas  v.  Bradley,  20 


Fed.  R.  289,  290.  See  Starin  r.  New 
York,  115  U.  S.  248,  257;  Southern  Pa- 
cific R.  R.  Co.  V.  California,  118  U.  S. 
109,  112. 

3  Osborn  v.  U.  S.  Rank,  9  Wheat.  738, 
823;  Pacific  Railroad  Removal  Cases,  115 
U.  S.  1 ;  Farmers'  L.  &  Tr.  Co.  v.  Denver, 
S.  P.  &  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  1  Ry.  &  Corp.  L.  J. 
584. 

•*  Adams  Express  Co.  v.  Denver  &  R. 
G.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  Fed.  R.  712. 

5  Act  of  March  3,  1887,  §  4, 24  St.  at  I 
oh.  373,  p.  5-52.  See  Armstrong  v.  Kttle- 
sohn,  36  Fed.  R.  209  ;  Armstrong  i-.  Traut- 
mann,  36  Fed.  R.  275;  McConville  v. 
Gilmour,  36  FeiL  R.  277  ;  Whittemore  v. 
Amoskcag  Nat.  ]5ank,  134  U.  S.  527; 
First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Forest,  40  Fed.  R.  705; 


36  JURISDICTION.  [chap.  I. 

ception  leaves  the  Circuit  and  District  Courts  with  jurisdic- 
tion over  cases  commenced  after  the  Act  of  1887.^  It  has  been 
held  that  a  case  does  not  arise  under  the  laws  of  the  United 
States,  though  brought  to  enjoin  the  infringement  of  a  patent, 
when  the  defendant  admits  the  validity  of  the  patent,  and  rests 
his  defense  upon  an  alleged  license  from  the  plaintiff.'  A  suit 
to  determine  the  title  to  a  patent  the  validity  of  which  is  not 
disputed  does  not  arise  under  the  Constitution  and  laws  of  the 
United  States.^  A  suit  to  set  aside  a  land  patent  solely  on  ac- 
count of  fraud  has  been  held  not  to  arise  under  the  Constitution 
and  laws  of  the  United  States.^  Where,  however,  the  decision  of 
a  case  depends  upon  the  construction  of  a  patent  for  an  inven- 
tion or  a  land  patent,  or  upon  the  construction  of  the  land  laws, 
mining  laws,  or  patent  laws,  the  suit  arises  under  the  laws  of 
the  United  States. ^*^  A  suit  to  enjoin  a  receiver  appointed  by  a 
Federal  court  has  been  held  to  arise  under  the  laws  of  the  United 
States. ^^  A  suit  to  recover  property  taken  by  a  receiver  of  a 
national  bank  under  color  of  a  law  of  the  United  States  arises 
under  the  laws  of  the  United  States.^^  A  suit  upon  a  marshal's 
bond  arises  under  the  laws  of  the  United  States. ^^  A  suit  against 
a  marshal  for  levying  under  a  writ  upon  property  claimed  by 
a  stranger  to  the  suit  on  which  the  writ  issued  1)ut  Avhich  tlie 
marshal  claims  belonged  to  the  defendant  to  the  writ,  arises 
under  the  laws  of  the  United  States  ;  ^^  but  a  suit  against  a 
marshal  for  a  levy  upon  goods  which  he  docs  not  claim  to  be  the 
property  of  a  person  named  in  the  writ  docs  not  arise  under  the 

P'.'irmers'  Nat.  Bank  v.  McEIIiinncy,  42  ^  Montgomery  Palace  Stove  Car  Co. 

Fed.  K.  801 ;  Sowles  v.  First  Nat.  Bank  of  v.    Street   Stable  Car   Line,  40  Fed.   R. 

St.  Albans,  46  Fed.  R.  513.     See  §  19.  329. 

G  Stephens  v.  Bernays,  44  Fed.  R.  642.  '■>  Holland  r.  Hyde,  41  Fed.  R.  977. 

"  Kartell  v.  Tilghman,  99  U.  S.  &47  ;  lO  Dunton  v.  Mutli,  45  Fed.  R.  390,395; 

Wilson    V.   Sandford,    10    How.    99;    Al-  Jones  U.Florida  C.  &  P.  R.  Co.,  41  Fed. 

bright  V.  Teas,  106   U.  S.  61o;  IMe  Tile  R.  70;  Murray  v.  Bluebird  Min.  Co.  Ld. 

Manuf.  Co.  v.  Hyatt,  125  U.  S.  40;  Feli.v  45  Fed.  R.  385;   Cheesman  v.  Shrevc,  37 

r.  Scharnweber,  125  U.  S.  54;  McCarty  Fed.  R.  3(5. 

&  Hall  Trading  Co.  v.  Glaenzcr,  30  Fed.  "  Evans  v.  Dillingham.  43  Fed.  R.  177. 

R.  387.     But  see  Smith  r.  Standard  Laun-  But  see  25  St.  at  L.  cli.  866,  §  3,  p.  434  ; 

dry  Mach.  Co.,  19  Fed.  R.  825;  Conti-  /«/m,  §251. 

nental   Store  Service  Co.  v.   Clark,   100  '  i-  Sowles  r.  Witters,  43  Fed.  R.  700. 

N.   Y.    365;    Hat   Sweat   Jlanuf.    Co.    i'.  13  Teibelinan    r.    Pnckard,    109    F.    S. 

Reinoehl,  102  N.  Y.  167;  Puelz  u.  Brans-  421;    Bachrack    v.    Norton,    132    U.    S. 

ford,   32   Fed.   R.   318;    St.   Paul   Plow  337. 

Works  V.  Starhng,  127  U.  S.  .370;  Sei-  '-*  Rock  r.  Perkins,  139  U.  S.  028.     But 

bert   C.  O.  Cup  Co.  v.  Manning,  32  Fed.  NSee  Buck  r.  Colbath,  3  Wall.  531. 
R.  025. 


§  18.]     CONTROVERSY   BETWEEN   CITIZENS   OF  DIFFERENT  STATES.     37 

laws  of  the  United  States.^^  A  suit  on  a  judgment  recovered  in  a 
coui-t  of  the  United  States  is  not  necessarily  a  suit  arising  under 
the  laws  of  the  United  States.^^  A  case  does  not  arise  under  the 
laws  of  the  United  States  simply  because  a  Federal  court  has 
decided  in  another  suit  the  questions  of  law  which  arc  involved.'" 
No  Federal  question  is  raised  by  an  answer  that  is  bad  in  sub- 
stance without  reference  to  the  Federal  question  which  it  seeks 
to  plead.'^ 

§  18.  Controversy  between  Citizens  of  different  States.  —  A 
controversy  between  citizens  of  diilerent  States  is  one  in  which 
every  party  u})on  one  side  is  a  citizen  of  a  different  State  from 
every  party  ujjon  the  other.' 

The  citizenship  of  formal  parties  with  no  real  interest  in  the 
controversy  does  not  affect  the  jurisdiction.^  Such  are  the  hus- 
band of  the  plaintiff  when  made  a  defendant  to  a  suit  against 
another  to  enforce  the  trusts  of  a  marriage  settlement ;  ^  a  State 
in  a  suit  by  it  for  the  use  of  one  of  its  citizens  brought  upon  a 
bond  given  by  an  administrator ;  *  an  agent  ^  or  attorney  "^  of  a 
corporation  when  a  defendant  to  a  suit  against  it  which  seeks  no 
relief  against  him  ;  the  sheriff  and  the  commissioners  of  a})praisal 
summoned  by  him  when  defendants  to  a  suit  to  enjoin  a  corpora- 
tion from  prosecuting  condemnation  proceedings." 

In  determining  between  whom  the  controvei'sy  exists,  the  court 
is  not  bound  by  the  title  of  the  cause,  or  the  form  of  the 
pleadings,  but  should  examine  the  record,  ascertain  the  matter 
in  dispute,  and  arrange  the  parties  on  opposite  sides  of  the  same 
according  to  the  facts,  no  matter  what  their  technical  place  as 
plaintiffs  or  defendants  may  be.*^     In  a  suit  by  taxpayers  against 

15  Buck  r.  Colbath,  3  Wall.  .53.  3  Wormley  r.  Wormley,  8  Wlient.  421. 

i«  Provident  Savings  Society  r.  Ford,  '^  Maryland  v.  Baldwin,  112  11.8.400. 

114  U.  S.  635;  Metcalf  v.  Watertown,  128  See  also  Northman  v.  Wade,  77  Georgia, 

U.  S.  580.     See  Winter  v.  Swinburne,  8  651. 
Fed.  n.  40  ;  and  infra,  §  21.  ^  Wood  r.  Davis,  18  How.  467  ;  Brown 

'^  Leather     Manufacturers'     Bank     v.  v.  Murray  Nelson  &  Co.,  43  Fed.  Iv.  (114. 
Cooper,  120  U.  S.  778,  781.  «  Brown   r.  Murray  Nelson  &  Co.,  43 

1^  Fitzgerald   v.    Missouri   Pacific  Ry.  Fed.  R.  014. 
Co.,  45  Fed.  R.  812.  "  Sioux  City  &  I).  M.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Chi- 

§  18.  1  Blake  v.  McKim,  103  U.  S.  830.  cago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  27  Fed.  R.  770. 
•^  Removal  Cases,  100  U.  S.  457  ;    Bar-  **  Removal  Cases,  100  U.  S.  457,  468; 

ney  v.  Latham,  103  U.  S.  205;  Barter  v.  Pacific  R.  R.  v.  Ketchum,  101   U.  S.  280; 

Kernochan,  103  U.S.  562;  Maryland  r.  Barney  f.  Latham,  103  U.  S.  205 ;  Carson 

Brtldwin,     112     U.    S.     400;     Wormley  v.   Hyatt,   118  U.  S.  270,286;  Brown  v. 

V.  Wormley,   8   Wheat.   421;    Taylor   r.  Murray   Nelson   &  Co.,  43  Fed.  R.  014; 

Holmes,  14  Fed.  R.  4'J9.     See  inj'ra,  §  51.  Anderson  v.  Bowers,  40  Fed.  R.  708. 


38  jURisDiCTiox.  [chap.  I. 

county  officers  and  holders  of  county  bonds  to  enjoin  payment  of 
the  bonds,  the  defendant  officers  are  presumed  to  be  on  the  same 
side  of  the  controversy  as  the  comphiinants.^ 

When  at  the  time  a  bill  is  filed  the  court  has  no  jurisdiction, 
jurisdiction  cannot  subsequently  be  conferred  by  an  amendment 
strikinir  out  a  party  plaintiff  who  was  properly  and  necessarily 
made  such  at  the  commencement  of  the  suit;^'^  but  in  one  case 
the  court  retained  jurisdiction  by  allowing  an  amendment  which 
made  one  of  the  original  plaintiffs  a  defendant.!^  When  they 
are  not  indispensable  parties,  jurisdiction  may  be  retained  upon  a 
discontinuance  or  dismissal  as  regards  defendants  who  are  citi- 
zens of  the  same  State  as  the  plaintiff.^^ 

19,  Citizenship.  —  If  there  arc  no  other  grounds  of  jurisdic- 
tion, the  Federal  courts  do  not  take  cognizance  of  a  controversy 
between  two  aliens  ;  ^  or  of  one  between  a  citizen  of  the  District 
of  Columbia,^  or  a  citizen  of  a  Territory,  and  a  citizen  of  a  Statc.^ 
A  suit  brought  by  a  State  against  one  of  its  own  citizens,  or 
against  a  citizen  of  another  State,  cannot,  independently  of  other 
grounds,  be  maintained  in  a  Federal  court.^  If  one  of  the  parties 
sues  or  is  sued  as  receiver,'^  or  as  an  executor  or  administrator,^ 
his  own  citizenship,  not  that  of  those  whom  he  represents,  is  the 
test  in  determining  the  jurisdiction.  When  an  infant  sues  by 
his  next  friend  or  special  guardian,  the  citizenship  of  the  infant 
alone  is  to  be  considered."  A  corjioration  is  conclusively  pre- 
sumed to  be  composed  of  citizens  of  the  State  or  nation  which 
chartered  it,  or  from  wliich  it  derives  its  powers.^  A  municipal 
corporation  is  treated  as  a  citizen  of  the  State  within  which  it  i^ 
situated.'^     The  same  princiide  has  been  applied  at  circuit  to  aa 

9  Ilarteri;.  Kernochan,  103  U.  S.  5G2;  Coal   Co.    r.   Blatchfonl,    11    Wall.   172; 

Anderson  v.  Bowers,  40  Fed.  H.  708.  Browne  r.  Browne,  1  Wash.  429;  Harper 

1'  Anderson  r.  Watt,  i:J8  U.  S.  6'.)4.  v.  Norfolk  &  W.  R.  Co.,  m  Fed.  K.  102. 
11  Conolly  V.  Taylor,  2  Pet.  556.  "  Woolridge  v.  McKenna,  8   Fed.  K. 

1-2  Beebe  v.  Louisville,  N.  O.  &  T.'  K.  650. 
Co.,  3'J  Fed.  E.  481,  484.  ^  Louisville  C.  &   C.  K.  R.  Co.  r.  Let- 

§10.  1  Mossman  y.  llifr^^inson,  4  Dall.  son,  2  How.  407 ;  Marsliall  /•.    P.altiniore 

12;  Rateau  v.  Bernard,  ;}  I'.latchf.  244.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  How.  ;514  ;  Muller  r. 

-  Hepburn   v.  Ellzey,  2   Crancli,  445;  Dows,  04    U.   S.  446;  Steamship  Co.  r. 

Wescott  i\  Fairfield,  Pet.  C.  C.  45 ;  Bar-  Tu<,Mnan,    100   U.  S.    118.     For   an    able 

ney  >■.  Baltimore,  1  Hnglies,  11^.  criticism  of  these  rulings,  see  the  address 

3  New  Orleans  r.  Winter.  1  Wheat,  01.  of  Hon.  Alfred  Russell  before  tlie  Ameri- 

•1  Alabama  v.  Wolffe,  IS  Fed.  R.  80(3.  can  P.nr  Association  in  Aujjust,  1801  (25 

^'  Davies  c.  Lathrop,  12   Fed.  R.  353, •  American  Law  Review,  77(),  79.5-803). 
Farlow  v.  Lea,  2  C.  L.  R.  320.  ->  °  Cowles  v.  Mercer  County,  7  Wall. 

^  Bradford  v.  Williams,  3  How.  570;  118. 


§  !?•] 


CITIZENSHIP. 


39 


unincorporated  association  authorized  by  statute  to  sue  and  be 
sued  under  the  name  of  one  of  its  officers. ^'^  A  corporation  char- 
tered by  two  or  more  States  is  usually  treated  for  the  purposes  of 
jurisdiction  as  a  citizen  and  resident  of  that  one  of  them  within 
whose  limits  the  suit  is  brought ;  ^^  but  a  different  rule  would 
seem  to  apply  to  a  corporation  formed  by  the  consolidation  of 
two  or  more  corporations  chartered  by  different  States.^-  A 
national  bank  is  deemed  a  citizen  of  the  State  in  which  it  is  lo- 
cated.^^  The  filing  of  a  declaration  of  his  intention  to  become  a 
citizen  of  the  United  States  does  not  terminate  a  party's  alienage, 
although  he  is  permitted  by  the  laws  of  the  State  of  his  residence 
to  vote  and  hold  office. ^^  Residence  is  not  conclusive  evidence  of 
citizenship. ^5     An  exercise  of  the  right  of  suffrage  by  a  citizen 


1^  Fargo  V.  L.  N.  A.  &  C.  R.  U.  Co.,  6 
Fed.  R.  787  ;  VVhitnum  v.  Hubbt4I,  30  Fed. 
R.  81  ;  Maltz  i".  American  Express  Co.,  3 
Central  L.  J.  784  ;  Liverpool  Ins.  Co.  v. 
IMassacliusetts,  10  Wall.  566.  Contra, 
Dinsniore  v.  Pliila.  &  R.  Co.,  8  Central  L. 
J.  157  ;  and  see  Chapman  v.  Barney,  129 
U.  S.  677. 

11  0.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Wheeler,  1 
Black,  28(5 ;  Hallway  Co.  v.  Whitton,  13 
Wall.  270 ;  Muller  v.  Dows,  94  U.  S.  444. 
See  Railroad  Co.  v.  Harris,  12  Wall.  05 ; 
Graham  v.  B.  H.  &  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  118 
U.  S.  161  ;  Pa.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  St.  L.  A.  & 
T.  H.  U.  R.  Co.,  118  U.  S.  290;  Nashua 
&  Lowell  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Boston  &  Lowell 
R.  R.  Co.,  136  U.  S.  356;  Fitzgerald  y. 
IMissouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  45  Fed.  R.  812 ; 
Moore  «.  C.  St.  P.  M.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  21 
Fed.  R.  817  ;  C.  St.  P.  M.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Dakota  Co.,  28  Fed.  R.  219  ;  Page  v. 
Fall  River  W.  &  P.  R.  Co.,  31  Fed.  R. 
257  ;  Johnson  v.  P.  W.  &  B.  R.  R.  Co.,  1 
Am.  L.J.  457  ;  James  r.  St.  Louis  &  S.  F. 
Ry.  Co.,  40  Fed.  R.  47  ;  Central  Trust  Co. 
V.  St.  Louis  &  S.  T.  Ry.  Co.,  41  Fed.  R. 
551. 

12  Nashua  &  Lowell  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Boston 
&  Lowell  R.  R.  Co.,  13(i  U.  S.  356.  See 
Paul  V.  Baltimore  &  0.  R.  R.  Co  ,  44  Fed. 
R  513. 

»  24  St.  at  L.  ch.  373,  §  4,  p.  554  ;  First 
Nat.  Bk.  V.  Forest,  40  Fed.  R.  705  :  Farm- 
ers' Nat.  Bank  v.  RIcElhiiiney,  42  Fed.  R. 
80.     See  §  17. 

1*  Lanz  r.  Randall,  4  Dill.  425;  Maloy 
V.  Duden,  25  Fed.  R.  073. 


i'^  Shelton  v.  Tiffin,  6  How.  163,  185 ; 
Reynolds  v.  Adden,  ]o6  U.  S.  348,  352  ; 
Kemna  v.  Brockhaus,  5  Fed.  R.  762,  763- 
764,  766-767  ;  per  Dyer,  J.  :  — 

"  The  general  rule  ujjon  the  subject  of 
citizenship  is  well  settled.  It  is  that,  'in 
order  to  give  jurisdiction  to  the  courts  of 
the  United  States,  the  citizenship  of  tlie 
party  must  be  founded  on  a  change  of 
domicile,  and  permanent  residence  in  the 
State  to  which  he  may  have  removed  from 
another  State.  Mere  residence  is  prima 
facie  evidence  of  such  change,  although 
when  it  is  e.xplained  and  shown  to  have 
been  for  temporary  purposes,  the  pre- 
sumption is  destroyed.  The  intention 
is  to  be  collected  from  acts.'  Lessee 
of  Butler  v.  Farnsvvorth,  4  Wash.  101 ; 
1  Abbott  (U.  S.)  Pr.  211.  'If  a  citizen 
of  one  State  think  proper  to  change  his 
domicile,  and  to  remove  himself  and 
family  .  .  .  into  another  State,  with  a 
bona  Jide  intention  of  abandoning  his 
former  place  of  residence,  and  to  become 
an  inhabitant  or  resident  of  the  State  to 
which  he  removes,  he  becomes,  immedi- 
ately upon  such  removal,  accomi)anied 
with  such  intention,  a  resident  citizen 
of  that  State  within  the  meaning  of 
the  provision  of  the  Constitution  rela- 
tive to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  fed- 
eral courts,  and  may  maintain  an  ac- 
tion in  the  Circuit  Court  of  the  State 
which  he  has  abandoned.  .  .  .  Time  in 
relation  to  his  new  residence,  occupation, 
a  sud<ien  removal  back  after  instituting 
a  suit,  and  the  like,  are  circumstances 


40 


JUtllSDICTION. 


[chap.  I. 


of  the  United  States  is  conclusive  evidence  of  his  citizenship.^^ 
Less  evidence  may,  however,  be  sufficient  to  establish  a  change 
of  citizenship.!^     Tlie  fact  that  a  plaintiff  has  changed  his  resi- 


which  may  be  relied  upon  to  sliow  tliat 
liis  first  removal  was  not  butxi  Jide  or  per- 
manent, but  will  not  disprove  his  citizen- 
ship in  the  place  of  his  new  domicile,  if 
the  jurj'  are  satisfied  that  his  first  removal 
was  bona  fide  and  without  an  intention  of 
returning.'  Cooper  i-.  Galbraith,  3  Wash. 
564.  '  If  there  has  been  an  actual  re- 
moval, with  intent  to  make  a  permanent 
residence,  and  the  acts  of  the  party  cor- 
respond with  the  purpose,  the  change  of 
domicile  is  completed,  and  the  law  forces 
upon  him  the  character  of  a  citizen  of  tlie 
State  where  he  has  chosen  his  domicile.' 
Butler  V.  Farnsworth,  supra.  A  tempor- 
ary return  to  one's  former  place  of  resi- 
dence, with  views  and  for  objects  merely 
temporary,  does  not  revive  a  former 
citizenship.  Burnham  r.  Kangely,  1 
Woodb.  &  M.  7.  '  If  the  change  of  resi- 
dence or  citizenship  is  apparent  only,  and 
there  has  been,  in  fact,  no  change  of  resi- 
dence, but  only  a  transfer  of  apparent 
residence,  animo  revertendi,  to  give  color 
of  jurisdiction  in  a  suit  in  the  State  of 
actual  residence,  it  may  not  avail;  but, 
where  there  is  an  actual  change  of  resi- 
dence and  citizenship  before  suit  brouglit, 
the  motive  to  such  change  is  not  material, 
even  if  it  was  a  desire  to  give  capacity  to 
sue  in  the  courts  of  the  United  States." 
Pond  V.  The  Vermont  Valley  K.  Co.,  12 
Blatchf.  29o.  So,  to  effect  a  change  of 
citizenship  from  one  State  to  another, 
there  must  be  an  actual  removal,  an  ac- 
tual change  of  domicile,  with  a  bona  fide 
intention  of  abandoning  the  former  place 
of  residence  and  establishing  a  new  one, 
and  the  acts  of  the  party  must  correspond 
with  such  purpose."  ..."  Since  the  ques- 
tion is  one  of  mixed  law  and  fact,  and  since 
so  much  may  depend  upon  intention,  in 
connection  witli  the  acts  of  the  party  and 
the  circumstances  of  the  case,  it  is  some- 


16  Rabaud  v.  D'Wolf,  1  Paine,  580; 
State  Savings  Assoc,  v.  Howard,  ol  Fed. 
R.  433;  McDonald  v.  Salem  C.  F.  Mills 
Co.,  31  Fed.  R.  577. 

1"  Shelton  v.  TitTm,  G  IIow.  103,  185. 
For  in  a  case  where  it  was  lield  that  a  pre- 


times  difficult  to  determine  when  there 
has  been  such  a  change  of  domicile  as  de- 
stroys a  former  citizenship  and  establishes 
a  new  one.  The  plaintiff  has  testified, 
under  objection,  to  the  intentions  and 
purposes  of  herself  and  husband.  It  is 
true,  as  argued,  that  intention  is  to  be 
collected  from  acts,  and  therefore  it  is 
not  competent  for  a  party  to  prove  iiis 
own  declarations  of  intention,  made  before 
any  acts  done,  in  order  to  give  character 
to  his  subsequent  acts.  But  where  acts 
have  been  done,  such  as  actual  removal 
from  one  place  to  another,  it  is,  as  I 
understand,  competent  in  a  case  like  this 
for  the  party  to  testify  to  his  purpose  and 
intention  as  connected  with  those  acts, 
when  they  are  brought  in  question,  pre- 
cisely as,  in  a  case  where  fraud  is  charged, 
an  actor  in  the  transaction  ma\-  be  asked 
directly  whether  any  fraud  is  intended. 
It  is,  of  course,  the  duty  of  the  court  in 
such  cases  to  scrutinize  the  acts,  to  see 
if  they  correspond  with  the  allege<l  pur- 
pose. It  is  apparent  that  the  circimi- 
stance  of  the  plaintiff's  return  to  Mil- 
waukee in  December  was  one,  which,  if 
une.\"j)lained,  would  tend  to  throw  doubt 
upon  the  permanency  of  the  alleged  set- 
tlement in  Minnesota.  But  if  her  return 
was  for  an  object  merely  temporary-,  as 
she  alleges,  tlien  her  domiciliary  status  in 
that  State  would  not  be  affected.  Com- 
ment was  made  upon  the  fact  that  the 
plaintiff's  husband  pledged  their  house- 
hold furniture  and  left  it  in  the  hands  of 
a  pawnbroker,  at  the  time  they  removed 
to  Minnesota,  as  a  circumstance  indica- 
tive of  a  purpose  not  to  abandim  their 
residence  in  Milwaukee.  While  the  situa- 
tion in  which  their  furniture  was  placed 
has  a  bearing  upon  the  pecimiary  ability 
of  the  husband  to  engage  in  business,  it 
has  seemed  to  me  that  the  fact  that  the 


vious  statement  in  a  bond,  that  a  party 
was  "of"  Massachusetts,  did  not  estop 
him  from  subsequently  proving  that  he 
was  then  a  citizen  of  New  Hampshire, 
see  Reynolds  v.  Adden,  13G  U.  S.  318. 


§21.] 


ANCILLARY   JURISDICTION. 


41 


deuce  for  the  purpose  of  bringing  the  suit  in  a  Federal  court  does 
not  divest  the  jurisdiction  if  the  change  has  actually  occurred. ^^ 
A  change  of  citizenship,  or  a  change  of  parties  after  the  jurisdic- 
tion has  once  attached,  will  not  divest  it.^^ 

§  20.  Under  Grants  of  Different  States.  —  Where  One  party 
claimed  land  under  a  grant  of  Now  Hampshire  made  when  Ver- 
mont  was  a  part  of  that  State,  and  the  other  under  a  grant  from 
Vermont  made  after  their  separation,  it  was  held  that  the  con- 
troversy arose  between  persons  claiming  land  under  grants  of 
different  States. ^  Where  a  controversy  is  founded  upon  con- 
flicting grants  of  different  States,  the  Federal  courts  have  juris- 
diction irrespective  of  the  equitable  title  of  the  parties  before 
either  grant.^ 

§  21.  Ancillary  Jurisdiction.  —  After  a  Federal  court  has 
acquired  jurisdiction  through  the  existence  of  the  necessary 
difference  of  citizenship  between  the  original  parties,  ancillary 
proceedings  may  be  therein  instituted,  although  jiarties  upon  the 
different  sides  of  the  controversy  arc  citizens  of  the  same  State, 


parties  broke  up  housekeeping,  stored 
their  furniture  and  pawned  it  for  money, 
which  must  have  enabled  tlieni  to  remove 
from  tlie  State,  tends  ratlier  to  corrobo- 
rate tlie  claim  that  the  removal  was  made 
with  a  view  of  establisliing  a  permanent 
residence  elsevv];ere,  than  otherwise.  The 
plaintiff's  home  had  always  been  in  Mil- 
waukee. Here  her  parents  and  family 
resided.  Why  shouhl  these  acts  be  done 
unless  there  was  a  bimn  Jixle  intention  to 
remove  to  another  State  1  The  court 
cannot  infer  that  they  were  done  merely 
to  enable  her  to  begin  this  suit  in  this 
court,  in  the  absence  of  any  proof  tending 
in  that  direction.  To  adopt  the  view  taken 
1)}'  the  learned  counsel  for  the  defendants, 
involves,  as  I  conceive,  the  utter  rejection 
of  the  plaintiff's  testimony  as  quite  un- 
worthy of  belief.  I  do  not  think  it  is 
sufficiently  impeached  to  justify  tlie  court 
in  so  doing  as  to  material  matters  whereof 
she  speaks  from  avowed  personal  knowl- 
edge ;  and  we  have  to  settle  the  question 
upon  the  weight  of  credible  evidence  as 
it  is  now  presented  to  the  court.  There 
was  a  breaking  uj)  by  the  parties  of 
househo'd  life  in  IMihvaukee.  There  was 
an  actual  removal  to  another  State.  There 
appears  to  have  been  an  intention  to  re- 


move to  a  fixed  place  in  that  State,  fol- 
lowed by  a  change  to  another  place, 
because  of  the  failure  of  business  pro- 
jects. There  was  a  continued  residence 
in  the  alleged  new  domicile,  and  the 
testimony  is  that  the  return  to  the  for- 
mer domicile  was  for  temporary  purposes 
only.  The  place  of  business  of  the  plain- 
titl's  husband,  according  to  the  present 
siiowing,  is  in  the  State  to  which  the 
parties  have  gone.  And  although  the 
court  might  wish  that  the  proof  was  more 
adequate  and  the  circumstances  more  con- 
clusive, I  think  upon  the  evidence,  as  it 
stands,  it  must  be  held  that  such  a  change 
of  domicile  was  made,  and  such  a  new 
residence  was  acquired  and  establishtd 
citizenship  in  another  State." 

IS  Hrijrcrs  V.  J'rench,  2  Sumner,  251, 
255,  256;  Catlett  v.  Pacific  Ins.  Co.,  1 
Paine,  594  ;  Cooper  v.  Galbraith,  ?,  Wash. 
C.  C.  54(3,  553 ;  Case  v.  Clarke.  5  Mason, 
70 ;  Robertson  v.  Carson,  19  Wall.  94.  lOti. 
But  see  Morris  v.  Gilmer,  129  U.  S  •■]15. 

i'»  Ober  V.  Gallaglier,  93  U.  S.  199.  206  ; 
Stewart  v.  Dunham,  115  U.  S.  61,  64; 
Phelps  V.  Oaks.  117  U.  S.  2:16. 

§  20.  1  Pawlet  v.  Clark,  9  Cranch,  292 ; 
Coison  ;■.  Lewis,  2  Wheat.  377. 

-  Coison  V.  Lewis,  2  Wheat.  377,  379. 


JURISDICTION. 


[chap.  1. 


and  there  is  no  other  ground  of  Federal  jurisdiction.^  "  The 
question  is  not  whether  the  proceeding  is  supplemental  and  an- 
cillary, or  is  independent  and  original  in  the  sense  of  the  rales 
of  equity  pleading,  but  whether  it  is  supplemental  and  ancillary, 
or  is  to  be  considered  entirely  new  and  original,  in  the  sense 
which  this  court  has  sanctioned  with  reference  to  the  line  which 
divides  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Federal  courts  from  that  of  the 
State  courts."  2  Thus,  not  only  can  a  bill  of  revivor  or  a  suj)- 
plemental  bill,^  or  a  cross-bill,^  be  maintained  in  a  Federal  court 
wliich  had  jurisdiction  of  the  original  litigation,  but  so  can  a  bill 
to  restrain,  or  to  regulate,^  or  to  set  aside,'''  or  to  obtain  a  judicial 
construction,"  or  to  enforce  a  judgment  or  decree  of  a  Federal 
court.^  A  bill  for  the  reformation  of  a  policy  of  insurance  is 
ancillary  to  an  action  upon  such  jiolicy.^  A  creditor's  bill 
between  citizens  of  the  same  State  founded  upon  a  decree  in 
admiralty  has  been  held  not  within  the  jurisdiction  of  a  Federal 
court.i'^  An  original  bill  to  foreclose  a  mortgage  on  a  railway  in 
the  possession  of  a  receiver  appointed  by  a  Federal  court  in  a 
prior  suit  to  foreclose  a  subsequent  mortgage,  can  be  brought  in 
tluit  Federal  court  independent  of  tlie  citizenship  of  the  parties, 
even  after  sale  in  the  former  suit.^^  It  has  been  held  at  circuit 
that  a  bill  cannot  thus  be  sustained,  irrespective  of  the  citizenship 
of  the  parties  when  filed  to  set  aside  for  fraud  subsequent  to  its 
entry  the  decree  of  the  Federal  court  or  a  contract  affecting 
such  decree. ^2 


§  21.  1  Dunn  ;;.  Clarke.  8  Pet.  1  ; 
Clarke  c.  Mathewson,  12  Pot.  1G4  ;  Free- 
man c.  Howe,  24  How.  450,  4i)0;  Minne- 
sota Company  r.  St.  Paul  Company,  2 
Wall.  GOO;  Jones  >-.  AmlrL'w^,  10  Wall. 
;327  ;  Krippendorf  r.  Ilyile,  110  U.  S  270; 
Pacific  II.  K.  of  iMo.  v.  Mo.  P.  K.  R.,  Ill 
U.  S.  505,  522;  Dewey  v.  W.  F.  G.  C.  Co., 
123  U.  S.  .32'J;  Gmnbel  >:  Pitkin,  124 
U.  3.  131  ;  Seymour  v.  Phillips  &  C.  Con- 
struction Co.,  7  liiss.  400.  But  see  Christ- 
mas V.  Kussell,  14  Wall.  00. 

-  Miller,  J.,  in  Minnesota  Company  v. 
St.  Paul  Comj.any,  2  Wall.  COO,  6:^3. 

3  Clarke  r.  Mathcwson;  12  Pet.  104. 

4  Morgan  La.  &  T.  U.  11.  &  St.  Co.  r. 
Texas  Central  Ky.  Co.,  1:17  U.  S.  171.  See 
iiifni,  §  172. 

■''  Dunn  r.  Clarke.  8  Pot.  1;  Freeman 
V.  Iluwe,  24  How.  450,  4G0;  Jones  v.  An- 


drews, 10  Wall.  327 ;  Krippendorf  v. 
Hyde,  110  U.  S.  276;  Johnson  v.  Chris- 
tian, 125  U.  S.  042. 

6  Pacific  K.  li  of  Mo.  r.  Mo.  P.  P.  P., 
Ill  U.  S.  505,  522;  Foster  r.  Mansfield, 
C.  &  L.  M.  P.  Co.,  30  Fed.  R.  027. 

"  Minnesota  Company  v.  St.  Paul 
Company,  2  Wall.  GOO. 

**  Railroad  Companies  ;•.  Chamberlain, 
6  Wall.  748. 

9  Rosenbaum  v.  Council  Bluffs  Ins 
Co.,  37  Fed.  R.  724;  Abraham  z\  Nortli 
German  F.  Ins.  Co.,  37  Fed.  R.  731. 

1'  Winter  r.  Swinburne,  8  Fed.  Ix.  40. 
See  Provident  Savings  Society  v.  Ford, 
114  U.  S.  035;  Mctcaif  y.  Watertown,  128 
U.  S.  580;  supra,  §  17. 

11  Farmers'  L.  &  Tr.  Co.  r.  Houston  & 
T.-C.  r.y.  Co.,  41  Fed.  R.  115. 

1-  Yeatman  r.  Bradford,  41  Fed.  R.  530. 


§  21.]  ANCILLARY   JUrJSDICTlOX.  43 

Converscl}',  there  is  a  similar  limitation  upon  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  Federal  courts.  This  is  well  explained  in  the  following  ex- 
tract from  an  opinion  by  Bradley,  J. :  "  The  question  presented 
with  regard  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Circuit  Court  is,  whether 
the  proceeding  to  procure  nullity  of  the  former  judgment  in  such 
a  case  as  the  present  is  or  is  not  in  its  nature  a  separate  suit,  or 
whether  it  is  a  sujjplementary  proceeding,  so  connected  with  the 
original  suit  as  to  form  an  incident  to  it,  and  substantially  a  con- 
tinuation of  it.  If  the  proceeding  is  merely  tantamount  to  the 
common-law  practice  of  moving  to  set  aside  a  judgment  for  irreg- 
ularity, or  to  a  writ  of  error,  or  to  a  bill  of  review,  or  an  aj)])eal, 
it  would  belong  to  the  latter  category,  and  the  United  States 
court  could  not  properly  entertain  jurisdiction  of  the  case.  Other- 
wise, the  Circuit  Courts  of  the  United  States  would  become  in- 
vested with  power  to  control  the  proceedings  in  the  State  courts, 
or  would  have  appellate  jurisdiction  over  them  in  all  cases  where 
the  parties  are  citizens  of  different  States.  Such  a  result  would 
be  totally  inadmissible.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  proceedings 
are  tantamount  to  a  bill  in  equity  to  set  aside  a  decree  for  fraud 
in  the  obtaining  thereof,  then  they  constitute  an  original  and  in- 
de})cndent  proceeding,  and  according  to  the  doctrine  laid  down  in 
Gaines  v.  Fuentes,^'^  the  case  might  be  within  the  cognizance  of 
the  Federal  courts.  The  distinction  between  the  two  classes  of 
cases  may  be  somewhat  nice,  but  it  may  be  afiirmed  to  exist.  In 
the  one  class  there  would  bo  a  mere  revision  of  errors  and  irregu- 
larities, or  of  the  legality  and  correctness  of  the  judgments  and 
decrees  of  the  State  courts ;  and  in  the  other  class,  the  investi- 
gation of  a  new  case  arising  upon  new  facts,  although  having 
relation  to  the  validity  of  an  actual  judgment  or  decree,  or  the 
party's  right  to  claim  any  Ijeneiit  by  reason  thereof."  ^^  Proceed- 
ings supplementary  to  execution  under  the  judgment  of  a  State 
court  authorized  by  State  statutes  against  a  judgment  debtor  or 
third  persons  cannot  be  instituted  in  or  removed  to  the  Federal 
courts,  although  a  creditor's  bill  may  be.^-^  A  petition,  after 
judgment  in  a  State  court,  by  plaintiff  in  ejectment  to  have  the 
defendant's  damages  allowed  to  him,  is  a  mere  incident  to  the 

13  02  U.    S.   10.      See   Arrowsniith   v.  Poole   r.  Tliatelierdeft,    10   Fed.  R.   49; 

Gleasnn,  129  U.  S.  86.  Biiford  >■.  Strntlier,  3  MeCrary,  253;  s.  c. 

»  Bnrrow  r.  Hunton,  99  U.  S.  80,  82.  10  Fed.  R.  100;  Flash  v.  Dilion,  22  Fed. 

15  Webber  v.  Humphreys,  5  Dill.  223  ;  R.  1. 


44  JUKISDICTI0J7.  [chap.  I. 

ejectment  suit,  and  the  Federal  courts  can  take  no  jurisdiction 
of  it.16 

§  22.  Limitations  upon  Jurisdiction  by  Residence.  —  The  Ju- 
diciary Act  of  18S7  limits  the  jurisdiction  of  tlie  Circuit  Courts 
of  the  United  States  as  follows :  "  But  no  person  sluill  be 
arrested  in  one  district  for  trial  in  another  in  any  civil  action 
before  a  Circuit  or  District  Court;  and  no  civil  suit  shall  be 
brought  before  either  of  said  courts  against  any  person  by  any 
original  process  or  proceeding  in  any  other  district  than  that 
whereof  he  is  an  inhabitant ;  but  where  the  jurisdiction  is  founded 
only  on  the  fact  that  the  action  is  between  citizens  of  different 
States,  suit  shall  be  brought  only  in  the  district  of  the  residence 
of  either  the  plaintiff  or  the  defendant."  ^  A  decision  in  the 
California  circuit  construed  this  act  as  depriving  the  Circuit 
Courts  of  all  jurisdiction,  whether  originally  or  by  removal,  over 
foreign  corporations  or  other  persons  who  are  inhabitants  of 
other  districts.^  The  other  Circuit  Courts,  however,  declined  to 
follow  this  decision; 2  and  it  was  finally  overruled  by  the  judges 
who  made  it.*  The  interpretation  seems  to  be  established  that, 
when  the  jurisdiction  depends  upon  the  existence  of  a  Federal  ques- 
tion, or  because  a  party  is  an  alien,  or  upon  grounds  other  than 
the  citizensliip  of  the  parties,  the  defendant  must  be  sued  in  the 
district  which  lie  inhabits  ;  ^  but  when  the  jurisdiction  depends  upon 
the  citizensliip  of  the  parties,  none  of  whom  are  aliens,  the  suit 
may  be  brought  in  the  district  in  which  either  the  plaintiff  or  the 
defendant  resides.*^     Whether  a  corporation  can  have  a  residence 

15  Chapman  v.  Barger,  4  Dill.  557.  &  McCormick  H.   INI.  Co.   r.  Walthers, 

§  22.  1  Act  of   March  3,  1887,  §  1,  24  134  U.  S.  41,  43;  St.  Louis  V.  &  II.   U. 

St.  at  L.  552  ;  as  amendetl,  25  St.  at  L.  Co.  v.  Terre   Haute  &   I.  K.  Co.,  '.]?,  Fe<l. 

4;J1.  K.  385,386;  Meyer  v.   Ilerrera,  41  Fed. 

-  County   of    Yuba  r.    I'loueer   Gold-  R.  G58. 
Mining  Co.,  32  Fed.  11.  183;  /jp/- Sawyer,  «  McCormick  H.   M.  Co.  v.  "Walthers, 

Field  &  Sabin,  J.I.     See  also  Ilardenberg  134  U.  S    41 ;  Pitkin  Min.   Co.   v.   Mar- 

i;.  Ray,  33  Fed.  R.  812,  814;  /;prl)eady,J.  kell,  33  Fed.  R.   380,   D.  Colorado;  per 

3  St.  Louis  V.  &  T.  H.  R.  Co.  v.  Terro  Ilallett,  J. ;  St.  Louis  V.  &  T.  II.  R.  Co. 

Haute  &  L  R.  Co.,  33  Fed.  R.  385;  Pit-  v.  Terre  Plaute  &  L  R.  Co.,  33  Fed.  \i. 

kin  County  Min.  Co.  r.  Markell,  .33  Fed.  385,   380,   S.    D.   Illinois;    per    Gresliam 

R.  38G;  Fales  y.  Cliica.<;o,  M.  &  St.  r.  Hy.  and  Allen,  J.L ;  Fales  v.  Chicago,   M.  & 

Co.,  32  Fed.  R.  673;  Short  v.  Chi.  M.  &  St.  P.   Ry.  Co.,  32  Fed.  R.  G73,  E.  D. 

St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  33  Fed.  R.  114;  Gavin  v.  Iowa;  per  Sliiras,  J.;  Short  v.  Chicago, 

Vance,  33  Fed.  R.  84;  W.  U.  Tel.  Co.  r.  M.   &   St.   P.  Ry.,   33   Fed.    R.   114,  1). 

Brown,  32  Fed.  R.  337.  Minnesota;     per   Brewer,   J.;    Gavin    v 

•»  Wilson  r.  W.  U.  Tel.  Co..  3t  Fed.  R.  ^'ance.  33  Fed.  R.  84,  W.  D.  Tennessee , 

561 ;  McCormick  II.  M.  Co.   v.  Walthers,  pn-  ^Hammond,  J.  ;    W.    U.   Tel.    Co.   v. 

134  U.  S.  41.  Brown,  32  Fed.  R.  337,  E.  D.  Missouri ; 


§22.] 


LIMITATIONS   UPON   JURISDICTION   BY   RESIDENCE. 


45 


beyond  the  territory  of  the  government  from  wliich  it  derives  its 
charter  is  uncertain."  It  lias  been  held  at  circuit  that  the  non- 
resident defendant  alone  can  object  to  the  jurisdiction,  because 
the  suit  is  not  brought  in  the  proper  district.^  This  objection 
may  be  waived.^  Where  a  foreign  corporation,  as  a  condition  of 
being  allowed  to  transact  business  in  Massachusetts,  had  filed  a 
statutory  agreement  making  the  Commissioner  of  Corporations 
its  attorney  "  upon  whom  all  the  lawful  processes  in  any  action  or 
proceeding  against  said  corporation  in  said  Commonwealth  may 
be  served  in  like  manner  and  with  the  same  effect  as  if  said  cor- 
poration existed  therein,"  it  was  held  that  it  might  then  be  sued 
in  the  Federal  courts  of  Massachusetts.^^  Wlicn  one  of  the 
plaintiffs  was  a  resident  of  the  district,  and  the  other  plaintiff 
and  the  defendant,  who  were  citizens  of  different  States,  were 


per  Brewer,  J. ;  Loom  is  v.  N.  Y.  &  C. 
Gas  Coal  Co.,  33  Fed-  R.  353,  N.  D.  New 
York;  jier  Coxe,  J,  Wallace  and  La- 
couibe,  JJ.,  concurring. 

"  Laconibe,  J.,  Filli  v.  Delaware,  L.  & 
W.  R.  Co.,  37  Fed.  R.  65,  S.  D.  New 
,  York ;  Hohorst  v.  Hamburg-American 
Packet  Co.,  38  Fed.  R.  273,  S.  D.  New 
York  ;  and  National  Typographic  Co.  v. 
New  York  Typographic  Co.,  44  Fed.  R. 
711,  S.  1).  New  York  ;  Ross,  J.,  in  Den- 
ton V.  International  Co.  of  Me.xico,  36 
Fed.  R.  1,  S.  D.  California ;  Foster,  J.  iu 
Purcell  V.  British  Land  &  Mortgage  Co. 
Limited,  42  Fed.  R.  465,  D.  Kansas ; 
Tiiayer,  J.,  in  Bensinger  Self-Adding 
Casli  Register  Co.  v.  National  Casli  Regis- 
ter Co.,  42  Fed.  R.  81,  E.  D.  Missouri; 
Shiras,  J.,  in  Myers  v.  Murray,  Nelson  & 
Co.,  43  Fed.  R.  695,  S.  D.  Iowa ;  Bond, 
J.,  in  Ilenning  v.  Western  Union  Tel. 
Co.,  43  Fed.  R.  97,  D.  South  Carolina; 
Woods,  J.,  in  Amsden  v.  Norwich  Union 
Fire  Ins.  Co.,  44  Fed.  R.  515,  D.  Indiana; 
and  Mr.  Justice  Brewer,  when  Circuit 
Judge,  in  Booth  v.  St.  Louis  Fire-Engine 
iManuf.  Co.,  40  Fed.  R.  1,  E.  D.  Mis- 
souri, held  that  it  cannot,  Maxey,  J.,  in 
Zambrino  v.  Galveston  H.  &  S.  A.  Ry. 
Co.,  38  Fed.  R.  449,  W.  D.  Texas ;  and 
Scott  V.  Texas  Land  &  Cattle  Co.,  Lim- 
ited, 41  Fed.  R.  225,  W.  D.  Texas ;  Mc- 
Kennan  and  Acheson,  JJ.,  in  Riddle  i'. 
New  York,  L.  E.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  39  Fed.  R. 
290,  W.  D.  rennylTania;    Mr.  Justice 


Miller,  in  Hirschl  v.  J.  Kare  Threshing 
Math.  Co.,  42  Fed.  R.  803,  S.  D.  Iowa ; 
Deady,  J.,  in  Miller  v.  Eastern  Oregon 
Gold  Min.  Co.,  45  Fed.  R.  345,  D.  Ore- 
gon;  and  Colt,  J.,  in  Consolidated  Store- 
Service  Co.  V.  Lamson  Consolidated 
Store-Service  Co.,  41  Fed.  R.  833,  D. 
Mass.,  held  that  a  foreign  corporation 
which  transacts  the  principal  part  of  its 
business  in  another  State  resides  there, 
and  cannot,  on  account  of  a  difference  of 
tlie  citizenship  between  the  parties  to  the 
controversy,  remove  a  case  to  the  Federal 
court.  The  same  opinion  is  expressed 
by  Judge  Speer,  U.  S.  D.  J.,  S.  D.  Geor- 
gia, in  his  Removal  of  Causes,  p.  38. 
Judge  Shipman,  U.  S.  D.  J.,  D.  Conn., 
appears  to  entertain  the  same  view.  See 
his  opinion  in  Overman  Wheel  Co.  v. 
Pope  Manuf.  Co.,  46  Fed.  R.  577.  See 
also  McCormick  Harvesting  Macliine  Co. 
V.  Waltliers,  134  U.  S.  41;  and  the  ad- 
dress of  Hon.  Alfred  Russell  before  the 
American  Bar  Association  in  August, 
1891,  25  American  Law  Review,  776, 
795,  803. 

8  Jewett  I'.  Bradford  Sav.  Bank  & 
Trust  Co.,  45  Fed.  R.  801. 

'■*  Consolidated  Store-Service  Co.  v. 
Lamson  Consolidated  Store-Service  Co., 
41  Fed.  R.  833.     See  in/ni,  §§  94,  101. 

1"  Consolidated  Store-Service  Co.  v. 
Lamson  Consolidated  Store-Service  Co., 
41  Fed,  R.  833,  D.  Mass.,  per  Colt,  J. 


46  jUFJSDicTiox.  [chap.  I. 

non-residents,  it  was  held  that  the  court  had  no  jurisdiction. ^^ 
The  limitation  as  to  residence  does  not  apply  as  regards  a  part  of 
the  defendants,  who  are  served  by  publication. ^^  This  statute 
does  not  affect  the  jurisdiction  in  admiralty .^3  ^  special  rule 
regulates  proceedings  under  the  Act  to  protect  trade  and  com- 
merce from  unlawful  restraints  and  monopolies.^^  The  Revised 
Statutes  previously  provided  as  follows  :  "  When  a  State  contains 
more  than  one  district,  every  suit  not  of  a  local  nature  in  the 
Circuit  or  District  Courts  thereof,  against  a  single  defendant, 
inhabitant  of  such  State,  must  be  brought  in  the  district  where 
he  resides;  but  if  there  are  two  or  more  defendants,  residing  in 
different  districts  of  the  State,  it  may  be  brought  in  either  dis- 
trict, and  a  duplicate  writ  may  be  issued  against  the  defendants, 
directed  to  the  marshal  of  any  other  district  in  which  any 
defendant  resides.  The  clerk  issuing  the  duplicate  writ  shall 
indorse  thereon  that  it  is  a  true  copy  of  a  writ  sued  out  of  the 
court  of  the  proper  district;  and  such  original  and  duplicate 
writs,  Avlien  executed  and  returned  into  the  ofhce  from  which 
they  issue,  shall  constitute  and  be  proceeded  on  as  one  suit ;  and 
upon  any  judgment  or  decree  rendered  therein,  execution  may 
be  issued,  directed  to  the  marshal  of  any  district  in  tlie  same 
State."  ^^  "  In  suits  of  a  local  nature,  where  the  defendant  resides 
in  a  different  district,  in  the  same  State,  from  that  in  which  the 
suit  is  brought,  the  plaintiff  may  have  original  and  final  process 
against  him,  directed  to  the  marshal  of  the  district  in  which  he 
resides."'^  "Any  suit  of  a  local  nature,  at  law  or  in  equity, 
where  the  land  «>r  other  subject-matter  of  a  fixed  character  lies 
partly  in  one  district  and  partly  in  another,  within  the  same 
State,  may  be  brought  in  the  Circuit  or  District  Court  of  cither 
district;  and  the  court  in  which  it  is  brought  shall  have  jurisdic- 
tion to  hear  and  decide  it,  and  to  cause  mesne  or  final  process  to 
be  issued  and  executed,  as  fully  as  if  tlie  said  subject-matter  were 
wholly  within  the  district  for  which  such  court  is  constituted."  ^' 
Pi'ior  to  the  act  of  1887  special  statutes  regulated  in  this  respect 
the  Federal  courts  in  the  districts  of  Alabama,  Georgia,  Indiana, 
Iowa,   Kentucky,    Michigan,   Missouri,    Ohio,    and    Tennessee.^** 

11  Smith  r.  Lvon,  133  U.  S.  315.  »  2G  St.  at  L.  209.     See  Appendi.K. 

1-^  Ames  r.  IIoMfrbaum,  42  I'Vd  R.  341.  '^  u.  S.  11.  S.,  §  740. 

See  infra,  §  '.(7.  lo  U.  S    H.  S.,  §  741. 

1^  In   re    Louisville    Underwriters,  134  V  U.  S.  K.  S.,  §  742. 

U.  S.  488.  18  AUib(imo.  —  2Z  St.  at  L.  18-19,  after 


§  22.]  LIMITATIONS    UPON    JURISDICTION    BY    RESIDENCE.  47 

Recent  statutes  also  regulate  the  Federal   courts  in  the  north- 
eastern  division   of   the    southern   district   of    Geor<2:ia,  and  the 


diviiling  the  Nortliorn  District  of  Ala- 
bama into  Northern  and  Soutiifrn  Divis- 
ions, provides  :  — 

"§  4.  That  all  civil  suits,  not  of  a 
local  character,  which  shall  be  hereafter 
•brought  in  the  circuit  or  district  court  of 
United  States  fur  the  northern  district 
of  Alabama,  in  either  of  said  divisions, 
against  a  single  defendant,  or  where  all 
the  defendants  reside  in  the  same  divis- 
ion of  said  district,  shall  be  brought  in 
the  division  in  which  the  defendant  or 
defendants  reside ;  but  if  there  are  two 
or  more  defendants,  residing  in  different 
divisions,  such  suit  may  be  brought  in 
either  division  ;  and  all  mesne  and  final 
process,  subject  to  the  provisions  of  this 
act  issued  in  either  of  said  divisions,  may 
be  served  and  executed  in  either  or  both 
of  the  divisions." 

Georgia.  — 21  St.  at  L.  62-G3  (1st  Supp. 
U.  S.  k.  S.  507-508),  after  altering  the 
boundaries  of  the  Southern  District  of 
Georgia,  and  dividing  it  into  Eastern  and 
Western  Divisions,  provides  that :  — 

"  §  4.  All  suits  not  of  a  local  nature 
in  the  circuit  and  district  courts  against 
a  single  defendant,  inhabitant  of  said 
State,  must  be  brought  in  the  division  of 
the  district  where  he  resides  ;  but  if  there 
are  two  or  more  defendants  residing  in 
different  divisions  of  tiie  district,  such 
suits  may  be  brought  in  eitlier  division. 
All  issues  of  fact  in  said  suits  shall  be 
tried  at  a  term  of  the  court  held  in  the 
division  where  the  suit  is  so  brouglit. 

"  §  5.  Prosecutions  for  crimes  or  of- 
fences hereafter  committed  in  either  of 
the  subdivisions  shall  be  cognizable 
within  such  division ;  and  all  jirosecu- 
tions  for  crimes  or  offences  heretofore 
committed  within  eitlier  of  said  coun- 
ties, taken  as  aforesaid  from  the  north- 
ern district,  or  committed  m  the  southern 
district  as  hitherto  constituted,  shall  be 
commenced  and  proceeded  with  as  if  this 
act  had  not  been  passed. 

"  §  6.  Civil  actions  or  proceedings  now 
pending  at  Savannah  in  said  southern 
district,  which  would  under  this  act  be 
brought  in  the  western  division  of  said 
district,  may  be  transferred,  by  the  con- 


sent of  all  the  parties,  to  said  western 
division  ;  and  in  case  of  such  transfer, 
all  papers  and  files  therein,  with  copies 
of  all  journal  entries,  shall  be  transferred 
to  the  deputy  clerk's  office  at  Macon, 
and  the  same  shall  be  proceeded  with  in 
all  respects  as  though  it  was  originally 
commenced  in  the  western  division. 

"  §  7.  In  all  cases  of  removal  of  suits 
fron)  the  courts  of  the  State  of  Georgia 
to  the  courts  of  the  United  States  in  the 
southern  district  of  Georgia,  such  removal 
shall  be  to  the  United  States  courts  in 
the  division  in  which  the  county  is  situ- 
ated from  which  the  removal  is  made ; 
and  the  time  within  which  the  removal 
shall  be  perfected,  in  so  far  as  it  refers 
to,  or  is  regulated  by,  the  terms  of  the 
United  States  courts,  shall  be  deemed  to 
refer  to  the  terms  of  the  United  States 
courts  in  stich  division. 

"  §  8.  All  grand  and  petit  jurors  sum- 
moned for  service  in  each  division  shall 
be  residents  of  such  division.  All  mesne 
and  final  process,  subject  to  the  pro- 
visions hereinbefore  contained,  issued  in 
either  of  said  divisions,  may  be  served 
and  executed  in  either  or  both  of  the 
divisions." 

Indiana.  —  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  743.  '•  In  the 
district  of  Indiana  all  actions  of  which 
the  circuit  and  district  courts  have  juris- 
diction may  be  instituted  in  said  courts, 
respectively,  held  at  New  Albany  and 
Evansville,  in  the  first  instance,  by  filing 
the  proper  pleadings  or  other  papers  in 
the  offices  of  the  deputy  clerks  perform- 
ing the  duties  of  clerks  of  said  courts 
respectively ,  and  all  proper  and  lawful 
process  shall  issue  therefrom  in  the  same 
manner  as  from  other  circuit  and  district 
courts  in  like  cases." 

lou-a.  —  U.  S.  K.  S.  §  744.  "  In  the  dis- 
trict of  Iowa  all  suits  not  of  a  local  nature 
in  the  district  court  against  a  single  de- 
fendant, inhabitant  of  such  State,  must 
be  brought  in  the  division  of  the  district 
where  he  resides  ;  hut  if  there  are  two  or 
more  defendants,  residing  in  different  di- 
visions of  the  district,  such  suits  may  be 
brought  in  either  division,  and  duphcate 
writs  may  be  sent  to  the  other  defend- 


48 


JURISDICTION. 


[chap.  I. 


districts    of    Kansa.s,   Kentucky,    Louisiana,   Minnesota,   North 
Dakota^  South  Dakota,  and  Washington. ^^ 


ants.  The  clerk  issuing  the  duplicate 
writ  sliall  indorse  tliereon  that  it  is  a 
true  copy  of  a  writ  sued  out  of  tlie  court 
in  the  proper  division  of  tlie  district ;  and 
the  original  and  duplicate  writs,  when 
executed  and  returned  into  the  office 
from  which  they  issue,  shall  constitute 
and  be  proceeded  in  as  one  suit.  All 
issues  of  fact  in  such  suits  shall  be  tried 
at  a  term  of  the  court  held  in  the  division 
where  the  suit  is  so  brought." 

21  St.  at  L.  155  (1  Supp.  U.  S.  R.  S. 
536) :  "  §  1.  That  the  circuit  court  of  the 
United  States  in  and  for  the  district  of 
Iowa  shall  hereafter  be  held  at  the  times 
and  places  provided  by  law  for  lioUling 
the  United  States  district  court  in  and 
for  said  district.  Causes  removed  from 
any  court  of  the  State  of  Iowa  into  said 
circuit  court  within  said  district  shall  be 
removed  to  the  circuit  court  in  the  di- 
vision in  which  such  State  court  is  held, 
unless  the  parties  thereto  shall  otherwise 
agree,  or  the  court,  for  good  cause,  shall 
otherwise  order. 

"  §  2.  That  all  civil  suits  not  of  a  I'ocal 
nature  which  shall  be  hereafter  brought 
in  the  circuit  or  district  court  of  the 
United  States  in  said  district  must  be 
brought  in  the   division   of  the   district 


1^  The  act  creating  the  northeastern 
division  of  the  southern  district  of  Geonjia 
provides  that  "  all  civil  suits  not  of  a  local 
nature  must  be  brought  in  said  northeast- 
ern division,  where  the  defendant  resides 
in  said  northeastern  division  of  the  South- 
ern Federal  judicial  district  of  Georgia. 
But  if  there  are  two  or  more  defendants, 
some  residing  in  the  northeastern  division 
and  others  residing  in  any  other  portion 
of  said  southern  district  of  Georgia,  the 
action  may  be  brought  in  any  one  of  the 
divisions  in  which  any  one  of  the  defend- 
ants resides.  When  the  defendant  is  a 
non-resident  of  either  division,  action  may, 
if  plaintiff  is  a  citizen  of  the  district,  be 
brouglit  in  that  division  where  the  de- 
fendant may  be  found.  Cases  removed 
from  any  of  the  courts  of  the  State  of 
Georgia  to  the  circuit  courts  of  the  United 
States  shall  be  removed  to  the  circuit 


where  the  defendant  or  defendants  re- 
side ;  but  if  there  are  two  or  more  de- 
fendants residing  in  different  divisions, 
the  plaintiff  may  sue  in  either  one  of  the 
divisions  in  which  a  defendant  resides. 
All  issues  of  fact  triable  in  either  of  said 
courts  shall  be  tried  in  the  division  where 
the  defendant  or  one  of  the  defentlants 
resides,  unless  by  consent  of  both  parties 
the  case  shall  be  removed  to  some  other 
division.  Where  the  defendant  is  a  non- 
resident of  the  district,  suit  may  be 
brought  in  any  division  where  property 
or  the  defendant  is  found." 

Keutucki/.  —  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  745.  "  In  the 
district  of  Kentucky  the  clerks  of  the  cir- 
cuit and  district  courts,  respectively,  u{)on 
issuing  original  process  in  a  civil  action, 
shall  make  it  returnable  to  the  court 
nearest  to  the  county  of  the  residence  of 
the  defendant,  or  of  that  defendant  whose 
count}-  is  nearest  a  court,  if  he  have  in- 
formation sufficient,  and  shall  immedi- 
ately, upon  payment  by  the  plaintiff  of 
his  fees  accrued,  send  the  papers  filed 
to  the  clerk  of  the  court  to  which  the 
process  is  made  returnable;  and  when- 
ever the  process  is  not  thus  made  return- 
able, any  defendant  may,  upon  motion, 
on  or  before   the   calling  of   the  cause, 


court  in  tlie  division  in  which  said  court 
is  held."     25  St.  at  L.  ch.  168,  p.  671. 

The  act  dividing  the  district  of  Kansas 
provides  "  that  all  civil  suits  not  of  a  lo- 
cal character  which  shall  be  hereafter 
brought  in  either  of  said  divisions  against 
a  single  defendant,  or  where  all  the  de- 
fendants reside  in  the  same  division  of 
said  district,  shall  be  brought  in  the 
division  in  wdiich  the  defendant  or  de- 
fendants reside  ;  but  if  there  are  two  or 
more  defendants  residing  in  different 
divisions,  such  suit  may  be  brought  in 
either  division,  and  all  mesne  and  final 
process  subject  to  the  provisions  of  this 
act,  issued  in  either  of  said  divisions,  may 
be  served  and  executed  in  either  or  both 
of  the  divisions."  20  St.  at  L.  ch.  403, 
§  2,  p.  129. 

-■The   act   creating    the   Owensborough 
division  of  the  district  of  Kentucky  pro- 


§  23.]       CIRCUIT  COURT  FOR  SOUTHERN  DISTRICT  OF  NEW  YORK.  49 

§  23.    Special   Limitation   upon   Jurisdiction   of    Circuit   Court    for 
Southern  District  of  New  York.  —  The  Revised  Statutes  provide 


have  it  transferred  to  the  court  to  which 
it  should  have  been  sent  had  tiie  clerk 
known  the  residence  of  tiie  defendant 
when  the  action  was  brought." 

Michigan.  —  20  St.  at  L.  175  (1  Supp. 
U.  S.  K.  S.  375)  :  "  §  1.  That  tiie  coun- 
ties of  Cliippewa,  Schoolcraft,  Marquette, 
Houghton,  Keweenaw,  Ontonagon,  Isle 
Koyale,  Baraga,  and  Mackinaw,  being 
and  including  all  that  portion  of  tlie 
territory  and  waters  of  said  eastern  dis- 
trict lying  in  the  upper  peninsula  of 
Michigan,  be,  and  the  same  are  hereby 
detached  from  the  eastern  judicial  dis- 
trict of  Michigan,  and  attached  to  the 
western  judicial  district  of  said  State. 

"  §  2.  That  for  the  trial  and  determi- 
nation of  all  causes  and  proceedings  cog- 
nizable and  triable  in  the  circuit  and 
district  courts  of  the  United  States  for 
tiie  western  district  of  Michigan  as 
bounded  and  described  in  this  act,  the 
said  district  shall  consist  of  two  divisions 
known  respectively  as  the  southern  and 
nortliern  divisions  of  said  district.  The 
southern  division  shall  comprise  all  that 
jiortion  of  said  district  lying  and  being 
in  tlie  lower  peninsula  of  said  State,  and 
tlie  northern  division  of  said  district  shall 
comprise  all  the  territory  and  waters  of 


vidcs  th.Tt  "  where  one  or  more  defendants 
in  any  civil  cause  sliall  reside  in  said 
division,  and  one  or  more  defendants  to 
such  cause  shall  reside  out  of  said  division 
but  in  said  district,  tlien  the  plaintiff  may 
institute  his  action  either  in  tlie  court 
having  jurisdiction  over  the  latter  or  in 
said  rm'ision."     25  St.  at  L.  cli.  7'J2,  §  2, 

p.3n*f;   5   J 

Tli^ac!^  dWiding  tl:e  eastern  district 
of  LoHisi(mt  into  two  divisions  provides, 
"  thaftf  4Cicrft  lie  more  tlian  one  defend- 
ant aJJ?!  tftipy  rt^ide  in  different  divisions 
of  the. diaries  tlie  plaintid  may  sue  in 
eitheM^li\^ioS  and  send  diijilicale  writ 
or  writ^  10  tlui  other  defendants,  and  the 
said  iE-it^  wBcn  executed  and  returned 
into  tlie  mmn  from  which  tliey  issued, 
shall  ggnstitute  one  suit  and  be  proceeded 
in  accordingly"  (25  St.  at  L.  ch.  809, 
§  3,  p.  438);  "that  all  causes  triable  in 
VOL.   I.  —  4 


the  entire  upper  peninsula  of  said  State  ; 
and  there  shall  be  two  regular  terms  of 
the  circuit  and  district  courts  begun  and 
held  in  each  of  the  divisions  of  said 
western  district  annually.  The  regular 
terms  of  the  circuit  and  district  courts 
in  said  southern  division  shall  be  iield  at 
the  city  of  Grand  liapids,  commencing 
on  the  first  Tuesdays  of  Marcli  and  Octo- 
ber in  each  year.  The  regular  terms  of 
the  circuit  and  district  courts  in  said 
nortliern  division  shall  be  held  at  the 
city  of  Marquette,  commencing  upon  the 
first  Tuesdays  of  May  and  September  in 
each  year.  And  all  issues  of  fact  shall 
be  tried  at  the  terms  of  said  courts  to  be 
held  in  tlie  division  where  sucli  suits  shall 
liereafter  be  commenced  ;  but  nothing 
herein  contained  shall  prevent  the  said 
circuit  and  district  courts  from  regulat- 
ing by  general  rule  the  venue  of  transi- 
tory actions,  either  at  law  or  in  equity, 
and  from  changing  the  same  for  cause. 

"  §  3.  That  all  suits  and  proceedings 
hereafter  to  be  brought  in  the  said  cir- 
cuit or  district  courts  not  of  a  local  na- 
ture shall  be  brought  in  a  court  of  the 
division  of  the  district  where  the  defend- 
ant resides.  But  if  there  be  more  than 
one  defendant,  and  they  reside  in  different 


either  of  the  courts  of  said  eastern  dis- 
trict shall  be  tried  in  me  division  to 
which  the  process  is  returnable  under  the 
provisions  of  this  act,  unless  by  consent 
of  all  parties  the  cause  be  removed  to 
some  other  division  of  said  district."  25 
St.  at  L.  ch.  809,  §  4,  p.  438.  "  Causes 
removed  from  any  court  of  the  State  of 
Louisiana  in  the  circuit  court  of  the 
United  States  within  said  eastern  district 
shall  be  removed  to  the  circuit  court  in 
the  division  in  which  such  State  court  is 
held."     25  St.  at  L.  ch.  8G9,  §  8,  p.  438. 

The  act  dividing  the  western  district 
of  Louisiana  into  two  divisions  provides, 
"  that  if  there  be  more  tiian  one  defend- 
ant and  they  reside  in  different  divisions 
of  the  district,  the  plaintiff  may  sue  in 
either  division,  and  send  duplicate  writ 
or  writs  to  the  other  defendants ;  and 
the   said   writs,  when   executed   and  re- 


50 


JURISDICTION. 


[chap.  I. 


that  "  the  original  jurisdiction  of  the  Circuit  Court  for  the  South- 
ern District  of  New  York  shall  not  be  construed  to  extend  to 


divisions  of  tlie  district,  tlie  plaintiff  may 
sue  in  either  divisions  and  send  duplicate 
writ  or  writs  to  tlie  otlier  defendants,  on 
which  the  plaintiff  or  his  attorney  shall 
enilorse  that  the  writ  thus  sent  is  a  copy 
of  a  writ  sued  out  of  a  court  of  the  proper 
division  of  the  said  district;  and  the  said 
writs,  when  executed  and  returned  into 
the  ofBce  from  wliich  they  issued,  shall 
constitute  one  suit,  and  be  proceeded  in 
accordingly. 

"  §  4.  The  clerk  of  the  circuit  and 
district  courts  for  the  western  division 
of  Michigan  shall  reside  and  keep  his 
office  at  Grand  Eapids,  and  sliall  also 
appoint  a  deputy  clerk  for  said  courts 
held  at  Marquette,  who  shall  reside  and 
keep  his  office  at  that  place  ;  and  said 
deputy  clerk  shall  keep  in  his  office  full 
records  of  all  actions  and  proceedings  in 
the  said  circuit  and  district  courts  for  the 
northern  division  of  said  district  held  at 
that  place,  and  shall  liave  the  same  power 
to  issue  all  processes  from  the  said  courts 
and  perform  any  other  duty  that  is  or 
may  be  given  to  the  clerks  of  other  cir- 
cuit and  district  courts  in  like  cases. 

"  §  0.  That  the  district  attorney  and 
marshal  of  the  said  western  district  of 
Michigan  shall  respectively  perform  the 


duties  of  district  attorney  and  marshal 
for  the  southern  and  northern  divisions  of 
said  district  as  established  by  this  act. 
The  marshal  of  said  district  shall  keep  an 
office  and  a  deputy  marshal  at  ]\[arquette 
in  the  northern  division  of  said  district. 

"  §  6.  Any  person  charged  with  violat- 
ing any  of  the  penal  or  criminal  statutes 
of  the  United  States  of  which  the  said 
circuit  or  district  courts  have  jurisdiction, 
shall  be  proceeded  against  by  indictment 
or  otherwise,  within  the  division  of  said 
district  where  the  alleged  ofTence  or  of- 
fences shall  be  committed,  and  shall  have 
his  or  her  trial  at  a  term  of  the  said  court 
held  in  said  division,  unless  for  cause 
shown,  the  judge  shall  otherwise  direct ; 
and  one  grand  and  one  petit  jury  only 
shall  be  summoned,  and  serve  in  both  said 
courts  at  each  term  thereof ;  and  jurors 
shall  be  selected  and  drawn  from  the  di- 
vision of  the  said  district  in  which  they 
reside  and  in  which  the  terms  of  the  said' 
circuit  and  district  courts  to  which  they 
are  summoned  are  held. 

"  §  7.  This  act  shall  not  affect  or  in 
any  wise  interfere  with  causes  of  action 
now  pending  in  the  circuit  and  district 
courts  for  the  eastern  district  of  Michi- 
gan, but  the  same  may  be  proceeded  with 


turned  into  the  court  from  which  they 
issued,  shall  constitute  one  suit  and  be 
proceeded  in  accordingly."  2-5  St.  at  L. 
ch.  789,  §  2,  p.  388.  "^' That  all  causes 
triable  in  either  of  the  courts  of  said 
western  district,  shall  be  tried  in  the  di- 
vision to  which  the  process  is  returnable 
under  the  provisions  of  this  act,  unless, 
by  consent  of  all  parties,  the  cause  be 
removed  to  some  other  division  of  said 
district."  25  St.  at  L.  ch.  389,  §  3,  p.  ."88. 
"  That  causes  removed  from  any  court 
of  the  State  of  Louisiana  into  the  circuit 
court  of  the  United  States  within  said 
western  district,  shall  be  removed  to  the 
circuit  court  in  the  division  in  which 
sucli  State  court  is  held."  25  St.  at  L. 
ch.  789,  §  7,  p.  .",88. 

The  act  dividing  the  district  of  Minne- 
sota  into   six   divisions   provides,    "that^ 
causes  removed   from  any   court  In  the 


State  of  ^Minnesota  into  the  circuit  court 
shall  be  removed  to  the  circuit  court  in 
the  division  in  whicii  said  State  court  is 
held,  and  all  civil  suits  not  of  a  local 
nature  must  be  brought  in  the  division 
where  the  defendant  or  defendants  re- 
side ;  but  if  there  are  two  or  more  de- 
fendants residing  in  different  divisions, 
the  action  may  be  brouglit  in  an}'  divis- 
ion in  which  a  defendant  resides  ;  that 
all  civil  process  from  the  circuit  and  dis- 
trict courts  of  the  United  States  for  said 
district  of  Minnesota  against  defendants 
residing  or  found  therein  shall  be  re- 
turned to  the  place  appointed  for  the 
holding  of  said  courts  in  the  division 
where  such  defendant  resides;  that  if 
there  be  more  than  one  defendant,  and 
they  reside  in  different  divisions  of  the 
district,  the  plaintiff  may  sue  in  either 
division,  and  send  duplicate  writ  or  writs 


§  23.] 


CIECUIT  COURT  FOR  SOUTHERN  DISTRICT  OF  NEW  YORK. 


51 


causes  of   action   arising  within  the  Northern  District  of   said 
State."  ^    This  does  not  exchidc  from  tlie  jurisdiction  of  the  court 


in  the  same  manner  as  thoujjli  this  act 
had  not  been  passed  :  Provided,  liowever, 
Tliat  upon  cause  shown,  the  circuit  and 
district  courts  for  tlie  eastern  district  may 
transfer  civil  causes  arising  in  tliat  por- 
tion of  said  district  detaclied  therefrom 
by  this  act  to  the  circuit  and  district 
courts  for  tlie  northern  division  of  the 
western  district  of  jVIichigan,  provided 
for  in  this  act.  Tiie  circuit  and  district 
courts  for  the  eastern  district  of  Michi- 
gan shall  continue  to  have  the  same  juris- 
diction in  reference  to  all  crimes  and 
offences  committed  prior  to  the  passage 
of  this  act  in  any  portion  of  the  State  of 
^Michigan  by  this  act  detached  from  said 
eastern  district  and  attached  to  said  west- 
ern district. 

"§  8.  All  provisions  of  law  in  conflict 
with  this  act  are  hereby  repealed. 

"  §  9.  There  shall  be  one  or  more 
terms  of  the  district  court  for  the  eastern 
district  of  Michigan,  hehl  annually  at 
the  United  States  court  room  in  the  city 
of  Port  Huron  in  said  district,  in  the  dis- 
cretion of  tlie  judge  of  said  district  court, 
and  at  such  times  as  he  shall  appoint 
therefor." 

Missouri.  — 20  St.  at  L.  263  (1  Supp. 
U.  S.  K.  S.  393) :  "  §  1.  The  western  dis- 


to  the  other  defendants,  and  the  said 
writs,  when  executed  and  returned  into 
the  court  from  which  they  issued,  shall 
constitute  one  suit  and  be  proceeded 
in  accordingly."  2G  St.  at  L.  ch.  167, 
§  2,  p.  72. 

The  act  dividing  the  district  of  North 
Dakota  provides,  "  that  all  civil  suits 
not  of  a  local  character  now  pending,  or 
which  shall  be  brought  in  the  district  or 
circuit  courts  of  the  United  States  for 
the  district  of  North  Dakota  in  either  of 
the  said  divisions  against  a  single  defend- 
ant, or  where  all  the  defendants  reside  in 
the  same  divisions  of  said  district,  shall 
be  bronglit  in  the  division  in  whicli  tlie 
defendant  or  defendants  reside,  or  if 
there  are  two  or  more  defendants  resid- 
ing in  different  divisions,  such  suit  may 


trict  of  Missouri  is  hereby  divided  into 
two  divisions,  which  sliall  be  known  as 
the  eastern  and  western  divisions  of  the 
western  district  of  Missouri.  The  western 
division  shall  include  the  counties  of  An- 
drew, Atchison,  Barton,  Hates,  Buclianan, 
Caldwell,  Carroll,  Cass,  Chariton,  Clay, 
Clinton,  Daviess,  De  Kiilb,  (Jentry,  Grun- 
dy, Harrison,  Ilolt,  Jackson,  Jasjier,  La 
Fayette,  Linn,  Livingston,  Mercer,  Noda- 
way, Platte,  Putnam,  Hay,  Saline,  Sulli- 
van, Vernon,  and  Worth  ;  and  a  term  of 
the  district  court  and  circuit  of  the 
United  States  for  said  district  shall  be 
held  therein  at  the  City  of  Kansas  on 
the  third  Monday  in  May  and  the  third 
Monday  in  October  of  each  year.  Tiie 
remaining  counties  embraced  in  said  dis- 
trict shall  constitute  the  eastern  division 
thereof,  and  the  terms  of  the  district  and 
circuit  courts  of  the  United  States  for 
said  district  shall  be  held  therein  at  the 
times  and  place  now  prescribed  by  law. 

"  §  2.  All  offences  hereafter  com- 
mitted in  either  of  said  divisions  shall  be 
cognizable  and  indictable  within  the  di- 
vision where  committed  ;  and  all  grand 
and  petit  jurors  summoned  for  service  in 
each  division  shall  be  inhabitants  thereof. 
And   all   offences   heretofore    committed 


be  brought  in  either  division,  and  all 
mesne  and  final  process  subject  to  tiie 
provisions  of  this  act,  issued  in  either  of 
said  divisions,  may  be  served  and  exe- 
cuted in  either  or  all  of  said  divisions. 
All  issues  of  fact  in  civil  causes  triable  in 
any  of  the  said  courts  shall  be  tried  in 
the  division  where  the  defendant  or  one 
of  the  defendants  reside,  unless  by  con- 
sent of  both  parties  the  case  shall  be 
removed  to  some  other  division."  '26  St. 
at  L.  ch.  161,  §4,  p.  08. 

The  act  dividing  the  district  of  South 
Dakota  provides,  "  that  all  civil  suits  not 
of  a  local  nature  must  be  brought  in  the 
division  of  the  district  where  the  defend- 
ant or  defendants  reside;  but  if  there  are 
two  or  more  defendants  residing  in  differ- 
ent divisions,  the  action  may  be  brought 


§  23.    1  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  G57. 


52 


JURISDICTION. 


[chap.  I. 


causes  of  action  that  arise  without  the  State.^     It  has  been  lield 
that  this  forbids  the  issue  by  that  court  of  an  injunction  to  pre- 


witliin  said  district  shall  be  prosecuted 
and  tried  as  if  this  act  had  not  passed. 

"  §  ?>.  All  civil  suits  not  of  a  local  char- 
acter which  shall  be  hereafter  brought  in 
tlie  district  or  circuit  courts  of  tlie  United 
States  for  the  western  district  of  Missouri 
in  eitlier  of  said  divisions,  against  a  single 
defendant,  or  wliere  all  the  defendants 
reside  in  the  same  division  of  said  dis- 
trict, shall  be  brought  in  the  division  in 
which  the  defendant  or  defendants  re- 
side; but  if  tliere  are  two  or  more  de- 
fendants residing  in  different  divisions, 
such  suit  may  be  brought  in  either  di- 
vision, and  all  mesne  and  final  process 
subject  to  the  provisions  of  this  act,  issued 
in  eitlier  of  said  divisions,  mny  be  served 
and  executed  in  either  or  both  of  the 
divisions. 

"  §  4.  Tlie  clerks  of  the  circuit  and 
district  courts  for  said  district  shall  each 
appoint  a  deputy  clerk  at  the  place  where 
their  respective  courts  are  required  to  be 
held,  in  the  division,  of  the  district  in 
whicii  such  clerk  shall  not  himself  reside, 
each  of  whom  shall,  in  the  absence  of  the 
clerk,  e.vercise  all  the  powers  and  per- 
form all  the  duties  of  clerk  within  the 
division  for  which  he  shall  be  appointed  ; 
Provided,  That  the  appointment  of  such 
deputies  shall  be  approved  by  the  court 
for  which  they  shall  be  respectively  ap- 
pointed, and  may  be  annulled  by  such 
court  at  its  pleasure.  And  tlie  clerk  shall 
be  responsible  for  the  official  acts  and 
neglects  of  all  such  deputies. 


"§  5.  All  civil  suits  and  proceedings 
now  pending  in  the  circuit  or  district 
court  of  said  western  district  of  Missouri, 
and  which  would,  if  instituted  after  the 
passage  of  this  act,  be  required  to  be 
brouglit  in  the  western  division  of  said 
district,  may  be  transferred,  b}'  consent 
of  all  the  parties,  to  said  western  division 
of  said  district,  and  tliere  disposed  of  in 
the  same  manner  and  with  like  effect  as 
if  the  same  had  been  there  instituted ; 
And  all  process,  writs,  and  recognizances 
relating  to  such  suits  and  proceedings  so 
transferred  sliall  be  considered  as  belong- 
ing to  tiie  term  of  the  court  in  the  western 
division  of  said  district,  in  the  same  man- 
ner and  with  like  effect  as  if  they  had 
been  issued  or  taken  in  reference  thereto 
originally." 

Ohio.  — 20  St.  at  L.  101  (1  Supp.  U.  S. 
R.  S.  338) :  "  §  1.  That  a  term  of  the  cir- 
cuit court  and  district  court  for  the  north- 
ern district  of  Ohio  shall  be  held  at 
Toledo,  in  said  State,  on  the  first  Tues- 
day of  the  months  of  June  and  December 
in  each  year;  and  one  grand  jury  and 
one  petit  jury  only  shall  be  summoned, 
and  serve  in  both  of  said  courts  at  each 
term  thereof.  And  the  existing  provis- 
ions of  law  fixing  the  times  of  holding 
the  district  court  at  Toledo  are  hereby 
rejiealcd. 

"  §  2.  Said  northern  district  shall  be, 
and  hereby  is,  divided  into  two  divisions, 
to  be  known  as  the  eastern  and  the  west- 
ern  division   of  the  northern  district  of 


in  either  of  the  divisions  in  which  a  de- 
fendant resides."  2G  St.  at  L.  ch.  21, 
§  4,  p.  14. 

The  act  dividing  the  district  of  Wash- 
infilnn  ])rovides,  "that  all  civil  siiits  not 
of  a  local  character  which  shall  be 
brought  in  the  district  or  circuit  courts 
of  the  United  States  for  the  district  of 
Washington  in  eitlier  of  the  said  divis- 
ions against  a  single  defendant,  or  whore 
all  the  defendants  reside  in  the  same  di- 
vision of  said  district,  sliall  be  brought  in 
the  division  in  which  the  defendant  or 
defendants  reside,  or  if  there  are  two  or 
more  defendants  residing  in  different  di- 


visions, such  suit  may  be  brought  in 
either  division,  and  all  mesne  and  final 
process  subject  to  the  provisions  of  this 
act,  issued  in  either  of  said  divisions, 
may  be  served  and  executed  in  eitlier  or 
all  of  said  divisions.  All  issues  of  fact  in 
civil  causes  triable  in  any  of  the  said 
courts  shall  be  tried  in  the  division  where 
the  defendant  or  one  of  the  defendants 
reside,  unless  bj'  consent  of  both  parties 
the  case  shall  be  removed  to  some  other 
division."     20  St.  at  L.  ch.  05,  §  4,  p.  45. 

§  23.      2  Wheeler    v.    McCormick,    8 
Dlatchf.  268. 


§  23.]      CIRCUIT  COURT  FOR  SOUTHERN  DISTRICT  OF  NEW  YORK.  53 

vent  the  infringement  of  a  patent  when  the  sole  previous  cases 
of  infrino-eiuent  occurred  in  the  northern  district  of  New  Yorlv.^ 


Oliio.  The  western  division  shall  con- 
sist of  twenty-four  counties,  to  wit ;  Wil- 
liams, Defiance,  Paulding,  Van  Wert, 
Mercer,  Auglaize,  Allen,  Putnam,  Henry, 
Fulton,  Lucas,  Wood,  Hancock,  Hardin, 
Logan,  Union,  Delaware,  Marion,  Wy- 
andot, Seneca,  Sandusky,  Ottawa,  Erie, 
and  Huron  ;  and  the  eastern  division  shall 
consist  of  the  remaining  counties  in  said 
district.  But  no  additional  clerk  or  mar- 
shal shall  be  appointed  in  said  district. 

"  §  3.  All  suits  not  of  a  local  nature 
in  tiie  circuit  and  district  courts,  against 
a  single  defendant,  inhabitant  of  such 
State,  must  be  brought  in  the  division  of 
the  district  where  he  resides  ;  but  if  there 
are  two  or  more  defendants,  residing  in 
different  divisions  of  the  district,  such 
suits  may  be  brought  in  either  division. 
All  issues  of  fact  in  such  suits  shall  be 
tried  at  a  term  of  the  court  held  in  the 
division  where  the  suit  is  so  brought." 

"  §  6.  ...  All  mesne  and  final  process, 
subject  to  the  provisions  hereinbefore 
contained,  issueil  in  eitiier  of  said  divis- 
ions, may  be  served  and  executed  in 
either  or  both  of  the  divisions.  .  .  ." 

21  St.  at  L.  63  (1  Supp.  U.  S.  R.  S. 
508,  509)  •  "  §  1.  That  the  counties  of 
Union,  Delaware,  Morrow,  Knox,  Cos- 
hocton, Harrison,  and  Jefferson,  hereto- 
fore composing  a  part  of  the  northern 
district  of  Ohio,  be  transferred  to,  and 
henceforth  form  a  part  of,  the  southern 
district  of  Ohio. 

"  §  2.  A  term  of  the  circuit  court  and 
of  the  district  court  for  the  southern  dis- 
trict of  Ohio  shall  be  held  at  Columbus 
in  said  State  on  the  first  Tuesday  of  the 
months  of  June  and  December  in  each 
year. 

"§3.  Said  southern  district  shall  be, 
and  hereby  is,  divided  into  two  divisions, 
to  be  known  as  the  eastern  and  the  west- 
ern division  of  the  southern  district  of 
Oliio.  The  eastern  division  shall  consist 
of  twenty-nine  counties,  to  wit:  Union, 
Delaware,  Morrow,  Knox,  Coshocton, 
Harrison,  Jefferson,  Madison,  Fayette, 
Franklin,  Pickaway,  Ross,  Pike,  Gallia, 


Jackson,  Meigs,  Vinton,  Athens,  Hock- 
ing, Fairfield,  Licking,  Perrj-,  Muskin- 
gum, Morgan,  Washington,  Noble,  Mon- 
roe, Belmont,  and  Guernsey;  and  the 
western  division  shall  consist  of  the  re- 
maining counties  in  said  district.  But  no 
additional  clerk  or  marshal  shall  be  ap- 
pointed in  said  district. 

"  §  4.  All  suits  not  of  a  local  nature 
in  the  circuit  and  district  courts  against 
a  single  defendant,  inhabitant  of  said 
State,  must  be  brought  in  the  division 
of  the  district  where  he  resides ;  but  if 
there  are  two  or  more  defendants  residing 
in  different  divisions  of  the  district,  such 
suits  may  be  brought  in  either  division. 
All  issues  of  fact  in  said  suits  shall  be 
tried  at  a  term  of  the  court  held  in  the 
division  where  the  suit  is  so  brought." 

"  §  7.  ...  All  mesne  and  final  process 
subject  to  the  provisions  hereinbefore 
contained  issued  in  either  of  said  di- 
visions may  be  served  and  executed  in 
either  or  both  of  the  divisions. 

"  §  8.  In  all  cases  of  removal  of  suits 
from  the  courts  of  the  State  of  Ohio  to 
the  courts  of  the  United  States  in  tlie 
southern  district  of  Ohio,  such  removal 
shall  be  to  the  United  States  courts  in 
the  division  in  which  the  county  is  situ- 
ated from  whicii  the  removal  is  made  ; 
and  the  time  within  which  the  removal 
shall  be  i)erfected,  in  so  far  as  it  refers 
to  or  is  regulated  by  the  terms  of  the 
United  States  courts,  shall  be  deemed  to 
refer  to  tiie  terms  of  the  United  States 
courts  in  such  division." 

Tennessee. — 21  St.  at  L.  751  (1  Supp. 
U.  S.  R.  S.  548) :  "  §  1.  That  tiie  county 
of  Grundy,  heretofore  composing  a  part 
of  the  middle  district  of  Tennessee,  be 
transferred  to,  and  henceforth  form  a 
part  of,  the  eastern  district  of  Tennessee. 

"§2.  A  term  of  the  circuit  court  and 
of  the  district  court  for  the  eastern  dis- 
trict of  Tennessee  siiall  be  held  at  Chat- 
tanooga in  said  State  in  each  year  on  the 
first  Mondays  of  April  and  October,  after 
the  passage  of  this  act. 

"  §  3.    Said  eastern    district     shall  be 


8  Black  V.  Thorne,  10  Blatchf .  60. 


54 


JURISDICTION. 


[chap.  I. 


§  24.  Suits  by  Assignees.  —  The  statutes  further  limit  the  juris- 
diction of  the  courts  of  the  United  States  hy  providing  that  no 
Circuit  or  District  Court  shall  "  have  cognizance  of  any  suit, 
except  upon  foreign  bills  of  exchange,  to  recover  the  contents 
of  any  promissory  note  or  other  chose  in  action  in  favor  of  any 
assignee,  or  of  any  subsequent  holder,  if  such  instrument  be  pay- 
able to  bearer  and  be  not  made  by  any  corporation,  unless  such 
suit  might  have  been  prosecuted  in  such  court  to  recover  the  said 
contents  if  no  assignment  or  transfer  had  been  made."  ^  A  check 
is  a  bill  of  exchange.^  A  draft  drawn  in  one  on  another  of  the 
United  States  is  a  foreign  bill  of  exchange.^     A  promissory  note 

payable  "  to  the  order  of "  is  equivalent  to  a  promissory  note 

payable  to  bearer.^     A  bill  of  exchange  drawn  by  a  coi'poration 
in  favor  of  itself  and  by  it  indorsed  in  blank  is  payable  to  bearer 


and  hereby  is  divided  into  two  divisions, 
to  be  known  as  tlie  nortliern  and  southern 
divisions  of  the  eastern  district  of  Ten- 
nessee;  the  soutliern  division  sliali  con- 
sist of  the  following  counties,  to  wit : 
Hamilton,  James,  Polk,  McMinn,  Brad- 
ley, Meigs,  Rliea,  Marion,  Sequatchie, 
Bledsoe,  Grundy,  and  Cumberland,  and 
the  northern  division  shall  consist  of 
the  remaining  counties  in  said  district. 
But  no  additional  clerk  or  marshal  shall 
be  appointed  in  said  district. 

"  §  4.  That  the  clerks  of  the  district 
and  circuit  courts  for  the  eastern  district 
of  Tennessee,  and  the  marshal  and  dis- 
trict attorney  for  said  district,  shall  per- 
form the  duties  appertaining  to  their 
offices  respectively  for  said  courts.  And 
tl)e  said  clerks  and  marshals  sliall  each 
api)oint  a  deputy  to  reside  and  keep  their 
offices  in  the  city  of  Chattanooga,  and 
who  shall,  in  the  absence  of  tlieir  jirin- 
cipals,  do  and  perform  all  the  duties 
appertaining  to  their  offices  respectively. 

"  §  5.  All  suits  not  of  a  local  nature 
in  the  circuit  and  district  courts  against 
a  single  defendant,  inhabitant  of  said 
State,  must  be  brought  in  the  division  of 
the  district  where  he  resides  ;  but  if  there 
are  two  or  more  defendants  residing  in 
different  divisions  of  the  district,  such 
suits  may  be  brought  in  either  division. 
All  issues  of  fact  in  said  suits  shall  be 
tried  at  a  term  of  the  court  held  in  the 
division  wiiere  the  suit  is  so  brought." 


"§7.  ...  All  mesne  and  final  process 
subject  to  the  provisions  hereinbefore 
contained,  issued  in  either  of  said  di- 
visions, may  be  served  and  executed  in 
either  or  both  of  the  divisions. 

"  §  8.  In  all  cases  of  removal  of  suits 
from  the  courts  of  the  State  of  Ten- 
nessee to  the  courts  of  the  United  States 
in  the  eastern  district  of  Tennessee,  such 
removal  shall  be  to  the  United  States 
courts  in  the  division  in  which  the  county 
is  situated  from  which  the  removal  is 
made;  and  the  time  within  which  the 
removal  siiall  be  perfected,  in  so  far  as  it 
refers  to  or  is  regulated  by  the  terms  of 
the  United  Stat?s  courts,  shall  be  deemed 
to  refer  to  the  terms  of  the  United  States 
courts  in  such  division. 

"  §  9.  That  each  of  said  courts  shall 
be  held  in  a  building  to  be  provided  for 
that  purpose  by  the  State  or  municijial 
authorities  and  witliout  expense  to  tlie 
United  States. 

"  §  10.  This  act  shall  be  in  force  from 
and  after  the  first  day  of  July  anno 
Domini  eif^hteen  hundred  and  eighty  ; 
and  all  acts  and  parts  of  acts  inconsistent 
herewith  are  hereby  repealed." 

§  24.  1  Act  of  March  3,  1887,  §  1  ;  24 
St.  at  L.  5.52. 

2  Bull  V.  Bank  of  Kasson,  123  U.  S. 
105. 

•!  Buckncr  >:  Finley,  2  Pet.  586,  503. 

s4  Steel  V.  Ratiiburn,  42  Fed.  It  390. 


§  24]  SUITS   BY   ASSIGNEES.  55 

within  the  meaning  of  the  statute.^  A  county  is  a  corporation 
within  the  meaning  of  the  statute.^  The  hokler  of  a  draft  wliich 
has  been  accepted  by  the  drawee,  who  is  a  citizen  of  a  different 
State  from  liimself,  can  sue  the  latter  in  the  Federal  court,  irre- 
spective of  the  citizenship  of  the  drawer. ^  It  has  been  said  that 
"  the  clause  '  if  such  instrument  be  payable  to  bearer,  and  not 
made  by  any  corporation '  operates  as  an  exception  to  the  general 
rule,  and  gives  the  Federal  courts  jurisdiction  of  those  suits  by 
assignees,  where  the  action  is  founded  on  an  obligation  made 
by  a  corporation,  that  is  payable  to  bearer,  and  is  negotiable  by 
mere  delivery  ; "  ^  and  that  "  the  exceptions,  aside  from  suits  on 
foreign  bills  of  exchange,  are  limited  to  suits  on  promissory 
notes  and  other  choses  in  action,  where  the  demand  sought  to  be 
enforced  is  represented  by  an  instrument  in  writing,  payable  to 
bearer  and  not  made  by  a  corporation,  the  words  following  the 
designation  of  ehoses  in  action  indicating  the  manner  in  which 
they  are  to  be  shown,  they  must  be  such  as  arise  upon  contracts 
of  the  original  parties."  ^  The  phrase  "  suit  to  recover  the  con- 
tents of  a  chose  in  action  "  includes  suits  to  recover  debts,  or  any 
claims  for  damages  for  breach  of  contract,  or  for  torts  connected 
with  contract.^*^  The  phrase  also  includes  suits  to  foreclose  mort- 
gages,^^ and  to  enfoi'ce  the  specific  performance  of  contracts.-'-^ 
Such  is  an  action  to  recover  upon  a  contract  of  insurance  and  for 
a  reformation  of  the  policy.^^  The  phrase  does  not  include  a  suit 
of  replevin  ^'^  or  ejectment,^^  or  otherwise  brought  to  recover  prop- 
erty taken  by  the  defendant  before  the  assignment  of  the  title  to 
the  plaintiff ;  ^^  nor  a  suit  to  recover  damages  for  the  conversion 
of  personal  property  ;  ^'  nor  a  suit  in  equity  to  compel  the  transfer 
of  stock  on  the  books  of  a  corporation  ;^^  nor  a  suit  upon  a  judg- 

^  Bank  of  British  N.  A.  v.  Barling,  46     143;  Corbin  v.  County  of  Black  Hawk, 
Fed.  R.  357.  105  U.  S.  G59,  G65,  666. 

6  Rollins  V.   Ciiaffee  County,  .34  Fed.         "  Sheldon  v.  Gill,  8  How   441. 

R.  91 ;  Wilson  v.  Kno.\  County,  43  Fed.  i-  Corbin  v.  County  of  Black  Hawk, 

R.  481.  105  U.  S.  059,  605 ;  Slioecraft  v.  Bloxiiam, 

7  Superior  City  r.  Ripley,  138  U.  S.  93.  124  U.  S.  7.30 

8  Mr.  Justice  Miller  in  Wilson  v.  Knox  i^  Laird  v.  Indemnity  Mat.  Ma.  Co.,  44 
County,  48  Fed.  R.  481,  482.  Fed.  R.  712. 

°  Mr.  Justice  Field  in  Ambler  v.  Ep-  i^  Deshler  v.  Dodge,  16  How.  622,  031. 

pinger,  137  U.  S.  480,  482.  is  Smith  v.  Kernochen,  7  How.  198. 

10  Bushnell  v.  Kennedy,  9  Wall.  .387  ;  i«  Gest  ;•.  Packwood,  39  Fed.  R.  525. 

390;  Sere  r.   Pitot,   6  Cranch,  332,  335,  i'   Ambler  v.  Eppinger,  137  U.  S.  480. 

336;  Sheldon   v.  Gill,  8   How.  441,  449,  is  j^wctt  u.  Bradford  S.  B.  Tr.  Co.,  45 

4.50;  Tredway  v.  Sanger,  107  U.  S.  823,  Fed.  R.  801. 
325;  Mersman  v.  Werges,  112  U.  S.  139, 


56  JUEISDICTIOX.  [CIIAP.  I. 

ment,  though  the  suit  in  which  the  judgment  was  recovered  could 
not  have  been  brought  in  a  Federal  court.^^  It  has  been  held 
that  the  assignee  of  a  judgment  cannot  sue  in  a  Federal  court  to 
enforce  it  unless  his  assignor  could  have  sued  there.^*^  It  has 
been  suggested  that  the  restriction  applies  only  to  contracts 
"  which  may  be  properly  said  to  have  contents,"  not  to  "  mere 
naked  rights  of  action  founded  on  some  wrongful  act,  —  some 
neglect  of  duty  to  which  the  law  attaches  damages,"  such  as  a 
faihire  to  protest  a  note;  but  to  ''rights  of  action  founded  on 
contracts  whicli  contain  within  themselves  some  promise  or  duty 
to  be  performed."  21  It  has  been  held  that  an  indorsee,  who  is  a 
citizen  of  the  same  State  as  the  maker  of  the  note,  may  sue  his 
immediate  indorser  in  a  Federal  court,  if  tliat  indorser  be  a  citi- 
zen of  a  different  State; 22  but  that  when,  in  a  suit  against  a 
remote  indorser  the  plaintiff  derives  his  title  through  a  citizen  of 
the  same  State  as  the  defendant,  there  is  no  jurisdiction,  on 
account  of  the  difference  of  citizenship  between  the  latter  and 
the  plaintiff; 23  and  that  the  person  who  has  advanced  money 
upon  an  accommodation  note  can  sue  the  maker,  if  a  citizen  of  a 
different  State,  in  a  Federal  court,  although  the  indorser  is  a  citi- 
zen of  the  same  State.^^  Assignees  in  insolvency  ^^  are  included 
within  this  restriction;  but  receivers ^^  and  executors  and  ad- 
ministrators 2'  are  not.  A  party  who  claims  by  subrogation  is 
not  within  this  restriction.^^  It, has  been  held  that  the  restriction 
does  not  apply  when  the  only  reason  why  the  assignor  could  not 
have  sued  was  that  his  claim  was  less  in  value  than  the  jurisdic- 
tional amount.2'^  Tlic  assignee  must  aver  in  his  pleading  that  his 
assignor  might  have  sued  in  the  Federal  court.^^ 


"  Bean  r.  Sinitli,  2  Mason,  252,  269;  4  Dall.  8;  MoUan  i-.  Torrance,  9  Wheat. 

Ober  n.  Gallaglier,  93  U.  S.  199,  206.     But  537,  538. 

see  MetL-alf  r.  Watertown,  128  U.  S,  586 ;        24  Goldsmith   >:   Holmes,    36  Fed.  R. 

Mississi[>pi    Mills   v.    Cohn,    39   Fed.    K.  484. 
865.  -5  Sjre  v.  Pitot,  6  Cranch,  332,  336. 

■^>  Motcalf  r.  Watertown,  128  U.  S.  586;         -''  Davies  i:  Latlirop,  12  Fed.  K.  353. 
Mississippi  .Mills  v.  Colin,  39  Fed.  R.  865.         27  g^re  v.  Pitot,  6  Cranch,  332,   336; 

-1  Barney  o.  Globe  Hank,  5  Blatcb  107.  Chappodelaine  v.  Dechenaux,  4  Cranch, 

See,   however,    Bushnell   v.   Kennedy,   9  306  ;  Cliildras  v.  Emory,  8  Wheat.  642. 
Wall.  387,  391  ;  Ambler  v.  Eppinger,  137         **  New  Orleans  c.  Gaines'  Administra- 

U.  S.  480,  483.  tor,  138  U.  S.  595,  606. 

2-  Young    V.   Bryan,    6    Wheat.    146;         -'J  Bernheim  v.  Birnbaum,  30  Fed.  R. 

Manufacturing  Co.  v.  Bradley,  105  U.  S.  885,  887.     See  also  Hammond  v.  Cleave 

175.  la.^^i,  23  Fed.  R.  1. 

23  Turner  r.  Bank  of  North  America,        ^j  Parker  v.  Ormsby,  141  U.  S.  81. 


§  25.]  JURISDICTION    OF   THE   LISTrJCT   COURTS.  57 

§  25.  Jurisdiction  of  the  District  Courts  of  the  United  States.  — 
The  jurisdiction  of  the  District  Courts  of  the  United  States  in 
civil  causes  extends  to  suits  for  penalties  and  forfeitures  incurred 
under  any  law  of  the  United  States,  including  the  contract  labor 
law  ;  1  suits  at  common  law  brought  by  the  United  States  or  any 
ol'licer  thereof  authorized  by  law  to  sue,  including  a  receiver  of  a 
national  banking  association  appointed  by  the  comptroller ;  ^  suits 
in  equity  to  enforce  the  lien  of  the  United  States  u])on  any  real 
estate  for  any  internal  revenue  tax,  or  to  subject  to  the  payment 
of  any  such  tax  any  real  estate  owned  by  the  delinquent,  or  in 
which  he  has  any  right,  title,  or  interest ;  suits  for  the  recovery 
of  any  forfeiture  or  damages  under  Section  3490  of  the  Revised 
Statutes ;  causes  of  action  arising  under  the  postal  laws  of  the 
United  States ;  civil  causes  of  admiralty  and  maritime  jurisdic- 
tion, and  all  seizures  on  land  and  water  not  within  admiralty  and 
maritime  jurisdiction  ;  prizes  on  land  and  water ;  suits  brought  by 
the  assignees  of  debentures  for  drawback  of  duties  to  enforce  such 
debentures ;  all  suits  under  the  civil  rights  laws ;  suits  to  recover 
possession  of  any  ofiice  except  that  of  presidential  elector,  or  a 
legislative  office,  wherein  the  sole  question  touching  the  title  to 
such  office  arises  out  of  the  denial  of  the  right  of  a  citizen  to  vote 
on  account  of  race,  color,  or  previous  condition  of  servitude;  pro- 
ceedings by  quo  loarranto,  prosecuted  by  a  district  attorney  of 
the  United  States,  for  the  removal  from  office  of  a  person  dis- 
qualified by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  to  the  Constitution ; 
suits  by  aliens  for  torts  only  in  violation  of  the  law  of  nations 
or  of  a  treaty  of  the  United  States  ;  suits  against  consuls  or 
vice-consuls  ;  and  all  matters  and  proceedings  in  bankruptcy ;  ^ 
suits  against  the  United  States  to  collect  claims  not  exceeding 
one  thousand  dollars  for  money  only,  founded  upon  the  Constitu- 
tion of  the  United  States  or  on  any  law  of  Congress,  except  for 
pensions,  or  upon  any  contract  expressed  or  imjilied.  with  the 
government  of  the  United  States,  or  for  damages,  li(}uidated  or 
unliquidated,  in  cases  not  sounding  in  tort,  in  respect  of  which 
claims  the  plaintiff  would  be  entitled  to  redress  against  the 
United  States  in  a  court  of  law,  equity  or  admiralty,  if  the  United 
States  were  suable,  except  war  claims   which,   before  March  3, 

§  25.  1  United  States  v.  Wliitcomb  3  u.  S.  R.  S.  §  503.  See  United  States 
M.  B.  Co.,  45  Fed.  R.  8'J.  v.  Mooney,  110  U.  S.  104. 

^  Stephens  v.  Bernays,  44  Fed.  R.  G42. 


58  JURISDICTION.  [chap.  I. 

1887,  were  rejected  or  reported  on  adversely  by  any  court,  de- 
partment, or  commission  authorized  to  hear  and  determine  the 
same  ;  ^  and  proceeding's  to  condemn  for  national  public  purposes 
land  situated  within  their  respective  districts.^ 

§  26.  Territorial  Jurisdiction  and  Terras  of  the  Supreme  Court, 
Circuit  Courts  of  Appeal^  Circuit  and  District  Courts  of  the  United 
States.  —  The  Supreme  Court  has  jurisdiction  throughout  the 
United  States.  It  holds  one  term  annually  at  Washington,  com- 
mencing on  the  second  Monday  of  October.^  It  may  also  hold 
adjourned  and  special  terms.^  In  case  of  a  contagious  or  epi- 
demic disease,  a  term  may  be  held  at  another  place.^ 

The  territorial  jurisdiction  of  the  Circuit  Courts  of  Appeal 
is  as  follows  :  The  first  circuit  includes  the  districts  of  Rhode 
Island,  Massachusetts,  New  Hampshire,  and  Maine.*  The  sec- 
ond circuit  includes  the  districts  of  Vermont,  Connecticut,  and 
New  York.°  The  third  circuit  includes  the  districts  of  Penn- 
sylvania, New  Jersey,  and  Delaware.^  The  fourth  circuit  in- 
cludes the  districts  of  Maryland,  Virginia,  West  Virginia,  North 
Carolina,  and  South  Carolina.''  The  fifth  circuit  includes  the 
districts  of  Georgia,  Florida,  Alabama,  Mississippi,  Louisiana, 
and  Texas.*^  The  sixth  circuit  includes  the  districts  of  Ohio, 
Michigan,  Kentucky,  and  Tennessee.^  The  seventh  circuit  in- 
cludes the  districts  of  Indiana,  Illinois,  and  Wisconsin.^^  The 
eighth  circuit  includes  the  districts  of  Colorado,  Arkansas, 
Iowa,  Kansas,  Minnesota,  Missouri,  Nebraska,  New  Mexico, 
North  Dakota,  Oklahoma,  South  Dakota,  Utah,  and  Wyoming.^! 
The  ninth  circuit  includes  the  districts  of  Alaska,  Arizona,  Cali- 
fornia, Idaho,  Montana,  Nevada,  Oregon,  and  Washington.i^  The 
term  of  the  Circuit  Court  of  Appeals  for  the  first  circuit  is  held 
annually  in  the  city  of  Boston  on  the  first  Tuesday  of  Octobei- ; 
the  term  of  the  Circuit  Court  of  Appeals  for  the  second  circuit 
is  held  annually  in  the  city  of  New  York  on  the  last  Tuesday  of 

i  24  St.  at  L.  505 ;  United  States  v.         »  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  004. 
Jones,  131  U.  S.  1.  «  U.  S.  11.  S.  §  604. 

5  25  St.  at   L.   ch.  728,  p.   357.     See        !»  U.  S.  K.  S.  §  G04. 

infra,  §  381.  n  U.  S.  K.  S.  §  G04  ;  25  St.  at  L.  ch. 

§  20.  1  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  G84.  180,  §  21 ;  139  U.  S.  707  ;  20  St.  at  L.  ch. 

2  U.  S.  R.  S.  §§  084-680.  517,  §  15,  p.  830. 

3  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  4799.  i-i  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  004;  25  St.  at  L.  ch. 
«  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  004.  180,  §  21 ;  26  St.  at  L.  cli.  517,  §  15, 

6  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  604.  p.  830 ;  189  U.  S.  707 ;  26  St.  at  L. ch.  656, 
6  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  004.  §  16,  p.  217. 

V  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  004. 


§  26.]  DISTPJCTS   OF   ALABAMA.  59 

October ;  the  term  of  the  Circuit  Court  of  Appeals  for  the  tliird 
circuit  is  held  annually  in  the  city  of  Philadelphia  on  the  third 
Tuesday  of  March  and  tlic  third  Tuesday  of  Sci)tcmber ;  the  term 
of  the  Circuit  Court  of  Appeals  for  the  fourth  circuit  is  held 
annually  in  the  city  of  Richmond,  on  the  Tuesday  after  the 
first  Monday  of  February ;  the  term  of  the  Circuit  Court  of 
Appeals  for  the  fifth  circuit  is  held  annually  in  the  city  of  New 
Orleans  on  tlie  third  Monday  of  November ;  the  term  of  the  Cir- 
cuit Court  of  Appeals  for  the  sixth  circuit  is  held  annually  in  the 
city  of  Cincinnati  on  the  first  Monday  of  October ;  the  term  of 
the  Circuit  Court  of  Appeals  for  the  seventh  circuit  is  held  annu- 
ally in  the  city  of  Chicago  on  the  first  Monday  of  October ;  the 
term  of  the  Circuit  Court  of  Appeals  for  the  eighth  circuit  is  held 
annually  in  the  city  of  St.  Louis  on  the  second  Monday  of  Octo- 
ber ;  the  term  of  the  Circuit  Court  of  Appeals  for  the  ninth  cir- 
cuit is  held  annually  in  the  city  of  San  Francisco  on  the  first 
Monday  of  October. 

There  is  a  Circuit  Court  in  each  judicial  district  of  the  United 
Statcs.13 

When  one  term  begins  the  preceding  term  ends,  unless  it  was 
the  evident  intention  of  the  statutes  that  the  two  terms  should 
be  concurrent  in  whole  or  in  part.^^  There  is  a  District  Court 
in  each  judicial  district  of  the  United  States. 

The  judicial  districts  and  the  terms  of  the  Circuit  and  District 
Courts  held  therein  are  as  follows  :  — 

In  Alabama,  three  districts,  —  the  Southern,  Middle,  and  North- 
ern. The  Southern  District  of  Alabama  includes  the  counties  of 
Mobile,  Washington,  Baldwin,  Clarke,  Marengo,  Wilcox,  Monroe, 
and  Conecuh. 1^  The  terms  for  this  district  of  both  the  Circuit 
and  District  Courts  are  held  at  the  city  of  Mobile  on  the  fourth 
Monday  of  Novcmlicr  and  the  first  Monday  in  May.^*^  A  Circuit 
and  a  District  Court  for  the  Middle  District  of  Alabama  are  held 
at  the  city  of  Montgomer}'.  Tliis  includes  the  counties  of  j\Iont- 
gomery,  Autauga,  Coosa,  Tallapoosa,  Chaml)ers,  Randolph,  Ma- 
con, Russell,  Barbour,  Pike,  Henry,  Dale,  Coffee,  Covington, 
Lowndes,  Dallas,  Perry,  and  Butler.     The  terms  of  the  Cii'cuit 

13  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  008 ;  18  St.  at  L.  195 ;        is  u.  S.  R.  S.  §§  532,  608  ;  Act  of  June 

25  St.  at  L.  ch.  il;],  p.  G55 ;  lib  St.  at  L.  22,  1874,  cli.  401,  §  5;  18  St.  at  L.  195; 

ch.  180,  p.  682.  U.  S.  R.  S.  1st  Siipp.  pp.  87,  88;  Act  of 

i-*  Ex-  parte   Friday,   43   Fed.   R.   91G,  May  2,  1884,  cli.  38  ;  23  St.  at  L.  18. 
918.  i^  26  St.  at  L.  180. 


60  JUKISDICTION.  [chap.  I. 

and  District  Courts  for  this  district  are  hel  at  the  city  of  Mont- 
gomery on  the  first  Mondays  of  May  and  November.^'' 

There  is  a  Circuit  and  a  District  Court  for  tlie  Northern  Dis- 
trict, which  includes  the  remainder  of  the  State.  This  district  is 
divided  into  two  divisions. 

The  Southern  Division  of  the  Northern  District  contains  the 
counties  of  Sumter,  Greene,  Hale,  Pickens,  Tuscaloosa,  Lamar, 
Fayette,  Walker,  Jefferson,  Blount,  Bibb,  Shelby,  Saint  Clair,  Eto- 
wah, Calhoun,  Cleburne,  Clay,  Talladega,  Cherokee,  and  De  Kalb, 
in  which  the  court  is  held  at  Birmingham.^^ 

In  this  division  of  the  Northern  District,  terms  of  both  Circuit 
and  District  Courts  are  held  at  the  city  of  Birmingham  on  the 
first  Mondays  of  March  and  September.!^  The  Northern  Division 
of  the  Northern  District  includes  the  remaining  counties  in  it, 
and  both  the  Circuit  and  District  Courts  are  held  in  this  division 
at  the  city  of  Huntsville  on  the  first  Monday  of  April  and  the 
second  Monday  of  October.^o 

In  Arkansas,  two  districts,  —  the  Eastern  and  Western.  The 
Western  District  of  Arkansas  includes  the  counties  of  Benton, 
Washington,  Crawford,  Sebastian,  Scott,  Polk,  Montgomery,  Yell, 
Logan,  Franklin,  Johnson,  Madison,  Newton,  Carroll,  Boone,  and 
Marion,  and  formerly  included  "  what  is  known  as  the  Indian 
Territory."  Terms  of  the  Circuit  and  District  Courts  are  held  at 
Fort  Smith  on  the  first  Mondays  in  February,  May,  August,  and 
November.'-^^ 

The  Eastern  District  includes  the  residue  of  the  State,^^  and  is 
divided  into  Eastern  and  Western  Divisions.  The  Eastern  Divis- 
ion of  the  Eastern  District  consists  of  the  counties  of  Mississippi, 
Crittenden,  Lee,  Phillips,  Clay,  Craighead,  Poinsett,  Greene,  Cross, 


"  U.  S.  K.  S.  §§  532,  608  ;  Act  of  June  1st  Supp.  262;  24  St.  at  L.  ch.  422,  p.  83; 

22,  1874,  cli.  401,  §  G,  supra;  Act  of  May  25  St.  at  L.  ch.  118,  p.  055.     P'or  special 

2,  1884,  cli.  38,  supin.  jurisdiction  of  tlie  courts  iieUl  in  tiiis  dis- 

18  U.  S.  K.  S.  §§  532,  608  ;  18  St.  at  L.  trict  over  controversies  affecting  tlie  Gulf, 

195,  §  5  (Act  of  June  22,  18:4,  cli.  401  ;  Colorado    &    Santa    ¥6    Railroad    Com 

U.  S.  ]i.  S.  1st  Supp.  pp.  87,  88)  ;  Act  of  pany,  and  the  Southern  Kansas  Kailvvay 

May  2,  1884,  cii.  38  (23  St.  at  L.  18).  Coiupany,  see  2:5  St.  at  L.  cli.  177,  §  8, 

i^J  Act  of  May  2,  1884,  ch.  38,  §  2  (23  p.  72;  23  St.  at   L.  ch.   179,  §  8,  p.  75; 

St.  at  L.  18).  Briscoe   v.   Southern    Kan.    Ry.    Co.,   40 

2''  Act  of  May  2,  1884.  c!i.  .1«.  §  2  (23  Fed.  R.  273.     As  to  Indian  Territory,  see 

St.  at  L.  18) ;  Act  of  June  22,  1«74,  ch.  25  St.  at  L.  p.  786. 
572,  401,  §§  1,  0,  suprn.  '^-  Act  of  Jan.  31, 1877,  ch.  41  (1!)  St.  at 

21   U.  S.  R.  S.  §§  008,  533,  as  anicuded  I^.  230  ;  U-  S  R.  S.  1st  Siipj).  pp. 2H2, 2' ■.:•!), 

by  18  St.  at  L.  cli.  41,  p.  230,  U.  S.  R.  S.  ameiidiug  U.  fc).  li.  b.  §§  631,  671,  572. 


§  26.]      DISTRICTS  OF  CALIFOEXIA,  COLORADO,  AND  CONNECTICUT.      61 

Saint  Francis,  and  Monroe ;  and  the  Western  Division  of  the  re- 
maining" counties  of  the  district.^"^  A  term  of  the  Circuit  and 
District  Court  for  this  district  in  the  Eastern  Division  is  held  at 
Helena  on  the  second  Mondays  of  March  and  October,  and  in  the 
Western  Division  a  Circuit  Court  is  held  at  Little  Rock  on  the 
first  Mondays  of  April  and  October.^*  By  a  recent  statute,  "  The 
Texarkana  Division  of  the  Eastern  Judicial  District  of  Arkansas  " 
is  established,  in  which  terms  of  Circuit  and  District  Coui'ts  of 
this  district  are  to  be  held  at  Texarkana  on  the  third  Mondays  of 
May  and  November,  and  which  includes  the  counties  of  Columl)ia, 
Howard,' Hempstead,  Lafayette,  Little  River,  Miller,  Nevada,  Oua- 
chita, Pike,  and  Scvier.^s 

hi  Ct^/Z/or^^V?,  two  districts,  —  the  Northern  and  the  Southern, 
The  Southern  District  of  California  contains  the  counties  of  San 
Diego,  San  Bernardino,  Los  Angeles,  Ventura,  Santa  Barbara, 
San  Luis  Obispo,  Fresno,  Tulare,  and  Kern.  The  remainder  of 
California  is  comprised  in  the  Southern  District.  In  the  Southern 
District  terms  of  Circuit  and  of  District  Courts  respectively  are 
held  at  Los  Angeles  on  the  second  Monday  of  August  and  the 
second  Monday  of  January.  In  the  Northern  District  terms  of 
both  Circuit  and  District  Courts  are  held  at  San  Francisco  on  the 
first  Monday  in  February,  the  second  Monday  in  July,  and  the 
fourth  Monday  in  November.^^  Prior  to  the  division  of  the  origi- 
nal district  of  California,  provision  was  made  for  holding  special 
sessions  of  the  Circuit  Court.-' 

Colorado  constitutes  one  judicial  district.-^  Terms  of  Circuit 
and  District  Courts  for  this  district  are  held  at  Denver  on  the 
first  Tuesdays  in  May  and  November,  at  Pueblo  on  the  first 
Tuesday  in  April,  and  at  Del  Norte  on  the  first  Tuesday  in 
Augusf.s^ 

Connecticut  constitutes  one  judicial  district.^^  District  Courts 
are  hold  at  New  Haven  on  the  fourtli  Tuesday  in  February,  at 

23  U.  S.  Tl.  S.  §  533  ;  24  St.  at  L.  400,        U.  S.  R.  S.  §§  5-31,  572,  658,  act  of  June 

24  Act  of  Feb'  17,  18S7,  ch.  1.39  (24  St.  lU,  1874,  cli.  287,  and  act  of  Feb.  18,  187G, 
at  L.  406)  ;  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  572,  as  amended     ch.  (J. 

by  Act  of  Jan.  31,  1877,  ch.  41  (li)  St.  at  -'  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  064,  and  compare  with 

L.  230  ;  U.  S.  R.  S.  1st  Supp.  202,  263).  it  the  act  of  Aug.  5,  1886,  cli.  920. 

25  Act  of  Feb.  28,  1887  (24  St.  at  L.  28  Act  of  June  20,  1870,  cli.  147  (19  St. 
428) ;  Act  of  March  7,  1890  (26  St.  at  at  L.  61  ;  U.  S.  11.  S.  1st  Supp.  215,  210). 
L.  17).  -^  Act  of  Aug.  3,  1880,  ch.  848  (24  St. 

20  Act  of  Aug  5,  1880,  ch.  028  (24  St.     at  L.  214). 
at  L.  308-310),  supersedhig  in  tiiis  respect        ^o  u.  S.  R.  S.  §  531. 


62  JURISDICTION.  [chap.  I. 

Hartford  on  the  fourth  Tuesday  in  May,  at  New  Haven  on  the 
fourth  Tuesday  in  August,^^  and  at  Hartford  on  the  first  Tuesday 
of  December .32  ^  Circuit  Court  for  this  district  is  held  at  New 
Haven  on  the  fourth  Tuesday  in  April,  and  at  Hartford  on  the 
third  Tuesday  in  Septcmber.^^ 

Belaivare  constitutes  one  judicial  district.^  The  District  Court 
is  held  at  Wilmington  on  the  second  Tuesdays  in  January,  April, 
June,  and  September.^^  The  Circuit  Court  is  held  at  Wilmington 
on  the  third  Tuesdays  in  June  and  October.^^ 

In  i^/onV/a,  two  districts,  —  the  Northern  and  Southern.  The 
Southern  District  embraces  the  counties  of  Hernando,  Hills- 
borough, Polk,  Manatee,  and  Monroe,  the  remaining  territory 
constituting  the  Northern  District.^"  In  the  Southern  District, 
Circuit  and  District  Courts  are  held  at  Tampa  on  the  second 
Monday  in  February .-^^  A  Circuit  ^^  and  District  ^"^  Court  for  this 
district  is  also  held  at  Key  West  on  the  first  Mondays  of  May  and 
November.  In  the  Northern  District,  both  the  District  and  Circuit 
Courts  are  held  at  Tallahasse  on  the  first  Monday  in  February, 
at  Pensacola  on  the  first  Monday  in  March,  and  at  Jacksonville 
on  the  first  Monday  in  December.^^ 

In  (7gon/m,  two  districts,  —  the  Northern  and  Southern.  The 
northern  district  of  Georgia  originally  included  the  counties  of 
Troup,  Meriwether,  Pike,  Butts,  Jasper,  Morgan,  Green,  Talia- 
ferro, W^ilkes,  and  Lincoln  as  they  existed  Aug,  11, 1848,  with  all 
the  counties  north  of  them.  Pike,  Butts,  Jasper,  Lincoln,  Wilkes, 
and  Taliaferro  have  since  been  annexed  to  the  southern  district. 
The  Western  Division  of  the  Northern  District  has  recently  been 
constituted.  It  consists  of  the  counties  of  Muscogee,  Heard, 
Troup,  Meriwether,  Harris,  Talbot,  Taylor,  Marion,  Chattahochee, 
Stewart,  Schley,  Webster,  Quitman,  Clay,  Randolph,  Early,  Mil- 
ler, and  Terrell.  The  Southern  District  is  divided  into  Eastern, 
Northeastern,  and  Western  Divisions.  The  Western  Division 
consists  of  the  following  counties :  Bil)b,  Monroe,  Jones, 
Twiggs,  Houston,    Crawford,  Baldwin,  Wilkinson,  Laurens,  Pu- 

31  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  572.  L.  280;  U.  S.  R.  S.  1st  Supp.  407),  su- 

32  Act  of  Juno  30.  1879.  cli.  40  (21   St.     pcrseding  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  5.34. 

at  L.  41  ;  U.  S.  R.  S.  1st  Supp.  497).  ss  Act  of  June  80,  188G,  cli.  581  (24  St. 

33  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  658.  at  L.  lOG),  repealing  part  of  the  act  of 

34  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  531.  Feb.  3,  1870,  supra. 

85  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  572.  89  u.  S.  R.  S.  §  658. 

86  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  G58.  s     40  u.  S.  R.  S.  §  572. 

8"  Act  of  Feb.  3,  1879,  ch.  43  (20  St.  at        ^i  u.  S.  R.  S.  §§  572,  058. 


§  26.]  DISTRICTS    OF   GEORGIA,   IDAHO,   AXD    ILLINOIS.  63 

laski,  Dooly,  Macon,  Upson,  Pike,  Butts,  Jasper,  Putnam,  Han- 
cock, Warren,  Dodge,  Wilcox,  Telfair,  Sumter,  Lee,  Terrell, 
Calhoun,  Dougherty,  Baker,  and  Mitchell.^^  The  Eastern  Divis- 
ion consists  of  the  remaining  counties  of  the  district.*^  The 
counties  of  Warren,  Glascock,  McDufHe,  Columbia,  Richmond, 
Burke,  Jefferson,  Johnson,  Washington,  Lincoln,  Wilkes,  and 
Taliaferro  compose  the  Northeastern  Division.'**  In  the  North- 
ern District  terms  of  both  courts  are  held  at  Atlanta  on  the 
second  Monday  in  March  and  on  the  first  Monday  in  October,'*^ 
and  at  Columbus,  Muscogee  County,  on  the  second  Mondays  of 
January  and  June,  for  two  weeks.**'  In  the  Southern  District 
terms  of  the  District  Court  are  held  at  Savannah  on  the  second 
Tuesdays  in  February,  May,  August,  and  November,*'  and  of  the 
Circuit  Court  on  the  second  Monday  of  April  and  the  Thursday 
after  the  first  Monday  in  November  ;*^  at  Macon,  of  both  courts  on 
the  first  Mondays  of  May  and  October,*^  and  at  Augusta  of  both 
courts  on  the  first  Monday  of  April  and  the  tliird  Monday  of 
November.^*' 

Idaho  constitutes  one  judicial  district.  The  Circuit  and 
District  Courts  arc  held  at  the  capital  of  the  State  for  the 
time  being  on  the  first  Mondays  of  April  and  November  of 
each  year.'^* 

Li  Illinois,  two  districts,  —  the  Northern  and  Southern.  The 
Northern  District  of  Illinois  includes  the  counties  of  McDonough, 
Henderson,  Warren,  Fulton,  Knox,  Peoria,  Tazewell,  Woodford, 
Livingston,  and  Iroquois,  with  all  the  counties  north  of  them. 
The  Southern  District  of  Illinois  includes  the  remaining  counties 
of  the  State.°-  The  Northern  District  is  divided  into  two  divisions, 
known  as  the  Northern  and  Southern  Divisions  of  the  Northern 
District  of  Illinois.  The  Southern  Division  includes  the  counties 
of  Peoria,  Stark,  Henry,  Rock  Island,  Mercer,  Henderson,  War- 
ren, Knox,   McDonough,  Fulton,   Putnam,   Marshall,  Woodford, 

<2  21  St.  at  L.  cli.  17,  p.  62,  U.  S.  R.  S.  *■  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  572. 
1st  Supp.  p.  507,  superseding,  in  tliis  re-  •is  u.  S.  R.  S.  §  6-58. 
speet,  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  535;  26  St.  at  L.  1110.         «  21   St.  at  L.  ch.  17,  p.  82,  U.  S.  R.  S. 

«  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  572;  25  St.   at  L.  ch.  1st  Supp.  507. 
205,  p.  600.  ^''  25  St.  at  L.  ch.  108,  p.  671. 

"  25  St.  at  L.  ch.  168,  p.  671.  ^^  26  St.  at  L.  cli.  656,  §  16,  p.  217. 

«  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  6.58;  Act  of  June  20,        5-  u.  s.  R.  S.  §  5-36,  as  ainended  by  act 

1884,  ch.  10()  (2?<  St.  at  L.  50),  amendnig  of  IMarcli  2,  1887,  cli.  315  (21  St.  at  L 

§§  572.  658  of  the  Hev.  Sts.  442). 
"•»>^  26  St.  at  L.  1110. 


64  JURISDICTION.  [chap.  I. 

Tazewell,  Livingston,  and  Iroquois.  The  Northern  Division  in- 
cludes the  remaining  counties  of  the  Northern  District.^'^ 

Terms  of  both  the  Circuit  and  District  Courts  for  the  Northern 
Division  of  tlie  Northern  District  of  Illinois  are  held  at  Chicago 
on  the  first  Monday  in  July  and  the  third  Monday  in  December  ;5* 
and  for  the  Southern  Division  of  the  Northern  District  at  Peoria 
on  the  third  Mondays  of  April  and  October.^^  Terms  of  both 
courts  in  the  Southern  District  of  Illinois  are  held  at  Springfield 
on  the  first  Mondays  in  January  and  June,^^  and  at  Danville  on 
the  first  Monday  of  May.^^  Terms  of  the  District  Court  alone  are 
held  at  Cairo  on  the  first  IMondays  of  March  and  October.^^ 

Indiana  constitutes  one  judicial  district.^^  Terms  of  both 
Circuit  and  District  Courts  are  held  at  Indianapolis  on  the  first 
Tuesdays  in  May  and  November,  at  New  Albany  on  the  first 
Mondays  in  January  and  July,*^''  at  Evansville  on  the  first  Mon- 
days of  April  and  October,^!  at  Fort  Wayne  on  the  second  Tues- 
days in  June  and  December  in  each  year ;  "^^  and  also  twice  a  year 
at  Fort  Wayne  at  such  time  as  the  judges  of  said  courts  may 
designate.^3 

In  loiva,  two  districts,  —  the  Northern  and  Southern.  The 
counties  of  Clinton,  Jones,  Linn,  Benton,  Black  Hawk,  Grundy, 
Harding,  Hamilton,  Webster,  Calhoun,  Sac,  Ida,  Monona,  and 
all  the  counties  north  of  them,  and  the  counties  of  Cedar,  John- 
ston, Iowa,  and  Tama  constitute  the  Northern  District  of  Iowa. 
The  remaining  counties  of  the  State  constitute  the  Southern 
District.^  For  the  purposes  of  holding  terms  of  court,  the 
JSorthern  District  of  Iowa  is  divided  into  four  divions,  known 
as  the  "Eastern,"  "  Central,"  "  Western,"  and  "  Cedar  Rapids  " 
Divisions  of  the  Northern  District  of  Iowa.  The  Eastern  Division 
includes  the  counties  of  Jackson,  Black  Hawk,  Buchanan,  Dela- 
ware,  Dubuque,   Clayton,   Fayette,   Bremer,   Floyd,   Chickasaw, 

55  Act  of  March  2,  1887,  supra.  62  Act  of  March  3,  1881  (21  St.  at  L. 

54  U.  S.  R.  S.  §§  572,  058.  571 ;  U.  S.  R.  S.  1st  Supp.  615). 

55  Act  of  March  2,  1887,  oh.  315,  §  3,  63  Act  of  June  18,  1878,  ch.  2G1)  (20  St. 
supra.  at  L.  1G6 ;  U.  S.  R.  S.  1st  Supp.  367). 

56  U.  S.  R.  S.  §§  572,  658.  C4  Act  of  July  20,  1882,  ch.  312  (22  St. 
5"  26  St.  at  L.  212.                                        at  L.  172),  superseding,  in   tliis  respect, 

58  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  572.  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  531 ;  Act   of  June  4,  1880, 

59  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  531.  ch.  120  (21  St.  at  L.  155;  U.  S.  R.  S.  1st 
G^  U.  8.  R.  S.  §§  572,  058.  Supp  530)  ;  Act  of  Feb.  21,  1891,  cii.282, 
61  Act  of  June  23,   1874,  ch.  463  (18     (26  St.  at  L.  767). 

St.   at   L.  251;   U.   S.   R.  S.  1st   Supp. 
103). 


§  2G.]  DISTRICTS   OF   IOWA.  65 

Mitchell,  Howard,  Winneshiek,  and  Allamakee.^^  In  this  divis- 
ion, both  Circuit  and  District  Courts  arc  held  at  Dubuque  on  the 
first  Tuesday  in  April  and  the  fourth  Tuesday  in  November  of 
each  year.^^  The  Central  Division  includes  the  counties  of 
Hamilton,  Webster,  Calhoun,  Pocahontas,  Palo  Alto,  Emmett, 
Kossuth,  Humboldt,  Wright,  Hancock,  Winnebago,  Worth,  Cerro 
Gordo,  Franklin,  and  Butler.^^  Terms  of  both  Circuit  and  Dis- 
trict Courts  in  this  division  are  held  at  Fort  Dodge  ^'  on  the  sec- 
ond Tuesday  of  November  and  first  Tuesday  of  June.^^  The 
Western  Division  includes  the  counties  of  Monona,  Woodbury, 
Plj-mouth,  Sioux,  Lyon,  Osceola,  O'Brien,  Cherokee,  Ida,  Sac, 
Buena  Vista,  Clay,  and  Dickinson.^^  Terms  of  both  Circuit  and 
District  Courts  in  this  division  are  held  at  Sioux  City  on  the  first 
Tuesdays  of  May  and  October,  at  Fort  Dodge  on  the  second 
Tuesday  of  November  and  the  first  Tuesday  of  June,  and  at 
Dubuque  on  the  fourth  Tuesday  of  November  and  first  Tuesday 
of  April.*^^  The  Cedar  Rapids  Division  includes  the  counties  of 
Johnston,  Iowa,  Tama,  Grundy,  Hardin,  Benton,  Linn,  Jones, 
and  Clinton.  Terms  of  both  Circuit  and  District  Courts  for  this 
division  are  held  at  Cedar  Rapids  on  the  third  Tuesday  of  Feb- 
ruary and  the  second  Tuesday  of  September.^^ 

For  the  purposes  of  holding  terms  of  court  the  Southern 
District  of  Iowa  is  divided  into  three  divisions,  known  as  the 
Eastern,  Central,  and  Western  Divisions. 

The  Eastern  Division  includes  the  counties  of  Scott,  Cedar, 
Muscatine,  Washington,  Louisa,  Keokuk,  Appanoose,  Davis, 
Wapello,  Jefferson,  Van  Buren,  Henry,  Des  Moines,  and  Lee.^^ 
Terms  of  both  Circuit  and  District  Courts  in  this  division  are 
held,  at  Keokuk,  on  the  third  Tuesdays  of  January  and  June."*^ 
The  Central  Division  includes  the  counties  of  Johnson,  Iowa, 
Poweshiek,  Mahaska,  Jasper,  Tama,  Marshall,  Story,  Boone, 
Greene,  Guthrie,  Adair,  Dallas,  Polk,  Madison,  Warren,  Marion, 
Clark,  Lucas,  Decatur,  Monroe,  and  Wayne.^^  Terms  of  both 
Circuit  and  District  Courts  in  this  division  are  held  at  Des 
Moines,®^  on  the  second  Tuesday  of  May  and  the  third  Tuesday 
in   October.'^      The  Western    Division   includes   the   counties  of 

68  Act  of  July  20,  1882,  cli.  312,  §  5.  69  See  references  in  note  64. 

66  25  St.  at  L.  87.  •?»  u.  S.  R.  S.  §  572  ;  18  St.  at  L.  15 

6-  Act  of  July  20,  1882,  ch.  312  (22  St.  (U.  S.  R.  S.  1st  Supp.  4) ;  21   St.  at   L. 

at  L.  172).  155  (U.  S.  R.  S.  1st  Supp.  53(5). 

6"  26  St.  at  L.  767.  'i  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  672,  made  applicable  to 

VOL.   I.  —  5 


66  juiiisDiCTioN.  [chap.  I. 

Carroll,  Crawford,  Harrison,  Shelby,  Audubon,  Cass,  Pottawatta- 
mie, Mills,  Montgomery,  Adams,  Union,  Ringgold,  Taylor,  Page, 
and  Fremont.^^  Terms  of  both  Circuit  and  District  courts  in  this 
division  are  held,  at  Council  Bluffs,'''^  on  the  fourth  Mondays  of 
March  and  September.' o 

Kansas  constitutes  one  judicial  district."^  The  terms  of  tlie 
District  Court  for  Kansas  are  held  as  follows  :  at  Topeka,  on 
the  second  Monday  in  April  ;  at  Salina,  on  the  second  Monday  of 
May ;  at  Wichita,  on  the  first  Monday  of  March  and  the  second 
Monday  of  September  ;  at  Leavenworth,  on  the  second  Monday 
of  October ;  at  Fort  Scott,  on  the  second  Monday  of  January ;  at 
Wichita  on  the  first  Monday  of  Marcli.'^  At  Salina  no  case  can 
be  tried  except  by  consent  or  special  order.'*  The  terms  of  the 
Circuit  Court  for  the  district  of  Kansas  are  held  as  follows :  at 
Wichita,  on  the  first  Monday  of  March  and  the  second  Monday 
of  September ;  at  Topeka,  on  the  fourth  ^Monday  of  November ;  at 
Leavenworth,  on  the  first  Monday  in  June ;  at  Wichita,  on  the 
second  Monday  of  September ;  at  Fort  Scott,  on  the  second  ]\Ion- 
day  of  Jaimary ;  at  W^ichita,  on  the  second  Monday  of  March.'^ 

Kentucky/  constitutes  one  district."^  This  is  divided  into  two 
divisions.  The  Owcns]K)rough  Division  consists  of  the  counties 
of  Daviess,  Henderson,  Union,  Christian,  Todd,  Hopkins,  Webster, 
McLean,  JVIuhlenberg,  Logan,  Butler,  Grayson,  Ohio,  Hancock, 
and  Breckenridgc."  The  rest  of  the  State  constitutes  the  other 
division.""  The  regular  terms  of  the  Circuit  and  District  Courts 
in  this  district  arc  held :  at  Covington,  on  the  second  Monday  in 
May  and  the  first  Monday  in  December;  at  Louisville,  on  the 
third  Monday  in  February  and  the  first  Monday  in  Octol)er ;  at 
Frankfort,  on  the  first  Monday  in  January  and  second  j\Ionday 
in  .June;  at  Paducah,  on  the  first  Monday  in  April  and  third 
^Monday  in  November,  in  each  year;'^  and  for  the  Owensborough 

Circuit  Courts  of  this  district  by  .act  of  (U.  S.  K.  S.  1st  Supp.452) ;  Act  of  June  9, 

June  4,  18«0,  eh.  120,  supra.  1«'J0  (2G  St.  at  L.  eh.  403,  p.  120). 

"  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  531.     For  special  juris-  "  25  St.  at  L  ch.  817,  §  1,  p.  ?.02. 

diction  of  the  courts  held  in  this  district,  "  U.  S.  K.  S.  §  658;  Act  of  March  3, 

over  controversies  affecting  the  Gulf,  Col-  1879,  ch.  177,  §  l"  (20  St.  at  L.  355)  ;  Act 

orado  and  Santa  Fe  Railroad  Company,  of  Juno  9,   1890   (2G   St.  at  L.  ch.  403, 

and  the  Southern  Kansas  Railway  Com-  p.  129). 

pany,  see  2:]  St.  at  L.  ch.  177,  §  8,  p.  72  ;  "o  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  531. 

23  St.  at  L.  ch.  179,  §  8,  p.  75;  Briscoe  v.  "  95  St.  at  L.  ch.  792,  p.  389. 

Southern  Kan.  Ry.  Co  ,  40  Fed.  R.  273.  "8  U.  S.  R.  S.  §S  572,  G58 ;  Act  of  July 

'3  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  572 ;  25  St.  at  L.  ch.  817,  1,  1879,  ch.  59,  §  1  (21  St.  at  L.  45  ;  U.  S. 

§  1,  p.  392;  20  St.  at  L.  ch.  177,  p.  355,  R.  S.  1st  Supp.  499). 


§  26.]  DISTKICTS   OF   KENTUCKY   AND   LOUISIANA.  67 

Division  at  the  city  of  Ovvensborougli,  on  the  fourth  Monday  of 
January  and  the  first  Monday  of  June,  for  not  more  than  eighteen 
judicial  days  in  each  such  term."'-^ 

In Loinsiana,t\\'o  judicial  districts,  the  Eastern  and  tlie  Western.^^ 
The  Western  District  includes  the  parishes  of  Caddo,  Bossier, 
Webster,  Claiborne,  Union,  Morehouse,  West  Carroll,  East  Car- 
roll, Madison,  Richland,  Ouachita,  Lincoln,  Bienville,  Red  River, 
De  Soto,  Sabine,  Winn,  Natchitoches,  Jackson,  Caldwell,  Frank- 
lin, Tensas,  Concordia,  Catahoula,  Grant,  Vernon,  Rapides 
Avoyelles,  Saint  Landry,  La  Fayette,  Saint  Martin,  Vermillion, 
Cameron,  and  Calcasieu.  The  remaining  parishes  form  the 
Eastern  District.^^  The  Western  District  is  divided  into  three 
divisions.^i  All  process  from  the  Circuit  and  District  Courts  of 
the  Western  District  of  Louisiana  against  defendants  residing 
in  the  parishes  of  Saint  Landry,  Saint  Martin,  Cameron,  Calca- 
sieu, La  Fayette,  and  Vermillion,  are  returnable  to  Opelousas.^'^ 
All  process  from  said  courts  against  defendants  residing  in  the 
parishes  of  Rapides,  Vernon,  Avoyelles,  Catahoula,  Grant,  and 
Winn,  are  returnable  to  Alexandria.^^  All  process  from  said 
courts  against  defendants  residing  in  the  parishes  of  Caddo,  De 
Soto,  Bossier,  Webster,  Claiborne,  Bienville,  Natchitoches,  Red 
River,  and  Sabine,  are  returnable  at  Shreveport.'^*  All  process 
from  said  courts  against  defendants  residing  in  the  parishes  of 
Ouachita,  Franklin,  Richland,  Morehouse,  East  Carroll,  West 
Carroll,  Madison,  Tensas,  Concordia,  Union,  Caldwell,  Jackson, 
and  Lincoln  are  returnable  at  Monroe.^*  The  Eastern  District  is 
divided  into  two  divisions.^^  All  process  from  the  Circuit  and 
District  Courts  for  the  Eastern  District  of  Louisiana  against  de- 
fendants residing  in  the  parishes  of  Pointe  Coupee,  West  Baton 
Rouge,  Iberville,  Ascension,  East  Feliciana,  West  Feliciana,  East 
Baton  Rouge,  Saint  Helena,  and  Livingston  are  returnable  to  such 
courts  at  Baton  Rouge,^^  All  process  against  defendants  residing 
in  the  other  parishes  of  the  Eastern  District  are  returnable  at 
New  Orleans.^'  In  the  Western  District,  the  terms  of  the  Circuit 
and  District  Courts  are  held :  at  Opelousas,  on  the  first  Mondays 
of  January  and  June ;  at  Alexandria,  on  the  fourth  Mondays  of 

■9  25  St.  at  L.  ch.  792,  p.  388.  »'  25  St.  at  L.  ch.  780,  §  1,  p.  388. 

^  21  St.  at  L.  507  (U.  S.   R.   S.  1st        ***  25  St.  at  L.  ch.  789,  §  1,  p.  388. 

Supp.  611).  85  25  St.  at  L.  ch.  869,  p.  438. 

81  25  St.  at  L.  ch.  780,  §  1,  p.  388.  ^6  25  St.  at  L.  cli.  860,  p.  438. 

82  25  St.  at  L.  cli.  789,  §  1,  p.  388.  ^7  25  St.  at  L.  ch.  809,  p.  438. 


68  JURISDICTION.  [chap.  I. 

January  and  June ;  at  Shreveport,  on  the  third  Mondays  of 
Fehruary  and  July ;  and  at  Monroe,  on  the  first  Mondays  of  April 
and  October  in  each  year.^^  Terms  of  the  District  Courts  for  the 
Eastern  District  are  held  at  New  Orleans,  on  the  third  Mondays  in 
February,  May,  and  November.^^  Terms  of  the  Circuit  Courts  for 
the  same  district  are  held  at  New  Orleans,  on  the  fourth  Monday 
in  April  and  the  first  Monday  in  November.^*^  Terms  of  both 
courts  are  held  at  Baton  Rouge  on  the  second  Mondays  of  April 
and  November,^^ 

Maine  constitutes  one  judicial  district.-'-  The  terms  of  the 
District  Court  are  held  at  Portland,  on  the  first  Tuesdays  of 
February  and  December  ;^3  at  Bangor,  on  the  first  Tuesday  of 
Juue  ;^'*  at  Bath,  on  the  first  Tuesday  of  Soptembcr.'^^  The  terms 
of  the  Circuit  Court  are  held  at  Portland,  on  the  twenty-third 
days  of  April  and  September.^'^ 

3Iaryland  forms  one  judicial  district,^"  the  District  Courts  of 
which  are  held  at  Baltimore  on  the  first  Tuesdays  in  March, 
June,  September,  and  December.'^^  The  terms  of  the  Circuit 
Courts  for  the  same  district  are  held  at  Baltimore  on  the  first 
Mondays  in  April  and  November.^^ 

3Iassachusetts  forms  one  judicial  district.^*^^  The  terms  of  the 
District  Courts  are  held  at  Boston  on  the  third  Tuesday  in 
March,  on  the  fourth  Tuesday  in  June,  on  the  second  Tuesday 
in  September,  and  on  the  first  Tuesday  in  December.^*^^  The 
terms  of  the  United  States  Circuit  Courts  for  this  district  are 
held  at  Boston,  on  the  fifteenth  days  of  May  and  October.^'^'- 

In  Michigan^  two  districts,  the  Eastern  and  Western ;  and  the 
latter  has  a  Northern  and  a  Southern  Division.  The  Northern 
Division  of  the  Western  District  includes  all  the  territory  and 
waters  of  the  upper  peninsula  of  the  State.^^'^  The  Southern 
Division  of  this  district  comprises  all  that  portion  of  the  southern 

88  Act  of  Marcli  3,   1881,  cli.  144,  §  5  9^  U.  S.  K.  S.  §  572. 

(21   St.  at  L.  507;  U.  S.  R.  S.  1st  Supp.  »''  U.  S.  K.  S.  §  658. 

(511).  9T  u.  s.  li.  s.  §  581. 

83  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  572;  Act  of  March  3,  os  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  572. 

1881,  ch.  144,  §  6,  finpm.  99  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  G58. 

">  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  658;  Act  of  March  3,  i-^-^  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  531. 

1881,  supra.  lOi  xj.  S.  R.  S.  §  572. 

91  25  St.  at  L.  ch.  869,  p.  438.  i''2  xj.  S.  R.  S.  §  058. 

9^  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  531.  ns  Act  of  June  19,  1878,  ch.  326  (20  St. 

93  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  572.  at  L.  175;  U.  S.  R.  S.  1st  Supp.  375). 

9*  Act -of  Jan.  18,  1884,  ch.  1  (23  St.  at 
L.  1). 


§  26.]  DISTRICTS   OF   MICHIGAN   AND   MINNESOTA.  69 

or  lower  peninsula  lying  west  of  a  line  described  as  follows  by 
the  Revised  Statutes  :  — 

"  Commencing  at  the  southwest  corner  of  Branch  county,  iu 
said  State,  and  running  thence  north  on  the  west  line  of  Branch 
and  Calhoun  counties,  to  the  south  line  of  Barry  county :  thence 
east  on  the  north  line  of  Calhoun  and  Jackson  counties,  to  the 
southeast  corner  of  Eaton  county  ;  thence  north  on  the  cnst 
boundary  of  Eaton  county  to  the  south  line  of  Clinton  county  ; 
thence  west  on  the  south  boundary  of  said  county  to  the  southwest 
corner  thereof;  thence  north  on  the  west  boundary  of  Clinton 
and  Gratiot  counties,  to  the  south  boundary  of  Isabella  county ; 
thence  west  on  its  south  boundary,  to  the  southwest  corner  of 
said  last  named  county  ;  thence  north  on  the  west  line  of  Isabella 
and  Clare  counties,  to  the  south  boundary  of  Missaukee  county  ; 
thence  east,  on  its  south  boundary,  to  the  southeast  corner  of 
Missaukee  county  ;  thence  north,  on  the  east  line  of  Missaukee, 
Kalcaska,  and  Antrim  counties,  to  the  south  boundary  of  Emmett 
county  ;  thence  east,  to  the  southeast  corner  of  Emmett  county  ; 
thence  north  on  the  east  boundary  of  Emmett  county,  to  the 
straits  of  Mackinac ;  thence  north  to  midway  across  said  straits : 
thence  westerly  in  a  direct  line  to  a  point  on  the  shore  of  Lake 
Michigan  where  the  north  boundary  of  Delta  county  reaches  Lake 
Michigan."  ^'^  The  eastern  division  includes  the  remaining  por- 
tion of  the  territory  and  waters  of  the  southern  peninsula.^'^'* 
Terms  of  both  Circuit  and  District  Courts  in  the  Southern  Di- 
vision of  the  Western  District  are  held  at  Grand  Rapids  on  the 
first  Tuesdays  of  March  and  October;  and  in  the  Northern 
Division,  at  Marquette,  on  the  first  Tuesdays  of  May  and  Sep- 
tember.io^  In  the  Eastern  District,  terms  of  both  courts  are 
held  at  Bay  City  at  such  times  as  the  courts  shall  appoint ;  i*''^ 
and  at  Detroit,  on  the  first  Tuesdays  of  March,  June,  and 
November.iO' 

Minnesota  constitutes  one  judicial  district,  which  is  divided 
into  six  divisions,  known  as  the  First,  Second,  Third,  Fourtli, 
Fifth,  and  Sixth  Divisions.^'^^  That  portion  of  the  State  of  Min- 
nesota comprising  the  counties  of  Winona,  Wabasha,  Olmsted, 

i"4  U.  S.  R.  8.  §  538  ;  and  see  Act  of  lO"  Act  of  Feb.  28,  1887,  cli.  209  (24  St. 
June  19,  1878,  supra.  at  L.  423). 

1  '5  Act  of  June  19,  1878,  cli.  320,  supra,        i"^  U.  S.  R.  S.  §§  572,  658. 
§  2.  1*  U.    S.  R.   S.  §  531 ;   20   St.   at.   L. 

ch.  107,  §  1,  p.  72. 


70  JURISDICTION.  [CHA.P.  I. 

Dodge,  Steele,  Mower,  Fillmore,  and  Houston  constitute  the  First 
Division,  the  courts  of  which  are  held  at  Winona;  the  counties 
of  Freeborn,  Faribault,  Martin,  Jaclcson,  Nobles,  Rock,  Pipestone, 
Murray,  Cottonwood,  Watonwan,  Blue  Earth,  Waseca,  Le  Sueur, 
Nicollet,  Brown,  Redwood,  Lyon,  Lincoln,  Yellow  Medicine, 
Sibley,  and  Lac  Qui  Parle,  constitute  the  Second  Division,  the 
courts  of  which  are  held  at  Mankato  ;  the  counties  of  Chicago, 
Washington,  Ramsey,  Dakota,  Goodhue,  Rice,  and  Scott  con- 
stitute the  Third  Division,  the  courts  of  which  are  held  at  St. 
Paul ;  the  counties  of  Hennepin,  Wright,  Meeker,  Kandiyohi, 
Swift,  Chippewa,  Renville,  McLeod,  Carver,  Anoka,  Sherburne, 
and  Isanti  constitute  the  Fourth  Division,  the  courts  of  which 
are  held  at  Minneapolis;  the  counties  of  Cook,  Lake,  St.  Louis, 
Itasca,  Cass,  Crow  Wing,  Aitkin,  Carlton,  Pine,  Kanabec,  Mille 
Lacs,  Morrison,  and  Benton  constitute  the  Fifth  Division,  the 
courts  of  which  are  held  at  Duluth  ;  the  counties  of  Stearns, 
Pope,  Stevens,  Big  Stone,  Traverse,  Grant,  Douglas,  Todd,  Otter 
Tail,  Wilkin,  Clay,  Becker,  Wadena,  Norman,  Polk,  Marshall, 
Kittson,  Beltromi,  and  Hubbard  constitute  the  Sixth  Division, 
the  courts  of  which  are  held  at  Fergus  Falls. '^^^ 

The  terms  of  the  Circuit  and  District  Courts  are  held,  for  the 
First  Division,  on  the  first  Tuesdays  of  June  and  December  ;  for 
the  Second  Division,  on  the  third  Tuesday  of  April  and  the  first 
Tuesday  of  November  ;  for  the  Third  Division,  on  the  fourth 
Tuesday  of  June  and  the  second  Tuesday  of  January  ;  for  the 
Fourth  Division,  on  the  first  Tuesday  in  March  and  the  first 
Tuesday  in  September  ;  for  the  Fifth  Division,  on  the  second 
Tuesdays  of  May  and  Octol)er  ;  and  for  tlie  Sixth  Division,  on 
the  fourth  Tuesdays  oi  ]\Iarch  and  September."^ 

In  Mississippi,  two  districts,  tlie  Northci-n  and  Soutliern.  The 
Northern  District  is  sul)divided  into  l*]astcrn  and  Western  Divi- 
sions. The  Eastern  Division  of  the  Northern  District  includes 
the  counties  of  Tishamingo,  Alcorn,  Prentiss,  Itawamba,  Lee, 
Pontotoc,  Monroe,  Chickasaw,  Clay,  Oktibbeha,  Lowndes,  Nox- 
ubee, Winston,  Choctaw,  Attala,  Neshoha,  and  Kemper,  as  they 
existed  June  15,  1882.  The  Western  Division  of  the  Northern 
District  comprises  the  counties  of  Carroll,  Bolivar,  Coahoma, 
Tunica,  De  Soto,  Tate,  Marshall,  ]*anola,  Benton,  Tippah,  Sun- 
fiower,  Montgomery,  Grenada,  Tallahatchee,  La  Fayette,  Union, 

i'^9  20  St.  at  L.  ch.  1G7,  §  1,  p.  72.  rio  26  St.  at  L.  cli.  1G7,  §  4,  p.  73. 


§  26.]  DISTRICTS   OF   MISSISSIPPI   AND   MISSOURI,  71 

Webster,  Calhoun,  Quitman,  and  Yalabuslia,  as  they  existed  in 
June,  1882.111 

Terms  of  both  Circuit  and  District  Courts  in  the  Eastern  Divi- 
sion of  the  Northern  District  are  held  at  Aberdeen,  on  the  first 
Mondays  of  April  and  October,  to  continue  twenty-four  judicial 
days  if  the  business  so  long  require.  The  terms  of  both  courts 
for  the  Western  Division  are  held  at  Oxford,  on  the  first  Mon- 
days of  June  and  December,  to  continue  as  long  as  the  business 
may  require.n^ 

In  the  Northern  District  the  judge  is  authorized  to  appoint 
and  hold  additional  special  terms.n^ 

The  Southern  District  of  Mississippi  is  divided  into  three  divi- 
sions. The  Western  Division  consists  of  the  counties  of  Wash- 
ington, Sharkey,  Inaquena,  and  Motte.H'i  The  Southern  Division 
consists  of  the  counties  of  Hancock,  Harrison,  Jackson,  Clarion, 
Perry,  and  Green.n^  The  remainder  of  the  Southern  District  con- 
stitutes the  other  division.n^  The  terms  of  the  Circuit  and  Dis- 
trict Courts  for  the  Western  Division  are  held  at  Vicksburg,  on 
the  first  Mondays  of  January  and  July  in  each  year  ;  for  the 
Southern  Division,  at  Mississippi  City,  on  the  third  Mondays  of 
Fel)ruary  and  August  ;  for  the  other  division  of  the  Southern 
District  the  terms  of  the  Circuit  Court  are  held  at  Jackson,  on 
the  first  Mondays  of  May  and  November,"^  and  the  terms  of  the 
District  Court  for  the  same  are  held  at  Jackson,  on  the  fourth 
Mondays  of  January  and  June  in  each  year.n' 

In  dlissouri,  two  districts,  the  Eastern  and  Western.  The 
Eastern  District  of  Missouri  embraces  the  following  counties : 
St.  Louis,  Franklin,  Gasconade,  Jefferson,  Crawford,  Wash- 
ington, St.  Fran9ois,  St.  Genevieve,  Dent,  Iron,  Madison, 
Perry,  Bollinger,  Cape  Girai-deau,  Shannon,  Reynolds,  Wayne, 
Scott,  Carter,  Oregon,  Ripley,  Butler,  Stoddard,  New  Madrid, 
Mississippi,  Dunklin,  Pemiscot,  Montgomery,  Lincoln,  War- 
ren, St.  Charles,  Macon,  Adair,  Clarke,  Knox,  Lewis,  Marion, 
Monroe,    Pike,    Ralls,    Schuyler,    Scotland,    Shelly,    and    Ran- 

111  Act  of  June  15, 1882,  ch.  218  (22  St.  i"  24  St.  at  L.  ch.  279,  p.  4.S0. 
at  L.  101)  ;  Act  of  July  8,  1886,  ch.  745  -^^  25  St.  at  L.  ch.  58,  p.  78. 
(24  St.  at  L.  127).  ne  24  St.  at  L.  430. 

112  Act  of  June  15, 1882,  ch.  218  (22  St.  n"  24  St.  at  L.  cli.  279,  p.  430;  U.  S. 
at  L.  101) ;  Act  of  Julv  8,  1886  (24  St.  at  K.  S.  §§  572,  658;  25  St.  at  L.  ch.  68. 
L.  127).  p.  78. 

113  Act  of  June  15, 1882,  ch.  218  (22  St. 
at  L.  103). 


72  JURISDICTION.  [chap.  I. 

dolph.  The  remaining  counties  of  the  State  form  the  Western 
District.118 

There  are  two  divisions  in  the  Eastern  District.  The  city  of 
St.  Louis  and  the  counties  of  St.  Louis,  Franklin,  Gasconade, 
Jefferson,  Crawford,  Washington,  St.  Francois,  St.  Genevieve, 
Dent,  Iron,  Madison,  Perry,  Bollinger,  Cape  Girardeau,  Shan- 
non, Reynolds,  Wayne,  Scott,  Carter,  Oregon,  Ripley,  Butler, 
Stoddard,  New  Madrid,  Mississippi,  Dunklin,  Pemiscot,  Mont- 
gomery, Lincoln,  Warren,  and  St.  Charles  form  the  Eastern 
Division.  The  remaining  counties  of  the  Eastern  District  con- 
stitute the  Northern  Division. ^^^ 

The  Western  District  of  Missouri  is  divided  into  four  divisions. 
The  counties  of  Clay,  Ray,  Carroll,  Chariton,  Sullivan,  Jackson, 
La  Fayette,  Saline,  Cass,  Johnson,  Bates,  Henry,  Vernon,  Put- 
nam, Caldwell,  Livingston,  Grundy,  Mercer,  Linn,  Barton,  Jas- 
per, and  St.  Clair  form  the  Western  Division  of  the  Western 
District.  The  counties  of  Atchison,  Nodaway,  Holt,  Andrew, 
Buchanan,  Platte,  Clinton,  Harrison,  Daviess,  De  Kalb,  Gentry, 
and  Worth  form  the  St.  Joseph  Division.  The  counties  of  Cedar, 
Polk,  Dallas,  Laclede,  Pulaski,  Dade,  Greene,  Webster,  Wright, 
Texas,  Lawrence,  Christian,  Douglas,  Howell,  Newton,  Barry, 
McDonald,  Stone,  Taney,  and  Ozark  form  the  Southern  Division 
of  the  Western  District.  The  remaining  counties  of  the  Western 
District  form  the  Central  Division. ^^'^  Li  each  of  the  divisions 
of  the  Eastern  and  Western  Districts  there  are  established  a  Dis- 
trict and  a  Circuit  Court  of  the  United  States.^'^^  There  are  held 
two  terms  of  the  District  and  Circuit  Courts  in  each  year  in  each 
of  the  divisions.^^i  The  times  and  places  of  liolding  the  District 
Court  in  the  Eastern  District  are,  for  the  Eastern  Division,  at 
St.  Louis,  on  the  first  Mondays  in  May  and  November;  and  for 
the  Circuit  Court,  at  the  same  place,  on  the  third  Mondays  in 
March  and  September.^'-^^  Pq^.  ^\^q  Northern  Division,  for  both 
courts,  at  Hannibal,  on  tlie  first  Mondays  in  May  and  Novcm- 
ber.^-2     Courts  for   the   Western  District   are   held  as  follows  : 

"8  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  540;  24  St.  at  L.  424  ;  (20  St.  at  L.  106)  ;  Act  of  Aug.  29,  1890, 

25  St.  at  L.  498.  ch.  818  (20  St.  at  L.  .'309). 

'•'J  Act  of  Feb.  28,  1887,  ch.  271  (24  St.  i^^  U.  S.  K.  S.  §§  572,  658  ;  Act  of  Feb. 

at  L.  424).  28,  1887,  ch.  271  (24  St.  at  L.  424). 

1^24  St.  at  L.  424;  25  St.  at  L.  '-•'  Act  of  Feb.  28, 1887,  cli.  271  (24  St. 

498.  at  L.  424) ;  25  St.  at  L.  cli.  129,  §  1,  p.  88  ; 

i-:i  Act  of  Feb.  28,  1887,  cli.  271  (24  St.  Act  of  May  14,  1890,  ch.  202  (20  St.  at  L. 

at  L.  424) ;  Act  of  May  14,  1890,  ch.  202  100). 


§  26.]      MONTANA,  NEBRASKA,  NEVADA,  N.  HAMPSHIRE,  N.  JERSEY.      73 

both  courts  for  the  Central  Division,  at  Jefferson  City,  on  the 
third  Mondays  in  April  and  November ;  i^*  both  courts  for  the 
St.  Joseph  Division,  at  St.  Joseph,  on  the  first  Mondays  in  April 
and  November ;  ^-^  both  courts  for  the  Western  Division,  at  Kan- 
sas City,  on  the  first  Mondays  in  March  and  September ;  ^-^  both 
courts  for  the  Southern  Division,  at  Springfield,  on  the  third 
Mondays  in  May  and  October.^^; 

Montana,  on  its  admission  as  a  State,  constitutes  one  district. ^'^^ 

Nehraiskaiovviis,  one  judicial  district.^^^  The  time  and  places  of 
holding  courts  therein,  Circuit  and  District,  are  at  Omaha,  on  the 
second  Mondays  of  May  and  November ;  at  Lincoln,  on  the  second 
Monday  of  January ;  in  Hastings,  on  the  second  Monday  in 
March ;  and  at  Norfolk,  on  the  second  jMonday  of  April. ^^^^ 

Nevada  forms  one  judicial  district.^^^  The  District  Courts 
therein  are  held  at  Carson  City,  on  the  first  Mondays  in  Feb- 
ruary, May,  and  October.^^'^  And  the  Circuit  Courts  for  the  same 
are  held  at  Carson  City,  on  the  third  Monday  of  March  and  tlie 
first  Monday  of  November  of  each  ycai-.^^-^ 

Ne-w  Hampshire  forms  one  judicial  district,^^^  the  District  Courts 
in  which  are  held  at  Portsmouth  on  the  third  Tuesday  in  March 
and  September,  and  at  Concord,  on  the  third  Tuesday  in  June 
and  December.^35  '^\^\^q  terms  of  the  Circuit  Court  for  the  same 
are  held  at  Portsmouth  on  the  eighth  day  of  May,  and  at  Con- 
cord on  the  eighth  day  of  October.^-^*^ 

JVeiv  Jersey  constitutes  one  judicial  district,  in  which  the  terms 
of  the  District  Court  are  held  at  Trenton  on  the  third  Tuesdays 
in  January,  April,  June,  and  September.  The  terms  of  the  Cir- 
cuit Court  for  the  same  district  are  held  at  Trenton  on  the  fourth 
Tuesdays  in  March  and  September  in  each  year.^s" 

124  Act  of  Feb.  28,  1887,  ch.  271  (24  St.  i-s  25  St  at  L.  ch.  180,  p.  682. 

at  L.  424) ;  U.  S.  R.  S.  §§  572,  G58.  i'^^  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  531. 

1^5  Act  of  Feb.  28,  1887,  ch.  271  (24  St.  i^"  25  St.  at  L.  ch.  891,  §  1,  p.  443. 

at  L.  424)  ;  Act  of  Aug.  29,  1890,  cli.  818  ^^i  u.  S.  R.  S.  §  531. 

(20  St.  at  L.  3Gfl).  13^  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  572. 

1-8  Act  of  Feb.  28,  1887,  ch.  271  (24  St.  i^a  Act  of  Feb.  18,  1876,  ch.  11  (19  St. 

at  L.  424)  ;  Act  of  Jan.  21,  1879,  ch.  20  at  L.  4 ;  U.  S.  R.  S.  1st  Supp.  200). 

(20  St.  at  L.  203  ;  U.  S.  R.  S.  1st  Supp.  i«  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  531. 

392) ;  Act  of  Aug.  29, 1890,  ch.  818  (2G  St.  i^s  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  572  ;  Act  of  Feb.  23, 

at.  L.  S69).  1881,  ch.  71  (21  St.  at  L.  330). 

127  Act  of  Feb.  28,  1887,  ch.  271  (24  St.  i3«  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  658 ;  Act  of  Feb.  23, 

at  L.  424) ;  Act  of  May  14,  1890,  ch.  200  1881,  ch.  71  (21  St.  at  L.  330). 

(26  St.  at  L.  40G) ;  Act  of  Aug.  29,  1890,  137  u.  S.  R.  S.  §§  531,  572,  658. 
ch.  818  (26  St.  at  L.  369). 


74  JUEISDICTION.  [chap.  I. 

In  New  Yorh,  three  districts,  the  Northern,  the  Eastern,  and 
the  Southern.  The  Northern  District  includes  the  counties  of 
Rensselaer,  Alban\',  Schoharie,  and  Delaware,  "vvith  all  the 
counties  north  and  west  of  them.  The  Eastern  District  includes 
the  counties  of  Richmond,  Kings,  Queens,  and  Suffolk,  with  the 
waters  thereof.  The  remainder  of  the  State  with  the  waters 
thereof  constitutes  the  Southern  District. ^^^^  The  District  Courts 
of  the  Southern  and  Eastern  Districts  of  New  York  have  con- 
current jurisdiction  over  the  waters  within  the  counties  of  New 
York,  Kings,  Queens,  and  Suffolk,  and  over  all  seizures  made 
and  all  matters  done  in  such  waters.^*^^  The  terms  of  the  District 
Court  for  the  Northern  District  of  New  York  are  held  at  Alban/ 
on  the  third  Tuesday  in  January ;  at  Utica,  on  the  third  Tuesday 
in  March  ;  at  Rochester,  on  the  second  Tuesday  in  May  ;  at  Buf- 
falo, on  the  third  Tuesday  in  September ;  at  Auburn,  on  the  third 
Tuesday  in  November;  and,  in  the  discretion  of  the  judge  of  the 
court,  one  term  annually  at  such  time  and  place  within  the  coun- 
ties of  Onondaga,  Saint  Lawrence,  Clinton,  Jefferson,  Oswego,  and 
Franklin,  as  he  may  from  time  to  time  appoint. ^^^  The  terms  of 
the  Circuit  Court  for  the  same  district  are  held  at  Canandaigua, 
on  tlie  third  Tuesday  in  June ;  at  Syracuse,  on  the  third  Tuesday 
in  November  ;  at  Albany,  on  the  third  Tuesday  in  January.  "  And 
when  the  said  term  aj^pointcd  to  be  held  at  Albany  be  adjourned, 
it  shall  be  adjourned  to  meet  in  Utica  on  the  third  Tuesday  in 
March ;  but  said  adjourned  term  shall  be  for  the  transaction  of 
civil  l)usiness  only."  i"*! 

The  terms  of  the  District  Court  for  the  Southern  District  of 
New  Yorlc  are  held  in  tlie  city  of  New  York,  on  the  first  Tuesday 
in  every  montli.^^^  'y\\q.  terms  of  the  Circuit  Court  for  the  same 
district  are  held  at  the  city  of  New  York  on  the  first  Monday  in 
April,  and  the  third  ]\Ionday  in  October;  and  for  the  trial  of 
criminal  causes  and  suits  in  equity,  on  th.e  last  Monday  in  Feli- 
ruary ;  and,  exclusively  for  the  trial  and  disposal  of  criminal 
cases  and  matters  arising  and  ])on(ling  in  said  court,  on  tlie 
second  Wednesdays  in  January,  March,  and  IMay,  on  the  third 
Wednesday  in  June,  and  on  tlic  second  Wednesdays  in  October 

138  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  541  ;  U.  S.  \\.  S.  1st        "i  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  658  ;  Act  of  Marcli  23, 
Supp.  138.  1882,  oil.  48,  p.  32  (22  St.  at  L.  33). 

"i  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  542.  H2  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  572. 

1*1  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  572  ;  Act  of  Marcli  23, 
1882,  ch.  48,  p.  32  (22  St.  at  L.  32). 


§  26.]      DISTRICTS   OF   NORTH  CAROLINA  AND   NORTH   DAKOTA.  75 

and  December:  ^^ Provided ,  that  the  holding  of  any  of  the  last- 
mentioned  terms  for  criminal  business  shall  not  dispense  with 
nor  affect  the  holding  of  any  other  term  of  court  at  the  same 
time,  and  that  the  pending  of  any  other  term  of  court  shall  not 
prevent  the  holding  of  any  of  said  terms  for  criminal  business."  ^^^ 
District  and  Circuit  Courts  for  the  Eastern  District  of  New  York 
are  held  at  Brooklyn  on  the  first  Wednesday  in  every  month. ^** 

In  North  Carolina,  two  judicial  districts,  the  Eastern  and  the 
Western.  The  Western  District  includes  the  counties  of  Meck- 
lenburg, Cabarras,  Stanly,  Montgomery,  Richmond,  Davie,  David- 
son, Randolph,  Guilford,  Rockingham,  Stokes,  Forsyth,  Union, 
Anson,  Caswell,  Person,  Alamance,  Orange,  Chatham,  Moore, 
Clay,  Cherokee,  Swain,  Macon,  Jackson,  Graham,  Haywood, 
Transylvania,  Henderson,  Buncombe,  Madison,  Yancey,  Mitchell, 
Watauga,  Ashe,  Alleghany,  Caldwell,  Burke,  McDowell,  Ruther- 
ford, Polk,  Cleveland,  Gaston,  Lincoln,  Catawba,  Alexander, 
Wilkes,  Surry,  Iredell,  Yadkin,  and  Rowan,  and  all  counties 
which  have  been  formed  within  this  territory  since  June  4th, 
1872.  The  Eastern  District  includes  the  residue  of  the  State. ^'^^ 
The  terms  of  District  and  Circuit  Courts  for  the  Western  District 
of  North  Carolina  are  held  at  Greensborough,  on  the  first  Mon- 
days in  April  and  October  ;  at  Statesville,  on  the  third  Mondays 
in  April  and  October ;  at  Asheville,  on  the  first  Mondays  in  May 
and  November ;  and  at  Charlotte,  on  the  second  Mondays  of  June 
and  December.^^*^  The  terms  of  the  District  Court  for  the  Eastern 
District  of  North  Carolina  are  held  at  Elizabeth  City,  on  the  third 
Mondays  in  April  and  October  ;  at  New  Berne,  on  the  fourth 
Mondays  in  April  and  October ;  and  at  Wilmington  on  the 
first  Mondays  after  the  fourth  Mondays  in  April  and  October.^^" 
The  terms  of  the  Circuit  Court  for  the  same  district  arc  held  at 
Raleigh,  on  the  first  Monday  in  June  and  last  Monday  in  No- 
vember ;  and  at  Wilmington,  on  the  first  Mondays  after  tlie 
fourth  ]\Iondays  in  April  and  October.^^^ 

North  Dakota  constitutes  one  judicial  district,  which  is  divided 
into  four  divisions,  known  as  the  Southwestern,  Southeastern, 
Northeastern,  and  Northwestern  Divisions.     The  portion  of  the 

»3  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  658.  »■  U.  S.  I?.  S  §  572. 

1**  U.  S.  II.  S.  §§  572,  G58.  i*^  U.  S.  U.  S.  §  G58  ;  Act  of  Feb.  17, 

1*5  U.  S.  R.  S.  §54.3.  1887,  ch.  137  (24  St.  at  L.  40G). 

»s  u.  S.  R.  S.  §"§  572,  658  ;  Act  of  June 
19,  1878,  ch.  322  (20  St.  at  L.  173). 


76  JURISDICTION.  [chap.  I. 

State  comprising  the  counties  of  Burieigh,  Stutsman,  Lcgan, 
Mcintosh,  Emmons,  Kidder,  Foster,  Wells,  McLean,  and  all  terri- 
tories in  said  State  of  North  Dakota  lying  south  and  west  of  the 
Missouri  River  constitutes  the  Southwestern  Division,  as  said  coun- 
ties were  bounded  on  April  26,  1890,  the  court  for  which  is  held 
at  the  city  of  Bismarck.  That  portion  of  the  State  comprising 
the  present  counties  of  Cass,  Richland,  Barnes,  Sargent,  Dickey, 
La  Moure,  Ransom,  Griggs,  and  Steele  constitute  the  Southeastern 
Division,  as  said  counties  were  bounded  on  April  26,  1890,  the 
court  for  which  is  held  at  the  city  of  Fargo.  The  portion  of  the 
State  comprising  the  present  counties  of  Grand  Forks,  Traill, 
Walsh,  Pembina,  Cavalier,  and  Nelson,  as  said  counties  were 
bounded  on  April  26,  1890,  constitute  the  Northeastern  Division, 
the  court  for  which  is  held  in  the  city  of  Grand  Forks.  That 
portion  of  the  State  comprising  the  present  counties  of  Ramsey, 
Eddy,  Benson,  Towner,  Rolette,  Bottineau,  Pierce,  McHenry,  and 
Ward,  and  all  the  territory  in  said  State  of  North  Dakota  lying 
north  of  the  Southwestern  Division  constitute  the  Northwestern 
Division,  as  said  counties  were  bounded  April  26,  1800,  the  court 
for  which  is  held  in  the  city  of  Devil's  Lake.^"*^  The  terms  of 
the  District  and  Circuit  Courts  are  held  each  year  for  the  South- 
western Division  at  Bismarck  on  the  first  Tuesday  of  April ;  for 
tlie  Southeastern  Division  at  Fargo  on  the  third  Tuesday  of  May  ; 
for  the  Northeastern  Division  at  Grand  Forks  on  the  first  Tues- 
day of  December  ;  and  for  the  Northwestern  Division  at  Devil's 
Lake  on  the  first  Tuesday  of  February. ^^o 

In  Ohio,  two  districts,  —  the  Northern  and  the  Southern.  The 
Southern  District  includes  the  counties  of  Belmont,  Guernsey, 
Muskingum,  Licking,  Franklin,  Madison,  Champaign,  Shelby, 
and  Mercer,  as  they  existed  February  10,  1855,  with  all  the 
counties  south  of  them,  and  also  the  counties  of  Uniun,  Dela- 
ware, Morrow,  Knox,  Coshocton,  Harrison,  and  Jeffei'son.  The 
Northern  District  includes  the  residue  of  the  State.^^^ 

The  Northern  District  of  Ohio  is  divided  into  two  divisions. 
The  counties  of  Williams,  Defiance,  Paulding,  Van  Wert,  ]\Icrccr, 
Auglaize,  Allen,  Putnam,  Henry,  Fulton,  Lucas,  Wood,  Hancock, 

•«  26  St.  at  L.  cli.  IGl,  §  2,  pp.  G7,  G8.  'Si  u.  S.  1{.  S.  §  544;  Act  of  P>h.  4, 

is^'  25  St.  at  L.  ch.  180,  p.  682  .  Act  of  1880,  cli.  18  (21  St.  at  L.  G3 ;  U.  S.  K.  S. 

April  20,  1800;  2G  St.  at  L.  cli.  161,  §  3,  1st  Supp.  508). 

p.  68  (26  St.  at  L.  68). 


§  26.]         DISTRICTS   OF   OHIO,   OREGON   AND    PENNSYLVANIA.  77 

Hardin,  Logan,  Marion,  Wyandot,  Seneca,  Sandusky,  Ottawa, 
Erie,  and  Huron  form  the  Western  Division.  The  remaining 
counties  in  the  said  district  form  the  Eastern  Division. ^^^ 

The  Southern  District  of  Ohio  is  divided  into  two  divisions. 
The  Eastern  Division  consists  of  the  counties  of  Union,  Delaware, 
Morrow,  Knox,  Coshocton,  Harrison,  Jefferson,  Madison,  Fayette, 
Franklin,  Pickaway,  Ross,  Pike,  Gallia,  Jackson,  Meigs,  Vinton, 
Athens,  Hocking,  Fairfield,  Licking,  Perry,  Muskingum,  Morgan, 
Washington,  Noble,  Monroe,  Belmont,  and  Guernsey.  The  West- 
ern Division  includes  the  remaining  counties  of  said  district.^^^ 

The  terms  of  the  Circuit  and  District  Courts  for  the  Northern 
District  of  Ohio  are  held  in  Cleveland,  in  the  Eastern  Division, 
on  the  first  Tuesdays  of  February,  April,  and  October ;  and  in 
Toledo,  in  the  Western  Division,  on  the  first  Tuesdays  of  June 
and  December  of  each  year.^^*  The  terms  of  both  courts  for  the 
Southern  District  arc  held  at  Cincinnati  on  the  first  Tuesdays  in 
February,  April,  and  October,  and  at  Columbus  on  the  first  Tues- 
days in  June  and  December.^*^ 

Oregon  constitutes  one  judicial  district,^^^  in  which  the  terms  of 
the  District  Court  are  held  at  Portland  on  the  first  Mondays  in 
March,  July,  and  November.!^"  The  Circuit  Court  for  the  same 
district  is  held  at  Portland  on  the  second  Monday  of  April  and 
the  first  Monday  of  October.i^s 

Li  Pennsylvania^  two  districts.^^^  The  Western  District  in- 
cludes the  counties  of  Fayette,  Greene,  Washington,  Allegheny, 
Westmoreland,  Somerset,  Bedford,  Huntingdon,  Centre,  Mifflin, 
Clearfield,  McKean,  Potter,  Jefferson,  Cambria,  Indiana,  Arm- 
strong, Butler,  Beaver,  Mercer,  Crawford,  Venango,  Erie,  War- 
ren, Susquehanna,  Bradford,  Tioga,  Union,  Northumberland, 
Columbia,  Luzerne,  and  Lycoming,  as  they  existed  April  20, 
1818.  The  Eastern  District  includes  the  rest  of  the  State.i<50 
The  terms  of  the  District  Court  for  the  Eastern  District  of 
Pennsylvania  are  held  at  Philadelphia  on  the  third  Mondays  in 

152  Act  of  June  8,  1878,  cli.  169  (20  St.  i^s  u.  S.  R.  S.  §§  572, 058  ;  Act  of  Feb. 
at  L.  101) ;  Act  of  Feb.  4,  1880,  cli.  18    4,  1880,  ch.  18  (21  St.  at  L.  03). 

(21  St.  at  L.  6.3).  i^'^  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  531. 

153  Act  of  Feb.  4,  1880,  cli.  18  (21  St.        i"  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  572. 

at  L.  5C9) ;  U.  S.  R.  S.  1st  Supp.  608.  ^^  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  658  ;  Act  of  June  16, 

151  U.   S.   R.   S.  §§  572,  658;   Act  of  1874,  ch.  287  (18  St.  at  L.  76)  ;   Act  of 

June  8,  1878,  ch.  169  (20  St.  at  L.  101) ;  Feb.  18,  1876,  ch.  11  (19  St.  at  L.  4). 

Act  of  July  27,  1882,  ch.  351  (22  St.  at  L.  i59  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  545. 

176).  i«^  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  546. 


78  JURISDICTION.  [chap.  I. 

Febriiarj,  May,  August,  and  November.  The  terms  of  the  Cir- 
cuit Court  for  the  same  district  are  held  at  Philadelphia  on  the 
first  Mondays  in  April  and  October.^*^i  The  terms  of  the  District 
Court  for  the  Western  District  are  held  at  Pittsburgh  on  the  first 
Monday  in  May  and  on  the  third  Monday  in  October ;  at  Wil- 
liamsport  on  the  third  Monday  in  June  and  on  the  first  ^Monday 
in  October ;  at  Erie  on  the  second  Monday  in  January  and  the 
third  Monday  in  July  ;  ^^^  and  at  Scranton  on  the  first  Mondays  of 
March  and  September.^^'^  The  terms  of  the  Circuit  Court  for  the 
same  district  are  held  at  Erie  on  the  second  Monday  of  January 
and  third  Monday  of  July  ;  at  Pittsburgh  on  the  second  Mondays 
in  May  and  November;  at  Williamsport  on  the  third  Mondays  in 
June  and  September ;  and  at  Scranton  on  the  first  Mondays  of 
March  and  September.^^* 

Rhode  Island  constitutes  one  judicial  district,  in  which  the 
terms  of  the  District  Court  are  held  at  Providence  on  the  first 
Tuesdays  in  Fe))ruary  and  August ;  at  Newport  on  the  second 
Tuesdays  in  May  and  on  the  third  Tuesday  in  October.  The 
Circuit  Court  for  the  same  district  is  held  at  Providence  on  the 
fifteenth  days  of  June  and  November.^''^ 

In  South  Carolina,  two  districts,  —  the  Eastern  and  Western. 
The  Western  District  includes  the  counties  of  Lancaster,  Chester, 
York,  Union,  Spartanburgh,  Greenville,  Pendleton,  Abbeville, 
Edgefield,  Newburry,  Laurens,  and  Fairfield,  as  they  existed  Feb- 
ruary 21,  1823.  Tlie  Eastern  District  includes  the  residue  of  the 
State. ^^"^  The  terms  of  the  Circuit  Court  for  the  Eastern  District 
are  held  at  Charleston  on  the  first  Monday  of  April,  and  at 
Columbia  on  the  fourth  Monday  of  November.  The  terms  of  the 
District  Court  for  the  Eastern  District  are  held  at  Charleston  on 
the  first  Mondays  in  January,  April,  and  July,  and  at  Columbia 
on  the  fourth  Monday  of  Noveml^er.^*^'  In  tlie  Western  District 
the  terms  of  both  courts  are  held  at  Greenville  on  the  first  Mon- 
days of  Fel)ruary  and  August.^^^ 

South   Dakota   constitutes  one   judicial   district,  which  is  di- 

lei  U.  S.  P..  S.  §§  572,  658.  i''«  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  546;  25  St.  at  L.  ch. 

le-i  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  572.  113,  p.  655. 

^53  Act  of  Aug.  5,  1886,  ch.  931  (21  St.  lo"  U.  S.   R.  S.  §§  572,  658;   Act  of 

at  L.  .^36).  April  26,  1890,  ch.  165  (26  St.  at  L.  71). 

164  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  658;  24  St.  at  L.  336.  ^ss  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  572 ;  25  St.  at  L.  655; 

165  U.  S.  U.  S.  §§  531.  572,  658.  Act  of  April  26,  1890,  ch.  165  (26  St.  at 

L.  71). 


§  26.]  DISTEICTS   OF   SOUTH   DAKOTA   AND   TENNESSEE.  79 

vided  into  three  divisions,  known  as  the  Eastern,  Central,  and 
Western  Divisions.  The  counties  of  Clay,  Union,  Yanlvton, 
Turner,  Lincoln,  Bonhommc,  Charles  Mix,  Douglas,  Hutchinson, 
Brule,  Aurora,  Davidson,  Hanson,  McCook,  ^linnehaha,  Moody, 
Lake,  Lyman,  Miner,  Sanborn,  Beadle,  Kingsbury,  Brookings, 
Hamlin,  Deuel,  Grant,  Roberts,  Codington,  Clark,  Day,  Marshall, 
Spink,  Brown,  Gregory,  Todd,  and  the  Yankton,  Sisseton,  Wahpe- 
ton,  and  Crow  Creek  Indian  Reservations  constitute  the  Eastern 
Division,  the  court  for  which  is  held  at  the  city  of  Sioux  Falls. 
The  counties  of  McPherson,  Edmunds,  Campbell,  Walworth,  Pot- 
ter, Sully,  Faulk,  Hand,  Hyde,  Hughes,  Buffalo,  Jerauld,  Stanley, 
Knowlen,  and  that  portion  of  the  counties  of  Pratt,  Jackson,  and 
Sterlings  not  included  in  any  Indian  reservation,  and  the  Standing 
Rock,  Cheyenne,  and  Lower  Brule  Indian  Reservations  constitute 
the  Central  Division,  the  court  for  which  is  held  at  the  city  of 
Pierre.  All  that  portion  of  the  State  of  South  Dakota  lying  west 
of  the  Central  Division,  and  in  addition  thereto  the  Rosebud  and 
Red  Cloud  Indian  Reservations  constitute  the  Western  Division, 
the  court  for  which  is  held  at  the  city  of  Dcadwood.^*^^  The 
terms  of  the  Circuit  Court  are  held  for  the  Eastern  Division  at 
Sioux  Falls  on  the  first  Tuesdays  of  April  and  October;  for  the 
Central  Division  at  Pierre  on  the  third  Tuesday  of  November; 
and  for  the  Western  Division  at  Deadwood  on  the  first  Tuesday 
of  July.i™  The  terms  of  the  District  Court  are  held  for  the  East- 
ern Division  at  Sioux  Falls  on  the  first  Tuesdays  of  April  and 
October  in  each  year  ;  for  the  Central  Division  at  Pierre  on  the 
third  Tuesdays  of  May  and  November  in  each  year ;  and  at  Dead- 
wood  on  the  first  Tuesdays  of  January  and  July  in  each  year.^'^ 

In  Tennessee^  three  districts,  —  the  Eastern,  Western,  and 
^liddle.  The  Eastern  District  includes  the  counties  of  Anderson, 
Bledsoe,  Blount,  Bradley,  Campbell,  Carter,  Claiborne,  Cocke, 
Cumberland,  Fentress,  Grainger,  Greene,  Hamilton,  Hancock, 
Hawkins,  Jefferson,  Johnson,  Knox,  McMinn,  Marion,  Meigs, 
Monroe,  Morgan,  Polk,  Rhea,  Roane,  Scott,  Sevier,  Sullivan, 
Union,  and  Washington,  as  they  existed  February  19,  1856.i'2 
The  Western  District  includes  the  Counties  of  Benton,  Carroll, 
Henry,  Obion,  Dyer,  Gibson,  Lauderdale,  Haywood,  Tipton,  Shelby, 

169  25  St.  at  L.  ch.  180,  p.  082 ;  20  St.        ^'i  26  St.  at  L.  ch.  21,  §  3,  p.  14. 
at  L.  cli.  21,  §  2,  p.  14.  ^'-  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  647 ;  21  St.  at  L.  751  ; 

i'»  26  St.  at  L.  ch.  21,  §  5,  p.  14.  23  St.  at  L.  280. 


80  JURISDICTION.  [chap.  I. 

Fayette,  Hardeman,  McNairy,  Hardin,  Madison,  Henderson,  and 
Weakley,  as  they  existed  June  18,  1838.  The  Middle  District 
includes  the  residue  of  the  State.i'^  The  Western  District  of 
Tennessee  is  divided  into  two  divisions,  called  the  Eastern 
and  Western  Divisions.  The  Eastern  Division  includes  the  coun- 
ties of  Benton,  Carroll,  Decatur,  Gibson.  Hardeman,  Hender- 
son, Henry,  McXairy,  Madison,  Hardin,  Dyer,  Lake,  Crockett, 
Weakley,  and  Obion,  and  the  terms  of  the  Circuit  and  District 
Courts  are  held  therein  at  Jackson,  at  least  twice  in  each  year,  at 
such  times  as  the  judges  thereof  respectively  fix.i'^  The  remain- 
ing counties  embraced  in  this  district  constitute  the  Western 
Division  thereof,  and  the  terms  of  District  and  Circuit  Courts 
are  held  at  Memphis  on  the  fourth  Mondays  in  May  and 
November.i'^ 

The  Eastern  District  of  Tennessee  is  divided  into  two  divisions, 
known  as  the  Northern  and  Southern  Divisions  of  the  Eastern 
District.  The  Southern  Division  includes  the  counties  of  Hamilton, 
James,  Polk,  McMinn,  Bradley,  Meigs,  Rhea,  ^Marion,  Sequatchie, 
Bledsoe,  Fentress,  and  Cumberland.  The  Northern  Division 
consists  of  the  remaining  counties  in  the  district.^'^  The  Dis- 
trict and  Circuit  Courts  for  the  Eastern  District  are  held  at 
Knoxville,  on  the  second  Mondays  in  January  and  July ;  and 
at  Chattanooga  on  the  first  Mondays  of  April  and  October  in 
each  year.^"  The  terms  of  the  District  and  Circuit  Courts  for 
the  Middle  District  of  Tennessee  are  held  at  Nashville,  on  the 
third  Mondays  in  April  and  October.^'^ 

Ill  Texas,  three  districts,  the  Northern,  Eastern,  and  Western.!'^ 
The  Northern  District  is  composed  of  the  counties  of  Brazos, 
Robertson,  Leon,  Limestone,  Freestone,  Navarro,  Ellis,  Kaufman, 
Dallas,  Rockwall,  Hunt,  Collin,  Grayson,  Cooke,  Denton,  Tarrant, 
Johnson,  Hill,  McLennan,  Falls,  Bell,  Coryell,  Hamilton,  Bosque, 
Comanche,  Erath,  Somervilic,  Hood,  Parker,  Palo,  Pinto,  Jack, 

1T3  u.  S.  R.  S.  §  547  ;  18  St.  at  L.  480 ;  i"  U.  S.  II.  S.  §§  572,  658 ;  Act  of  June 

21  St.  at  L.  757  ;  23  St.  at  L.  280.  11.  1880,  ch.  203,  §  2  (21  St.  at  L.  751). 

!■*  Act  of  June  20,  1878,  cli.  359,  §  17  i"*  U.  S.  H.  S.  §§  572,  658. 

(20  St.  at  L.  20G) ;  Act  of  Jan.  15,  1883,  i'»  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  548  ;  20  St.  at  L.  ch.  97, 

ch.  25  (22  St.  at  L.  402)  ;  Act  of  Dec.  27,  p.  318;  21  St.  at  L.  cli.  18,  §  1,  p.  10 ;  20 

1884  (23  St.  at  L.  280).  St.  at  L.  ch.  97,  p.  318  ;  21  St.  at  L.  ch. 

i'5  Act  of  June  20,  1878,  ch.  359,  §  17  213,  p.  198  ;  25  St.  at  L.  ch.  033,  §§  17, 18, 

(20  St.  at  L.  20G) ;  U.  S.  R.  S.  §§  572,  658.  p.  78G. 

™  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  547 ;  21  St.  at  L.  751 ; 
23  St.  at  L.  280. 


§  26.]  DISTRICTS   OF   TEXAS.  81 

Wise,  Montague,  Clay,  Archer,  Wichita,  Wilbarger,  Hardeman, 
Knox,  Baylor,  Haskell,  Throckmorton,  Young,  Stevens,  Shackel- 
ford, Jones,  Taylor,  Callahan,  Eastland,  Brown,  Coleman,  Run- 
nels, Greer,  Nolan,  Fisher,  Stonewall,  King,  Cottle,  Childress, 
Collingsworth,  Wheeler,  Hemphill,  Lipscomb,  Ochiltree,  Roberts, 
Gray,  Donley,  Hall,  Motley,  Dickens,  Kent,  Scurry,  Mitchell, 
Howard,  Borden,  Dawson,  Gaines,  Martin,  Andrews,  Garza, 
Crosby,  Floyd,  Briscoe,  Armstrong,  Carson,  Hutchinson,  Hans- 
ford, Sherman,  Moore,  Potter,  Randall,  Swisher,  Hale,  Lubbock, 
Lynn,  Terry,  Hockley,  Lamb,  Castro,  Deaf  Smith,  Oldham,  Hart- 
ley, Dellam,  Palmer,  Baylcy,  Cochran,  and  Yoakum,  The  East- 
ern District  is  com})Osed  of  the  counties  of  Matagorda,  Wharton, 
Brazoria,  Fort  Bend,  Colorado,  Austin,  Waller,  Harris,  Galveston, 
Chambers,  Jefferson,  Orange,  Hardin,  Liberty,  Newton,  Jasper, 
Tyler,  Polk,  San  Jacinto,  Montgomery,  Walker,  Grimes,  Madison, 
Trinity,  Angelina,  San  Augustine,  Sabine,  Shelby,  Nacogdoches, 
Cherokee,  Houston,  Anderson,  Henderson,  Smith,  Rusk,  Panola, 
Harrison,  Gregg,  Upshur,  Wood,  Vanzandt,  Rains,  Hopkins,  Camp, 
Titus,  Marion,  Cass,  Bowie,  Franklin,  Morris,  Red  River,  Jackson, 
Lamar,  Fannin,  and  Delta,  and  so  much  of  the  Indian  Territory 
as  is  thereto  annexed  by  the  Act  of  March  1,  1889.i8<^  That 
Act  provides,  "that  the  Chickasaw  Nation,  in  the  portion  of  the 
Choctaw  Nation  within  the  following  boundaries,  to  wit ;  be- 
ginning on  Red  River,  at  the  southeast  corner  of  the  Choctaw 
Nation ;  thence  north  with  the  boundary  line  between  the  said 
Choctaw  Nation  and  the  State  of  Arkansas,  to  a  point  where  Big 
Creek,  a  trilratary  of  the  Black  Fork  of  the  Kimishi  River, 
crosses  the  said  boundary  line ;  thence  westerly  with  Big  Creek 
and  the  said  Black  Fork  to  the  junction  of  the  said  Black  Fork 
with  Buffalo  Creek  ;  tlience  northwesterly  with  said  Ihiffalo  Creek 
to  a  point  where  the  same  is  crossed  by  the  old  military  road 
from  Fort  Smith,  Arkansas,  to  Boggy  Depot,  in  the  Choctaw 
Nation  ;  thence  southwesterly  with  the  said  road  to  where  the 
same  crosses  Perry  ville  Creek ;  thence  northwesterly  up  said 
Creek  to  where  the  same  is  crossed  by  the  IMissouri,  Kansas,  and 
Texas  Railway  track  ;  thence  northerly  up  the  centre  of  the  main 
track  of  the  said  road  to  the  South  Canadian  River  ;  thence  up 

18''  U.  S.  "R.  S.  §  548 ;  20  St.  at  L.  ch.  97,  213,  p.  198 ;  25  St.  at  L.  cli.  G33,  §§  17,  18, 
p.  318  ;  21  St.  at  L.  ch.  18,  §  1,  p.  10 ;  20  p.  786. 
St.  at  L.  cl).  97,  p.  318 ;  21  St.  at  L.  ch. 
VOL.  I.  —  6 


82  JURISDICTION.  [chap.  I. 

the  centre  of  the  main  channel  of  the  said  river  to  the  west- 
ern boundary  line  of  the  Chickasaw  Nation,  the  same  being 
tlie  northwest  corner  of  the  said  Nation  ;  thence  south  on  the 
boundary  line  between  the  said  Nation  and  the  reservation  of  the 
Wichita  Indians ;  thence  continuing  south  with  the  boundary 
line  between  the  said  Chickasaw  Nation  and  the  reservation  of 
the  Kiowa,  Comanche,  and  Apache  Indians  to  Red  River ;  thence 
down  said  river  to  the  place  of  beginning.  And  all  that  portion 
of  the  Indian  Territory  not  annexed  to  the  district  of  Kansas  by 
the  Act  approved  January  sixth,  eighteen  hundred  and  eighty- 
three,  and  not  set  apart  and  occupied  by  the  five  civilized  tribes, 
shall,  from  and  after  the  passage  of  this  Act,  be  annexed  to  and 
constitute  a  part  of  the  eastern  judicial  district  of  the  State  of 
Texas,  for  judicial  purposes."  "  The  counties  of  Lamar,  Fannin, 
Red  River,  and  Delta,  of  the  State  of  Texas,  and  all  that  part  of 
the  Indian  Territory  attached  to  the  said  eastern  judicial  district 
of  the  State  of  Texas  by  the  provisions  of  this  Act,  shall  consti- 
tute a  division  of  the  eastern  judicial  district  of  Texas ;  and 
terms  of  the  Circuit  and  District  Courts  of  the  United  States  for 
the  said  eastern  district  of  the  State  of  Texas  shall  be  held  twice 
in  each  year  at  the  city  of  Paris,  on  the  third  Mondays  in  April 
and  the  second  Mondays  in  October ;  and  the  United  States 
courts  herein  provided  to  be  held  at  Paris  shall  have  exclusive 
original  jurisdiction  of  all  offences  committed  agaiust  the  laws 
of  the  United  States  within  the  limits  of  that  portion  of  the 
Indian  Territory  attached  to  tlie  eastern  judicial  district  of  the 
State  of  Texas  by  the  provisions  of  this  Act,  of  which  jurisdiction 
is  not  given  by  this  Act  to  the  court  herein  estal)lished  in  the 
Indian  Territory  ;  and  all  civil  process,  issued  against  persons 
resident  in  the  said  counties  of  Lamar,  Fannin,  Red  River,  and 
Delta  cognizable  before  the  United  States  courts,  shall  be  made 
returnable  to  the  courts,  respectively,  to  Ije  held  at  the  city  of 
Paris,  Texas.  And  all  prosecutions  for  offences  committed  in 
either  of  said  last  mentioned  counties  shall  be  tried  iu  the  division 
of  said  eastern  district  of  wliich  said  counties  form  a  part: 
Provided,,  that  no  process  issued  or  prosecution  commenced  or 
suit  instituted  l)eforc  the  passage  of  this  Act,  shall  be  in  any 
way  affected  by  the  provisions  thereof."  ^^^ 

i*'i  25  St.  at  L.  cli.  .333,  §§  17  and  18,  pp.  780-787.     See  In  re  Jackson,  40  Fed.  R, 
372. 


§  26.]  DISTRICTS   OF   TEXAS   AND   VERMONT.  83 

The  Western  District  includes  the  counties  of  Calhoun,  Aransas, 
Victoria,  Goliad,  Refugio,  Bee,  San  Patricio,  Neuces,  Cameron, 
Hidalgo,  Starr,  Zapata,  Duval,  Encinal,  Webb,  La  Salle,  McMul- 
len,  Live  Oak,  De  Witt,  Lavaca,  Gonzales,  Wilson,  Karnes,  Atas- 
cosa, Frio  Dimmit,  Zavala,  Maverick,  Kinney,  Uvalde,  Medina, 
Bexar,  Guadalupe,  Caldwell,  Fayette,  Washington,  Lee,  Burleson, 
Milan,  Williamson,  Bastrop,  Travis,  Hays,  Comal,  Kendall,  Blanco, 
Burnett,  Llano,  Gillespie,  Kerr,  Bandera,  Edwards,  Kimball, 
Mason,  ^lenard,  El  Paso,  Presidio,  Tom  Green,  Crockett,  Pecos, 
Concho,  McCuUoch,  San  Saba,  and  Lampasas. ^^^  The  terms  of 
District  and  Circuit  Court  for  tlie  Northern  District  are  held  at 
Dallas,  on  the  second  Monday  of  January  and  the  third  Monday 
of  May  ;  at  Graham,  on  the  second  Monday  of  March  and  the 
third  Monday  of  October ;  at  Waco,  on  the  second  Monday  of 
April  and  the  third  Monday  of  November.^^^  The  terras  of  the 
same  courts  for  the  Eastern  District  are  held  at  Galveston,  on  the 
first  Mondays  of  March  and  November  ;  at  Tyler,  on  the  second 
Mondays  of  January  and  May ;  at  Jefferson,  on  the  second  Mon- 
days of  February  and  September ;  and  at  Paris,  on  the  third 
Monday  of  April  and  second  Monday  of  October.^^*  The  terms 
of  the  same  courts  for  the  Western  District  are  held  at  Browns- 
ville, on  the  first  Monday  of  January  and  the  second  Monday  of 
June ;  at  San  Antonio,  on  the  first  Mondays  of  May  and  Novem- 
ber; at  El  Paso,  on  the  first  Mondays  in  April  and  October;  and 
at  Austin,  on  the  first  Mondays  in  February  and  July.^*''^ 

Vermont  constitutes  one  judicial  district,^^  for  which  the 
terras  of  the  District  and  Circuit  Courts  are  held  at  Burlington, 
on  the  fourth  Tuesday  in  February ;  at  Windsor,  on  the  third 
Tuesday  in  May ;  and  at  Rutland,  on  the  first  Tuesday  in 
October.is' 

Jf2  U.  S.  K.  S.  §  548 ;  20  St.  at  L.  cli.  97,  i^^  Thid.,  and  25  St.  at  L.  ch.  63.3,  §  18, 

p.  .318;  21  St.  at  L.  ch.  18,  §  1,  p.  10;  20  p.  780. 

St.  at  L.  ch.  97,  p.  318;  21  St.  at  L.  ch.  ^^^  U.  S.  R.  S.  §§  572,  058;  Act  of  Feb. 

213,  p.  198 ;  25  St.  at  L.  ch.  03.3,  §§  17,  18,  24,  1879,  ch.  97  (20  St.  at  L.  318) ;  Act  of 

p.   786.     For  special  jurisdiction  of  tlie  June  11,  1879,  ch.   15  (21  St.  at  L.  10)  ; 

courts  held  in  this  district  over  contro-  Act  of  Feb.  18,  1881,  ch.  62  (21  St.  at  L. 

versies  affecting  the  Gulf,  Colorado,  and  320) ;  Act  of  June  3,  1884,  ch.  64  (23  St. 

Santa  Fe  l^ailroad  Company,  see  23  St.  at  L.  35) ;  Act  of  Feb.  4,  1890,  ch.  5  (26 

at  L.  ch.  177,  §  8,  p.  72 ;  23  St.  at  L.  ch.  St.  at  L.  3). 

179,  §  8,  p.  975;  Briscoe  v-  Southern  Kan.  ^^  U.  S.  K.  S.  §  531. 

Ry.  Co.,  40  Fed.  R.  273.  i"  U.  S.  R.  S.  §§  572,  6.58  ;  Act  of  June 

^^^  Act  of  June  20, 1884,  ch.  102  (23  St.  5,  1874,  ch.  214  (18  St.  at  L.  63). 
at  L.  48). 


84  JUKISDICTION.  [chap.  I. 

In  Virginia  two  districts,  the  Eastern  and  Western.  The 
Western  District  includes  the  counties  of  Albemarle,  Alleghany, 
Amherst,  Appomattox,  Augusta,  Bath,  Bedford,  Bland,  Botetourt, 
Buchanan,  Buckingham,  Campbell,  Carroll,  Charlotte,  Clarke, 
Craig,  Cumberland,  Floyd,  Franklin,  Frederick,  Fluvanna,  Giles, 
Grayson,  Greene,  Halifax,  Henry,  Highland,  Lee,  Madison,  Mont- 
gomery, Nelson,  Patrick,  Page,  Pulaski,  Pittsylvania,  Rappahan- 
nock, Roanoke,  Rockbridge,  Rockingham,  Russell,  Scott,  Smyth, 
Shenandoah,  Tazewell,  Washington,  Wise,  Wythe,  and  Warren. 
The  Eastern  District  includes  the  residue  of  the  State.^^^  The 
terms  of  the  District  and  the  Circuit  Court  for  the  Eastern  Dis- 
trict are  held  at  Richmond,  on  the  first  Mondays  in  April  and 
October  ;  at  Alexandria,  on  the  first  Mondays  in  January  and 
July ;  and  at  Norfolk,  on  the  first  Mondays  in  May  and  Novem- 
ber. The  terms  of  the  same  courts  for  the  Western  District 
are  held  at  Danville,  on  the  Tuesdays  after  the  second  Mondays 
in  April  and  November  ;  at  Lynchburg,  on  the  Tuesdays  after 
the  second  Mondays  in  March  and  September  ;  at  Abingdon,  on 
the  Tuesdays  after  the  first  Mondays  in  May  and  October  ;  and 
at  Harrisonburgh,  on  the  Tuesdays  after  the  first  Mondays  in 
June  and  December.i^^ 

Waslmigton  constitutes  one  judicial  district,  which  is  divided 
into  four  divisions,  the  Eastern,  Southern,  Northern,  and  West- 
ern. The  counties  of  Spokane,  Stevens,  Okanogan,  Douglas, 
Lincoln,  Adams,  and  Kittitass,  including  any  and  all  Lidian 
reservations  in  one  or  more  of  said  counties,  constitute  the 
Eastern  Division,  the  court  for  which  is  held  at  the  city  of  Spo- 
kane Falls.  The  counties  of  Whitman,  Asotin,  Garfield,  Colum- 
bia, Walla  Walla,  Franklin,  Yakima,  and  Klickitat,  including  any 
and  all  Lidian  reservations,  constitute  tlie  Southern  Division, 
the  court  for  which  is  held  at  the  city  of  Walla  Walla.  The 
counties  of  Whatcom,  Skagit,  San  Juan,  Island,  Snohomish,  Clal- 
lam, Jefferson,  Kitsap,  and  King,  including  any  and  all  Indian 
reservations  in  one  or  more  of  said  counties,  constitute  tlic 
Northern  Division,  the  court  for  which  is  held  at  the  city  of 
Seattle.  The  counties  of  Pierce,  Mason,  Thurston,  Chehalis, 
Pacific,  Lewis,  Wahkiakum,  Cowlitz,  Clarke,  and  Skamania,  in- 
cluding any  and  all  Indian  reservations  in  one  or  more  of  said 

IS''  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  510.  14,  1881,  cli.  45  (21  St.  at  L.  824) ;  Act  of 

183  U.  S.  K.  S.  §§  572,  058 ;  Act  of  Feb.     Sept.  25,  18'J0,  cli.  922  (20  St.  at  L.  474). 


§  2G.]  DISTRICTS   OF  WEST  VIRGINIA    AND   WISCONSIN.  85 

counties,  constitute  the  Western  Division,  the  court  for  which 
is  liekl  at  the  city  of  Tacoma.^^*^ 

The  terms  of  the  Circuit  and  District  Courts  of  the  United 
States  are  held,  for  the  Eastern  Division,  at  Spokane  Falls,  on 
the  first  Tuesdays  of  September  and  April  ;  for  the  Southern 
Division,  at  Walla  Walla,  on  the  first  Tuesdays  of  November 
and  May  ;  for  the  Northern  Division,  at  Seattle,  on  the  first 
Tuesdays  of  December  and  June  ;  and  for  the  Western  Division, 
at  Tacoma,  on  the  first  Tuesdays  of  February  and  July.^^*^ 

West  Virginia  constitutes  one  judicial  district.^^^  The  terms 
of  the  Circuit  and  District  Courts  for  West  Virginia  are  held 
at  Wheeling,  on  the  first  days  of  March  and  September  ;  at 
Clarksburg,  on  the  first  days  of  April  and  October  ;  at  Charles- 
ton, on  the  first  days  of  May  and  November.  When  any  of 
these  dates  fall  on  Sunday,  the  court  will  be  held  on  the  fol- 
lowing Monday .19^  The  terms  of  the  Circuit  Court  for  the  same 
district  are  also  held  at  Parkersburg,  on  the  tenth  days  of  Jan- 
uary and  June.  When  either  of  these  dates  falls  on  Sunday, 
the  term  will  commence  on  the  following  Monday. ^^^  Terms  of 
both  courts  are  also  held  at  Martinsburg,  on  the  first  Tuesday 
in  August.^^'^ 

In  Wisconsin  two  districts,  the  Eastern  and  Western.  The 
Western  District  includes  the  counties  of  Rock,  Jefferson,  Dane, 
Green,  Grant,  Columbia,  Iowa,  La  Fayette,  Sauk,  Richland,  Craw- 
ford, Vernon,  La  Cross,  Monroe,  Adams,  Juneau,  Buffalo,  Chip- 
pewa, Dunn,  Clark,  Jackson,  Eau  Claire,  Pepin,  Marathon,  Wood, 
Pierce,  Polk,  Portage,  St.  Croix,  Trempealeau,  Douglas,  Barron, 
Burnett,  Ashland,  and  Bayfield.  The  Eastern  District  includes 
the  residue  of  the  State.^^^  The  terms  of  the  District  and  Cir- 
cuit Courts  for  the  Eastern  District  of  Wisconsin  are  held  at 
Oshkosh,  on  the  second  Tuesday  of  July,  and  at  ]Milwaukee,  on 
the  first  Mondays  of  January  and  October.i^'^  The  same  courts 
for  the  Western  District  of  Wisconsin  arc  held  at  Madison,  on 
the  first  Monday  in  June,  and  at  La  Crosse,  on  the  third  Tues- 
day in  Septeraber.i^^ 

!»"  25  St.  at  L.  ch.  180,  p.  682;  20  St.  ^^-  U.  S.  K.  S.  §  058;  Act  of  Dec.  21, 

at.  L.  eh.  65,  §§  3  and  6.  1878,  ch.  9  (20  St.  at  L.  259). 

191  U.  S.  RS.  §  531.  i°*  25  St.  at  L.  ch.  201,  §  1,  p.  151. 

192  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  572;  Act  of  March  9,  i^^  U.  S.  K.  S.  §  550. 

1878,  ch.  27  (20  St.  at  L.  27  ;  Act  of  Feb.  i^'^  U.  S.  R.  S.  §§  572,  058  ;  Act  of  June 
0,  1889  (25  St.  at  L.  055).  10,  1874,  ch.  280  ( 18  St.  at  L.  75). 

19-  U.  S.  R.  S.  §§  572,  058. 


86  jupjsDicTiox.  [chap.  I. 

Wyoming  constitutes  one  district,  which  is  attached  to  the 
Eighth  Circuit.  The  Circuit  and  District  Courts  thereof  are 
held  at  the  capital  of  the  State,  for  the  time  being,  on  the  first 
Mondays  in  April  and  Xovember.i^^ 

§  26  a.  Jurisdiction  of  the  Court  of  Claims.  —  The  Revised 
Statutes  give  the  Court  of  Claims  the  jurisdiction  over  claims 
against  the  United  States,  as  follows  :  — 

"  First.  All  claims  founded  ujjou  any  law  of  Congress,  or 
npon  any  regulation  of  an  Executive  Department,  or  upon  any 
contract,  expressed  or  im])lied,  with  the  government  of  the 
United  States,  and  all  claims  which  may  be  referred  to  it  by 
either  House  of  Congress. 

"  Second,  All  set-offs,  counter-claims,  claims  for  damages, 
whether  liquidated  or  unliquidated,  or  other  demands  what- 
soever, on  the  part  of  the  government  of  the  United  States, 
against  any  person  making  claim  against  the  government  in 
said  court. 

"  Third.  The  claim  of  any  paymaster,  quartermaster,  com- 
missary of  subsistence,  or  other  disbursing  ofhccr  of  the  United 
States,  or  of  his  administrators  or  executors,  for  relief  from 
responsibility,  on  account  of  capture  or  otherwise,  while  in  the 
line  of  his  duty,  of  government  funds,  voucliers,  records,  or 
papers  in  his  charge,  and  for  which  such  officer  was  and  is 
held  responsil)le. 

"  Fourth.  Of  all  claims  for  the  proceeds  of  cajiturod  or  aban- 
doned property,  as  provided  by  the  Act  of  March  12,  1863, 
chapter  120,  entitled  '  An  Act  to  provide  for  the  collection  of 
abandoned  property  and  for  the  prevention  of  frauds  in  insur- 
rectionary districts  within  the  United  States,'  or  by  the  Act 
of  July  2,  1(Sij4,  chapter  225,  being  an  act  in  addition  thereto  : 
Provided,  that  the  remedy  given  in  cases  of  seizure  under  the 
said  acts,  by  preferring  claim  in  the  Court  of  Claims,  shall  be 
exclusive,  precluding  tlie  owner  of  any  property  taken  by  agents 
of  the  Treasury  Department  as  abandoned  or  captured  property 
in  virtue  or  under  color  of  said  acts,  from  suit  at  common  law, 
or  auy  other  mode  of  redress  whatever,  before  any  court  other 
than  said  Court  of  Claims  :  (Provided,  also,  that  tlie  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  Court  of  Claims  shall  not  extend  to  any  claim 
against  the  United    States   growing   out   of  the  destruction   or 

i»»  2G  St.  at  L.  ch.  GC4,  §  10,  p.  225. 


§  26  h.]      JURISDICTION  OF  THE  COURT  OF  PRIVATE  LAND  CLAIMS.        87 

appropriation  of,  or  damage  to,  property  by  the  army  or  navy 
engaged  in  the  suppression  of  the  rebellion)."  ^ 

"  All  petitions  and  bills  praying  or  providing  for  the  satis- 
faction of  private  claims  against  the  government,  founded  upon 
any  law  of  Congress,  or  upon  any  regulation  of  an  Executive 
Department,  or  upon  any  contract,  expressed  or  implied,  with 
the  government  of  the  United  States,  shall,  unless  otherwise 
ordered  by  resolution  of  the  House  in  which  they  are  intro- 
duced, be  transmitted  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Senate  or  the 
Clerk  of  the  House  of  Representatives,  with  all  the  accom- 
panying documents,  to  the  Court  of  Claims."  2 

"  No  person  shall  file  or  prosecute  in  the  Court  of  Claims, 
or  in  the  Supreme  Court  on  appeal  therefrom,  any  claim  for 
or  in  respect  to  which  he  or  any  assignee  of  his  has  pending 
in  any  other  court  any  suit  or  process  against  any  person  who, 
at  the  time  when  the  cause  of  action  alleged  in  such  suit  or 
process  arose,  was  in  respect  thereto  acting  or  professing  to 
act,  mediately  or  immediately,  under  the  authority  of  the  United 
States."  3 

The  practice  and  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  of  Claims  are  more 
fully  explained  in  a  subsequent  chapter.'* 

§  26  b.  Jurisdiction  of  the  Court  of  Private  Land  Claims.  — 
The  Court  of  Private  Land  Claims  has  jurisdiction  to  hear  and 
decide  private  land  claims  according  to  the  provisions  of  the 
Act  of  March  3,  1891,^  as  follows  :  — 

When  any  person  or  persons  or  corporation,  or  their  legal 
representatives,  claiming  lands  within  the  limits  of  the  territory 
derived  by  the  United  States  from  the  republic  of  Mexico,  and 
now  embraced  within  the  Territories  of  New  Mexico,  Arizona, 
or  Utah,  or  within  the  States  of  Nevada,  Colorado,  or  Wyoming, 
by  virtue  of  any  such  Spanish  or  Mexican  grant,  concession, 
warrant,  or  survey  as  the  United  States  are  bound  to  recog- 
nize and  confirm  by  virtue  of  the  treaties  of  cession  of  said 
country  by  Mexico  to  the  United  States,  which  at  the  date  of 
the  passage  of  this  act  have  not  been  confirmed  by  act  of  Con- 
gress, or  otherwise  finally  decided  upon  by  lawful  authority,  and 
which   are   not   already  complete   and   perfect,  presents  to  the 

§  26  a.  1  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  1059.  *  Infra,  ch.  xxxi.     See  also  74  St.  at 

2  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  lOGO.  L.  ch.  359,  p  505 ;  and  infra,  §  3G. 

3  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  1067.  §  206    i  20  St.  at  L.  ch.  539,  p-.  854. 


88  JURISDICTION.  [chap.  I. 

said  court  in  the  State  or  Territory  where  the  land  is  situated 
and  where  the  said  court  holds  its  sessions,  or,  in  cases  arising 
in  the  States  or  Territories  in  which  the  court  does  not  hold 
regular  sessions,  at  such  place  as  may  be  designated  by  tlie 
rules  of  the  court,  a  petition  praying  that  the  validity  of  his 
title  or  claim  may  be  inquired  into  and  decided.^ 

The  court  has  jurisdiction  to  hear  and  determine  all  ques- 
tions arising  in  cases  before  it  relative  to  the  title  to  the  land 
the  subject  of  such  case,  the  extent,  location,  and  boundaries 
thereof,  and  other  matters  connected  therewith,  fit  and  proper 
to  be  heard  and  determined,  and  by  a  final  decree  to  settle 
and  determine  the  question  of  the  validity  of  the  title  and  the 
boundaries  of  the  grant  or  claim  presented  for  adjudication, 
according  to  the  law  of  nations,  the  stipulations  of  the  treaty 
concluded  between  the  United  States  and  the  republic  of  Mex- 
ico at  the  city  of  Guadalupe-Hidalgo,  on  February  2,  1848,  or 
the  treaty  concluded  between  the  same  powers  at  the  city  of 
Mexico  on  December  30,  1853,  and  the  laws  and  ordinances  of 
the  government  from  which  it  is  alleged  to  have  been  derived, 
and  all  other  questions  properly  arising  between  the  claimants 
and  the  United  States,  which  decree  must  in  all  cases  refer  to 
the  treaty,  law,  or  ordinance  under  which  such  claim  is  con- 
firmed or  rejected  ;  and  in  confirming  any  such  claim,  in  whole 
or  in  part,  the  court  must  in  its  decree  specify  jJainly  the  loca- 
tion, boundaries,  and  area  of  the  land  the  claim  to  which  is  so 
confirmed.^ 

When  a  petition  is  presented  as  aforesaid  by  any  person  or 
corporation  claiming  lands  in  any  of  the  States  or  Territories 
in  the  United  States  above  mentioned,  under  a  title  derived 
from  the  Spanish  or  the  Mexican  government  that  was  com- 
plete and  perfect  at  the  date  when  the  United  States  acquired 
sovereignty  therein,  praying  the  court  for  a  confirmation  of  such 
title,  the  court  must  proceed  to  hear,  try,  and  determine  the 
validity  of  the  same  and  the  right  of  the  claimant  thereto,  its 
extent,  location,  and  boundaries,  in  the  same  manner  and  with 
the  same  powers  as  in  other  cases  in  the  act  mentioned.*  In 
such  a  case  the  confirmation  of  the  title  must  be  for  so  much 
land  only  as  such  perfect  title  shall  be  found  to  cover,  always 

2  20  St.  at  L.  cli.  53rt,  §  G,  p  856.  «  20  St.  at  L.  di.  539,  §  8,  p.  857. 

8  20  St.  at.  L.  ch.  539,  §  7,  p.  857. 


§  27.]        SOURCES  OF  FEDERAL  EQUITY  PRACTICE.  89 

excepting  any  part  of  such  land  that  may  have  been  disposed 
of  by  the  United  States  ;  and  subject  to  and  not  to  affect  any 
conflicting  private  interests,  rights,  or  chiims  held  or  claimed 
adversely  to  any  such  claim  or  title,  or  adversely  to  the  holder 
of  any  such  claim  or  title.  And  no  such  confirmation  of  a 
claim  or  title  has  any  effect  other  or  further  than  as  a  release 
of  all  claims  of  title  by  the  United  States,  and  no  private  right 
of  any  person  as  between  himself  and  other  claimants  in  respect 
of  any  such  lands  is  in  any  manner  thereby  affected.^ 

The  head  of  the  Department  of  Justice,  whenever  in  his  opin- 
ion the  public  interest  or  the  rights  of  any  claimant  may  require 
it,  may  cause  the  attorney  of  the  United  States  in  said  court  to 
file  in  said  court  a  petition  against  the  holder  or  possessor  of 
any  claim  or  land  in  any  of  the  States  or  Territories  of  tlie 
United  States,  who  shall  not  have  voluntarily  come  in  under  the 
provisions  of  the  act,  stating  in  substance  that  the  title  of  such 
holder  or  possessor  is  open  to  question,  or  stating  in  substance 
that  the  boundaries  of  any  such  land  the  claimant  or  possessor 
to  or  of  which  has  not  brought  the  matter  into  court,  and  pray- 
ing that  the  title  to  any  such  land,  or  the  boundaries  thereof, 
if  the  title  be  admitted,  be  settled  and  adjudicated  ;  and  there- 
upon the  court  must,  on  such  notice  to  such  claimant  or  pos- 
sessor as  it  may  deem  reasonable,  proceed  to  hear,  try,  and 
determine  the  questions  stated  in  such  petition,  or  arising  in  the 
matter,  and  determine  the  matter  according  to  law,  justice,  and 
the  provisions  of  the  act,  but  subject  to  all  lawful  rights  adverse 
to  such  claimant  or  possessor,  and  subject  in  this  rcsj)cct  to  all 
the  provisions  of  the  statute  applicable  thereto.*^ 

The  jurisdiction  of  this  court  and  the  practice  therein  are  more 
fully  explained  in  a  subsequent  chapter.'' 

§  27.  Sources  of  Federal  Equity  Practice.  —  The  Revised  Stat- 
utes provide  :  — 

"  Sec.  917.  The  Supreme  Court  shall  have  power  to  prescribe, 
from  time  to  time,  and  in  any  manner  not  inconsistent  with  any 
law  of  the  United  States,  the  forms  of  writs  and  other  process, 
the  modes  of  framing  and  filing  proceedings  and  pleadings,  of 
taking  and  obtaining  evidence,  of  obtaining  discovery,  of  pro- 
ceeding to  ol)tain  relief,  of  drawing  up,  entering,  and  enrolling 

6  26  St.  at  L.  ch.  539,  §  8,  pp.  857,  858.  ^  Infra,  ch.  xxxii. 

6  26  St.  at  L.  ch.  539,  §  8,  p.  858. 


90  JURISDICTION.  [chap.  L 

decrees,  and  of  proceeding  before  trustees  appointed  by  the  court, 
and  generally  to  regulate  the  whole  practice  to  be  used  in  suits 
in  equity  or  admiralty,  by  the  Circuit  and  District  Courts. 

"  Sec.  918.  The  several  Circuit  and  District  Courts  may,  from 
time  to  time,  and  in  any  manner  not  inconsistent  with  any  law 
of  the  United  States,  or  with  any  rule  prescribed  by  the  Su})reme 
Court  under  the  preceding  section,  make  rules  and  orders  direct- 
ing the  returning  of  writs  and  processes,  the  filing  of  ])leadings, 
the  taking  of  rules,  the  entering  and  making  up  of  judgments  by 
default,  and  other  matters,  in  vacation,  and  otherwise  regulate 
their  own  practice  as  may  be  necessary  or  convenient  for  the 
advancement  of  justice  and  the  prevention  of  delays  in  pro- 
ceedings." 

Under  these  provisions  the  Supreme  Court  has  from  time  to 
time  promulgated  ninety-four  rules  of  equity  practice ;  and  most 
of  the  inferior  courts  have  also  adopted  rules  of  their  own.  The 
ninetieth  rule  of  the  Supreme  Court,  which  was  promulgated  in 
1842,  provides  that,  "  in  all  cases  where  the  rules  prescribed  by 
this  court  or  by  the  Circuit  Court  do  not  apply,  the  practice  of 
the  Circuit  Court  shall  be  regulated  by  the  present  practice  of 
the  High  Court  of  Chancery  in  England,  so  far  as  the  same  may 
reasonably  be  applied  consistently  with  the  local  circumstances 
and  local  conveniences  of  the  district  where  the  court  is  held,  not 
as  positive  rules,  but  as  furnishing  just  analogies  to  regulate  the 
practice."     Of  this  rule  Judge  Sawyer  said  :  — 

"  The  jurisdiction  of  this  court  is  derived  from  the  Constitu- 
tion and  laws  of  the  United  States ;  and  these  rules  are  simply 
rules  of  practice,  for  regulating  the  mode  of  proceeding  in  the 
courts.  They  do  not,  and  could  not,  properly,  cither  limit  or 
enlarge  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court.  The  rule  quoted  simply 
regulates  the  practice  in  exercising  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court 
in  those  respects  wherein  the  rules  adopted  do  not  apply ;  but  the 
practice  of  the  High  Court  of  Chancery  is  to  be  applied,  not  as 
controlling,  but  simply  as  furnishing  just  analogies  to  regulate 
the  practice."  ^ 

By  reference  to  these  sources  and  the  decisions  of  the  courts 
resulting  from  them,  the  practice  at  equity  in  the  courts  of  the 
United  States  must  be  determined.^ 

§  27.  1  Lewis  v.  Shainwald,  7  Saw.  403,  -  See  Er  parte  Poiiltn(\v  v.  City  of  La 

405.  Fayette,  12  Pet.  472,  at  p.  474. 


§  31.]  MARRIED    WOMEN   AS   PLAINTIFFS.  91 


CHAPTER  II. 

PERSONS   WHO   MAY   BE   PLAINTIFFS   OR    DEFENDANTS   IN   A   SUIT 

IN    EQUITY. 

§  28.  General  Rule  as  to  Persons  capable  of  being  Plaintiffs.  —  All 
persons  may  file  a  bill  in  equity  iii  their  own  right,  except  alien 
enemies,  infants,  idiots,  lunatics,  married  women,  and  possibly 
those  who  by  the  laws  of  a  State  have  been  declared  civilly  dead. 

§  29.  states  as  Plaintiffs.  —  A  State  may  sue  as  plaintiff  in  any 
court  of  the  United  States.^  A  State  cannot  sue  in  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States  to  collect  a  judgment  for  a  penalty 
recovered  in  the  court  of  such  State  against  a  corporation  char- 
tered by  another  Statc.^ 

§  30.  Alien  Enemies  as  Plaintiffs.  —  Subjects  of  a  country  at  war 
with  the  United  States  cannot  sue  in  the  State  or  Federal  courts 
before  the  conclusion  of  peace,  unless  they  are  residents  of  this 
country  or  within  the  jurisdiction  of  one  of  our  allies.^  If  a  com- 
plainant become  an  alien  enemy  after  a  suit  has  been  begun,  the 
defence  may  be  interposed  by  plea  or  answei'.^  The  effect  of  such 
a  defence  is  then,  however,  merely  to  suspend  the  cause  of  action 
and  suit,  not  to  dismiss  the  bill.^ 

§  31.  Married  Women  as  Plaintiffs.  —  A  married  woman  origi- 
nally could  only  sue  when  joined  with  her  husband,  unless  he. 
had  deserted  her,  and  was  without  the  realm  or  civilly  dead, 
when  she  could  sue  alone  •,^  or  unless  the  suit  concerned  her  sep- 
arate property,  when  she  was  obliged  to  sue  by  her  next  friend.^ 
The  next  friend,  however,  was  chosen  by  herself ;  ^  and  the  hus- 
band was  then  usually  made  a  party  defendant,  that  he  might 

§  20.  1  Ames  v.  Kansas,  111  U.  S.  449  ;  Levine  v.  Taylor.  12  Mass.  8  ;  Ilamersley 

U.  "s.  r.  Louisiana,  123  U.  S.  32 ;  §  14.  v.  Lambert,  2  Johns.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  508 ;  Ex 

2  Wisc'on.-;in  v.  Pelican  Insurance  Co.,  p<trte  Boussmaker,  13  Ves.  71 ;  Wilcox  v. 
127  U.  S.  205.  Henry,  1  Dall.  00;  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  54. 

§30.  1  Wilcox  V.  Henry,  1  Dall.  GO;  But  see  Mumford «;.  Mumford,  1  Gall.  366. 
Crawford  v.   The  William  Penn,  1  Pet.  §  31.  i  Story's  Eq.  Pi.  §  01  ;  Countess 

C.  C.  106;  Mumford  v.  Mumford,  1  Gall,  of  Portland  r.  Prodgers,  2  Vern.  104. 
366  ;  Clarke  v.  Morey,  10  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  ^  Wake  v.  Parker,  2  Keen,  70;  Story's 

69 ;  2  Kent's  Com.  G3.  Eq.  PI.  §  63. 

^  Bell  V.  Chapman,  10  Johns.  183.  =<  Story's   Eq.    PI.   §   61  ;    Camber  v. 

3  Hutchinson  v.  Brock,  11  Mass.  119;  Atlee,  2  De  G.  &  Sm.  745. 
Parkinson  v.  Wentworth,  11    Mass.  20 ; 


92        PLAINTIFFS   OR   DEFENDANTS   IN   A   SUIT   IN   EQUITY.      [CHAP.  IL 

have  an  opportunity  to  assert  any  claim  he  might  have  to  the 
subject-matter  of  the  suit.**  In  the  courts  of  the  United  States, 
however,  the  rule  was  early  laid  down  as  follows :  "  Where  the 
wife  complains  of  the  husband  and  asks  relief  against  him  she 
must  use  the  name  of  some  other  person  in  prosecuting  the  suit  ; 
but  where  the  acts  of  the  husband  are  not  complained  of,  he 
would  seem  to  be  the  most  suitable  person  to  unite  with  her  in 
the  suit.  This  is  a  matter  of  practice  within  the  discretion  of  the 
court."  5  In  the  Circuit  Courts  held  in  the  State  of  New  York, 
where  a  married  woman  has  substantially  all  the  powers  of  a 
spinster,  she  may  sue  in  equity,  as  if  she  were  single,  at  least  if 
she  be  a  citizen  of  that  State.^  When  a  suit  has  been  begun  by 
a  married  woman  alone  who  should  have  sued  by  her  next  friend, 
leave  to  amend  by  adding  to  the  title  the  name  of  a  next  friend 
will  always  be  granted.' 

§  32.  Suits  on  behalf  of  Infants. —  The  equity  rules  provide  that 
"  all  infants  and  other  persons  so  incapable  may  sue  by  their 
guardians,  if  any,  or  by  their  procheiti  ami ;  subject,  however,  to 
such  orders  as  the  court  may  direct  for  the  protection  of  infants 
and  other  persons."  ^  It  has  never  been  decided  whether  this 
changes  the  former  practice,  which  was  as  follows  :  An  infant 
could  only  sue  by  his  next  friend,^  who  might  be  any  person  that 
would  undertake  the  suit  in  his  behalf,  subject,  however,  to  the 
costs  and  the  censure  of  the  court,  if  it  were  improperly  brought.^ 
The  next  friend  might,  at  any  time,  be  removed  by  the  court 
either  summarily  or  after  a  reference,  if  it  seemed  for  the  best  in- 
terest of  the  infant  to  appoint  another.^  It  was  doubtful  whether 
insolvency  and  consequent  inability  to  respond  for  costs  was,  in 
itself,  a  ground  for  the  next  friend's  removal.^  That  might,  how- 
ever, be  a  reason  for  an  order  directing  him  to  give  security  for 
costs.*"     The  coui't  might,  at  any  time,  order  a  reference  to  a 

4  Sigel  V.  Phelps,  7  Sim.  239  ;  Wake  v.  §  32.     i  Rule  87. 

Parker,  2  Keen,  70  ;  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  63.  2  Rule   87  ;    Story's    Eq.    PI.    §    57; 

°  Mr.  Justice  McLean  in  Bein  1-.  Heath,  Dudi^eon   v.    Watson,   23   Fed.    R.    101; 

6  IIow.  228.  240.     See  Douglas  i'.  Butler,  Bradwell  r.  Weeks,  1  J.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  325. 

6  Fed.  K.  228.  3  Camphell  v.  Campbell,  2  M.  &  C.  25, 

«  Lorillard  v.  Standard  Oil  Co.,  2  Fed.  at  page  30  ;  Sale  v.  Sale,  1  Beav.  586 ; 

R.  902.     But  see  Taylor  v.   Holmes,  14  Starten  v.  Bartholomew,  0  Beav.  143. 

Fed.  R.  499,  514  ;  United  States  v.  Pratt  ■*  Nalder  i:  Hawkins,  2  M.  &  K.  243 ; 

Coal  &  Coke  Co.,  18  Fed.  R  708 ;  O'Hara  Russell  r.  Sharpe,  1  Jac.  &  W.  482. 

v.  MacConnell,  93  U.  S.  150.  ^  Anon.,  1  Ves.  Jr.  409. 

"  Douglas  r.   Butler.  6    Fed.  R.  228;  ^  Fulton  v.  Rosevelt,  1  Paige  (N.  Y.), 

Taylor  ;;.  Holmes,  14  Fed.  R.  499.  178, "at  page  18U. 


§  32.]  SUITS   ON   BEHALF   OF    INFANTS.  93 

master,  to  determine  the  propriety  of  a  suit ;  and,  if  it  appeared 
to  have  been  brought  against  the  infant's  interest,  woukl  stay  pro- 
ceedings in  it  or  dismiss  the  bill,  with  costs  to  be  paid  by  the  next 
friend.'^  This  could  be  done  even  without  a  reference.^  No  such 
reference  would,  it  seems,  be  ordered  at  the  request  of  the  next 
friend  himself,'^  unless  there  were  another  cause  pending  by  rea- 
son of  which  the  infant's  property  was  subject  to  the  control  of 
the  court,  when  such  a  reference  might  be  ordered  at  the  insti- 
gation of  a  next  friend,  and  he  be  paid  his  costs  out  of  the 
estate  even  if  the  bill  were  finally  dismissed.^*'  An  application  to 
dismiss  a  bill  as  improperly  filed  on  behalf  of  an  infant  might  be 
made  b}^  a  person  "  as  next  friend  for  the  purpose  of  this  appli- 
cation," ^^  or  by  a  defendant  to  the  bill.^-  It  seems  that  any 
motion  clearly  for  the  interest  of  an  infant  complainant  could 
be  made  by  a  next  friend  for  the  purpose  of  the  application,  when 
the  next  friend  who  filed  the  bill  refused  to  move.^^  If  two  suits 
were  instituted  on  behalf  of  the  same  infant  for  the  same  purpose 
by  two  next  friends,  the  court  would  direct  a  master  to  inquire 
which  is  most  for  the  infant's  benefit.^*  A  bill  might  be  filed  by 
a  next  friend  on  behalf  of  a  child  still  in  its  mother's  womb.^^ 

If  an  infant  were  made  co-plaintiff  with  others,  and  it  appeared 
that  it  would  be  more  for  his  advantage  that  he  should  be  made 
a  defendant,  an  order  to  strike  out  his  name  as  plaintiff,  and  to 
make  him  a  defendant,  might  be  obtained  upon  motion.!*^  When 
a  bill  was  filed  in  behalf  of  an  infant,*  his  coming  of  age  did  not 
abate  the  suit  ;  but  he  might  then  elect  whether  he  would  pro- 
ceed with  it  or  not.^"  If  he  chose  to  go  on  with  the  suit,  all  fur- 
ther proceedings  could  be  carried  on  without  any  amendment  or 
the  filing  of  a  supplemental  bill.^^  He  was  then  liable  for  all 
costs  of  the  suit,  as  if  he  had  filed  the  bill  after  he  came  of  age.^^ 
Otherwise,  he  was  not  personally  chargeable  with  costs  ;-°  unless 


•^  Da  Costa  v.  Da  Costa,  3  P.  Wins.  110  ;         i*  Calvert  on  Parties  (2a  ed.),  418. 
Naliler  r.  Hawkins,  2  M.  &  K.  '2i'6 ;  Sale         i5  Luterel's  Case,  cited  Prcc.  Ch.  50 ; 

V.  Sale,  1  Beav.  586.  Musgrave  v.  Parry,  2  Vern.  710. 

8  Sale  V.  Sale,  1  Beav.  586.  ^'^  Tappen  v.  Norman,  11  Ves.  563. 

9  Jones  V.  Powell,  2  Mer.  141.  i"  Guy  v.  Guy,  2  Beav.  460. 

10  Taner  v.  Ivie,  2  Ves.  Sen.  4GG.  is  Hoffman's    Ch.    Pr.    60  ;    Danicll's 

11  Guy  V.  Guy,  2  Beav.  4G0.  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.),  102. 

12  Fox  V.  Suwerkrop,  1  Beav.  583.  i'-*  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed  )  102. 

13  Furtado  I'.  Furtado,  6  Jar.  227  ;  Cox        20  Waring  v.  Crane,  2  Paige  (N.  Y.), 
V.  Wright,  1)  Jur.  (n.  s.)  981 ;  Guy  v.  Guy,  79. 

2  Beav.  460. 


94       PLAINTIFFS    OR   DEFENDANTS   IN   A    SUIT   IN   EQUITY.       [CIIAP.  11. 

he  made  a  motion  to  dismiss  the  bill,  which  it  seems  could  only  be 
done  upon  the  payment  of  costs  by  himself,-^  if  he  could  not  es- 
tablish that  the  bill  was  improperly  filed  by  his  next  friend.^^  If 
the  next  friend  died  during  the  infant's  minority,  and  the  latter 
took  no  step  in  the  cause  after  he  had  come  of  age,  the  defendant 
might  have  the  bill  dismissed,  but  without  costs,  since  there  would 
then  be  no  one  living  who  was  liable  to  pa}^  them.^^ 

§  33.  Suits  on  behalf  of  Idiots,  Lunatics,  and  Persons  of  "Weak 
Mind.  —  Idiots  and  lunatics  sue  by  their  committees  or  guardians, 
if  they  have  an}^,  otherwise  by  next  friend. ^  It  is  the  usual  prac- 
tice to  join  them  as  plaintiffs  with  their  representatives,  though  it 
might  be  held  unnecessary  to  do  so  when  one  has  a  committee, 
authorized  by  statute  to  sue  in  his  name.^  If  the  interest  of  the 
committee  be  adverse  to  that  of  his  ward,  the  latter  should  sue  by 
a  next  friend.^  Although  the  practice  is  unsettled,  it  would  be 
advisable  to  have  the  next  friend  appointed  by  the  court.*  If 
a  plaintiff  become  a  lunatic  after  the  institution  of  a  suit,  a  sup- 
plemental bill  may  be  filed  in  the  joint  names  of  the  lunatic  and 
of  the  committee  of  his  estate,  which  will  answer  the  same  pur- 
pose as  a  bill  of  revivor  in  procuring  the  benefit  of  former  pro- 
ceedings.°  If  a  committee  die  and  a  new  committee  is  appointed 
after  a  suit  has  been  instituted  by  the  former  for  the  benefit  of 
his  idiot  or  lunatic,  the  proper  way  of  continuing  the  suit  is  by  a 
supplemental  bill  filed  by  the  idiot  or  lunatic  and  the  new  com- 
mittee.^ In  England,  a  committee,  usually  before  the  institution 
of  a  suit,  prayed  the  sanction  of  the  Lord  Chancellor  by  a  petition, 
which  was  often  referred  to  a  master."  If  a  person  of  full  age  is 
neither  an  idiot  nor  a  lunatic,  and  is  yet  incai)able  of  managing 
his  affairs,  the  court  may  appoint  a  next  friend  to  sue  for  him.^  If 
a  bill  has  l)ocn  filed  in  the  name  of  a  plaintiff,  who,  at  the  time  of 
filing  it,  is  in  a  state  of  mental  inca})acitj,  it  may,  on  motion,  l)e 

21  Waring  f.  Crane,  2  Paijie  (N.  Y.),  79.  *  Compare  Attorney-General  v.  Tiler, 

2-  Turner  y.  Turner,  2  Stra.  708.  1   Dickens,   378;  Hoffman's  Cli.  Pr.  lU  ; 

§  33.     1  Kale  87  ;  Hoiiman's  Cli.  Pr.  61.  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  64,  and  notes. 
■■^  See  Ortiey  v.  Messere,  7  Jolins.  Cli.  ^  See  Brown  v.  Clark,  3  Woodeson's 

(N.  Y.)  139;  Harrison  v.  Rowan,  4  Wash.  Lect.  378;  Daniell's  Cli.  Pr.  108. 

C.  C.  202;    Palmer,  Attorney-General  v.  ^  In  re  Reynolds,  Shelf,  on  Lnn.  417  ; 

Parkhurst,  1  Chan.  Cas.  112;  Gorham  v.  Daniell's  Ch.  I'r.  108. 

Gorham,  3  Uswh.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  24  ;   Hoff"-  "  In   re  Webb,    Shelf,    on    Lnn.    417  ; 

man's  Ch.  Pr.  ijl  ;  Story's  Eq.   PI.  §  (35,  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  108. 

and  notes.  8  Wartnaby  v.  Wartnnby,   .Tae.    ."77  ; 

3  Compnre  Attorney-General  r.  Tiler,  Owinti's    Case,   1  Bland    (Md.),    370,    at 

1  Dick.  378;  Hoffman's  Ch.  Pr.  Gl.  psfge  373  ;  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  60. 


§  36.]        THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  DEFENDANT.  95 

taken  off  the  file.^  If,  however,  after  a  suit  has  been  properly 
instituted,  a  plaintiff  becomes  imbecile,  the  bill  cannot  for  that 
reason  be  taken  off  the  file.^^ 

§  34.  Capacity  of  Foreign  Executors,  Administrators,  and  Receivers 
to  sue.  —  Foreign  executors  and  administrators,  under  which  term 
are  included  those  appointed  in  other  States  than  that  where  the 
court  is  held,  cannot  sue  until  they  have  taken  out  ancillary  let- 
ters of  administration.^  A  foreign  executor  may  sue  without  an- 
cillary letters  when  the  title  is  vested  in  him  as  trustee  by  devise.^ 
It  is  doubtful  whether  or  not  foreign  receivers  can  sue.^  The  better 
rule  would  seem  to  be,  that  they  can  always  sue,  no  matter  where, 
unless  by  so  doing  they  would  appropriate  assets  upon  which  do- 
mestic creditors  would  otherwise  have  a  prior  lien,  or  otherwise  im- 
pugn the  public  policy  of  the  State  in  which  the  action  is  brought.* 

§  35.  "Who  may  be  Defendants  to  a  Bill  in  Equity.  —  All  persons 
may  be  made  defendants  to  a  bill  in  equity  except  the  United 
States  ;  ^  foreign  States  and  sovereigns  for  acts  done  in  a  polit- 
ical capacity  ;2  "one  of  the  United  States  by  citizens  of  another 
State,  or  by  citizens  or  subjects  of  any  foreign  State  ;"^  receiv- 
ers appointed  by  State  courts  without  the  leave  of  such  courts  ;  * 
and  foreign  executors  and  administrators,^  unless  they  have  as- 
sets within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  where  the  bill  is  filed. "^ 
Whether  a  suit  can  be  brought  against  the  President  of  the 
United  States  is  undecided." 

§  36.  The  United  States  as  a  Defendant. — The  United  States 
may  waive  its  exemption  from  suit  by  statute,^  but  not  by  the 

^  Wartnaby   v.  Wartnaby,   Jac.    377;  betb,  41  N.  J.  Law  (12  Vrnom)  1 ;  Toronto 

Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  60.  General  Trust  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co., 

1'^  Wartnaby  v.  Wartnaby,  Jac.  377.  12:3  N.  Y.  87,  47. 

§  34.  1  Fenwick  i\  Sears,  1  Crancb,259;  §  .'].5.  i  Carr  v.  U.  S.,  98  U.  S.  4.33. 

Dixon  V.  Ramsay,  3  Crancli,  319;  Doe  ly.  ^  Duke  of  Brunswick  r.  King  of  Han- 

McFarlantl,  9  Crancli,  151 ;  Kerr  v.  Moon,  over,  6  Beav.  1  ;  Hullett  i\  King  of  Spain, 

9  Wheat.  -Sfio;  IMason  r.  Hnrtford,  Provi-  2  Biigh  N.  R.  31. 

dence,  &  Fishkill  R.  R.  Co..  19  Fed.  R  53;  3  11  th  Amendment  to  Constitution. 

Duchesse  d'Aiiby  v.  Porter,  41   Fed.  R.  *  Barton  v.  Barbour,  104   U.  S.   126; 

68  ;  Johnson  v.  Powers,  139  U.  S.  156. 158.  Thompson  v.  Scott,  4  Dill.  508  ;  E.xpress 

2  De  Forest  i'.  Thompson,  40  Fed.  R.  Co.  r.  Railroad  Co.,  99  U.  S.  191. 

375.  5  Vaughn  v.  Northrup,  15  Pet.  1  ;  Story's 

3  Booth  V.  Clark,  17  How.  322;  Brig-     Eq.  PI.  §  179. 

ham    v.    Luddington,    12    Blatchf.    237;  ^  gandilands  r.  Innes,  3  Sim.  263;  jNIc- 

Olney  v.  Tanner,  10  Fed.  R.  101 ;  Hazard  Namara  v.  Dwyer,  7  Paige  (N.  Y.),  239  ; 

V.  Durant,  19  Fed.  R.  471,  476.  Campbell  v.  Tousey,  7  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  64. 
*  Ex  parte  Norwood,  3  Biss.  504  ;  Hunt  '^  See  Miss.  r.  Johnson.  4  AVall.  475. 

I'.  Jackson,  5  Blatchf.    .349 ;  Cuykendall  §  36.  •  United  States  v.  Clarke,  8  Pet. 

V.  Miles,  10  Fed.  R.  342 ;  Hurd  v.  Eliza-  436 ;  The  Siren,  7  Wall.  152. 


96        PLAINTIFFS    OR   DEFENDxVNTS    IN   A    SUIT   IN   EQUITY.      [CIIAP   II. 

act  of  any  of  its  officers.^  When,  however,  tlie  United  States 
institute  a  suit,  it  waives  its  exemption  so  far  as  to  allow  a  pres- 
entation b}'  the  defendant  of  any  set-off,  legal  and  equitable,  to 
the  extent  of  the  demand  made  or  property  claimed ;  and  when 
it  proceeds  in  rew,  it  opens  to  consideration  all  claims  and  equities 
in  regard  to  the  property  libelled.-^  It  has  been  held  that  eject- 
ment will  lie  against  public  officers  holding  land  for  governmental 
purposes  in  the  name  of  the  United  States  ;  *  but  it  was  intimated 
that  an  injunction  will  not  be  granted  to  enjoin  an  officer  of  the 
United  States  from  infringing  a  patent  while  acting  in  its  service, 
and  that  the  remedy  of  the  patentee,  if  it  exists  at  all,  is  in  the 
Court  of  Claims.^  A  statute  passed  in  1887  provides  that  in 
"  all  claims  founded  upon  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States 
or  any  law  of  Congress,  except  for  pensions,  or  upon  an}'  regula- 
tion of  an  executive  department,  or  upon  any  contract,  express 
or  implied,  with  the  government  of  the  United  States,  or  for 
damages,  liquidated  or  unliquidated,  in  cases  not  sounding  in 
tort,  in  respect  of  which  claims  the  party  would  be  entitled  to 
redress  against  the  United  States  either  in  a  court  of  law,  equity, 
or  admiralty  if  the  United  States  were  suable,^  .  .  .  the  District 
Courts  of  the  United  States  shall  have  concurrent  jurisdiction 
with  the  Court  of  Claims  as  to  all  matters,"  where  the  amount  of 
the  claim  does  not  exceed  one  thousand  dollars;  and  the  Circuit 
Courts  of  the  United  States  shall  have  such  concurrent  jurisdic- 
tion in  all  cases  where  the  amount  of  such  claim  exceeds  one 
thousand  dollars,  and  does  not  exceed  ten  thousand  dollars.  All 
cases  brought  and  tried  under  the  provisions  of  this  Act  shall  be 
tried  by  the  court  without  a  jury,^  .  .  .  provided,  however,  that 
nothing  in  this  section  shall  be  construed  as  giving  to  either  of 
the  courts  herein  mentioned,  jurisdiction  to  hear  and  determine 
claims  growing  out  of  the  late  civil  war,  and  commonly  known 
as  '  war  claims,'  or  to  hear  and  determine  other  claims,  which  have 
heretofore  been  rejected,  or  reported  on  adversely  by  any  court, 

2  Carr  v.  United  States,  98  U.  S.  4.33.  »  James  v.  Campbell,  104  U.  S.  850, 

3  Mr.  Justice  Field  in  The  Siren,  7     359;  Ilollister  v.  Benedict  Manuf.  Co., 
Wall.    152,   154.     A    more    liberal    rule     113  U.  S.  59,  67. 

against  the  government  is  suggested  in  ^  Act  of  March  3,  1887,  24  St.  at  L. 

Fifth    National    Bank  v.  Long,  7    Biss.  ch.  359,  §  1.  p.  505. 

502 ;  Elliot  i\   Van   Voorst,  3  Wall.  Jr.,  "  Act  of  March  2^   1887,  24  St.  at  L. 

299  ;    Briggs   v.    The    Light    Boats,    11  ch.  359,  §  2,  p.  506. 

Allen  (Mass.),  157.  8  Act  of  March  3,  1887,  24  St.  at  L. 

4  United  States  v.  Lee,  lOG  U.  S,  196.  cli,  359,  §  1,  p.  505. 


§  3G.]         THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  DEFENDANT.  97 

department,  or  commission  authorized  to  hear  or  determine  the 
same."^  The  same  courts  are  similarly  given  jurisdiction  over 
"  all  set-offs,  counter-claims,  claims  for  damages,  whether  liquid- 
ated or  unliquidated,  or  other  demands  whatsoever  on  the  part 
of  the  government  of  the  United  States  against  any  claimant 
against  the  government,"  in  such  courts. ^"^  Under  this  act  a  suit 
may  be  brought  to  recover  the  purchase  price  paid  upon  void 
entries  of  public  land.^^  A  suit  may  be  l)rouglit  against  the 
United  States  by  a  contractor  for  extra  work  done  by  him  under 
the  direction  of  the  government's  agent,  and  for  damages  for  an 
inij)roper  interference  by  such  agent  with  the  fulfilment  of  the 
contract.^2  Where  a  suit  was  brought  by  an  army  officer  against 
the  United  States  for  indemnity  on  account  of  a  judgment  recov- 
ered against  and  paid  by  him  on  account  of  his  seizure  and  use 
of  a  boat  for  the  benefit  of  the  government,  under  the  orders  of 
his  superior  officer,  it  was  held  that,  if  the  liability  of  the  United 
States  was  in  tort,  no  action  would  lie,  and  that  if  the  liability 
was  upon  an  implied  contract,  it  arose  when  the  seizure  was 
made,  not  when  the  judgment  was  recovered. ^^  A  public  officer 
may  sue  the  United  States  to  recover  money  due  him  for  the 
performance  of  his  official  acts.^"*  No  suit  will  lie  under  this  act 
to  enforce  specific  performance  of  a  contract,  nor  one  founded 
upon  a  claim  which  is  not  a  claim  for  money .^^  "  In  section  1 
of  the  Act  of  March  3,  1887,  c.  359,  the  words  '  hear  and  deter- 
mine' are  used  four  times,  —  once  as  applied  to  the  Court  of 
Claims,  twice  as  applied  to  that  court  and  to  the  Circuit  and 
District  Courts,  and  again  as  applied  to  any  court,  department, 
or  commission.  These  words  must  be  taken  to  be  used  in  each 
instance  in  the  same  sense,  and  as  implying  an  adjudication  con- 
clusive as  between  the  parties,  in  the  nature  of  a  judgment  or 
award.  The  proviso  that  nothing  in  this  section  shall  be  con 
strued  as  giving  to  either  of  the  courts  named  in  the  act  juris- 

8  24  St.  at  L.  ch.  350,  |  1,  p.  505.  tion,  arises  from  a  breacli  of  promise,  the 

^'^  24  St.  at  L.  ch.  359,  §  1,  p.  505.  action  is  ex  conlmctu  ;  but  if  tlie  cause  of 

11  Emmons  i'.  United  States,  42  Fed.  action  arises  from  a  breacli  of  duty,  grow- 

R.  26.  ing  out  of  the  contract,  it  is  ex  delicto, 

1-  Bowe  V.  United  States,  42  Fed.  R.  and  case." 

761.  »  United    States   ?•.   McDermott,   140 

13  Carpenter  v.  United  States,  42  Fed.  U.  S.  157. 

R.  264.     In  Junker  v.  Fobes,  45  Fed.  R.  15  United    States  v.  Jones,   131   U.   S. 

840,  841,  Judge  Toulmin  said,  "  If  the  1,  19. 

cause  of  action,  as  stated  in  the  declara- 
VOL.  I.  —  7 


98        PLAINTIFFS   OR   DEFENDANTS   IN   A   SUIT   IN   EQUITY.      [CHAP.  IL 

diction  to  hear  and  determine  any  claims  '  wliich  have  heretofore 
been  rejected  or  reported  on  adversely  by  any  court,  department, 
or  commission  authorized  to  hear  and  determine  the  same,'  must 
be  limited  to  a  rejection  of  a  claim,  or  an  adverse  report  thereon, 
by  a  court,  department,  or  commission  which  determines  the  rights 
of  the  parties,  such  as  the  approval  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Treas- 
ury of  an  account  of  expenses  under  the  captured  and  abandoned 
property  acts,^^  or  the  decision  of  an  international  commission.^" 
Moreover,  the  Court  of  Claims,  even  before  the  passage  of  the 
Act  of  1887,  had  jurisdiction  of  claims  under  an  act  of  Congress 
or  under  a  contract,  and  could  therefore  hear  and  determine 
claims  for  legal  salaries  or  fees.^^  We  cannot  believe  that  the 
Act  of  1887,  entitled  '  An  Act  to  provide  for  the  bringing  of 
suits  against  the  government  of  the  United  States,'  the  mani- 
fest scope  and  purpose  of  which  are  to  extend  the  liability  of 
the  government  to  be  sued,  was  intended  to  take  away  a  juris- 
diction already  existing,  and  to  give  to  the  decisions  of  accounting 
officers  an  authority  and  effect  which  they  never  had  before."  ^^ 
The  same  act  regulates  the  practice  in  such  suits  in  the  Circuit 
and  District  Courts  as  follows  :  The  plaintiff  must  file  a  petition 
duly  verified  with  the  clerk  of  the  respective  courts  having  juris- 
diction of  the  case,  and  in  the  district  where  the  plaintiff  re- 
sides. Such  petition  shall  set  forth  the  full  name  and  residence 
of  the  plaintiff,  the  nature  of  his  claim,  and  a  succinct  state- 
ment of  the  facts  upon  which  the  claim  is  based,  the  money  or 
any  other  thing  claimed,  or  the  damages  sought  to  be  recov- 
ered, and  must  pray  the  court  for  a  judgment  or  decree  based 
upon  the  facts  and  the  law.^^  The  plaintiff  must  cause  a  copy 
of  his  petition,  after  filing  the  same,  to  be  served  upon  the  dis- 
trict attorney  of  the  United  States  in  the  district  wherein  suit 
is  brought,  and  must  mail  another  copy  by  registered  letter  to 
the  Attorney-General  of  the  United  States  ;  and  must  thereupon 
file  with  the  clerk  of  the  coui-t  wherein  the  suit  is  instituted, 
an  affidavit  of  such  service   and   mailing.-^    Tlie  United  States 


i«  United  States  i\  Johnson,  124  U.  S.  Rep.  117;  United   States   v.  Jones,  131 

36;  8Sup.  Ct.  Kep.  416.  U.  S.  1,  13. 

1'  Meade  v.  United  States,  9  Wall.  091.  i"  Mr.  Justice  Gray,  Colt,  C.  J.,  con- 

18  Mitclu'll  V.  United  States,  18  Ct.  Ci.  curring,  in  Harmon  c.  United  States,  43 

281 ;  8.  c.  109  U.  S.  146  ;  Adams  v.  United  Fed.  R,  560,  564,  505. 

States,  20  Ct.  CI.  115 ;  United   States  v.  "-'  24  St.  at  L.  ch.  359,  §  5,  p.  506. 

McDonald,  128   U.   S.  471  ;   9   Sup.   Ct.  -■  21  24  St.  at  L.  cli.  359,  §  6,  p.  506. 


§  36.]        THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  A  DEFENDANT.  99 

appears  by  the  district  attorney,  and  is  allowed  sixty  days,  or 
as  much  more  time  as  the  court  may  in  its  discretion  allow, 
within  which  to  file  a  pica,  answer,  or  demurrer  ;  "  and  to  file 
a  notice  of  any  counter-claim,  set-off,  claim  for  damages,  or 
other  demand  or  defence  whatsoever,  of  the  government  in  the 
premises  :  provided,  that  should  the  district  attorney  neglect  or 
refuse  to  file  the  plea,  answer,  demurrer,  or  defence,  as  required, 
the  plaintiff  may  proceed  with  the  case  under  such  rules  as  the 
court  may  adopt  in  the  premises."  But  the  plaintiff  cannot  have 
a  judgment  or  decree  in  his  favor  unless  he  establishes  the  same 
by  proof  satisfactory  to  the  court.-^  In  the  Court  of  Claims  the 
claimant  must  "  in  all  cases  fully  set  forth  in  his  petition  the 
claim,  the  action  thereon  in  Congress  or  by  any  of  the  depart- 
ments, if  such  action  has  been  had  ;  what  persons  are  owners 
thereof  or  interested  therein ;  when  and  upon  what  consideration 
such  persons  became  so  interested  ;  that  no  assignment  or  trans- 
fer of  said  claim,  or  of  any  part  thereof,  or  interest  therein,  has 
been  made,  except  as  stated  in  the  petition  ;  that  said  claimant 
is  justly  entitled  to  the  amount  therein  claimed  from  the  United 
States,  after  allowing  all  just  credits  and  off-sets ;  that  the  claim- 
ant, and,  where  the  claim  has  been  assigned,  the  original  and 
every  prior  owner  thereof,  if  a  citizen,  has  at  all  times  borne  true 
allegiance  to  the  government  of  the  United  States,  and,  whether 
a  citizen  or  not,  has  not  in  any  way  voluntarily  aided,  abetted, 
or  given  encouragement  to  rebellion  against  the  said  govern- 
ment ;  and  that  he  believes  the  facts  as  stated  in  said  petition 
to  be  true.  And  the  said  petition  shall  be  verified  by  the  affi- 
davit of  the  claimant,  his  agent  or  attorney."  ^^  It  is  the  duty 
of  the  court,  acting  under  the  Act  of  1887,  to  cause  a  written 
opinion  to  be  filed  in  the  cause,  "  setting  forth  the  specific  find- 
ings by  the  court  of  the  facts  therein,  and  the  conclusions  of 
the  court  upon  all  questions  of  law  involved  in  the  case,  and  to 
render  judgment  thereon.  If  the  suit  be  in  equity  or  admiralty, 
the  court  shall  proceed  with  the  same  according  to  the  rules 
of  such  courts."  ^^  If  the  United  States  puts  in  issue  the  right 
of  the  plaintiff  to  recover,  the  court  may  in  its  discretion  allow 
costs  to  the  prevailing  party,  which,  however,  cannot  exceed  what 
is  actually  incurred  for  witnesses,  "  and  for  summoning  the  same, 

22  24  St.  at  L.  ch.  359,  §  6,  p.  506.  24  94  st.  at  L.  ch.  359,  §  7,  p.  50G. 

23  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  1072. 


100     PLAINTIFFS   OR   DEFENDANTS   IN   A   SUIT   IN   EQUITY.      [CHAP.  11. 

and  fees  paid  to  the  clerk  of  the  court." -^  From  the  date  of  final 
judgment  or  decree  against  the  government,  interest  is  allowed 
"  to  be  computed  thereon,  at  the  rate  of  four  per  centum  per 
annum,  until  the  time  where  an  appropriation  is  made  for  the 
payment  of  the  judgment  or  decree."  ^'^  Before  the  creation  of 
the  Circuit  Courts  of  Appeal,  an  appeal  or  writ  of  error  under 
this  act  was  heard  by  and  returnable  to  the  Supreme  Court,^' 
not  to  the  Circuit  Court.^^  The  plaintiff  can  appeal  where  the 
amount  in  controversy  exceeds  three  thousand  dollars,  or  where 
his  claim  is  forfeited  to  the  United  States  by  the  judgment  of 
the  court  below,  under  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  1089.-^  Such  appeal  or  writ 
of  error  should  be  taken  within  ninety  days  after  the  judgment 
is  rendered-^*^  An  appeal  or  writ  of  error  may  be  taken,  irre- 
spective of  the  amount  involved,  by  the  district  attorney,  at  the 
direction  of  the  Attorney-General,  within  six  months  after  the 
judgment  or  decree.^^  Otherwise,  the  practice  in  all  courts  in 
suits  brought  under  this  statute  is  similar  to  that  in  other 
suits,  with  "  such  additions  and  modifications  as  said  courts 
may  adopt."  ^^ 

§  37.  Liability  of  States  to  Suits  by  Private  Persons.  —  Under 
the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  as  originally  adopted,  it 
was  provided  that  the  judicial  power  of  the  United  States  should 
extend  to  controversies  "between  a  State  and  citizens  of  another 
State."  1  This  was  held  to  subject  a  State  to  liability  to  an  action 
by  a  citizen  of  another  State.'^  This  decision  was  opposed  to  the 
views  of  Marshall  and  others,  as  expressed  in  the  conventions 
which  ratified  the  Constitution,-^  and  was  repugnant  to  the  feel- 
ings of  the  people.  Consequently,  the  Eleventh  Amendment  was 
adopted.  This  enacted  that  "  the  Judicial  Power  of  the  United 
States  shall  not  be  construed  to  extend  to  any  suit,  in  law  or 
equity,  commenced  or  prosecuted  against  one  of  the  United  States 
by  citizens  of  another  State,  or  by  citizens  or  subjects  of  any  For- 
eign State."     It   has  effectually  prevented  the  successful   prose- 

25  24  St.  at  L.  ch.  .3.')9,  §  1.5.  p.  508.  3t  21  St.  at  L.  ch.  350,  §  0.  p.   50G ; 

25  24  St.  at  L.  ch.  .359,  §  10,  p.  507.  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  708.     But  see  United  States 

2"  Uniteil  States  v.  Davis,  131  U.  S.  ."A  v.  Davis,  131  U.  S.  3(i,  39. 

28  Strong  V.  United  States,  40  Fed.  R.  3i  94  St.  at  L.  ch.  359,  §  10,  p.  507  ; 

183.  United  States  v.  Davis,  131  U.  S.  36,  39. 

25  24  St.  at  L.  ch.  .3-39,  §  9,  p.  50G  ;  U.  S.  32  24  St.  at  L.  ch.  359,  §  4,  p.  506. 

R.  S.  §  707  ;  United  States  ;-.  Davis,  131  §  37.  1  Art.  Ill,  Sec.  2. 

U.  S.  36.  39  ;  Strong  v.  United  States,  40  2  Cliisholm  v.  Georgia,  2  Dall.  419. 

Fed.  R.  183.             ^  -■  3  See  Elliott's  Debates. 


§  37.]      LIABILITY   OP   STATES   TO   SUITS   BY   PRIVATE   PEKSONS.      101 

cution  by  a  private  individual  of  a  suit  against  a  State  as  a  party 
defendant.  Cases  have,  liowever,  often  arisen  where,  although  a 
State  was  not  a  formal  party,  yet  it  had  rights  which  it  claimed 
would  be  affected  by  the  determination  of  a  suit  before  the  court. 
To  accurately  determine  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Federal  courts  in 
these  cases  has  been  a  very  difficult  and  delicate  matter,  and  the 
questions  which  thus  constantly  arise  are  hard  to  answer.  The 
fact  that  a  State  is  not  named  as  a  party  to  the  record  does  not 
of  itself  remove  a  case  from  the  terms  of  the  Eleventh  Amend- 
ment.* Whether  a  State  is  an  actual  party  in  tlic  sense  of  the 
prohibition  must  be  determined  by  a  consideration  of  the  na- 
ture of  the  case  as  presented  by  the  whole  record.^  The  subject 
was  recently  discussed  by  Mr,  Justice  Miller,  with  the  apparent 
approval  of  a  majority  of  the  Supreme  Court :  "  It  may  be  ac- 
cepted as  a  point  of  departure  unquestioned,  that  neither  a  State 
nor  the  United  States  can  be  sued  as  defendant  in  any  court  in 
this  country  without  their  consent,  except  in  the  limited  class 
of  cases  in  which  a  State  may  be  made  a  party  in  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States,  by  virtue  of  the  original  jurisdiction 
conferred  on  this  court  by  the  Constitution.  This  principle  is 
conceded  in  all  the  cases  ;  and  whenever  it  can  be  clearly  seen 
that  the  State  is  an  indispensable  party  to  enable  the  court, 
according  to  the  rules  which  govern  its  procedure,  to  grant  the 
relief  sought,  it  will  refuse  to  take  jurisdiction.  But  in  the  de- 
sire to  do  that  justice  which  in  many  cases  the  courts  can  see 
will  be  defeated  by  an  unwarranted  extension  of  this  principle, 
they  have  in  some  instances  gone  a  long  way  in  holding  the 
State  not  to  be  a  necessary  party,  though  some  interest  of  hers 
may  be  more  or  less  affected  by  the  decision.  In  many  of  these 
cases  the  action  of  the  court  has  been  based  upon  principles 
whose  soundness  cannot  be  disputed.  A  reference  to  a  few  of 
them  may  enlighten  us  in  regard  to  the  case  now  under  consid- 
eration. 1.  It  has  been  held  in  a  class  of  cases,  where  prop- 
erty of  the  State,  or  property  in  which  the  State  has  an  interest, 
comes  before  the  court  and  under  its  control,  in  the  regular 
course  of  judicial  administration,  without  being  forcibly  taken 

*  Elliott  V.  Wiltz,  107  U.  S.  711  ;  Cun-         *  Poindexter  r.  Greenhow,  114  U.  S. 

ningliam   v.  Macon  &   Brunswick  R.    U.  270,  287 ;   In  re  Ayers,  12o  U.   S.   443, 

Co.,  109  U.  S.  440 ;  Hagood  ?•.  Southern,  492. 
117  U.  S.  52;  In  re  Ayers,  123  U.  S.  443. 


102     PLAINTIFFS   OR   DEFENDANTS   IN   A   SUIT   IN   EQUITY.      [CHAP.  II. 

from  the  possession  of  the  government,  the  court  will  proceed 
to  discharge  its  duty  in  regard  to  that  property,  and  the  State, 
if  it  choose  to  come  in  as  plaintiff,  as  in  prize  cases,  or  to  inter- 
vene in  other  cases  where  she  may  have  a  lien  or  other  claim 
on  the  property,  will  be  permitted  to  do  so,  but  subject  to  the 
rule  that  her  rights  will  receive  the  same  consideration  as  any 
other  party  interested  in  the  matter,  and  be  subjected  in  like 
manner  to  the  judgment  of  the  court.^  2.  Another  class  of  cases 
is  where  an  individual  is  sued  in  tort  for  some  act  injurious  to 
another  in  regard  to  person  or  property,  to  which  his  defence 
is  that  he  has  acted  under  the  orders  of  the  government.  In 
these  cases  he  is  not  sued  as,  or  because  he  is,  the  officer  of 
the  government,  but  as  an  Individual,  and  the  court  is  not  ousted 
of  jurisdiction  because  he  asserts  authority  as  such  officer.  To 
make  out  his  defence  he  must  show  that  his  authority  was 
sufficient  in  law  to  protect  him.'  3.  A  third  class,  which  has 
given  rise  to  more  controversy,  is  where  the  law  has  imposed 
upon  an  officer  of  the  government  a  well-defined  duty  in  regard 
to  a  specific  matter,  not  affecting  the  general  powers  or  func- 
tions of  the  government,  but  in  the  performance  of  which  one 
or  more  individuals  have  a  distinct  interest  capable  of  enforce- 
ment by  judicial  process.  Of  this  class  are  writs  of  mandamus  to 
public  officers."  ^  "  But  in  all  such  cases,  from  tlie  nature  of  the 
remedy  of  mandamus,  the  duty  to  be  })crformed  must  be  merely 
ministerial,  and  must  involve  no  element  of  discretion  to  be  ex- 
ercised by  the  officer.  It  has,  however,  been  much  insisted  on 
that  in  this  class  of  cases,  where  it  shall  be  found  necessary  to 
enforce  the  rights  of  the  individual,  a  court  of  chancery  may, 
by  a  mandatory  decree  or  by  an  injunction,  compel  the  perform- 
ance of  the  appropriate  duty,  or  enjoin  the  officer  from  doing 
that  which  is  inconsistent  with  that  duty   and  with  plaintiff's 

•^  Cunningliani  y.  Macon  &  Brunswick  3G0;    United   States  v.  Lee,   106   U.   S. 

R.  K.  Co.,  10!)  U.  S.  440,  451,  452;  ciiing  lOG ;  Virginia  Coupon  Cases,  114  U.   S. 

on  tiiis  point  The  Siren,  7  Wall.  152,  157  ;  20'.). 

Tiie    Davis,   10   Wall.    15,  20;    Clark  i*.  **  Cuiiningliani  r.  Mncon  &  Brunswick 

Barnard,  108  U.  S.  436.  IJ.  R.  Co.,  100  U.  S.  44(5,  452,  453  ;  citing 

"  Cunningliarn  ?.'.  Macon  &  15runswiek  Marbury  r.  Madison,  1  Crancli,  137;  Kcn- 

H.  R.  Co.,   100  U.  S.  446,   452 ;    citing  dall  v.  Stokes,  3  How.  87  ;  United  States 

Mitchell    V.    Harmony,    13    How.    115;  r.  Schurz,  102  U.  S.  378 ;  United   States 

Bates  V.  Clark,  95  U.  S.  204;  Meigs  v.  v.  Boutwell,  17  Wall.  G04.     See  Rolston 

McClung,  9  Cranch,  11;  Wilcox  c.  .Tack-  v.    Missouri    Fund    Commissioners,    120 

son,    13  Pet.  498;    Brown   v.  Hugcr.  21  U.  S.  ;]n0,  411. 
How.  305;  Grisar  i-.  McDowell,  0  Wall. 


§  37.]      LIABILITY    OF    STATES   TO   SUITS    BY    PRIVATE    PERSONS.       103 

riglits  in  the  premises.  Perhaps  the  strongest  assertion  of  this 
doctrine  is  found  in  the  case  of  Davis  v.  Gray,  16  Wall.  203. 
In  that  case,  the  State  of  Texas,  having  made  a  grant  of  the 
alternate  sections  of  land  along  which  a  railroad  should  there- 
after be  located,  and  the  railroad  company  having  surveyed  the 
land  at  its  own  expense  and  located  its  road  through  it,  the  com- 
missioner of  the  State  land  office  and  the  governor  of  the  State 
were,  in  violation  of  the  rights  of  the  company,  selling  and  de- 
livering patents  for  the  sections  to  which  the  company  had  an 
undoubted  vested  right.  The  circuit  court  enjoined  them  from 
doing  this  by  its  decree,  which  was  affirmed  in  this  court."'  ^ 
"  But  it  is  clear  that  in  enjoining  the  governor  of  the  State  in 
the  performance  of  one  of  his  executive  functions,  the  case  goes 
to  tlie  verge  of  sound  doctrine,  if  not  beyond  it,  and  that  the 
principle  should  be  extended  no  further.^^  Nor  was  there  in  that 
case  any  affirmative  relief  granted  by  ordering  the  governor  and 
land  commissioner  to  perform  any  act  towards  perfecting  the 
title  of  the  company.  The  case  of  The  Board  of  Liquidation  v. 
McComh,  92  U.  S.  531,  is  to  the  same  effect.  The  board  of 
liquidation  was  charged  by  the  statute  of  Louisiana  with  cer- 
tain duties  in  regard  to  issuing  new  bonds  of  the  State  in  place 
of  old  ones  which  might  be  surrendered  for  exchange  by  the 
holders  of  the  latter.  The  amount  of  new  bonds  to  be  issued 
was  limited  by  a  constitutional  provision.  McComb,  the  owner 
of  some  of  the  new  bonds  already  issued,  fded  his  bill  to  restrain 
the  board  from  issuing  that  class  of  bonds  in  exchange  for  a 
class  of  indebtedness  not  included  within  the  purview  of  the 
statute,  on  the  ground  that  his  own  bonds  would  thereby  be 
rendered  less  valuable.  This  court  affirmed  the  decree  of  the 
circuit  court  enjoining  the  board  from  exceeding  its  power  in 
taking  up  by  the  new  issue  a  class  of  State  indebtedness  not 
within  the  provisions  of  the  law  on  that  subject.  In  the  opinion 
in  that  case  the  language  used  by  Mr.  Justice  Bradley  well  and 
truly  thus  expresses  tlie  rule  and  its  limitations  :  '  The  objec- 
tions to  proceeding  against  State  officers  by  mandamus  or  injunc- 
tion are,  first,  that  it  is  in  effect  proceeding  against  the  State 

8  Cunningham  v.  Macon  &  Bninswick  ^^  Davis    v.   Gray,    16  Wall.  203,  was 

R.  R.  Co.,  109  U.  S.  446,  453.     See  also  followerl  and  apitroverl   as   to   tlic    point 

Pennoyer  r.  McConnaughy,  140  IT.  S.  1  ;  questioned  liere  in  Pennoyer  v.  McCon- 

s.  c.  43  Fed.  R.   190  ;  s.  c  43  Fed.   R.  naugliy,  140  U.  S.  1 ;   s.  c.  43  Fed.  R. 

339.  190 ;  s.  c.  43  Fed.  R.  339. 


104     PLAINTIFFS   OR   DEFENDANTS   IN   A   SUIT   IN   EQUITY.      [CHAP.  II. 

itself ;  and,  second,  that  it  interferes  with  the  official  discretion 
vested  in  the  officers.  It  is  conceded  that  neither  of  these  can 
be  done.  A  State,  without  its  consent,  cannot  be  sued  as  an 
individual ;  and  a  court  cannot  substitute  its  own  discretion  for 
that  of  executive  officers,  in  matters  belonging  to  the  proper 
jurisdiction  of  the  latter.  But  it  has  been  settled  that  where 
a  plain  official  duty  requiring  no  exercise  of  discretion  is  to  be 
performed,  and  performance  is  refused,  any  person  who  will  sus- 
tain a  personal  injury  by  such  refusal  may  have  a  mandamus  to 
compel  performance  ;  and  when  such  duty  is  threatened  to  be 
violated  by  some  official  act,  any  person  who  will  sustain  per- 
sonal injury  thereby,  for  which  adequate  compensation  cannot 
be  had  at  law,  may  have  an  injunction  to  prevent  it.'  It  is  be- 
lieved that  this  is  as  far  as  the  court  has  gone  in  granting  relief 
in  this  class  of  cases.  The  case  of  Osborne  v.  Bank  of  the  United 
States,  9  Wheat.  738,  often  referred  to,  was  decided  upon  this 
principle,  and  goes  no  further  ;  for,  in  that  case,  a  preliminary 
injunction  of  the  court  forbidding  a  State  officer  from  placing 
the  money  of  the  bank,  which  he  had  seized,  in  the  treasury  of 
the  State,  having  been  disregarded,  the  final  decree  corrected 
this  violation  of  the  injunction,  by  requiring  the  restoration  of 
the  money  thus  removed."  ^^  "On  the  other  hand,  in  the  cases 
of  Louisiana  v.  Jumel,  and  Elliott  v.  Wiltz,  107  U.  S.  711,  decided 
at  the  last  term,  very  ably  argued  and  very  fully  considered,  the 
court  declined  to  go  any  further.  In  the  first  of  these  cases 
the  owners  of  the  new  bonds  issued  by  the  board  of  liquidation 
mentioned  in  McComb's  case,  above  cited,  brought  the  bill  in 
equity  in  the  Circuit  Court  of  the  United  States,  to  compel  the 
auditor  of  the  State  and  the  treasurer  of  the  State  to  pay,  out 
of  the  treasury  of  the  State,  the  overdue  interest  coupons  on 
their  bonds,  and  to  enjoin  them  from  paying  any  part  of  the 
taxes  collected  for  that  purpose  for  the  ordinary  expenses  of 
the  government.  They  at  the  same  time  applied  to  the  State 
court  for  a  writ  of  mandamus  to  the  same  officers,  which  suit 
was  then  removed  into  the  Circuit  Court  of  the  United  States. 
In  this  they  asked  that  these  officers  be  commanded  to  pay, 
out  of  the  moneys  in  the  treasury,  the  taxes  which  they  main- 

11  See  also  Pcnnoj-or?'.  McConnaiipIiy,     185  IT.  vS.  fiG2,  684;  Louisiana  y.  Junifl, 
140  U.  S.  1;  s.  c.  43  Fed.  R.  190;  s,  c.     107  U.  S.  711. 
43  Fed.   R.  3.39;  McGahcy   v     Virginia, 


§  37.]      LIABILITY   OF   STATES   TO   SUITS   BY   PRIVATE   PERSONS.      105 

tained  had  been  assessed  for  the  purpose  of  paying  the  inter- 
est on  their  bonds,  and  to  pay  such  sums  as  had  already  been 
diverted  from  that  purpose  to  others  by  the  officers  of  the  gov- 
ernment. The  Circuit  Court  refused  the  relief  asked  in  such 
case,  and  this  court  affirmed  the  judgment  of  that  court."  ^^  .  .  . 
"  We  think  the  foregoing  cases  mark,  with  reasonable  precision, 
the  limit  of  the  power  of  the  courts  in  cases  affecting  the  rights 
of  the  State  or  Federal  governments  in  suits  to  which  they  are 
not  voluntary  parties.  In  actions  at  law,  of  which  mandamus 
is  one,  where  an  individual  is  sued,  as  for  injuries  to  persous 
or  property,  real  or  personal,  or  in  regard  to  a  duty  which  lie 
is  personally  bound  to  perform,  the  government  does  not  stand 
behind  him  to  defend  him.  If  he  has  the  authority  of  law  to 
sustain  him  in  what  he  has  done,  like  any  other  defendant  he 
must  show  it  to  the  court  and  abide  the  result.  In  either  case 
the  State  is  not  bound  by  the  judgment  of  the  court,  and  gen- 
erally its  rights  remain  unaffected.  It  is  no  answer  for  the 
defendant  to  say,  I  am  an  officer  of  the  government  and  acted 
under  its  authority,  unless  he  shows  the  sufficiency  of  that  au- 
thority. Courts  of  Equity  proceed  upon  different  principles  in 
regard  to  parties."  ^^  "  Two  classes  of  cases  have  appeared  in 
the  decisions  of  this  court,  and  it  is  in  determining  to  which 
class  a  particular  case  belongs  that  differing  views  have  been 
presented.  The  first  class  is  where  the  suit  is  brought  against 
the  officers  of  the  State,  as  representing  the  State's  action  and 
liability,  thus  making  it,  though  not  a  party  to  the  record,  the 
real  party  against  which  the  judgment  will  so  operate  as  to  com- 
nel  it  to  specifically  perform  its  contracts.  ^^  The  other  class 
is  where  a  suit  is  bronght  against  defendants  who,  claiming  to 
act  as  officers  of  the  State,  and  under  the  color  of  an  unconsti- 
tutional statute,  commit  acts  of  wrong  and  injury  to  the  rights 
and  property  of  the  plaintiff'  acquired  under  a  contract  with  the 
State.  Such  suit,  whether  brought  to  recover  money  or  proj)- 
erty  in  the  hands  of  such  defendants,  unlawfully  taken  by  them 

'2  Cunningham  v.  Macon  &  Brunswick  ^^  Cunninffhani  ?-.  Macon  &  Brunswick 

R.  R.  Co.,  109  U.  S.  446,  454,  455.     See  R.  R.  Co  ,  lO'J  U.  S.  440,  45G.     See  Vir- 

also  Governor  of  Georgia  v.  Madrazo,  1  ginia  Coupon  Cases,  114  U.  S.  2G9. 

Pet.  124;  Hagood  v.  Southern,  117   U.  S.  i^  Pennoyer y.  McConnaughy,  140 U.S. 

52  ;  North  Carolina  ».  Temple,  134  U.  S.  1,  9,  10,  per  Mr.  Justice  Lamar. 
22 ;  Louisiana,  ex  rel,  N.  Y.  Guaranty  & 
Indemnity  Co.,  v.  Steele,  131  U.  S.  230. 


106     PLAINTIFFS   OR   DEFENDANTS   IN   A   SUIT   IN   EQUITY.      [CHAP.  II. 

in  behalf  of  the  State,  or  for  compensation  in  damages,  or,  in 
a  proper  case  where  the  remedy  at  law  is  inadequate,  for  an 
injunction  to  prevent  such  wrong  and  injury,  or  for  a  manda- 
mus, in  a  like  case,  to  enforce  upon  the  defendant  the  perform- 
ance of  a  plain,  legal  duty,  purely  ministerial,  ...  is  not,  within 
the  meaning  of  the  Eleventh  Amendment,  an  action  against  the 
State."  15 

In  accordance  with  tliese  views,  it  was  held  that  a  suit  by  a 
bondholder  against  the  officers  of  a  State  and  a  railroad  com- 
pany whose  bonds  he  held,  to  have  a  sale  of  mortgaged  prop- 
erty to  the  Governor  of  Georgia,  claiming  to  act  in  his  official 
capacity,  declared  void  upon  the  ground  "  that  the  governor  was 
not  authorized  to  bid  in  said  property  for  the  State,  and  the 
State  had  no  constitutional  power  to  make  the  purchase,"  could 
not  be  maintained.!*^  A  bill,  the  object  of  which  is  by  injunction, 
indirectly,  to  compel  the  specific  performance  of  a  contract  by 
a  State  by  forbidding  all  those  acts  and  doings  which  constitute 
breaches  of  the  contract,  is  a  suit  against  the  State. i""  Such 
was  held  to  be  a  suit  to  enjoin  the  Attorney-General,  auditor, 
and  various  Commonwealth  attorneys  of  the  State  of  Virginia 
from  bringing  suits  in  the  name  of  that  State  and  in  its  courts 
against  persons  who  had  tendered  in  payment  of  taxes  tax- 
receivable  coupons  of  Virginia  bonds. ^^  A  State  cannot  with- 
out its  consent  be  sued  by  one  of  its  own  citizens,  even  on  a 
cause  of  action  arising  under  the  Constitution  and  laws  of  the 
United  States. ^^  It  lias  been  held  that  a  State  is  not  a  neces- 
sary party  to  a  suit  by  the  United  States  to  cancel  a  contract 
between  it  and  a  private  individual  for  the  sale  of  lands,  ol>- 
tained  by  the  State  from  the  plaintiff  by  mistake  or  fraud.^'^  A 
county  is  subject  to  suit  in  a  court  of  the  United  States ;  and  a 
State  law  cannot  divest  a  Federal  court  of  jurisdiction  over  sucli 
a  suit.21 

15  Ponnoyer  t\  JlcConnaugliy,  140  U.  S.        ^^  In  re   Ayers,    123   U.  S.  443.     But 

1,  10.  "  see  Tucliman  v.  Welch.  42  Fe.l.  R.  548 ; 

i*"  Cunningham  v.  Macon  &  Brunswick  reversed  s.  c.  45  Fed.  K.  283  ;  and  criti- 

R.  R.  Co.,  lO'J  U.  S.  446.     See,  however,  ciscd  in  24  Am.  Law  Review,  0(51. 
the  dissenting  opinion  of  Field  and   Har-         i'^  Hans    r.    Louisiana,    134    U.    S.    1; 

Ian,  .J.I.     See  also   Ilagood   v.  Southern,  North  Carolina  v.  Temple,  134  U.  S.  22. 
117  U.  S.  52  ;  Christian  v.  Atlantic  &  N.  C.         -'  Williams  r.  United  States,  138  U.  S. 

R.  R.  Co.,  133  U.  S.  2.33.  514,  516. 

2"  fn  re  Ayers,  123  U.  S.  443,  502,  per        ^i  Lincoln  County  i-.  Luning,  133  U.  S. 

Matthews,  J.  529i 


§  39.]  SUITS   AGAINST   INFANTS.  107 

§  38.    Liability   of   a   State    to   a    Suit   by   another    State.  —  The 

Constitution  provides  that  "  the  judicial  power  shall  extend  .  .  . 
to  controversies  between  two  or  more  States  ;  .  .  .  and  between  a 
State,  or  the  citizens  thereof,  and  foreign  States,  citizens  or  sub- 
jects." 1  The  Eleventh  Amendment  has  not  taken  away  the  lia- 
bility of  one  of  the  United  States  to  a  suit  by  another  such  State 
or  a  foreign  State.  Such  jurisdiction,  however,  is  confined  to 
controversies  concerning  rights  affecting  property ;  not  to  those 
merely  affecting  political  rights.^  It  includes  controversies  con- 
cerning boundaries  between  different  States,  even  though  the 
complainant  claim  no  title  other  than  that  of  sovereignty  and 
jurisdiction  over  the  lands  in  question.^  For,  "  in  this  country, 
where  feudal  tenures  are  abolished,  in  cases  of  escheat  the  State 
takes  the  place  of  the  feudal  lord,  by  virtue  of  its  sovereignty, 
as  the  original  and  ultimate  proprietor  of  all  the  lands  within  its 
jurisdiction."*  If,  however,  in  a  bill  which  prays  relief  against 
a  threatened  invasion  of  rights  purely  political  in  their  nature,  a 
threatened  injury  to  property  be  stated  "  only  by  way  of  showing 
one  of  the  grievances  resulting  from  the  threatened  destruction 
of  the  State,  and  in  aggravation  of  it,  not  as  a  specific  ground 
of  relief;"  and  "this  matter  of  property  is  neither  stated  as  an 
independent  ground,  nor  is  it  noticed  at  all  in  the  prayers  for 
relief ; "  the  bill  will  be  dismissed.^  A  suit  cannot  be  main- 
tained when  brought  by  one  State  against  another  to  enforce 
the  payment  by  the  latter  of  its  bonds  originally  held  by  citi- 
zens of  the  former  State,  and  assigned  by  them  to  it  solely  for 
the  purpose  of  collection.^  A  tribe  of  Indians  domiciled  within 
the  borders  of  the  United  States  does  not  constitute  a  foreign 
State  within  the  meaning  of  the  Constitution.^ 

§  39.  Suits  against  Infants.  —  An  infant  when  sued  should  be 
provided  by  the  court  with  a  guardian  ad  litem}  For  an  omis- 
sion to  appoint  a  guardian  ad  litem,  a  decree  against  an  infant 
will  be  reversed  upon  appeal.^    An  application  for  the  appoint- 

§  .38.   1  Art.  III.  §  2.  4  Georgia  v.  Stanton,  6  Wall.  50,  73. 

2  Cherokee  Nation  r.  Georgia,  5  Pet.  1  ;  ^  Georgia  r.  Stanton,  6  Wall.  50,  77. 
Georgia  r.  Stanton,  6  Wall.  50 ;  Georgia  ''  New    Hampshire   v.   Louisiana,    108 
V.  Grant,  6  Wall.  241.  U.  S.  7Q. 

3  Rhode  Island  v.  Massachusetts,  12  "  Olierokee  Nation  r.  Georgia,  5  Pet.  1. 
Pet.  057;  Missouri  v.  Iowa,  7  How.  GOO;  §  .39.  i  Rule  87;  Bank  of  the  United 
Florida  v.  Georgia,  17  How.  478;  Ala-  States  v.  Ritchie,  8  Pet.  128,  144.  See 
bama  v.  Georgia,  2.3  How.  505 ;  Virginia  Woolridge  >:  McKenna,  8  Fed.  R.  0-50, 670. 
t;.  West  Virginia,  11  Wall.  39.  2  o'Hara  v.  MacConnell,  93  U.  S.  150. 


108     PLAINTIFFS   OR   DEFENDANTS   IN   A   SUIT   IN    EQUITY.      [CHAP.  II. 

ment  of  a  guardian  ad  litem  for  an  infant  should  be  made  by 
petition,  which,  if  the  appointment  of  a  particular  person  is  de- 
sired, should  state  his  name  and  his  consent  to  act  as  such.^ 
The  court  will  usually  appoint  the  infant's  general  guardian  or 
"  the  nearest  relative  not  concerned,  in  point  of  interest,  in  the 
matter  in  question  ; "  *  but  the  choice  of  the  guardian  rests  in 
the  sound  discretion  of  the  court,  and  only  in  an  extraordinary 
case  would  a  decree  be  reversed  for  an  error  in  this  respect.^ 
The  interests  of  an  infant  are  guarded  jealously  by  the  court, 
which  will  not  hold  him  bound  by  any  admission  made  by  him 
or  in  his  behalf,  whether  in  the  pleadings^  or  otherwise.^  The 
guardian  ad  litem  is  responsible  for  the  propriety  of  the  defence.^ 
He  must  pay  costs  for  scandal ;  ^  and  he  may  be  removed  by  the 
court  at  auy  time.^^  This  may  be  done  if  he  is  unable  or  unwilling 
to  pay  the  expenses  of  the  defense.^^  If  no  person  of  substance 
is  willing  to  serve  for  the  infants,  the  court  "  might  suspend  fur- 
ther proceedings  until  it  could  send  a  next  friend  or  guardian  ad 
litem  to  the  State  courts  having  jurisdiction  of  their  person  and 
property,  to  secure  such  guardianship  as  would  protect  them."  ^^ 
Infants  may  defend  in  forma  pauperis ;  but,  except  in  very 
extraordinary  circumstances,  their  expenses  will  not  be  ad- 
vanced out  of  a  fund  in  the  hands  of  a  receiver.^-^  A  guardian 
ad  litem  may  recoup  his  expenses  from  the  infant's  property.^'* 
According  to  the  English  practice,  an  appearance  could  be 
entered  for  an  infant  before  a  guardian  ad  litem  had  been 
appointed.i° 

§  40.  Suits  against  Idiots,  Lunatics,  and  Persons  of  Weak  Mind.  — 
Idiots  and  lunatics  defend  l)y  guardians  ad  litem,  appointed  for 
them  by  the  court.^    A  committee  will  usually  be  appointed  guar- 

3  Rliinelandcr  v.  Sanford,  3  Day  (2(1  ^  Knickerbacker     v.     De     Freest,     2 

Circuit,  Conn.),  279.  Paige  (N.  Y.),  804. 

•»  Bank  of  tlie  United  States  v.  Ritchie,  »  Danioll's  Cii.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  204. 

8   Pet.    128,   144;    Story's   Eq.  PI.  §  70;  "  Russell  v.  Sliarpe,  1  Jac.  &  W.  482. 

Calvert  on  Parties,  Book  III.  ch.  xxxi.  "  Ferguson  v.   Dent,  15  Fed.   R.  771, 

5  Bankof  tlie  United  States  i-.  Ritchie,  772. 

8  Pet.  128,  144.  i-^  Ferguson   v.  Dent,  15  Fed.  R.  771, 

^  Bankof  the  United  States  r.  Ritcliie,  772. 

8  Pet.  128,  144,  145  ;   Walton   r.  Coulson,  13  Ferguson  v.  Dent,  15  Fed.  R.  771. 

1  McLean,  125;  s.  c.  Coulson   r.  Walton,         '*  Ferguson   v.  Dent,  15  Fed.   R.  771, 

9  Pet.    62,   84;     Hawkins   v.    Luscoinhe,     772. 

2  Swanst.  875,  .390;  Savage  v.  Carroll,  1         ^^  Braithwaite's  Pr.  322. 

Ball  &  B.  558.  §  40.    i  Rule  87  ;    Harrison  v.  Rowan, 

7  Legard  v.  ShefTield,  2  Atk.  377.  4  Wasii.  C.  C.  202,  207. 


§  41.]  SUITS   AGAINST   MARRIED   WOMEN.  109 

dian  ad  lltein  of  the  person  in  his  charge,^  unless  his  interest  be 
opposed  to  that  of  the  idiot  or  lunatic,^  or  perhaps  if  he  refuse  to 
answer  or  defend.*  The  guardian  ad  litem  is  usually  joined  with 
the  idiot  or  lunatic  as  a  co-defendant.^  It  was  held  by  Chancellor 
Kent,  that  in  New  York  the  committee  appointed  in  accordance 
with  statute,  and  not  the  idiot  or  lunatic,  is  the  proper  party  to 
the  bill ;  ^  but  the  rule  in  the  Federal  courts  seems  to  be  other- 
wise." "A  person  reduced  by  age  or  infirmity  to  a  second  in- 
fancy may  defend  by  guardian."  ^  It  is  said  that  the  answer  of 
a  superannuated  person,  put  in  by  guardian,  may  be  read  against 
him  as  an  answer  of  one  of  full  age  put  in  in  person  ;  and  that 
the  difference  in  this  respect  between  such  answer  and  that  of 
an  infant  put  in  by  guardian  is,  because  an  infant  improves  and 
mends,  and  therefore  is  to  have  a  day  to  show  cause  after  he 
comes  of  age  ;  but  the  other  grows  worse,  and  is  to  have  no  day.^ 
§41.  Suits  against  Married  Women.  —  In  suits  against  a  mar- 
ried woman  by  a  third  person,  her  husband,  if  not  civilly  dead 
or  permanently  absent  from  the  State,  should  be  joined  with  her 
as  a  co-defendant ;  ^  except  perhaps  in  States  where  she  lias  the 
same  rights  and  liabilities  as  a  spinster,^  or  when  she  is  sued  in 
a  representative  capacity .^  She,  however,  may  answer  separately 
from  her  husband.*  A  bill  filed  in  the  name  of  a  married  woman 
suing  alone,  may  be  amended  by  the  addition  of  a  next  friend, 
when  necessary.^ 

2  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §70;  Westcomb  v.  §41.  i  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §71;  Calvert 
Westconib,  1  Dickens,  233  ;  Harrison  v.  on  Parties,  Book  III.  oil.  xx.x. ;  Hulme  v. 
Rowan,  4  Wash.  C.  C.  202,  207.  Tenant,  1  Brown,  Cli.  C.  16;  Taylor  v. 

3  Snell    V.    Hyat,    1     Dickens,    287 ;  Holmes,  14  Fed.  R.  498,  514. 

Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  70.  2  Lorillard  v.  Standard  Oil  Co.,  2  Fed. 

4  Lloyd  V. ,  2  Dickens,  460.  R.  902.     But  see  Taylor  v.  Holmes,  14 

5  Harrison  v.  Rowan,  4  Wash.  C.  C.  Fed.  R.  499,  514;  Douglas  v.  Butler,  6 
202.  Fed.  R.  228 ;  United  States  v.  Pratt  Coal 

6  Brasher's  Executors  v.  Van  Cort-  &  Coke  Co.,  18  Fed.  R.  708 ;  O'Hara  v. 
landt,  2  Johns.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  242.  MacConnell,  93  U.  S.  150. 

'  Harrison  v.  Rowan,  4  Wash.  C.  C.  ^  Moore  v.  Meynell,  2  Vern.  614,  note. 

202,  207.  *  Duke   of  Chandos   v.   Talbot,  2   P. 

8  Markle  v.  Markle,  4  J.  Ch.  168.  Wms.  372. 

a  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  224,  &  Douglas  v.  Butler,  6  Fed.  R.  228. 
225 ;  citing  Leving  v.  Caverly,  Prec.  Ch. 
229. 


110  PARTIES.  [CHAP.  IIL 


CHAPTER  III. 

PARTIES. 

§  42.  General  Rule  as  to  Parties.  —  111  ordinary  cases,  all  per- 
sons should  be  made  parties  to  a  suit  in  equity,  who  are  di- 
rectly interested  in  obtaining  or  resisting  the  relief  prayed  for 
in  the  bill  or  granted  in  the  decree.^  If  interested  in  obtaining 
the  relief  prayed  for,  they  should  join  as  plaintiffs  ;  unless  some 
refuse  to  appear  in  that  capacity,  when  the  rest  should  make  them 
defendants.2  This  rule  has  been  also  stated  by  the  expressions 
that  "  all  persons  interested  in  the  subject  of  the  suit  should  be 
before  the  court"  ;'^  and  that  "all  persons  who  have  in  the  object 
or  objects  of  the  suit  an  interest  or  interests  apparent  upon  the 
record,  are  necessary  parties."  * 

"  In  determining  who  are  proper  parties  to  a  suit,  courts  of 
equity  are  guided  by  two  leading  principles.  One  of  tliem  is  a 
principle  admitted  in  all  courts  of  justice  in  this  country,  upon 
questions  affecting  liberty,  or  life,  or  property ;  namely,  that  no 
proceedings  shall  take  place  with  respect  to  the  rights  of  any  one, 
except  in  his  presence.  Thus  a  decree  of  a  court  of  equity  binds 
no  one  who  is  not  to  be  regarded,  according  to  the  rules  of  the 
court,  either  as  a  party,  or  else.as  one  who  claims  under  a  party, 
to  the  suit.  The  second  is  a  principle  wliich  in  this  country  is 
peculiar  to  courts  of  equity ;  namel}',  that  when  a  decision  is 
made,  it  shall  provide  for  all  the  rights  which  different  persons 
have  in  the  matters  decided.  For  a  court  of  equity  in  all  cases 
delights  to  do  complete  justice,  and  not  by  halves;^  to  put  an 
end  to  litigation,  and  to  give  decrees  of  such  a  nature  that  the 
j)erformance  of  them  may  be  perfectly  safe  to  all  who  obey  them: 
interest  reipuhlicae  ut  sit  finis  litium.     In  this  respect,  there  is  a 

§  42.   1  Calvert   on   Parties,   Book   I.  ^  Sir   William   Grant    in    Wilkins   r. 

cli.  i.,  and  cases  there  cited.  Fry,  1  Mer.  244,  2G2. 

2  Ilardint,'  v.  Handy,  11  Wheat.  10-3 ;  •»  Calvert  on  Parties   (2d  cd.),  p.  13, 

Wisner   v.    Barnet,   4   Wash.  C.  C.  6-31,  and  cases  there  cited. 
642 ;  Fallowes  r.  Williamson,  11  Ves.  313  ;  6  Knight  v.  Knight,  3  P.  Wms.  333. 

Calvert  on  Parties,  Book  I.  cli.  viii. 


§  43.]     PARTIES  WITH  NO  INTEREST  IN  THE  MATTER  OF  THE  SUIT.      Ill 

manifest  distinction  between  the  practice  of  a  court  of  law  and 
that  of  a  court  of  eqiiit}'.  A  court  of  law  decides  some  one  in- 
dividual question  which  is  brought  before  it ;  a  court  of  equity 
not  merely  makes  a  decision  to  that  extent,  but  also  arranges  all 
the  rights  which  the  decision  immediately  affects."  ^  Thus  when 
a  person  who  is  charged  with  the  payment  of  a  sura  of  money  is 
surety  to  another,  the  principal  must  be  joined  as  defendant  to 
the  bill  ;  as  in  the  case  of  a  suit  against  an  heir  for  the  perform- 
ance of  a  covenant  by  his  ancestor  which  binds  him  as  well  as 
the  ancestor's  personal  estate,  when  the  personal  representative 
must  also  be  joined.  For  "  the  court  of  equity  in  all  cases  de- 
lights to  do  complete  justice,  and  not  by  halves  ;  as,  first,  to 
decree  the  heir  to  perform  this  covenant,  and  then  to  put  the  heir 
upon  another  bill  against  the  executor  to  reimburse  himself  out 
of  the  personal  assets,  which,  for  aught  appears  to  the  contrary, 
may  be  more  than  sufficient  to  answer  the  covenant ;  and  when 
the  executor  and  heir  are  both  brought  before  the  court,  complete 
justice  may  be  done  by  decreeing  the  executor  to  perform  this 
covenant  as  far  as  the  personal  assets  will  extend,  tlie  rest  to  be 
made  good  by  the  heir  out  of  the  real  assets.  And  here  appears 
no  difficulty  or  inconvenience  in  bringing  the  executor  before  the 
court.  On  the  contrary,  it  would  prevent  a  multiplicity  of  suits, 
which  a  court  of  equity  ought  to  do."  '^ 

§  43.  Parties  ■with  no  Interest  in  the  Subject-Matter  of  the  Suit. 
—  Although  as  a  general  rule  no  person  can  be  made  a  party 
against  whom  if  brought  to  a  hearing  the  plaintiff  can  have  no 
decree,!  yet  the  English  practice  allowed  strangers  in  certain 
cases  to  be  made  parties  for  the  sake  of  discovery,  and  even  in 
order  to  mulct  them  with  costs.  In  a  suit  against  a  corpora- 
tion, its  officers,  book-keeper,  or  members  might  be  made  parties 
for  the  sake  of  discovery  concerning  matters  which  had  come  to 
their  knowledge  while  transacting  the  business  of  the  corpora- 
tion ;  2  but  not,  it  seems,  to  obtain  discovery  of  such  as  they 
knew  only  through  their  participation  in  its  formation.^     Of  the 

8  Calvert  on  Parties  (2d  ed.),  pp.  2,  3.  Many  v.  Beekman   Iron    Co.,    9  Paige 

7  Lord  Chancellor  Talbot  in  Knight  v.  (N.  Y.),  189.    Calvert  on  Parties  (2a  ed.), 

Knight,  3  P.  Wms.  3:]1,  334.  pp.  92-94.    But  see  Boston  \V.  H.  Co.  r. 

§43.   1  Wycli  u.  Meal,  3  P.  Wms.  310,  Star   R.  C,  40  Fed.  R.  167;  Cleveland 

311,  note;  Dan.  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  342.  Forge  &  Bolt  Co.  v.  U.  S.  Rolling  Stock 

'i  Wych   V.   Meal,    3    P.   Wms.    310 ;  Co.,  41  Fed.  R.  476. 
Anon,  1  Vern.  117  ;  Fcnton  v.  Hnglies,  7  ^  McComb    v.  Chicago,    St.  Louis,  & 

Ves.  289;  Glyn  v.  Soares,  1  Y.  &  C.  044 ;  New  Orleans  R.  R.  Co.,  7  Fed.  R.  426. 


112  PARTIES.  [chap.  III. 

rule,  Lord  Eldon  said :  "  The  principle  upon  which  the  rule  has 
been  adopted  is  very  singular ;  it  originated  with  Lord  Talbot,^ 
■who  reasoned  thus  upon  it,  that  you  cannot  have  a  satisfactory 
answer  from  a  corporation,  therefore  you  make  the  secretary  a 
party,  and  get  from  him  the  discovery  you  cannot  be  sure  of 
having  from  them ;  and  it  is  added,  that  the  answer  of  the  secre- 
tary may  enable  you  to  get  better  information."  ^  "  The  first 
of  these  principles,"  continues  Lord  Eldon,  "  is  extremely  ques- 
tionable, if  it  were  now  to  be  considered  for  the  first  time ;  and  as 
to  the  latter,  it  is  very  singular  to  make  a  person  a  defendant  in 
order  to  enable  yourself  to  deal  better,  and  with  more  success, 
■with  those  whom  you  have  a  right  to  put  upon  the  record  ;  but 
this  practice  has  so  universally  prevailed  without  objection  that 
it  must  be  considered  established."  ^  When  an  answer  under 
oath  is  waived,  it  is  improper  to  make  the  officers  of  a  corpora- 
tion parties  to  a  suit  against  it,  if  no  relief  is  asked  against  them ; 
and  a  demurrer  by  them  to  such  a  bill  making  them  parties  de- 
fendant will  be  sustained."  Agents  to  sell,  auctioneers,  arbitra- 
tors, and  attorneys  could  formerly  be  made  defendants  for  a 
similar  purpose  in  suits  against  their  principals  concerning  trans- 
actions ■with  ■which  they  were  connected.^  And  in  a  few  cases 
of  fraud  it  has  been  held  that  persons  implicated  in  the  fraud 
might  be  made  parties  merely  to  make  them  liable  for  costs.^ 

§  44.  Persons  "who  on  account  of  their  Interest  need  not  be  made 
Parties  to  a  Suit  in  Equity.  —  No  persons  should  be  joined  as  par- 
ties to  a  suit  in  equity,  either  as  co-plaintiffs  or  co-defendants, 
■who  are  not  directly  interested  in  obtaining  or  resisting  the  relief 
prayed  for  in  the  bill,^  or  who  claim  the  property  in  question  un- 
der inconsistent  titles.^  Thus,  prior  incumbrancers  should  not 
be  made  parties  to  a  bill  for  the  foreclosure  of  a  mortgage,^  un- 
less it  prays  for  a  receiver,*  or  seeks  to  obtain  a  sale  of  the  entire 

*  In  Wych  v.  Meal,  3  P.  Wms.  310.  cases  cited.     See  Ewin  v.  Oregon  Ry.  & 

5  Fenton  v.  Hughes,  7  Ves.  287.  Nav.  Co.,  27  Fed.  11.  G25. 

c  Fenton  v.  Hugtu>s,.7  Ves.  288,  289.  §  44.   i  Calvert  on  Parties  (2d  ed.),  6 

7  Colonial  &  U.  S.  Mortg.  Co.  Ld.  v.  Mare  v.  Malachy,  1  M.  &  C.  559. 
Hutchinson   Mortg.  Co.,  44  Fed.  II.  219.  2  Calvert  on  Parties  (2ded.),105;  Mar- 
See  Boston  W.  H.  Co.  v.  Star  Rubber  Co.,  quis  Cliolmondeley  r.  Lord  Clinton,  2  Jac 
40  Fed.  R.  107.  &  W.  138 ,  Saumarez  v.  Saumarez,  4  M 

8  Fenton  r.  Hughes,  7  Ves.  288,  289 ;  &  C.   331  ;   Dial   v    Reynolds,  96  U.   S 
Dummer  iv  Corporation  of  Chippenham,  340. 

14  Ves.  252.  ^  Hagan  v.  Walker,  14  How.  29,  37 

9  Taylour  v.   Rochford,   2  Ves.   Sen.     Jerome  v.  McCarter,  94  U.  S.  734. 

281  ;  Smith  v.  Green,  37  Fed.  R.  424  ;  .*  Miltenberger  i-  Logansport  Railway 
Calvert  on  Parties  (2d  ed.),  p.  96,  and    Co.,  106  U.  S.  286,  306. 


U.] 


UNNECESSARY   PARTIES. 


113 


mortgaged  property  free  from  all  liens,'^  or  unless  "  there  is  sub- 
stantial doubt  respecting  the  amount  of  debts  due  prior  lien  cred- 
itors," in  which  case  "  there  is  obvious  propriety  in  making  them 
parties,  that  the  amount  of  the  charge  remaining  on  the  land  after 
the  sale  may  be  determined,  and  that  purchasers  at  the  sale  may 
be  advised  of  what  they  are  purchasing ; "  ^  or  unless  there  are 
other  peculiar  circumstances  making  it  necessary.  So,  in  suits 
for  specific  performance,  it  is  a  general  rule  that  none  but  parties 
to  the  contract  or  their  representatives  are  necessary  parties,'' 
unless  there  are  other  persons  with  such  an  interest  in  the  con- 
tract or  the  property  agreed  to  be  sold  that  their  concurrence  is 
necessary  to  the  completion  of  the  title,  or  their  rights  would 
be  prejudiced  were  a  decree  made  in  their  absence.^  Nor  need 
the  assignor  of  the  whole  interest  in  a  thing  in  action  be  made  a 
party  to  a  suit  by  the  assignee,^  except  in  the  case  of  a  suit  by 
the  equitable  assignee  of  a  patent,^*^  or  copyright,^^  or  the  licensee  ^^ 


5  Hagan  v.  Walker,  14  How.  29  ;  Je- 
rome V.  McCarter,  94  U.  S.  734,  735. 

"  Mr.  Justice  Strong  in  Jerome  v.  Mc- 
Carter, 94  U.  S.  734,  at  pages  735,  736. 

"  Tasker  v.  Small,  3  M.  &  C.  03,  68 ; 
Calvert  on  Parties  (2(1  eJ.),  Book  III. 
ch.  xvii. 

*  Jones  V  Lewis,  1  Cox  F.q.  199 ;  Evans 
V.  Jackson,  8  Sim.  217;  Calvert  on  Par- 
ties, Rook  III.  ch.  xvii. 

9  Harris  v.  Johnston,  3  Cranch,  311  ; 
Boon  V.  Chiles,  8  Pet.  532  ;  Robertson  ;;. 
Carson,  19  Wall.  04  ;  s.  c.  Chase's  Dec. 
475,  Batesville  Institute  z'  Kanffman,  18 
Wail.  151 ;  Fulham  v.  McCarthy,  1  H.  L. 
C.  703. 

1^  Stimpson  v  Rogers,  4  Blatchf.  333  ; 
North  V  Kershaw,  4  Blatchf.  70 ,  Patter- 
son V.  Stapler,  7  Fed  R.  210;  Goorlyear 
V   Allen,  3  Fisher,  284. 

11  Colburn  v  Dnneomhe,  9  Sim.  151  ; 
Chappell  V.  Purrlay,  4  Y  &  C.  485 ;  Cal- 
vert on  Parties  (2(1  ed  ),  315. 

12  Waterman  v.  Mackenzie,  138  U.  S.^ 
2-52,  25.5-256,  260-261,  per  Mr.  Justice 
Gray  ;  "  The  patentee  or  his  assigns  may, 
by  instrument  in  writing,  assign,  grant, 
and  convey  eitlier,  first,  tlie  whole  patent, 
comprising  tlie  exclusive  right  to  make, 
use,  and  vend  the  invention  throughout 
the  United  States ;  or,  second,  an  undi- 
vided part  or  share  of  that  exclusive 
right ;  or,  third,  the  exclusive  right  un- 

VOL.    I.  —  8 


der  the  patent  witliin  and  throughout  a 
.specified  part  of  the  United  States.  Rev. 
Stat.  §  4898.  A  transfer  of  either  of  these 
three  kinds  of  interests  is  an  assignment, 
properly  speaking,  and  vests  in  the  as- 
signee a  title  m  so  much  of  the  patent 
itself,  with  a  right  to  sue  infrmgers ;  in 
the  second  case,  jointly  with  the  assignor.; 
in  tlie  first  and  third  cases,  in  tlie  name 
of  the  assignee  alone.  Any  assignment 
or  transfer,  short  of  one  of  these,  is  a 
mere  license,  giving  the  licensee  no  title 
in  the  patent,  and  no  right  to  sue  at  law 
in  his  own  name  for  an  infringement. 
Rev.  Stat.  §  4919  ,  Gayler  v.  Wilder,  10 
How.  477,  494,  495  ;  Moore  v.  Marsh,  7 
Wall.  515.  In  equity,  as  at  law,  when 
the  transfer  amounts  to  a  license  only, 
the  title  remains  in  the  owner  of  the  pat- 
ent ;  and  suit  must  be  brought  in  his 
name,  and  never  in  the  name  of  the 
licensee  alone,  unless  that  is  necessary  to 
prevent  an  absolute  failure  of  justice,  as 
where  the  patentee  is  the  infringer,  and 
cannot  sue  himself.  Any  rights  of  ti.e 
licensee  must  be  enforced  through  or  in 
the  name  of  the  owner  of  the  patent, 
and  perhaps,  if  necessary,  to  jirotect  the 
rights  of  all  parties,  joining  the  licensee 
with  him  as  a  planitiff.  Rev  Stat  §  4921 ; 
Littlefield  v.  Perry,  21  Wall.  205.  223; 
Paper  Bag  Cases,  105  U.  S.  766,  771 ; 
Birdsell   v    ShaUol,    112   U.  S.  48-5-487. 


114 


PARTIES. 


[chap.  III. 


or  mortgagor  13  by  a  mortgage  duly  recorded  at  Washington,  or 
an  assignee  under  an  assignment  still  executory,^*  when  the  as- 
signor, licensor,  or  mortgagee  must  be  joined  as  either  plaintiff 


And  see  Renard  v  Levinstein,  2  Hem.  & 
Mil.  628.  Whetlier  a  transfer  of  a  par- 
ticular right  or  interest  under  a  patent  in 
an  assignment  or  a  license  does  not  de- 
])end  upon  the  name  by  which  it  calls 
itself,  but  upon  the  legal  effect  of  its  pro- 
visions. For  instance,  a  grant  of  an  ex- 
clusive riglit  to  make,  use,  and  vend  two 
patented  machines  within  a  certain  dis- 
trict is  an  assignment,  and  gives  tlie 
grantee  the  right  to  sue  in  his  own  name 
for  an  infringement  within  the  district, 
because  tlie  right,  althougli  limited  to 
making,  using,  and  vending  two  ma- 
chines, excludes  all  other  persons,  even 
the  patentee,  from  making,  using,  or 
vending  like  maciiines  ^vithi^  tiie  dis- 
trict. Wilson  V.  Rousseau,  4  How.  640, 
(586.  On  the  other  iiand,  the  grant  of  an 
exclusive  right  under  the  patent  within 
a  certain  district,  which  does  not  include 
tlie  right  to  make,  and  the  right  to  use, 
and  the  right  to  sell,  is  not  a  grant  of  a 
title  in  the  whole  patent-right  within  the 
district,  and  is  therefore  only  a  license. 
Such,  for  instance,  is  a  grant  of  '  tlie  full 
and  exclusive  right  to  make  and  vend  ' 
within  a  certain  district,  reserving  to  the 
grantor  the  right  to  make  within  the  dis- 
trict to  be  sold  outside  of  it.  Gayler  v. 
Wilder,  above  cited.  So  is  a  grant  of 
'  tlie  exclusive  right  to  make  and  use,' 
but  not  to  sell,  patented  machines  within 
a  certain  district.  Mitchell  v.  Hawk-y, 
10  Wall.  544.  So  is  an  instrument  grant- 
ing 'the  sole  right  and  privilege  of  man- 
ufacturing and  selling'  patented  articles, 
and  not  expressly  authorizing  their  use, 
because,  though  this  might  carry  by  im- 
plication the  right  to  use  articles  made 
under  the  patent  by  the  licensee,  it  cer- 
tainly would  not  authorize  him  to  use 
such  articles  made  by  others.  Ilayward 
V.  Andrews,  106  U.  S  672  See  also 
Oliver  v.  Rumford  Chemical  Works,  109 
U  S.  75  A  patent  right  is  incorporeal 
property,  not  susceptible  of  actual  de- 
livery or  possession  ;  and  the  recording 


of  a  mortgage  thereof  in  the  Patent  Office, 
in  accordance  with  the  act  of  Congress,  is 
equivalent  to  a  delivery  of  possession, 
and  makes  the  title  of  the  mortgagee 
complete  towards  all  other  persons,  ais 
well  as  against  the  mortgagor.  The  right 
conferred  by  letters-patent  for  an  inven- 
tion is  limited  to  a  term  ot  years ,  and  a 
large  part  of  its  value  consists  in  the 
profits  derived  from  royalties  and  license 
fees.  In  analogy  to  the  rules  governing 
mortgages  of  lands  and  of  chattels,  and 
with  even  stronger  reason,  the  assignee 
of  a  patent  by  a  mortgage  duly  recorded, 
whose  security  is  constantly  wasting  by 
the  lapse  of  time,  must  be  held  (unless 
otherwise  provided  in  the  mortgage)  enti- 
tled to  grant  licenses,  to  receive  license 
fees  and  royalties,  and  to  have  an  account 
of  profits  or  an  award  of  damages  against 
infringers.  There  can  be  no  doubt  th;it 
he  is  the  '  party  interested,  either  as  pat- 
entee, assignee,  or  grantee,'  and  as  such 
entitled  to  maintain  an  action  at  law  to 
recover  damages  for  an  infringement; 
and  it  cannot  have  been  the  intention  of 
Congress  that  a  suit  in  equity  against  an 
infringer  to  obtain  an  injunction  and  an 
account  of  profits,  in  whicli  the  court  is 
authorized  to  award  damages  when  ne- 
cessary to  fully  compensate  the  idaintifF, 
and  has  the  same  power  to  treble  the 
damages  as  in  an  action  at  law,  should 
not  be  brought  by  the  same  person.  Kev. 
Stat  §§  4019,  4021  ;  Root  v  Railway  Co., 
10.)  ij.'s  180,212.  The  necessary  con- 
clusion appears  to  us  to  be  that  Siiipman, 
being  the  present  owner  of  the  whole 
title  in  the  patent  under  a  mortgage  duly 
executed  and  recorded,  was  the  person, 
and  the  only  person,  entitled  to  maintain 
such  a  bill  as  this,  and  that  the  plea, 
therefore,  was  rightl}'  adjudged  good. 
In  the  light  of  our  legislation  and  decis- 
ions, no  weight  can  be  given  to  the  case 
of  Van  Gelder  ".  Sowerby  Bridge  Soci- 
ety, 44  Ch.  I)  374.  in  which,  upon  plead- 
ings and  facts  similar  to  those  now  before 


"  Waterman  i'.  Mackenzie,  138  U.  S. 
252,  261  ;  quoted  siipni,  note  12. 


1*  Land  Co.  of  New  Mexico  v.  Klkins, 
2Q  Fed.  K  545. 


§  44.]  UNNECESSARY   PARTIES.  115 

or  defendant.  Nor  need  a  mortgagor  who  has  sold  his  equity  of 
redemption  be  made  a  party  to  a  foreclosure  suit/^  unless  relief 
is  asked  against  him.^*^  It  has  been  held  at  circuit  that  a  tax 
collector  is  not  a  proper  party  to  a  bill  to  set  aside  a  convey- 
ance made  by  him.^'  And,  as  has  been  said  before,  no  persons 
should  be  joined  as  plaintiff's,^^  or  defendants,^^  who  claim  the 
property  in  question  under  inconsistent  titles.  For  example,  a 
mortgagee  cannot  maintain  a  bill  against  the  mortgagor  for  a 
foreclosure,  which  at  the  same  time  seeks  to  enjoin  a  claimant 
adverse  to  both  mortgagor  and  mortgagee  from  asserting  his  title 
to  the  mortgaged  property .^'^  An  interest  in  the  question  of  law 
involved  is  not  sufficient  to  make  a  person  a  necessary  or  even  a 
})roper  party ,2^  except  when  a  bill  of  peace  is  filed.  The  equity 
rules,  following  the  English  orders  in  chancery,  also  provide  that 
"  in  all  cases  in  which  the  plaintiff  has  a  joint  and  several  de- 
mand against  several  persons,  either  as  principals  or  sureties,  it 
shall  not  be  necessary  to  bring  before  the  court  as  parties  to  a 
suit  concerning  such  demand  all  the  persons  liable  thereto ;  but 
the  plaintiff  may  proceed  against  one  or  more  of  the  persons 
severally  liable."  ^"-^  This  rule,  however,  only  apj)lies  when  the 
demand  is  both  joint  and  several,  not  when  it  is  merely  joint  ;23 
and  when  one  of  two  or  more  jointly  and  severally  indebted  is 
the  principal  debtor  to  whom  the  others  are  sureties,  he  must,  it 
seems,  always  be  joined  in  a  bill  filed  by  the  creditor  to  enforce  a 
security  against  either  of  the  latter.-^     Concerning  the  chancery 

us,  the  inortgRcror  of  a  patent  wns  treated  But  see  Matcnlm   '■.   Smitli,  6  McLean, 

as  a  ninrtgagor  in  possession,  and  was  al-  41(3. 

loweil  to  maintain  a  suit  for  infringement  ^*'  Ayres  v.  Wiswall,  112  U   S.  187. 

under  tiie  provisions  of  tlie  En^dish  Jmli-  ^"  West  v   Duncan,  42  Fed.  K.  4:jO 

cature  Act  of  1873  and    Patent   Act  of  1-^  Marquis  Cliolmondeley  v.  Lord  Clin- 

1883.     Stats.  36  &  37  Vict.  cii.  GG,  §  2-5 ;  ton,  2  Jac.  &   W.  1,  at  page  135 ;    Sau- 

46   &  47    Vict.    cli.    57,    §§   23,   40,   87.  marez  0    Saumarez,  4  M.  &  C.  331,  336. 

Wiietlier  in  a  suit  brouglit  by  the  mort-  See  Parsons  v.  Lyman,  4  Blatclif  C.  C. 

gagee  the  court,  at  the  suggestion  of  the  432. 

mortgagor,  or  of   the   mortgagee,  or  of  ^^  Di.al  v.  Reynolds,  96  U  S.  340. 

the  defendants,  might,  in   its  discretion,  -*^  Dial  i\  Reynohls,  96  U.  S.  340.     But 

and  for  the  purpose  of  preventing  multi-  see  Hefner  v  Northwestern  Life  Ins.  Co., 

plicity  of  suits  or  miscarriage  of  justice,  123  U   S.  747. 

permit  or   order    the    mortgagor    to   be  -'■  Vallette  r.  Whitewater  Valley  Canal 

joined,  either  as  a  plaintiff  or  as  a  de-  Co.,  4  McLean,  192. 

tendant,  need  not  be  considered,  because  --  Rule  51,  copied  from  the  32d  Order 

no   sucli   question   is   presented   by   this  in  Chancery  of  August,  1841. 

record."  -3  Pierson  v.  Robinson,  3  Swanst.  139  n. 

i*"  K.anawlia    Coal    Co.   v    Kanawha   &  -■'  Robertson  v.  Carson,    19  Wall.   94; 

OhioCanal  Co  ,  7  Blatchf.  C.  C.  ;i91,416.  Wilson   v.  City  Bank,   3    Sumner,  423; 


116  PARTIES.  [chap.  III. 

order  from  which  Rule  fifty-one  was  copied,  Vice-Chancellor 
Shadvvell  said  that  it  "  applied  to  cases  where  several  persons 
were  liable  in  different  characters,  —  that  is,  some  as  principals 
and  the  rest  as  sureties ;  and  then  it  was  sufficient  to  make  one 
individual  of  each  class  a  party ;  but  where  there  was  only  one 
principal  and  one  surety,  both  of  them  must  be  made  parties."  -^ 

§  45.  Cases  where  the  Lavr  has  furnished  a  Representative.  — 
On  account  of  the  inconvenience  which  would  be  caused  if  the 
general  rule  were  enforced  in  all  cases,  there  are  several  classes 
of  exceptions  to  it.^  The  first  of  these  exists  when  the  law  has 
furnished  a  representative  of  the  interest  in  question.  In  such  a 
case,  those  whom  he  represents  are  not  usually  necessary  parties 
to  the  suit.2  Thus,  executors  and  administrators  are  deemed 
sufficiently  to  represent  all  legatees,  creditors,  and  next  of  kin 
in  suits  brought  by  or  against  them  in  their  representative  capa- 
city ,-5  except  when  they  are  made  defendants  to  a  suit  by  a  residu- 
ary legatee  for  his  share  of  the  estate,*  or  are  sued  for  collusion 
with  a  legatee  who  should  then  be  made  a  party,'^  or  probably 
when  an  executor  or  administrator  is  charged  with  a  breach  of 
trust.  So  a  bankrupt  or  insolvent  debtor  ^  and  his  creditors "  are 
not  usually  necessary  parties  to  a  suit  brought  l)y  or  against  his 
assignee.  And  by  analogy  to  this,  it  has  been  held  improper  for 
a  creditor  of  an  estate  to  join  with  its  i-eceiver  in  a  suit  concern- 
ing it.^  Nor  need  one  or  more  surviving  parties  in  suits  by  or 
against  strangers  affecting  the  i)artnership  property  have  joined 
with  them  the  personal  representatives  of  their  deceased  asso- 
ciate.^ So  the  English  rule  was  that  "  a  court  of  equity  in  many 
cases  considers  the  tenant  in  tail  as  having  the  whole  estate 
vested  in  him  at  least  for  the  purposes  of  suit ;  and  for  these 

Allan  V.  Houlden,  6  Beav.  148 ;  Pinkus  ^  Atwood    ?•.    Hawkins,    Rep.    temp, 

r.  Peters,  5  Beav.  25;}.  Fincli,   113;    Faithful   r.   Hunt,  o   Aiist. 

-»  Lloyd    V.    Smith,    1.3    Sim.   457,   at  751  ;    Calvert   on    Pnrties    {2(1  eil.),  200, 

pages  458,  4-59.  208. 

§  45.  1  Wallworth  v.  Holt,  4  M.  &  C.  •''  Attorney-General    r.    Wynne,   Mos. 

019;  Powell  r.  Wriirht,  7  Beav.  440.  120. 

•^  Calvert  on  Parties  {2d  cd  ),  22.     See  •'  De  Wolf  r.  Johnson,  10  Wheat.  367, 

Hopkirk  »;.  Pafje,  2  Brock.  20,  42.  at  p.  .384 ;  Van  Ileimsdyk  v.  Kane,  1  Gall. 

■^  Brown  v.  Dowthwaite,  1  Madd.  448;  371  ;  Calvert  on  Parties  (2d  ed.),  24. 

Potter  ('.  Gardner,  12  Wheat.  lltO ;  Bur-  '  Sprasjg  v.  Binkes,  5  Ves.  587. 

ton  V.  Smith.  4  Wash.  C.  C.  522;  Dan-  ^  Doggett  i-    Bailroad   Co.,  9!)  U.  S. 

dridge  c  Washington's  Executors,  2  Pet.  72. 

370,  377 ;    Wainwright   r.   Waterman,   1  "  Pagan   v.    Sparks,    2    Wash.    C.    C 

Ves.  Jr.  313 ;  Anon.,  12  iMod.  522.  325. 


§  45.]     WHERE   THE   LAW   HAS   FURNISHED   A    REPRESENTATIVE.      117 

purposes  does  not  look  beyond  the  estate  tail  in  a  suit  aiming  by 
the  decree  to  bind  the  right  to  the  land."^*^  "Those  in  remain- 
der were  considered  as  cyphers."  ^^  "  It  appears  that  this  rule 
was  originally  founded  upon  analogy  to  common  law.  As  a 
tenant  in  tail  might  bar  subsequent  remainder-men,  —  in  fact, 
might  at  any  moment  make  himself  master  of  the  entire  estate, 
it  was  considered  by  the  court  that  he  might  be  assumed  to  offer 
a  satisfactory  defense  for  all  those  subsequent  interests.  The 
court  has,  however,  gone  one  step  farther,  and  has  treated  in- 
fants as  sufficient  representatives  of  the  inheritance,  although 
they  are  unable,  by  reason  of  infancy,  to  bar  remainder-men.  In 
truth  the  court  has  gone  to  the  full  extent  which  is  requisite  for 
convenience  in  practice."  ^^  It  has  been  held  that  a  tenant  for 
life  and  the  contingent  remainder-man  in  fee  may  represent  the 
inheritance  in  a  bill  for  specific  performance,  if  the  children  of 
the  remainder-man  will  inherit  if  he  does  not.^^ 

In  most  cases  respecting  trust  property,  it  was  said  by  Lord 
Eldon  that  the  beneficiaries  of  the  trust  were  necessary  parties.^* 
The  expression  naturally  suggests  the  inquiry,  in  what  cases  are 
they  not  to  be  made  parties  ?  There  are  some  cases  in  which  the 
existence  or  enjoyment  of  the  property  is  affected  by  the  prayer 
of  the  suit.  There  are  others  in  which  the  existence  of  the  prop- 
erty is  not  affected,  and  the  only  object  is  to  transfer  it  into  the 
hands  of  the  trustees.^^  In  the  latter  cases  the  beneficiaries  of  the 
trust  need  not,^^  although  it  seems  they  may  be  made  parties.^' 
In  the  former,  when  not  too  numerous,  their  presence  was  always 
required  ^^  before  the  equity  rules.  The  rules,  however,  follow- 
ing an  English  chancery  order,^^  provide  that :  "  In  all  suits  con- 
cerning real  estate  which  is  vested  in  trustees  by  devise,  and 
such  trustees  are  competent  to  sell  and  give  discharges  for  the 
proceeds  of  the  sale,  and  for  the  rents  and  profits  of  the  estate, 
such  trustees  shall  represent  the  persons  beneficially  interested 
in  the  estate,  or  the  proceeds,  or  the  rents  and  profits,  in  the 

1 '  Lord    Eklon    in   Lloyd  v.  Jolines,  9  r.  Brown,  02  U.  8.  171  ;  Calvert  on  Par- 

Ves   (35.  ties  {2d  ed.),  277,  278. 

11  Lord  Camden  in  Reynoldson  r.  Per-  i'  Harrison  c.  Rowan,  4  Wash.  C.  C. 

kins,  Ambler,  564.             "  202. 

1-  Calvert  on  Parties  (2d  ed.),  5r..  i^  Whistler  i'.  Webb.Bunb.  5o  ;  Greene 

13  Solder  v.  Williams,  1  Curt.  47!>.  v.   Sisson,  2  Curt.  171  ;   Oliver  v.   Piatt, 

14  Adams  r.  St.  Le^er,  1  B.  &  B.  182.  3  How.  333  ;  s.  c.  2  McLean,  268;  Cross 

15  Calvert  on  Parties  (2d  ed.),  277.  r.  DeValle,  1  Wall.  5. 

16  Franco  v.  Franco,  3  Ves.  76;  Carey  i'-*  30th  Order  of  August,  1841. 


118  PARTIES.  [chap.  III. 

same  manner  and  to  the  same  extent  as  the  executors  or  admin- 
istrators in  suits  concerning  personal  estate  represent  the  per- 
sons beneficially  interested  in  such  personal  estate ;  and  in  such 
cases  it  shall  not  be  necessary  to  make  the  persons  beneficially 
interested  in  such  real  estate,  or  rents  and  profits,  parties  to  the 
suit.  But  the  court  may,  upon  consideration  of  the  matter  on 
the  hearing,  if  it  shall  so  think  fit,  order  such  persons  to  be  made 
parties."  ^o  "  It  seems  doubtful,  however,"  says  Daniell,  of  the 
English  order,  "  whether  this  order  will  apply  to  cases  where  a 
mortgagee  seeks  to  foreclose  the  equity  of  redemption  of  estates 
which  are  subject  to  such  trusts."  ^^  Trustees  under  a  railroad 
mortgage,^^  or  of  any  other  trust-deed  of  a  similar  nature  secur- 
ing the  rights  in  real  property  of  a  lai'gc  number  of  beneficiaries,^'^ 
are  held,  in  all  proceedings  affecting  the  property  which  they  thus 
hold,  adequately  to  represent  the  latter,  who  will  be  bound  in  the 
absence  of  fraud  by  notice  given,  or  a  decree  entered  against 
tliem,  although  the  court  may  in  its  discretion  make  any  of  such 
beneficiaries  a  party  to  the  suit  at  his  application.^^  It  has  been 
lield,  however,  that  to  a  bill  against  the  heirs  of  a  trustee  to  quiet 
the  title  to  property  conveyed  by  the  trustee  to  the  complainant, 
the  beneficiary  of  the  trust  need  not  be  joined  as  a  party .^^  It 
has  been  held  that  a  corporation  is  so  far  a  representative  of  its 
stockholders  that  none  of  them  need  l)e  joined  in  a  suit  for  an 
accounting,  under  a  lease  which  ]irovides  for  the  payment  of 
dividends  directly  to  its  stockholders.^'^  It  has  been  licld  that  a 
State  statute  authorizing  one  or  more  officers  of  an  unincorpo- 
rated association  to  represent  the  others  in  the  courts,  when 
suing  or  Ijeing  sued  about  a  matter  concerning  their  common 
interest,  will  be  followed  by  a  Federal  court  of  equity,  and  the 
members  conclusively  presumed  to  have  the  same  citizenship  as 
such  oi]ficers.2^ 

20  Rule  49  -2*  Willinnis  r  :\Iorgnn,  111  U  S.  684. 

21  Danieli's  Ch.  Pr  (2(1  Am.  ed.)  .304.  See  TlioniM.s  r  Brownville,  F  K.  &  P 
See  also  Wilton  v.  Jones,  2  Y  &  C  244  ;     K,  R   Co.,  10'.)  U.  S  522. 

Cross  c.  De  Valle,  1  Wall   1.  -^  Griilley  r.  Wynant,  2:3  IIow.  500 

22  Shaw  V  Railroad  Co.,  100  U.  S  00-5,  2'  Paeific  R  R.  of  Mo.  r.  Atlantic  &  P. 
Gil  ;  Reals  v.  Illinois,  Mo  &  T.  R.  R  Co.,     R.  R  Co.,  20  Fed.  R.  277. 

]:;:}   U.    S    290;  Elwell    >■    Fosdick,  134  '^'  Farjjo  v.  Louisville,  N.  A.  &  C.  Ry. 

U  S  '500;  Loavenwortli  County  Com 'rs  i'  Co.,  fi  Fed   R.  787;  Whitman  v.  Hubhell, 

Chicago,  R.  I  &  P.  Ry  Co.,  1:54  U  S  688.  ?,0  Fed.  R.  81 ,  Liverpool  Ins   Co.  v  I\Lis- 

23  Van  Vecliten  v  Terry,  2  -lohns  Ch.  sachusetts,  10  Wall  -566;  and  suprn,  §  19. 
(\.  Y.)  197;  Kerrison  (-•.  Stewart,  93  U.  S.  But  see  Chapman  v  Barney,  129  L.  S. 
155.  677. 


§  46.]  SUITS  BY  COMPLAINANT  ON  BEHALF  OF  HIMSELF  AND  OTHERS.    119 

§  46.  Suits  by  a  Complainant  on  behalf  of  Himself  and  Others 
similarly  situated.  —  When  a  number  of  persons  have  a  common 
interest  in  a  thing  which  is  the  subject  of  litigation,  and,  in  some 
instances,  when  a  number  of  persons  have  a  common  interest  in 
a  question  which  is  before  the  court  for  decision,  one  or  more 
may  sue  or  be  sued  in  behalf  of  the  rest.  Judge  Story  divides 
the  first  of  these  divisions  into  two  :  "  (1)  When  the  question  is 
one  of  a  common  and  general  interest,  and  one  or  more  sue  or 
defend  for  the  benefit  of  the  whole ; "  and  "  (2)  when  the  parties 
form  a  voluntary  association  for  public  or  private  purposes,  and 
those  wlio  sue  or  defend  may  fairly  be  presumed  to  represent  the 
rights  and  interests  of  the  whole."  ^  But  there  seems  to  be  no 
reason  for  treating  these  two  classes  separately.  AVhen  one  or 
more  thus  file  a  bill  on  behalf  of  themselves  and  others  similarly 
interested,  they  must  state  in  the  title  of  their  bill  that  they  so 
sue,  and  show  that  the  others  are  numerous  or  unknown.^  Any 
of  the  otliers  of  the  class  have  the  right  to  join  with  them  in  the 
suit  at  any  time  upon  payment  of  his  share  of  the  costs,-^  and 
counsel  fees*  which  have  been  then  paid  or  incurred,  provided 
they  do  not  seek  to  act  in  hostility  to  the  original  complainants,'^ 
in  which  case  the  court  may  in  its  discretion  allow  tliem  to  in- 
tervene." If  their  joinder  as  plaintiffs  would  oust  the  court  of 
jurisdiction,  they  may  be  brought  in  as  defendants,"  Such  a  bill 
may  be  filed  even  when  a  majority  of  those  interested  object  to 
the  suit.^  For  "  where  a  matter  is  necessarily  injurious  to  the 
common  right,  the  majority  of  the  persons  interested  can  neither 
excuse  the  wrong  nor  deprive  all  other  parties  of  their  remedy 
by  suit."  ^  To  such  a  bill  it  is  not  necessary  to  make  defendants 
all  who  object  to  its  being  filed,  provided  that  enough  arc  brought 
before  the  court  to  sufficiently  represent  their  interest.^'^     It  was 

§46.  1  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  97  ^  Galveston  Railroad  v.  Cowdrey,   11 

2  Hoe  V.  Wilson,  9  Wall.  501.  Wall.  459,  478. 

8  Ogilvie  V.  Knox  Ins.  Co.,  2  Black,  "^  Brown  v.  Pacific  Mail  S.  S.  Co.,  5 

530  ;  s.  c.  22  How.  380  ;  Ex  parte  Jordan,  Blatchf.  C.  C  525.  535.     But  see  Stewart 

94  U.  S.  248;  Hallett  v.  Hallett,  2  Paige  v.  Dunham,  115  U.  S  61. 
(N.   Y.),   15;    Leigli   r    Thomas,  2   Ves.  "  Bromley  i?.  Smith,  1  Simons,  8  ,  Tay- 

Sen.  313  ;  Ransom  v.  Davis,  18  How.  295 ;  lor  r   Salmon,  4  Myl.  &  Cr.  134  ;  Story's 

Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  99.  ¥.q.  PI   §  114.     But  see  Jones  i'.  Garcia 

*  Central  Railroad  i'.  Pettus,  113  U.  S.  del  Rio,  1  Turn.  &  Russ  300. 
110;  Trustees  v.   Greenougli,  105  U.    S.  ^  Bromley  r.  Smith,  1  Simons,  8,  11. 

527.  ^'^  Clinch  v.  Financial  Corporation,  L 

5  Forbes  )•  Memphis,  El  Paso,  &  Paci-  R.  4  Ch.  App.   117,  at  p.  122,    Story's 

fie  R.  R.  Co.,  2  Woods,  323.  Eq  PI.  §  135  b. 


120  PARTIES.  [chap.  III. 

originally  held  that  no  one  could  sue  on  behalf  of  others  who 
claimed  for  himself  an  interest  in  the  matter  in  controversy  dis- 
tinct from  that  of  those  whom  he  sought  to  represent ;  for  ex- 
ample, a  mortgagee  was  not  allowed  to  sue  in  b^^half  of  general 
creditors  while  enforcing  his  mortgage ;  ^^  but  recent  authorities 
seem  to  have  changed  this  doctrine. ^^  j^\\  on  whose  behalf  one 
sues  must  appear  to  have  an  interest  in  the  relief  prayed  for  by 
him. ^3  jn  such  a  suit,  the  bill  may  be  dismissed  at  any  time  be- 
fore decree  by  the  consent  of  those  who  are  joined  as  plaintiffs,^* 
but  not  afterwards,  since  by  the  decree  a  right  becomes  vested 
in  the  others. ^^  The  court  will  nearly  always  allow  a  bill  filed 
by  an  individual  in  his  own  right  to  be  amended,  so  as  to  allow 
him  to  sue  on  behalf  of  himself  and  other  members  of  a  class. ^^ 

§  47.  Illustration  of  Bills  filed  by  Representatives.  —  The  ordi- 
nary cases  of  bills  liled  by  one  person  of  a  class  on  behalf  of 
others  similarly  situated  are  bills  by  stockholders  of  corpora- 
tions ;  1  by  members  of  unincorporated  associations  ;  -  by  railroad 
bondholders,'^  of  whom  one  holding  bonds  secured  by  successive 
mortgages  may,  after  the  death  of  all  the  trustees,  sue  for  a  fore- 
closure on  behalf  of  himself  and  the  holders  of  each  class  of  the 
bonds  which  he  owns;'^  and  bills  by  creditors.^  In  a  case  where 
a  railroad  mortgaged  its  property  directly,  without  the  interven- 
tion of  a  trustee,  to  fifteen  bondholders,  naming  them,  and  the 
adequacy  of  the  security  was  doubtful ;  it  was  held  that  one 
could  not  sue  on  behalf  of  the  rest,  but  that  all  the  bondholders 
must  be  joined  as  parties  to  the  bill.^     Such  bills  may  also  be 

1^  Burney  c.  Morgan,  1  Sim.  &  S.  3-58,  §  47.  ^  Bacon  v.   Robertson,  18  How. 

36-2;  Palmer  v.  Foote,  7  Paige  (N.  Y.),  480;  Wallwortli  r.  Holt,  4  Myl.  &  Cr.  619; 

437,  Wliite  y.  Hillacre,  3  Y.  &  C.  597.  Taylor   v.    Salmon,   4   Myl.  &  Cr.   134; 

1-  Galveston  Railroad  v.  Cowdrey,  11  Hicliens   ?-.   Congreve,   4    Russell,    502 ; 

Wall.  459;  Mason  v.  Bogg,  2  Myl.  &  Cr.  Gray  c.  Cliai)lin,  2  Sim.  &  S.  267;  Crease 

443;    Story's  Eq.   PI.   §    101,  and   cases  r.  Babcock,  10  Met.  (Mass.)  532. 
tliere  cited.  '-  Bniiibiiilge  v.  Burton,  2  Beav.  5.39. 

13  Newton  y.  Earl  of  Egmont,  4  Simons,         3  Trustees   of   The   Wabash   &    Erie 

574,  585;  Jones  v.  Garcia  del  Rio,  1  T.  &  Canal  Co.   v.  Beers,  2  Blnck,  448;  Gal- 

R.  297.  veston    Railroad    v.   Cowdrey,    11    Wall. 

»4  Handford  v.  Storie,  2  Sim.  &  S.  196  ;  4.59  ;  Central  Railroad  v.  Pettus,  113  U.  8. 

Hubbell  V.  Warren,  8  Allen  (Mass.),  173.  116. 

^^  Handford  v.  Storie,  2  Sim.  &  S.  196;  *  Galveston   Railroad  c.  Cowdrey,  11 

York  c.  White,   10  Jurist,   168;  Innes  v.  Wall.  459,  478. 
Lansing,  7  Paige  (N.  Y),  583.  s  pjpk  v.  Patterson,  21  Fed.  R.  002. 

''  -Johnson  v.  Compton,  4  Simons,  47  ;  ''  Railroad  Company  v.  Urr,  18  Wall. 

Lloyd  V.    Loaring,  6  Ves.  773;  Daniell's  471. 
Ch.'  Pr.  (5tli  Am.  cd.)  236,  note  6,  and 
245,  and  cases  cited.  s 


§  48.]  SUITS   AGAINST   ONE   OR   MORE   OF   A   CLASS.  121 

filed  by  one  or  more  legatees,"  at  least  if  not  residuary  lega- 
tees;^ by  one  of  several  next  of  kin;^  by  one  of  several  part- 
ners ;  1^  by  one  of  a  class  for  the  benefit  of  which  a  charity  was 
founded;^'  and  by  one  of  the  crew  of  a  privateer  seeking  an 
account  from  a  defendant  who  has  collected  their  joint  prize 
money  .^2 

§  48.  Suits  against  one  or  more  of  a  Class.  —  Similarly,  when 
persons  who  are  jointly  liable  are  very  numerous,  some  may  be 
sued  instead  of  all,  provided  that  the  manner  in  which  they  are 
sued  and  the  fact  that  they  are  numerous  are  stated  in  the  bill.^ 
Ordinarily,  the  com})lainant  selects  such  of  the  class  as  he  chooses 
to  represent  the  rest.  In  one  case,  the  persons  thus  selected  were 
a  committee  chosen  by  the  rest  of  the  class  to  act  for  them  in  the 
matters  complained  of.^  It  is  proper,  however,  to  name  all  of  the 
class  in  the  title  to  the  bill,  and  then  have  the  court  select  some 
of  them  to  be  served  and  to  defend  for  the  rcst.^  This  rule 
applies  to  members  of  a  club*  or  other  unincorporated  associa- 
tion,^ when  sued  for  the  collection  of  its  debts  ;  and  to  the  stock- 
holders of  a  corporation  in  a  suit  brought  by  a  creditor  after  its 
dissolution  to  recover  the  amount  of  its  capital  stock  which  has 
been  divided  among  them.*^  The  equity  rule  upon  this  subject  is 
as  follows  :  "  When  the  parties  on  either  side  are  very  numerous, 
and  cannot,  without  manifest  inconvenience  and  oppressive  de- 
lays in  the  suit,  be  all  brought  before  it,  the  court  in  its  discretion 
may  dispense  with  making  all  of  them  parties,  and  may  proceed 
in  the  suit,  having  sufificient  parties  before  it  to  represent  all  the 
adverse  interests  of  the  plaintiffs  and  the  defendants  in  the  suit 
properly  before  it.  But  in  such  cases  the  decree  shall  be  without 
prejudice  to  the  rights  and  claims  of  all  the  absent  parties." ' 

"  Bennett  r.  Tlonywood,  Ambler,  708;  §48.  i  Story's  Eq.   PI.   §§   116,   117; 

Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  104,  and  cases  cited.  McArtlmr  v.  Scott,  113  U.  S.  340,  395. 

'^  Upon  tliis  point  there  is  a  conflict  of  ^  Railroad    Company    v.    Howard,    7 

authority.     Compare  Brown  v.  Ricketts,  Wall.  392. 

3  .1.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  555  ;  and  Davone  r.  Fan-  ^  Ayres  v.  Carver,  17  How.  591. 

ning,  4  J.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  199,  witli  Kettle  v.-         *  Cullen  v.  Duke  of  Queensberry,  1 

Crary,  1  Paige  (N.  Y.),  417,  note.     See  Brown   Ch.   101;    Cousins   v.  Smith,   13 

also  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  89.  Ves.  544 ;  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  116. 

»  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  105.  ^  Mandeville  v.  Riggs,  2  Pet.  482 ;  Rail- 

1"  Chancey   v.   May,    Prec    Ch.   592 ;  road  Company  v.  Howard,  7  Wall.  392. 
Small  V.  Attwood,  1  Younge,  407.  *^  Wood  v.  Dummer,  3  Mason,  315. 

n  Smith  1-.  Swormstedt,  1(3  How   288.  '   Rule   48.     McArthur    v.   Scott,    113 

12  Good  v.  Blewitt,  13  Ves.  397  ;  West  U.  S.  340,  395. 
r.  Randall,  2  Mason,  181,  194. 


122  PARTIES.  [chap.  Ill, 

§  49.  Suits  by  or  against  one  or  more  as  Representatives  of  a 
Class  claiming  a  Common  Right.  —  111  SOUie  instances  when  a 
number  of  persons  having  a  common  interest  in  the  decision  of 
a  question  of  fact  or  law,  though  they  have  no  common  interest 
in  any  property  which  is  the  subject  of  litigation,  yet,  as  they 
are  said  to  claim  under  a  common  right,  one  or  more  of  them 
have  been  allowed  to  represent  the  rest  as  plaintiffs  or  defend- 
ants in  a  suit  to  determine  the  disputed  question. ^  Ordinarily, 
the  complainant  selects  such  defendants  as  he  considers  ])roper 
and  sufficient ;  but  he  may  name  all  of  the  class  in  the  title  of 
his  bill  and  ask  the  court  to  select  a  few  to  defend  on  behalf  of 
the  rest.2  Instances  where  a  suit  of  this  kind  has  been  allowed 
by  one  or  more  as  plaintiffs  in  behalf  of  others  similarly  situated, 
have  usually  occurred  when,  though  the  plaintiff  and  those  rep- 
resented by  him  had  no  common  interest  in  property,  yet  he 
sought  a  determination  of  a  question  affecting  the  enjoyment  of 
estates  which,  though  distinct,  came  to  him  and  the  rest  from  a 
common  source.  Thus,  one  or  more  tenants  or  parishioners  may 
sue  a  lord  of  a  manor  or  parson,  to  establish  a  right  of  common,-'^ 
or  of  turbary.*  A  few  defendants  have  been  allowed  to  repre- 
sent a  large  class,  not  only  when  all  of  that  cla^^s  had  some  priority 
of  estate,  but  also  in  otlier  cases.  Thus,  a  parson  was  allowed  to 
sue  a  few  on  behalf  of  all  his  parishioners  to  establish  a  disputed 
right  to  tithes.^  A  lord  of  a  manor  may  sue  some  on  behalf  of 
all  of  his  tenants  to  establish  their  duty  to  grind  at  his  mill,  or 
his  right  of  enclosure,^  or  to  enforce  a  rent-charge.'  A  bill  was 
sustained  when  brought  by  those  interested  in  contesting  the 
legality  of  the  issue  of  certain  certificates  of  indebtedness,  against 
some  on  behalf  of  all  of  the  holders  of  sucli  certificates.^  It 
seems  that  a  bill  can  be  sustained  when  filed  by  one  claiming  the 
prior  equitable  title  to  a  tract  of  land,  against  some  on  behalf  of 
all  who  have  severally  bought  parcels  of  it  since  his  right  ac- 
crued, with  notice  thereof,  praying  that  their  conveyances  may 

§  49.  1  West  r.  Randall,  2  Mason,  181,  5  Rnnvn  r.  Vermuden,  1  Cli.  Cas.  272  , 

19.5.  Ilardcastle  i\  Sniithson,  .3  Alk.  24t;. 

2  Ayres  v.  Carver,  17  How.  .591.  ''  Brown  v.  Vermuden,  1  Cli.  Cas.  272. 

3  Anon.,  1  Cliancery  Oases,  2(59 ,  Con-         '  Attorney-General  r.  Wybiirjjii,  1  P. 
yers  v.  Lord   Ahcrsavenny,  1  Atk.  285;  Wms.599;  s  c.  2  Eq  Cas.  Abr.  107;  x\ttor- 
Brown    c    Vermuden,    1    Cli.    Cas.    272;  noy-General  c  Jack.-;on,  11  Ves.  .'iOo,  3(57 ; 
Smith    >:.    Karl   Rrownlow,  L.   R.   9  Eq.  Attorney-General  r   Shelly,  1  Salk.  162. 
241  **  Siieffield  Water  Works  v.  Yeomans, 

4  Baker  v.  Rogers,  Sel.  Ch.  Cas.  74.  L.-.R.  2  Ch.  App.  8. 


§  50.]  DEFENDANTS   WITHOUT   THE   JURISDICTION.  123 

be  set  aside  as  in  fraud  of  his  rights.^  "  And  it  has  long  been 
settled,  that  if  a  person  has  a  common  right  against  a  great  many 
of  the  king's  subjects,  inasmuch  as  he  cannot  contend  with  all 
the  king's  subjects,  a  court  of  equity  will  permit  him  to  file  a  bill 
against  some  of  them,  taking  care  to  bring  so  many  persons  be- 
fore the  court  that  their  interests  shall  be  such  as  to  lead  to  a 
fair  and  honest  support  of  the  public  interest ;  and  when  a  decree 
has  been  obtained,  then,  Avith  respect  to  the  individuals  whose 
interest  is  so  fully  and  honestly  established,  the  court  on  the 
footing  of  the  former  decree  will  carry  the  benefit  of  it  into  exe- 
cution against  other  individuals  who  were  not  parties."  ^^  Thus, 
a  city  may  file  such  a  bill  to  establish  its  right  to  levy  a  duty.^^ 
In  these  cases,  as  has  been  said,  a  decree  against  the  defendants 
before  the  court  has  been  held  in  England  to  bind  others  of  the 
same  class ;  ^^  but,  on  account  of  the  positive  language  of  the 
equity  rule  previously  quoted,  it  is  doubtful  whether  these  deci- 
sions would  be  followed  here.^'^ 

§  50.  Omission  of  Defendants  not  -within  the  Jurisdiction  of  the 
Court.  —  The  second  exception  to  the  general  rule  is,  that  per- 
sons who  cannot  be  subjected  to  the  jurisdiction  of  a  court  of 
equity  need  not  be  joined  as  ])artics  to  a  bill,  provided  that  their 
presence  is  not  indispensable  to  a  decree.  "  When  any  are  ab- 
sent from  the  jurisdiction  who,  if  within  it,  would  be  necessary 
parties  defendant,  their  presence  will  ordinarily  be  dispensed 
with,  ])rovided  an  equitable  and  effectual  decree  can  be  made 
against  those  who  have  been  served  with  process.  The  former 
English  practice  was  to  charge  in  the  bill  the  fact  of  the  ab- 
sence from  the  realm  of  any  who  otherwise  ought  to  have  been 
joined  as  defendants,  and  to  pray  that  they  might  be  served 
with  process  if  they  came  within  the  jurisdiction.  Under  the 
modern  English  system  this  strictness  is  not  required,  and  it 
seems  to  be  sufficient  if  the  excuse  for  not  making  the  absent 
parties  defendant  appears  on  the  face  of  the  bill."  ^  This  rule 
of  equity  practice  has   been   affirmed  by  statute  in  the  United 

9  Ayres  v.  Carvor.  17  How.  591.  ^^  Brown  v.  Verniuden,  1  Cli  Cas.  272; 

1'  Lord  Eldon  in  Weale  r.  West  Middle-  Lord  Eldon  in  Weale  v.  West  Middlesex 

sex   Water  Works  Co.,  1  Jac.  &  Walk.  Water  Works   Co.,  1  Jac.  &  Walk.  358, 

358,  3G0.  358,  309. 

"  City  of  London  v.  Perkins,  3  Bro.  i^  gpe    McArtliur  r    Scott,  113  U    S. 

Pari.   Cas.  602 ;  Mayor  of  York  v.  Pilk-  340,  395. 

ington,  1  Atk.  282.  §  50.   >  Judge  Foster  in  Palmer  v.  Ste- 
vens, 100  Mass.  461,  pp.  4(35,  406. 


124  PARTIES.  [chap.  III. 

States.  "  When  there  are  several  defendants  in  any  suit  at  law 
or  in  equity,  and  one  or  more  of  them  are  neither  inhabitants  of 
nor  found  within  the  district  in  which  the  suit  is  brought,  and  do 
not  vohmtarily  appear,  the  court  may  entertain  jurisdiction,  and 
proceed  to  the  trial  and  adjudication  of  the  suit  between  tlie 
parties  who  are  properly  before  it,  but  the  judgment  or  decree 
rendered  therein  shall  not  conclude  or  prejudice  other  parties  not 
regularly  served  with  process  nor  voluntarily  appearing  to  answer; 
and  non-joinder  of  parties  who  are  not  inhabitants  of,  nor  found 
within  the  district  as  aforesaid,  shall  not  constitute  matter  of 
abatement  or  objection  to  the  suit."  ^  This  statute  is,  however, 
merely  declaratory,  and  does  not  enlarge  the  power  previously 
possessed  by  courts  of  equity.^  The  power  has  been  extended  by 
rule,  and  parties  not  indispensable  to  an  equitable  decree  may  be 
omitted  if  their  joinder  would  oust  the  court  of  jurisdiction  by 
placing  persons  of  the  same  citizenship  upon  different  sides  of  a 
controversy.  "In  all  cases  where  it  shall  appear  to  the  court 
that  persons  wlio  might  otherwise  be  deemed  necessary  or  proper 
parties  to  the  suit  cannot  be  made  parties  by  reason  of  their  being 
out  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court,  or  incapable  otherwise  of 
being  made  parties,  or  because  their  joinder  would  oust  the  juris- 
diction of  the  court  as  to  the  parties  before  the  court,  the  court 
may  in  their  discretion  proceed  in  the  cause  without  making  such 
persons  parties ;  and  in  such  cases  the  decree  shall  be  without 
prejudice  to  the  absent  parties."^  "If  any  persons,  other  than 
those  named  as  defendants  in  the  bill,  shall  appear  to  be  neces- 
sary or  proper  parties  thereto,  the  bill  shall  aver  the  reason 
why  they  are  not  made  parties,  by  showing  tliem  to  be  without 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  court,  or  that  they  cannot  bo  j(^incd  without 
ousting  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  as  to  other  parties.  And  as 
to  persons  who  are  without  the  jurisdiction  and  may  proj>erly  be 
made  parties,  the  bill  may  j^ray  that  process  may  issue  to  make 
them  parties  to  the  bill  if  they  should  come  within  tlio  jurisdic- 
tion." ^  Such  being  the  general  rule,  it  remains  to  be  considered 
what  parties  are  indispensable  to  an  e(|uitable  decree.  As  has 
been  said  above,  a  court  of  equity  will  ordinarily  seek  to  have 
before   it  as   parties   all    persons   in    any  manner  interested   in 

2  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  737.     See  ConoUy  v.         •'  siiields  r.  Barrow,  17  IIow.  130,  141. 
Wells,  .33  Fed.  R."205;  Wall  v.  Thomas,         *  Kule  47. 
41  Fed.  R.  620.  ^    '^  Rule  22. 


§  50.]  DEFENDANTS   WITHOUT   THE   JURISDICTION.'  125 

the  subject-matter  of  the  litigation,  in  order  that  it  may  make  a 
decree  which  will  prevent  the  necessity  of  a  subsequent  appeal  to 
its  aid.°  This  rule,  however,  having  been  established  for  the 
promotion  of  justice,  will  be  modified  whenever  its  rigid  enforce- 
ment would  prevent  the  court  from  doing  justice  to  a  person 
invoking  its  aid.  Accordingly  it  will  proceed  to  a  decree  without 
the  presence  of  such  parties  as  cannot  be  subjected  to  its  jurisdic- 
tion, provided  it  can  determine  the  respective  rights  of  the  parties 
before  it  without  affecting  those  of  the  rest.  There  are  three 
classes  of  parties  :  Formal  parties  ;  parties  necessary  to  a  decree 
which  completely  disposes  of  the  controversy,  so  that  the  aid  of 
the  court  need  not  be  invoked  again,  but  whose  interests  are  so 
far  separable  from  those  of  the  parties  before  the  court,  that  it 
can  dispose  of  the  controversy  between  the  latter  without  affect- 
ing the  interests  of  the  former ;  and  parties  with  an  intci'cst  in 
the  controversy  "  of  such  a  nature  that  a  final  decree  cannot  be 
made  witliout  either  affecting  that  interest,  or  leaving  the  contro- 
versy in  such  a  condition  that  its  final  determination  may  be 
wholly  inconsistent  with  equity  and  good  conscience." '  Of  these 
the  first  two  classes  can  always  be  omitted,  when  they  are  beyond 
the  reach  of  the  process  of  the  court  or  their  joinder  would  oust 
its  jurisdiction.  The  rule  upon  the  subject  has  been  well  stated 
by  Mr.  Justice  Bradley.  "  The  general  rule  as  to  parties  in 
chancery  is  that  all  ought  to  be  made  parties  who  are  interested 
in  the  controversy,  in  order  that  there  may  be  an  end  of  liti- 
gation. But  there  are  qualifications  of  this  rule  arising  out  of 
public  policy  and  the  necessities  of  particular  cases.  The  true 
distinction  appears  to  be  as  follows  :  First,  when  a  person  will  l)e 
directly  affected  by  a  decree  he  is  an  indispensable  party,  unless 
the  parties  are  too  numerous  to  be  brought  before  the  court,  when 
the  case  is  subject  to  a  special  rule.  Secondly,  when  a  person  is 
interested  in  the  controversy,  but  will  not  be  directly  affected  by 
a  decree  made  in  his  absence,  he  is  not  an  indispensable  party, 
but  he  should  be  made  a  party  if  possible,  and  the  court  will  not 
proceed  to  a  decree  without  him  if  he  can  be  reached.  Thirdly, 
when  he  is  not  interested  in  the  controversy  between  the  imme- 
diate litigants,  but  has  an  interest  in  the  subject-matter,  which 
may  be  conveniently  settled  in   the   suit,  and   thereby  prevent 

®  §  42.  "  Mr.  Justice  Curtis  in  Shields  v.  Bar- 

row, 17  How.  130,  139. 


126  PARTIES.  [chap.  hi. 

further  litigation,  he  may  be  a  party  or  not  at  the  option  of  the 
complainant."  ^ 

§  51.  Formal  Parties  w^ho  may  be  omitted  when  without  the  Juris- 
diction.—  Formal  parties  are  those  with  a  naked  legal  title  but 
no  equitable  interest  in  the  subject-matter  of  the  controversy. 
If  the  persons  really  interested  are  before  the  court,  formal 
parties  can  always  be  omitted  if  without  the  jurisdiction ;  ^  and 
their  joinder,  no  matter  whether  as  plaintiffs  or  defendants,  can- 
not oust  the  court  of  jurisdiction,  as  they  are  in  reality  upon 
neither  side  of  the  controversy .^  Such  are,  a  husband  against 
whom  no  relief  is  sought,  in  a  suit  by  his  wife  to  enforce  the 
trusts  of  a  marriage  settlement ;  ^  one  or  all  of  the  trustees  of  a 
railroad  or  canal  mortgage  not  opposing  the  foreclosure  in  a 
bondholder's  foreclosure  suit ;  *  trustees  of  prior  railroad  mort- 
gages in  a  suit  for  the  foreclosure  of  a  subsequent  mortgage 
and  the  sale  of  the  mortgaged  property  subject  to  their  liens  ;^ 
and  parties  with  the  naked  legal  title  having  no  interest  in  the 
controversy.^  A  person  against  whom  an  injunction  is  souglit, 
unless  he  consents  thereto,  is  never  a  nominal  party.' 

§  52.  Parties  whose  Interest  is  Separable.  —  The  second  class  is 
not  so  easy  to  define ;  and  it  is  difficult  to  mark  the  limits  be- 
tween this  and  the  third  class  of  parties  who  are  always  indis- 
pensable. It  includes  all  having  an  interest  in  the  controversy 
so  far  separable  from  that  of  those  before  the  court  that  a  decree 
can  be  made  and  enforced,  which  disposes  of  the  matter  in 
dispute  between  the  latter  without  affecting  their  rights.^     Thus, 


^  Williams  r.  Bankhead,  19  Wall.  563,  Canal   Co  ,    1   Feil.   TJ.  361 ;    Walden  v. 

571.  Skinner,  101  U.  S.  577,  588. 

§  51.   1  Simms  o.  Guthrie,  9   Cranch,  5  Pacific  R.  R.  v.  Ketclium,  101  U.  S. 

19.25;  Wormley  y.  Wormley,  8  Wheat.  289,298. 

421,451,  Boon's   Heirs  /■    Chiles,  8  Pet.  *'  Simms  iv  Guthrie,  9  Cranch,  19,  25; 

532;  Union   Rank  of  Louisiana   v.   Staf-  Boon's  Heirs  r.  Chiles,  8  Pet.  532 ;  Union 

ford,  12   How.  327;  New  Orleans  Canal  Bank  of  Lf)uisiana  v.  Stafford,  12  How. 

&  Banking  Co.  v.  Stafford,  12  How.  343.  327;  New  Orleans  Canal  &  Banking  Co. 

•^  Wormlev    v     Wormley,   8     Wheat,  v.    Stafford,    12    How.    343,    Walden    c. 

421,451;  Removal  Cases,  100  U.  S  457;  Skinner,   101   U.   S.   577,  588;  Bacon  v. 

Pacific  R   R.  V.  Ketchum,  101  U.  S.  289;  Rives,  ]()()  U.  S.  99. 

Walden  y.  Skinner,  101  U.  S.  577  ;  Harter         "  Ward   v.  Arredondo,  1   Paine,  410; 

V  Kernochan,  103  U.  S.  562.  Mills  v.  Hurd,  32  Fed.  R.  127. 

2  Wormley     '•.    Wormley,    8    W^heat.  §  52.    >  Cameron      r.     McRoherts,     3 

421  ;  Taylor  V.  Holmes,  14  Fed.  R.  409.  Wlieat.  591  ;  Mallow  >:.  Hinde,  12  Wheat. 

But  see  Watts  !•.  Waddle,  1  McLean,  200.  193;  Gridley  v.  Wynant,  23  How.  500; 

4  Pacific  R.  R.  ;;.  Ketchum,  101  U.  S.  Horn  r.  Lockhart,  17  Wall.  570;  Nesmith 

289,  299;  Stewart  v.  Chesapeake  &  Ohio  r.  (Talvert,  1  Woodb.  &  M.  34. 


§  52.]  PARTIES   WHOSE    INTEREST   IS    SEPARABLE.  127 

a  trustee  or  director,  beyond  the  jurisdiction,  has  been  hold 
properly  omitted  in  a  suit  against  his  colleagues  on  account  of  a 
breach  of  trust.^  For  a  trustee's  liability  is  joint  and  several.^ 
One  of  the  next  of  kin  *  may  sue  an  administrator  and  his 
sureties ;  and  a  legatee,^  at  least  if  not  a  residuary  legatee,  may 
sue  an  executor  to  recover  his  share  of  a  decedent's  estate  with- 
out joining  the  rest  of  the  class  to  which  he  belongs.  It  seems, 
that  the  executor  of  a  dead  debtor  need  not  be  a  party  to  a  bill 
brought  by  a  creditor  of  the  estate  to  obtain  payment  out  of 
assets  in  the  hands  of  a  legatee.^  Subsequent  lienors  are  not 
indispensable  parties  to  a  foreclosure  suit."  In  a  suit  against  a 
firm  by  strangers,  a  partner  beyond  the  jurisdiction  may  probably 
be  omitted  if  no  injustice  will  be  done  him  by  a  decree  in  his 
absence.^  It  has  been  held  that  in  a  suit  by  one  partner  against 
another  for  an  account  of  money  received  by  the  defendant  in 
excess  of  his  share  of  the  firm  assets,  partners  beyond  the  juris- 
diction may  be  omitted  if  it  appears  that  each  has  received  his 
full  share  of  the  joint  property.^  When  one  of  two  joint  contrac- 
tors has  fraudulently  released  his  interest  in  the  contract,  he  is 
not  an  indispensable  party  to  a  bill  filed  by  his  associate  against 
the  other  party. ^'^  "  The  owners  of  partial  interests  in  contracts 
for  land,  acquired  subsequently  to  their  execution,  are  not  neces- 
sary parties  to  bills  for  their  enforcement.  The  original  parties 
on  one  side  are  not  to  be  mixed  up  in  controversies  between  the 
parties  on  the  other  side,  in  which  they  have  no  concern."  ^^  An 
heir  may  file  a  bill  for  the  specific  performance  of  a  contract  en- 
titling his  ancestor  to  purchase  land  without  bringing  in  the  per- 
sonal representative  of  his  ancestor,  provided  that  he  offers  him- 

2  Parsons  v.  Howard,  2  Woods,  1,  5;  129;  Union  Bank  of  Louisiana  v.  Staf- 
Heath  v.  Erie  Ry.  Co.,  8  Blatclif  C.  C  ford,  12  Howard,  827;  New  Orleans  Ca- 
345;  Hazard  i-.  Durant,  19  Fed.  R.  471,  nal  &  Banking  Co.  v.  Stafford,  12  How. 
476.  But  see  Wall  v.  Thomas,  41  Fed.  343;  Howard  v  Railway  Co.,  101  U.  S. 
R.  020.  837. 

3  Parsons  v.  Howard,  2  Woods,  1,  5;  ^  Cowslad  u.  Cely,  Free.  Ch.  83;  Dar- 
Heath  v.  Erie  Ky.  Co  ,  8  Blatcli.  347.  went  v.  Walton,  2  Atk.  510,  Calvert  on 

*  Payne  v.   Hook,  7   Wall.  425.     See,  Parties,   Book  III.,  ch.   xxiii.  ;   Vose   v. 

however.  West  v.  Randall,  2  Mason,  181 ;  Philbrook,  3  Story,  C.  C.  335.     But  con- 

Wisner  v.  Barnet,  4  Wash.  C.  C.  031,  G42  ;  tra,  Parsons  v.  Howard,  2  Woods,  1 ,  Bell 

Greene  v.  Sisson,  2  Curtis,  171.  v.  Donohoe,  17  Fed.  R.  710. 

^  Dandridge   c.  Washington's  Execu-         ^  Towle  r.  Pierce,  12  Met.  (Mass.)  329. 
tors,  2  Pet.  377.     See  West  v.  Randall,  2        i'^  Canal  Co.  v.  Gordon,  6  Wall.  561. 
Mason,  181.  ^'  Mr.  Justice  Field  in  Willard  v.  Tay- 

«  Milligan  v.  Milled^e,  3  Cranch,  220,  loe,  8  Wall.  557,  571.     But  see  Ploxie  v. 

'  Brewster  v.  Wakefield,  22  How.  118,  Carr,  1  Sumner,  173 


128  PARTIES.  [chap.  III. 

self  to  provide  for  the  payment  of  the  purchase-money. ^^  Specific 
performance  of  a  contract  for  the  sale  of  land  may  be  enforced 
against  one  of  several  joint  tenants  without  joining  the  others  with 
him  as  defendants. ^^  The  assignor  of  a  claim  is  not  a  necessary 
party  to  a  suit  upon  it  by  his  assignee  ^*  unless  the  assignment  be 
executory.!^  A  railway  company  is  not  an  indispensable  party 
to  a  bill  against  its  receiver  to  enforce  specific  performance  of  a 
contract  made  by  it.^^^  The  directors  of  a  corporation  are  not 
indispensable  parties  to  a  suit  by  a  stockholder  to  restrain  it  from 
acting  in  violation  of  his  rights.^"  To  a  bill  to  restrain  the  direc- 
tors of  a  corporation  from  negotiating  a  fraudulent  sale  of  its 
property,  the  person  to  whom  the  sale  is  about  to  be  made  is  not 
an  indispensable  parity  if  no  contract  has  been  made  with  him.^^ 
To  a  suit  by  one  indorser  of  a  bill  of  exchange  to  restrain  the 
collection  of  a  judgment  for  the  amount  of  the  bill  against  him^ 
upon  the  ground  that  the  bill  had  been  paid  !)y  another  indorser, 
the  latter  indorser  is  not  a  necessary  party. ^^  To  a  bill  by  a 
creditor  to  satisfy  a  judgment  out  of  land  in  a  debtor's  possession, 
but  fraudulently  conveyed  by  him  to  a  person  beyond  the  juris- 
diction of  the  court,  the  person  in  whose  name  the  land  stood  has 
been  held  not  to  be  an  indispensable  party.^o  To  a  bill  to  enjoin 
the  execution  of  a  judgment  of  ejectment  and  to  decree  a  con- 
veyance of  lands,  when  the  plaintiffs  had  an  equitable  title  only, 
the  persons  wdiose  legal  title  the  complainants  asserted  were  held 
properly  omitted,  when  no  relief  was  prayed  against  them,  and 
their  joinder  would  have  ousted  the  court  of  jurisdiction.-^  It 
has  been  said,  that,  to  a  bill  by  a  private  individual  to  enjoin  the 
maintenance  of  a  public  nuisance,  neither  persons  jointly  inter- 
ested with  him  nor  those  jointly  guilty  with  the  defendant  are 
indispensable  partics.^^  It  has  been  suggested  that  the  absence 
of  one  person  guilty  of  a  joint  fraud  might  not  prevent  the  court 

12  Proutu.  Roby,  15  Wall.  471.  Co.,  4  Blitclif.   C    C  489;   Wallace  v. 

"  Steplien  v.  Bcall,  22  Wall.  .",29.  Holmes,  9  Blatohf  C  C  05. 

'»  Hatesville  Institute  r.  Kauffman,  18  !»  Atkins  v.  Dick.  14  Pet.  114. 

Wall.  151  ;  Trecothick    v.  Austin,  4  Ma-  20  McCoy  r.  Klioiles,  11  How.  181,  141 

son,  16.  21  Simms  r.  Cxiitlirie,  9  Cranch,  19.  25. 

15  Land  Co.  of  New  Mexico  v.  Elkins,  See  also   Boon's   Heirs  1:  Chiles,  8  Pet. 

20  Fed.  R.  545.  6.S2.     But  compare  Mallow  ;•    Ilinde,  12 

'"'  Express  Co.  v  Railroad  Co.,  99  U.  S.  Wheat.  19.3.     A  border  case  is  Elmendorf 

191.  V.  Taylor,  10  Wheat.  152. 

'"  Heath   v.  Erie   Ry.  Co.,  8   Blatchf.  2.!  Mississippi  &  Missouri  R.  R.  Co.  v 

C  C.  347.  Ward,  2  Blackf.  485. 

1^  Abbot   V.    American    Hard   Rubber 


§  53.]         PARTIES  INDISPENSABLE  TO  A  DECREE,  129 

from  taking  jurisdiction  over  the  others.^^  In  an  action  by  a 
creditor  of  a  corporation  to  enforce  the  individual  liability  of  its 
directors  or  stocivholders,  or  to  collect  unpaid  assessments  or  sub- 
scriptions from  them,  he  cannot  usually  sue  alone  at  law,  but 
should  file  a  bill  in  equity  in  behalf  of  himself  and  the  other  cred- 
itors,-* if  any ;  and  he  may  ordinarily  make  one,  some,  or  all  the 
stockholders  parties  according  to  his  pleasure.^^  A  State  is  not 
an  indispensable  party  to  a  bill  seeking  to  restrain  its  officers 
from  levying  for  its  benefit  an  illegal  tax  i"^  nor,  it  has  been  held, 
to  a  bill  to  prevent  their  illegal  issue  of  land  warrants  for  property 
which  it  had  agreed  to  convey  to  the  plaintiff ;  2"  nor  to  a  bill  to 
restrain  their  unlawful  issue  of  bonds  which  would  diminish  the 
value  of  bonds  held  by  the  complainant.^^  To  such  l)ills  the 
persons  to  whom  the  unlawful  issue  of  bonds  or  land  warrants  is 
about  to  be  made,  are  not  indispensable  partics.^^ 

§  53.  Parties  indispensable  to  a  Decree.  —  No  suit,  however,  can 
proceed  unless  the  court  have  before  it  as  parties  all  persons  who 
will  be  directly  affected  by  the  decree  sought,  or  whose  obedience 
is  necessary  to  its  enforcement,  when  it  does  not  appear  that 
they  consent  thereto.^  A  person  is  affected  by  a  decree  when  his 
rights  against,  or  liability  to  any  of  the  parties  to  the  suit  is 
thereby  determined.  If  a  decree  in  favor  of  the  complainant 
would  cast  a  cloud  upon  another's  title,  that  person,  it  seems,  is 
thereby  directly  affected.^  A  State  is  an  indispensal^le  party  to 
a  bill  against  its  officers  to  compel  specific  performance  by  them 
for  it  of  its  contract  for  the  sale  of  land  ;^  or  to  establish  a  claim 
to  property  held  by  its  officers  claiming  a  title  in  the  State 
thereto  ;*  or  to  corporate  stock  registered  in  its  name,  the  certi- 

2'  Judge  Foster  in  Palmer  v.  Stevens,  9   Wlieat.   738 ;   Dodge   r.   Woolsey,   18 

100  Mnss.  401,  46G.     See  also  Heath  r.  How.  3.31. 

Erie  Railway  Co.,  8  Blatchf.  C.  C.  347.  27  pavis  r.  Gray,  16  WsiW.  203;  Han- 

Biit  see  Bell  v.  Donolioe,  17  Fed.  R.  710;  cock  r   Walsh,  3   Woods,  351.     But  see 

Wall  V.  Thomas,  41  Fed.  R.  620.  Cunningham  v.  Macon  &  Brunswick  R. 

2'!  Hornor   v.   Henning,  93  U.   S.  228;  ,R.  Co.,  109  U.  S.  440,  453. 

Terry  v.  Little,  101   U.  S.  216;  Terry   v  28  Board  of  Liquidation  v.  McComb,  92 

Tubman,  92  U.  S.  156;  Pollard  v.  Bailey,  U.  S.  531. 

20  Wall.  526 ;  Welles  r.  Graves,  41  Fed.  29  navis  v.  Gray,  10  Wall.  203,  233. 

R.  450.  §5.3.  'See  §55.   But  sec  Eagle  Manuf. 

25  Ogilvie  i:  Knox  Ins.  Co.,  22   How.  Co.  ;•   Miller,  41  Fed.  R.  351. 

380;    Hatch    r.    Dana,    101    U.    S    205;  2  Young  y.  Gushing,  4  Biss  456. 

Manufacturing  Company  v.  Bradley,  105  ^  Preston  v.  Walsh,   10  Fed.  R.  315. 

U.  S.  175.                                              "  See  also  Walsh  v.  Preston,  100  U   S  297. 

26  Osborn  ;■.  Bank  of  the  United  States,  *  Cunningham  r.  Macon  &  Brunswick 


R.  R.  Co.,  109  U.  S.  446. 


VOL.  I.  —  9 


130  PARTIES.  [chap.  III. 

ficates  of  which  are  held  by  its  officers ;  ^  or  to  enjoin  its  officers 
from  commencing  a  suit  in  its  name;^  but  not,  it  has  been  held, 
to  a  bill  by  the  United  States  against  a  private  individual  to  can- 
cel a  contract  between  him  and  the  State  for  the  purchase  of 
land  obtained  by  the  State  from  the  plaintiff  tli rough  mistake 
or  fraud."  The  trustee  of  an  active  trust  is  a  necessary  party 
to  a  suit  affecting  the  trust  estate.*^  Every  party  to  a  contract, 
whether  of  sale  or  for  another  purpose,  except  a  pai'ty  who  has 
released  his  interest,^  is  ordinarily  a  necessary  party  to  a  suit  to 
enforce  it ;  ^*^  or  to  set  it  aside ;  ^^  or,  unless  its  performance  would 
amount  to  a  nuisance,'^  to  enjoin  a  person  from  carrying  it  into 
effect,^^  even  it  has  been  held  in  a  case  at  circuit  when  the  other 
parties  are  co-trustees  beyond  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court.^^ 
Thus,  a  railway  company  is  an  indispensable  party  to  a  suit  to 
enjoin  another  railway  company  from  constructing  a  road  under 
a  lease  by  it.^^  To  a  bill  against  the  administrator  with  the 
will  annexed  of  Kosciuszko,  claiming  a  legacy  under  an  alleged 
codicil  to  the  will,  foreigners  claiming  the  assets  of  the  deceased 
as  heirs-at-law  were  held  necessary  parties. ^^  To  a  bill  between 
partners  for  an  accounting,  all  the  surviving  partners  and  the 
representatives  of  a  deceased  partner,  even  when  alleged  to  be 
insolvent,  are,  it  seems,  indispensable  parties,^'  unless  it  can 
be  shown  that  each  of  those  omitted  has  received  his  full  share 
of  the  assets,  and  that  no  claim  is  made  against  him.^^     To  a  par- 

5  Christian  v.  Atlantic  &  N.  C.  R.  R.  ing  Machine  Company  v.  Singer  Manuf. 

Co.,  13.J  U.  S.  233.  Company,  4  Fisher's  Pat.  Cas.  32'J  ;  s.  c. 

e  /»  re  Ayers,  123  U.  S.  443.  8    Biatclif.    C.    C.    113;     Chadbourn    v. 

7  Williams  t-.  United  States,  138  U.  S.  Coe,  45  Fed.  R.  822.     Rut    see    French 

514,510.  V.    Shoemaker,  14   Wall.    314;    West    v. 

**  McRe/i  v.  Brnnch  Bank  of  Alabama,  Duncan,  42  Fed.  R.  4."]0. 

19  How.  376;  O'Hara  v.  MacConnell,  93  i-  Mississippi   &  Missouri  R.  R.  Co.  r. 

U.  S.  1.50;  Thayer  o.  Life    Association,  Ward,  2  Black,  485. 

112  U.S.  717;    American  Bible   Society  i-'  Northern     Indiana     R.    R.     Co.     >: 

1-.  Price,  110  U.  S.Gl.  Michigan    Central    R.    R.    Co.,  15  How. 

^  Canal  Company  v.  Gordon,  6  Wall.  233.     But  see  Ileriot  v.  Davis,  2  Woodb. 

5G1.  &  M.  229;  Boon's  Heirs  ?•.  Chiles,  8  Pet. 

If  Mallow    V.    Hinde,  12    Wheat.   193;  532. 

Shields  >:  Barrow,  17  How.  130 ;  Gregory  i'  Wall  r.  Thomas,  41  Fed.  R.  G20. 

V.  Stetson,  133  U.  S.  579.  -5  Nortiiern     Indiana    R.     R.     Co.     v. 

"Shields    r.    Barrow,    17    How.    1.30;  Michigan  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  15  How.  233. 

Coiron  r.  Millaudon,  19  How.  113  ;  Gay-  '"  Armstrong  v.  Lear,  8  Pet.  .52. 

lords  (.'.  Kelshaw,  1    Wall.  81  ;  Ribon    v.  '^'  Bank   r.  Carrollton   R.  R.,  11   Wall. 

Railroad  Comi)anips,  10  Wall.  440;  Law-  624;  Bartle  >•.  Coleman,  3  Cranch,  C.  C. 

rencer.Wirtz,  1  Wash.  C.  C.  417;  Tol.in  283;  Gray    r.   Larrimore,   2    Abb.  C.  C. 

V.    Walkinshaw,    1    McAll.    20;    Bell    r.  542. 

Donohoe,  17  Fed.  R.  710;  Florence  Sew-  i^  Towlc  v.  Pierce,  12  Met.  (Ma<s  )  329. 


§  53.]         PARTIES  INDISPENSABLE  TO  A  DECREE.  131 

tition  suit  all  of  the  tenants  in  common  are  indispensable  parties.^^ 
A  person  in  possession  under  a  claim  of  a  title  or  interest  in  prop- 
erty is  a  necessary  party  to  a  suit  affecting  it.^^  The  mortgagor 
is  a  necessary  party  to  a  suit  by  the  mortgagee  against  a  third 
person  to  remove  a  cloud  upon  the  title.^^  It  is  the  safer  practice 
to  join  the  mortgagor  as  a  party  defendant  to  a  bill  by  the 
mortgagee  of  a  patent  seeking  an  injunction  against  its  infringe- 
ment Avitli  damages  or  an  account  of  profits.'^^  The  mortgagor 
is  not  an  indispensable,  although  he  is  a  proper  party,  to  a  bill  to 
collect  a  mortgage  from  a  purchaser  who  has  assumed  it ;  when 
before  the  bill  is  filed  the  mortgaged  property  was  sold  upon  the 
foreclosure  of  a  prior  mortgagees  To  a  bill  to  enforce  specific 
performance  of  a  contract,  providing  for  the  sale  of  land  the  title 
to  which  was  in  one  party,  and  its  distribution  between  both 
parties  to  the  contract,  when  filed,  after  the  death  of  each,  by 
the  personal  representatives  of  the  one  as  complainants,  against 
the  heirs-at-law  of  the  other  as  defendants,  the  executors  of  the 
defendant's  ancestor  are  necessary  if  not  indispensable  parties 
defendant,  and  the  hcirs-at-law  of  the  complainants'  decedent  are 
not."'^*  All  a  man's  heirs-at-law  are  indispensable  parties  to  a  bill 
by  one  of  them  to  set  aside  a  sale  of  his  proi)erty  under  a  decree  ; 
and  to  such  a  bill  the  party  to  the  former  suit  at  whose  instance 
the  sale  was  made  is  also  an  indispensable  party .^^  All  a  woman's 
heirs  have  been  held  necessary  parties  to  a  bill  to  set  aside  a 
marriage  settlcment.^^  To  a  bill  by  a  stockholder  to  set  aside 
the  foreclosure  of  a  railroad  mortgage,  the  trustees  of  the 
mortgage  foreclosed,  the  mortgagor,  the  purchaser,  and  enough 
of  the  stockholders  and  bondholders  as  consented  to  the  fore- 
closure to  represent  the  remainder,  are  indispensable  parties.^" 
A  corporatif)n  or  its  receiver  ^^  must  be  a  party  to  a  suit  to  enforce 
a  right  against  a  third  person  which  the  corporation  refuses  to 
assert.29    The  trustees  and  county  treasurer  of  an  Iowa  township 

w  Barney  v.  Baltimore   City,  G  Wall.  24  Seymour  v.  Freer,  8  Wall.  202,  218. 

280.             '                                  "  See  Prout  r.  IJoby,  15  Wall.  471. 

2'^  Williams  v.BankIiea.1, 19  Wall.  503;  -^  Hoe  ;■.   Wilson,  9  Wall.    501;  Ilar- 

Young  V.  Ciisliing,  4  Riss.  4^)C).     But  see  wood  v.  Railroad  Co  ,  17  Wall.  78. 

Rinffo  v.  Binns.  10  Pet.  2('>'.),  281.  20  McDonnell  v.  Iviton,  18  Fed.  R.  710. 

21  Rettes  r.  Dana,  2  Sumner,  SS.I.  27  ]|ii,oii    r.    Hailroail    Companies,    16 

22  Waterman  v.  Mackenzie,  1?.8  U.  S.  Wall.  440. 

252.  201  ;  quoted  snpm,  §  44,  note  12.  28  porfer  v.  Sabin,  .36  Feil.  R.  475. 

2^  Kelly    I'.    Ashford,    133    U.    S.   610,         29  D.ivenport  r.  Dows,  18  Wall.  G20  ; 
620.  New  Jersey  Central   P.  R.  Co.  v.  Mills, 


132  PARTIES.  [chap.  III. 

are  necessary  parties  to  a  suit  by  a  taxpayer  to  prevent  the  pay- 
ment to  their  holder  of  bonds  claimed  to  be  invalid.^'^  It  seems, 
that  the  principal  debtor,  or  his  assignee  in  bankruptcy  or  insol- 
vency, is  a  necessary  party  to  a  suit  against  a  surety .-^^  To  a  suit 
by  a  creditor  to  enforce  a  lien  upon  property  through  a  trust- 
deed  made  for  the  benefit  of  a  surety,  both  the  trustee  and  his 
beneficiary  are  indispensable  parties,  although  the  property  is 
in  the  possession  of  neither  of  them ;  but  if  filed  in  a  double 
aspect,  either  for  the  complainant's  individual  benefit,  or  on  be- 
half of  the  other  creditors  of  the  principal  debtor,  a  sale  may  be 
ordered  without  having  the  surety  or  his  trustee  before  the 
court.'^''^  So,  a  debtor,  or  if  a  bankrupt  or  insolvent,  his  assignee, 
is  a  necessary  party  to  a  creditor's  suit  to  enforce  a  lien  ^^  or 
levy  31  upon  property  in  which  the  debtor  has  an  interest,  or  to 
collect  2^  a  debt  due  the  debtor.  A  corporation  must  be  joined 
as  a  defendant  to  a  bill  filed  by  a  creditor  to  apply  to  the  pay- 
ment of  its  indebtedness  money  due  it  from  its  stockholders  ;  ^^ 
and  to  a  bill  to  compel  a  transfer  upon  its  books  of  stock  which 
stands  in  the  name  of  another  than  the  complainant.^'  To  a  bill 
by  a  legatee  against  the  husband  of  a  residuary  legatee  or  devisee 
to  obtain  payment  of  the  complainant's  legacy  from  assets  in  the 
defendant's  possession,  the  residuary  legatee  herself,  or,  if  she  be 
dead,  her  personal  representative,  is  a  necessary  party ,3^  at  least 
when  it  does  not  appear  that  she  or  her  personal  representative 
is  without  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court.  To  a  bill  to  foreclose  a 
mortgage  by  an  executor,  it  was  held  that  all  devisees  of  any 
part  of  the  property  were  indispensable  parties. ^^ 

It  was  held  in  a  case,  the  authority  of  which  may  be  doubted, 
that  in  a  suit  to  compel  the  execution  of  a  mortgage  and  its  fore- 


113  U.  S  240,  256;  Bell  v.  Donohoe,  17  ^5  United  States  v   Howlanrl,  4  Wlieat. 

Fed.  R  710  108. 

35  Sully    V.    Drennan,    11.3    U    S.    287.  *^  BriRliam  r.  Luddinston,  12  Blatolif. 

Compare  Ilarter  v.  Kernoclian,  10.3  U   S.  C.  C.  2o7  ;  First  National  Bank  v.  Smith, 

562.  6   Fed.   11    215 ;  Dormitzcr  r.  Illinois   & 

31  Robertson  i'.  Carson,   19  Wall.  0».  St.  L.  Bridije  Co.,  6  Fed.  R.  217  ;  Walsh 

See  also   Russell  v.  Clark,  7  Crancli,  09.  r.  Memphis,  C.  &  N.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  6  Fed. 

But  compare  Rule  51.  R.  797. 

82  McRea  v.  Branch  Bank  of  Alabama,  ^7  Kenditr    r.    Dean.    97    U.    S.   423; 

19  IIow.  376.  Roirers  r.  Nortwick,  45  Fed.  R.  513.    But 

•*3  Russell  »  Clark,  7  Cranch,  69  ;  Rob-  see  Gould  v.  Mead,  41  Fod.  R.  240,  248. 

ertson  v   Carson,  19  Wall    94.     But  see  •'**  Lewis  r.  Darlinir,  16  IIow.  1. 

Heriot  v.  Davis,  2  Woodb.  &  M  229.  39  Detweiler   v.   Ilolderbaum,  42   Fed. 

»^  Wilson  V.  City  Bank,  3  Sumner,  422.  }l  337.     See  §  22. 


§  55.]      WHEN   A   PEESON   CONSENTS    TO    THE    RELIEF   SOUGHT.  133 

closure,  prior  incumbrancers  and  others  claiming  an  interest  in 
the  mortgaged  property  were  necessary  parties,  when  it  did  not 
appear  that  their  joinder  was  impossible  or  would  oust  the  juris- 
diction.**^ In  one  case,  where  a  bill  was  filed  to  stay  proceedings 
in  ejectment,  the  court  required  the  nominal  defendant  at  law  to 
be  joined  as  a  co-plaintiff  with  the  real  person  interested  ;  although 
it  did  not  appear  what  citizenship  he  had."^^ 

§  54.  When  Numerous  Interests  have  been  created  for  the  Pur- 
pose of  preventing  the  Plaintiff  from  obtaining  Equitable  Relief.  — 
When  numerous  interests  have  been  created  for  the  purj)ose  of 
preventing  a  person  from  obtaining  equitable  relief,  the  English 
courts  allowed  the  persons  to  whom  these  interests  were  thus 
conveyed  to  be  omitted  from  the  bill,  if  the  original  owner  of  the 
property  thus  divided  were  made  a  defendant.^  The  rule  and  the 
reasons  for  it  are  thus  stated  by  Calvert  in  his  valuable  woriv  on 
Parties  :  "  If  a  party  has  divided  an  interest  amongst  a  number  of 
persons  for  this  purpose,  the  court,  in  order  that  the  contrivance 
may  be  frustrated,  and  the  equitable  relief  may  be  obtained,  allows 
the  suit  to  proceed  in  their  absence.  Such  a  division  is  in  reality 
a  fraud ;  an  attempt  to  defeat  justice  by  converting  the  general 
rule  of  the  court  into  an  obstruction  to  the  ordinary  proceedings. 
The  court  defeats  tlie  fraud  by  refusing  to  enforcing  the  gen- 
eral rule."  ^  Lord  Hardwicke  said  upon  this  subject  :  "  Where 
a  mortgagee  who  has  a  plain  redeemable  interest  makes  several 
conveyances  upon  trust,  in  order  to  entangle  the  affair,  and  to 
render  it  difficult  for  a  mortgagor  or  his  representatives  to  redeem, 
there  it  is  not  necessary  that  the  plaintiff  should  trace  out  all 
tlie  persons  who  have  an  interest  in  such  trust,  to  make  them 
parties."  ^  This  rule  might,  perhaps,  be  extended  here  to  a  case, 
where  an  attempt  had  been  made  to  defeat  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
Federal  court  by  a  merely  colorable  conveyance  to  a  person  of  the 
same  citizenship  as  the  complainant.* 

§  55.  When  a  Person  consents  to  the  Relief  Sought.  —  A  J>orsou 
who  consents  to  the  relief  sought,  when  it  is  so  stated  in  the  bill, 

«  Caldwell  v.  Taggart,  4  Pet.  100.  ^  Calvert  on  Parties  (2(1  ed.),  Gl. 

"  Hyde  r.  Folsrer,  4  McCIean,  2-5.5.  3  Yates  v.  HamMy,  2  Atk.  237,  2:>8. 

§  54.  1  Calvert    on   Parties   (2d  ed.),  *  See   Union    Bank   of    Louisiana   v. 

Book  I.  ch.  iv.,  p.  61  ;  Yates   v.  Hambly,  Stafford,    12    How.   327  ;    New    Orleans 

2   Atk.   237.     See   also    Union    Bank   of  Canal  &  Banking  Co.  c  Stnfford,  12  How. 

Louisianx  v.  Safford,  12  How.  327 ;  New  343 ;    Leather    Manufacturers'    Bank    v. 

Orleans  Canal  &  Banking  Co.  v.  Stafford,  Cooper,  120  U.  S.  778,  781. 
12  How.  313. 


134  PARTIES.  [chap.  III. 

need  not  be  joined  as  a  defendant  with  the  other  parties  inter- 
ested, unless  his  presence  is  indispensable  for  their  protection.^ 
Sometimes  the  plaintiff  is  required  to  execute  a  satisfactory  un- 
dertaking that  the  party  omitted  will  conform  to  the  decree.^ 
Similarly,  a  person  who  disclaims  all  interest  in  the  subject- 
matter  may  also  be  omitted,  unless  his  joinder  is  essential  to  the 
protection  of  the  rights  of  the  other  defendants.^  An  agreement 
between  two  persons  that  one  shall  represent  the  other  as  plain- 
tiff, when  the  former  would  otherwise  have  no  right  to  the  relief 
sought,  will  not  be  sanctioned  by  the  court.* 

§  56.  When  the  Plaintiff  waives  his  Right  against  a  Person.  — 
"Where  a  plaintiff,''  says  Lord  Hurdwicke,  "  is  only  concerned  in 
interest,  there  he  may  waive  his  demand,  and  omit  making  the 
party  a  defendant  to  his  bill."  ^  In  accordance  with  this  practice, 
the  equity  rules  provide  that  "  in  suits  to  execute  the  trusts  of  a 
will,  it  shall  not  be  necessary  to  make  the  heir-at-law  a  party ; 
but  the  plaintiff  shall  be  at  liberty  to  make  the  heir-at-law  a  party 
when  he  desires  to  have  the  will  established  against  him."^  Such 
a  waiver  cannot,  however,  be  made  unless  it  can  be  without  preju- 
dice to  those  against  whom  the  bill  is  filed.^ 

§  57.  When  the  Interest  of  an  absent  Person  is  evidently  very 
small.  —  In  England  it  lias  been  held,  in  accordance  with  the 
maxim  de  minimis  non  curat  lex,  that  when  the  interest  of  an 
absent  person  is  evidently  very  small  the  court  will  dispense  with 
his  presence  in  the  suit.^  This  view  seems  to  be  sanctioned  by  two 
decisions  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States. ^ 

§  58.  When  the  Right  of  Administration  is  in  Dispute.  —  The 
English  rule  was,  that  when  tiiere  was  a  contest  in  tlie  Ecclesias- 
tical Court  over  the  right  of  administration  upon  a  decedent's  es- 
tate, the  omission  in  a  bill  affecting  that  estate  of  an  administrator 

§55.  1  Mechanics' Bank  of  Ale.xanilria  '  Rule  50,  copiefl  from  the  olst  Order 

r.  Seton,  1  Pet.  299,  .306;  Calvert  on  Far-  in  Chancery  of  August,  1841. 
ties  (2(1  oil.),  Book  I.  ch.  v.,  pp  69,  84.  ^  Anon.,  2  Eq.  Cas    Abr.  ItJO,  pi.  G; 

^  Calvert  on  Parties  (2(1  ed.),  Book  1.  Story's  Ecj.  PI.  §  lo9. 
ch.  v.,  p.  ()9;  Kirk  i?.  Clark,  Prcc.  in  Ch.  §57.    ^  Calvert  on    Parties    (2(1   cd.), 

275;  Harvey  v.  Cooke,  4   Russ.  35,  55;  Book  I.  ch.  v.,  p.  70;  Daws  r.  Benn,  1  J. 

Bawtree  v.  Wat.son,  3  M.  &  K.  .3:'/),  340.  &  W.  518  ;  Attorney-General  v.  Goddard, 

a  Vattier  v.  Ilindo,  7  Pet.  252,  258.  1  T.  &  R.  348,  .350.     Sec  also  Faulkner  v. 

*  Rylands  v.  Latouclie,  2  Blisli,  579.  Daniel,  3  Hare,  199,  218. 

§  50.  1  Williams  v.  Williams,  9  Mod.  -  Union  Bank  of  Louisiana  v.  Stafford, 

299.     See  also  Wilson  y  Todd.  1  M.  &  C.  12    How.    327;    New    Orleans    Canal    & 

42,  40;  Calvert  on  Parties  (2d  ed.),  83,  Banking  Co.  u.  Stafl()rd,  12  How.  343. 
and  cases  cited. 


§  60.]      RESTATEMENT  OF  THE  RULES  AS  TO  PARTIES.        135 

might  be  excused  if  special  circumstances  were  shown.^  If,  how- 
ever, no  proceeding  in  the  Ecclesiastical  Court  were  pending,  one 
must  be  instituted  before  the  bill  could  be  filed.^ 

§  59.  Relaxation  of  Rule  as  to  Parties  in  Special  Cases.  —  The 
rules  upon  the  subject  of  parties  are,  however,  very  loose,  and  the 
questions  arising  under  them  are  decided  largely  in  the  discretion 
of  the  court.i  "  The  necessity  for  the  relaxation  of  the  rule  is 
more  especially  apparent  in  the  courts  of  the  United  State,  where, 
oftentimes,  the  enforcement  of  the  rule  would  oust  them  of  their 
jurisdiction,  and  deprive  parties  entitled  to  the  interposition  of  a 
court  of  equity  of  any  remedy  whatever."  ^  A  court  of  equity 
adapts  its  decrees  to  the  necessities  of  each  case ;  and  should  a 
suit  brought  by  a  single  complainant  concerning  a  matter  in 
which  others  as  well  as  himself  were  interested  terminate  in  a 
decree  against  the  defendants,  it  is  easy  to  do  substantial  justice 
to  all  the  parties  in  interest,  and  prevent  a  multiplicity  of  suits, 
by  allowing  the  other  persons  similarly  situated  with  the  plaintiff, 
"either  through  a  reference  to  a  master,  or  by  some  other  proper 
proceeding,  to  come  in  and  share  in  the  benefit  of  the  litigation."^ 
The  discretion  as  to  the  joinder  or  omission  of  parties  is,  however, 
one  which,  when  properly  raised,  is  subject  to  review  upon  appeal.* 
An  act  of  Congress  relaxing  or  extending  the  rules  as  to  parties 
in  a  particular  case  is  constitutional.^ 

§  60.  Restatement  of  the  Rules  as  to  Parties.  —  The  rules  upon 
the  subject  may  be  summarily  though  roughly  stated  thus :  — 

I.  All  persons  not  too  numerous,  and  whose  joinder  will  not 
oust  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court,  who  have  any  direct  interest  in 
obtaining  or  resisting  the  relief  prayed  for  in  a  bill  or  granted  in 
a  decree  which  so  disposes  of  the  controversy  as  to  prevent  any 

§  58.  1  Plunket  v  Penson,  2  Atk.  51  ;  Woods,   1  ;  Winter  v.  Ludlow,  3  Phila. 

Penny  v.  Watts,  2  Pliillips,  149,  154  ;  Cal-  (Pa.)  464. 

vert  on  l^arties  (2d  ed.),  Book  I.  ch.  v.,  -  Mr.  Justice  Davis  in  Payne  v.  Hook, 

p.  70.  7  Wall.  425,  432. 

-  Penny  v.  Watts,  2  Pliillips,  149,  154 ;  ^  ^j.  Justice  Davis  in  Payne  v.  Hook, 

Calvert  on  Parties  (2d  ed.),  Book  I.  cii.  v.  7  Wall.  425,  4o2.     See  s.   c.  as  Hook  i-. 

§  59.    1  Cameron     v.     McRoberts,     3  Payne,  14  Wall.  252. 

Wheat.    591;    Elmendorf  y.    Taylor,    10  *  Caldwell  c.  Tasisart,  4  Pet.  190  ;  Rob- 

Wlieat.  152,  107;  Lewis  v.  Darling,  10  ertson   v.   Carson,  19   Wall.   94;   Hoe   v. 

How.   1  ;    Barney    v.   Baltimore    Cit\',    6  Wilson,  9  Wall.  501  ;    Railroad  Company 

Wall.  280;  Payne  v.  Hook,  7  Wall.  425;  v.  Orr,  18  Wall.  471. 

Barney  v.  Latliara,  103  U.  S.  205;  Greene  ^  United  States  o.  Union  Pacific  R.  R., 

v.  Sisson,  2  Curtis,  171 ;  West  v.  Randall,  98  U.  S.  509. 
2    Mason,    181;    Parsons   v.    Howard,  2 


136  PARTIES.  [chap.  III. 

future  litigation  coiiceruiug  the  same,  must  be  parties  to  a  suit 
in  equity.^ 

II.  No  person  without  an  interest  in  tlie  contest  or  its  settle- 
ment can  be  joined  as  a  party  except  the  officer  or  member  of  a 
corporation,  who  may  be  made  a  defendant  to  a  bill  praying  re- 
lief against  it,  in  order  to  compel  from  him  a  discovery  of  facts  of 
which  he  acquired  knowledge  in  his  official  capacity.^ 

III.  If  the  persons  having  a  common  interest  in  the  subject  of 
the  controversy  or  the  question  to  be  decided  therein  are  numer- 
ous, they  may  in  certain  cases  be  represented,  as  plaintiffs  or  de- 
fendants, by  others  who  hold  the  legal  title  in  trust  for  them,  or 
by  one  or  more  of  their  number  suing,  or  more  rarely  being  sued, 
in  their  behalf.^ 

IV.  Persons  having  a  mere  formal  interest,  or  an  interest  so 
far  separable  from  that  of  the  principal  parties,  that  a  decree  dis- 
posing of  the  controversy  as  between  the  latter  can  be  made  and 
enforced  without  affecting  their  rights,  may  always  be  omitted 
when,  by  reason  of  their  residence  or  citizenship,  not  within  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  court.* 

V.  All  persons  who  have  such  an  interest  in  the  controversy 
that  a  deci'ce  cannot  be  enforced  without  directly  affecting  their 

'rights,  must  be  joined  as  parties  ;  except  possibly  when  their  inter- 
est is  very  small,  or  has  been  created  for  the  purpose  of  depriving 
the  court  of  jurisdiction.^ 

VI.  There  is  no  need  of  joining  as  parties  any  against  whom 
the  plaintiffs  waive  their  rights,  or  who  are  willing  to  allow  the 
relief  prayed  for  in  the  bill,  unless  their  presence  is  necessary  for 
the  protection  of  those  who  have  been  made  defendants.^ 

VII.  The  necessity  of  tlie  joinder  of  parties  is  always  in  the 
sound  discretion  of  the  court,  which  adapts  itself  to  the  facts  of 
each  particular  case." 

§  61.  Objection  for  Want  of  Parties.  — An  objection  that  there 
is  a  defect  of  parties  may  be  taken  by  demurrer,  ))lea,  or  answer,^ 
or  at  the  hearing ;  and  if  the  absent  persons  are  indispensal)lc 
parties,  even  for  the  first  time  upon  appeal ;  ^  although  not  if  a 

§  60.   1  §§  42,  4.3,  50.  "  §  ^O. 

2  §44.  §  til.   1  YoT  the   rules  rcpulatinp  tlie 

3  §§  40,  47,  48.  manner  of  takinf:^  the  nhjection,  see  the 
*  §§  5f>.  ''"'li  52.  chapters  on  tho.se  pleailinj,'s. 

6  §§  5P,,  54,  57.  2  Hoe  v.  Wilson,  9  Wall.  501. 

6  §55. 


§  61]  OBJECTION   FOR   WANT   OF   PARTIES.  137 

decree  lias  been  made  which  cannot  prejudice  their  interests.^ 
"  If  a  defendant  shall,  at  the  hearing  of  a  cause,  object  that  a  suit 
is  defective  for  want  of  parties,  not  having  by  plea  or  answer 
taken  the  objection,  and  therein  si)eciried  by  name  or  description 
the  parties  to  whom  the  objection  ai)plies,  the  court  (if  it  shall  think 
fit)  shall  be  at  liberty  to  make  a  decree  saving  the  rights  of  ab- 
sent parties."  '^  The  usual  practice  is  for  the  court,  if  it  considers 
the  objection  good,  to  allow  the  cause  to  stand  over  until  the 
plaintiff  shall  amend  his  bill  by  bringing  in  the  additional  parties 
needed.^  If  the  omitted  parties  on  account  of  their  citizenship 
cannot  be  brought  in,  the  court  may  retain  the  bill,  and  perhaps 
continue  an  injunction  in  accordance  with  its  prayer,  until  the 
complainants  have  had  a  reasonable  time  to  litigate  the  matters 
in  controversy  between  themselves  and  the  omitted  parties  in  a 
court  of  competent  jurisdiction ;  and  if  it  should  then  ajipcar  by 
the  judgment  of  such  a  court  that  the  complainants  have  in  equity 
a  superior  title  to  the  omitted  parties,  proceed  to  a  determination 
of  the  rights  between  the  parties  to  the  bill.^  If,  however,  the 
complainant  does  not  within  a  reasonable  time  amend  his  bill, 
or,  if  so  allowed  by  the  court,  proceed  against  the  omitted  parties, 
the  court  may  dismiss  his  bill  ;  but  such  dismissal  must  be  with- 
out prejudice.'''  "  Where  the  defendant  shall,  by  his  answer, 
suggest  that  the  bill  is  defective  for  want  of  parties,  the  plaintiff 
shall  bo  at  liberty,  within  fourteen  days  after  answer  filed,  to  set 
down  the  cause  for  argument  upon  that  objection  only  ;  and  the 
purpose  for  which  the  same  is  so  set  down  shall  be  notified  by  an 
entry,  to  be  made  in  the  clerk's  order-book,  in  the  form  or  to  the 
effect  following  (that  is  to  say)  :  '  set  down  upon  the  defendant's 
objection  for  want  of  parties.'  And  where  the  plaintiff  shall  not 
so  set  down  his  cause,  but  shall  proceed  therewith  to  a  hearing, 
notwithstanding  an  objection  for  want  of  parties  taken  by  the 
answer,  he  shall  not,  at  the  hearing  of  the  cause,  if  the  defendant's 
objection  shall  then  be  allowed,  bo  entitled  as  of  course  to  an  order 
for  liberty  to  amend  his  bill  by  adding  parties,  but  the  court,  if  it 
thinks  fit,  shall  be  at  liberty  to  dismiss  the  bill."  ^  A  lack  of  proper 
parties  is  not  a  jurisdictional  defect ;  and  therefore,  if  pending  the 

8  §§52,53.     See  Keller  y.  Asliforrl,  1.33  6  Mallow  v.   Hinde,    12   Wheat.   193, 

U.  S.'OIO,  626.  198,  190. 

4  Rale  53.  '  Mallnw  v.   Hinde,   12   Wlieat.    19.3, 

5  Hunt  V.  Wickliffe,  2  Pet.  201,  215.  190 ;  Hunt  v  Wickliffe,  2  Pet.  201,  215. 

8  Rule  52. 


138 


PARTIES. 


[chap.  III. 


decision  of  the  court,  upon  an  objection  for  the  omission  of  a 
party  whose  presence  would  oust  the  circuit  court  of  jurisdiction, 
he  dies,  and  the  defect  is  thereby  cured,  the  court  will  retain  the 
bill.9 

§  62.  Objection  for  Joinder  of  Improper  Parties.  —  If  persons  are 
improperly  joined  as  plaintiffs,  all  the  defendants  may  demur.i 
If  a  person  is  joined  as  a  plaintiff  without  his  consent,  he  may 
on  motion  upon  notice  to  all  parties  have  his  name  stricken  out 
with  costs  to  be  paid  by  the  plaintiff  who  has  improperly  brought 
him  into  the  suit.^  If  a  person  having  no  interest  in  the  contro- 
versy be  improperly  joined  as  defendant,  he  alone  can  demur.^ 
And  no  notice  of  his  demurrer  need  be  given  to  the  other  defend- 
ants,* except  in  special  cases  where  it  is  clearly  for  the  latter's 
interest  to  retain  him  in  the  suit.  If  a  misjoinder  is  apparent 
on  the  face  of  the  bill  it  is  more  prudent  to  demur.  If  such  an 
objection  is  not  made  till  the  hearing,  tbe  court  may  disregard  it.^ 
It  cannot  be  raised  for  the  first  time  upon  appeal.*^  When  a  de- 
murrer is  sustained  in  favor  of  defendants  improperly  joined  as 
having  no  interest  in  the  controversy,  the  plaintiff  will  always  be 
allowed  to  amend  by  striking  out  their  names."  If  the  bill  is  dis- 
missed for  a  misjoinder  of  complainants  and  one  of  them  appears 
to  have  a  good  cause  for  equitable  relief,  the  dismissal  must  be 
without  prejudice.^ 


9  Harrison  v.  Rowan,  4  Wash.  C.  C. 
202,  208. 

§  62.  1  Cuff  V.  Platell,  4  Russ.  242  ; 
King  of  Spain  v.  Machado,  4  Russ.  225; 
Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  544. 

2  Calvert  on  Parties  (2ii  ed.),  430; 
Keppell  V.  Bailey,  2  M.  &  K.  517  ;  Tit- 
terton  v.  Osborne,  1  Dickens,  350;  Wil- 
son V.  Wilson,  1  J.  &  W.  459. 

3  Wliitbeck  0.  Edgar,  2  Barb.  Ch. 
(N,  Y.)  106;  Seymour  v.  Freer,  8  Wall. 
202,  218 ;  Buerk  v  Imliaeuser,  8  Fed.  R. 
457  ;  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  544. 

*  Anon.,  9  Ves.  512  ;  Ilodson  v.  Ball, 


11  Simons,  459,  Calvert  on  Parties  (2d 
ed.),  4:30. 

^  Story  /'.  Living.^ton,  1-3  Pet.  350; 
Fades  )•.  "Harris,  1  Y.  &  C.  N.  R.  2-35; 
Raffety  r  King,  1  Keen,  001 ;  Mosley  v. 
Taylor,  cited  in  1  Keen,  601,  s.  c  2  Y.  & 
J  520,  Calvert  on  Parties  (2d  ed.),  1.56 ; 
Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  544. 

'^  Livingston  v.  Woodworth,  15  How. 
546. 

"  Tryon  v.  Westminster  Improvement 
Comm'rs,  6  Jurist,  n.  s   1324. 

"  House  V.  Mullen,  22  Wall.  42. 


§  63.]  INFORMATIONS.  139 


CHAPTER   IV. 

BILLS. 

§  63.  Informations.  —  The  first  proceeding  in  a  suit  in  equity 
is  the  preparation  and  filing  of  the  first  pleading.  This  was  either 
an  information,  a  bill,  or  an  information  and  bill.  In  England, 
the  attorney-general  or  solicitor-general  could  file  an  information 
on  behalf  of  the  crown,  or  of  those  who  either  as  idiots  and 
lunatics  partook  of  its  prerogative,  or  whose  rights,  as  those  in 
charities,  were  under  its  particular  protection.  The  law  officers 
of  the  royal  consort  had  the  same  right.  If  the  suit  did  not 
immediately  concern  the  rights  of  the  crown,  a  relator,  who  sus- 
tained and  directed  the  litigation,  was  usually  joined  with  the 
officer  in  whose  name  it  was  filed.  The  main  distinction  between 
an  information  and  a  bill  was,  that,  whereas  the  latter  was  in  the 
form  of  a  petition  to  the  court;  in  the  former  the  officer  that  filed 
it  stated  tlie  case  by  way  not  of  petition  or  complaint,  but  of 
information  to  the  court  of  the  rights  which  the  crown  claimed 
on  behalf  of  itself  or  others,  and  of  the  invasion  or  detention  of 
those  rights  for  which  the  suit  is  instituted.  If  the  relator  had 
a  personal  interest  in  the  relief  sought,  his  personal  complaint 
was  joined  to,  and  incorporated  with  the  information  given  to 
the  court  by  the  officer  of  the  crown  ;  and  the  pleading  was 
termed  an  information  and  bill.^  The  proceedings  upon  an 
information  could  only  abate  by  the  death  or  determination  of 
interest  of  the  defendant.  If,  however,  the  information  were 
filed  at  the  instance  of  one  or  more  relators  and  all  died,  the 
court  would  not  allow  the  cause  to  proceed  till  an  order  had 
been  obtained  giving  leave  to  insert  the  name  of  a  new  relator, 
and  one  had  been  inserted  accordingly.  Otherwise,  proceedings 
upon  informations  were  substantially  the  same  as  upon  bills, 
except  that  great  laxity  of  practice  was  permitted  when  infor- 
mations were  filed  on  behalf  of  charities,^     In  the  courts  of  the 

§  63.   1  Mitford's  PI.  ch.  1.  ^  Mitford's  PI.  ch.  1  ;  Story's  Eq.  PI. 


140  BILLS.  _,  [chap.  IV. 

United  States,  it  has  been  held  to  be  the  proper  practice  for 
the  government  to  sue  in  equity  in  its  own  name  by  a  bill  simi- 
lar to  one  filed  by  a  private  citizen  ;3  but  a  pleading  styled  an 
information  filed  on  behalf  of  tlie  United  States,  being  in  sub- 
stance a  bill,  was  sustained  as  such,*  and  so  was  one  filed  on 
behalf  of  the  United  States  by  the  district  attorney  for  the  north- 
e;'n  district  of  New  York.^  In  the  suit  brought  by  the  State 
of  Florida  against  the  State  of  Georgia  to  settle  the  boundary 
between  them,  the  attorney-general  of  the  United  States  was 
permitted  to  file  an  information  praying  "that  he  be  permitted  to 
appear  in  said  case,  and  be  heard  in  behalf  of  the  United  States, 
in  such  time  and  form  as  the  court  shall  order;"  and,  although 
permission  for  him  to  take  testimony  in  the  name  of  Florida  with 
its  consent  was  refused,  it  was  "  Ordered,  that  the  attorney- 
general  have  leave  to  adduce  evidence,  either  written  or  j^arol, 
and  to  examine  witnesses  and  file  tlieir  depositions,  in  order  to 
establish  the  boundary  claimed  by  the  United  States."*^  Infor- 
mations have,  however,  been  filed  in  equity  in  the  courts  of  some 
of  the  individual  States."  "  When  the  United  States  comes  into 
a  court  of  equity  as  a  suitor,  it  is  subject  to  the  defences  peculiar 
to  that  court."  ^  Sucli  an  information  or  bill  should  be  filed  in 
the  name  of  the  United  States,  not  in  the  name  of  one  of  its  law 
officers.^ 

§  64.  Definition  and  Classification  of  Bills.  —  The  usual  course, 
and  the  only  one  open  to  a  private  citizen,  is  the  filing  of  a  bill. 
The  word  bill  is  derived  from  tlie  Latin  libellus ;  and  such  a 
pleading  is  sometimes  called  an  English  bill;  because  at  the 
time  when  pleadings  at  common  law  were  in  Law  Latin  or  Law 
French,  it  was  as  now  written  in  the  English  language.^  A  bill 
is  a  petition  addressed  to  the  judges  of  a  court  of  equity,  con- 
taining a  statement  of  the  facts  which  in  the  plaintiff's  opinion 

8  Benton    v.    Woolsey,    12    Pet.    27  ;  4  Wall.  2-32.     See  Benton  v.  Woolsey,  VI 

United  States  i-.  Hughes.  11    How.  552,  Pet.  27. 

568 ;  s.  c.  as  Hughes  r.  United  States,  4  ^  Benton  v.  Woolsey,  12  Pet.  27. 

Wall.  2.72 ;   Mississippi  &  Missouri  R.  R.  «  Florida  i'.  Georgia,  17  How.  478,  480, 

Co.  V.  Ward,  2  Black,  485,  4'J2  ;    United  523. 

States  V.   Union  Pacific   R.  R.,  98  U.  S.  '  See  for  example  Attorney-General  v. 

50!);  Moffat  r.  United  States,  112  U.  S.  Butler,  12.3  Mass.  300. 

24;    United   States  v.  Minor,  114  U.  S.  ^  United   States  v.  White,  17  Fed.  R 

233.  501,. 505. 

■•United    Rintes    ;<.    Huglic*.    11    How.  '•*  Benton  »».  Woolsey.  12  Pet.  27. 

5-52. 508;  8  c.  as  Hughes  c  United  States,  §  ^4.    ^  Story's  Va^  I'l.  §  7. 


§  64.]  CLASSIFICATION    OF    BILLS.  141 

give  him  a  right  to  sue,  and  concluding  with  a  prayer  for  the 
relief  to  which  he  deems  hinitielf  entitled. 

Quis,  quid,  coram  quo,  quo  jure  petatur,  et  a  quo, 
liecte  cumpositus  quisque  libellus  habet- 

Bills  are  divided  by  the  books  into  three  classes:  original  bills, 
bills  not  original,  and  bills  in  the  nature  of  original  bills.  A 
fourth  class,  which  may  be  termed  original  bills  in  the  nature  of 
bills  not  original,  is  recognized  by  the  Federal  courts.  Original 
bills  are  those  which  relate  to  some  matter  not  before  litigated 
in  the  court  at  equit}'-  by  the  same  parties  standing  in  the  same 
interests.  Bills  not  original  are  those  which  relate  to  some  mat- 
ter already  litigated  in  the  court  at  equity  by  the  same  parties, 
or  their  representatives,  and  which  are  either  an  addition  to,  or 
a  continuance  of  an  original  bill,  or  botli.  Bills  in  the  nature 
of  original  bills  are  those  which  serve  to  bring  before  the  coui't 
the  proceedings  and  decree  in  a  former  suit,  for  the  purpose  of 
either  obtaining  the  benefit  of  the  same  or  procuring  the  reversal 
of  the  decision  made  therein.^  Original  bills  in  the  nature  of 
bills  not  original  are  those  having  all  the  characteristics  of  origi- 
nal bills,  except  that  the  Federal  courts  will  take  jurisdiction 
of  them  without  regard  to  the  citizenship  of  the  parties,  or  the 
other  limitations  of  the  original  F'ederal  jurisdiction.'*  Original 
bills  are  of  two  kinds :  those  which  pray  relief,  and  those  which 
do  not  pray  relief.  Original  bills  which  pray  relief  are  said  to 
belong  to  three  classes*  bills  which  pray  the  decree  of  the  court 
concerning  some  right  claimed  by  the  plaintiff  in  opposition  to 
some  right  claimed  by  the  defendant,  bills  of  interpleader,  and 
bills  of  certiorari.  Original  bills  not  praj'ing  relief  are  of  two 
kinds  :  bills  to  perpetuate  the  testimony  of  witnesses,  and  bills 
of  discovery.  Bills  not  original  are  bills  of  revivor,  supple- 
mental bills,  and  bills  of  revivor  and  supplement.  Bills  in  the 
nature  of  original  bills  are  bills  in  the  nature  of  supplemental 
bills,  bills  in  the  nature  of  bills  of  revivor,  cross-bills,  bills  of 
review,  bills  impeaching  decrees  upon  the  ground  of  fraud,  bills 
to  suspend  the  operation  of  decrees  on  special  circumstances  or 
to  avoid  them  on  the  ground  of  matter  subsequent,  and  bills  par- 

2  Com.  Dig.  Chancery  E  2  ;  Story's  Eq.  *  Minnesota  Co.  r.  St.  Paul  Co.,  2  Wall. 

Pi.  §  2o.                                               '  r.OO ;  Krippendorf  v.  Hyde,  110  U.  S.  270 ; 

^  Mitford's  PI.  ch.  1,  §  2;   Story's  Eq.  Pacific;  Kailroad  of  Mi,<soiiri  v.  Missouri 

PI.  §  IG.  Pacific  Ky.  Co.,  Ill  U.  S.  605. 


142  BILLS.  [chap.  IV. 

taking  of  the  qualities  of  some  one  or  more  of  these  bills.^  If 
the  court  has  jurisdiction  of  an  original  bill,  it  will  take  jurisdic- 
tion of  bills  not  original,  and  bills  in  the  nature  of  original  bills 
growing  oat  of  the  first  suit,  without  regard  to  the  citizenship 
of  the  parties  thereto.^  And  in  certain  other  cases  it  will  take 
jurisdiction  of  bills  otherwise  original  which  are  so  intimately- 
connected  with  matters  before  the  Federal  court  that  it  is  in  the 
interest  of  convenience  and  justice  to  have  them  disposed  of 
before  the  same  tribunal."  These  may  be  named  original  bills 
in  the  nature  of  bills  not  original.  Such  is  a  bill  to  obtain 
a  judicial  construction  of  previous  decrees;'  a  bill  to  obtain  a 
determination  of  the  rights  of  a  claimant  to  a  fund  in  the  hands 
of  a  Federal  marshal ;  ^  a  bill  to  stay  proceedings  at  law  ;  ^  and  a 
bill  to  set  aside  a  decree.^*^  The  peculiarities  in  the  form  and  the 
procedure  upon  original  bills  not  praying  relief,  bills  not  original, 
and  bills  in  the  nature  of  original  bills,  will  be  discussed  in  the 
latter  part  of  this  work.  In  this  chapter,  the  form  of  original 
bills  praying  relief  and,  in  the  chapters  immediately  succeeding, 
the  proceedings  upon  them,  will  be  explained,  beginning  with 
the  ordinary  kind,  —  bills  which  seek  relief  concerning  some  right 
claimed  by  the  plaintiff  in  opposition  to  one  claimed  by  the 
defendant. 

§  65.  Frame  of  a  Bill  in  Equity.  —  Formerly,  bills  usually  con- 
sisted of  nine  parts  :  the  direction  or  address,  the  introduction, 
the  premises  or  stating  part,  the  common-confederacy  clause,  tlie 
charging  part,  the  jurisdiction  clause,  the  interrogating  part, 
the  prayer  of  relief,  and  the  prayer  of  process.^  Of  these,  how- 
ever, the  common-confederacy  clause,  alleging  that  the  defendant 
or  defendants  are  combining  and  confederating  with  some  persons 
to  the  plaintiff  unknown,  whose  names  when  discovered  he  prays 
leave  to  insert  as  defendants,  which  owed  its  origin  to  an  idea 
that  otherwise  the  bill  could  not  be  amended  so  as  to  add  new 

5  Mitford's  PI.  ch.  I,  §  2  ;  Story's  Eq.  »  Logan   v.   Patrick,   5   Cranch,  288  ; 

PI.  §§  1(5-24.  Dunn  v.  Clarke,  8  Pet.  1;  Jones  v.  An- 

c  Clarke   ;-.  Matliewson,  12  Pet.  104;  drcws,  10  Wall.  327,  303  ;  Dunlap  v.  Stet- 

Joncs    1-.   Andrews,    10  Wall.    327,  333 ;  son,  4  Mason,  3411 

PaeificK.K.  of  Missouri  I'. Missouri  Pacific  ^'  Pacific  Railroad  of  Missouri  »•.  Mis- 

Ry.  Co.,  Ill  U.  S  505.     See  §  21.  souri  Pacific  Railway  Company,  111  U.  S. 

7  Minnesota  Co  v.  St.  Paul  Co.,  2  Wall.  505. 

609.     See  §  21.  §  f>5.   i  Mitford's  PI.  cli.  1,  §  3;  Story's 

s  Krippendorf  v.  Hvdo.  110  U.  S.  276;  Eq.  PI.  §§  2G-4«. 
Freeman  r.  Howe,  24  How.  4-30. 


§  66.]  ADDRESS    AND    INTRODUCTION.  143 

defendants,  and  its  retention  to  the  practice  of  taxing  costs 
according  to  tlie  length  of  the  documents  filed ;  the  charging 
part,  alleging  the  defence  which  it  anticipated  would  be  made 
by  the  defendant,  and  the  repl}'  which  the  plaintiff  intended  to 
make  thereto  ;  and  the  jurisdiction  clause,  alleging  that  the  acts 
of  the  defendant  which  were  complained  of  were  contrary  to 
equity,  and  that  the  plaintiff  was  without  any  remedy  at  law : 
were  not  even  then  considered  necessary  by  the  best  authorities,^ 
and  by  the  equity  rules  have  been  expressly  declared  super- 
fluous.^ 

§66.  The  Address  and  Introduction.  —  In  England,  a  bill  in 
chancery  was  required  to  be  addressed  to  the  person  having  the 
custody  of  the  great  seal,  usually  either  the  sovereign  or  the 
Lord  Chancellor,  except  when  the  Lord  Chancellor  himself  was 
the  complainant,  when  it  was  addressed  to  the  sovereign  "  in  his 
high  court  of  chancery."  ^  Li  the  United  States,  as  a  great  seal 
is  not  as  in  England  essential  to  the  validity  of  writs  in  equity, 
a  bill  is  addressed  to  the  judge  or  judges  of  the  court  where  it  is 
filed.2  The  introduction  formerly  contained  the  names,  descrip- 
tions, and  residences  of  the  complainants,  together  with  the 
character  in  which  they  sued,  if  in  a  representative  capacit3%  and 
such  other  allegations  as  were  necessary  to  found  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  court.^  Sometimes  the  names  and  descriptions  of  the  de- 
fendants were  also  here  inserted,  but  it  was  more  usual  to  name 
them  in  the  next  part  of  the  bill.*  The  equity  rules  regulate 
the  subject  as  follows :  "  Every  bill  in  the  introductory  part 
thereof  shall  contain  the  names,  places  of  abode,  and  citizenship 
of  all  the  parties,  plaintiffs  and  defendants,  bj^  and  against  whom 
the  bill  is  brought.  The  form,  in  substance,  shall  be  as  follows  : 
'  To  the  judges  of  the  circuit  court  of  the  United  States  for  the 

district  of  :  A.  B.,  of  ,  and  a  citizen  of  the  State  of 

,  brings  this  his  bill  against  C.  D.,  of  ,  and  a  citizen  of 

the  State  of  ,  and  E.  F,  of ,  and  a  citizen  of  the  State 

of  .     And  thereupon  your  orator  complains  and  says  that,' 

&c."  ^     If  one  of  the  parties  is  a  corporation  the  bill  must  state 

2  Mitford's  PI.  ch.  1,  §  3  ;  Lnngdeirs  Eq.  3  Mitford's  PI.  ch.  1,  §  3;  Story's  Eq. 

ri.  §  55  ,•  Story's  Eq.  11.  §§  20,  H-J,  :3;5,  34 ;  PI.  §  26. 

Coinstock  (;.  Herron,  45  Fed.  R.  GGO.  <  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  20.     Contra  Lcavcn- 

»  Hide  21.  worth  v.  Pepper,  32  Fed.  R.  718. 

§0(3.     1  Mitford's  PI.  ell.  l.§  3;  Story's  ^  Hule2n;  United  Stnfes  r.  Pratt  Coid 

Fq.  PI.  §  26.              -^  Rule  20.  &  Coke  Co.,  18  Fed.  H.  708 ;  §  00. 


144  BILLS.  [CHAr.  IV. 

by  or  under  the  laws  of  what  State  it  was  created,  and  its  mem- 
bers will  then  be  conclusively  presumed  to  be  citizens  of  that 
State.^  If  one  of  tiie  [)ai'ties  is  an  alien,  it  should  aver  that  he  is 
"  a  citizen  and  subject  of  a  foreign  State,"  specifying  that  State's 
name.'  How  advantage  could  be  taken  of  an  omission  in  the 
introduction  of  the  residence  of  the  parties,  whether  by  demurrer 
or  simply  by  a  motion  for  security  for  costs,  was,  under  the  old 
practice,  a  doubtful  question.^  The  bill  is  certainly  demurrable 
if  enough  does  not  appear  upon  its  face  to  show  the  court's  juris- 
diction.^ A  defect  in  this  respect  in  the  introductory  part  of  a 
bill  is,  it  seems,  not  cured  by  an  allegation  in  its  title  or  caption.^*^ 
It  has  been  said  that  no  one  can  be  made  a  defendant  under  a 
fictitious  name  ;  ^^  but  in  an  English  case  where  the  parents  of  an 
infant,  who  was  a  necessary  defendant  to  a  bill,  refused  to  have 
her  baptized  in  order  to  interpose  difficulties  in  the  plaintiff's 
way,  Sir  John  Leach  ordered  that  she  should  be  described  as 
"  the  youngest  female  child  of  A.  B.  (naming  her  father)  and 
C.  D.  (naming  her  mother)."  ^^  Although  this  part  of  the  bill 
should  contain  the  statement  that  the  complainant  sues  on  be- 
half of  others  as  well  as  himself,  if  he  intends  so  to  do,  it  has 
been  suggested  that  this  might  not  be  necessary  when  his  case 
is  founded  upon  a  statute  "  which  itself  gives  that  force  and 
direction  to  the  bill."^^ 

§  67.  The  Narrative  Part  of  a  Bill.  —  The  most  important  por- 
tion of  a  bill  in  equity  is  the  narrative  or  stating  part.  This 
contains  the  plaintiff's  cause  of  action.  "  It  should  set  forth  the 
plaintiff's  case  in  a  clear  and  distinct  narrative,  with  the  facts 
relied  u})on  as  the  basis  of  the  suit.  For  convenience,  each  para- 
graph should  be  numbered,  so  that  the  successive  allegations  may 
be  readily  referred  to.^  The  oV)ject  of  old  common-law  pleading 
was  to  bring  the  matter  in  controversy  to  certain  distinct  issues. 
In  equity  pleading  no  such  attempt  is  made.  The  statement  of 
the  plaintiff's  case  in  the  bill  differs  little  in  language  or  form 

6  Lafayette  Ins.  Co.  v.  French,  18  How.  i"  Jackson  v.  Ashton,  8  Pet.  148.     See 

404;    Mullor    v.   Dows,  91   U.    S.   444;  Sharon  u.  Hill,  2-3  Fed.  R,  333. 

Steanisliip  Co.  v.  Tuginan,  100  U.  8.  118.  ii  Kentucky  Silver  Mining  Co.  r.  Day, 

"  Wilson  V.  Citv  Bank,  3  Sumner,  422.  2  Sawyer  C.  C.  468. 

8  Rowley  v.  Ecclcs,  1   Sim.  &  S.  611;  12  Ei^^^y  y_  Broughton,  2  Sim.  &  S.  188. 

Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2(1  Am.  eel.),  409.  ^^  Irons    v.  Manufacturers'  Nat.  Bank 

3  Bingham  r.  Cabot,  3  Dall.  382;  .Jack-  of  Chicago,  17  Fed.  R.  308. 

son  V.  Ashton,  8  Pet.  1 18  ;  United  States  v.  §  07.    1  An  omission  to  do  this  will  not 

Pratt  Coal  &  Coke  Co.,  18  Fed.  H.  708.  be  a  defect  in  pleading. 


§  68.]  SCANDAL    AND    IMPERTINENCE.  145 

from  any  other  statement  of  facts  which  might  be  drawn  up  for 
the  information  of  third  parties,  say  an  application  to  a  govern- 
ment board.  The  defendant's  answer  usually  admits,  or  denies, 
or  qualifies  seriatim  each  statement  in  the  bill ;  and  occasionally, 
before  proceeding  to  notice  the  statement  in  detail,  the  defendant 
gives  a  general  history  of  the  case  from  his  own  point  of  view. 
The  issues,  both  of  fact  and  of  law,  are  thus  often  involved  in 
large  masses  of  statement,  and  have  to  be  selected,  so  to  speak, 
by  the  judge  who  tries  the  cause,  with  the  assistance  of  the 
arguments  of  counsel.  It  would  be  difficult  to  imagine  a  less 
technical  document  than  a  bill  in  equity."  ^  The  bill  must  con- 
tain every  fact  essential  to  the  plaintiff's  cause  of  action.  For 
no  evidence  will  be  admitted  or  considered  to  prove  any  fact  not 
alleged  in  it.^  It  must  plead  every  fact  essential  to  the  rights  of 
the  plaintiff,  and  necessarily  within  his  knowledge  positively,  not 
upon  information  and  belief,"*  and  with  certainty.*''  Otherwise,  it 
is  demurrable.  An  allegation  that  an  event  occurred  on  or  about 
a  certain  specified  day  is,  however,  sufficient.^  And  less  certainty 
is  required  concerning  facts  of  which  a  discovery  is  sought  from 
the  defendant.'' 

§  68.  Scandal  and  Impertinence.  — "  Every  bill  shall  be  ex- 
pressed in  as  brief  and  succinct  terms  as  it  reasonably  can  be, 
and  shall  contain  no  unnecessary  recitals  of  deeds,  documents, 
contracts,  or  other  instruments,  in  liaec  verba,  or  any  other  im- 
pertinent matter,  or  any  scandalous  matter  not  relevant  to  the 
suit."  ^  "  Facts  not  material  to  the  decision  arc  impertinent,  and 
if  reproachful  they  are  scandalous ;  and,  perhaps,  the  best  test 
by  which  to  ascertain  whether  the  matter  be  impertinent  is  to 
try  whether  the  subject  of  the  allegation  could  be  put  in  issue, 
and  would  be  matter  proper  to  be  given  in  evidence  between  the 

•  Lectures  lefore  the  Law  School  of    620;    Mitford's  PI.  40;   Story's  Eq.  PI. 
Boston   Universit}'-   on   Equity   Pleading     §§  255,  256. 

by    Judge    Dwight    Foster,    MS.      See         ''  Harrison  v.  Nixon,  9  Pet.  483,  503 ; 

Hayne     Eq.  70.  Wormald  y.  De  Lisle,  3  Beav.  18  ;  Brooks 

3"  Gordon   v.   Gordon,   3    Swanst.   400,  &  Hardy  y.O'Hara  Brothers,  8  Fed.  R.  520; 

472;    Miller  v.  Gotten,  5  Ga.  341,  346;  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  421-425. 
AVilson     V.     StoUey,    4    McLean,     275 ;        '^  Richards  v.  Evans,  1  Ves.  Sen.  89 ; 

Crocket  v.  Lee,  7  Wheat.  522 ;  Jackson  Roberts   v.   Williams,    12  East,   33,   37 ; 

V.  Ashton,  8  Pet.  148 ;  Henry  v.  Suule,  Leigh  v.  Leigh,  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  369. 
42  Fed.  R.  91.     See  chap.  xii.  on  Amend-        '  Towle  v.  Pierce,  12  Met.  (Mass.)  329, 

ments.  332 ;  Lafayette  Co.  v.  Neely,  21  Fed.  R. 

*  Lord  Uxbridge  v.  Staveland,  1  Ves.  738. 

Sen.  56 ;  Egremont   v.  Cowell,  5  Beav.        §  08.     1  Rule  26. 

VOL.  1.  — 10 


146  BILLS.  [chap.  IV. 

parties."  ^  It  is  customary  in  bills  seeking  the  protection  or  en- 
forcement of  rights  depending  upon  complicated  provisions  of 
Federal  or  State  statutes,  to  set  forth  such  statutes  either  at 
length  or  according  to  their  legal  effect ;  and  when  the  com- 
plainant depends  upon  historical  facts,  of  which  the  court  will 
take  judicial  notice,  to  state  such  facts  also.  Sometimes  former 
decisions  of  the  courts  are  similarly  pleaded.  Although  this 
practice  is  not  strictly  correct,  it  is  still  convenient  for  the  court 
as  well  as  counsel,  inasmuch  as  the  case  made  by  the  bill  is 
t,hereby  made  more  easy  of  comprehension.  It  seems  that  ex- 
ceptions to  such  allegations  for  impertinence  cannot  be  sustained.^ 
If  a  bill  contain  scandalous  or  impertinent  matter,  "  it  may,  ou 
exceptions,  be  referred  to  a  master  by  any  judge  of  the  court,  for 
impertinence  or  scandal ;  and  if  so  found  by  him,  the  matter  shall 
be  expunged  at  the  expense  of  the  plaintiff,  and  he  shall  pay  to 
the  defendant  all  his  costs  in  the  suit  up  to  that  time,  unless  the 
court  or  a  judge  thereof  shall  otherwise  order.  If  the  master 
shall  report  that  the  bill  is  not  scandalous  or  impertinent,  the 
plaintiff  shall  be  entitled  to  all  costs  occasioned  by  the  refer- 
ence."* "  No  order  shall  be  made  by  any  judge  for  referring 
any  bill,  answer,  or  pleading,  or  other  matter  or  proceeding  de- 
pending before  the  court,  for  scandal  or  impertinence,  unless 
exceptions  are  taken  in  writing  and  signed  by  counsel,  describing 
the  particular  passages  which  are  considered  to  be  scandalous  or 
impertinent ;  nor  unless  the  exceptions  shall  be  filed  on  or  before 
the  next  rule-day  after  the  process  on  the  bill  shall  be  returnable, 
or  after  the  answer  or  pleading  is  filed.  And  such  order  when 
obtained  shall  be  considered  as  abandoned,  unless  the  party  ob- 
taining the  order  shall,  without  any  unnecessary  delay,  procure 
tlie  master  to  examine  and  report  for  the  same  on  or  before  the 
next  succeeding  rule-da}',  or  the  master  shall  certify  that  further 
time  is  necessary  for  him  to  complete  the  examination."  ^  It  has 
been  held  in  England  that  a  person  not  a  party  to  the  suit  may, 
by  leave  of  the  court,  file  exceptions  to  a  bill  for  scandalous 

2  Chancellor  Kent  in  Woods  v.  Jlor-  tion  Co.,  15  Fed.  R.  5G1 ;  s.  c.  8  Sawyer, 
rell,  1  J.  Cli.  (N.  y.)  103,  at  p.  106.  See  600;  Allen  v.  U'Donald,  20  Fed.  K.  573; 
also  Hood  (•.  Inman,  4  J.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  4o7.  Steam  Gauge  &  Lantern  Co.  v.  Mcllob- 
For  an   illustration  of    scandal,    see  the  erts,  20  Fed.  R.  7G5. 

record  in   United    States  v.  Scliurz,   102         *  Rule  26. 
U.  S.  378.  6  liule  27. 

3  Wells  V.  Oregon  Railway  &  Naviga- 


§  G9.]  CERTAINTY.  147 

matter  reflecting  upon  himself;^  and  that  the  court  may  of  its 
own  motion  expunge  scandah)us  matter  at  any  time.'  Excep- 
tions for  impertinence  cannot,  however,  be  taken  after  answer.^ 
Neither  scandal  nor  impertinence,  however  gross,  is  a  ground  for 
demurrer,  it  being  a  maxim  of  pleading  that  utile  per  inutile  non 
vitiatur?  It  has  been  said  that  an  exception  for  impertinence 
must  be  allowed  in  whole  or  not  at  all.^*^ 

§  69.  Certainty.  —  A  bill  must  state  the  plaintiff's  case  with 
sufficient  certainty.  Thus  a  bill  by  a  receiver  of  a  national  bank 
to  recover  for  the  loss  caused  to  it  by  the  negligence  of  its  di- 
rectors, which  prays  relief  against  the  persons  who  have  acted  as 
directors  during  various  periods  of  time,  together  with  the  repre- 
sentatives of  such  as  are  dead,  must  "  state  the  dates  of  the  losses 
sustained  by  the  corporation  and  the  dates  of  the  acts  or  omis- 
sions contributing  to  those  losses,  with  sufficient  certainty  to  in- 
form each  of  the  defendants  with  which  and  how  many  of  the 
losses  it  is  sought  to  charge  him."  ^  A  bill  to  enjoin  the  enforce- 
ment as  a  lien  upon  land  of  a  judgment  entered  a  few  days  after 
complainant  had  begun  to  erect  a  building  upon  such  land  under 
a  contract  with  its  owner  which  he  claimed  gave  him  priority 
under  a  mechanic's  lien,  was  held  demurrable  for  lack  of  cer- 
tainty because  it  failed  to  set  forth  "the  actual  dates  at  which  he 
commenced,  carried  on,  and  finished  work  and  labor,  and  the 
actual  dates  on  which  he  furnished  materials,"  in  order  that  the 
court  might  determine  the  validity  and  extent,  and  right  to  pri- 
ority of  the  lien  he  claimed.^  The  bill  must  state  facts,  not  con- 
clusions of  law,  which  will  be  disregarded  b}'  the  court;^  Thus 
a  general  charge  of  fraud  is  not  sufficient,  but  it  must  allege  the 
specific  acts  or  language  which  constitute  the  fraud.*  It  has  been 
held  that  a  creditor's  Ijill  for  an  injunction  and  a  receiver  because 
of   the  fraudulent  disposition  of   assets,  need   not  describe  the 

''  Williams    r.    Douglas,    5   Roav.  82;  i^  Oliapman   v.   School   District  No.  1, 

Daiiiell's  CIi.  Pr   (2(1  Am.  ed  )  402.  Dearly,  108.  117,  per  Deady,  J. 

"  £.r /ia?Ve  Simpson,  15  Ves  476 ;  Dan-  §09.    i  Price  v.   Coleman,  21  Fed.  R. 

iell's   Cli.   Pr.    (2fl    Am.   ed  )   402,   403;  357. 

Storv's  Eq.  PI.  §  270.     See  also  Langdon  -  McKee    v.   Travelers'   Ins.   Co.,   41 

V  Goddard,  3  Story,  13.  Fed.  P.  117,  119. 

**  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  270.  ^  Harper  v.  Hill,  35  Miss.  G3. 

9  D.anicirs  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  401.  ■»  Gilbert  v.  Lewis,  1   De  G.,  J.  &  Sm. 

Sec  also  Pacific  Railroad  of  Missouri  v.  38,  49;    Bryan    i'    Spruill,    4   Jones   Eq. 

Missouri  Pacific  Ry.  Co.,  Ill   U.  S.  505,  (N.  C  ),  27;  United  States  v.  Aflierton, 

61G,  522.  102  U.  S.  372  ;  United   States  v.  Norsch, 

42  Fed.  R.  417.     See  infra,  §  100. 


148  BILLS.  [chap.  IV. 

assets.^  An  allegation  of  a  fraudulent  intent  has  been  held  to 
be  an  allegation  of  a  fact.*^  A  bill  alleged  "  that  the  bank  was 
insolvent  on  the  5th  day  of  May  ;  that  this  was  well  known  to  its 
officers  ;  that  it  wrongfully  neglected  to  disclose  its  insolvency 
to  complainant,  and,  by  continuing  business  and  otherwise,  repre- 
sented to  complainant  and  all  other  persons  dealing  with  it,  that 
it  was  solvent;  that  complainant,  on  the  faith  of  these  representa- 
tions believed  such  to  be  the  fact,  without  suspicion  that  the  bank 
was,  or  was  in  danger  of  becoming,  insolvent;  that,  acting  upon 
the  representations,  and  relying  on  the  bank's  solvency,  complain- 
ant delivered  the  draft ;  that  next  morning  the  bank  closed  its 
doors,  and  the  draft  was  collected  thereafter;  and  that,  by  reason 
of  the  premises,  the  draft  or  its  proceeds  did  not  become  the 
property  of  the  bank."  These  allegations  were  held  sufficient  to 
charge  fraud.  "  The  omission  to  state  in  the  pleading  the  degree 
of  insolvency  which  rendered  the  bank's  conduct  fraudulent,  was 
not  fatal,  as  the  conclusion  asserted  showed  the  intention  of  the 
pleader."^  It  is  not  sufficient  to  state  that  the  defendant  is  a 
trustee,  without  alleging  the  facts  by  which  he  is  shown  to  l)e  a 
trustee.^  An  allegation  that  a  defendant  corporation  is  about  to 
exceed  its  powers  is  insufficient.  The  bill  must  sliow  what  acts 
are  threatened,  and  why  they  exceed  the  powers  of  the  corpora- 
tion.9  "  The  pleader  should  state  the  facts,  and  not  formulate 
mere  epithetic  '  charges.'  ...  If  the  facts  are  not  to  be  ascer- 
tained by  diligence,  or  because  of  some  obstruction,  or  if  the  evi- 
dence of  them  is  in  possession  of  the  other  side,  this  should  be 
made  to  appear,  with  technical  averments  sliowing  the  necessity 
of  discovery,  when  that  is  wanted;  but  a  court  cannot  sustain  a 
bill  upon  mere  denunciatory  statements  of  the  plaintiff's  suspi- 
cions or  belief.  The  best  pleadings  are  those  which  state  the 
inculpatory  facts  that  carry  with  them  their  own  conviction  of 
the  fraud,  and  by  which  the  wrong-doing  appears,  without  much 
necessity  for  characterizing  it  as  such."  ^°  The  bill  should  usually 
state  facts  and  not  evidence.  The  English  rule  was  that  no  ad- 
missions, whether  written  or  oral,  could  be  given  in  evidence 


5  Shainwald  v.  Lewis,  6  Fed.  R.  766,  8  Evan  v.  Avon,  20  Beav.  144 

775.  »  Leo  v.  Union  I'ac.  Ry.  Co.,  19  Fed. 

e  Piatt  r.  Mead,  9  Fed.  R.  91.  R.  283. 

"  St.   Louis  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Jolin-        ^^  Lafayette  Co.  v.  Neely,  21  Fed.  R. 

son,  13.3  U.  S.  506,  577,  678.  738. 


§  70.]       INCONSISTENCY    AND    BILLS    WITH    A    DOUBLE   ASPECT.  149 

unless  they  had  been  specifically  charged  in  the  bill."  In  this 
country,  however,  though  the  i)oint  has  never  been  decided  l)y 
the  Supreme  Court,  we  have  the  great  authority  of  Judge  Story,  at 
circuit,  holding  that  such  a  practice  is  unnecessary.^^  So,  accord- 
ing to  Professor  Langdell, "  when  a  bill  charges  a  defendant  with 
having  had  notice,  or  with  having  committed  a  fraud,  or  with  in- 
sanity or  drunkenness,  or  lewdness  or  misconduct  in  ofiice,  if  the 
plaintiff  intends  to  prove  specific  acts  of  notice,  or  of  fraud,  in- 
sanity, drunkenness,  lewdness,  or  misconduct  in  office,  it  seems 
that  such  acts  should  be  specifically  charged  in  the  bill.  But  this 
view  is  not  fully  supported  by  authority.  It  may  also  be  stated 
generally,  that  whenever  the  plaintiff  has  evidence  which  is  likely 
to  take  the  defendant  by  surprise,  it  is  the  safer  course  to  indi- 
cate its  nature  in  the  bill,  rather  than  to  run  the  risk  of  having 
it  objected  to  at  tlie  hearing."  ^^  But  as  the  cases  upon  the  au- 
thority of  which  he  made  these  statements  were  decided  when 
each  party's  evidence  was  unknown  to  the  otlier  mitil  the  hear- 
ing,—  a  method  of  taking  testimony  long  since  disused,^^ — it  is 
not  likely  that  the  courts  would  be  as  strict  now  as  formerly  in 
requiring  such  evidence  to  be  pleaded. ^^ 

§  70.  Inconsistency  and  Bills  with  a  Double  Aspect.  —  A  bill 
must  not  state  two  inconsistent  states  of  fact  and  ask  relief  in 
the  alternative.  But  it  may  state  the  facts  and  ask  relief  in  the 
alternative  according  to  the  conclusion  of  law  that  the  court  may 
draw  from  them,  so  that  if  one  kind  of  relief  sought  be  denied, 
another  may  be  granted  ;  and  it  may  state  facts  of  a  different 
nature  not  inconsistent  with  each  other,  and  equally  supporting 
the  prayer  for  relief.  In  both  of  these  cases  a  bill  is  said  to  have 
"a  double  aspect."  ^  Thus,  a  bill  may  state  facts  constituting  an 
attempt  to  form  a  new  corporation  by  the  consolidation  of  two 
already  existing,  and  pray  that,  if  the  new  corporation  have  a 
legal  existence,  the  plaintiff  may  be  declared  entitled  to  a  certain 
number  of  shares  therein,  otherwise  to  a  corresponding  interest 

"  Hall  V.  Malthy,  6  Price,  240;  Evans  L.  R.  6  Eq.  23  ,  Clark  v.  Periani,  2  Atk. 

V.  Bicknell,  6  Ves.  183;  Austin  v.  Ciiam-  337;  Sheplicrd  v.  Morris,  4  Beav  252. 
bers,  6  CI.  &  Fin.  38;   Story's  Eq.  PI.        "  See  Amendments   to   Rule  Cu,  and 

265.  Cliapter  on  Evidence. 

1-  Smith  I.  Burnliam,  2  Sumner  C.  C.        ^^  See  Smith  v.  Burnham,  2  Sumner 

612;  Jenkins  v   Eldredge,  3  Story  C.  C.  C.  C.  612,  (122;  Story's  Eq.  PI   §  26.5a. 
181,283,284;  Story's  Eq.  PI   §20-5.  §70    i  Shields   v.    Barrow.    17    How. 

i»  Langdell's   Eq.   PI.  §60.     See  Wes-  130,   144;    Story's    Eq.    PI.  §§420,   note, 

ton   V.   Empire   Assurance    Corporation,  254. 


150  BILLS.  [chap.  IV- 

in  the  stock  of  one  of  the  old  corporations.^  The  complainant 
may  seek  to  quiet  the  title  to  lands,  claiming  either  as  devisee  cr 
as  heir-at-law.3  j^  ]j[\[  j^ay  contain  a  prayer  that  an  agreement 
be  either  set  aside  as  obtained  by  fraud,  or  else  specifically  en- 
forced.* A  bill  was  sustained  when  filed  by  one  partner  against 
another,  praying  for  specific  performance  of  a  contract  for  the 
sale  of  land,  or  else  for  an  account  of  the  partnership  debts,  and 
a  charge  of  their  amount  upon  the  land  as  belonging  to  the 
assets  of  the  firm.^  If  the  plaintiff  wish  to  set  aside  a  deed  on 
account  of  fraud,  imposition,  and  undue  influence,  he  may  allege 
both  that  tlie  maker  was  insane  and  that  he  had  a  great  imbecil- 
ity of  mind.*^  But  if  he  allege  that  a  decree  which  he  wishes  to 
set  aside  was  obtained  either  by  mistake  of  all  the  parties,  or  by 
deception  practised  upon  himself,  or  by  collusion  of  the  defendant 
with  tliird  parties,  the  bill  will  be  demurrable  for  indefinitcness.'' 
In  a  recent  case  the  court  said :  "  To  allege  that  a  sale  is  simu- 
lated, and  if  not  simulated  is  fraudulent,  meaning  tliereby  it  is  a 
sham  sale,  and  if  not  a  sham  then  a  real  sale,  but  fraudulent,  may 
be  consistent,  but  it  is  not  certain ;  and  certainty  is  a  requisite 
in  equity  pleading  as  well  as  consistency.  It  seems  to  me  that, 
if  there  is  doubt  as  to  the  nature  of  the  transaction,  the  creditor, 
who  has  '  to  strike  in  the  dark,'  should  charge  a  fraudulent  simu- 
lation, and  on  discovery  amend  if  necessary."  ^  A  bill  was  sus- 
tained where  the  complainant  sought  specific  performance  of  an 
agreement  by  his  partner  to  transfer  to  him  the  latter's  interest 
in  certain  land,  or  in  the  alternative  to  have  the  land  charged 
with  the  debts  of  the  copartnership.^  But  it  was  held  in  Eng- 
land that  a  bill  may  not  pray  relief  primarily  against  one  of  two 
defendants,  and,  in  case  the  court  should  hold  him  free  from  lia- 
bility, then  against  the  other.^*'  A  bill  is  bad  when  it  contains 
two  alternative  claims  each  belonging  to  several  persons,  one  of 

2  KilfTour   V.  New  Orleans    Gas-Light     Paiwe  (N.  Y.),  30G ;  Lloyd  v.   Brewster, 
Co.,  2  WooJs,  144,  148.  4  Paige  (N.  Y.),  5:17. 

3  Gaines  v.  Chew,  2  How.  619,  61.1.  '  Brooks  r.   O'Hara,  8  Fed.   R.  529 ; 
*   Hardin  v.  Boyd,  113  U.  S.  Toti.     But     s.  c.  2  McCrary,  644.     But  see  Williams 

see  Shields  (,-.  Barrow,  17  How.  130.  14:5;  v.  United  States,  1-38  U.  S.  514,  517. 

St.   Louis   V.  &   T.   H.   R.  Co.   v.  Terre  ^  Pardee,   J.,  in   Socola  v.   Grant,   15 

Haute  &  L  R.  Co.,  33  Fed.  R.  440,  448,  Fed.  R.  487,  489. 

;149.  ^  Hoxie  v.  Carr,  1  Sumnor,  173. 

8  Hoxie  V.  Carr,  1  Sumner,  173.  ii  Clark  v.  Lord  Rivers,  L.  R.  5  Eq.  91, 

**  Story's    Eq.    PI.   §  254 ;    Bennet   r.  07.      But   see    Kilgour   r.    New   Orleans 

Vade,   2    Atk.    ;J25 ;    Colton    v.    Ross,   2  Gas-Light  Co.,  2  Woods,  144,  148. 


§  70.]       INCONSISTENCY   AND    BILLS   WITH   A    DOUBLE   ASPECT.  151 

whom  has  no  interest  in  one  claim,  and  others  of  whom  have  no 
interest  in  the  other  claim.^^     A  bill  should  not  pray  in  the  alter- 
native legal  and  equitable  relief.^^     "  When  the  ])lcadings  are  so 
framed   as  to  rest  the  claim  for  relief  solely  on  the  ground  of 
fraud,  it  is  not  open  to  the  plaintiff,  if  lie  fails  in  establishing  the 
fraud,  to  pick  out  from  the  allegations   of  the  bill  facts   whicli 
might,  if  not  put  forward  as  proofs  of  fraud,  have  yet  warranted 
the   plaintiff  in  asking  for  relief.     A  defendant  in  answering  a 
case  not  founded  on  fraud  is  not  bound  to  do  more  than  answer 
the  case  in  the  mode  in  which  it  is  put  forward.     If,  indeed,  re- 
lief is  asked  alternatively,  either  on  the  ground  of  fraud,  or,  fail- 
ing on  that  ground,  on  some  other  equity,  a  plaintiff  failing  on 
the  first  may  succeed  on  the  latter  alternative.     But  then  the 
attention  of  the  defendant  has  been  distinctly  called  to  it,  and  he 
has  been  called  upon  to  answer  the  case  according  to  both  alter- 
^^    natives.     It  is  the  dutv  of  the  iudge  to  determine  whether  the 
[^    two  are  so  interwoven   with  each   other  that,  on  the  failure  of 
^  proof  of  fraud,  it  is  impossible  to  treat  the  facts  as  separate  alle- 
^   gations,  justifying   a  separate   mode    of    dealing  with   them."  ^^ 
^   When  a  bill  alleges  both  fraud  and  mistake,  if  the  latter  alone 
-^  is  proved  the  bill  will  be  sustained.^*    The  averment  "  that  if  said 
O   intention  is  true,  which  is  denied,  then  the  said  State  law,  to  wit, 
/-^    the  Act  of  No.  85  of  1888,  is  null  and  void,  because  it  operates 
*^   as  a  discrimination  against  the  shareholders  of  national  banks, 
^  in  violation  of  the  express  terms  of  Section  5219  of  the  Revised 
^    Statutes  of  the  United  States  ; "  is  sufficient  to  raise  the  issue 
Q    whether  there  is  in  the  act  any  discrimination  prohibited  Ijy  the 
-^    act  of  Congress.  ^^     A  bill  to  enjoin  the  infringement  of  a  copy- 
right may  set  forth   an  agreement  between  the  author  and  the 
plaintiff,  and  then  allege  that  if  such  agreement  does  not  con- 
stitute   an    assignment   of    the    copyright,   it    is    an    exclusive 
license.  ^^ 

"  Stebbins  v.  St.  Anne,  116  U.  S.  386.  Lombard,  L.  R.  1  H.  of  L.  326 ;  Thomson 

1-  Cherokee  Nation  y.  Southern  Kansas  v.   Eastwood,   L.   R.  2  App.  Cases,  215; 

Ry.  Co.,  1.35  U.  S.  641,  651.  Price  v.  Berrington,  2  Macn.  &  G.  486, 

15  Dwight  Foster's  Lectures  on  Equity  498. 

Pleading,  MS.  ;  Eyre  v.  Potter,  15  How.  i*  Williams  v.  United  States,  138  U.  S. 

42,  56;  Britton   r.   Brewster,  2   Fed    R.  514,517. 

160;  French  v.  Shoemaker,  14  Wall.  :314,  ^^  Whitney   Nat.   Bank   v.  Parker,  41 

385;  Fisher  v.  Boody,  I  Curt.  206;  Hoyt  Fed.  R.  402,  406. 

V.  Hoyt,  27  N.J.  Eq.  ,399 ;  Wilde  v.  C.ib-  i«  Black   v.   Henry   G.   Allen   Co.,  42 

son,  i   H.  of  L.  Cases,  605;  Hickson  v.  Fed.  R.  618,  628. 


152  BILLS.  [chap.  IV. 

§  71.  Multifariousness  in  General.  —  A  bill  must  not  be  multi- 
farious. Multifariousness  consists  in  the  joinder  of  two  or  more 
distinct  and  unconnected  grounds  for  equitable  relief,  each  of 
which  might  be  the  foundation  for  a  separate  bill.  This  may 
occur  in  three  ways,  —  by  a  misjoinder  of  plaintiffs,  by  a  mis- 
joinder of  defendants,  and  by  a  misjoinder  of  grounds  for  equit- 
able relief  held  by  and  against  the  same  parties.^  "  To  lay  down 
any  rule  applicable  universally,  or  to  say  what  constitutes  multi- 
fariousness as  an  abstract  proposition,  is,  uj)on  the  authorities, 
utterly  impossible.  The  cases  upon  the  subject  are  extremely 
various,  and  the  court  in  deciding  them  seems  to  have  considered 
what  was  convenient  in  particular  circumstances,  rather  than  to 
have  attempted  to  lay  down  any  absolute  rule."  ^  "  The  only 
way  of  reconciling  the  authorities  upon  the  subject  is  by  advert- 
ino;  to  the  fact  that,  although  the  books  speak  generallv  of  de- 
murrers  for  multifariousness,  yet  in  truth  such  demurrei's  may 
be  divided  into  two  distinct  kinds.  Frequently  the  objection 
raised,  though  termed  multifariousness,  is  in  fact  more  properly 
misjoinder  ;  that  is  to  say,  the  cases  or  claims  united  in  the  bill 
are  of  so  different  a  character  that  the  court  will  not  permit 
them  to  be  litigated  in  one  record.  It  may  be  that  the  plaintiffs 
and  defendants  are  parties  to  the  whole  of  the  transactions  which 
form  the  subject  of  the  suit,  and  nevertheless  these  transactions 
may  be  so  dissimilar  that  the  court  will  not  allow  them  to  be 
joined  together,  but  will  require  distinct  records.  But  what  is 
more  familiarly  understood  by  the  term  '  multifariousness,'  as 
applied  to  a  bill,  is  where  a  party  is  al)le  to  say  he  is  brought  as 
a  defendant  upon  a  record,  with  a  largo  portion  of  which,  and 
of  the  case  made  by  which,  he  has  no  connection  whatever."^ 
There  is,  however,  little  practicable  good  to  be  obtained  from  a 
maintenance  of  this  distinction  except  as  a  means  of  elucidating 
some  of  the  expressions  in  the  earlier  authorities.*  "  The  de- 
cisions on  this  subject  are  contradictory  and  unsatisfactory.  The 
common-sense  rule  in  such  cases  is  that  an  individual  shall  not 
be  called  to  maintain  his  title  or  shall  not  assert  it  in  con- 
nection with  others  to  which  it  has  no  analogy,  and  in  the  invcs- 

§  71.   1  Calvert   on   Parties,   Book   I.  ^  Lord    Cottenham     in    Campbell    v. 

ch.  vii.  IMackay,  1  M.  &  Cr.  003,  618.     Approved 

2  Lord    Cottenliam    in    Campbell    v.     in  Sliicids  r.  Tlionias,  18  How.  25.3,  2')!>. 
Mackay,  1  M.  &  Cr.  003,  618.  ^  See  Calvert  on  Parties,  Book  I.  ch. 

tH. 


§  72.]        MULTIFARIOUSNESS   BY   MISJOINDER   OF   PLAINTIFFS.  153 

tigation  of  which  the  costs  and  complexity  of  tlie  case  will  be 
increased."  ^ 

§  72.  Multifariousness  by  Misjoinder  of  Plaintiffs. — No  persons 
can  unite  as  complainants  in  a  bill  in  equity  unless  they  have  a 
joint  or  common  interest  in  obtaining  the  same  relief.^  Thus  if 
one  of  them  has  no  interest  in  the  relief  claimed,  the  bill  is 
demurrable.^  Those  who  claim  the  return  of  money  paid  by 
them  severally  on  distinct  promissory  notes  cannot  join  their 
claims  in  the  same  bill ;  ^  nor  can  several  creditors  claiming 
under  several  obligations  unite  in  a  suit  to  attach  the  debts  of  an 
absent  debtor.^  Persons  who  were  defrauded  of  stock  in  a  corpo- 
ration by  the  men  who  promised  it  to  them  before  the  organiza- 
tion of  the  corporation  cannot  join  in  bill  to  com])el  the  issue  of 
the  stock  to  each  of  thcm.^  Persons  who  have  been  separately 
indicted  for  similar  acts  committed  while  acting  as  agents  for  the 
same  principal  cannot  join  in  a  bill  to  enjoin  the  further  prosecu- 
tion of  the  indictments.^  But  in  a  bill  to  compel  specific  perform- 
ance of  a  decree  in  a  former  suit,  all  the  complainants  in  the  first 
suit  may  join  as  plaintiffs,  though  the  decree  sought  to  be  enforced 
orders  the  payment  of  specific  sums  severally  to  each  of  themj 
Plaintiffs  with  conflicting  interests  cannot  so  join.^  Such  are,  in 
a  suit  for  the  construction  of  a  will,  persons,  each  of  Avhom  is 
interested  in  having  a  different  construction  put  upon  it.^  Nor 
can  two  join  in  a  Vjill  to  set  aside  a  fraudulent  conveyance  of  land, 
of  whom  one  claims  the  land  as  a  creditor  of  the  person  who  has 
made  the  conveyance,  and  the  other  as  the  purchaser  of  the  land 
upon  a  sheriff's  sale  to  satisfy  a  judgment  held  by  him.^o  But  the 
interests  of  the  complainants  need  not  be  coextensive.  Thus,  a 
tenant  for  life  and  the  remainder-men  of  an  estate,  either  legal 
or  equitable,  may  join  in  a  suit  to  protect  the  estate. ^^     Although 

5  Mr.   Justice   McLean    in    Turner  v.  ^  "Woolstein  v.  Welch,  42  Fed.  R.  5GG. 

American   Baptist   Missionary   Union,  5  "  Shields  c.  Thomas,  18  How.  2uo. 

McLean,  .344,  349.  ^  Walker  v.   Powers,   104    U.  S.  245; 

§  72.  1  Story's  Eq.  PI   §  270;  Calvert  Sanmarez  r.  Saumarez,  4  Mylne.  &  Cr. 

on  Parties  (2d  ed.),  105,  110  S'-]\,  .So6 ;  Parsons  i-.  Lyman,  4  Blatchf. 

-  Walker  ('.  Powers,   101   U.    S.   245,  C.  C.  432;  Bell  r.  Curcton,  2  M.&  K.  503. 

249;  Do£rgett  1-.  Railroad  Co.,  99  U.  S.  72.  ^  Parsons  r.  Lyman,  4  Blatchf.  CO. 

3  Yeaton  v.  Lenox,  8  Pet.  123.  432  ;  Saumarez  v.  Saumarez,  4  M.  &  Cr. 

*  Yeaton  (-.  Lenox,  8  Pet.  123.     But  331,  336. 

see  Norris   v.   Hassler,  22   Fed.   R.   401;  i"  Walker  r.  Powers,  101  U.  S.  245. 

Langdon  v.  Branch,  37  Fed.  R.  449.  n  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  279  a  ;  Buckeridge 

5  Summerlin  v.  Fronterizac  S.  M.  &  M.  r.  Glasse,  1  Cr.  &  Phill.  12G ;  Calvert  on 

Co.,  41  Fed.  R.  249.  Parties  (2d  ed.)  99. 


154  BILLS.  [chap.  IV. 

usually  there  must  be  some  privity  between  the  complainants  in 
a  bill,  yet  in  certain  cases  those  between  whom  there  is  no  priv- 
ity are  allowed  to  sue  together  when  they  seek  to  avert  an  injury 
which  will  affect  them  all  alike.  Thus,  several  tenants  or  par- 
ishioners may  unite  in  a  bill  of  peace  seeking  to  dispose  of  a  dis- 
puted right  claimed  against  them  by  the  lord  of  the  manor  ^^  or 
the  parson  of  the  parish. ^^  And  the  owners  of  several  lots  of 
land  claiming  under  a  common  source  of  title  may  unite  in  a 
bill  of  peace  against  several  other  claimants  to  the  same  lots, 
who  also  rely  upon  a  common  source  of  title  adverse  to  that 
of  the  complainants.^'*  Several  claimants  in  possession  of  several 
parcels  of  land  whose  rights  depend  upon  the  same  question  of 
fact  or  law  may  unite  in  a  bill  of  peace  against  the  same  defend- 
ant who  claims  title  to  all  the  land  by  reason  of  the  same  disputed 
facts  or  legal  i)roposition.i^  It  has  been  said  that  the  owners 
of  adjacent  property  may  maintain  a  bill  in  equity  to  enjoin  a  de- 
fendant from  erecting  a  livery  stable  or  other  nuisance  in  their 
vicinity .^^  But  another  case  holds  that  different  persons,  each 
of  whom  will  suffer  a  distinct  injury  from  the  levy  of  a  tax, 
cannot  unite  in  a  bill  to  enjoin  its  levy  on  account  of  its  alleged 
imconstitutionality.^"  Several  stockholders  who  have  been  com- 
pelled to  pay  corporate  debts  have  been  allowed  to  join  in  a  bill 
against  another  stockholder  to  compel  him  to  contribute  his 
proportion. 1^ 

§73.  Multifariousness  by  Misjoinder  of  Defendants.  —  No  per- 
sons can  be  joined  as  defendants  to  a  bill  in  equity  who  have  not 
a  joint  or  common  interest  in  opposing  the  relief  prayed  for.^ 
Different  relief  may,  however,  be  obtained  against  different  de- 
fendants when  the  bill  seeks  to  prevent  or  annul  the  effect  of  acts 
in  pursuance  of  a  common  scheme,  or  so  connected  with  each 
other  as  to  form  ])art  of  the  same  transaction.^     The  rule  was 

12  Anon.,  1  Chan.  Cas.  2G0  ;  Smith  v.        i'  Cutting  v.  Gilbert,  5  Blatchf.  C.  C. 

Earl  Rrownlow,  L.  R.  0  Eq.  241.  259.     See,  however,  Central  Pacific  R.  R. 

!•'  Rudge  r.  Hopkins,  2  Eq.  Cas.  Abr.  v.  liver,  1  Saw.  641  ;  Union  Pacific  R.  R. 

170.  V.  McSh.ane,  3  Dill.  .'303. 

1*  Crews  V.  Rurcham,  1  Black,  3-')2.  '**  Allen  v.  Fairbanks,  45  Fed.  R.  445. 

15  Osborne  '•.  Wisconsin  Cent.  R.  Co.,  §  73.    i  Calvert  on  Parties,  Book  I.ch. 

43  Fell.  R.  824.     See  Central  Pacific  R.  R.  vii  ;  United  States  r.  Alexander, 4  Cranch 

Co.  V.  Dyer,  1  Saw.  641  ;  In /hi,  §  7.3.  C  C.  311. 

lo  Flint   V.  Russell,   5   Dill.   151.     See  2  Calvert   on    Parties,    Book   I.  chap, 

also     Parker     v.    Nightinjjale,    6    Allen  vii.;    Manners    v.    Rowley,    10    Simons, 

(Mass.),  341.     But  mntra,  Hudson  v.  Mad-  470. 

dison,  12  Simons,  410.  ^ 


§  73.]      MULTIFARIOUSNESS   BY    MISJOINDER    OF   DEFENDANTS.  155 

thus  stated  by  Sir  John  Leach  :  "  In  order  to  determine  whether 
a  suit  is  multifarious,  or  in  other  words,  contains  distinct  matters, 
the  in(|uiry  is  not,  as  this  defendant  suj)poses,  whether  eacli 
defendant  is  connected  with  every  branch  of  the  cause,  but 
whether  the  plaintift's  bill  seeks  relief  in  resj)ect  of  matters  which 
are  in  their  nature  separate  and  distinct.  If  the  object  of  the 
suit  be  single,  but  it  ha})pens  that  different  persons  have  separate 
interests  in  distinct  questions  which  arise  out  of  that  single 
object,  it  necessarily  follows  that  such  difi'erent  persons  must  be 
brought  before  the  court,  in  order  that  the  suit  may  conclude 
the  whole  object."^  "The  entirety  of  the  case  against  one  de- 
fendant constitutes  the  connecting  link."  ^  But  a  bill  is  multi- 
farious, when  the  charge  against  one  defendant  is  in  no  way 
connected  with  those  against  other  defendants.^  A  bill  is  multi- 
farious which  seeks  both  to  foreclose  a  mortgage  and  to  restrain 
another  defendant  from  asserting  a  claim  of  title  adverse  to  both 
mortgagee  and  mortgagor,^  at  least  when  such  adverse  title  oc- 
curred prior  to  the  mortgage."  But  a  party  claiming  a  lien  upon 
the  property  by  a  judgment  against  the  mortgagor  prior  to  the 
mortgage,  the  validity  of  which  lien  is  contested  by  the  mortgagee, 
may  be  joined  as  a  party  defendant  to  a  foreclosure  suit.^  A  bill 
is  multifarious  which  seeks  to  obtain  a  transfer  of  land  from  one 
defendant,  and  to  restrain  another  from  asserting  a  conflicting 
claim  to  the  same ;  ^  and  a  bill  by  an  executor  to  settle  the  con- 
flicting controversies  between  himself,  the  heirs  of  his  testatri.x, 
the  heirs  of  her  husband,  both  of  whom  dispute  bequests  under 
her  will,  and  one  claiming  to  be  a  creditor  of  her  estate. ^'^  An 
English  case  holds  that  different  violators  of  the  same  copyright 
cannot  be  enjoined  by  the  same  bill  when  their  acts  of  ])iracy 
were  not  performed  in  confederacy  with  each  other.^i  But  this 
case  has  been  douljted  by  Judge   Story ,^2  and  distinguished  by 

3  Salvidge  v.  Hyde,  5  MadJock,  138,  see  Mendenhall  v.  Hall,   134  U.  S.  559, 

146.  568. 

*  Calvert    on    Parties    (2d   ed.),    98;  "  Mendenhall  v.  Hall,  134  U.  S.  559, 

quotlnji    Sir  John   Leach   in   Turner   v.  568. 

Robinson,   1    Sim.  &  S.  313  ;  and    Lord  ^  Converse  v.  Michigan  Dairy  Co.,  45 

Cottonliam   in  Attorney-General  r.   Cor-  Fed.  R.  18. 

poration  of  Poole,  4  M.  &  Cr.  17,  31.  ^  Copen  v.  Flosher,  1  Bond,  440. 

5  Wood    V.   nunimer,  3    Mason,   308;  ^  Haines  r.  Carpenter,  1  Woods,  262. 
West   V.    Randall,    2    Mason,    181,    200;  n  Dilly  v.  Doig,  2  Ves.  Jr.  486.     See 
Lewarne  v.  Me.xican  International  Imp.  Thomas  H.  El.  Co.  v.  Sperry  El.  Co.,  46 
Co.,  38  Fed.  R.  629.  Fed.  K.  75 

6  Dial  V.  Reynolds,  96  U.  S.  310.     But  i-  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §§  277,  278. 


156  BILLS.  [chap.  IV. 

Chancellor  Kent ;  ^^  and  the  courts  might  perhaps  refuse  to  follow 
it  here.^'*  Persons  who  are  acting  in  concert  as  employees  of  the 
same  corporation  in  the  infringement  of  a  patent  may  be  joined 
as  defendants  to  a  bill.^^  Several  insurance  companies  may  join 
in  a  bill  to  set  aside  on  tlie  same  grounds  an  award  made  against 
them  in  defendant's  favor  upon  several  policies  of  fire  insurance 
owned  by  them  separately-^*^  A  bill  filed  by  an  assignee  in  bank- 
ruptcy against  all  the  incumbrancers  of  his  assignor's  estate,  some 
but  not  all  of  whom  had  liens  upon  the  same  property,  to  set  aside 
their  lions  as  fraudulent,  and  to  have  the  property  sold  for  the 
common  benefit  of  the  creditors,  was  held  not  multifarious.^''  A 
bill  filed  by  the  beneficiary  under  several  deeds  of  trust,  some 
upon  different  parts  of  the  same  property,  one  covering  the  entire 
property,  against  the  trustees,  the  trustor,  and  the  different  per- 
sons claiming  liens  upon  the  property,  was  held  not  multifarious.^^ 
A  bill  was  sustained  when  filed  by  one  of  tlie  next  of  kin  against 
both  an  administrator  and  his  sureties,  to  obtain  the  plaintiff's 
share  of  the  estate. ^^  A  creditor's  bill  may  be  filed  against  the 
members  of  two  different  firms  when  some  are  members  of  both.^^ 
A  bill  may  be  filed  by  the  holder  of  a  bond  secured  by  a  lien  upon 
tlie  property  of  a  corporation  against  both  the  corporation  and  its 
stockholders,  at  the  same  time  to  foreclose  his  lien,  and  compel 
the  stocklioldcrs  to  pay  so  much  of  the  balance  of  their  subscrip- 
tions to  the  stock  of  tlie  corporation  as  will  suffice  for  the  pay- 
ment of  the  deficiency  after  the  foreclosure  sale.^^  A  bill  of  peace 
may  be  filed  to  dispose  of  the  claims  of  a  number  of  defendants, 
which  all  depend  on  the  determination  of  a  single  question  of  fact 
or  law.-2  Such  are  a  bill  by  a  parson  or  lord  of  a  manor  to  estab- 
lish a  claim  against  all  of  his  parishioners  ^^  or  tenants  ;  2*  a  bill  by 

13  Brinkerhoff    v.    Brown,    6    J.     Cli.  ^^  Payne  v.  Hook,  7  Wall.  425. 

(N.  Y.)  i;5!l,  at  p.  155.  -'  Nelson  v.  Hill,  5  How.  127.     See  also 

1*  See   Foxwell   v.    Webster,    10    Jur.  Oliver   v.  Piatt,   3   How.   .3.>>.     But   see 

N.  s.  137.  Griffin  (.-.  Merrill,  10  M.l.  .304. 

15  Poppenhusen    r.   Falke,    4    Blatcli.  -i  Manufacturing  Company  >■.  Brailicy. 

C.  C.  4(i:i  105  U.  S.  175. 

I'j  Hartford    Fire    Ins.    Co.    c.    Bonner  --  Gaines  «•.  Ciiew,  2  How.  010  ;  Uniteil 

Mercantile  Co.,  44  Fed.  R.  152.  States  v.  Cnrtner,  2G  Fed.  R.  20K,  208; 

1'  .McLean  v.  Lafayette   Bank,   3    Mc-  Hynian  v.  Wheeler,  33  Fed.  K.  .320. 

Lean,  415.     See  also  Jones  *;.  Slansson,  -•''  Brown  v.  Vernuulen,  1   Chan.  Cas. 

33   Fed.  R.  032 ;  Potts  v.  Hahn,  -32  Fed.  272. 

R.  600.  -^  Conyers    ;;.   Lord    Aberga\-enny,   1 

i«  Grant  v.  Phoeni.x  Life  Ins.  Co.,  121  Atk.  285. 
U.  S.  105. 


§  74.]      MULTIFARIOUSXESS    WITHOUT   MISJOIXDEK    OF   PARTIES.       157 

the  owner  of  a  fishery  to  estabHsh  his  clahn  against  a  number  of 
riparian  owners  ;25  a  bill  by  a  city  to  establish  its  claim  to  a  tax 
against  several  of  the  class  liable  to  it ;  ^e  a  bill  by  a  railroad  com- 
pany to  restrain  the  tax-collectors  of  different  counties  from  levy- 
ing taxes  separately  assessed,  but  part  of  each  of  which  is  to  be 
paid  to  the  State,  and  the  validity  of  all  of  which  depends  upon 
the  construction  of  a  single  statute  ;  2-  a  bill  by  a  railroad  company 
to  quiet  its  title  against  a  number  of  claimants  to  land  in  severalty, 
the  validity  of  the  separate  title  of  each  of  whom  depends  upon 
the  construction  of  one  statute  ;2S  and  a  bill  by  an  heir-at-law 
against  the  executors  of  an  invalid  will,  and  all  who  have  pur- 
chased from  them  the  land  belonging  to  the  ancestor's  estate.''^^ 

§  74.  Multifariousness  without  Misjoinder  of  Parties.  —  Multi- 
fariousness may  also  exist  without  a  misjoinder  of  parties,  when 
two  or  more  distinct  and  unconnected  grounds  of  equitable  relief 
are  joined  in  the  same  bill.  The  grounds  of  relief  must  be  differ- 
ent, and  each  ground  must  be  sufficient  as  stated  to  sustain  a  sepa- 
rate bill.i  Thus,  a  bill  is  multifarious  when  filed  by  the  receiver 
against  the  directors  of  a  national  bank  to  recover  claims  for 
losses  suffered  by  the  corporation  by  reason  of  the  directors'  neg- 
ligence, and  claims  for  losses  suffered  by  the  stockholders  by 
reason  of  liaving  been  induced  to  subscribe  for  new  shares  by 
misrepresentations  of  the  directors.^  So  is  a  bill  whicli  seeks  an 
account  of  a  trust  held  by  all  of  the  defendants,  and  also  seeks 
to  set  aside  the  effects  of  a  distinct  and  independent  fraud  upon 
the  trustor  committed  by  one  only  of  them.^  So  was  held,  a  bill 
which  alleged  that  complainant's  title  to  certain  property  had  been 
so  thoroughly  established  by  adjudication  that  further  litigation 
would  be  vexatious,  and  prayed  that  defendant  miglit  be  enjoined 
from  any  further  litigation  affecting  the  same,  and  which  also 
claimed  the  enforcement  of  a  statutory  right  to  requii-e  the  de- 
fendant's claim  of  title  to  be  now  set  up,  tried,  and  determined.^ 

25  Mayor  of  York  v.  Pilkincrton,  1  Atk.  §  74.    ^  Brown    v.    Safe   Deposit    Co., 

284.  128U.  S.  403. 

^s  City  of  London  v.  Perkins,  3  Bro.  -  Price  r.  Coleman,  21   Fed.   R.   3.57. 

Pari.  Cas.  002.  See   also   Lewarne  i\   Mexican   Interna- 

••^"  Union    Pacific   R.    R.    v.   McShane,  tional  Imp.  Co  ,  38  Fed.  R.  G29. 
3  Dill.  303.  3  West  v.  Randall.  2  Mason,  181.     But 

-«  Central  Pacific  R.  R.  Co.  r.  Dyer,  1  see  Mills  o.  Iliird,  32  Fed.  R.  127. 
Saw.   641.      See    Osborne   v.   Wisconsin  *  Leliigii  Zinc  Siove  Co.  r.  N.  J.  Zinc 

Cent.  R.  Co.,  43  Fed.  R  824  ;  supra,  §  72.  &  Iron  Co.',  43  Fed.  R.  545. 

29  Gaines  v.  Chew,  2  How.  619. 


158  BILLS.  [chap.  IV. 

So  is  a  bill  by  one  heir-at-law  of  a  deceased  married  woman 
against  her  husband  and  the  other  heirs,  to  set  aside  both  her 
marriage  settlement  and  her  will.  For  "■  in  these  two  matters  the 
necessary  parties  to  the  suit  may  be  the  same,  but  their  interests 
and  attitude  are  decidedly  at  variance."  ^  A  bill  to  determine 
conflicting  claims  to  land,  and  also  asking  fur  a  partition  of  the 
land  after  the  title  should  be  determined,  has  been  held  multifa- 
rious ;  ^  and  so  has  a  bill  asking  for  a  discovery  by  the  defendant 
of  an  application  for  a  policy  of  life  insurance,  and  for  the  s])eci- 
fic  performance  of  an  agreement  to  issue  the  policy  sought  in  the 
application,'  and  a  bill  praying  an  injunction  against  the  building 
of  a  railroad  or  in  the  alternative  an  award  of  damages  or  com- 
pensation for  land  proposed  to  be  taken  by  the  railroad  com- 
pany.^ It  has  also  been  held  multifarious  to  sue  in  one  bill  for  an 
injunction  against  the  violation  of  several  distinct  patents  ;^  but 
not  if  the  infringement  is  made  by  the  use  or  manufacture  of  a 
single  machine.^*^  In  tlie  latter  case  the  bill  should  so  allege.  It 
has  been  said  that  the  complainant  "should  aver  that  said  inven- 
tions are  capable  of  conjoint  as  well  as  separate  use,  and  are  so 
used  by  tlie  defendants."  ^^  A  bill  seeking  an  injunction  with 
damages,  against  the  infringement  of  a  patent,  and  an  injunction 
with  damages  against  the  publication  of  libellous  circulars  affect- 
ing })laintiirs  patent,  has  been  held  multifarious. ^^  It  is  not  multi- 
farious to  seek  in  the  same  bill  to  reform  a  written  agreement  on 
account  of  a  mistake,  and  to  enforce  its  performance  as  re- 
formed ;^'^  nor  to  seek  to  set  aside  and  cancel  an  insurance  policy 
and  enjoin  the  further  prosecution  of  an  action  to  recover  pre- 
miums paid  upon  it;^'*  nor  to  compel  the  issue  of  such  a  policy, 

5  McDonnell  v.  Eaton,  18  Fed.  R.  710.  han,  G  Fisher's  Pat.  Ca.«.  286.     See  United 

G  Cliapin  V.  Sears,  18  Fed.  R.  814.  States  v.  Am.  Bell   Telephone   Co.    128 

1  Markey  r.  Mutual  Benefit  Life  Ins.  U.  S.  315. 

Co.,  G  Ins.  L.  J.  537.  "  Garnewell  Fire  Alarm  Telegraph  Co. 

*  Cherokee  Nation  r.  Southern  Kansas  v.  City   of  Chiliicothe,   7   Fed.    R.    351 ; 

Railway  Co.,  135  U   S.  041,051.     But  see  Nellis  y.  McLanahan,  0  Fisher's  Pat.  Cas. 

s  c.   1:35  U.  S.  at  pages  051-052,  cited  286. 

infrn,  §  123.  '-  Fougeres  v.  Murbarger,  44  Fed.  R. 

9  Hayes    v.   Dayton,  8   Fed.    R.    702 ;  292.     See  International  Tooth-Crown  Co. 

Shickle  v.  South  St.  Louis  Foundry  Co.,  v.    Carmichael,    44   Fed.    R.   349;     cited 

22  Fed.  R.  105.  supra,  §  71,  and  n)fr(i,  §  77. 

1'  Nourse  v.  Allen,  4  Biatchf.  C.  C  370;  '^  Gillespie  v.  Moon,  2  J  Ch.  (N.  Y.) 

Perry   r    Corning,  7   Biatchf.  C.   C.   195;  585. 

Case  V.  Redfield,  4  McLean,  526  ;  Game-  '^  Equitable  Life    Assurance   Soc.   v. 

well  Fire  Alarm  Tel.  Co.  v.  City  of  Chil-  Patterson,  1  Fed.  R.  120. 

licothe,  7  Fed.  R  351 ;  Nellis  v   McLana-  ., 


§  75.]  OBJECTIONS   FOR   MULTIFARIOUSNESS.  159 

and  at  tlie  same  time  collect  its  amount. ^^  Nor  is  a  bill  against  a 
single  defendant  to  collect  assessments  on  account  of  the  same  im- 
provement made  against  several  different  lots  owned  by  him  which 
do  not  adjoin  each  other. ^'^  Nor  a  bill  filed  by  one  railway  com- 
pany against  another  to  compel  an  accounting  as  to  the  disposition 
and  proceeds  of  bonds  issued  by  the  former  to  the  latter,  and  the 
payment  of  the  damages  resulting  from  the  foreclosure  of  the 
mortgage  given  to  secure  those  bonds,  and  to  recover  the  rents  due 
under  a  lease  of  the  plaintiff's  road ;  when  the  execution  of  this 
lease  and  the  issue  of  these  bonds  were  parts  of  the  same  trans- 
action.^' Nor  a  bill  by  the  United  States  to  set  aside  a  land- 
patent  for  fraud,  obtain  an  accounting  of  the  rents  and  profits  of 
the  land,  and  recover  damage  for  waste.^^  Nor  a  bill  to  dissolve 
a  partnership,  which  alleges  that  complainant  was  induced  by 
fraud  to  enter  into  the  agreement  of  partnership,  that  the  de- 
fendant partner  wilfully  neglects  to  comply  with  the  agreement, 
and  that  the  business  is  being  conducted  at  a  loss.^^ 

§  75.  Objections  for  Multifariousness.  —  An  objection  to  a  bill 
as  multifarious  should  be  raised  by  demurrer.^  If  not  apparent 
upon  the  face  of  the  bill,  it  is  very  doubtful  whether  it  can  be 
raised  by  plea  or  answer.^  It  can  never  be  taken  for  the  first 
time  at  the  hearing  ^  or  upon  appeal ;  *  but  the  court  may,  of  its 
own  motion,  dismiss  a  bill  for  multifariousness  at  any  time  ;^  and 
perhaps  the  objection  that  the  rights  of  the  complainants  are  in- 
consistent can  be  raised  at  the  hearing.^  It  has  been  said  that 
the  objection  cannot  be  taken  by  a  defendant  who  is  not  injured 
by  it.'  The  misjoinder  of  a  defendant  against  whom  the  bill 
states  no  ground  for  relief  is  not  a  cause  for  a  demurrer  by  the 

15  Hebert  v.  Mutual  Life  Ins.  Co.,  12  3  Qreenwoorl  v.  Churchill,  1  M.  &  K. 
Fed.  R.  807;  Brugger  v.  State  Invest-  5-59;  Oliver  v.  Piatt,  3  How.  333,  412; 
ment  Ins.  Co.,  5  Saw.  304.  Nelson  v.   Hill,   5   How.  127;  Bowman's 

16  Fitch  r.  Creighton,  24  How.  159.  Devisees  v-  Wathen,  2  McLean,  376. 

1"  Pacific  R.  R.  (of  Missouri)  r.  Atlan-  *  Oliver   v.  Piatt.    3    How.    333,   412; 

tic  &  Pacific  R.  R.  Co.,  20  Fed.  R.  277.  Barney  )'.  Latham,   103   U.  S.  205,  215; 

1^  United  States  i-.  Pratt  Coal  &  Coke  Converse  v.  Michigan  Dairy  Co.,  45  Fed 

Co.,  18  Fed.  R.  708.  R.  18. 

19  Rosenstein  v.  Burns,  41  Fed.  R.  841.  5  Oliver    v.   Piatt,  3    How.   3.33,  412; 

§  7.5.    1  Nelson  v.  Hill,  5  How.  127  Nelson  >:  Hill,  5  How.  127,  132;  Green- 

2  Bensoti    v.    Hadfield,   4    Hare,   -32;  wood  r.  Churchill,  1  M.  &  K.  550;  Ohio 

Greenwood  v.  Churchill,  1   M.  &  K.  550;  v.  Ellis,  10  Ohio,  456. 

Gibbs  V.  Clagett,  2  Gill  &  J.  (Md.)   14;  «  Davies  v.  Quaterman,  4  Y.  &  Coll. 

Putnam  r.  Hollander,  6  Fed.  R.  882.     See  257. 

§§  77. 110;  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  747  ;  Beames  '  Buerk  v.  Imhaeuser,  8  Fed.  R.  457. 
on  Pleas,  157,  158. 


160  BILLS.  [chap.  IV. 

other  defendants.^  Multifariousness  as  to  subjects  or  parties 
does  not  render  a  decree  void,  so  that  it  can  be  treated  as  a 
nullity  in  a  collateral  action.^  It  has  been  held  in  other  courts, 
that  a  bill  is  not  multifarious  which  joins  an  insufficient  with  a 
good  case  for  equitable  relief,  when  there  is  no  misjoinder  of 
parties,  and  that  the  proper  course  of  the  defendant  is  to  demur 
to  so  much  of  the  bill  as  is  insufficient ;  ^^  but  a  bill  is  multifarious 
which  joins  two  inconsistent  complaints  by  different  plaintiffs,^i 
although  the  case  shown  by  the  principal  plaintiff  is  insufficient. 
It  is  within  the  constitutional  power  of  Congress  to  pass  a  law 
allowing,  in  a  single  specified  suit  against  a  corporation  chartered 
by  it,  matters  and  defendants  to  be  joined  in  a  manner  that  would 
otherwise  constitute  multifariousness.^'^  When  an  objection  for 
multifariousness  is  sustained,  the  complainant  will  always  be  al- 
lowed, if  he  asks  leave  to  do  so,  to  amend  upon  payment  of  costs, 
unless  his  bill  be  otherwise  fatally  defective. ^^  The  cases  show 
a  tendency  towards  holding  that  multifariousness  depends  so 
much  upon  the  discretion  of  the  courts  of  first  instance,  that 
a  decision  overruling  an  objection  upon  that  ground  would  not 
be  reviewed  upon  appeal.^"*  In  no  case  has  the  Supreme  Court 
of  the  United  States  reversed  a  decree  on  account  of  multi- 
fariousness in  the  bill.  In  general,  it  may  be  remarked  that 
multifariousness  is  an  objection  much  more  often  taken  than 
sustained. 

§  76.  Special  Provisions  of  the  Federal  Equity  Rules  and  Prac- 
tice. —  "  The  plaintiff  may  in  the  stating  or  narrative  part  of  his 
bill  state,  and  avoid,  by  counter-averments  at  his  option,  any 
matter  or  thing  which  he  supposes  will  be  insisted  upon  by  the 
defendant  by  way  of  defense  or  excuse  to  the  case  made  by  the 
plaintiff  for  relief."  ^  Such  matter  was  formerly  included  in  a 
separate  part  called  the   charging  part  of  the  bill,  which,  how- 

8  Warthen  i'.  Brantley,  5  Ga.  571;  "  Walker  v.  Powers,  104  U.  S.  2''\ 
Whitbeek  V.  Edgar,  2  BaVb.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)     240. 

106;  Miller  v.  Jamison,  9  C.  E.  Green        i-  United  States  f.  Union  Pacific  R.  R., 

(N.  J.),  41 ;  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  -544.  98  U.  S.  569. 

9  Hefner  !•.  Northwestern  Life  Ins.  Co,  ^'^  Walker  v.  Powers,  104  U.  S.  245, 
123  U.  S.  747.  240 ;  Price  v.  Coleman,  21  Fed,  Pv.  357. 

1^  McCabe  r.  Bellows,  1  Allen  (Mass.),  "  See  Gaines  v.  Chew,  2  How.  GIO; 
260;  Snavely  v.  Harkrader,  29  Grntt.  Oliver  v.  Piatt,  8  How.  .333;  Barney  v. 
(Va.)  112;  Storv's  F.q.  PI.  §  283.  See  Latliam,  103  U.  S.  205  ;  Slieldon  v.  Keo- 
Brown  v.  Guarantee  Trust  Co.,  128  U.  S.  kuk  N.  L.  Packet  Co.,  8  Fed.  R.  769; 
403.  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  335,  note  2. 

§  76.   1  Rule  21. 


§  76  ]   PROVISIONS  OF  FEDERAL  EQUITY  RULES  AND  PRACTICE.  161 

ever,  was  never  indispensable.^  It  is  often  important  for  the 
plaintiff  to  thus  meet  a  defense  which  he  anticipates.  For  as 
special  replications  are  not  allowed,  he  may  thus  save  the  delay 
of  an  enforced  amendment  of  his  bill,  in  order  to  plead  new  mat- 
ter as  a  reply  to  a  defense  in  the  answer.  "  If  any  persons,  other 
than  those  named  as  defendants  in  the  bill,  shall  appear  to  be 
necessary  or  proper  parties  thereto,  the  bill  shall  aver  the  reason 
why  they  are  not  made  parties,  by  showing  them  to  be  without 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  court,  or  that  they  cannot  be  joined  with- 
out ousting  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  as  to  other  parties."  ^ 
These  averments  should  be  included  in  this  part  of  the  bill. 
"  Every  bill  brought  by  one  or  more  stockholders  in  a  corporation 
against  the  corporation  and  other  parties,  founded  on  rights  which 
may  properly  be  asserted  by  the  corporation,  must  be  verified  by 
oath,  and  must  contain  an  allegation  that  the  plaintiff  was  a  share- 
holder at  the  time  of  the  transaction  of  which  he  complains  ;  or 
that  his  share  had  devolved  on  him  since  by  operation  of  law ; 
and  that  the  suit  is  not  a  collusive  one  to  confer  on  a  court  of  the 
United  States  jurisdiction  of  a  case  of  which  it  would  not  other- 
wise have  cognizance.  It  must  also  set  forth  with  particular- 
ity the  efforts  of  the  plaintiff  to  secure  such  action  as  he  desires 
on  the  part  of  the  managing  directors  or  trustees,  and,  if  neces- 
sary, of  the  shareholders,  and  the  causes  of  his  failure  to  obtain 
such  action."  ^  This  rule  does  not  apply  to  suits  brought  by 
the  stockholders  of  a  corporation  after  its  dissolution ;  ^  nor  to  a 
suit  to  restrain  corporate  action  to  which  the  president  of  the  cor- 
poration is  made  a  party  solely  for  purposes  of  discovery  ;  ^  nor 
to  a  case  where  it  clearly  appears  that  the  corporation  would 
certainly  refuse  to  exercise  the  right  upon  which  the  suit  is 
founded."  But  it  has  been  said,  that  "  it  is  not  enough  to  say 
that  it  appears  from  the  bill  that  the  corporation  would  probably 
refuse  relief.  The  rule  is  imperative  that  efforts  should  be  made 
to  obtain  relief  in  that  direction  before  such  a  suit  as  this  shall  be 

2  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  33  ;  Langilell's  Eq.     Loan   &    Trust    Co.,    12    Fed.   R.   752; 
PI.  §  55.  Dimpfell    v.  Oliio    &    Miss.   R.   R.   Co., 

3  Rule  22.  110  U.  S.  200  ;  Quincy  v.  Steel,  120  U.  S., 
*  Rule  94.      See  also  Hawes  v.  Oak-     241  ;  §§  12,  87,  207. 

land,  104  U.  S.  450 ;  Huntington  r.  Palmer,  5  Lafayette  Co.  v.  Neely,  21  Fed.  R.  738. 

104    U.  S.  482;    Dodge    v.  Woolsey,   18  «  Leo'r.    Union    Pacific    Ry.    Co.,    17 

How.  331 ;  Greenwood  v.  Freiglit  Co.,  105  Fed.  R.  27.3. 

U.  S.  13,  16;  Detroit  ;•.  Dean,  106  U.  S.  '  County  of  Tazewell  c.  Farmers' Loan 

537,  542 ;  County  of  Tazewell  i-.  Farmers'  &  Trust  Co ,  12  Fed.  R.  752. 
VOL.  I.  —  11 


162  BILLS.  [chap.  IV. 

commenced."  ^  It  has  been  said  that  "  the  bill  may  show  that 
there  was  no  necessity  for  efforts  to  be  made  with  the  share- 
holders, but  not  so  as  to  the  directors." ^  An  allegation  "that 
this  suit  is  brought  in  good  faith,  and  for  the  collection  of,  and  to 
compel  the  collection  of,  what  your  orator  believes  to  be  a  merito- 
rious claim,"  is  not  equivalent  to  the  allegation  "  that  the  suit  is 
not  a  collusive  one,  to  confer  on  a  court  of  the  United  States 
jurisdiction  of  a  case  of  which  it  would  not  otherwise  have  cog- 
nizance." 1*^  In  cases  where  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  depended 
upon  the  amount  involved,  it  has  been  held  at  circuit  that  the  bill 
should  show  that  the  value  of  the  matter  in  dispute  exceeds  the 
jurisdictional  amount."  If  a  bill  be  filed  to  impeach  a  patent  or 
other  grant  by  the  United  States  and  be  not  brought  by  the 
Attorney-General,  or  some  other  officer  authorized  by  statute  to 
do  so,  it  must  contain  an  allegation  that  the  Attorney-General  has 
"  given  such  order  for  its  institution  as  will  make  him  officially 
responsible  for  it,  and  show  his  control  over  the  cause."  ^^  The 
signature  of  the  Attorney -General  subscribed  to  the  bill  is 
sufficient  to  show  his  authority  ■  for  filing  it.'^ 

§  77.  Bills  to  enjoin  the  Infringement  of  Patents.  —  A  bill  to 
restrain  the  infringement  of  a  patent  must  contain  an  allegation 
that  the  complainant  or  the  person  through  whom  he  claims  was 
the  inventor  or  discoverer  of  the  thing  or  process  patented. ^  It 
must  also  contain  a  substantial  description  of  the  ])atcnt  or  else 
set  out  the  patent  itself,  or  have  the  same  annexed  as  an  exhibit,^ 
The  history  of  the  invention,  and  a  description  of  patents  issued 
to  the  complainant  before  that  sued  upon,  are  proper  averments."^ 
It  is  also  proper  to  describe  previous  litigation  over  the  same  or 
similar  patents.*  It  has  been  held  to  be  a  sufficient  allegation 
of  title   and   infringement   for   the  plaintiff  to  allege :  that  he 

8  McCrary,  J.,  orally  in  Foote  v.  Cu-  i^  u.  s.  ,..  M„llan,  10  Fed.  R.  785; 
nard  Mining  Co.,  17  Fed.  R.  4G,  48.  s.  c.  118  U.  S.  271. 

9  Squair  c.  Lookout  Mountain  Co.,  42  §  77.  i  Sullivan  v.  Redfield,  1  Paine, 
Fed.  R.  729,  731.  441. 

w  Quincyw.  Steel,  1200.8.241,246,247.  2  Strirrat  v.  E.xcelsior  Manuf.  Co.,  44 

u  United  States  v.  Pratt  Coal  &  Coke  Fed.  R.  142. 
Co.,   18    Fed.   R.  708;    Murpliy  v.  Fast         3  Steam  Gauge  &  Lantern  Co.  r.  Me- 

Portland,  42  Fed.  R.  308;   Leliigh   Zinc  Roberts,  20  Fed.  R.  765. 
&  Iron  Co.  V.  N.  J.  Zinc  &  Iron  Co.,  43         ^  Steam  Gauge  &  Lantern  Co.  v.  Mc- 

Fed.  R.  545,  546;  Oleson  v.  Nortlicrn  R.  Roberts,  26  Fed.  R.  765;  American  Bell 

Co.,  43  Fed.  R.  112.  Tel.  Co.  v.  Southern  Tel.  Co.,  34  Fed.  R. 

12  Mr.  .Justice  Miller  in  United  States  803. 
V.  Throckmorton,  98  U.  S.  61,  71. 


§  77.]        BILLS    TO    ENJOIN    THE   INFRINGEMENT   OF    PATENTS.  163 

"was  the  true,  original,  and  first  inventor  of  a  certain  new 
and  useful  imi)roved  ajiplication  of  steam  j)0\ver  to  the  capstan 
of  vessels,  not  known  or  used  before  ; "  "  that  a  description  or 
specification  of  the  aforesaid  improvement  was  given  in  his 
schedule  to  the  aforesaid  letters-patent  annexed,  accompanied  by 
certain  drawings  referred  to  in  said  last  mentioned  schedule,  and 
forming  parts  of  said  letters-patent,  —  the  said  letters-patent  and 
the  said  specification  thereto  annexed  (which,  or  an  exemplified 
copy  of  which,  your  orators  will  produce,  as  your  honors  may 
direct)  were  duly  recorded  in  the  patent  office  ;  "  and  "  that  the 
defendant  is  now  constructing,  using,  and  selling  steam-power 
capstans  for  vessels  in  some  parts  thereof  substantially  the  same 
in  construction  and  operation  as  in  the  said  letters-patent  men- 
tioned." ^  A  bill  for  an  injunction  and  an  accounting  was  held  to 
be  good  on  demurrer,  although  it  did  not  allege  that  the  com- 
plainant was  engaged  in  using  the  invention  patented,  or  that  it 
was  a  source  of  profit  to  him,  when  it  alleged  that  the  defendant 
had  made  profits  by  the  use  of  the  invention.^  When  a  bill 
alleged  "  that  the  patentee  was  the  original,  first,  and  sole  inventor 
of  a  certain  new  and  useful  improvement  in  the  construction  of 
cable  railways,  fully  described  in  the  specification  of  the  said 
letters-patents,  which  had  not  been  patented  to  himself  or  to 
others,  witli  his  knowledge  or  consent,  in  any  country,  and  had 
not,  to  his  or  the  orator's  knowledge,  been  in  public  use  or  on  sale 
in  the  United  States  for  more  than  two  years  prior  to  his  inven- 
tion and  discovery  thereof,  and  application  for  letters-patent  of 
the  United  States  therefor,"  it  was  held  sufficient."  A  bill  which 
alleged  that  a  complainant  had  obtained  a  certain  patent,  that  the 
defendant  had  obtained  patents  of  a  later  date  which  interfered 
with  complainant's  rights,  and  that  defendant  is  making  and 
selling  machines  under  his  patents,  and  has  in  other  ways  dis- 
turbed complainant  in  the  use  and  enjoyment  of  the  rights  granted 
by  his  patent,  was  held  sufficiently  to  charge  interference.^  The 
allegation  "  as  by  the  said  letters-patent  and  specification,  all  in 
due  form  of  law  ready  in  court  to  be  produced,  will  fully  appear," 
is  equivalent  to  profert  in  the  most  formal  and  ample  terms.     It 

5  M'Millin  v.  St.  Louis  &  Mississippi  "  American  Cable   R3-.  Co.  v.  Mayor, 
Valley    Transportation    Co.,  18  Fed.  R.  &c'.  of  the  City  of  N.  Y.,  43  Fed.  R.  60. 
260,  261.     See  M'Coy  v.  Nelson,  121  U.  S.  ^  Stonemetz  P.  M.  Co.  v.  Brown  F.  M. 
484.  Co.,  46  Fed.  R.  72. 

6  Wirt  V.  Hicks,  46  Fed.  R.  71. 


164  BILLS.  [chap.  IV. 

tenders  the  entire  grant  to  the  inspection  of  tiie  court  and  party.^ 
When  profert  of  the  patent  is  made  in  the  bill,  only  its  title  need 
be  set  forth. ''^  It  was  held  at  circuit  that  in  a  bill  founded  upon  a 
reissued  patent  it  is  not  necessary  to  cover  s})ccifically  the  ground 
upon  which  the  original  patent  was  surrendered ;  ^^  but  if  such  a 
bill  shows  a  delay  of  more  than  two  years  in  obtaining  the  reissue, 
it  should  set  up  an  excuse  for  the  delay .^^  Upon  a  demurrer 
for  both  uncertainty  and  want  of  equity  to  a  bill  founded  upon  a 
reissued  patent,  when  the  only  allegations  concerning  the  re- 
issue were  "  that  said  Charles  T.  Day,  having  for  good  and  lawful 
cause  and  with  the  consent  and  approbation  of  your  orator,  sur- 
rendered said  letters-patent  to  the  commissioner  of  patents,  and 
having  made  due  application  therefor,  and  having  in  all  things 
complied  with  the  acts  of  Congress  in  such  case  made  and  })ro- 
vided,  did,  on  the  eighteenth  of  February,  1879,  obtain  new 
letters-patent,  being  reissued  letters-patent,  for  the  same  inven- 
tion for  the  residue  of  said  term,  and  which  were  marked  '  reis- 
sue, Xo.  8,590,'  and  were  issued  in  due  form  of  law  to  your  orator, 
as  assignee,  under  the  seal  of  the  patent  office  of  the  United 
States,  signed  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Interior  and  countersigned 
by  the  Commissioner  of  Patents,  and  bearing  date  the  day  and 
year  aforesaid,  as  by  the  last  mentioned  reissued  letters-|)atent, 
ready  here  in  court  to  be  produced,  will  appear ; "  it  was  held  that 
the  bill  was  not  objectionaljle.^^  The  court  then  said  :  "  It  is  not 
necessary  to  aver,  specifically,  the  ground  on  which  the  original 
patent  was  surrendered.  The  reissue  of  letters-patent  by  the 
Commissioner  is  j;nw?a/a(?eV  evidence  that  such  reissue  is  founded 
on  sufficient  cause,  and  is  in  accordance  with  law.  It  is  also 
presumed  until  the  contrary  is  shown  that  the  Commissioner  acted 
within  his  statutory  authority."  '^  A  bill  founded  upon  a  reissued 
patent,  which  shows  a  delay  of  more  thnn  two  years  in  the  appli- 
cation for  the  reissue,  must  allege  sufficient  excuse  for  the  delay. ^'^ 
So  must  a  bill  to  compel  the  issue  of  a  patent  which  shows  a  delay 
i)f  two  years  in  prosecuting  the  application  in  the  Patent  Oihce.^'' 

'■>  Wilder  r.  McCormick,  2  RIatclif.  81,  For  a  precedent  of  n  bill  for  the  infrin^e- 

•5'3-  inent  of  an  oriirinnl  patent,  see  McCoy  v. 

'"  M'Millin  V.  St.  Louis  &  Mississippi  Nelson.  121  U.  S.  484. 

Valley  Transportation  Co.,  18  Fed.  R.2f;0.  »  Colt,  J.,    in    Spneth   v.  Barney,   22 

"  Spaeth  V.  Harney,  22  Fed.  R.  828.  Fed.  R.  828,  82^. 

1-^  Wollensak  r.  Keiher,  115  U.  S.  O^i.  '-^  Wollensak  v.  Keiher,  11'.  U.  S.  OG. 

"  Spaeth    V.  Harney,  22    Fed.  II  828.  i'''  Gandy  r.  Marble,  122  U.  S.  432. 


§  78.]         GENERAL  RULES  OF  EQUITY  PLEADING.  165 

It  has  been  held  that  a  simple  averment  that  the  defendant  has 
infringed  the  patents  above  described  is  sufficient.^"  A  bill  to 
enjoin  the  infringement  of  a  patent  by  the  use  of  a  machine  need 
not  state  what  articles  the  defendant  has  made  by  the  use  of  the 
machine. ^'^  An  allegation  that  the  defendant  "  since  the  date  of 
said  patent  "  had  infringed,  was  held  upon  demurrer  not  to  signify 
"ever  since,"  but  "after  or  subsequently  to"  that  datc.^^  A  bill 
to  enjoin  the  infringement  of  several  distinct  ))atents  has  been 
held  multifarious;-^  but  if  all  the  patents  arc  infringed  in  the  use 
of  or  manufacture  of  a  single  machine  and  it  is  so  alleged,  the  bill 
is  good.-^  It  has  been  said  that  the  complainant  "  should  aver 
that  said  inventions  are  capable  of  conjoint  as  well  as  separate  use, 
and  are  so  used  by  the  defendants."  ^^  A  charge  of  infringement, 
and  a  prayer  for  an  injunction  and  accounting  accordingly,  may  be 
joined  with  a  charge  of  interference  and  a  prayer  for  relief,  under 
§  4918  of  the  Revised  Statutes.-'^  A  bill  seeking  an  injunction 
with  damages  against  the  infringement  of  a  patent,  and  an  injunc- 
tion with  damages  against  the  publication  of  libellous  circulars 
affecting  plaintiff's  patent,  has  been  held  multifarious.^*  Persons 
who  arc  acting  in  concert  as  employees  of  the  same  corporation 
in  the  infringement  of  a  patent  may  bo  joined  as  defendants  to 
the  same  bill.-'^  An  objection  that  defendants  were  improperly 
joined  should  be  raised  by  demurrer  wdien  it  appears  on  the  face 
of  the  bill. 26 

§  78.  General  Rules  cf  Equity  Pleading.  —  Otherwise,  the  rules 
regulating  the  framing  of  a  bill  and,  with  the  exceptions  subse- 
quently given,  other  pleadings   in  equity  are   substantially  the 

1'^  American  Bell  Tel.  Co.  ;;.  Southern  Cliillieothe,  7  Fed.  R.  351 ;  Nellis  v.  Mo- 
Tel.  Co.,  .34  Fed.  R.  80:1  See  also  Mc-  Lanalian,  C,  Fislier's  Pat.  Cas.  286. 
Millin  i:  St.  Louis  &  Mississippi  Valley  —  Gamewell  Fire  Alarm  Telegraph  Co. 
Transportation  Co.,  18  Fed.  R.  2r,0;  Mc-  ;•.  City  of  Chillicotlie,  7  Fed  R.  ?.51 ;  Nel- 
Coy  >:  Nelson,  121  U.  S.  484  ;  Cleveland  lis  r.  McLanalian,  6  Fisher's  Fat.  Cas.  286. 
F.  &  B.  Co.  u.  U.  S.  Rolling  Stock  Co.,  41  -^  Leach  v.  Chandler,  18  Fed.  K.  202  ; 
Fed.  R.  476.  Holliday  v.  Pickhardt,  20  Fed.   R.  853; 

18  Fischer  v.  Hayes,  6  Fed.  R.  76,  78.  Swift  r.  .Tenks,  21)  P\'d.  U.  642  ;   American 

19  Brush  Flectric  Co  »;.  Ball  Flectric  Roll  Paper  Co.  r.  Knopp,  44  Fed.  R.  60'.», 
LiL'ht  Co.,  43  Fed.  R.  809.  612;  Stonemetz  P.  M.  Co.  v.  Brown  F.  M. 

•-'^  Hayes    r.   Dayton,  8  Fed.  R.   702;  Co.,  46  Fed.  R.  72. 

Shickle  v.  South  St.  Louis  Foundry   Co.,  -■*  Fougeres  v.  Murharger,  44  Fed.  R. 

22  Fed.  R.  105.  202.     Sec  §  74. 

21  Nourse  r.  Allen,  4  Blatchf.  C.  C.  37(i ;  -^  Poppenhusen  v.  Falke,  4  Blatchf.  403. 

Perry  v.  Corning,  7  Blatchf.  C.  C  105 ;  -»  Putnam  ;-.  Hollander,  6  Fed.  R.  882. 

Case  V.  Redfield,  4  McLean,  52i) :  Game-  See  §§  75,  110. 
well  Fire  Alarm  Telegrapii  Co.  r.  City  of 


166  BILLS.  [chap.  IV. 

same  as  those  of  pleading  at  common  law  ;  but  more  liberality  is 
used  in  their  construction,^  and  the  use  of  technical  expressions 
is  never  necessary .^  An  allegation  that  the  plaintiff  is  seized  in 
fee  simple  is  equivalent  to  an  allegation  that  he  is  in  possession.^ 
If  the  plaintiff  claim  under  a  derivative  title,  he  must  show  the 
steps  by  which  it  has  come  into  existence.*  Where,  however, 
there  is  an  existing  privity  between  the  plaintiff  and  defendant, 
independently  of  the  plaintiff's  title,  which  gives  the  plaintiff  a 
right  to  maintain  the  suit ;  as,  for  example,  if  they  are  landlord 
and  tenant,  or  mortgagor  and  mortgagee,  then  it  is  not  necessary 
to  state  the  plaintiff's  title  fully  in  the  bill.^  An  allegation  that 
the  complainant  acquired  the  title  by  purchase  from  the  assignee 
in  bankruptcy  of  the  original  owner  was  held  sufficient,  although 
it  did  not  state  that  the  assignee  in  bankruptcy  obtained  an  order 
from  the  court  authorizing  him  to  make  the  sale.*^  It  was  said 
recently  at  circuit,  that  in  a  suit  to  remove  a  cloud  from  the  title 
of  land  generally,  "it  will  be  found  sufficient  for  the  plaintiff  to 
allege  his  possession,  and  interest  or  estate  in  the  land,  or  that  he 
is  the  owner  thereof  in  fee  for  life  or  for  years,  and  that  he  claims 
the  same  by  a  regular  chain  of  conveyances  from  some  recognized 
and  undisputed  source  of  title,  as,  the  United  States,  or  its  donee 
under  the  donation  act  of  September  27, 1850,  without  setting  out 
such  conveyances  or  stating  them  in  detail.  •  But  when  there  is 
reason  to  believe,  as  in  this  case  and  many  others,  that  the  right- 
fulness of  the  defendant's  claim  depends  on  the  validity  or  legal 
effect  of  some  link  or  links  in  tlie  conveyances  under  which  the 
plaintiff  claims  title,  it  is  very  convenient,  if  not  necessary,  that 
the  statement  of  the  plaintiff's  case  should  contain  the  facts  fully 
and  in  detail  at  that  point  in  the  chain  of  his  title  where  it  con- 
flicts with  the  claim  of  the  defendant.  By  so  doing  the  necessity 
of  future  amendments  will  be  avoided,  and  the  progress  and  dis- 
patch of  the  case  promoted."  '  And  a  demurrer  to  a  bill  for  a 
lack  of  certainty  in  this  respect  has  been  sustained.^     "  It  is  not 

§  78.   1  Daniell's  Cli.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed  )  •'  Daiuell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  370, 

41. -i.  37  L 

-  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  414.  •'  Amory  r.  Lawrence,  3  Cliff.  523. 

3  Gage  r.  Kaufman,  1.33  U.  S.  471.  '  (ioldsmith   r.   Gilliland,  22  Fed.  R. 

*  Lord  Digby  v.   Meecli,   Bnnb.   195 ;  865,  808. 
Humphreys  r!  fate,  4  Iredell's  Eq.  (N.C.).  «  Goldsmith    v.    Gilliland,  22  Fed.  R. 

220 ;  Marshall  -•.  Turnbull,  34  Fed.  H.  827;  805. 
Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  3u0,  370. 


§  78.]  GENERAL    RULES    OF    EQUITY    PLEADING.  167 

necessary,  wlien  all  the  legal  and  equitable  owners  are  joined,  to 
state  the  formalities  or  the  mode  of  conveyance  by  which  the 
equitable  interests  became  vested  in  the  co-complainants."  ^  In 
a  bill  filed  by  an  executor  or  an  administrator,  it  seems  to  be 
sutlicient  to  state  that  the  will  has  been  proved,  or  letters  of  ad- 
ministration taken  out,  '•  in  the  proper  court,"  without  naming  it.^'^ 
If,  however,  the  plaintiff  undertake  to  name  the  court,  and  it  be 
an  improper  or  insufficient  one,  the  bill  is  demurrable.^^  If  the 
plaintiff's  title  would  be  incomplete  without  the  performance  of 
some  preliminary  act,  its  performance  must  be  alleged,  and  a 
mere  statement  that  the  title  is  complete  is  insufficient.^^  Thus, 
in  an  English  case,  where  the  plaintiff  sued  as  a  shareholder  of  a 
joint-stock  company,  and  merely  alleged  in  his  bill  "  that  he  pur- 
chased for  valuable  considerations  divers  shares,  upon  which  the 
instalment  of  five  per  cent  had  been  paid,  and  that  he  ever  since 
lias  been,  and  now  is,  the  holder  of  such  shares;"  while  in  an- 
other part  of  the  bill  it  was  alleged  "that  by  the  rules  of  the 
association,  as  set  forth  in  the  prospectus,  no  transfer  of  shares 
■would  be  valid  in  law  or  equity,  unless  the  purchaser  was  approved 
by  a  board  of  directors,  and  signed  an  instrument  binding  him  to 
observe  the  regulations,"  —  it  was  held,  on  demurrer,  that  such 
action  on  the  part  of  the  board  and  the  purchaser  was  a  condition 
precedent  to  the  transfer  of  the  title  to  a  share  of  stock ;  and 
that  the  bill  was  defective  for  not  alleging  such  action. ^^  So,  a 
complainant  who  rests  his  title  upon  a  tax-deed  must  plead  the 
performance  of  the  prerequisites  to  the  validity  of  the  deed.^* 
When  the  nature  of  the  conveyance  through  which  the  plaintiff 
claims  is  sucli  that  by  common  law  independent  of  a  statute,  as  the 
statute  of  frauds,  for  example,  no  deed,  writing,  or  other  formality 
was  essential  to  its  validity,  the  English  rule  was  that  compliance 
with  such  formality  need  not  be  alleged. ^^  In  this  respect,  equity 
followed  the  rule  at  common  law,  that  such  statutory  regulations 
did  not  alter  the  form  of  pleadings. ^^     If,  however,  it  appeai'ed 

9  Sliipman  J.,  in  Bl.ack  r.  Henry  G.         i-  Walburn  r.  Ingilhy,  1  M.  &  K.  Gl  ; 

Allen  Co.,  4-2  Fed.  K.  G18,  62:?.  '  Daniell's    Ch.    Pr.    (2(1    Am.    cd.)   369; 

w  Humnlireys  v.  Ingledon,  1  P.  Wms.  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §§  257.  257  a,  258. 
752;  Black  v.  Henry    G.   Allen    Co.,   42         i^  Walburn  i:  Ingilby,  1  M.  &  K.  61. 
Fed.  R.  618,  623.  »  Green  wait  i-.  Duncan,  16  Fed.  R.  35. 

^1  Tourton  r.  Flower,  3  P.  Wms.  .369;         i'  nanicU's  Ch.  Pr.   (2d  Am.  cd.)  416, 

Black  V.  Henry  G.  Allen  Co..  42  Fed.  R.  417  ;  Harrison  /•.  Hosrcr,  2  Ves.  Jr.  327. 
618,  624;  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)         i'-  DanioH's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  416, 

364.  417  ;  Stephen  on  Pleading,  313. 


168  BihLS.  [chap.  IV. 

upon  the  face  of  the  bill  that  compliance  had  not  been  made  with 
such  a  formality,  the  bill  was  demurrable  upon  that  ground. i' 
When,  however,  a  right  had  been  originally  created  by  statute^  as 
a  right  to  land  by  devise,  or  in  this  country  a  patent  or  copyright, 
a  compliance  with  the  statutory  requirements  had  to  be  alleged 
by  one  claiming  under  it.^^ 

"  The  rule  in  equity  is  that  it  is  not  sufficient  to  charge  a  fraud 
simply,  but  you  must  charge  also  some  injury  as  the  result  of  the 
fraud."  ^^  Where  a  bill  shows  apparent  laches,  it  should  set 
forth  the  impediments  to  an  earlier  suit,  the  cause  of  the  com- 
plainant's previous  ignorance,  if  any,  of  his  rights,  and  when  he 
first  knew  of  them.^*^  The  same  rule  is  applied  to  a  bill  upon  a 
reissued  patent  showing  a  delay  of  more  than  two  years  in  the 
application  for  a  reissue  ;  ^^  and  to  a  bill  to  compel  the  issue  of 
a  patent  which  shows  a  delay  of  two  years  in  prosecuting  the  ap- 
plication in  the  Patent  Office.-^  In  construing  this,  as  well  as  all 
other  parts  of  pleadings,  every  doubt  is  against  the  pleader  ;^  but 
contracts  by  corporations  are  presumed  to  be  within  their  charters 
until  the  contrary  is  shown.^^  When  the  bill  contains  general  and 
specific  allegations  as  to  the  same  matter,  the  general  allegations  will 
be  referred  to  those  which  are  specific.^^  Exhibits  attached  to  the 
bill,  and  therein  referred  to,  are  considered  as  a  part  of  the  same.^^ 

§  79.  The  Common  Confederacy  Clause.  —  The  confederacy  part, 
which  came  next  in  order,  is  now  expressly  declared  unnecessary 
by  the  equity  rules.^  It  is  still,  however,  inserted  by  some  prac- 
titioners. The  old  form  was  substantially  as  follows  :  "  But  now 
it  is,  may  it  please  your  honor,  that  the  said  A.  B.,  combining 
and  confederating  with  divers  persons,"  or,  if  there  are  several 
defendants,  "  combining  and  confederating  with  the  said  C.  D. 
and  E  F.,  and  with  divers  other  persons,  ...  at  present  un- 
known to  your  orator,  whose  names  when  discovered  your  orator 

1^  Randall   v.    Howard,   2   Black,   585,  21  Wollcnsak  v.  'Reilier,  115  U.  S.  06. 

5S9;  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am   ed.)  417  ;  22  Gandy  ;•.  Marble,  122  U.  S.  432. 

Redding  v.  Wilkes,  3  Brown  C.  0.  401.  23  phelps  v.  McDonald,  99  U.  S.  298, 

i»  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  419  ;  305. 

Sullivan  r.  Rcdfield,  1  Paine,  441 ;  Atwill  24  Express  Co.  v.  Railroad  Co.,  99  U.  S. 

V.  Ferrett,  2  Blatch.  C.  C.  39.  191,  at  pa^^e  199. 

IS'  Linn  17.  Green,  17  Fed.  R.  407.  «  Ellis    v.     Colman,    25     Beav.    GG2  ; 

2'  Badger  v.  Badger,  2  Wall   87  ;  Rich-  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  37  a. 

ards  ('.   Mackall,   124   U.  S.  183;  Gandy  20  Rij^ek    r.   Henry    G.    Allen    Co,    42 

V.  .Marble,  122  U.  S.  432;  Wollensak  v.  Fed.  R.  018.  025;  infm,  §  100. 

Reiher,  115  U.  S.  90.  §  79.    1  Rule  21. 


§  81.]  THE   JURISDICTION    CLAUSE.  1C9 

prays  he  may  be  at  liberty  to  insert  herein,  with  apt  words  to 
charge  them  as  the  parties  defendant  hereto,  and,  contriving  how 
to  wrong  and  injure  your  orator  in  the  premises,  he  the  said 
A.  B.  at  times  pretends  that."  ^  "  This  practice  is  said  to  have 
arisen  from  the  idea  that  without  such  a  charge  parties  could  not 
be  added  to  the  bill  by  amendment,  and  in  some  cases,  perhaps, 
the  charge  has  been  inserted  with  a  view  to  give  the  court  juris- 
diction." 2  It  is  mere  surplusage,  and  being  a  conclusion  of  law 
when  inserted  need  not  be  answered.^ 

§  80.  The  Charging  Part.  —  Next  followed  formerly  tlic  char- 
ging part  of  the  bill,  which  also  has  been  declared  unnecessary  by 
the  equity  rules,^  but  is  occasionally  used.  "  It  usually  consists 
of  some  allegation  or  allegations  which  set  forth  the  matters  of 
defense  or  excuse  which  it  i.s  supposed  the  defendant  intends 
or  pretends  to  set  up  to  justify  his  non-compliance  with  the 
plaintiff's  right  or  claim,  and  then  charges  other  matters,  which 
disprove  or  avoid  the  supposed  defense  or  excuse.  It  is  some- 
times also  used  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  a  discovery  of  the 
nature  of  the  defendant's  case,  or  to  i)ut  in  issue  some  matter 
which  it  is  not  for  the  interest  of  the  plaintiff  to  admit ;  for  which 
purpose  the  charge  of  the  pretence  of  the  defendant  is  held  to  be 
sufficient."  ^  If  such  averments  are  considered  necessary  now, 
the  proper  method  of  pleading  is  to  include  them  in  the  narj-ative 
part  of  the  bill.'^ 

§  81.  The  Jurisdiction  Clause.  —  Then  camc  the  jurisdiction 
clause.  This  ran  substantially  as  follows  :  "  All  which  actings, 
doings,  and  pretences  of  the  said  confederates  are  contrary  to 
equity  and  good  conscience,  and  tend  to  the  manifest  wrong,  in- 
jury, and  oppression  of  your  orator  in  the  premises.  In  tender 
consideration  whereof,  and  forasmuch  as  your  orator  is  entirely 
remediless  by  the  strict  rules  of  the  common  law,  and  can  only 
have  relief  in  a  court  of  equity  where  matters  of  this  nature  are 
properly  cognizable ;  to  the  end,  therefore,"  ^  &:c.  It  is  still  the 
common  usage  to  insert  a  short  clause  of  this  character,  although 
it  has  been  declared  by  the  equity  rules  unnecessary .^ 

'■'  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  29,  note  2.  3  Rule  21;  Partridge  v.  Haycraft,  11 

3  Mitford's  PI.  (;li.  1,  §  2.  Ves.  574.     See  §  67. 

*  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  29.  §  81.   i  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  34,  and  notes. 

§80.    1  Rule  21.  2  Rule  21, 
2  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  01.     See  Mitford's 
PI.  cii.  1,  §  3. 


170  BILLS.  [chap.  IV. 

§  82.  The  Interrogatory  Clause.  —  The  interrogatory  clause 
which  followed  was  of  much  more  importance  formerly,  when 
parties  to  a  suit  could  not  testify  in  actions  at  common  law,  than 
it  is  at  the  present  time.  Yet,  in  addition  to  the  inclusion  in  the 
prayer  for  relief  of  a  request  that  the  defendants  be  compelled 
to  answer  the  bill,  it  is  still  not  unusual  to  require  them  to 
answer  specific  interrogatories.  The  equity  rules  provide  as  fol- 
lows :  "  The  interrogatories  contained  in  the  interrogating  part 
of  the  bill  must  be  divided  as  conveniently  as  may  be  from  each 
other,  and  numbered  consecutively  1,  2,  3,  &c. ;  and  the  inter- 
rogatories which  each  defendant  is  required  to  answer  shall  be 
specified  in  a  note  at  the  foot  of  the  bill,  in  the  form  to  the 
effect  following,  that  is  to  say  :  '  The  defendant  (A.  B.)  is  re- 
quired to  answer  the  interrogatories  numbered  respectively  1,  2, 
3,  &c.'  "  ^  The  note  at  the  foot  of  the  bill,  specifying  the  in- 
terrogatories which  each  defendant  is  reijuired  to  answer,  shall 
be  considered  and  treated  as  part  of  the  bill ;  and  the  addition 
of  any  such  note  to  the  bill,  or  any  alteration  in  or  addition  to 
such  note  after  the  bill  is  filed,  shall  be  considered  and  treated 
as  an  amendment  to  the  bill."  ^  "  Instead  of  the  words  of  the  bill 
now  in  use  preceding  the  interrogatory  part  thereof,^  and  begin- 
ning with  the  words  '  to  the  end  therefore,'  there  shall  hereafter 
be  used  words  in  the  form  or  to  the  effect  following :  '  To  the 
end,  therefore,  that  the  said  defendants  may,  if  they  can,  show 
why  your  orator  should  not  have  the  relief  hereby  prayed,  and 
may,  upon  their  several  corporate  oaths,  and  according  to  the 
best  and  utmost  of  their  several  and  res])ective  knowledge,  re- 
membrance, information,  and  belief,  full,  true,  direct,  and  perfect 
answer  make  to  each  of  the  several  interrogatories  hereinafter 
numbered  and  set  forth,  as  by  the  note  hereunder  written  they 
are  respectively  required  to  answer;  that  is  to  say, — 

§  82.  1  Rule  41.  gated  ;  and  tliat  not  only  to  tlie  best  of 

-  IJiile  42.  their  respective  knowledge  and   remein- 

3  The  old  form  was  as  follows  :  "  To  brant-e,  but  also  as  to  tlie  best  of  their 

the  end,  therefore,  that  tiie  said   A.   B.  several  and  respective  information,  Iienr- 

and  the  rest  of  the  confederates,  when  say,  and  belief;  and  more  especially  that 

discovered,  may   upon  their  several  and  they  may  answer  and  set  forth  whether, 

respective  corporate  oaths,  full,  true,  di-  &c. ;  or  thoy  may  set  forth  and  discover 

rect,  and  perfect  answer  make,  to  all  and  whether  they  do  not  know,  have  heard, 

singular  the  matters  liereinbefore  stateiJ  or  are  informed,  and  in  their  conscience 

and  charged,  as  fully  and  particularly  as  believe  that,"  &c.     Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  35, 

if  the  same  were    hereinafter   repeated,  note  2. 
and    they    thereunto    distinctly    interro- 


§  83.]  THE    ITvAYER   FOR   RELIEF.  171 

" '  Whether,  &c. 

"  '  Whether,  &c.'  "  * 

No  interrogatory  need  be  answered  or  will  be  snstaincd  which 
does  not  refer  to  some  matter  alleged  in  the  narrative  part  of  the 
bill,^  but  a  number  of  interrogatories  may  be  founded  upon  a 
single  allegation.*^  The  criterion  of  immateriality  of  interroga- 
tories is  not  whether  an  affirmative  answer  will  ])rove  an  allega- 
tion in  a  bill,  but  whether  it  will  tend  to  prove  the  bill.'  The 
defendant  need  not  answer  an  interrogatory  if  by  so  doing  he 
would  subject  himself  to  a  penalty,  or  a  forfeiture,  or  to  punish- 
ment for  a  crime.^  When  there  are  no  specific  interrogatories 
the  defendants  are  still  bound  to  answer,  either  admitting  or 
denying  every  part  of  the  bill,  as  if  they  had  been  specifically 
interrogated  thereabout.^  An  answer  under  oath  to  the  whole 
of  the  bill,  or  to  all  but  certain  specified  interrogatories,  may  be 
expressly  waived  by  the  ])laintiff.^*^  Such  waiver  is  usually  in- 
serted in  the  prayer  for  relief  or  for  process. 

§  83.  The  Prayer  for  Relief.  —  "  The  prayer  of  the  bill  shall  ask 
the  special  relief  to  which  the  plaintiff  supposes  himself  entitled, 
and  also  shall  contain  a  prayer  for  general  I'elief.  And  if  an 
injunction,  or  a  writ  of  ne  exeat  regno^  or  any  other  special  order 
pending  the  suit  is  required,  it  shall  also  be  specially  asked  for."  ^ 
Under  the  prayer  for  general  relief  the  court  will  usually  grant 
any  relief  ^  other  than  an  interlocutory  order,  which  is  consistent 
with,  and  a  ground  for  which  is  included  in,  the  allegations  of 
the  bill,^  and  not  inconsistent  with  the  prayer  for  special  relief.^ 

*  Rule  43.     For  an  excellent  statement        i"  Amendment  of  1851  to  Rule  41. 
of  the  reasons  for  tlie  use  of  siiccific  in-  §  83.  i  Rule  21.     Compare  Bloomfield 

terrogatories,   see    Report    of    Cliancer3'  v.  Eyre,  8  Beav.  250,  250. 
Commissioners,  9th  March,  1820,  Appen-  ^  Tayloe  v.  Mercliants'  Fire  Ins.  Co., 

dix,  pp.  1.2;  Story's  Eq.  ri.  §  .38,  note  3.  9  How.'. 390;   Stewart  v.   Ciiesapeake   & 

5  Attorney-General  r.  Whorwood,  1  Oliio  Canal  Co.,  1  Fed.  R.  SGI ;  (\)unty 
Ves.  534;  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  of  Mobile  v.  KimbaU,  102  U.  S.  OOl"; 
432,  433.  Chicago.  St.  L.  &  N.  O.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ma- 

6  Faulder  i-.  Stuart,  11  Ves.  296 ;  Bui-  comb,  2  Fed.  R.  18;  Adams  v.  Kelilur 
lock  V.  Richardson,  11  Ves.  375;  Story's  Milling  Co.,  30  Fed.  R.  212. 

Eq.  PI.  §  37.  3  English  v.  Foxall,  2  Pet.  595;  Curry 

7  Uhlmann  v.  Arnholt  &  Schaoffer  i-.  Lloyd,  22  Fed.  R  258,  265  ;  Mackall  v. 
Brewing  Co.,  41  Fed.  R.  309.  Casilear,  1-37  U.  S.  550,  504. 

^  Stewart  v.  Drasha,  4  McLean,  503;  ^  Hiern  v.  Mill,  13  Ves.  118;  Soden  v. 

Atwill   V.  Ferrett,   2   Blat<hf.   C.   C.  30;  Soden,  there  cited;  Grimes  r.  French,  2 

United  States  v.  White,  17  Fed.  R.  561,  Atk.  141  ;  Curry   v.  Lloyd,  22  Fed.    R. 

505.  258,  205. 

9  Amendment  of  18.30  to  Rule  40. 


172  BILLS.  [chap.  IV. 

It  seems  that  if  there  be  no  objection  to  the  specific  relief  prayed 
for,  the  plaintiff  cannot  at  the  hearing  abandon  that  and  obtain 
a  decree  for  different  relief.^  It  has  been  held  in  England  that, 
in  some  cases  of  fraud,  where  no  other  relief  can  be  given  against 
a  party  deeply  involved  in  the  fraud  charged  by  the  bill,  the 
payment  of  the  costs  of  the  suit  by  that  party  ought  to  form  the 
subject  of  a  specific  prayer,  and  that  otherwise  his  demurrer  to 
the  bill  will  be  sustained.*^  In  a  case  where  the  bill  contained 
allegations  showing  threatened  injury  to  rights  of  property,  not 
however  mentioned  as  an  independent  ground  of  relief,  while  it 
was  mainly  occupied  witli  complaints  of  a  threatened  invasion 
of  rights  of  a  political  nature,  as  the  specific  prayers  for  relief 
were  confined  to  the  protection  of  the  political  rights,  although 
the  bill  contained  a  general  prayer  for  relief,  the  court  refused 
to  consider  the  allegations  concerning  the  threatened  injuiy  to 
property."  A  bill  may,  however,  pray  relief  in  the  alternative, 
when  it  is  said  to  have  a  double  aspect.^  The  prayer  for  general 
relief,  Mr.  Robbins,  "  an  eminent  counsel,"  used  to  say,  was  "  the 
best  prayer  after  the  Lord's  Prayer."  ^  It  is  usually  in  one  of 
the  two  following  forms :  "  And  that  your  orator  shall  have  such 
other  or  further,  or  other  and  further,  relief  in  the  premises  as 
to  this  court  shall  seem  meet;"  or,  "that  your  orator  may  be 
further  and  otherwise  relieved  in  the  premises  according  to 
equity  and  good  conscience."  If  a  different  state  of  facts,  under 
which  the  complainant  is  entitled  to  relief,  appears  upon  the 
hearing,  the  court  may  allow  the  case  to  stand  over,  and  give 
the  plaintiff  leave  to  amend  his  bill  in  conformity  with  them,  and 
then  obtain  relief.^''  And  if  the  complainant  be  an  infant  or  the 
representative  of  a  charity,  it  would  formerly  grant  relief  without 
regard  to  the  allegations  in  the  h\\\M 

§  84.   Waivers  and    Offers.  —  It   is    customary  to  insert  in  the 
prayer  for  relief  any  waiver  or  offer  whicli  the  plaintiff'  desires  to 

5  Allen  V.  Coffman,  1  Ril>l;  (Ky.),4G9;  »  Mannton  >:  Molesworth,  1  Eden,  26, 

Pillow  V.  Pillow,  o  Yi>rg.  ('i'enn.),  420.  note  b;  Dormer  v.  P'ortescue,  3  Atk.  124  ; 

^  Le   Texier   v.   Tiio    Margravine    of  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  41,  n.  1. 

Anspach,  15  Vcs.  \o9,  1(34;  Daniell's  Cli.  '"  Beaumont  v.  Boultbee,  5  Ves.  48.5; 

Pr.  (2(1  Am.  ed  )  441.  Palk  r.  Lord  Clinton,  12  Ves.  0.3;  Dan- 

7  Georgia  v.  Stanton,  6  Wall.  50.  iell's  Cli.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  -i'.VJ,  440. 

«  Siiields  r.  Barrow,  17  How.  1.30,  144;  n  Stapilton    v.    Stapilton,    1    Atk.    2; 

Kilgour  V.  New  Orleans  Gas-Liglit  Co,,  Attorney-General  r.  .leanes,  1  Atk.  .355 ; 

2  Woods  144,  148;    Gaines  v.  Chew,  2  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  40,  note. 
How.  G19,  043.     See  §  70. 


§  84.]  WAIVERS   AND   OFFERS.  173 

make ;  ^  although  there  is  no  reason  why  that  should  not  be  set 
forth  in  the  narrative  part  of  the  bill.  "If  the  complainant  in 
his  bill  shall  waive  an  answer  in  the  oath,  or  shall  only  require 
an  answer  under  oath  with  regard  to  certain  specified  interroga- 
tories, the  answer  of  the  defendant,  though  under  oath,  except 
such  part  thereof  as  shall  be  directly  responsive  to  such  inter- 
rogatories, shall  not  be  evidence  in  his  favor,  unless  the  cause  be 
set  down  for  hearing  on  bill  and  answer  only  ;  but  may  never- 
theless be  used  as  an  affidavit,  with  the  same  effect  as  heretofore, 
on  a  motion  to  grant  or  dissolve  an  injunction,  or  on  any  other 
incidental  motion  in  the  cause.  But  this  shall  not  prevent  a 
defendant  from  becoming  a  witness  in  his  own  behalf  under  sec- 
tion 3  of  the  Act  of  Congress  of  July  2,  18G4."2  It  rarely 
happens  that  advantage  of  this  rule  is  not  taken  by  a  waiver 
inserted  here,  or  more  frequently  in  the  prayer  of  process,  in 
order  to  avoid  the  rule,  that  otherwise  an  allegation  responsive 
to  the  bill  in  a  sworn  answer  is  presumed  to  be  true,  unless  re- 
butted by  the  testimony  of  two  witnesses,  or  one  witness  and 
strong  corroborating  circumstances.^  In  accordance  with  the 
maxim  that  he  who  seeks  equity  must  do  equity,  a  court  of 
equity  often  refuses  relief  to  one  seeking  its  aid,  unless  upon 
condition  that  he  shall  do  what  it  considers  equitable  to  the 
defendant,  or  sometimes  even  to  a  third  person.*  In  some  cases 
it  enforces  this  by  the  entry  of  a  conditional  decree  without 
reference  to  the  pleadings.^  But  its  more  usual  practice  is  to 
insist  that  the  plaintiff  shall  offer  to  jjerform,  or,  in  some  cases, 
allege  the  performance  of,  the  equitable  act  that  it  requires  of 
him  in  his  bill,  which  otherwise  will  be  demurrable.  Thus,  a  bill 
to  cancel  securities  claimed  to  be  usurious,  or  otherwise  rendered 
void  by  a  statute,  must  contain  an  offer  by  the  plaintiff  to  pay 
the  defendant  the  money  he  has  received  therefor  with  lawful 
interest.*^  And  it  seems  that  a  State  statute  abolishing  this  rule 
of  equity  will  not  be  followed  by  a  United  States  court,  though 
the  suit  concerns  securities  made  in  such  State,  at  least  not  when 
the  court  is  held  in  another  State."     So  a  bill  to  redeem  a  mort- 

§84.  iDaniell'sCh.Pr.(2(l  Am.e(l.)443.  «  Mason  v.  Gardiner,  4  Brown  C.  C. 

-  Amendment  of  1871  to  Kule  41.  436;  Tapper  v.  Powell,  1  J.  Cli.   (N.  Y.) 

=»  Vigel  V.  Hopp,  104  U.  S.  441.  439  ;  Daniell's  Cli.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  443. 
*  Fosdick  V.  Schali,  99  U.  S.  235.  "  Matthews  v.  Warner,  6  Fed.  R.  4(31  ; 

^  Walden  v.  Bodley,  14  Pet.  156,  164,  s.   c.  affirmed  upon   another  point,   112 

1G5.  U.  S.  GOO. 


174  BILLS.  [chap.  IV. 

gage  must  contain  an  offer  to  pay  what  is  clue  thereon,  though 
the  particular  sum  need  not  be  specified.^  A  bill  to  set  aside 
a  judicial  sale  as  void  must  be  accompanied  by  a  tender  or  offer 
of  the  purchase-money  with  interest,  provided  it  was  applied  for 
tlie  benefit  of  the  estate,  unless  that  money  has  been  first  repaid, 
which  the  court  might  require  to  be  done  before  the  bill  is  filed.^ 
It  seems  that  a  bill  to  set  aside  a  foreclosure  of  a  railway 
mortgage  should  contain  an  offer  of  payment  of  the  amount 
admitted  to  be  due  under  the  mortgage,  and  of  the  costs  of  the 
foreclosure  suit,  or  at  least  show  some  reason  why  such  an  offer 
should  not  be  required.^*^  A  bill  to  set  aside  a  tax  sale  must  ordi- 
narily contain  an  order  to  repay  the  purchaser  at  least  all  legal 
taxes  on  the  property  paid  by  him,  botli  those  for  which  the  prop- 
erty was  sold,  and  those  subsequently  levied  thereon  and  paid  by 
him,  with  interest  upon  each  sum.^^  A  bill  to  restrain  the  col- 
lection of  State  taxes  must  be  preceded  by  payment  of  "  what  is 
conceded  to  be  due,  or  what  can  be  seen  to  be  due  on  the  face 
of  the  bill,  or  be  shown  by  affidavits,  whether  conceded  or  not, 
before  the  preliminary  injunction  should  be  granted."  ^^  If  the 
whole  tax  is  claimed  to  be  void  as  improperly  assessed,  it  seems 
that  the  complainant  must  tender  the  amount  he  would  owe  if 
a  proper  assessment  had  been  made.^^  If  the  proper  officer 
refuses  to  receive  a  part  of  the  tax,  it  must  be  tendered  without 
the  condition  annexed  of  a  receipt  in  full.^*  A  bill  to  compel 
the  specific  performance  of  a  contract  ])y  a  defendant  should, 
it  seems,  contain  an  offer  by  the  plaintiff  to  perform  his  part 
thereof. ^^  And  formerly  it  was,^*^  but  no  longer  is,^'  required 
that  a  bill  for  an  account  should  contain  an  offer  on  the  part  of 
the  plaintiff  to  pay  the  balance,  if  any,  found  due  against  him. 
But  a  bill  filed  by  the  United  States  to  vacate  a  patent  for  public 

5  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  187  a  ;  Hanling  v.  57-5,  617;  National  Bank  v.  Kimball,  103 

Pini^ey,  10  Jurist  n.  s  872  ;  Perry  v.  Carr,  U.  S.  7;^2. 

41  N.  IL  .371;  Robinson  v.  Iron  Railway  "  State  Railroad  Tax  Cases,  02  U.  S. 

Co.,  135  U.  S.  522.  575,  617  ;  National  Bank  v.  Kimball,  103 

9  Davis  v.  Gaines,  104  U.  S.  386.  U.  S.  732. 

"  Carey  v.  Houston  &  T.  C.  Ry.  Co.,  ^^  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2(1  Am.  etl.)  442; 

45  Fed.  R.  438,  44-3.  Stapylton  r.  Scott.  1.3  Yes.  425;  Fife  i-. 

11  Gage   i:   Pumpelly,   115  U.   S.  454.  Clayton,  13  Yes.  54(5. 

But  see   Mendenliall   v.   Hall.   1.34   U.   S.  i'^  Godbolt  r.  Watts,  2  Anst.  543  ;  Dan- 

55'.»,  500.  iell's  Cli.  Pr.  442. 

1-  State  Railroad  Tax  Cases,  92  U.  S.  i"  Colombian    Government    v.    Rotbs- 

575,  617.  child,  1  Simons,  94, 103 ;  Wells  v.  Strange, 

13  State  Railroad  Tax  Cases,  02  U.  S.  5<ia  22. 


§  85.]  THE  PRAYER  OF  PROCESS.  175 

lands  as  obtained  b}^  fraud,  need  not  contain  an  offer  to  return 
the  money  paid  therefor  by  tlie  fraudulent  patentee. ^^  Nor  need 
a  bill  to  obtain  relief  against  an  infringement  of  a  copyriglit  con- 
tain a  waiver  of  the  complainant's  statutory  right  to  a  forfeiture 
of  the  piratical  plates. ^^  It  is,  however,  a  rule  in  equity,  that 
no  person  will  be  compelled  to  discover  that  which  may  expose 
him  to  a  penalty  or  forfeiture.^^  A  discovery  of  such  matters 
can  only  be  compelled  when  the  complainant  is  the  only  person 
who  can  enforce  the  penalty  or  forfeiture,  and  he  is  willing  to 
waive  it,2i  as,  for  example,  in  a  case  of  infringement  of  cop}-- 
right.22  An  omission  of  a  waiver,  tender,  or  offer,  whenever 
considered  necessary,  is  a  ground  for  demurrer ;  ^3  but  leave  to 
amend  is  in  such  cases  usually  given.  And  in  many,  but  not 
all  cases,^^  when  no  actual  tender  is  required,  a  general  offer  to 
do  whatever  equity  requires  in  the  premises  seems  to  be  suffi- 
cient. In  some  cases  the  court  will  give  relief  by  a  conditional 
decree  imposing  terms  upon  the  complainant,  although  no  offer 
is  contained  in  his  bill.^ 

§  85.  The  Prayer  of  Process.  —  The  prayer  of  process  usually 
requests  the  issue  of  a  subpoena  to  compel  the  defendants  to 
appear  and  answer  and  abide  the  judgment  of  the  court.  "  The 
prayer  for  process  of  subpoina  in  the  bill  shall  contain  the 
names  of  all  the  defendants  named  in  the  introductory  part  of 
the  bill,  and  if  any  of  them  are  known  to  be  infants  under  age, 
or  otherwise  under  guardianship,  shall  state  the  fact,  so  that  the 
court  may  take  order  thereon  as  justice  may  require,  upon  the 
return  of  the  process.  If  an  injunction  or  a  writ  of  ne  exeat 
regno,  or  any  other  special  order  pending  the  suit,  is  asked  for  in 
the  prayer  for  relief,  that  shall  be  sufficient,  without  repeating  the 
same  in  the  prayer  for  process."  ^     "  The  plaintiff  may  complain 


18  United  States  r.  Minor,  114  U.  S.  21  Lord  Uxbridge  v.  Staveland,  1  Ves. 

2.S.3;  United  States   v.  Trinidad   Coal  &  Sen.  56;  Atwiil  r.  Ferrett,  2  Blatciif.  39. 

Coke  Co.,  137  U.  S  160.     See  also  Moflfat  2-  Atwill    v.    Ferrett,   2   Blatchf.   39; 

V.  United  States,  112  U.  S.  24;  United  Farmer  i-.  Calvert  Lithographing  Co.,  1 

States  V.  White,  17   Fed.   R.  561,  5G5 ;  Flippin,  228,  233. 

United  States  r.  Pratt  Coal  &  Coke  Co.,  23  United  States  v.  Pratt  Coal  &  Coke 

18  Fed.  R.  708.  Co ,  18  Fed.  R.  708. 

1"  Farmer;-.  Calvert  Lithographing  Co.,  -^  State  Railroad  Tax  Cases,  92  U.  S. 

1  Flippin,  228.  575,  617. 

•-»  Stewart  v.  Drasha,  4  McLean,  563;  25  VValden  v.  Bodley,  14  Pet.  1.56,  164, 

Atwill  V.  Ferrett,  2  RIatchf.  39  ;  United  165. 

States  V.  White,  17  Fed.  R.  561,  565.  §  85.    1  Rnle  23.     Segee  v.  Thomas,  3 


176  BILLS.  fCHAP.  IV. 

and  tell  stories  of  whom  he  pleases,  but  they  only  are  defendants 
against  whom  process  is  prayed."  '^  It  has,  however,  been  held 
that  the  omission  in  the  prayer  of  process  of  the  name  of  a 
defendant  otherwise  sufficiently  described  in  the  bill  is  waived 
bv  his  general  appearance,  and  that  no  other  defendant  can  take 
advantage  of  the  defect.^  If  a  party  is  sought  to  be  sued  in  both 
his  individual  and  a  representative  capacity,  process  should  be 
asked  against  him  in  both  capacities.  Otherwise,  it  seems,  that 
lie  would  be  held  to  be  a  party  only  in  that  capacity  in  which 
he  was  therein  referred  to,  even  though  in  the  subpoena  and  in 
tlie  introduction  to  the  bill  he  were  named  as  a  defendant  in  both 
capacities.*  If  process  be  prayed  against  a  defendant  in  a  rep- 
resentative capacity  and  the  subpoena  be  issued  against  him  gen- 
erally, the  bill  is  not  demurrable.^  The  proper  remedy  is  a 
motion  to  set  aside  the  suljpoBna.  A  bill  without  a  prayer  of 
process  is  demurrable.^ 

§  86.  The  Signature  to  a  BiU.  —  "Every  bill  shall  contain  the 
signature  of  counsel  annexed  to  it,  which  shall  be  considered  as 
an  affirmation  on  his  part  that,  upon  the  instructions  given  to 
him  and  the  case  laid  before  him,  there  is  good  ground  for  the 
suit  in  the  manner  in  which  it  is  framed."  ^  This  practice  began, 
it  is  said,  in  the  time  of  Sir  Thomas  More.^  Before  that  time  it 
was  the  practice  for  a  master  in  chancery  to  examine  the  bill  and 
determine  whether  it  was  better  to  dismiss  it  originally  or  retain 
it  by  subpoena.""^  A  signature  upon  the  back  of  the  bill  has  been 
held  to  be  sufficient.*  The  remedy  for  a  defect  in  tliis  respect 
is  by  a  motion  to  take  the  bill  off  the  file,^  or  by  demurrer.^ 
The  court  may  of  its  own  motion  order  the  bill  taken  off  the 
file.'^  Leave  to  amend  by  adding  the  signature  is  always 
granted.^     If  the  defendant   should    answer  without   taking  the 

Blatchf.  C.  C.  11 ;  Buerk  i\  Imhaeuser,  8  -  1  Hargrave's  Law  Tracts,  302;  Dan- 
Fed.  R.  457.  iell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2cl  Am.  ed.)  357 

^  Lord  Chancellor  Parker  in  Favvkes  ^  1  Hargrave's  Law  Tracts,  302;  Dan- 

V.  Pratt,  1  P.  Wins.  593.  iell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed  )  357. 

3  Buerk  v.  Imhaeuser,  8  Fed.  R.  457.  ••  Dwight   v.    Humphreys,  y  McLean, 

*  Carter  r.  Ingraham,  43  Ala.  78.    But  104. 
see  Brasher  v.   Van   Cortlandt,  2  J.  Ch.  ^  Dillon  v.  Francis,  1  Dickens,  68. 

(N.  Y.)  247.  6  Kirkley    v.    Burton,  5   Madd.   378; 

5  Walton  V.  Herbert.  3  Green,  Ch.  (N.  Dwight  v.  Humphreys,  3  McLean,  104. 
J.)  73.  ^  French  v.  Dear,  5  Ves.  547. 

8  Elmendorf   i'.  Delancey,  1  Hopkins  ^  Kirkley    v.    Burton,    5  Madd.  378; 

(N.  Y.),  555.  Dwight  v.  Humphreys,  3  McLean,  104. 

§  86.     1  Rule  24. 


§  87.]  AFFIDAVITS   TO    BILLS.  177 

objection,  such  a  defect  would  probably  be  held  waived.^  If  the 
complainant  sued  in  person,  the  signature  of  counsel  would  prob- 
ably be  dispensed  with.^^  A  bill  is  also  usually  sig-ned  by  the 
solicitor,  who  may  be  the  same  person  as  the  counsel,  but  need 
not  be  signed  by  the  plaintiff  unless  he  sue  in  person. 

§  87.  Affidavits  to  Bills.  —  An  affidavit  must  be  annexed  to 
the  bill  in  the  following  cases  and  no  others,  although  a  super- 
fluous affidavit  will  not  make  the  bill  bad  :  A  bill  to  obtain  the 
benefit  of  an  instrument  upon  which  an  action  at  law  would  lie, 
were  it  not  either  lost  or  out  of  the  possession  of  the  complainant 
and  believed  to  be  in  that  of  the  defendant,  must  be  supported 
by  an  affidavit  of  those  facts  which  are  necessary  to  give  the 
court  jurisdiction.^  A  bill  to  perpetuate  the  testimony  of  wit- 
nesses, or  to  take  testimony  de  bene  esse,  must  be  supported  by 
an  affidavit  stating  the  reasons  which  render  such  a  proceeding 
necessary .2  A  bill  of  interpleader,  and  perhaps  also  a  bill  in  the 
nature  of  an  interpleader,  should  be  supported  by  an  affidavit  by 
the  plaintiff  that  he  does  not  collude  with  either  of  the  defend- 
ants ;3  or  if  the  plaintiff  be  a  corporation,  by  one  of  its  officers, 
that,  to  the  best  of  his  knowledge  and  belief,  the  plaintiff  does 
not  so  collude.^  "  Every  bill  brought  by  one  or  more  stock- 
holders in  a  corporation  against  the  corporation  and  other 
parties,  founded  on  rights  which  may  properly  be  asserted  by  the 
corporation,  must  be  verified  under  oath."^  Every  bill  which  it 
is  desired  to  use  in  support  of  a  motion  for  a  stay  order,  special 
injunction,  substituted  service,  or  other  interlocutory  application, 
other  than  one  for  a  common  injunction,  must  be  accompanied 
by  an  affidavit  verifying  the  bill  itself  or  the  substance  of  its 
allegations  ;  °  but  the  affidavit  need  not  be  filed  with  the  bill,  nor 
before  the  notice  of  a  motion  for  the  interlocutory  relief,  and  its 
omission  does  not  make  the  bill  demurrable.'^  In  the  first  three 
instances,  where  an  affidavit  is  required,  the  defendant  can  only 


9  See  U.  S.  T?.  S.  §  954.  3  Metcalf  v.  Hervey,  1  Ves.  Sen.  248. 

1'^  See  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  747  ;  1  Hoffman's         *  Bignold  i-.  Audland,  11  Simons,  23. 
Cli.  Pr.  97.  5  Kule  94.     Sec  §§  12,  7G,  87,  207. 

§  87.    1  Walmsley  v.  Cliilcl,  1  Ves.  Sen.  c  See  chapter  XV. 

343;  Wliitfielcl   r.   Fausset,  1   Ves.    Sen.  "  Huglies  r.  Northern  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  18 

392;  Story's   Eq.  PI.  §§  31.3,  477;  Dan-  Fed.    R.    106,  110;    Black    r.  Henry   E. 

iell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  449,  450.  Allen  Co.,  42  Fed.  R.  G18,  622. 

'  Philips   V.  Carew,  1  P.  Wms.   117; 
Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  452. 

VOL.  I.  — 12 


178  BILLS.  [chap,  il 

take  advantage  of  the  defect  by  demurrer.^     By  plea  or  answer 
tlie  omission  will  be  waived.^ 

§  88.  Bills  of  Interpleader.  —  A  bill  of  interpleader  is  a  petition 
filed  by  a  disinterested  person  holding  a  fund  or  thing  to  which 
two  or  more  who  are  made  defendants  set  up  conflicting  claims, 
between  whom  he  cannot  decide  without  incurring  the  risk,  if  he 
delivers  the  property  to  one,  of  being  finally  obliged  to  pay  the 
other  damages  for  having  done  so.^  It  can  only  be  filed  by  one 
who  claims  no  interest  in  the  property  in  question,  and  who  seeks 
no  other  relief  than  leave  to  deposit  it  in  the  care  of  the  court, 
and  be  relieved  from  all  danger  of  further  vexation  concerning 
the  same.2  The  conflicting  claims  must  be  doubtful .^  The 
claimants  must  seek  the  same  thing,  not  merely  the  same 
amounts  under  different  contracts.*  A  tenant  or  agent  may  not, 
by  filing  such  a  bill,  dispute  the  title  of  his  lessor  or  principal 
when  a  demand  is  made  upon  him  by  a  stranger  claiming  under 
title  paramount.^  He  may,  however,  thus  obtain  relief  when 
different  persons  claim  under  assignments  from  the  person  to 
whom  he  first  owed  the  debt.^  A  bill  of  interpleader  may  be 
filed  before  or  after  proceedings  at  law  have  been  begun  against 
the  complainant;"  but  no  injunction  can  be  gi-anted  to  restrain  a 
proceeding  already  begun  in  a  State  court ;  ^  nor,  according  to 
the  English  rule,  to  stay  proceedings  in  ejectment  in  any  court.^ 
If  a  suit  in  equity  have  been  already  begun  against  the  stake- 
holder, he  might  perhaps  obtain  relief  by  a  petition  therein ;  ^^  but 
the  more  prudent  course  is  for  him  to  file  a  new  bill.^^  The  fact 
that  one  of  the  conflicting  claims  is  actionable  at  law  and  the 
other  is  purely  equitable,  will  not  deprive  him  of  relief.^-     The 


8  Findlay  v.  Hinde,  1  Pet.  241,  244;  *  Hoggart  v.  Cutts,  1  Cr.  &  Th.  197; 

Crosse   v.   BedingfieUl,   12    Simons,    35 ;  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  293. 

Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  453.  ^  Rungey  v.  Angove,  2  Ves.  Jr.  304, 

a  Findlay  v.  Hinde,  1  Pet.  241,  244;  310;  Lowe  v.  Ricliardson,  3  Madd.  277; 

Crosse  v.  Bedingfield,  12  Simons,  35.  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  295. 

§  88.  1  Mitford's  Eq.  PI.  ch.  1  ;  Story's  »  Cowtan   v.    Williams,   9   Vcs.    107  ; 

Eq.  PI.  §§  291-297  ;   Daniell's  CIi.  Pr.  (2d  Clarke  v.  Byne,  13  Ves.  386;  Hoggart  v. 

Am.  ed.)  ch.  .\xxii.  Cutts,  1  Cr.  &  Pii.  197,  205. 

•^  Killian  v.  Kbbinliaus,  110  U.  S.  508;  ^  Kicliardsv.  Salter,6  J.Ch.(N.Y.)  445. 

Langston   v.    Boylston,  2   Ves.   Jr.   101 ;  ^  u.  S.  R.  S.  §  720. 

Mohawk  &  Hudson  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Clute,  »  Metcalf  v.  Hervey,  1  Ves.  Sen.  248. 

4  Paige  (N.  Y.),  384.  i'  Badeau  v.  Rogers,  2  Paige  (N.  Y.), 

»  Shaw  V.  Coster,  8  Paige  (N.  Y.),  3-39 ;  209. 

Cochrane    v.  O'Brien,   2  Jones  &  La  T.  "  Birch  v.  Corbin,  1  Cox  Eq.  144. 

380;  Story's  Eq.  I'l.  §  292.  12  Richards  i-.  Salter,6  J.Ch.  (N.Y.)  445. 


§  88.]  BILLS   OF   INTEEPLEADEE.  179 

enactment  of  a  State  statute  giving  similar  relief  upon  motion 
by  the  defendant  to  an  action  at  law,  does  not  deprive  equity  of 
its  original  jurisdiction.^^  The  most  common  kind  of  interpleader 
suits  at  the  present  time  are  those  brought  by  insurance  com- 
panies against  conflicting  claimants  to  the  proceeds  of  policies 
issued  by  them.^'*  A  bill  of  interpleader  should  state  the  manner 
in  wliicli  the  plaintiff  obtained  possession  of  the  property  in 
question,  and  admit  that  he  has  no  interest  therein.  It  should 
set  forth  the  claims  of  the  defendants,  showing  that  they  con- 
flict, and  that  he  is  ignorant  of  their  respective  rights,  and  cannot 
determine  between  them  without  hazard  to  himself.  It  should 
offer  to  deposit  the  fund  or  other  property  in  the  custody  of  the 
court;  and  conclude  with  a  prayer  that  upon  such  deposit  the 
defendants  may  be  enjoined  from  further  molesting  him  about 
the  matter  in  question ;  that  they  be  required  to  interplead  and 
settle  their  respective  rights  among  themselves  ;  and  that  he  may 
have  his  costs  out  of  the  fund,  if  there  be  one,  otherwise  from 
the  defendants. ^^  Tlie  bill  must  be  accompanied  by  an  affidavit; 
which,  when  filed  by  a  natural  person,  should  be  sworn  to  by 
him,  and  state  that  "  this  bill  is  not  filed  in  collusion  with  either 
of  the  defendants  named,  but  merely  of  his  own  accord  for  relief 
in  this  Honorable  Court."  ^^  If  a  corporation  be  the  complainant, 
one  of  its  officers  should  make  the  affidavit,  swearing  that,  to  the 
best  of  his  knowledge  and  belief,  the  corporation  does  not  col- 
lude with  either  of  the  defendants. i"  The  omission  of  the  affidavit 
is  a  ground  for  a  dcmurrer.^^  The  bill  should  also  conform  to 
the  provisions  of  the  rules  regulating  original  bills.  No  other 
step  can  be  taken  in  the  cause  until  after  deposit  in  court  of  the 
fund  or  other  property  in  dispute. ^^  It  has,  however,  been  held 
in  England  that  a  bill  is  not  demurrable  for  the  omission  of  an 
offer  so  to  do.^o  It  is  better  practice  to  obtain  an  order  ex  parte 
permitting  such  payment,^^     When  that  is  done,  an  injunction 

"  Barry  v.   IMutnal  Life  Ins.    Co.,    53  i"  Bignold  t:  Audland,  11  Simons,  23. 

N.  Y.  536  ;  Wood  r.  Swift,  81  N.  Y.  31,  35 ;  '^  Metcalf  v.  Hervey,  1  Ves.  Sen.  248  ; 

Board  of  Education  v.  Scoville,  13  Kan.  Tobin  v.  Wilson,  3  J.  J.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  67  ; 

17,    30;     Prudential    Assurance    Co.    ^\  Mitford's  Eq.  PI.  cli.  1. 

Tliomas,  L.  R.  3  Ch.  App.  74,  77.  i'  Meux  v.  Bell,  6  Simons,  175 ;  Wil- 

^^  Spring  V.  Soutii  Carolina  Ins.  Co.,  8  liams  v.  Walker,  2  Richardson  Eq.  (S.  C) 

Wheat.  2G8.  291. 

'5  Mitford's  Eq.  PI.  ch.  1 ;  Story's  Eq.  ^o  Meux  v.  Bell,  6  Simons,  175. 

PI.  §§  2'.n-207.  21  Williams   v.  Walker,  2   Richardson 

16  Metcalf  V.  Hervey,  1  Ves.  Sen.  248.  Eq.  (S.  C)  291. 


180  BILLS.  [chap.  IV. 

will  be  granted  restraining  tlie  defendants  from  suing  the  plain- 
tiff, and  from  continuing  any  action  already  begun  touching  the 
matter  in  dispute.-^  The  injunction  is  usually  granted  to  take 
effect  upon  payment  of  the  fund  into  court.^  Under  special 
circumstances,  however,  a  stay  order  might  be  granted  until  the 
complainant  had  an  opportunity  to  do  so.-"*  Upon  an  argument 
to  dissolve  this  injunction  before  hearing,  it  seems  that  the  defend- 
ants cannot  contradict  the  affidavit  that  there  is  no  collusion ;  -° 
but  a  reference  may  be  directed  when  such  a  charge  is  made, 
and  at  the  hearing  collusion  may  be  shown.-*^  In  England,  a  bill 
of  interpleader  can  be  successfuly  maintained  though  all  the  de- 
fendants are  beyond  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court.-"  Such  suits  are 
usually  heard  on  bill  and  answers  ;  although  there  is  no  reason 
why  testimony  should  not  be  taken.  If  at  the  hearing  the  cause 
is  ripe  for  a  decision,  the  court  will  then  decide  the  controversy 
between  the  dcfendants.^^  If  not,  it  will  enter  a  decree  dis- 
missing the  plaintiff  with  his  costs,  enjoining  the  defendants  in 
accordance  with  the  prayer  of  the  bill,  and  directing  them  to 
interplead .2'^  If  the  claims  on  both  sides  are  purely  legal,  an 
action  or  an  issue  at  law  will  usually  bo  directed.  If  one  of 
them  is  of  an  equitable  nature,  and  sometimes  even  when  both 
are  legal,  a  reference  to  a  master  is  usually  directed. ■^'^  At  the 
hearing,  each  defendant  may  read  the  other's  answer  against 
him.3^  If  one  of  them  has  allowed  the  bill  to  be  taken  as  con- 
fessed against  him,  this  is  considered  as  an  admission  that  the 
bill  was  properly  filed,  and  that  he  has  made  an  improper  claim 
against  the  fund.^^  If,  after  answer,  one  of  them  defaults  at  the 
hearing,  the  court  will  enter  a  decree  after  hearing  the  other. ^^ 

22  Sieveking  v.  Behrens,  2  Myl.  &  Cr.        ^^  Daniell's  Cli.  Pr.  (2(1  Am.ed  )  1765; 
581.  An<,'ell  v.  Hadden  16  Ves.  202  ;  City  Bank 

23  Sieveking  v.  Behrens,  2  Myl.  &  Cr.     v.  Bangs,  2  Paige  (N.  Y.),  570. 

581.  -^  Daniell's  Cli.  Pr.  {2d  Am.  ed.)  1765; 

21  Sieveking  v.  Behrens,  2  Myl.  &  Cr.  Angell   v.   Iladden,    16  Ves.    202 ;    City 

581  ;  U.  S.  11.  S.  §  718.  Bank  v.  Bangs,  2  Paige  (N.  Y.),  .570. 

25  Stevenson  v.  Amlerson,  2  Ves.  &  B.  ^'  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  1765;  Story's  Eq. 

407;  Manby   v.    Robinson,   L.  R.   4   Ch.  Jur.  §  822;   Angell  v.  Iladden,  16   Ves. 

App.  347  ;  Fahie  v.  Lindsay,  8  Oreg.  474.  202 ;  City  Bank  v.  Bangs,  2  Paige  (N.  Y.), 

2"  Manby  v.  Robinson,  L.  R.  4  Ch.  App.  570. 

347  ;  Langston  r.  Boylston,  2  Ves.  Jr.  101 ;  ^i  Bowyer  r.  Pritohard,  11  Price,  10:1 ; 

Dungey  v.  Angove,  2  Ves.  Jr.  304.  Daniell's  Cli.  Pr.  1765. 

2?  Martinius   r.   Helmuth,   G.    Cooper,  ^2  Badeau  v.  Rogers,  2  Paige  (N.  Y.), 

248;  Stevenson  c.  Anderson,  2  Ves.  &  B.  209;  Fairbrother  v.  Prattent,   1   Daniel, 

412.    Contra,   Herndon   v.    Ridgeway,    17  64. 

How.  424 ;  and  see  §  96.  s      3;^  Hodges  v.  Smitli,  1  Cox  Eq.  357. 


§  90]  BILLS   OF   CERTIORARL  181 

The  plaintiff,  if  successful,  is  entitled  to  his  costs  out  of  the  fund, 
if  there  be  one.^*  Otherwise,  from  the  defendant  whose  claim 
is  finally  held  bad.^^  These  costs,  as  well  as  the  costs  of  the 
successful  defendant,  must  eventually  be  paid  by  him  whose 
claim  is  finally  dismissed-^*^  It  has  been  said  that  when  the  bill 
is  dismissed,  there  can  be  no  further  proceedings  in  the  cause 
as  between  the  defendants  ;  not  even  by  consent ;  inasmuch  as 
the  court  has  thereby  lost  jurisdiction.^^  After  a  decree  in  the 
plaintiff's  favor,  the  cause  is  terminated  as  to  him ;  and  in  case 
of  his  subsequent  death  the  cause  will  proceed  without  a 
revivor.^^ 

§  89.  Bills  in  the  Nature  of  Interpleader.  —  Where  the  plaintiff 
claims  for  himself  some  interest  in  the  fund  or  matter  in  ques- 
tion, or  does  not  admit  the  whole  of  a  defendant's  claim,  or  the 
defendants  claim  different  amounts,  although  a  bill  of  inter- 
pleader may  not,  a  bill  in  the  nature  of  an  interpleader  may, 
perhaps,  be  sustained.^  The  frame  of  such  a  bill  and  the  pro- 
ceedings thereunder  should  conform,  mutatis  mutandis,  to  those 
of  a  strict  bill  of  interpleader.  After  payment  of  what  he  admits 
to  be  due,  a  decree  may  be  entered  discharging  the  plaintiff  as 
to  that,  and  directing  the  suit,  or,  if  an  action  at  law  had  pre- 
viously been  begun,  the  latter,  to  proceed  till  his  disputed  rights 
are  determined. ^ 

§  90.  Bills  of  Certiorari.  —  A  bill  of  certiorari  was  a  bill  filed 
in  a  superior  court  of  equity  for  the  purpose  of  removing  thither 
a  suit  in  equity  pending  in  an  inferior  court,  on  account  of  some 
alleged  incompetency  in  the  latter  or  some  defect  in  its  proceed- 
ings.^ Such  a  bill  first  stated  the  proceedings  in  the  inferior 
court ;  then  the  cause  of  its  incompetency,  as,  for  example,  that 
the  subject  of  the  action  or  the  parties  were  not  within  its  juris- 
diction, or  that,  for  some  other  cause,  equal  justice  could  not  be 

^  Dunlop  V.  Hubbard,    19   Ves.   205;  §89.   i  Dorn   v.  Fo.x,   61   N.  Y.  264; 

Dowsnn  v.  Hardcastle,  2  Cox  Eq.  270.  Moliawk  &  Hudson  K.  K.  Co.  v.  Clute, 

«*  Aldrid^e  r.  Mesner,  6  Ves.  418;  Ma-  4  Paige    (N.  Y.),  385;    Story's   Eq.   PI. 

son  V.  Hamilton,  5  Simons,  19;  Daniell's  §  297  b  ;  Daniell's   Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.) 

Ch.  Pr.  1767.  17(38.     Contni,  New  England  Mutual  Life 

««  Mason  v.  Hamilton,  5  Simons,  19;  Ins.  Co.  t-.  Odell,  50  Hun  (57  N.  Y.  S.  C. 

Cowtan  ('.  Williams,  9  Ves.  107  ;  Daniell's  R.),  279. 
Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  176G,  1707.  -  City  Bank  v.  Bangs,  2  Paige  (N.  Y.), 

^'  Jennings  v.  Nugent,  1  Molloy,  1:U.  570. 

^  Anon.,  1  Vern.  351 ;  Jennings  *•.  Nu-  §  90.    i  Mitford's  PI.  Ch.   1 ;    Story's 

pent,  1  Molloy,  134 ;   Daniell's   Ch.  Pr.  Eq.  PI.  §  298. 
1765. 


182  BILLS.  [chap.  IV. 

done  there ;  and  finally  prayed  a  writ  of  certiorari^  to  certify  and 
remove  the  record  and  the  cause  to  the  superior  court.^  It  did 
not  pray  that  the  defendant  should  answer,  or  even  that  he 
should  appear  to  the  bill,  and,  consequently,  prayed  for  no  writ 
of  subpoena,  although  a  subpoena  had  to  be  sued  out  and  served.^ 
It  was  considered  as  an  original  bill,  and  filed  as  such  in  the 
superior  court.  Thereupon,  the  plaintiff  was  required  to  exe- 
cute a  bond  in  the  penalty  of  XlOO,  with  one  surety  conditioned 
to  prove  the  suggestions  of  the  bill  in  fourteen  days.  A  sub- 
poena was  next  sued  out  and  served  ;  and  a  writ  of  certiorari 
issued  directed  to  the  judge  of  the  inferior  court,  requiring  him 
to  certify  or  send  to  the  court  issuing  the  writ  the  tenor  of  the 
bill  or  plaint  below,  with  the  process  or  proceedings  thereon. 
The  writ  having  been  served  and  returned,  together  with  the 
required  statement  and  papers,  an  order  directing  them  to  be 
filed  was  then  obtained.  Testimony  to  prove  or  disprove  the 
suggestions  of  the  bill  was  immediately  taken,  and  the  cause 
referred  to  a  master  to  report  whether  they  were  proven  or  no. 
This  was  required  to  be  done  within  fourteen  days,  unless  the 
court  specially  enlarged  the  time.  If  the  allegations  were  proved 
and  showed  a  sufficient  reason  for  retaining  tlie  suit,  an  order  to 
retain  the  bill  was  granted ;  and  the  defendant  below  was  ol)liged 
to  answer,  and  the  cause  removed  proceeded  in  the  same  manner 
as  if  it  had  been  originally  instituted  in  the  superior  court.*  In 
no  reported  case  has  such  a  bill  been  filed  in  a  court  of  the 
United  States,  although  petitions  for  writs  of  certiorari  in  pro- 
ceedings at  common  law  are  not  uncommon.^ 

2  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  298.  *  Hinile's  Pr.  28-32  and  581,  582. 

3  Story's  Eq.  PL  §  298;  Mitford's  PI.  &  See  wfra,  §  365. 
ch.  L 


§91.]  DEFINITION    AND   FORM   OF   SUBPCENA.  183 


CHAPTER  V. 

SUBPCENAS   TO   APPEAR   AND   ANSWER. 

§  91.  Definition  and  Form  of  Subpoena.  —  The  first  process  ill  a 
court  of  equity  is  the  subpoena,  which  is  a  writ  requiring  the 
defendant  to  appear  and  answer  the  bill  under  a  penalty  therein 
expressed,  A  similar  writ,  called  quibusdam  certis  de  causis,  in 
the  form  of  a  subpoena  without  any  penalty,  is  also  found  in 
some  of  the  early  English  chancery  cases.^  The  process  of  sub- 
poena constitutes  the  proper  mesne  process  in  all  suits  in  equity, 
in  the  first  instance,  to  require  the  defendant  to  appear  and 
answer  the  exigency  of  the  bill.^  These  writs,  like  all  writs  and 
processes  issuing  from  the  courts  of  the  United  States,  must  be 
under  the  seal  of  the  court  from  which  they  issue,  and  signed  by 
the  clerk  thereof.  Those  issuing  from  the  Supreme  Court  or  a 
Circuit  Court  must  bear  teste  of  the  Chief  Justice  of  the  United 
States,  or,  when  that  office  is  vacant,  of  the  associate  justice  next 
in  precedence  ;  and  those  issuing  from  a  District  Court  must  bear 
teste  of  the  judge,  or,  when  that  office  is  vacant,  of  the  clerk 
thereof."'^  When  issued  from  the  Supreme  Court  the  writ  must  be 
in  the  name  of  the  President  of  the  United  States.*  It  must  be  re- 
turnable into  the  clerk's  office  the  next  rule  day,  or,  at  the  election 
of  the  plaintiff,  the  next  rule  day  but  one,  occurring  twenty  days 
from  the  time  of  the  issue  thereof,^  except  in  the  Supreme  Court 
when  the  return  day  must  be  at  least  sixty  days  after  service 
of  the  writ.^  "  At  the  bottom  of  the  subpoena  shall  be  placed  a 
memorandum  that  the  defendant  is  to  enter  his  appearance  in  the 
suit  in  the  clerk's  office  on  or  before  the  day  at  which  the  writ  is 
returnable,  otherwise  the  bill  may  be  taken  pro  confesso.'" '  The 
penalty  named  in  the  writ  is  now  usually  two  hundred  and  fifty 

§  91.   1  Judge  O.  W.  Holmes,  Jr.,  in  an        3  u.  S.  R.  S.  §  911. 
article  on  Early  English  Equity,  1  Law         <  Rule  5  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 

Quarterly  Review,  162,  note  2,  citing  Pal-  United  States, 
grave,  King's  Council.  131,  132,  note  x;         ^  Rule  12. 
Scaldewell  v.  Stormesworth,  1  Cal.  Ch.  5.        ''  Supreme  Court  Rule  5. 

*  Rule  7.  1  Rule  12. 


184  SUBPCENAS   TO   APPEAR   AND   ANSWER.  [CHAP.  V. 

dollars  ;  in  earlier  times  it  might  be  life  or  limb  ;  ^  but  it  is  never 
enforced ;  since  the  taking  of  the  bill  as  confessed  affords  a  far 
more  substantial  remedy.  The  sul)pa3na  should  be  addressed  to 
the  defendant  against  whom  it  is  issued.^  "  When  there  are 
more  than  one  defendant,  a  writ  of  subpoena  may,  at  the  option 
of  the  plaintiff,  be  sued  out  separately  for  each  defendant,  except 
in  the  case  of  husband  and  wife  defendants,  or  a  joint  subpoena 
against  all  the  defendants."  ^^  If  a  defendant  is  sued  in  a  repre- 
sentative capacity,  or  in  both  an  individual  and  a  representative 
capacity,  he  should  be  so  described  in  the  subpoena ;  which 
should  in  this  respect  follow  the  prayer  of  process  in  the  bill.^^ 
Otherwise,  the  service  of  the  subpoena  may  be  set  aside  upon 
motion,  as  issued  without  authority.^^  Such  a  defect  will,  how- 
ever, be  waived,  if  the  defendant  enter  his  general  appearance  in 
his  representative  capacity. ^^ 

The  usual  form  of  a  subpoena  in  a  circuit  court  of  the  United 
States  is  substantially  as  follows :  — 

The  President  of  the  United  States  of  America,  to  John  Aber  : 

Greeting,  —  You  are  herebj-  commanded  that  3'ou  personally  appear 
before  the  Judges  of  the  Circuit  Court  of  the  United  States  of  America, 
for  the  Southern  District  of  New  York,  in  the  Second  Circuit  Court,  in 
Equit3',on  the  first  Monday  of  December,  A.D.  1889,  wherever  the  said 
Court  shall  then  be,  to  answer  a  bill  of  complaint  exhibited  against  you 
in  the  said  court  b}-  Archibald  Brown,  and  do  further  and  receive 
what  the  said  Court  shall  have  considered  in  that  behalf.  And  this 
you  are  not  to  omit  under  the  penalt}'  on  you  of  two  hundred  and 
fifty  dollars. 

Witness,  Honorable  MELVILLE  W.  FULLER,  Justice  of  the 
United  States  at  the  City  of  New  York,  on  the  first  day  of  November 
in  the  year  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  eighty-nine,  and  of  the 
independence  of  the  United  States  of  America,  the  one  hundred  and 
thirteenth. 

Robert  Jones,  Complainayit' s  SoVr,  John  A.  Shields,  Clerk. 

8  Judge   O.   W.    Ilolmos,    Jr.,    in    an  73 ;  Brasher  v.  Van  Cortlandt,  2  J.  Ch. 

article  on  Early  English  Equity,  1  Law  (N.  Y.)  247. 

Quarterly  Review,  162,  note  2,  citing  1  i-  AValton    v.    Herbert,    3 .  Green    Ch. 

rroceedings  Privy  Council  (21  K.  2,  a.  d.  (N.  J.)  73  ;  Brasher  v.  Van  Cortlandt,  2  J. 

i:];i7).  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  212,  247. 

••*  Danieil's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  cd.)  495.  "Walton    v.    Herbert,    3    Green    Ch. 

1 '  Rule  12.  (N.  J.)  7:{ :  Rraslier  v.  Van  Cortlandt,  2  J. 

"Carter    v.    Ingraham,    43    Ala.    78;  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  242,  247  ;  Buerk  r.  Iniiiaeuscr, 

Walton  V.  Herbert,  3  Green  Ch.   (N.  J.)  8  Fed.  R.  457. 


§  92.]  ISSUE   OF   THE   SUBPCENA.  185 

The  Defendant  is  required  to  enter  appearance  in  the  above  cause 
in  the  Clerk's  oflice  of  this  Court  on  or  before  the  first  Monday  of 
December,  188U,  or  the  bill  will  be  taken  ^j^ro  confesso  against  him. 

John  A.  Shields,  Clerk. 

§  92.  Issue  of  the  Subpoena.  —  No  process  of  subpoena  can 
issue  from  the  clerk's  office  in  any  suit  in  equity  until  the  bill 
is  filed  in  the  office.^  Whenever  a  bill  is  filed  the  clerk  must 
issue  the  process  of  subpoena  thereon,  as  of  course,  upon  the 
application  of  the  plaintiff.^  The  signature  of  counsel  is  a  suf- 
ficient warrant  for  his  so  doing.  A  prcscipe,  or  written  order  for 
the  subpoena,  signed  by  the  attorney  is  usually  first  given  him. 
In  the  early  times,  the  bill  was  first  examined  by  one  of  the 
masters  in  chancery,  whose  duty  it  was  to  determine  whether  to 
dismiss  the  bill  by  original  or  to  retain  it  by  subpoena.^  The 
present  practice,  it  is  said,  originated  when  Sir  Thomas  More 
was  Keeper.^  In  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  a 
motion  for  leave  to  file  a  bill  must  first  be  made.  This  is  usually 
heard  ex  parte  ;^  but  when  leave  was  asked  to  file  a  bill  against 
the  President  of  the  United  States,  under  the  peculiar  circum- 
stances of  that  case  it  was  thought  proper  that  argument  should 
be  heard  against  the  motion  for  leave.^  The  court  refused  to 
extend  this  exception  so  as  to  include  a  suit  by  a  State  against 
General  Grant  when  in  command  of  the  army,  but  then  required 
ten  printed  copies  of  the  bill  to  be  filed  with  the  clerk  before  the 
hearing,  which  it  determined  should  be  the  regular  practice  in 
all  cases  of  original  jurisdiction  brought  before  it."  Whenever 
any  subpoena  is  returned  not  executed  as  to  any  defendant,  the 
plaintiff  is  entitled  to  another  subpoena,  toties  quoties,  against 
such  defendant,  if  he  requires  it,  until  due  service  is  made."  ^ 

§  93.  'When  a  Subpoena  is  necessary.  —  No  defendant  can  be 
brought  before  the  court  ag^ainst  his  will  without  the  service  of 
a  subpoena  upon  him.^     A  general  appearance  will,  however, 

§  92.   1  Rule  11,  5  State  of  Georgia  v.  Grant,  6  Wall. 

2  Rule  12.  241. 

8  Treatise  on  Masters  of  the  Ohaun-  ^  State  of  Georgia  v.  Grant,  G  Wall, 

eerie,  1  Harg.  Law  Tracts,  302  ;  Daniell's  241, 242  ;  State  of  Mississippi  ?;.  Johnson, 

Ch.  Pr.  (2(1  Am.  e.l.)  357.  4  Wall.  475. 

*  Treatise  on  Masters  of  the  Chaun-  '  State  of  Georgia  v.  Grant,  G  Wall, 

eerie.  1  Harg.  Law  Tracts,  .302  ;  Daniell's  241. 

Chancery  Practice  (2d  American  edition),  ^  Rule  14. 

357.  §  93.  1  Rule  7. 


186  SUBPCENAS   TO   APPEAR   AXD   ANSWER.  [CHAP.  V. 

waive  such  an  omission.^  After  a  bill  has  been  amended  with 
no  further  change  than  the  bringing  in  of  new  parties  defendant, 
they  alone  need  be  served  with  a  new  subpcena.^  If,  however, 
it  be  otherwise  substantially  amended,  according  to  the  English 
practice  a  subpoena  to  answer  the  amendments  had  to  be  served 
upon  all  the  defendants.^  A  subpoena  to  appear  and  answer  a 
bill  of  revivor  should  be  substantially  in  the  form  of  a  subpoena 
to  an  original  bill,  except  that  it  requires  the  proper  representa- 
tives of  the  party  against  whom  it  issues  to  appear  at  the  next 
rule-day,  which  shall  occur  after  fourteen  days  from  the  time  of 
the  service  of  the  process,  and  thei'c  show  cause,  if  any  they  have, 
why  the  cause  should  not  be  revived.^ 

§  94.  Personal  Service  of  a  Subpoena.  —  Except  in  certain  ex- 
ceptional cases  the  service  of  the  subpoena  must  be  personal. 
It  must  be  made  by  the  marshal  of  the  district  or  his  deputy, 
or  by  some  other  person  specially  a])pointed  by  the  court  for 
that  purpose,  and  not  otherwise.^  "  When  the  marshal  or  his 
deputy  is  a  party  in  any  cause,  the  writs  and  prajcepts  therein 
shall  be  directed  to  such  disinterested  person  as  the  court  or  any 
justice  or  judge  thereof  may  appoint,  and  the  person  so  ap- 
pointed may  execute  and  return  them."  ^  If  the  marshal  or  his 
deputy  make  the  service,  his  unverified  return  is  sufficient,^  and 
it  has  been  said  cannot  be  contradicted,*  the  only  remedy  being 
an  action  against  the  officer  for  a  false  return.^  But  it  is  capa- 
ble of  subsequent  amendment.^  Where  there  has  been  personal 
service  upon  the  defendant  by  a  special  deputy,  the  fact  that 
the  return  was  in  the  name  of  such  deputy  instead  of  in  the 
name  of  the  marshal  was  held  an  irregularity  which  did  not 
avoid  the  judgment  when  attacked  in  a  collateral  proceeding." 
It  has  been  held  that  the  return  to  a  State  court  by  a  sheriff 
cannot  be  amended  after  a  removal.^     The  return  should  state 

2  Biierk  v.  Imliaeuser,  8  Fed.  R.  4.57.       101  ;  Phccni.x  Ins.  Co.  r.  Wulf,  1  Fed.  U. 

3  Longworth    r.    Taylor,    1    McLean,     77-5 ;  Rule  1(3. 

514  ;    Ansrer.stein  v.  Clarke,    1    Ves.   Jr.  ■•  Vnn  Roy  ;•.  Blackman,  3  Woods,  98, 

250  ;  Skcffiiigton  v. ,  4  Ves.  66.  100      Rut  see  McCIaskey  v.  Barr,  45  Fed. 

*  Cooke  V.  Da  vies,  T.  &  R.  309  ;  Bram-  R.  151. 
ston  V.  Carter,  2  Simons,  458.     See  Ken-  ''  Von  Roy  r.  Blackman,  3  Woods,  98, 

dall  V.  Beckett,  1  Russ   152.  100. 

5  Rule  50.  •'  Phoenix  Ins    Co.  v.  Wnlf,  1   Fed.  R. 

§94.    1  Rule    15;    Deacon    v.    Sewing  775. 
Machine  Co.,  14  Reporter,  43.  "  Hill  r.  Gordon,  45  Fed.  R.  270. 

2  U.  S.  R  S.  §  922.  **  Tallman  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.,  45 

3  Von  Kov  c.  Blackman,  3  Woods,  08,  Fed.  R.  156. 


§94.]  PERSONAL   SERVICE   OF   A   SUBPCENA.  187 

where  the  service  was  made,  if  the  defendant  reside  without 
the  district,'^  and  probably  in  any  event.  If  another  than  the 
marshal  or  his  deputy  serve  the  subpoena,  proof  must  be  made 
by  the  affidavit  of  the  process-server.^'^  Where  the  defendant  was 
named  in  the  bill  as  Jacob  Kraig,  a  return  that  the  subpoena 
had  been  served  on  Jacob  King  was  held  insufficient.^^  The 
indorsement  by  the  defendant  upon  a  subpoena  issued  from  the 
circuit  court  for  Vermont:  "Washington,  D.  C,  October  18th, 
1883.  I  hereby  accept  service  of  the  within  subpoena,  to  have 
the  same  effect  as  if  duly  served  upon  me  by  a  proper  officer,  and 
I  do  hereby  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  a  copy  thereof.  E.  M. 
^larblo,  Cora'r  of  Patents,"  has  been  held  to  be  nothing  more 
than  that  "  the  commissioner  admits  service  with  the  same  effect 
it  would  have  if  made  by  an  officer  of  the  District  of  Columbia," 
and  not  to  be  a  waiver  of  the  objection  that  the  suljpoena  could 
not  properly  be  served  beyond  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  whence 
it  issued.^2  A  case  at  circuit  holds  that  an  acceptance  of  due  ser- 
vice of  process  amounts  to  no  more  than  personal  service  at  the 
place  where  the  acceptance  is  made,  and  is  not  a  waiver  of  the 
objection  that  the  defendant  is  not  an  inhabitant  of  the  district.^^ 
"  The  service  of  all  subpoenas  shall  be  by  a  delivery  of  a  copy 
thereof  by  the  officer  serving  the  same  to  the  defendant  person- 
ally, or  by  leaving  a  copy  thereof  at  the  dwelling-house  or  usual 
place  of  abode  of  each  defendant  with  some  adult  person  who 
is  a  member  or  resident  of  the  family."  i*  When  a  husband  and 
wife  are  parties  a  copy  must  be  served  upon  each,  although  the 
former  practice  was  complied  with  by  service  upon  the  husband 
alone.i-^  Service  at  the  door  of  the  defendant's  dwelling  has  been 
held  a  sufficient  compliance  with  the  rule.^*^  In  an  English  case, 
where  infant  defendants  were  secreted,  service  upon  their  mother 
was  allowed,  and  held  sufficient.^"  Chief  Baron  Gilbert,  in  his 
"  Forum  Romanum,"  says  of  the  subpoena :  "  The  service  is  good 
in  the  night  or  on  Sunday,  if  it  be  before  the  time  of  the  return  ; 

9  Allen  V.  Blunt,  1  Elatchf.  480,  487 ;  '*  Rule   13.     See  Plioenix   Ins.    Co.  v. 

Thayer  v.   Wales,  5   Fisher's   Pat.   Cas.  Wulf,  1  Fed.  R.  775;  Hyslop  r.  Hoppock, 

448.  5  Ben.  447. 

1'  Rule  15.  '•'^  O'Hara  v.  MacConnell,  9.3  U.  S.  150; 

11  McClaskey  v.  Barr,  45  Fed.  R.  151.  Robinson  v.  Cathcart,  2  Cranch  C.  C.  590. 

12  Butterworth  v.  Hill,  114  U.  S.  128,  i«  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  v.  Wulf,  1  Fed.  R. 
132,  133.  775. 

"  United  States  i-.  Loughrey,  43  Fed.        "  Smith  v.  Marshall,  2  Atk.  70. 
R.  449. 


188  SUBPCENAS   TO   APPEAR   AND   ANSWEK.  [CHAP.  V. 

for  this  being  only  process  of  notice,  and  not  to  arrest  the  parties, 
it  can  create  no  disturbance,  though  it  be  served  in  the  night  or 
on  Sunday."  ^'^  It  has,  however,  since  been  held  in  England  that  a 
service  on  Sunday  may  be  set  aside.^^  A  decision  at  circuit  holds 
that,  in  an  extraordinary  case,  a  warrant  of  arrest  in  admii-alty 
can  be  issued  on  Sunday ."'^'^  Personal  service  of  the  subposna  can- 
not, in  the  absence  of  any  special  statutory  provision,  be  made 
beyond  the  territorial  jurisdiction  of  the  court  ;2i  except  when  a 
subpoena  issues  from  a  court  in  a  State  which  is  divided  into  two 
districts,  in  which  case,  it  seems,  that  it  may  be  served  in  either 
district  within  the  same  State.^^  When  a  petition  is  filed  by 
a  district  attorney  of  the  United  States  praying  an  injunction 
against  a  combination  in  restraint  of  commerce  among  the  sev- 
eral States  or  with  foreign  nations,  the  subpoena  may  be  served 
by  leave  of  the  court  in  any  district  by  the  marshal  thereof.^^ 
"  Upon  the  return  of  the  subpoena  as  served  and  executed  upon 
any  defendant,  the  clerk  shall  enter  the  suit  upon  his  docket  as 
pending  in  the  court,  and  shall  state  the  time  of  the  entry."  ^ 
§  95.  Service  upon  Corporations.  —  If  the  United  States  is 
sought  to  be  made  a  party  defendant,  the  subpoena  should  be 
served  upon  the  attorney-general  or  the  district  attorney  of  the 
district  where  the  suit  is  brought.^  "  When  process  at  common 
law  or  in  equity  shall  issue  against  a  State,  the  same  shall  be 
served  on  the  governor,  or  chief  executive  magistrate,  and 
attorney-general  of  such  State."  ^  When  a  suit  is  brought 
against  a  domestic  corporation,  that  is,  one  chartered  within  the 
State  in  which  is  the  district  where  the  suit  is  brought,  the 
subpfjena  should  be  served  upon  one  of  its  officers,  or  perhaps 
one  of  its  members.^  The  State  practice  in  such  cases,  although 
not  binding  upon  the  Federal  courts  in  equity,  furnishes  a  guide 
which  they  are  apt  to  follow.*     The  jurisdiction  of  the  Circuit 

1**  Gilbert's  Forum  Romanum  (Tyler's  -*  Rule  16. 

edition),  42.  §05.   i  Hoffman's  Cli.  Pr.  108;   Dan- 

19  Miickreth  ;;.  Nicholson,  19  Ves.  .%7.  icU's  Cii.  Pr.  (2(1  Am.  cd.)  517.  note  4. 

2"  Pearson  ?'.  Tiie  Alsalfa,  44  Fed.  R.  2  Supreme  Court  Rule  5;  Grayson  i'. 

358;   U.  S.  1).  C.  D.,  S.  C.  Virginia,  3  Dall.  ;]20. 

21  Toland  v.  Sprajrue,  12  Pet.  .300.  328  ;  3  Daniell's  Cli.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  501, 

Picquct  ('.  Swan,  5  Mason,85;  Bourke  ;■.  and  note  2.     But  see   St.  Clair  v.  Cox, 

Amison.  32  Fed.  R.  710.  106  U.  S.  350,  359. 

^-  Winter   v.    Ludlow,   3  Pliila.    (Pa.)  *  Tliornburgh  v.  Savage  Mining  Co., 

464.  1   Pacific   Law    Mag.   267.      See    infra, 

2a  Act   of  July  2,  1890  (26  St.  at  L.  §  360. 
ch.  647,  §  5,  p.  210).     See  Appendix. 


§  95.]  SERVICE  UPON  CORPORATIONS.  189 

and  District  Courts  of  the  United  States  over  foreign  corpora- 
tions is,  on  account  of  the  obscurity  of  the  Judiciary  Act  of 
1887,  a  doubtful  question.^  The  weight  of  authority  seems  to 
hold  that  when  the  jurisdiction  rests  solely  upon  the  existence 
of  a  federal  question  in  the  case,  not  arising  under  the  statute 
against  combinations  in  restraint  of  commerce,  such  a  court  has 
no  jurisdiction  over  a  foreign  corporation;^  but  that  when  juris- 
diction is  claimed  on  account  of  a  difference  of  citizenship  in  a 
suit  between  citizens  of  different  States,  a  foreign  corporation 
may  be  served  with  process  provided  it  be  "  found  "  within  the 
district.'^  What  constitutes  such  a  finding  is  a  matter  hard  to 
define  with  accuracy.  If  a  State  statute  forbids  a  foreign  corpo- 
ration to  transact  business  witliin  her  borders  except  upon  con- 
dition that  the  corporation  stipulate  to  allow  legal  process  to 
be  served  upon  it,  and  the  comi)any  execute  such  a  stipulation, 
which  is  not  in  express  terms  restricted  to  the  process  of  a  State 
court,  it  will  be  considered  to  apply  to  the  Federal  courts,  and  a 
subpoena  from  a  Federal  court  may  be  served  upon  the  foreign 
corporation  in  the  same  way  as  would  a  similar  process  of  a  State 
tribunal.^  Such  condition  and  stipulation  may  be  implied  as  well 
as  expressed.  If  a  State  permits  a  foreign  corporation  to  do  busi- 
ness within  her  limits,  and  at  the  same  time  provides  that  in  suits 
against  it  for  business  there  done,  process  shall  be  served  upon 
its  agents,  the  provision  is  deemed  to  be  a  condition  of  the  per- 
mission ;  and  corporations  that  subsequently  do  business  in  the 
State  are  to  be  deemed  to  assent  to  such  condition  as  fully  as 
though  they  had  specially  authorized  their  agents  to  receive  ser- 
vice of  the  process.^     "  Such  condition  must  not,  however,  en- 

8  24   St.  at  L.  ch.  373.     Cf.   Filli   v.         '  McCormick  H.  M.  Co.  v.  Walthers, 

D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  37  Fed.  R.  65 ;  134  U.   S.  41  ;   Fales   v.  Chicago,   M.  & 

Holiorst  V.  Hamburg  Amer.  Packet  Co.,  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  32  Fed.  R.  673;  Short  v. 

38  Fed.  R.  273;  and  Denton  v.  Interna-  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  33  Fed.  R. 

tional  Co.  of  Mexico,  36  Fed.  R.  1  ;  with  114  ;  St.  Louis,  V.  &  T.  H.  R.  R   Co.  v. 

Zambrino  v.  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Terre  Haute  &  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  33  Fed.  R. 

Co.,  38  Fed.  R.  449 ;  and  Riddle  v.  N.  Y.  385 ;  Bostwick  v.  American  Finance  Co., 

L.  E.  &  VV.  R.  Co.,  39  Fed.  R.  290 ;  and  43    Fed.   R.  897  ;   supm,   §    22.     Contra, 

see  §  22.  County  of  Yuba  v.  Pioneer  Gold  Mining 

6  McCormick  H.  M.  Co.  v.  Walthers,  Co.,  32  Fed.  R.  183. 
134  U.  S.  41 ;  St.  Louis,  V.  &  T.  H.  R.  R.         «  Ex  parte  Schollenberger,  96  U.   S. 
Co.  V.  Terre  Haute  &  I.   R.  R.  Co.,  33  369;  overruling  several  cases  to  the  con- 
Fed.  R.  385,  386.     See  County  of  Yuba  trary  previously  decided  in   the  Circuit 
V.  Pioneer  Gold  Mining  Co.,  32  Fed.  R.  Courts. 

183 ;  Act  of  July  2,  1890   (26  St.  at  L.  »  St.  Clair  v.  Cox,  106  U.  S.  3-50,  356. 

ch.  647,  §  5,  p.  210) ;  and  supra,  §  22. 


190  SUBPCENAS   TO   APPEAR   AND   ANSWER.  [CHAP.  V. 

croacli  upon  that  principle  of  natural  justice  which  requires  notice 
of  a  suit  to  a  party  before  he  can  be  bound  by  it.  I";  must  be 
reasonable,  and  the  service  provided  for  should  be  only  upon  such 
agents  as  may  be  properly  deemed  representatives  of  the  foreign 
corporation."  ^°  Service  upon  an  agent  who  stood  in  no  repre- 
sentative character  to  the  company,  whose  duties  were  limited  to 
those  of  a  subordinate  employe,  or  to  a  particular  transaction,  or 
whose  agency  had  ceased  when  the  matter  in  dispute  arose,  would, 
probably,  be  held  insufficient.^^  In  order  thus  to  subject  itself 
to  the  service  of  process,  the  foreign  corporation  must  actually 
transact  business  in  the  district  where  the  suit  is  brought.^^  ^ 
single  act  of  business,  such  as  tlie  making  of  a  contract  there 
for  the  sale  of  an  article  to  be  manufactured  elsewhere  and 
there  delivered,  would  not  be  sufficient,  "  wlien  there  was  no  pur- 
pose to  do  any  other  business  or  to  have  a  place  of  business" 
within  the  district. ^^  So,  it  has  been  held,  that  the  presence  of 
the  principal  officers  of  a  corporation  in  a  foreign  State,  when 
they  have  with  them  property  of  the  corporation  mei'cly  for  the 
purpose  of  exhibition,  does  not  make  the  corporation  liable  to  the 
service  of  process  upon  them  thcre.^*  The  lease  by  a  foreign  to 
a  domestic  corporation  of  personal  property,  and  the  payment  by 
the  latter  to  the  former  of  a  part  of  the  profits  derived  from  the 
use  of  such  property  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court,  does 
not  give  the  court  jurisdiction  over  the  former  corporation,  upon 
service  of  a  subpoena  upon  the  latter  as  its  agent.^^  Tlie  negotia- 
tion of  loans  upon  a  mortgage  and  a  successful  application  to 
have  the  bonds  thereby  secured  listed  on  the  stock  exchange,  are 
not  sufficient  acts  of  business  to  authorize  service  of  process  upon 


1"^  Mr.  Justice  Field  in  St.  Clair  r.  Cox,  burg  Amer.  Packet  Co.,  38  Fed.  R.  273  ; 

106  U.  S.  350,  356.     See  also  Haj'den  v.  Denton  v.  International  Co.  of  Mexico, 

Androscoggin  Mills,  1  Fed.  R.  93;  Estes  36  Fed.  R.  1  ;  Block  v.  Atchison,  T.  &  S. 

V.  Belford,  22  Fed.  R.  275.  F.  R.  Co.,  21  Fed.  R.  529. 

11  St.  Clair  v.  Cox,  lOG  U.  S.  350,  359,  "  Cooper  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Ferguson,  113 
360;  Maxwell  v.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  U.  S.  727,  735;  Good  Hope  Co.  v.  Rail- 
Co.,  31  Fed.  R.  286.  way  Barb  Fencing  Co.,  22  Fed.  R.  035; 

1-  Cooper  Manuf.  Co.  r.  Ferguson,  113  Maxwell  i).  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co., 

U  S.  727  ;  Ilaydcn  )-.  Androscoggin  Mills,  34  Fed.  R.  286. 

1  Fed.  R.  93;  Zambrino  v.  Galveston,  II.  i*  Carpenter  i'.Wcstinghouse  Air  Brake 
&  S.  A.  Ry.  Co.,  38  Fed.  R.  449  ;  Riddle  Co.,  32  Fed.  R.  434.  See  Reifsnider  v. 
V.  N.  Y.  L.  E.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  39  Fed.  R.  American  Imp.  Pub.  Co.,  45  Fed.  R.  433. 
290;  Maxwell  v.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  i^  United  States  v.  American  Bell  Tele- 
Co.,  37  Fed.  R.  286;  Filli  v.  D.  L.  &  W.  phone  Co.,  29  Fed.  R.  17. 
R.  R.  Co.,  37  Fed.  R.  65  ;  Hohorst  v.  Ham-  ., 


§  96.]  SUBSTITUTED   SERVICE   OF   A   SUBPCENA.  191 

its  president  for  the  corporation  while  he  is  temporarily  within  the 
State  for  those  purposes. ^^  It  has  been  held,  at  circuit,  that  ser- 
vice of  process  in  the  manner  prescribed  by  the  State  practice 
may  subject  a  foreign  corporation  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Fed- 
eral court,  in  a  case  over  which  the  State  courts  have  no  jurisdic- 
tion because  the  cause  of  action  arose  without  the  State. ^'^  It 
lias  been  said,  however,  "  that  in  the  absence  of  a  voluntary  ap- 
pearance, three  conditions  must  concur  or  co-exist  in  order  to  give 
the  Federal  courts  jurisdiction  in  'personam  over  a  corporation 
created  without  the  territorial  limits  of  the  State  in  which  the 
court  is  held,  viz. :  (1)  It  must  appear  as  a  matter  of  fact  that 
the  corporation  is  carrying  on  its  business  in  such  foreign  State 
or  district ;  (2)  that  such  business  is  transacted  or  managed  by 
some  agent  or  officer  appointed  by  and  representing  the  corpora- 
tion in  such  State  ;  and  (3)  the  existence  of  some  local  law  mak- 
ing such  corporation,  or  foreign  corporations  generally,  amenable 
to  suit  there,  as  a  condition,  express  or  implied,  of  doing  business 
in  the  State."  ^^ 

§  96.  Substituted  Service  of  a  SubpcBiia.  —  Independently  of 
any  express  statutory  authority,  there  is  no  power  in  a  court  of 
equity  to  order  actual  personal  service  to  be  effected  upon  a  de- 
fendant beyond  its  territorial  jurisdiction ;  ^  but,  in  a  few  cases, 
such  courts  have  for  more  than  a  century  assumed  the  power  of 
ordering  service  to  be  made  within  their  jurisdiction  upon  some 
person  for  the  absent  defendant,  and  have  treated  such  service  as 
valid.2  In  suits  to  stay  proceedings  at  law  in  the  same  court,  the 
service  of  a  subpoena  upon  the  attorney  of  the  plaintiff  at  law 
may  be  allowed,  and  will  then  bind  the  latter  if  he  be  beyond  the 
territorial  jurisdiction  of  the  court.^  A  similar  practice  would  in 
all  probability  be  allowed  in  serving  process  under  bills  not  origi- 

16  Clews   V.  Woodstock   Iron   Co.,  44  145,  note  ;  Carter  v.  De  Brune,  1  Dickens, 

Fed.  R.  31.  39;    Hyde   r.   Forster,   1   Dickens,    102; 

1"  Carstairs  v.  Mechanics'  &  Traders'  Lady  Carrington  v.  Cantillon,  Bunbury, 

Ins.  Co.  of  N.  Y.,  13  Fed.  R.  82-3.  107  ;  Hobhouse  v.  Courtney,  12  Simons, 

1**  United  States  v.  American  Bell  Tele-  140,  and  cases  there  cited  ;   Daniell's  Ch. 

phone  Co.,  29  Fed.  R.  17,  35.     See  Max-  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  502-508. 
well  V.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  34         ^  Y)nm\  v.  Clarke,  8  Pet.  1 ;   Hitner  v. 

Fed.  R.  286,  289.  Suckley,  2  Wash.  465;  Eckert  v.  Bauert, 

§  96.  1  This  passage  was  quoted  and  4  Wash.  370;  Ward  v.  Seabry,  4  Wash, 

approved  by  Ma.xey,  J.,  in  Batt  r.  Proctor,  42G  ;    Read   v.  Consequa,  4  Wash.   174; 

45  Fed.  R.  515,  510.  Bartlett  v.  Sultan  of  Turkey,  19  Fed.  H. 

-  Hales  I'.  Sutton,  1  Dickens,  26 ;  s.  c.  346.     See  also  Logan  v.  Patrick,  5  Crancii, 

iub  710111.  Hallett   v.  Sutton,  12   Simons,  288;  Dunlap  iv  Stetson,  4  Mason,  349. 


192  SUBPOENAS   TO   APPEAR   AND   ANSWER.  [CHAP.  V. 

nal ;  namely,  bills  of  revivor,  supplemental  bills,  and  bills  of 
revivor  and  supplement ;  which  are  nothing-  more  than  continua- 
tions of  the  suits  upon  which  they  operate."^  So,  under  a  bill  to 
reform  an  insurance  policy  pending  an  action  at  law  upon  the 
policy,  a  subpcena  may  be  thus  served  upon  the  attorney  for  the 
party  to  the  action  at  law.^  The  Federal  courts  have  refused  to 
extend  this  class  of  cases  so  as  to  include  a  bill  of  interpleader, 
two  of  the  defendants  to  which  were  engaged  in  a  action  between 
themselves  in  the  same  court  concerning  the  same  matter;^  al- 
though in  England  such  a  mode  of  service  might  have  been 
allowed.'  Nor,  it  seems,  can  a  subpoena  thus  be  served  under  a 
bill  to  set  aside  a  sale  made  under  a  decree  of  the  same  court  to 
which  persons  are  joined  as  defendants  who  were  not  parties  to 
the  former  suit.^  Substituted  service  of  a  subpoena  to  appear  and 
answer  to  a  cross-bill  has  been  allowed,^  but  not  when  the  cross- 
bill sought  to  introduce  new  and  distinct  matters  into  the  origi- 
nal suit.^*^  The  safer  practice  when  a  defendant  to  a  cross-bill 
cannot  be  served  personally  seems  to  be  to  procure  an  order  stay- 
ing his  proceedings  in  the  original  cause  until  he  answers  the 
cross-bill.^^  Substituted  service  was  also  allowed  upon  the  agent 
of  a  defendant  beyond  the  jurisdiction,  who  had  authority  to  rep- 
resent the  latter  with  respect  to  the  property  which  was  the 
subject  of  the  suit.^^  The  court  may  authorize  service  of  process 
upon  the  agent  of  a  non-resident  receiver.^'^     When  this  mode  of 

4  Norton  y.  Hepwortli,  1  Hall  &  Twell,  well,  5  Dillon,  325;  Sawyer  r.  Gill,  3 
158  ,•  Dunn  v.  Clarke,  8  Pet.  1.  But  see  Woodb.  &  M.  97  ;  Segee  v.  Thomas,  3 
Henderson  v.  Meggs,  2  Brown  Ch.  C.  127  ;  Blatchf.  11 ;  Hitner  v.  Suckley,  2  Wash. 
Anderson  v.  Lewis,  3  Brown  Ch.  C.  429 ;  4G5  ;  Anderson  v.  Lewis,  3  Brown  Ch.  C. 
Gardiner  v.  Mason,  4  Brown  Ch.  C.  478  ;  429  ;  Gardiner  v.  Mason,  4  Brown  Ch.  C. 
Waterton  v.  Croft,  5  Simons,  502.  478 ;  Waterton  v.  Croft,  5  Simons,  502. 

5  Abraliam  v.  North  German  Fire  Ins.  ^'  Rubber  Co.  v.  Goodyear,  9  Wall. 
Co.,  37  Fed.  R.  731.  307;  Heath  v.  Erie  Ry.  Co.,  9  Blatclif. 

«'  Herndon  v.  Ridgway,  17  How.  424.  316.     But  see  Kingsbury  v.  Buckner,  134 

See  §  88.  U.  S.  050,  676.     See  in/hi,  §  173. 

•  Martiniusj-.Hflmuth,G.  Cooper, 248;  ^^  Sawyer  z;.  Gill,  3  W.  &  M.97;  Segee 
Stevenson  v.  Anderson,  2  Ves.  &  B.  407.  i'.  Thomas,  3  Blatchf.  11 ;  Hitner  r.  Suck- 
See  §  88.  ley,  2    Wasli.   465;    Anderson   r.   Lewis, 

8  Pacific  Railroad  of  Missouri  v.  Mis-  3  Brown  Ch.  C.  429;  Gardiner  v  Mason, 
souri  Pacific  Ry.  Co.,  3  Fed.  R.  772;  s.  c.  4  Brown  Ch.  C.  478;  Waterton  v.  Croft, 
1    McCrary,  047;    s.  c.  on   appeal.   111  5  Simons,  502. 

U.  S.  505,  522.  ^-  Ilobhouse  r.  Courtney,  12  Simons, 

9  Johnson  R.  R.  Signal  Co.  v.  Union  140,  and  cases  cited.  But  see  U.  S.  R.  S. 
Switch  &  Signal   Co.,  43   Fed.  R.  331 ;     §  793. 

§  173;  Kingsbury  v.  Buckner,  134  i8  Central  Trust  Co.  i'.  St.  Louis,  A.  & 
U.   S.  C50,   670  ;    Lowenstein    v.   Glide-^    T.  Ry.  Co.,  40  Fed.  R.  420. 


§  97.]  STATUTOKY   SERVICE   OF   A    SUBPCENA.  193 

service  is  desired,  an  order  must  be  obtained  that  service  upon 
the  attorney  employed  in  the  former  suit  or  action  shall  be  deemed 
good  service.^^  If  service  be  made  upon  the  attorney  without 
such  an  order  having  been  obtained,  it  may  be  set  aside.^^  The 
motion  for  such  an  order  may  ordinarily  be  made  ex  parte}^  It 
must  be  supported  by  an  affidavit,  made  by  the  plaintiff  or  some 
person  having  personal  knowledge  of  the  facts  therein  stated, 
setting  forth  the  reasons  why  such  service  is  desired,  and  veri- 
fying the  allegations  of  the  bill.^"  Written  admissions  of  the 
defendant  may,  however,  be  sufficient  to  support  the  motion 
without  such  affidavit.^^  A  previous  request  of  the  attorney  to 
accept  service  of  the  subpoena  and  his  refusal  so  to  do,  are  not 
a  necessary  preliminary  to  such  a  motion. ^^ 

§  97.  Statutory  Service  of  a  Subpoena.  —  The  statutes  of  the 
United  States,  which  in  this  respect  are  analogous  to  those  of 
England,^  provide,  "  That  when  in  any  suit,  commenced  in  any 
court  of  the  United  States,  to  enforce  any  legal  or  equitable  lien 
upon,  or  claim  to,  or  to  remove  any  incumbrance  or  lien  or  cloud 
upon  the  title  to  real  or  personal  property  within  the  district 
where  such  suit  is  brought,  one  or  more  of  the  defendants  therein 
shall  not  be  an  inhabitant  of,  or  found  within,  the  said  district, 
or  shall  not  voluntarily  appear  thereto,  it  shall  be  lawful  for  the 
court  to  make  an  order  directing  such  absent  defendant  or  de- 
fendants to  appear,  plead,  answer,  or  demur  by  a  day  certain  to  be 
designated,  which  order  shall  be  served  on  such  absent  defendant  or 
defendants,  if  practicable,  wherever  found,  and  also  upon  the  per- 
son or  persons  in  possession  or  charge  of  said  property,  if  any  there 
be ;  or  where  such  personal  service  upon  such  absent  defendant 
or  defendants  is  not  practicable,  sucli  order  shall  be  published  in 
sucli  manner  as  the  court  may  direct  not  less  than  once  a  week 
for  six  consecutive  weeks ;  and  in  case  such  absent  defendant 

1*  Pacific  Railroad  of  Missouri  v.  Mis-  souri  Pacific  Ry.  Co.,  3  Fed.  R.  772 ;  s.  c- 

souri  Pacific  Uy.  Co.,  3  Fed.  R.  772;   s.  c.  1    McCrary,  G47  ;    Delancy  v.  Wallis,   3 

1   McCrary,   G47  ;  Daniell's   Cli.    Pr.   (•2d  Brown's    C.   C.   12;    Stephen   v.  Cini,  4 

Am.  ed.)  502.  Ves.  350 ;  Kcnwortiiy  i:  Accunor,  3  Madd. 

1^  Pacific  Railroad  of  Missouri  v.  Mis-  550. 

souri  Pacific  Ry.  Co.,  3  Fed.  R.  772;  s.  c.  >"  Royal  Exx-lianfro  Ins.  Co.  v.  Ward, 

1  McCrary,  647.  1  Fowler  Ex.  Pr.  225. 

16  Daniell's  Cli.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  503.  i-'  French  v.  Roe,  13  Ves.  593.     " 

But  see  Crew  v.  Martin,  I  Fowler  Ex.  Pr.  §  97.    i  2  Wm.  IV.  c.  33  ;  4  &  5  Wm. 

225.  IV."  c.  82. 

1"  Pacific  Railroad  of  Missouri  v.  Mis- 

VOL.    I. —  13 


194  SUBPOENAS   TO   APPEAR   AND   ANSWER.  [CHAP.  V. 

shall  not  appear,  plead,  answer,  or  demur  within  the  time  so 
limited,  or  within  some  further  time  to  be  allowed  by  the  court, 
in  its  discretion,  and  upon  proof  of  the  service  or  publication  of 
said  order,  and  of  the  performance  of  the  directions  contained  in 
the  same,  it  shall  be  lawful  for  the  court  to  entertain  jurisdiction 
and  proceed  to  the  hearing  and  adjudication  of  such  suit  in  the 
same  manner  as  if  such  absent  defendant  had  been  served  with 
process  within  the  said  district ;  but  said  adjudication  shall,  as 
regards  said  absent  defendant  or  defendants  without  appear- 
ance, affect  only  the  property  which  shall  have  been  the  subject 
of  the  suit,  and  under  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  therein,  with- 
in such  district ;  and  when  a  part  of  the  said  real  or  personal 
property  against  which  such  proceeding  shall  be  taken  shall  be 
within  another  district,  but  within  the  same  State,  said  suit  may 
be  brought  in  either  district  in  said  State :  Provided,  however^ 
That  any  defendant  or  defendants  not  actually  personally  notified 
as  above  provided  may,  at  any  time  within  one  year  after  final 
judgment  in  any  suit  mentioned  in  this  section,  enter  his  appear- 
ance in  said  suit  in  said  circuit  court,  and  thereupon  the  said 
court  shall  make  an  order  setting  aside  the  judgment  therein,  and 
permitting  said  defendant  or  defendants  to  plead  therein  on  pay- 
ment by  him  or  them  of  such  costs  as  the  courts  shall  deem  just ; 
and  thereupon  said  suit  shall  be  proceeded  with  to  final  judgment 
according  to  law."  ^  A  subpcena  cannot  tluis  be  served  when  the 
main  object  of  the  bill  is  for  an  accounting  by  an  absent  and 
non-resident  defendant,  although  there  is  also  a  prayer  for  the 
appointment  of  a  receiver  of  property  within  the  district.^  It 
seems  that  service  can  thus  be  made  in  a  suit  to  establish  a 
trust  in  real  estate  although  the  bill  also  prays  an  accounting.^ 
It  has  been  held  no  defense  to  such  a  suit  that  neither  the  de- 
fendants thus  served  by  publication  nor  the  plaintiff  are  resi- 
dents of  the  district.^  Process  cannot  thus  be  served  in  a  suit  to 
remove  a  cloud  upon  the  title  to  a  patent-right  although  the  of- 
ficial letters-patent  evidencing  the  patent-right  are  within  the 
jurisdiction.'^     Process  may  thus  be  served  in  a  suit  to  foreclose 

2  U.  R.  R.  S.  §  738;  as  amendefl  liy  *  Porter  Land  &  Water  Co.  i<.  Baskin, 
act  of  March  3,  1875,  ch.  137,  §  8  (18  St.     43  Fed.  R.  323. 

at  L.  472.)  s  Ames  v.   Ilolderbaum,   42   Fed.   R 

3  Ellis  V.  Reynolds,  35  Fed.  R.  394.     341. 

Rut   see   I'orter    Land    &   Water   Co.   v.  ''  Non-Magnetic  Watch    Co.    v.   Asso- 

Baskin,  43  Fed.  U.  323.  elation  H.  S.  of  Geneve,  44  Fed.  H.  6 


§  98.]  EXEMPTIONS   FROM   SERVICE.  195 

a  railway  mortQ:age."  It  has  been  said,  that  a  claim  to  a  certain 
number  of  undesignated  shares  of  stock  in  a  corporation  char- 
tered within  the  district  is  not  pro])erty  within  that  district  when 
the  liolder  of  tlie  legal  title  to  the  stock  is  domiciled  elsewhere.^ 
An  absent  judgment  debtor  may  thus  be  served  in  a  suit  by  the 
creditor  to  appropriate  his  assets.^  It  has  been  held  at  circuit : 
that  an  order  in  pursuance  of  this  statute  may  be  obtained  imme- 
diately on  filing  the  bill,  upon  proof  by  affidavit  that  the  defend- 
ant does  not  dwell  within  the  district,  and  cannot  be  served  or 
found  therein  ;  ^^  that  the  day  named  for  his  appearance  need  not 
be  one  of  the  rule  days  of  the  court ;  ^^  that  personal  service  of 
the  order  must  be  made  in  all  cases  where  the  residence  of  the 
absent  defendant  is  known  or  can  be  ascertained,  or  service  upon 
him  can  be  made  within  a  reasonable  time  and  by  the  exercise  of 
reasonable  diligence  ;  and  that  its  service  by  publication  can  only 
be  authorized  upon  proof  by  affidavit  of  the  facts  showing  that 
personal  service  without  the  jurisdiction  is  impracticable.^^  The 
affidavit  should  state  the  known  places  of  residence  of  the  absent 
defendants,  and  show  that  diligence  has  been  used  to  ascertain  the 
places  of  residence  which  are  unknoAvn.^^  The  fact  that  it  would 
be  very  expensive  to  make  personal  service  upon  the  absent  defen- 
dant whose  residence  was  known  was  held  no  ground  for  allowing 
service  by  publication.''*  If  the  absent  defendant  reside  in  another 
district  of  the  United  States,  the  safer  practice  is  to  obtain  an  or- 
der directing  the  marshal  of  that  district  to  serve  him.'^  A  defect 
in  personal  service  or  the  fact  that  personal  service  was  obtained 
by  fraud  will  not  prejudice  proceedings  regularly  taken  under  this 
statute.'*^ 

§  98.  Exemptions  from  Service  of  Subpoena  or  other  Process, 
Legal  or  Equitable,  other  than  Arrest. —  Chief  Justice  Marshall, 
in  the  course  of  the  trial  of  Aaron  Burr,  ordered  that  a  sub- 
poena duces  tecum  should  issue  against  President  Jefferson.  Jef- 
ferson, however,  refused  to  obey  the  subpoena,  while  expressing 

^  Farmers'  L.  &  Tr.  Co.  v.  Houston  &  T.  "  Forsyth  v.  Pierson,  9  Fed.  R.  801. 

C.  Ry.  Co.,  44  Fed.  R.  115.  i-  Bronson  v.  Keokuk,  2  Dill.  498  ;  Batt 

^  Kilgour  V.   New   Orleans    Gas-light  v.  Procter,  45  Fed.  R.  515. 

Co.,  2  Woods,  144.  "  Batt  v.  Procter,  45  Fed   R.  515. 

9  Brighara  v.  Luddington,  12  Blatchf.  ^^  Batt  r.  Procter,  45  Fed.  R.  515. 

237.     Compare  Picquet  f.  Swan,  5  Mason,  i^  Bronson    v.    Keokuk,   2    Dill.   498; 

35 ;  s.  0.  5  Mason,  561.  Forsyth  v.  Pierson,  9  Fed.  R.  801. 

'^  Forsyth  v.   Pierson,  9  Fed.   R.  801.  i'^  Fitzgerald  &  M.  C.  Co.  v.  Fitzgerald, 

But  see  Bronson  v.  Keokuk,  2  Dill.  498.  137  U.  S.  98. 


196  SUBPCENAS   TO   APPEAK   AND    ANSWER.  [CHAP.  V. 

his  perfect  willingness  to  furnish  the  ])apcr  desired,  if  I'equested 
in  what  he  considered  a  proper  way.  The  dispute  went  no  far- 
ther,^ Subsequently,  a  motion  was  made  for  leave  to  file  a  bill 
in  the  Supreme  Court,  praying  for  an  injunction  against  Pj-esi- 
dent  Johnson  to  restrain  him  from  executing  the  reconstruction 
laws.  The  attorney-general  then  took  the  position  that  the  Pres- 
ident was  not  amenable  to  process  ;  but  that  point  was  not  then 
and  has  not  since  been  decided. ^  On  the  trial  of  Guiteau  for 
the  murder  of  President  Garfield  a  written  statement  signed  by 
President  Arthur  was  admitted  in  evidence  by  consent  without 
his  personal  attendance.  No  other  officer  or  person  has  been 
claimed  to  be  above  the  law.  The  Federal  Constitution  provides 
that  senators  and  representatives  "  shall  in  all  cases,  except 
Treason,  Felony,  and  Breach  of  the  Peace,  be  privileged  from 
Arrest  during  their  Attendance  at  the  Session  of  their  respective 
Houses,  and  in  going  to  and  returning  from  the  same.""  This 
has  been  construed  at  circuit  to  exempt  them  from  service  of 
process,  unaccomj)anied  by  arrest  of  the  person,  when  on  their 
way  to  attend  a  session  of  Congress  ;'*  and  it  has  been  further 
held  that  such  exemption  is  not  lost  by  a  slight  deviation  from 
the  most  direct  road  to  the  capital.'^  In  certain  cases  individuals 
are  temporarily  exempt  from  the  service  of  process.  A  person 
temporarily  within  the  district  for  tlie  purpose  of  attending,  either 
as  witness,*^  party,"  attorney,  or  counsel,^  a  trial  or  other  pro- 
ceeding,^ civil  or  criminal  ji*^,  in  a  State  ^^  or  Federal  ^^  court,  is, 
while  there,  exempt  from  the  service  of  process  eundo,  morando, 
et  redeundo.    A  similar  exemption  would  probably  be  ap])licd  to 

§  98.    1  Burr's  Trial.  ^  United   States  v.   Bridgman,  8   Am. 

-  Mississippi  >•.  Jolinson,  4  Wall.  475.  Law  Record,  541;  Newton  v.   Askew,  tj 

See  Jefferson's  Works,  vol.  v.  p.  102.  Hare,  ^19;  Matthews  v.  Tufts,  87  N.  Y. 

3  Const.  Art.  I.  §  0.  5G8. 

•»  :\Iiner  >:  Markliam,  28  Fed.  R.  ?,S7.  i'^  United  States  r.  Bridpman,  8  Atn. 

^  .Miner  r.  Markliam,  28  Fed.  R.  387.  Law  Record,  541.      But   see   Jenkins  v. 

''•  Person   r.  Grier,  RO  N.  Y.  124,  and  Smitli,  57  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  171. 

cases  tliere  cited  ;  Kauffman  v.  Kennedy,  '^  Juneau  Bank  v.  McSpedan,  5  Biss. 

25  Fed.  R.  785.                                            '  G4  ;  Matthews  r.  Tufts,  87  N.  Y.  508. 

"  Parker  i-.  Hotclikiss,  1  Wall.  Jr.  2G9  ;  i-  Parker  r.  Ilotcldiiss,  1  Wall.  Jr.  209  ; 

Juneau   Bank  r.  McSpedan,  5  Biss.  64;  United  States  r.   Bridgman,  8  Am.  Law 

Matthews  r.  Tufts,  87  N.  Y.  508;  Brooks  Record,   541  ;  Brooks   r.  Farwell,  2  Mc- 

V.  Farwell,  2  McCrary,  220;  s.  c.  4  Fed.  Crary,  220;  s.  c.  4  Fed.  R.  107  ;  Bridges 

R.  1G7  ;  Bridges  r.  Sheldon,  7  Fed.  R.  17;  c    Shehhm,  7  Fed.   R.  17;    Mattliews  r. 

Matthews    r.    Puffer.    10    Fed     R.    GOG;  Puffer,  10  Fed.  R.  GOG  ;  Larned  i-.  Gritlin, 

Larne.l  r.  GrifHn,  12  Fed.  R.  r>W.  12  Fed.  R.  590. 

«  Matthews  v.  Tufts,  87  N.  Y.  5G8. 


§  98.]  EXEMPTIONS  FROM   SERVICE.  197 

any  person  wliile  temporarily  within  the  district  in  the  discharge 
uf  a  public  duty. ^2  The  privilege  of  a  witness  does  not  exempt 
him  from  liability  to  service  in  a  suit  arising  out  of  his  acts 
upon  that  same  visit  to  the  jurisdiction. ^^  A  Federal  court  will 
not  punish  as  a  contempt  the  arrest  or  service  of  process  by  a 
State  court  upon  a  foreign  witness  in  attendance  before  it ;  ^^ 
though  it  might  perhaps  upon  habeas  corpus  discharge  the  wit- 
ness from  such  arrest,!*^  or  punish  the  party  who  molested  the 
witness,  by  a  stay  of  proceedings  in  a  case  pending  between  him 
and  the  witness  in  the  Federal  court.^^  If  a  person  be  fraud- 
ulently enticed  within  the  district  and  then  served  with  pro- 
cess by  those  who  thus  induced  him  to  come,  the  service  may  be 
set  aside.i^  In  one  case,  when  a  man  was  induced  by  a  forged 
telegram  to  enter  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court,  the  party  who 
served  him  there  was  held  to  be  presumptively  connected  with 
the  fraud.i9 

1^  Lyell  V.  Goodwin,  4  McLean,  20.  i^  Union  Sugar  Refinery  v.  Mathiesson, 

"  Nichols  V.  Horton,  14  Fed.  R.  327.  2  Cliff.  304 ;  Steiger  v.  Bonn,  4  Fed.  R. 

i»  £x/«r/eSchulenburg,25Fed.  R.  211.  17;  Blair  v.  Turtle,  5  Fed.  R.  394;  s.  c. 

16  Ex  parte  Hurst,  1  Wasli.  C.  C.  186.  23  Alb.  L.  J.  435;   Baker  v.  Wales,   14 

See  Ex  parte  Schulenburg,  25  Fed.  R.211,  Abb.  Pr.  n.  s.  (N.  Y.)  331;  Fitzgerald  & 

212.  M.  C.  Co.  V.  Fitzgerald,  137  U.  S.  98,  105. 

1"  Bridges  v.  Sheldon,  7  Fed.  R.  17,  42 ;  i9  Steiger  v.  Bonn,  4  Fed.  R.  17. 
Ex  parte  Schulenburg,  25  Fed.  R.  211,  213. 


198  APPEARANCE.  [CHAP.  VL 


CHAPTER  VI. 

APPEARANCE. 

§  99.  Definition  of  an  Appearance,  —  An  appearance  IS  the  pro- 
cess by  which  a  defendant  submits  himself  to  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  court.  An  appearance  is  either  general  or  special.  B}" 
a  general  appearance  a  defendant  appears  for  all  purposes  in 
the  suit.  By  a  special  appearance  he  apjjcars  solely  for  the 
purpose  of  objecting  to  the  jurisdiction  on  account  of  a  defect, 
omission,  or  irregularity  in  the  service  of  the  subpoina  upon 
him,  or  perha{)S  for  some  other  reason. ^  An  ap])earance  gratis 
is  an  appearance  by  a  defendant  who  has  not  been  served  with 
process.^ 

§  100.  What  constitutes  an  Appearance. — The  proper  method 
of  entering  an  appearance  is  to  deliver  to  the  clerk  a  prajcipe, 
that  is,  a  written  direction,  ordering  him  to  enter  the  appearance 
of  the  defendant  who  subscribes  it.^  A  defendant  may  ajipear  in 
person  2  or  by  his  attorney.  No  attorney-at-law  can  appear  in 
a  court  of  the  United  States  unless  authorized  by  a  power  of 
attorney,  if  he  is  not  a  member  of  the  bar  of  such  court.  The 
rules  as  to  admission  to  the  bar  of  the  District  and  Circuit  Courts 
vary  with  tlic  different  courts.  It  is  the  usual  ])racticc  to  recog- 
nize in  each  District  and  Circuit  Court  a  member  of  the  bar  of 
the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  as  a  member  of  the  bar 
of  sucli  inferior  court  without  requiring  any  formal  order  or  mo- 
tion for  his  admission.^  The  Circuit  Court  of  the  United  States 
for  the  Southern  District  of  New  York  has  in  one  oi-  more  cases 
refused  to  recognize  a  member  of  the  bar  of  the  Supremo  Court 
of  the  United  States  who  had  not  been  admitted  to  practice  in 

§  99.   1  National  Furnace  Co.  v.  Moline  2  Danicll's  Ch.  Pr.  (2il  Am.  ed.)  590- 

Malleable  Iron  Works,  18  Fed.  U.  8(5:? ;  595. 

Elliott  V.  Lawhead.  43  Ohio  St.  171  ;  Dorr  S  100.  1  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.) 

V.    Gihboney,    .'J    Hufjhes,    382;    United  590.591. 
States  n.  American  Bell  Telepiione  Co.,  ^  u.  S.  R.  S.  §  747. 

29  Fed.  K.  17.  3  See  Goodvear  D.  V.  Co.  i'.  Osgood, 

13  Off.  Gaz.  325. 


101.] 


EFFECT   OF   AN   APPEARANCE. 


199 


such  Circuit  Court.*  The  taking  of  any  proceeding^  other  than 
a  special  appearance  and  a  motion  or  plea  thereon  founded,  is 
equivalent  to  a  general  appearance.*^  It  has  not  yet  been  authori- 
tatively decided  whether  or  not  the  filing  of  a  petition  for  a 
removal  from  a  State  to  a  Federal  court  is  equivalent  to  a  gen- 
eral appearance."  The  indorsement  and  signature  by  a  defendant 
upon  a  subpoena  of  the  words,  "  1  hereby  accept  service  of  the 
within  subpoena,  to  have  the  same  effect  as  if  duly  served  on  me 
by  a  proper  officer,  and  do  hereby  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  a 
copy  thereof,"  is  not  equivalent  to  an  appearance.^  A  special 
appearance,  it  would  seem,  is  only  properly  made  by  special  leave 
of  the  court  obtained  by  an  ex  parte  motion ;  ^  and  it-  is  the  safer 
practice  to  accompany  it  with  an  undertaking  by  the  defendant  to 
abide  by  the  further  orders  of  the  court.^*^  An  appearance  gratis 
can  only  be  made  by  a  defendant  named  in  the  introduction  or 
prayer  for  process  in  the  bill  unless  by  consent  of  all  the  parties 
to  the  suit.^i 

§  101.  Effect  of  an  Appearance.  —  A  general  appearance  waives 
all  objections  to  the  form  or  manner  of  service  of  the  subpoena,^ 


■*  See  proceedings  in  Matter  of  Appli- 
cation for  Writ  of  Habeas  Corpus  by 
Joseph  Wood,  before  Lacombe,  J.,  July, 
1891. 

^  Jones  V.  Andrews,  10  Wall.  327 ; 
Thornburgli  i-.  Savage  Mining  Co.,  1  Paci- 
fic Law  Mag.  267  ;  Livingston  o.  Gibbons, 
4  J.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  yi,  99. 

6  New  Jersey  v.  New  York,  6  Pet.  323 ; 
Van  Antwerp  v.  Hulburd,  7  Blatclif.  426, 
440 ;  Livingston  i".  Gibbons,  4  J.  Ch. 
(N.  Y.)  94  ;  Blackburn  v.  Selma,  M.  &  M. 
R.  U.  Co.,  2  Flippin,  525;  Fitzgerald  & 
M.  Construction  Co.  v.  Fitzgerald,  137 
U.  S.  98;  infra,  %  101. 

''  It  was  held  that  it  was  not,  in  Par- 
rott  V.  Alabama  Gold  Lite  Ins.  Co.,  5  Fed. 
R.  391  ;  Atciiison  v.  Morris,  11  Fed.  R. 
582;  Small  r.  Montgomery,  17  Fed.  R. 
865;  Miner  r.  Markham,  28  Fed.  R.  387; 
Perkins  i'.  Hendry.x,  40  Fed.  R.  6.57 ; 
Golden  v.  The  Morning  News  of  New 
Haven,  42  Fed.  R.  112;  Porter  Land  & 
Water  Co.  v.  Baskin,  43  Fed.  R.  323; 
Clews  V.  Woodstock  Iron  Co.,  44  Fed.  R. 
31 ;  Reifsnider  v.  American  Imp.  Pub. 
Co.,  45  Fed.  R.  433;  Bentlif  v.  London  & 
0.  F.  Corp.  Ld.,  44  Fed.  R.  667;  Estes  v. 
Knickerbocker  Life  Ins.  Co.,  N.  Y.  C  P. 


Trial  Term,  Beach,  J.,  Daily  Register, 
Nov.  17,  1882.  See  also  Freidlander  v. 
Pollock,  5  Coldw.  (Tenn.)  490.  But  see 
the  conflicting  cases  of  Sayles  v.  N.  W. 
Ins.  Co.,  2  Curt.  212;  Buslinell  v.  Ken- 
nedy, 9  Wall.  387,  393;  Sweeney  v.  Cof- 
fin, 1  Dill.  73,  75 ;  Tallman  v.  Baltimore 
&  0.  R.  Co.,  45  Fed.  R.  1-56.     See  §  391. 

»  Butterworth  v.  Hill,  114  U.  S.  128, 
132,  133. 

9  Thayer  v.  Wales,  5  Fisher's  Pat. 
Cas.  448 ;  Romaine  v.  Union  Ins.  Co.,  28 
Fed.  R.  625.  But  see  Dorr  v.  Gibboney, 
3  Hugiies,  382 ;  National  Furnace  Co.  v. 
Moline  Malleable  Iron  Works,  18  Fed.  R. 
863. 

^'5  Romaine  v.  Union  Ins.  Co.,  28  Fed. 
R.  625. 

11  Attorney-General  v.  Pearson,  7  Si- 
mons, 290,  302;  Kentucky  Silver  Mining 
Co.  V.  Day,  2  Saw.  468,  473. 

§  101.  1  Segee  v.  Thomas,  3  Blatchf. 
11  ;  Goodyear  v.  Chaffee,  3  Blatchf  268  ; 
Hale  ('.  Continental  Life  Ins.  Co.,  12  Fed. 
R.  359 ;  Provident  Savings  Life  Assur- 
ance Society  r.  Ford,  114  U.  S.  635,  639; 
Robinson  v.  National  Stockyard  Co.,  12 
Fed.  R.  .361 ;  8.  c.  20  Blatchf  513 ;  Buerk 
V.  Imhaeuser,  8  Fed.  R.  457. 


200  APPEAEANCE.  [CHAP.  TI. 

including  the  objection  that  the  defendant  was  not  "  found  "  and 
did  not  reside  within  the  district.^  A  general  appearance  also 
waives  an  omission  of  the  name  of  the  defendant  from  the  prayer 
of  process,  provided  he  was  named  in  another  part  of  the  bill.^ 
A  general  appearance  does  not  waive  an  objection  to  the  juris- 
diction of  the  court  upon  the  ground  of  a  lack  of  the  requisite 
difference  of  citizenship.*  A  general  appearance  does  not  admit 
the  validity  of  a  writ  of  foreign  attachment  previously  issued.^ 
If  a  party  joins  with  a  special  appearance  and  motion  to  set 
aside  service  of  process  a  motion  to  dismiss  the  suit  on  another 
ground,  he  thereby  waives  his  objection  to  the  irregularity  of  ser- 
vice, and  his  proceeding  is  equivalent  to  a  general  apj)earance.^ 
After  a  special  appearance  for  the  purpose  of  objectiug  to  the 
jurisdiction  lias  been  made,  aud  the  objection  overruled,  the  riglit 
to  insist  upon  tliis  objection  on  an  appeal  is  not  lost  by  a  sub- 
sequent appearance  and  defense  to  the  suit  u})on  tlie  merits.^ 
The  court  has  power  to  allow  a  general  appearance  to  be  changed 
by  amendment  to  a  special  appearance,^  or  to  be  withdrawn.^ 

§  102.  When  an  Appearance  must  be  made.  —  "  Tlie  appearance- 
day  of  the  defendant  shall  be  the  rule-day  to  which  the  suljpoena 
is  made  returnable,  provided  he  has  been  served  with  the  process 
twenty  days  before  that  day ;  otherwise,  his  appearance-day  shall 
be  the  next  rule-day  succeeding  the  rule-day  when  the  process 
is  returnal)le."  ^  The  first  Monday  of  each  month  is  a  rule-day .^ 
A  defendant  may  appear  at  any  time  after  the  filing  of  the  bill, 
and  before  the  time  named  in  the  rule  has  expired.^  The  court 
has  power  to  enlarge  the  time  for  an  appearance,  if  special  cause 
therefor  be  sliown.* 

2  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  McBride,  «  Lackett  r.  Rnmbaugh,  45  Fed.  R.  23. 
141  U.  S.  127,  132;  McRride  v.  Grand  «  Fitzgerald  &  xAI.  C.  Co.  c.  Fitzyeral-i, 
de  Tour  Plow  Co.,  40  Fed.  R.  102  ;  Sayies  137  U.  S.  98.  See  also  Jones  v.  Andrews, 
V.  Northwestern  Ins.  Co.,  2  Curt.  212;  10  Wall.  327;  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co. 
Shields    v.  Thomas,    18    How.  253,  2.J9 ;  v.  McBride,  141  U.  S.  127,  132. 

Toland    r.    Sprafjue,    12    Pet.    300,   331;  "  Harkness  r.  Hyde,  98  U.  S.  476. 

Butterworth  r.  Hill,  114  U.  S.  128,  132,  »  United  States  v.  Yates,  0  How.  005; 

133  ;  Provident   Savings  Life  Assurance  Ilohorst  i\  Hamburg  Amer.  Packet  Co., 

Society  v.  Ford,  114  U.  S.  035,  039.     But  38  Fed.  R.  273. 
see  Xoyes  v.  Canada,  30  Fed.  R.  665.  ^  Rhode  Island  v.  Massachusetts,    13 

3  Segce    r.    Thomas,    3    Blatchf.    11  ;  Pet.  2.3. 

Buerk  r.  Imhaeuscr,  8  Fed.  R.  457.  §  102.  i  Rule  17. 

*  Romaine  v.  Union  Ins.  Co.,  28  Fed.  -'  Rule  2. 

R.  625;  U.  S.  R.  S   1  Supp.  pp.  173,  175;  «  Ileyman  r.  Uhlman,  34  Fed.  R.  680. 

18  Sts.  at  L.  470;  Act  of  March  3,  1875,  ••  Poultney  v.  City  of  La  Fayette,  12 

§  5.  Pet.  472. 


§  103.]  WHEN  A   BILL   MAY  BE   TAKEN  PRO   CONFESSO.  201 


CHAPTER   YII. 

TAKING   BILLS   PEO   CONFESSO. 

§  103.  When  a  Bill  may  be  taken  pro  confesso.  —  If  a  defendant 
fails  to  enter  his  appearance  on  or  before  the  day  at  which  the  writ 
is  returnable,  the  bill  may  be  taken  as  confessed,  pro  confesso} 
Where  the  bill  when  the  subpoena  was  served  did  not  show  juris- 
diction against  a  defendant,  a  subsequent  amendment  stating  facts 
sufficient  to  show  jurisdiction  against  it  will  not  warrant  the  entry 
of  an  order  taking  the  bill  as  confessed  without  a  second  service  of 
the  subpoena,  or  an  a})pearance  by  such  defendant.^  If  a  defendant 
fails  to  file  a  plea,  answer,  or  demurrer,  to  the  bill  on  or  before  the 
rule-day  next  succeeding  that  of  entering  his  appearance,  the  plain- 
tiff may  have  the  bill  taken  pro  confesso,  unless  the  defendant  has 
had  his  time  enlarged  for  cause  shown  by  a  judge  of  the  court.^  A 
bill  may  be  also  taken  as  confessed  upon  the  failure  of  a  defendant 
to  answer  within  the  time  allowed  him  after  a  demurrer  or  plea  has 
been  overruled.^  In  a  proper  case,  part  of  a  bill  may  be  taken  as 
confessed."  Thus,  where  the  defendant  had  repeatedly  failed  to  an- 
swer an  interrogatory,  the  parts  of  the  bill  which  the  same  affected 
were  ordered  taken  as  confessed.^  It  is  uncertain  whether,  when 
the  defendant  after  answering  the  original  bill  fails  to  file  a  further 
answer  to  material  amendments  thereof,  the  complainant  is  entitled 
to  have  the  whole  bill  taken  as  confessed,  or  only  the  part  unan- 
swered." It  is  doubtful  whether  a  bill  can  be  taken  as  confessed 
against  an  infant  or  other  person  under  a  disability.^  Certainly, 
it  cannot  before  a  guardian  ad  litem  has  been  appointed.^  Should 
the  guardian  refuse  to  answer,  the  safer  course  fpr  the  complain- 
ant would  be  to  obtain  a  reference  to  a  master  and  prove  the  alle- 
gations of  the  bill  before  them.!** 

§  103.     1  Rule  12.  7  Suydam  v.  Beals,  4  McLean,  12,  15; 

2  Non-Magnetic  Watch  Co.  of  Amer.  v.  Trust  &  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Jenkins,  8  Paige, 

Asso.  Hor.  of  Gen.,  45  Fed.  R.  210.  But  see  (N.  Y. )  589,  593,  594 ;  Hawkins  v.  Crook, 

Brown  v.  Lake  Sup.  IronCo.,  134 U.  S.  530.  2  P.  Wms.  559. 

^  liule  18.  8  Compare   the   positive  language  of 

*  Suydam  v.  Beals,  4  McLean,  12.  Equity   Rule   18,  with  Mills   v.   Dennis, 

5  Suydam  v.  Beals,  4  McLean,  12,  15;  3  J.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  367;  O'Hara  v.  MacCon- 

Hale  V.  Cont.  Life  Ins.  Co.,  20  Fed.  R.  344.  nell,  93  U.  S.  151. 

«  Hale  V.  Cont.  Life  Ins.  Co.,  20  Fed.  «  O'Hara  v.  MacConnell,  93  U.  S.  151. 

R.  344.  10  Mills  V.  Dennis,  3  J.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  307. 


202  TAKING  BILLS   PKO   CONFESSO.  [CHAP.  VII. 

§104.  Practice  in  Taking  a  Bill  pro  confesso.  —  The  practice 
when  a  bill  is  taken  ^j»ro  confesso  can  be  most  satisfactorily  de- 
scribed in  the  following  quotations  from  the  Equity  Rules,  and 
from  a  recent  opinion  by  Mr.  Justice  Bradley.^  When  a  defend- 
ant fails  to  plead  in  time,  "  the  plaintiff  may,  at  his  election,  enter 
an  order  (as  of  course)  in  the  order-book,  that  the  bill  be  taken 
pro  confesso;  and  thereupon  the  cause  shall  be  proceeded  in 
ex  parte,  and  the  matter  of  the  bill  may  be  decreed  by  the  court 
at  any  time  after  the  expiration  of  thirty  days  from  and  after  the 
entry  of  said  order,  if  the  same  can  be  done  without  an  answer, 
and  is  proper  to  be  decreed  ;  or  the  plaintiff,  if  he  requires  any 
discovery  or  answer  to  enable  him  to  obtain  a  proper  decree, 
shall  be  entitled  to  process  of  attachment  against  the  defendant 
to  compel  an  answer,  and  the  defendant  shall  not,  when  arrested 
upon  such  process,  be  discharged  therefrom,  unless  upon  filing 
his  answer,  or  otherwise  complying  with  such  order  as  the  court 
or  judge  thereof  may  direct,  as  to  pleading  to  or  fully  answering 
the  bill,  within  a  period  to  be  fixed  by  the  court  or  judge,  and 
undertaking  to  speed  the  cause."  ^  No  service  need  be  made 
of  the  order  taking  the  bill  pro  confesso.^  "  When  the  bill  is 
taken  pro  confesso  the  court  may  proceed  to  a  decree  at  any 
time  after  the  expiration  of  thirty  days  from  and  after  the  en- 
try of  the  order  to  take  the  bill  jiro  confesso ;  and  such  decree 
rendered  shall  be  deemed  absolute,  unless  the  court  shall,  at 
the  same  term,  set  aside  the  same,  or  enlarge  the  time  for  filing 
the  answer,  upon  cause  shown,  upon  motion  and  affidavit  of 
the  defendant ;  and  no  such  motion  shall  be  granted  unless 
upon  payment  of  the  costs  of  the  plaintiff  in  the  suit  up  to 
that  time,  or  such  part  thereof  as  the  court  shall  deem  reason- 
able, and  unless  the  defendant  shall  undertake  to  file  his  an- 
swer witliin  such  time  as  the  court  shall  direct,  and  submit 
to  such  other  terms  as  the  court  shall  direct,  for  the  purpose  of 
speeding  the  cause.""*  After  the  term,  a  decree  taking  a  bill  as 
confessed  cannot  be  set  aside  on  motion.^  "  A  confession  of  facts 
properly  pleaded  dispenses  with  proof  of  these  facts,  and  is  as 
effective  for  the  purposes  of  the  suit  as  if  the  facts  were  proved  ; 

§  104.    1  Thomson  v.  Wooster,  114  U.  ^  Bank  of  the  United  States  v.  White, 

S.  104.  8  Pet.  2G2. 

2  Rule  18.     See  Read  v.  Consequa,  4  *  Rule  19.     See  Maynard  v.  Pomfret, 

Wash.  174;    O'Uara  v.   MacConnell,  93  3Atk.  4(;8;  Ileyn  r.  Ileyn.  Jacob,  49. 
U.  S.  150,  152.  &  Allen  v.  Wilson,  21  Fed.  R.  881. 


§  104.]     PEACTICE  IN  TAKING  A  BILL  PRO  CONFESSO.       203 

and  a  decree  pro  confesso  regards  the  statements  of  the  bill  as 
confessed.  By  the  early  practice  of  the  civil  law,  failure  to  ap- 
pear at  the  day  to  which  the  cause  was  adjourned  was  deemed  a 
confession  of  the  action,  but  in  later  times  this  rule  was  changed, 
so  that  the  plaintiff,  notwithstanding  the  contumacy  of  the  de- 
fendant, only  obtained  judgment  in  accordance  with  the  truth  of 
the  case  as  established  by  an  ex  parte  examination.  Keller,  Pro- 
ceed. Rom.  §  69.  The  original  practice  of  the  English  Court  of 
Chancery  was  in  accordance  with  the  later  Roman  law.  Haivkins 
V.  Crook^  2  P.  Wras.  556.  But  for  at  least  two  centuries  past 
bills  have  been  taken  pro  confesso  for  contumacy.  Ibid.  Chief 
Baron  Gilbert  says  :  '  Where  a  man  appears  by  his  clerk  in  court, 
and  after  lies  in  prison,  and  is  brought  up  three  times  in  court  by 
habeas  corpus.,  and  has  the  bill  read  to  him,  and  refuses  to  an- 
swer, such  public  refusal  in  court  does  amount  to  a  confession  of 
the  whole  bill.  Secondly,  when  a  person  appears  and  departs 
without  answering,  and  the  whole  process  of  the  court  has  been 
awarded  against  him  after  his  appearance  and  departure,  to  the 
sequestration  ;  there  also  the  bill  is  taken  p>ro  confesso.,  because 
it  is  presumed  to  be  true  when  he  has  appeared  and  departs  in 
despite  of  the  court,  and  withstands  all  its  process  without  an- 
swering.' Forum  Romanum,  36.  Lord  Hardwicke  likened  a 
decree  pro  confesso  to  a  judgment  by  nil  dicit  at  common  law, 
and  to  judgment  for  plaintiff  on  demurrer  to  the  defendant's 
plea.  Davis  v.  Davis,  2  Atk.  21.  It  was  said  in  Hawkins  v.  Crook., 
qua  supra,  and  quoted  in  2  Eq.  Ca.  Ab.  179,  that  '  the  method  in 
equity  of  taking  a  bill  p>ro  confesso  is  consonant  to  the  rule  and 
practice  of  the  courts  at  law,  where,  if  the  defendant  makes  de- 
fault by  nil  dicit,  judgment  is  immediately  given  in  debt,  or  in 
all  cases  where  the  thing  demanded  is  certain  ;  but  where  the 
matter  sued  for  consists  in  damages,  a  judgment  interlocutory  is 
given ;  after  which  a  writ  of  inquiry  goes  to  ascertain  the  dam- 
ages, and  then  the  judgment  follows.'  The  strict  analogy  of 
this  proceeding  in  actions  of  law  to  a  general  decree  pro  confesso 
in  equity  in  favor  of  the  complainant,  with  a  reference  to  a  mas- 
ter to  take  a  necessary  account,  or  to  assess  unliquidated  dam- 
ages, is  obvious  and  striking.  A  carefully  prepared  history  of 
the  practice  and  effect  of  taking  bills  pro  confesso  is  given  in 
Williams  v.  Corwin,  Hopkins  Ch.  471,  by  Hoffman,  Master,  in  a 
report  made  to  Chancellor  Sanford,  of  New  York,  in  which  the 


204  TAKING  BILLS   PRO   CONFESSO.  [CHAP.  VIL 

conclusion  come  to  (and  adopted  by  the  Chancellor),  as  to  the 
effect  of  taking  a  bill  pro  confesso,  was  that  '  when  the  allegations 
of  a  bill  are  distinct  and  positive,  and  the  bill  is  taken  as  con- 
fessed, such  allegations  are  taken  as  true  without  proofs,'  and  a 
decree  will  be  made  accordingly  ;  but  '  where  the  allegations  of 
a  bill  are  indefinite,  or  the  demand  of  the  complainant  is  in  its 
nature  uncertain,  the  certainty  requisite  to  a  proper  decree  must 
be  afforded  by  proofs.  The  bill,  when  confessed  by  the  default 
of  the  defendant,  is  taken  to  be  true  in  all  matters  alleged  with 
sufficient  certainty ;  but  in  respect  to  matters  not  alleged  with 
due  certainty,  or  subjects  which  from  their  nature  and  the  course 
of  the  court  require  an  examination  of  details,  the  obligation  to 
furnish  proofs  rests  on  the  complainant.' "  ^  When  the  bill  re- 
lates to  an  unsettled  account,  a  reference  to  a  master  is  always 
necessary."  "  We  may  properly  say,  therefore,  that  to  take  a  bill 
pro  confesso  is  to  order  it  to  stand  as  if  its  statements  were  con- 
fessed to  be  true  ;  and  that  a  decree  pro  confesso  is  a  decree 
based  on  such  statements,  assumed  to  be  true,  1  Smith's  Ch. 
Pract.  153,  and  such  a  decree  is  as  binding  and  conclusive  as 
any  decree  rendered  in  the  most  solemn  manner.  It  cannot  be 
impeached  collaterally,  but  only  upon  a  bill  of  review,  or  [a  bill] 
to  set  it  aside  for  fraud."  ^  "A  decree  pro  confesso  is  not  a 
decree  as  of  course  according  to  the  prayer  of  the  bill,  nor  merely 
such  as  the  complainant  chooses  to  take  it;"^  but  it  should  be 
made  "  by  the  court  according  to  what  is  proper  to  be  decreed 
upon  the  statements  of  the  bill  assumed  to  be  true  ;  "  ^^  "  the  mat- 
ter of  the  bill  ought  at  least  to  be  opened  and  explained  to  the 
court  when  the  decree  is  applied  for,  so  that  the  court  may  see 
that  the  decree  is  a  proper  one.  The  binding  character  of  the 
decree,  as  declared  in  Rule  19,  renders  it  proper  that  this  degree 
of  precaution  should  be  taken."  ^^  "  We  have  deemed  it  unne- 
cessary to  make  any  remarks  as  to  the  status  of  a  defendant 
before  a  master  on  a  reference  under  a  decree  pro  confesso.  Both 
parties  in  this  case  seem  to  have  taken  it  for  granted  that  the 

•^  Mr.  Justice  Bradley  in  Tiiomson  v.  '"  Mr.  Justice  Bradley  in  Thomson  r. 

Wooster,  114  U.  S.  104, "no,  111.  Wooster,  114  U.  S.  104,  113;  Andrews  v. 

'  Pendleton  v.  Evans,  4  Wasli.  .^l.  Cole,  20  Fed.  R.  410;  Kose  r.  Woodruff, 

8  Mr.  Justice  Bradley  in  Thomson  v.  4  J.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  547,  548. 

Wooster,  114  U.  S.  104,  112.  'i  Mr.  Justice  Bradley  in  Thomson  v. 

9  Mr.  Justice  Bradley  in  Thomson  i'.     Wooster,  114  U.  S.  104,"llo,  114. 
Wooster,  114  U.  S.  104,  111,  112. 


§  104.]  PRACTICE   IN   TAKING  A   BILL   PRO   CONFESSO.  205 

rights  of  the  defendants  were  the  same  as  if  the  decree  had  been 
made  upon  answer  and  proofs.  In  the  English  practice,  it  is 
true,  as  it  existed  at  the  time  of  the  adoption  of  our  present 
Rules  (in  1842),  the  defendant,  after  a  decree  pro  confesso  and  a 
reference  for  an  account,  was  entitled  to  appeal-  before  the  mas- 
ter, and  to  have  notice  of  and  take  part  in  the  proceedings,  pro- 
vided he  obtained  an  order  of  the  court  for  that  purpose,  which 
would  be  granted  on  terms.  2  Daniell  Ch.  Pr.  804,  1st  ed. ; 
ditto,  1358,  2d  ed.,  by  Perkins  ;  Heyn  v.  Heyn,  Jacob,  49.  The 
former  practice  in  the  Court  of  Chancery  of  New  York  was  sub- 
stantially the  same.  1  Hoffman  Ch.  Pr.  520  ;  1  Barb.  Ch.  Pr, 
479.  In  New  Jersey,  except  in  plain  cases  of  decree  for  the 
foreclosure  of  a  mortgage  (where  no  reference  is  required),  the 
matter  is  left  to  the  discretion  of  tlie  court.  Sometimes  notice 
is  ordered  to  be  given  to  the  defendant  to  appear  before  the 
master,  and  sometimes  not ;  as  it  is  also  in  the  Chancellor's  dis- 
cretion to  order  a  bill  to  be  taken  pro  confesso  for  a  default,  or  to 
order  the  complainant  to  take  proofs  to  sustain  the  allegations  of 
the  bill.  Nixon  Dig.,  Art.  Chancery,  §  21 ;  Gen.  Orders  in 
Chancer}',  XIV.  3-7  ,  Brundage  v.  Goodfellow,  4  Halst.  Ch.  513. 
As  we  have  seen,  by  our  18th  Rule  in  Equity,  it  is  provided  that 
if  a  defendant  make  default  in  not  filing  his  plea,  demurrer,  or 
answer  in  proper  time,  the  plaintiff  may,  as  one  alternative,  enter 
an  order,  as  of  course,  that  the  bill  be  taken  pro  confesso,  '  and 
thereupon  the  same  shall  be  proceeded  ex  parte.''  The  old  Rules, 
adopted  in  1822,  did  not  contain  this  ex  parte  clause;  tliey  sim- 
ply declared  that  if  the  defendant  failed  to  appear  and  file  his 
answer  within  three  months  after  appearance  day,  the  plaintiff 
might  take  the  bill  for  confessed,  and  that  the  matter  tliereof 
should  be  decreed  accordingly;  the  decree  to  be  absolute  unless 
cause  should  be  shown  at  the  next  term.  See  Equity  Rules  VI. 
and  X.  of  1822,  7  Wheat.  VI 1.,  and  Pendleton  v.  Evans,  4  Wash. 
C.  C.  R.  336  ;  O'Hara  v.  MaoOonnell,  93  U.  S.  150.  Under  these 
rules  the  English  practice  was  left  to  govern  the  subsequent 
course  of  proceeding,  by  which,  as  we  have  seen,  the  defendant 
might  have  an  order  to  permit  him  to  appear  before  the  master, 
and  be  entitled  to  notice.  Whether  under  the  present  rule  a  dif- 
ferent practice  was  intended  to  be  introduced  is  a  question  which 
it  is  not  necessary  to  decide  in  this  case."  ^^  It  has,  however, 
12  Mr.  Justice  Bradley  in  Tliomson  t;.  Wooster,  lU  U.  S.  104,  11C>,  120. 


206  TAKING  BILLS   PEO   CONFESSO.  [CHAP.  VH. 

been  held  in  the  second  circuit,  that  "  Equity  Rule  18  provides 
that,  after  the  order  pro  confesso,  the  cause  shall  proceed  ex  j) arte  ; 
but  this  does  not  mean  without  notice  to  a  party  who  has  appeared 
in  the  cause.  Such  party  is  entitled  to  notice,  and  has  the  right 
to  be  heard  as  to  the  form  of  the  decree,  and  upon  such  other 
questions  as  can  be  presented  upon  the  complainant's  pleadings 
and  proofs.  This  is  the  uniform  construction  given  to  the  Rule 
throughout  this  circuit."  ^^  Where  a  bill  for  the  infringement  of 
a  patent  alleges  infringement  of  "  the  invention  "  of  the  plaintiffs, 
and  is  taken  as  confessed,  it  seems  that  it  cannot  be  claimed  in 
subsequent  proceedings  in  the  same  suit  that  the  patent  is  void 
upon  its  face.^^  When  there  are  more  than  one  defendant  who 
are  charged  with  a  joint  liability,  after  the  bill  has  been  taken  as 
confessed  against  one,  no  final  decree  can  be  made  against  him, 
unless  and  until  a  decree  is  entered  against  those  who  appear  and 
defend  the  suit.^'^  It  seems  that  a  decree  taking  a  bill  as  con- 
fessed is  of  no  effect  unless  followed  by,  or  included  in  a  final  de- 
cree.^^  The  entry  of  a  final  decree  by  default  upon  notice  to  the 
defendants,  without  the  previous  entry  of  a  formal  order  taking 
the  bill  as  confessed,  is  an  irregularity  for  which  the  decree  cannot 
be  set  aside  upon  motion  after  the  term  at  which  it  is  rendered.^' 
But  a  decree  entered  />r(?  confesso  will  be  set  aside  upon  motion 
at  a  subsequent  term,  when  entered  before  tlie  time  allowed 
the  defendant  by  the  rules  to  plead  to  the  bill.'^  An  ap])eal 
can  be  taken  from  the  final  decree  after  a  bill  has  been  taken 
as  confessed.^^  Upon  such  an  appeal  the  decree  may  be  re- 
versed for  a  defect  in  the  service  of  the  subpaMia,-*^  for  failure  to 
appoint  a  guardian  ad  litem  when  required,-^  and  it  seems  for 
a  want  of  indispensaV)le  parties.--  Otberwise,  the  only  question 
for  tlie  consideration  of  the  court  is  Avhether  the  allegations  in  the 
bill  are  sufficient  to  support  the  decree.^  It  seems  that  the  ob- 
jection that  the  complainant  has  an  adequate  remedy  at  law  may 


"  Jud,£re  Wallace  in  Bennett  v.  Hocf-  '^  Frow  v.  De  La  Vega,  15  Wall.  552 ; 

ner,  17  Blatchf.  'M\,  ."I2.  Butterworth  v.  Hill,  114  U.  S.  128. 

»  Dobson  V.  Hartford  Carpet  Co.,  Hi  -'  O'llara  v.  MacConncll,  93  U.  S.  150; 

U.  S.  4.3'J,  41(>,  447.  Butterwortti  v.  Hill,  114  U.  8.  128. 

15  Frow  V.  De  La  Vega,  15  Wall.  .552.  21  O'FIara  v.  MacConnell,  9-3  U.  S.  150. 

16  Lockiiart    v.    Horn,    .3    Woods,   542,  2-  O'Hara  v  MacConnell,  93  U.  S.  150. 
648.  23  Mnsterson  ;'.  Howard,  18  Wail.  99  ; 

1"  Linder  i-  Lewis,  1  Fed.  R.  378.  Oldo  C.  H.  R.  Co.  v.  Central  Trust  Co., 

"  Fellows  V.  Hall,  3  McLean,  281,  133  U.  S.  83. 


§  104.]  PRACTICE   IN    TAKING   A   BILL    PRO    CONFESSO.  207 

be  disregarded  by  the  appellate  court.^*  When  the  defendant  had 
not  moved  for  nine  months  after  the  appointment  of  a  receiver, 
and  meanwhile  the  bill  had  been  taken  against  him  as  confessed, 
it  was  held  too  late  to  claim  that  no  relief  could  be  granted,  be- 
cause the  complainant  had  an  adequate  remedy  at  law.^^ 

24  Brown  v.  Lake  Superior  Iron  Co.,        ^s  Brown  v.  Lake  Superior  Iron  Co., 
134  U.  S.  530.  134  U.  S.  530. 


208  DEMUKEEKS.  [CHAP.  VIII. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

DEMURRERS. 

§  105.  Definition  and  General  Characteristics  of  a  Demurrer.  — 
A  demurrer  is  a  pleading  v^^hich  admits  the  truth  gf  a  bill,  but 
claims  that  the  defendant  should  be  excused  from  answering 
thereto  and  the  complainant  be  denied  relief  on  account  of  some 
irregularity  or  insufficiency  existing  in  it.  As  the  name  denotes, 
demurrers  were  borrowed  from  the  connuon  law.^  They  are  so 
termed  because  the  defendant  demoratur,  or  will  go  no  farther.^ 
A  speaking  demurrer  is  one  that  introduces  a  new  fact  or  aver- 
ment which  is  necessary  to  support  the  demurrer,  and  does  not 
appear  distinctl}"  on  the  face  of  the  bill.^  Such  a  demurrer  is 
always  bad,  and  Avill  be  overruled.'*  But  in  order  to  constitute  a 
speaking  demurrer,  the  fact  or  averment  introduced  must  be 
one  which  is  necessary  to  support  the  demurrer  and  is  not  found 
in  the  bill ;  the  introduction  of  inimate?'ial  facts,  or  averments, 
or  of  arguments,  is  improper,  but  constitutes  mere  surplusage 
and  will  not  vitiate  the  demurrer.^  A  demurrer  is  also  bad  if  it 
relies  for  its  support  upon  averments  in  an  answer.^  A  demurrer 
must  not  be  addressed  to  a  point  within  the  discretion  of  the 
court;  if  so,  it  will  be  overruled."  It  has  been  held,  that  when 
the  bill  sliows  that  a  defendant  is  not  an  inliabitant  of  the 
district  that  defect  may  be  raised  by  demurrer.^  A  demurrer 
cannot  be  filed  to  an  answer.^ 

§  106.    Admissions    by  a  Demurrer.  —  A    demurrer   admits    the 

§  105.   1  Langdell's  Eq.  PI.  §§  53,  92.  5  Danicll's  Ch.  Pr.  (2(1  Am.  ed  )  657  ; 

-  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (5th  Am.  ed.)  543;  Cawthorn   v.  Chalie,  2  Sim.  &   S.  127; 

3  Bl.  Com.  314.  Davics  v.  Williams,  1  Simons,  5. 

3  Ed.sell  V.  Buchanan,  4  Brown  Ch.  C.  «  Chicago,   St.   Louis  &  New  Orleans 

254  ;  Davics  r.  Williams,  1  S'imons,  5,  7  ;  R.  R   Co.  r.  Macomb,  2  Fed.  K.  18. 

Lamb  v.  Starr,  Dcady,  350;  Daniell's  Ch.  '   Vcrplank  v.  Caines,  1  J.  Ch.  (N.  Y.) 

Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  05G,'note  2;  Story's  Eq.  57. 

PL  §  448.  8  Reinstadlcr   v.   Rehls,    33    Fed     R. 

*  Edsell  V.  Buchanan,  4  Brown  Ch.  C.  308;  Miller  Matree  Co.  r.  Carpenter,  34 

254  ;  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  448;  Daniell's  Ch.  Fed.  R.  433.     But  see  §  101. 

Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  G5G.  note  2.  »  Crouch  v.  Kerr,  38  Fed.  R.  649. 


§  106]  ADMISSIONS    BY   A   DEMURRER.  209 

truth  of  the  allegations  of  fact  in  the  bill.^  "  xis  a  matter  of  con- 
struction of  an  ambiguous  clause,  the  court  is  bound  to  adopt  that 
interpretation  which  is  least  favorable  to  the  plaintiff;  but  the 
defendant  is  not  entitled  to  press  this  princi[)le  so  far  as  to  draw- 
any  inferences  of  fact  he  pleases  which  may  happen  to  be  not  in- 
consistent with  the  averments  of  the  bill."  ^  It  has  been  said  that 
"reasonable  i)resumptions  are  admitted  by  demurrer  as  well  as 
the  matters  expressly  alleged."  ^  The  court  will  not  infer  from 
an  allegation,  that  a  fraud  was  committed  at  a  time  beyond  the 
limit  of  the  Stiitute  of  Limitations,  that  the  fraud  was  then  dis- 
covered.^ "A  demurrer  only  admits  facts  well  pleaded;  it  does 
not  admit  matters  of  inference  and  argument,  however  clearly 
stated ;  it  does  not  admit,  for  example,  the  accuracy  of  an  alleged 
construction  of  an  instrument,  when  the  instrument  itself  is  set 
forth  in  the  bill,  or  a  copy  is  annexed,  against  a  construction  re- 
quired by  its  terras,  nor  the  correctness  of  the  ascription  of  a  pur- 
pose to  the  parties  when  not  justified  by  the  language  used.  The 
several  averments  of  the  plaintiff  in  the  bill  as  to  his  understand- 
ing of  his  rights,  and  of  the  liabilities  and  duties  of  others  under 
the  contract,  can,  therefore,  exert  no  influence  upon  the  mind  of 
the  court  in  the  disposition  of  the  demurrer."  ^  "  Though  the 
authorities  are  by  no  means  unanimous,  the  weight  of  opinion 
is  in  favor  of  the  proposition  that  where  profert  is  made  of  a 
recorded  paper  it  is  for  all  purposes  presented  to  the  court  as  a 
part  of  the  pleading,  and  an  objection  thereto  may  be  taken  by 
demurrer."  ^  A  demurrer  does  not  admit  conclusions  of  law  ; 
and  in  the  construction  of  the  bill  upon  the  argument  they  may 

§  106.  1  Bailey   v.   Birkcnheafi,   Lan-  nard,  21   Wall.  430,  437,  4o8.     See  also 

casliire  &  Cheshire   .Junction    Ry.    Co.,  s.  c.  1  Holmes,  386;    United   States   v. 

12  Beav.  433,  443;  Pacific  R.  K.  of  Mis-  Ames,  99  U.  S.  35,  45;  Cornell  v.  Green, 

souri   V.   Missouri   Pacific   Ry.    Co.,    Ill  43  Fed.  R.  105,  107  ;  Interstate  Land  Co. 

U.  S.  505,  522 ;  Boyer  v.  Boyer,  113  U.  S.  v.  Maxwell  Land  Co.,  139  U.  S.  569. 

689,  701.  ^  Coxe,  J.,  in  Bogart  r.  Hinds,  25  Fed- 

-  Sir  Page  Wood,  V.  C,  in  Simpson  r.  R.  484,  citing   Knott   v.  Burleson,  2   G. 

Fogo,  1  J.  &  H.  18,  23  ;  s.  c  6  Jurist  n.  s.  Greene  (Iowa),  600;    Wilder   v.   M'Cor- 

949.     See  Union  Pac  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mercer,  mick,  2  Blatehf.  31,35  ;  Grahamei-.  Cooke, 

28  Fed.  R.  9.        "  1   Cranch  C.  C.  116;  Douglass  v.  Rath- 

3  Mr.  Justice  Clifford  in  Amory  v.  bone,  5  Hill  (N.  Y.),  143  ;  Rantin  r.  Rob- 
Lawrence,  3  Clifford,  523,  536.  ertson,  2   Strobh.   Law    (S.   C),   .366;    1 

*  Sheldon  i'.  Keokuk  No.  Line  Packet  Chitty's  PI.  415,  410.  So  held  of  patents 
Co.,  8  Fed.  R.  769,  777 ;  Johnson  v.  and  reissued  patents  by  Coxe,  J.,  in  Inter- 
Powers,  13  Fed.  R.  315;  Jones  v.  Slaw-  national  Terra  Cotta  Lumber  Co.  v. 
son.  33  Fed.  R.  632,  636.  Maurer,  44  Fed.  R.  G18,  619. 

^  Mr.  Justice  Field  in  Dillon  v.  Bar- 

VOL.  I.  —  14 


210  DEMURRERS.  [CHAP.  VIII. 

be  disregarded.'^  Such,  for  example,  are  the  allegations  that  a 
tax  is  "  unreasonable  and  excessive,"  without  the  statement  of 
any  valid  reasons  for  so  considering  it ;  ^  that  a  fee  charged  by  an 
ordinance  styling  it  wharfage  "  is  not  real  wharfage,  but  a  duty  on 
tonnage."  ^  "  The  words  '  fraud '  and  '  conspiracy  '  alone,  no  mat- 
ter how  often  repeated  in  a  pleading,  cannot  make  a  case  for  the 
interference  of  a  court  of  equity.  Until  connected  w^ith  some 
specific  acts  for  which  one  person  is  in  law  responsible  to  another 
they  have  no  more  effect  than  other  words  of  unpleasant  signifi- 
cation." ^'^  The  words  "  fraudulently,"  "  deceitfully,"  and  "  by 
mistake"  are  conclusions  of  law,  and  will  be  disregarded.^^  Ave)-- 
ments  that  w^hat  was  done  was  "  colorable,"  "  a  fraud,"  "  a  breach 
of  trust,"  and  "  a  scheme  by  which  Blair  and  Taylor  were  to  get" 
certain  stock  or  shares  of  stock  in  a  corporation  "  without  paying 
for  them,"  are  allegations  of  conclusions  of  law,  w^hich  a  demurrer 
does  not  adniit.^-  An  averment  that  a  thing  was  done  with  the 
intent  to  defraud  is  an  allegation  of  fact.^^  A  demurrer  does  not 
admit  a  false  allegation  concerning  a  fact  of  which  the  court  will 
take  judicial  notice.^*  An  allegation  as  to  the  future  effect  of  an 
act  threatened  by  the  defendant  will,  however,  be  admitted  by  a 
demurrcr.^^ 

§  107.  Demurrers  to  Parts  of  Bills.  —  A  demurrer  may  be  to  the 
wliole,  or  to  a  part  of  a  l)ill,^  or  to  both  the  whole  and  separate 
parts  of  a  bill.-  Separate  demurrers  may  be  filed  for  different 
causes  to  separate  parts  of  a  bill.'^  If  only  a  part  of  the  bill  be 
demurred  to,  the  demurrer  must  be  accompanied  by  a  plea  or  an- 
swer to  what  remains."^  The  defendant  may  demur  to  part,  plead 
to  part,  and  answer  as  to  the  residue.^     Such  a  mode  of  pleading 

^  Dillon    V.   Barnard,    21   Wall.   430;  i^  Fog";  r.  Blair,  139  U.  S.  118,  127. 

Wilson  V.  Gaines,  103  U.  S.  417;  Packet  "  Piatt  i'.  Mead,  9  Fed.  R.  91. 

Company  v.  Catiettsburg,  105  U.  S.  5o9 ;  i'*  Taylor   r.    Barclay,  2   Simons,  213. 

Transportation  Company  v.  Parkersbnrp,  Compare  Louisville  &  S'ashville  K.  R.  Co. 

107  U.  S.   691;    Louisville   &   Nashville  i-.  Palmes,  109  U.  S.  244,  252. 

R.  R.  Co.  V.  Palmes,  109  U.  S.  244.  ^^  St.   Louis  v.  Knapp  Company,  104 

s  Packet  Company  y.  Catiettsburg,  105  U.  S.  658. 

U.  S  559.  §  107.     1  Rule  .32. 

5  Transportation  Company  v.  Parkers-  -  International    Terra   Cotta  Lumber 

burg,  107  U.  S.  091.  Co.  v.  Marner,  44  Fed.  R.  021. 

i»  Chief  .lustice  Waite  in   Ambler  v.  ^  North  i;.  Karl  of  Strafford,  3  P.  Wms. 

Choteau,  107  U.  S.  .580,  591.     For  allega-  148;    Roberdeau   v.    Rous,   1    Atk.   544; 

tions  held  sufficient,  see  Pacific  R.  R.  of  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (5th  Am.  ed.)  584. 

Mo.  V.  Missouri  Pacific  Ry.  Co.,  Ill  U.  S.  *  See  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  442;  Daniell's 

50,-).  Ch.  Pr.  (5th  Am.  ed.)  583. 

11  Magniac  f.Thorapson,2Wall.  Jr  209.  ^  Rule  32. 


§  107.]  DEMURRERS   TO   PARTS   OF   BILLS.  211 

is  now,  however,  very  rare  ;  for  the  same  defenses  can  usually  be 
embraced  with  more  convenience  and  safety  in  an  answer.^  "  If 
a  demurrer  is  too  general,  that  is,  if  it  covers,  or  is  applied  to  the 
whole  bill,  when  it  is  good  to  a  part  only  ;  or  if  it  is  a  demurrer 
to  a  part  of  a  bill  only,  but  yet  is  not  good  to  the  full  extent 
which  it  covers,  but  is  so  to  a  part  only,  it  will  be  overruled ;  for 
it  is  a  general  rule  that  a  demurrer  (it  is  otherwise  as  to  a  plea) 
cannot  be  good  as  to  a  part  which  it  covers,  and  bad  as  to  the 
rest,  and  therefore  it  must  stand  or  fall  altogether." '  The  court 
may,  however,  allow  the  defendant  to  amend  his  demurrer  upon 
narrowing  its  terms.^  It  has  been  held  at  circuit  that  an  objec- 
tion to  an  immaterial  allegation  in  a  bill  should  be  taken  by  ex- 
ception and  not  by  demurrer.^  The  equity  rules,  changing  the 
former  practice,  now  provide  that  "  no  demurrer  or  plea  shall  be 
overruled  ujjon  argument,  only  because  such  demurrer  or  plea  shall 
not  cover  so  much  of  the  bill  as  it  might  by  law  have  extended  to."  '^^- 
Formerly,  when  a  defendant  filed  a  plea  or  answer  to  the  same 
part  of  a  bill  as  he  demurred  to,  he  was  held  to  have  waived 
his  demurrer,  which  would  be  overruled  by  the  court."  But  a 
demurrer  by  one  defendant  was  not  overruled  by  a  plea  or  answer 
filed  by  another. ^^  Now,  however,  the  rules  declare  that  "  no  de- 
murrer or  plea  shall  be  held  bad,  and  overruled  upon  argument, 
only  because  the  answer  of  the  defendant  may  extend  to  some 
part  of  the  same  matter  as  may  be  covered  by  the  demurrer  or 
plea."  1^  It  has  been  held,  under  this  rule,  that  a  demurrer  to  the 
whole  bill  is  not  overruled  by  a  plea  or  answer :  ^*  but  the  defend- 
ant may  be  compelled  upon  motion  to  elect  between  such  a  de- 

6  Rule  no.  "  Kule  36,  which  follows  the  36th  Order 

■^  Story's   Eq.    PI.    §  443;  Metcalf  v.  in  Ciiancery  of  August,  1841.     See,  how - 

Hervey,  1    Ves.  Sen.   248  ;  Verplank   v.  ever,  Dell  v.  Hale,  2  Y.  &  C.  N.  R.    1  ; 

Caines,    1  J.   Ch.    (N.    Y.)    57;    Higin-  Atwiil  r.  Ferrett,   2  Blatchf.   39;    Heath 

botham  v.  Burnet,  5  J.  Ch.    (N.  Y.)   184  ;  v-  Erie  Ry.  Co.,  8  Blatchf.  347  ;  Brandon 

AtwilU'.  Ferrett,  2  Blatchf.  39;  Brandon  Manuf.   Co.  v.  Prime,   14   Blatchf.   371; 

Manuf.   Co.   v.  Prime,    14  Blatchf.  371;  s.  c.  3  Bann.  &  A.  Pat.  Cas.  191  ;  Equitable 

s.  c.  3  Bann.  &  A.  Pat.  Cas.  191  ;  Heath  Life  Ass.  Soc.  ;-.  Patterson,  1  Fed.  R.  126. 

V.  Erie  Ry.  Co.,  8  Blatchf.  347;  Equitable  "  Story's   Eq.    PI.  §  443;    Dawson  v. 

Life  Ass.  Soc.  v.  Patterson,  1  Fed.  R.  126.  Sadler,  1  Sim.  &  S.  537,  542  ;  Langdell's 

8  Baker  v.  Mellish.  11  Ves   70;  Gregg  Eq.  PI.  §  103. 

V.   Legh,  4   Madd.   192,   207  ;   Atwill  v.  i-  Dakin  v.  Union  Pacific  Ry.  Co.,   5 

Ferrett,  2  Blatchf.  39,  49  ;  Northern  Pac.  Fed.  R.  66.5. 

R.  Co.  V.  Roberts,  42  Fed.  R.  734.  i'^  Rule  37. 

3  Stonemetz  P.  U.  Co.  v.  Brown  F.  M.  "  Hayes  v.  Dayton,  8  Fed.  R.  702,  706. 

Co.  4f)   Fed.  R.  72 ;    Stirrat  v.  Excelsior  Contra,   Crescent  City  Live  Stock  Co.  v. 

Manuf.  Co.,  44  Fed.  R.  142.  Butchers'  Union  Live  Stock  Co.,  12  Fed. 


212  DEMURRERS.  [CHAP.  VIIL 

miirrer  and  the  answer  or  plea;^^  and  if  he  elect  to  stand  by  his 
demurrer,  it  seems  that  he  will  thereby  waive  his  right  to  answer 
should  his  demurrer  be  overruled.!'^  By  proceeding  to  an  argu- 
ment of  the  demurrer,  an  objection  of  this  nature  will  be  waived.^" 
The  English  courts  have  held,  that  a  defendant  cannot  answer  to 
the  relief  of  a  bill  and  demur  to  the  discovery,  unless  he  can  rest 
his  demurrer  upon  one  of  the  recognized  grounds  on  account  of 
which  a  witness  is  always  excused  from  answering.^^  A  demurrer 
which  is  good  as  to  the  relief  will  also  bar  the  discovery  ;  although 
if  the  bill  be  good  for  discovery  but  not  for  relief,  the  defendant 
does  not  prejudice  a  demurrer  filed  by  him  to  the  relief  by  ansvrer- 
ing  as  to  the  discovery. ^^  A  demurrer  which  is  good  as  to  the 
discovery  need  not  be  good  as  to  the  relief.^*^ 

§  108.  Classification  of  Demurrers  to  the  Relief.  —  Demurrers  to 
the  relief  claim  that  for  some  reason  apparent  upon  the  face  of 
the  bill  the  plaintiff  is  not  entitled  to  the  relief  prayed  for  in  it. 
They  are  classified  by  Mitford,  afterwards  Lord  Redesdale,  sub- 
stantially as  follows.^  Demurrers  to  the  relief  are  founded  on 
objections  to  the  jurisdiction;  to  the  person  ;  or  to  the  matter  of 
the  bill,  either  in  substance  or  in  form.  Demurrers  to  the  juris- 
diction are  allowed  either  (1)  because  the  subject  of  the  suit  is 
not  within  the  jurisdiction  of  a  court  of  equity  ;  or  (2)  because 
some  other  court  of  equity  has  the  proper  jurisdiction.  A  de- 
murrer of  this  last  class  is  much  more  frequent  now  than  form- 
erly. For  the  rule,  that  in  a  superior  court  of  general  jurisdiction 
the  presumption  is  that  nothing  shall  be  intended  out  of  its  juris- 
diction that  is  not  shown  or  intended  to  be  so,^  does  not  apply  to 
the  courts  of  the  United  States,  whose  jurisdiction  is  confined  to 
what  is  expressly  given  them  by  the  Constitution  and  statutes ; 

R.  22-5;  Adams  v.  Howard,  21  Off.  G.iz.  60-5;   Lanfrdell's  Eq.  PI.  §  10.3;  Story's 

2G4;  s.  c.  fl  Fed.  R.  347.  Eq.  PI.  §  312:  Kiiles  30,  37;    Jeffreys  v. 

1^  Adams  v.  Howard,  21  Off.  Gaz.  264  ;  Baldwin,  Amb.  104  ;  Hodgkin  v.  Loniiden, 

s.  c.  9  Fed.  R.  347.     See  United  States  y.  8  Ves.    2;    Todd   v.    Gee,    17  Ves.    273; 

Am.  Bell  Telephone  Co.,  30  Fed.  R.  523.  French  v.  Hay,  22  Wall.  250. 

i«  Adams  V.  Howard,  21  Off.  Gaz.  204;  2J  Atwill  r' Ferrett,  2  Blatdif.   30,  43; 

s.  c.  9  Fed.   K.  .347;    Orendorf  v.  Bud-  Heath  u.  Erie  Ry.   Co.,  8   Blatchf.  348; 

long,  12  Fed.  R.  24.           .  Farmer  v.  Calvert  Lith.  Co.,   1  Flippin, 

"  Hayes  i\  Dayton,  8  Fed.  R.  702,  700.  228. 

i»  Dell  V.   Hale,  2   Y.  &  C.  N.   R.   1  ;  §  108.     i  Mitford's  PI.  cli.  11,  §2. 

Brownsword   v.    Edwards.    2    Ves.    Sen.  '^  Daniell's  Cli.   Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  615 ; 

243  ;  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  005-  Earl  of  Derby  v.  Duke  of  Athol,  1  Ves. 

607.  Sen.  203. 

19  Danicll  Ch.  Pr.    (2d  Am.   ed.)  004, 


§108.]^      CLASSIFICATION    OF   DEMURRERS   TO   THE   RELIEF.  213 

and  must  always  appear  upon  the  record.^  It  has  been  held  that 
the  objection  that  one  of  two  plaintiffs  suing  to  enforce  a  common, 
not  a  joint  right,  is  a  citizen  of  the  same  State  as  a  defendant, 
cannot  be  raised  by  a  demurrer  to  the  whole  bill*  Causes  of 
demurrer  to  the  person  are,  that  it  appears  upon  the  face  of  the 
bill  tliat  the  plaintiff  has  not  the  legal  capacity  to  sue,  —  either 
at  all,  as  an  alien  enemy,  or  an  unincorporated  association  suing 
as  a  corporation ;  or  alone,  as  an  infant,  idiot,  lunatic,  and  in 
some  States  a  married  woman.^  Demurrers  to  the  substance  of 
a  bill  are  that  it  appears  upon  the  face  of  the  bill :  (1)  That  the 
plaintiff  has  no  interest  in  the  subject-matter  of  the  bill.  It  has 
been  held  that  the  objection  that  one  of  two  plaintiffs  has  no 
interest  in  the  subject-matter  can  be  raised  by  a  general  demurrer 
for  want  of  equity.^  (2)  That  the  defendant  is  not  answerable  to 
him,  but  to  some  other  person.  (3)  That  the  defendant  has  no 
interest  in  the  subject-matter  of  the  suit.  (4)  That  the  plaintiff 
is  not  entitled  to  the  relief  he  prays  ;  but  if  the  bill  show  a  case 
for  some  relief,  and  yet  ask  for  too  much  or  the  wrong  relief,  it  is 
not  demurrable,  provided  it  contain  the  prayer  for  general  relief.'^ 
(5)  That  tlie  value  of  the  subject-matter  is  beneath  the  dignity 
of  the  court.  In  England  the  Court  of  Chancery  declined  to  in- 
terfere when  the  value  of  the  matter  in  dispute  was  less  than  ten 
pounds,  except  in  suits  brought  by  or  on  behalf  of  charities,  under 
bills  to  obtain  relief  on  account  of  fraud,  or  to  establish  a  right.^ 
In  the  Circuit  Courts  of  the  United  States  the  bill  should  show 
affirmatively  that  the  matter  in  dispute  exceeds  two  thousand 
dollars,^  except  in  certain  cases  for  which  the  statutes  specially 
provide.^*'  (6)  That  the  bill  does  not  embrace  the  whole  matter 
concerning  which  the  suit  is  brought,  and  which  is  capable  of 
being  immediately  disposed  of,  so  that  there  is  danger  of  the 
defendant's  being  harassed  with  other  suits    about   the  same.^^ 

3  Turner  v.  Bank  of  North  America,  4  Whitbeck  v.  Edgar,  2  Barb.  Ch.  (N.  Y.) 

Dall.  8;  Godfrey  r.  Terry,  97  U.  S.  171.  106. 

*  Nebraska  City  National  Bank  r.  Ne-  ^  Daniell's  Cb.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)   ."78, 

braska  City  Hydraulic  Gas  Light  Co.,  14  379;  Brace  v.  Taylor  2  Atk.  253;  Moore 

Fed.  R.  763.     But  see  Hodge  v.  North  v.  Lyttle,  4  J.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  183. 

Missouri  R.  R.  Co..  1  Dill.  104.  9  United  States  i'.  Pratt  Coal  &  Coke 

5  See  Chapter  II.  Co.,  18  Fed.  R.  708  ;   24   St.  at   L.  ch. 

6  Ilodge  V.  North  Missouri  R.   R.,   1  873.     But  see  Sharon  v.  Terry,  36  Fed. 
Dillon,  104.     But  see  Nebraska  City  Na-  R.  337. 

tional  Bank  v.  Nebraska  City  Hydraulic         ^''  See  §§  15,  16. 

Gas  Light  Co.,  14  Fed.  R.  763.  n  Anon.,  2  Chancery  Cases,  164  ;  Pure- 

"  Patrick  v.  Isenhart,  20  Fed.  R.  339  ;     foy  v.  Purefoy,  1  Vern.  29  ;  Shuttleworth 


214  DEMUEREKS.  [CHAF.  VIII. 

(7)  That  there  is  a  want  of  proper  parties,  plaintiff  or  defendant.i^ 

(8)  That  there  is  a  misjoinder  ^^  of  parties  plaintiff.  A  super- 
fluity of  defendants,  not  accompanied  by  multifariousness,  is  the 
subject  of  objection  by  those  only  who  were  improperly  joined.^'* 

(9)  That  the  plaintiff's  remedy  is  barred  by  length  of  time  or 
laches.^^  When  a  bill  praying  an  injunction  to  restrain  the  in- 
fringement of  a  reissued  patent  sets  out  or  exhibits  both  the  origi- 
nal and  the  reissued  patent,  and  it  appears  from  inspection  that  the 
sole  object  of  the  reissue  was  to  enlarge  and  expand  the  claims  of 
the  original,  and  that  a  delay  of  two  or  three  years  has  taken  place 
in  applying  for  the  reissue,  not  explained  by  special  circumstances 
giving  sufficient  ground  for  the  delay,  the  question  of  laches  is  a 
question  of  law  arising  on  the  face  of  the  bill,  which  avails  as  a  de- 
fence, upon  a  general  demurrer  for  want  of  equity. ^^  If  it  a})pears 
by  the  face  of  the  bill  that  the  case  of  the  complainant  is  barred  by 
the  statute  of  limitations,  it  is  demurrable.^'  A  demurrer  will  also 
be  sustained  where  the  bill  shows  that  the  plaintiff's  case  is  repug- 
nant to  the  statute  of  frauds.^^  (10)  That  the  bill  is  multifari- 
ous.^^ It  has  been  held  that  only  such  defendants  as  would  suffer 
by  the  multifariousness  can  raise  this  objection.^*^  Or  (11)  that 
there  is  another  suit  pending  between  the  parties  for  the  same 
cause  of  action.  Demurrers  for  insufficiency  as  to  form  are 
either  :  (1)  That  the  plaintiff's  place  of  abode  is  not  stated ;  or 
that  a  compliance  has  not  been  made  with  any  of  the  other  requi- 
sites of  Rule  20.21     (2)  That  the  facts  essential  to  the  plaintiff's 

I'.  Laycock,  1  Vern.  215;  Margrave  v.  Le  ^^'  WoUensak  v.  Reilier,  115  U.  S.   96, 

Hooke,  2  Vern.  207.  101. 

12  Dwight  i;.  Central  Vt.  R.   11.  Co.,  9  i'  Godden  i-.   Kimniell,  99  U.  S.  201  ; 

Fed.  R.  785.  National   Bank  v.  Carpenter,  101    U.    S. 

w  Walker  v.  Powers,   104  U.   S.  245;  567;    Wisner  y.  Barnet,  4  Wash.  631.  But 

Lansdale  v.  Smith,  106  U.  S.  391 ;  Taylor  see  Sullivan  r.  Portland  &  Kennebec  R. 

V.    Holiues,    14    Fed.  R.  498;  Markey  v.  R.  Co.,   94  U.  S.   806,811;  Doe  r.  Hyde, 

Mutual  Benefit  Life  Ins.  Co.,  6  Ins.  L.  J.  114  U.  S.  247  ;  Philippi   v.  Piiilippe,  115 

537;  WoUensak  v.  Reiher,  115  U.   S  96.  U.  S.  151. 

"  Cherreyr.  Monro,  2  Barb.  Ch.(N.Y.)  i«  Randall   v.    Howard,  2   Black,  585, 

618;  Toulmin  v.  Hamilton,7  Ala.  362.    But  589.  But  see  Chapman  v.  School  District, 

see  Bank);.Carr()llt<)n  H.  R.,11  Wall.  624.  1  Deady,  108. 

15  Maxwell  v.   Kennedy,  8  How.  210;  w  See  §§  71-75. 

Badgerr.  Badger,  2  Wall.  87,94  ;  Marsli  v.  2)  Atwill  v.  Ferrctt,  2  Blatchf.  39,  44  , 

Whitmore,  21  Wall.  185  ;  Sullivan  v.  Port-  Buerk  ;:  Imhaeuser,  8  Fed.  R.  457  ;  Hill 

land  &  K.  Railroad  Company,  94  U.   S.  i'    Bonaffon,  2  Weekly   Notes   of    Cases 

806;    Brown  r.  County  of  Buena  Vista,  (Pa  ),  356. 

95    U.    S.  161;  Godden   v.    Kimmell,   99  -'  Mitford's   PI.  ch.  2,  §  2;  Rowley  v. 

U.  S.  201 ;  National  Bank  v.   Carpenter,  Eccles,  1  Sim.  &  S.  511. 
101  U.  S.  567. 


§  109.]  DEMURRERS   TO   THE   DISCOVERY.  215 

right  aud  within  his  own  knowledge  are  not  alleged  positively .22 
(3)  That  the  bill  is  deficient  in  certainty .-^  (4)  That  the  plain- 
tiff does  not  in  his  bill  offer  to  do  equity,  when  it  is  the  custom 
of  the  court  to  require  him  to  do  so.^*  (5)  That  the  bill  is  not 
signed  by  counsel.^^  (6)  That  the  bill  is  not  supported  by  an 
allidavit  when  one  is  necessary .^^  A  demurrer  to  the  relief  will 
not  lie  upon  the  ground  that  the  bill  contains  irrelevant  matter. 
The  proper  remedy  for  this  is  an  exception  for  impertinence.-" 
Neither  is  a  bill  demurrable  because  indispensable  parties,  whom 
it  names  and  against  whom  it  prays  process,  have  not  been  served 
with  subpoenas  to  appear  and  answer.^^  If  any  part  of  the  relief 
prayed  is  proper  the  demurrer  will  be  overruled.^^ 

§  109.  Demurrers  to  the  Discovery.  —  A  demurrer  to  the  dis- 
covery claims  that,  for  some  reason  apparent  upon  the  face  of 
the  bill,  the  defendant  should  not  be  obliged  to  answer  so  much 
thereof  as  his  demurrer  covers.  Professor  Langdell  says  :  "A  de- 
murrer to  discovery  indeed  is  not  in  its  nature  a  demurrer  at  all, 
but  a  mere  statement  in  writing  that  the  defendant  refuses  to 
answer  certain  allegations  in  the  bill,  for  reasons  which  appear 
upon  the  face  of  the  bill,  and  which  the  demurrer  points  out."  ^ 
A  defendant  may  thus  demur  because  (1)  his  answer  may  sub- 
ject him  to  a  pain,  penalty,  or  forfeiture  ;2  (2)  that  it  is  imma- 
terial to  the  purposes  of  the  suit ;  ^  (3)  that  it  would  involve  a 
breach  of  some  confidence  which  it  is  the  policy  of  the  law  to 
preserve  inviolate,*  as  a  professional  confidence,^  or  one  obtained 
in  the  course  of  a  public  office  ;  ^  (4)  that  the  matters  of  which 

22  MitfortVs  PI.  ch.2,  §  2;  Daniell's  Ch.  ~  Stewart  v.  Drasha,  4  M'Lean,  563; 

I'r.  412,  625.  Atwill  y.  Ferrett,  2  Blatclif.  39;  United 

2^  Taylor  V.   Holmes,  14  Fed.  R.  498 ;  States  i-.  White,   17   Fed.   R.   561,  565; 

Gold.smith  v.  Gilliland,  22  Fed.  R.  865.  Paxton  v.  Douglas,  19  Ves.  225;  Story's 

21  United  States  v.  Pratt  Coal  &  Coke  Eq.  PI.  §§  575-599. 
Co  ,  18  Fed.  R.  708.     See  §  82.  3  Harvey  v.  Morris,  Rep.  temp.  Fincli, 

•■^^  Rule  24;  Dwight  v.  Humphreys,  3  214;  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed  )  636, 

M'Lean,  104.  687.    But  see  Pacific  Railroad  of  Missouri 

2'3  Findlay  v.  Hinde,  1  Pet.  241,  244.  v.  Missouri  Pacific  Railway  Co.,  HI  U.  S. 

2T  Pacific  Railroad  of  Missouri  v.  Mis-  505,  522. 
souri  Pacific  Railway  Co.,  Ill  U.  S   505,  *  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  547. 

522  ;  Rule  26.  ^  Greenough  v.  Gaskell,  1  Myl.  &  K. 

28  Kilgour  r.  New  Orleans  Gas  Light  100  ;  Story's  Eq.  Pi.  §  547,  and  cases 
Co.,  2  Woods,  145.  cited. 

29  Chicago  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  c  Smith  v.  East  India  Co.,  1  Phillips. 
Hartshorn,  30  Fed.  R.  541;  Town  of  50;  Attorney-General  i;.  London,  12  Beav. 
Strawberry  Hill  v.  Chicago  M.  &  St.  P.  8 ;  Worthington  v.  Scribner,  109  Mass. 
Ry  Co.,  41  Fed.  R.  568  487,  493. 

§  109.     1  Langdell's  Eq.  Pi.  §  97. 


216  DEMURRERS.  [CHAP.  VIII. 

a  discovery  is  sought  pertain  exclusively  to  the  defendant's  case;'^ 
(5)  according  to  the  old  rule,  because  the  defendant  has,  "  in  con- 
science, a  right  equal  to  that  claimed  by  a  person  filing  a  bill 
against  him,  though  not  clothed  with  a  perfect  legal  title,"  ^  as, 
if  he  be  a  purchaser  in  good  faith,  and  for  a  valuable  consid- 
eration, without  any  notice  of  the  plaintiff's  claim.^  Where  the 
complainant  is  the  only  person  who  can  insist  upon  the  penalty 
or  forfeiture,  and  he  waives  it  in  his  bill,  he  may  compel  a  dis- 
covery.^^  In  certain  cases,  a  defendant  may  be  obliged  to  answer 
to  a  charge  of  a  fraud  which  migbt  subject  him  to  a  criminal 
prosecution.^^  An  Euglish  case  holds  that  a  discovery  can  be 
compelled  although  a  defendant  might  thereby  aduiit  his  guilt 
of  an  offeuce  against  the*  criminal  laws  of  a  foreign  country. ^^ 
Demurrers  to  the  discovery  are  now  rarely  filed.  For  the  objec- 
tions to  the  discovery  do  not  usually  appear  upon  the  face  of  a 
bill  ;  and  when  they  do,  it  seems  that,  since  the  equity  rules, 
they  can  now  in  all  cases  be  taken  by  answer.^^  A  demurrer  to 
an  interrogatory  that  has  been  already  answered  caunot  raise  the 
question  whether  the  answer  to  it  is  sufficient.^*  The  subject  of 
discovery  is  of  much  less  importance  now  than  formerly  ;  and 
the  curious  reader  is  therefore  referred  to  the  works  of  Wigram 
and  Hare  for  a  full  discussion  of  it. 

§  110  Of  what  Defects  Advantage  should  be  taken  by  De- 
murrer. —  Advantage  can  be  taken  of  most  defects  in  a  bill  by 
answer,  as  well  as  by  demurrer.  But  objections  to  defects  in 
the  form  of  a  bill,  except  possibly  those  which  are  required  by 
the  e(juity  rules,^  can  only  be  raised  by  demurrer.^  Such  is  an 
omissi(ni  to  allege  that  two  defendants  hif ringed  a  patent  jointly.^ 

7  Bolton  (.'.  Corporation  of  Liverpool,  Simons  n.  s.  .301.  See  also  United  States 
1  Myl  &  K.  88;  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  of  America  «.  McRae,  L.  R.  4  Eq.  327; 
Am.  ed.)  645-018.  s  c.  on  appeal,  L.  R.  3  Ch.  App.  79. 

8  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  035,  ^^  gee  Rules  .30,  44. 

636.  "  Chicago,   St.  Louis  &  New  Orleans 

9  Jerrard  v.  Saunders,  2  Ves.  ,Tr    4.54  ;  R.  R  Co.  v  Macomb,  2  Fed.  R.  18. 
Gle<rg  y.  Legh,  4  Madd.   103;  Langdell's  §  110.     ^  See  National  Bank  y   Insur- 
Eq   PI.  §  188.  ance  Company,  104  U.  S.  54,  70. 

'"  Mason  v.  Lake,  2   Brown,  P   C.  495;  -  Daniell's  Ch.    Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  453; 

Lord  Uxbridge  V.  Staveland,  1  Ves.  Sen.  Story's    Eq.   PI.   §§  4-53,   528;    Hook    v. 

66  .  Atwill  ,!.  Eerrett,  3  Blatchf.  .3!).  Dorman,  1  Sim.  &  S  227  ;  Crosse  r.  Bed- 

11  Dummer  v.  Corporation  of  Chippen-  ingfield,  12  Simons,  35;  Findlay  r.  Hinde, 

ham,  14  Ves.  245,  251;  Story's  Eq.   PI.  1   Pet.  244;  Fischer  v.  O'Shaughnessey, 

§  .578;    Daniell's   Ch.  Pr.    (2d   Am.   ed.)  6  Fed.  R.  92. 

631,  082.  «  Fischer  r.  O'Shaughneissey,  0  Fed.  R. 

'-  King   of  Two  Sicilies  v.  Willco.x,  1  92,  Putnam  v.  Hollander,  0  Fed.  R.  882. 


§  113.]  PROTESTATION.  217 

If  the  want  of  equity  of  the  plaintiff's  case  be  clearly  apparent 
upon  the  face  of  the  bill,  an  omission  to  demur  may  be  a  gronnd 
for  refusing  the  defendant  costs  at  the  hearing.*  The  oV)jection 
that  the  plaintiff  has  an  adequate  remedy  at  law  should  be  spe- 
cifically raised  in  a  demurrer,  plea,  or  answer,^  although  the 
court  may  for  its  own  protection  dismiss  a  bill  for  this  at  any 
stage  of  the  proceedings.^ 

§111.  When  a  Demurrer  should  be  Filed.  —  "It  shall  be  the 
duty  of  the  defendant,  unless  his  time  shall  be  otherwise  en- 
larged, for  cause  shown  by  a  judge  of  the  court  upon  motion 
for  that  purpose,  to  file  his  plea,  demurrer,  or  answer  to  the 
bill  in  the  clerk's  office  on  the  rule-day  next  succeeding  that  of 
entering  his  appearance.  In  default  thereof,  the  plaintiff  may 
at  his  election  enter  an  order  (as  of  course)  in  the  order-book 
that  the  bill  be  taken  pro  eonfesso ;  and  thereupon  the  cause 
shall  be  proceeded  in  ex  ijcirte,  and  the  matter  of  the  bill  may 
be  decreed  by  the  court  at  any  time  after  the  expiration  of  thirty 
days  from  and  after  the  entry  of  said  order,  if  the  same  can  be 
done  without  an  answer  and  is  proper  to  be  decreed."  ^  The  de- 
murrer may  be  filed,  even  after  the  rule-day,  at  any  time  before 
an  order  has  been  entered  directing  that  the  bill  be  taken  2^ro 
confesso^  or  after  such  an  order  by  leave  of  the  court.'^ 

§  112.  Title  of  Demurrer.  —  A  demurrer  is  usually  entitled  sub- 
stantially thus  :  "  The  demurrer  of  John  Stiles  to  the  bill  of  com- 
plaint of  Richard  Roe."  ^  If  accompanied  by  a  plea  or  answer, 
or  both,  it  should  be  called  in  the  title  "  the  demurrer  and  plea," 
or  "  the  demurrer  and  answer,"  or  "  the  demurrer,  plea,  and  an- 
swer." -  When  it  is  to  an  amended  bill,  it  need  not  be  expressed 
in  the  title  to  be  a  demurrer  to  both  the  original  and  the  amended 
bill  ;  but  if  designated  as  a  demurrer  to  the  amended  bill,  that 
will  be  sufficient.^ 

§  113.  Protestation.  —  After  the  title  formerly  followed  the 
clause,  "This  defendant,  by  protestation,  not  confessing  all  or 

^  Harland  v.  Bankers'  &  M.  Tel.  Co.,  32  §  111.  i  Rule  18. 

Fed.  R.  :30.'j.  -  Rule  32 ;  Oliver  v.  Decatur,  4  Cranch 

5  Rcynes  r.    Dumont,  1.30   U.   S.   .154;  0.0.458. 
Kilbnrn  v.  Suuderlanil,   i:;0   U.   S.  505  ;  «  Rule  32. 

Brown  r    Lake  Superior   Iron   Co.,  134  §  112.  i  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2a  Am.  ed.) 

U.  S  580.  652. 

6  Lewis  V.  Cockes,  23  Wall.  46G  ;  Oel-  2  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.(2d  Am.  ed.)(;52, 65.3. 
richs  V.  Spain,  15  Wall.  211  ;  Reynes  v.  ^  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  653; 
Dumont,  130  U.  S.  354,  395.  Smith  r.  Bryon,  3  Madd.  428. 


218  DEMUKEERS.  [CHAP.  VIII. 

any  of  the  matters  and  things  in  the  said  complainant's  bill 
contained  to  be  true  in  such  manner  and  form  as  the  same 
are  therein  set  forth  and  alleged."  ^  This  was  a  practice  bor- 
rowed from  the  common  law,  and  was  probably  intended  to 
avoid  conclusion  in  another  suit ;  ^  but  it  is  a  needless  form,^ 
and  may  well  be  omitted. 

§  114.  statement  of  the  Extent  of  the  Demurrer,  —  If  a  demurrer 
be  not  to  the  whole  bill,  it  must  clearly  express  those  parts  which 
it  is  designed  to  cover.^  "  And  this  must  be  done  not  by  way  of 
exception,  as  by  demurring  to  all  except  certain  parts  of  the  bill, 
but  by  a  positive  definition  of  the  parts  to  which  the  defendant 
seeks  to  avoid  making  any  answer."  ^  A  special  demurrer  should 
point  out  specifically  by  paragraph,  page,  or  folio,  or  in  some 
other  distinct  form  of  reference,  the  parts  of  the  bill  to  which 
it  is  intended  to  apply.^  When  the  bill  was  long,  a  special  de- 
murrer "  to  so  much  of  the  bill  as  seeks  "  certain  relief,  without 
further  specifying  the  part  demurred  to,  has  been  held  bad.*  A 
demurrer  may,  however,  be  expressed  as  to  the  whole  bill  except 
to  a  specified  part.^ 

§  115.  statement  of  Causes  of  Demurrer.  —  By  the  English 
practice  a  demurrer  was  required  to  contain  a  statement  of  its 
causes,  otherwise  it  would  be  overruled.^  It  is  the  safer  practice 
for  the  pleader  to  comply  with  this.  It  was,  however,  said  in  a 
recent  case  :  "  The  formal  statement  of  causes  of  a  demurrer, 
though  usual,  is  not  necessary.  The  assertion  of  a  general  de- 
murrer is  that  the  plaintiff  has  not,  on  his  own  showing,  made 
out  a  case.  If  the  causes  of  demurrer  are  not  formally  set  forth 
the  plaintiff  may  object,  and  require  them  to  be  thus  stated."  ^ 


§  113.    1  Story's  Eq.  §  455,  n.  .3.  3  Atwill  v.  Ferrett,  2  Blatolif.  .30;  Clii- 

-  Mitford's   PI.  cli.   2,   §  2 ;    Taylor  v.  cago,  St.  Louis,  &  N.  O.  K.  R.  Co.  v.  Ma- 

Holme.s,  14  Fed.  R.  498.  comb,  2  Fed.  R   18. 

8  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  452.  4  Atwill  r.  Ferrett,  2  Blntchf.  .39. 

§  114.  1  Devonsher  v.  Neweiihani,  2  *  Hicks  v.  Raincock,  1  Cox,  40 ;  Howe 
Sch.  &  Lef.  199;  Chetwynd  v.  Lindon,  2  v.  Duppa,  1  Ves.  &  B.  511 ;  Daniell's  Ch. 
Ves.  Sen.  450;  Saikeld  v.  Science,  2  Ves.  Pr.  (2<]  Am.  ed.)  0.54. 
Sen.  107;  Atwill  v.  Ferrett,  2  Blatchf.  §  115.1  Langdell's  Eq.  PI.  §90;  San- 
aa ;  Ciiicago,  St.  L.  &  N.  O.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  ders'  Orders,  180,228  ;  Duffield  v.  Greaves, 
Maooml),  2  Fed.  R.  18;  Daniell's  Ch.  Gary,  125;  Offeley  r.  Morgan,  Cary,  153  ; 
Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  653,654;  Story's  Eq.  PI.  Peaeliie  v.  Twyecrosse,  Cary,  113;  Dan- 
§§  457,  458.  iell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  055. 

'^  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  457;   Robinson  v.  -  Taylor  ?•.  Holmes,  14  Fed.   R.   498, 

Thompson,  2  Ves.  &  B.  118  ;  Devonsher  499  ;  per  Dick,  D.  J. 
V.  Ncwenham,  2  Sch.  &  Lef.  205. 


§  115.]  STATEMENT   OF   CAUSES   OF   DEMURRER.  219 

Demurrers  are  either  general  or  special.  They  are  general  when 
no  particular  cause  is  assigned  except  the  usual  formulary,  to 
comply  with  the  rules  of  the  court,  that  there  is  no  equity  in  the 
bill.^  Such  a  one  is  called  a  demurrer  for  want  of  equity.  They 
are  special  when  the  particular  defects  or  objections  are  pointed 
out.  The  former  will  be  sufficient,  although  special  causes  are 
usually  stated,  when  the  bill  is  defective  in  substance.  The  lat- 
ter is  indispensable  when  the  objection  is  to  the  defects  of  the 
bill  in  point  of  form.^  But  under  a  general  demurrer  a  defend- 
ant may  take  advantage  of  a  few  objections  which  appear  to  be 
as  to  nuxtters  of  form.  Thus,  under  a  demurrer  for  want  of 
equity,  the  objection  that  a  necessary  affidavit  is  wanting,  or  that 
the  ])laintiff  has  not  offered  to  do  equity  when  that  is  required, 
may  be  raised.^  So,  may  a  lack  of  sufficient  positiveness  in  the 
statement  of  facts  in  the  bill,^  and  a  misjoinder  of  plaintiffs  by 
the  addition  of  one  with  no  interest  in  the  subject  of  the  bill." 
But  it  has  been  held  that  a  general  demurrer  for  want  of  equity 
will  not  cover  an  objection  to  the  discovery  only.  That,  it  was 
said,  must  be  made  the  subject  of  a  special  demurrer.^  A  de- 
fendant may,  however,  in  cases  where  he  demurs  to  the  substance 
of  the  bill,  in  which  term  is  included  an  apparent  defect  of  juris- 
diction, state  specially  the  different  grounds  upon  which  he 
founds  his  objection;^  and,  indeed,  some  of  these  grounds  of 
demurrer  seem  to  require  a  more  particular  statement.  Thus, 
a  demurrer  for  want  of  parties  should  show  who  are  the  neces- 
sary parties  that  have  been  omitted,  not  necessarily  by  name, 
but  in  such  a  manner  as  to  point  out  to  the  plaintiff  the  objec- 
tions to  his  bill,  so  that  he  may  amend  by  adding  the  proper 
parties.^o  But  it  has  been  said  that  this  rule  does  not  apply 
where  it  appears  from  the  face  of  the  bill  that  the  plaintiff  has 
sufficient  information  as  to  the  names,  interests,  and  residences 

3  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §455;  Langdell's  Eq.  »  Wliittinjrliam   v.  Burgoyiie,    3  Anst. 

PI.  §  95.  900;  DaiiioU's  Cli.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  656. 

*  Story's    Eq.    PI.    5    455.       See    also  "  See,    for  example,  the  statement  of 

Beames'  Orders   in    Clianoery,    77,   173;  causes  for  the  demurrer  in  Pacific  Rail- 

Mitford's   PI.  ch.  2,   §  2 ;    Daniell's   Ch.  road  of  Missouri  v.  Missouri  Pacific  Ry. 

Pr.  (2d  Am   ed.)  055.     But  see  Taylor  v.  Co.,  Ill  U.  S.  505,  514. 

Holmes,  14  Fed.  R  49S,  499.  i"  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  3:>3, 

6  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.   (2d  Am.  ed.)  655.  655;  Tourton  y.  Flower,  3  P.  Wms.  369; 

«  Daniell's  CIi.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  655.  Attorney-General    v.    Jackson,    11    Ves. 

T  Ilodtre  i».  North  Missouri  R.  R.  Co.,  369  ;  Dwight  y.  Central  Vermont  RR.Co., 

1  Dill.  104.  9  Fed.  R.  785 ;  Taylor  v.  Holmes,  14  Fed. 

R.  498,  499. 


220  DEMURRERS.  [CHAP.  VIII. 

of  the  proper  parties.^^  It  is  said  by  Mr.  Daniell  that  "  in  the 
case  of  a  demurrer  for  multifariousness,  a  mere  allegation  '  that 
the  bill  is  multifarious  '  will  be  informal ;  it  should  state,  as  the 
ground  of  demurrer,  that  the  bill  unites  distinct  matters  upon 
one  record,  and  show  the  inconvenience  of  so  doing."  ^^  But 
the  case  cited  by  him  does  not  seem  to  hold  that  the  more 
general  form  is  bad.^^  A  defendant  is  not  limited  to  show  one 
cause  of  demurrer  only  ;  he  may  assign  as  many  causes  of 
demurrer  as  he  pleases,  either  to  the  whole  bill  or  to  each  part 
demurred  to,  and  if  any  one  of  the  causes  of  demurrer  assigned 
hold  good  the  demurrer  will  be  allowed.!^  When,  however,  two 
or  more  causes  of  demurrer  ai-e  shown  to  the  whole  bill  the  court 
will  treat  it  as  one  demurrer ;  and  if  one  of  the  causes  be  con- 
sidered sufficient  the  order  will  be  drawn  up,  as  upon  a  complete 
allowance  of  the  demurrer.^^ 

§  116.  Demurrers  ore  tenus.  —  kx  the  hearing  other  causes  of 
demurrer  may  be  assigned  orally  ;  when  the  defendant  is  said  to 
demur  ore  tenun}  When  such  a  demurrer  only  is  sustained  and 
the  previously  assigned  causes  are  held  bad,  the  defendant  usu- 
ally recovers  no  costs,^  and  often  is  obliged  to  pay  costs. ^  But 
a  demurrer  ore  tenus  will,  it  has  been  said,  never  be  allowed, 
unless  there  is  a  dcmui-rer  on  record.*  Thus,  when  there  was 
a  plea  on  record,  and  that  was  disallowed,  a  demurrer  ore  tenus 
was  also  disallowed.^  A  demurrer  filed  to  a  part  cannot  at  the 
hearing  ore  tenus  be  extended  to  the  whole  of  the  bill  ;  and  such 
a  demurrer  is,  it  seems,  only  permitted  for  some  cause  which 
covers  the  whole  extent  of  the  demurrer  filed.^     It  is  doubtful 

11  Taylor  v.  Holmes,  14  Fed.  R.  498,  2  Xaylor   v.   Holmes,  14   Fed.  K.  498, 

499.       '  499;   VVright    v.    Dame,    1   Met.   (Mass.) 

1^  Daniell's  Cli.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  655.  2-37  ;  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  464  ;  DanicU'sCh. 

13  Rayner  *;.  .lulian,  2   Dit-kens,  677  ;  Pr.  G72.     But  see  Rule  .34. 

s.  c.  more  fully   reported,  5  Madd.   144,  ^  Langdell's  Eq.  PI.  §  95;  Story's  Eq. 

note.  PI-    §  404  ;  Attorney-General   v.  Brown, 

1'  IIarri.«on  v.  Hogsr,  2   Ves.  Jr.  323 ;  1  Swanst.  265,  at  page  268 ;  Mortimer  v. 

.Jones  (•   Frost,  3  Madd.  9;  s.c.  on  appeal.  Eraser,  2  Myl.  &  Cr.  173. 

1  Jacobs,  466.  *  Durdant    v.   Redman,    1    Vern.    78 ; 

1^  Wellesley  v.  Wellesley,  4  Myl.  &  Cr.  Hook  v.  Dorman,  1  Sim  &  S.  227  ;  Story's 

554;  Daniell's  Cli.  Pr.  (2d"^  Am.  ed.)  657.  Eq.  PI.  §  464  ;  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am. 

§  116.    1  Taylor  v.  Holmes,  14  Fed.  R.  ed.)  668. 

40S,    Brinkerii'oir   v.    Brown,    6    J.   Ch.  ^  Story's    Eq.  PI.    §  464;    Durdant  r. 

(N.  Y.)  149;    Daniell's  Ch.  Pr,  (2d  Am.  Redman.  1   Vern.  78;   Attorney-General 

ed.)657;  Langdell's  Eq.  PI.  §  95 ;  Story's  r.  Brown,  1  Swanst.  288;  Hook  r.  Dor- 

Eq.  PI.  §  464  ;  Tourton  v.  Flower,  3  P.  man,  1  Sim.  &  S.  227. 

Wms.  371.  "  Equitable  Life  Assurance  Society  v. 


§  119.]  MOTIONS   TO    TAKE    DEMURRERS    OFF   THE   FILE.  221 

whether  by  a  demurrer  ore   terms   advantage   can  be  taken  of 
defects  in  form." 

§  117.  Prayer  of  Judgment.  —  A  demurrer,  having  assigned  the 
cause  or  causes  of  its  interposition,  then  proceeds  to  demand 
judgment  of  the  court  whether  tlie  defendant  ouglit  to  be  com- 
pelled to  put  in  any  further  or  other  answer  to  the  bill,  or  to 
such  part  thereof  as  is  specified  as  the  subject  of  demurrer;  and 
concludes  with  a  prayer  that  the  defendant  be  dismissed,  or,  if 
to  a  part  only,  that  he  be  excused  from  answering  tliat  part, 
with  his  reasonable  costs  in  that  behalf  sustained.^  When  the 
demurrer  is  to  a  part  only  of  the  bill,  the  answer  or  plea  to  what 
remains  usually  follows  the  statement  of  the  causes  of  demurrer, 
and  the  submission  to  the  judgment  of  the  court  of  the  plain- 
tiff's right  to  call  upon  the  defendant  to  make  further  or  other 
answer.2 

§  118.  Certificate  of  Counsel.  —  Every  demurrer  must  be  accom- 
panied by  a  certificate  of  counsel,  that  in  his  opinion  it  is  well 
founded  in  point  of  law,  and  supported  by  the  afhdavit  of  the 
defendant ;  that  it  is  not  interposed  for  delay. ^  Otherwise,  it 
might  perhaps  be  disregarded  i^  though  the  proper  remedy  for 
this,  as  for  any  irregularity  in  form  or  in  filing,  would  be  to 
move  to  take  the  demurrer  off  the  file.^  But  it  seems  that  the 
demurrer  may  be  overruled  for  such  an  omission.*  Whether  a 
certificate  of  counsel  is  required  when  the  defendant  appears  in 
person,  has  not  yet  been  decided  in  the  Federal  courts.-'^ 

§  119.  Motions  to  take  Demurrers  off  the  File.  —  The  remedy  for 
an  irregularity  in  the  form  or  the  manner  of  filing  a  demuri'er, 
for  example,  if  there  be  an  error  in  its  title,  or  it  be  filed  too  late, 
is  by  a  motion  to  take  it  off  the  file.^  When  an  order  to  that 
effect  is  granted,  the  cause  stands  in  the  same  position  as  if  no 
demurrer  had   been  filed  ;    and   the   defendant   is    at   liberty  to 

Patterson,  1  Ferl.  R.  120  ;  Baker  v.  Mel-  «  See  §  119 ;  Daniell's  Cli.  Pr.  (2cl  Am. 

lisli,  11  Ves.  70,  at  page  76;  Story's  Eq.  ed.)   Gi;i-66.3;  Ewing  v.  Blight,  3  Wall. 

PI.  §  4fi4.     But  see  Crouch  v.  Hickin,  1  Jr.  134. 

Keen,  .385.  *  See  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  747  ;  1  Hoffman's 

■  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  443.  Cli.  Pr.  97. 

§  117.  1  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  5  Secor  v.  Singleton,  9  Fed.  R.  809  ; 

659.  s.  c.  3  McCrary,  230. 

'-'  Daniell's  Cli.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed  )  659.  §  119.     »  Ewlng  v.  Blight,  3  Wall.  Jr. 

§  118.     1  Rule  31.  134;  Curzon  v.  De  la  Zouch,  1  Swanst. 

-  National  Bank  v.  Insurance  Compa-  193;  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  6G1- 

ny,  104  U.  S.  64,  76.  603. 


222  DEMURRERS.  [CHAP.  VIII. 

demur  anew,  or  to  plead  or  answer,  as  he  may  be  advised.^  The 
order  that  a  demurrer  be  taken  off  the  file  may  allow  the  de- 
fendant to  file  the  same  paper  with  the  proper  additions  and 
corrections.^  The  application  should  be  for  an  order  "  to  take 
a  certain  paper  purporting  to  be  a  demurrer"  off  the  file.*  A 
demurrer  is  not  taken  off  the  file  by  the  mere  entry  of  an  order 
to  that  effect.  The  order  should  be  taken  to  the  clerk,  who  will 
withdraw  the  demurrer  by  annexing  the  order  to  it.^  By  setting 
the  demurrer  down  for  argument  or  taking  any  other  proceeding 
in  the  cause,  all  defects  of  form  except  the  omission  of  the  affida- 
vit and  certificate  of  counsel,^  and  any  irregularity  in  filing  it, 
would  ])robably  be  waived. 

§  120.  Setting  Demurrer  down  for  Argument.  —  If  the  plaintiff 
fail  to  set  down  any  plea  or  demurrer  for  argument  on  the  rule- 
day  when  the  same  is  filed,  or  on  the  next  succeeding  rule-day, 
he  is  deemed  to  admit  the  sufficiency  thereof,  and  his  bill  is 
dismissed  as  of  course,  unless  a  judge  of  the  court  allows  him 
further  time  for  the  purpose.^  The  defendant  filing  the  demurrer 
is  the  only  party  that  can  have  the  bill  dismissed  upon  this  ac- 
count.^ The  former  English  practice  in  setting  a  demurrer  down 
for  argument  was  for  the  plaintiff  to  obtain  an  order  ex  parte^ 
upon  petition  for  that  purpose ;  and  to  serve  the  same  upon  the 
defendant's  solicitor  at  least  two  days  before  the  hearing.^  In 
the  different  circuits  of  the  United  States  the  matter  is  usually 
regulated  by  local  rule  or  custom.'*  It  has  been  held,  that  a  de- 
murrer to  a  bill  seeking  an  injunction  must  be  decided,  before  a 
motion  for  an  injunction  noticed  after  the  filing  of  the  demurrer 
can  be  heard,^  and  before  action  is  taken  upon  a  ])lea  subsequently 
or  contemporaneously  filed  ;  ^  and  that  while  a  demurrer  is  pend- 
ing undecided,  the  allegations  of  the  bill  must  for  the  purposes  of 
a  motion  be  deemed  admitted." 

§  121.    Argument  of  Demurrer.  —  When  a  demurrer  was  called 

2  Ciist  V.  Bnode,  1  Sim.  &  S.  21  ;  Dan-  §  120.     i  "Rule  38. 

iell's  Oil.  Pr.  tl6.3.  2  ciiicairo  &  Alton  U.  K.  Co.  v.  Union 

3  Bailey  Washing  Madiine  Company     Eolling  Mill  Co.,  109  U.  S.  702,  717. 

V.  Young,  12  IJlatoliif.  199.  3  DanicU's  Ch.  Pr.  (2(1  Am.  ed.)  665, 

*  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2cl  Am.  ed.)  732.  6G6. 

5  Cust  »;.  Boode,  1  Sim.  &S.  21;  Dan-  *  See  Gordon  )'.   St.  Paul   Harvester 

iell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  60.3.  Works,  23  Fed.  H.  147. 

•5  National  Bank  r.   Insurance  Compa-  *  Ketchum  v.  Driggs,  6  :\IcLoan,  1.3. 

ny,  101  U.  S.  .54,  70;  Secor  v.  Singleton,         «  Campbell  i-.  Mayor,  33  Fcil.  R.  795. 
9  Fed.  R.  809.  '   Bayerque  v.  Cohen,  M'Allister,  113. 


§  122.]  OVERRULING  A   DEMURRER.  223 

on  for  hearing  and  the  defendant  failed  to  appear,  in  the  English 
j)ractice  the  demurrer  was  struck  out  of  the  paper,  unless  the 
plaintiff  had  set  down  the  demurrer,  and  could  produce  an  affi- 
davit of  service  upon  the  defendant  or  his  solicitor  of  the  order  to 
set  it  down.  If  the  plaintiff  could  produce  such  an  affidavit,  the 
demurrer  was  not  necessarily  overruled ;  but  he  had  to  be  heard 
in  support  of  the  bill,  the  affidavit  of  service  not  authorizing  the 
court,  in  the  absence  of  the  defendant,  to  overrule  the  demurrer, 
but  to  hear  the  plaintiff.^  When  the  defendant  appeared  and 
the  plaintiff  did  not,  the  demurrer  was  also  struck  out  of  the 
paper,  unless  the  defendant  could  produce  an  affidavit  of  service 
upon  himself  of  the  order  setting  down  the  demurrer ;  or  unless, 
in  the  event  of  the  defendant  having  himself  set  down  the  de- 
murrer, he  could  produce  an  affidavit  of  service  upon  the  plaintiff 
or  his  solicitor.  On  the  production  of  such  an  affidavit  in  either 
case,  the  defendant  might  have  the  demurrer  allowed  with  costs.^ 
Where  a  demurrer  had  been  struck  out  of  the  paper,  a  fresh  order 
had  to  be  obtained  for  setting  it  down,  which  might  be  had  either 
upon  petition  or  motion.^  The  usual  course  of  proceeding,  when 
the  demurrer  came  on  for  hearing,  and  all  parties  appeared,  was 
generally  for  the  junior  counsel  for  the  party  setting  the  demurrer 
down  for  argument  to  open  the  pleadings,  after  which  the  counsel 
in  support  of  the  demurrer  were  heard,  and  next  the  plaintiff's 
counsel,  and  then  the  leading  counsel  for  the  demurring  party 
replied.^  The  practice  in  these  respects  in  the  courts  of  the 
United  States  is  very  loose ;  it  is  sometimes  regulated  by  the 
local  rule,  and  often  by  a  local  custom,  after  the  analogy  of  the 
State  practice. 

§  122.  Overruling  a  Demurrer.  — If  upon  the  hearing,  any  de- 
murrer is  overruled,  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  his  costs  in  the 
cause  up  to  that  period,  unless  the  court  is  satisfied  that  the 
defendant  has  good  ground,  in  point  of  law  or  fact,  to  interpose 
the  same,  and  it  was  not  interposed  vexatiously  or  for  delay.  ^ 
Upon,  the  overruling  of  any  demurrer,  the  defendant  is  assigned 
to  answer  the  bill,  or  so  much  thereof  as  is  covered  by  the  demur- 
rer, the  next  succeeding  rule-day,  or  at  such  other  period  as  con- 

§  121.  1  Penfokl  v.  Ramsbottom,  1  3  Tolson  v.  Lord  Fitzwilli.am,  4  Madd. 
Swanst.  552  ;  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.     403. 

ed.)  606,667.  *  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  666, 

2  Jennings  v.  Pearce,  1  Ves.  Jr.  447.         667. 

§  122.  1  Rule  34. 


224  DExMUEKERS.  [CHAP.  Vlll. 

sistently  with  the  rights  of  the  defendant,  the  same  can,  in  the 
judgment  of  the  court,  be  reasonably  done;  in  default  whereof, 
the  bill  is  to  be  taken  against  him  pro  confesso,  and  the  matter 
thereof  proceeded  in  and  decreed  accordingly.^  If  the  plaintiff 
does  not  desire  an  answer,  terms  may  be  imposed  as  a  condition 
upon  the  filing  of  an  answer  by  the  defendant.'^  A  demurrer  is 
presumed  abandoned  when  tlie  parties  proceed  to  a  hearing  after 
an  answer  without  argument  of  the  demurrer.*  When  a  de- 
murrer both  to  the  whole  bill  and  to  part  thereof  is  sustained 
only  as  to  a  part,  the  proper  decree  is  to  dismiss  so  mucii  of  the 
bill  as  seeks  relief  in  reference  to  the  matters  adjudged  to  be  bad, 
overrule  the  demurrer  to  the  residue,  and  direct  the  defendant  to 
answer  thereto.^  When  several  defendants  have  joined  in  the 
demurrer,  it  may  be  sustained  as  to  one  of  them,  and  overruled 
as  to  the  rest.^  "  The  court  cannot  let  a  demurrer  stand  for  an 
answer,  because  it  is  a  mute  thing." '  It  must  be  either  sustained 
or  overruled.  If,  therefore,  it  is  doubtful  whether  a  demurrer 
should  be  sustained  or  not,  the  court  will  overrule  it,  and  allow 
the  same  defense  to  be  taken  by  answer ;  ^  or,  even  if  it  be  not 
taken  in  the  answer,  may  sustain  it  at  tlie  hearing.^  By  special 
leave,  such  a  defense  may  also  be  made  by  a  plea.^'^  When  the 
answer  by  supplying  omissions  in  the  bill  establishes  the  com- 
plainant's case,  a  decree  for  him  will  not  be  reversed  upon  appeal, 
for  an  error  in  overruling  a  demurrer.^^  After  a  demurrer  to  the 
whole  bill  has  been  overruled,  a  second  demurrer  to  the  same 
extent  cannot  be  allowed ;  for  that  would  be  in  effect  to  re-hear 
the  case  on  the  first  demurrer  ;  as,  on  argument  of  a  demurrer, 
any  cause  of  demurrer,  though  not  shown  in  the  demurrer  as 
filed,  may  be  alleged  at  the  bar,  and  if  good  will  support  the  de- 
murrcr.^2     ^\^  demurrer,  however,  of  a  less  extensive  nature  may 


-  Rule  34.  sonville,  3  McLean,   3.3G ;    Standanl  Oil 

3  Ilalderman   i-.    Ilalderman,   Hempst.  Co.  v.  Southern  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  42  Fed.  R. 
407.  295.     See  Crawford  r.  The  William  Penn, 

4  Basey  v  Gallagher,  20  Wall.  670.  3  Wash.  484. 

6  Powder   Co.    v.   Powder    Works,    98  »  Johnasson  y.  Bonhote,  L.  R.  2  Ch.  D. 

U.  S.  126.  208. 

6  Mayor  of  London    i-.    Levy,  8    Ves.  i»  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.   (2d  Am.  ed.)  G75  ; 

403,  404  ;  Story's  Eq    PI  §  445.  Rowley  v.  Eccles,  1  S.  &  S.  512. 

'  Lord  Chancellor  llardwicke,  in  Anon.,  ^^  Cavender   v.   Cavender,    114    U.    S. 

3  Atk.  530.  464.     See  also  West  v.  Randall,  2  Mason, 

s  Storms  r.  Kansas  Pacific  Ry.  Co.,  5  181. 

Dill    480;    Bromley  v.  Town  of  Jeffer-  i^  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  674. 


§  123.]  SUSTAINING   A   DEMURRER.  225 

by  special  leave  of  the  court  be  subsequently  put  in ;  ^^  and  an 
amendment  of  a  demurrer  confining  it  to  a  part  of  the  bill  may 
also  be  allowed.^* 

§  123.  Sustaining  a  Demurrer.  —  If  upon  the  hearing  any  de- 
murrer be  allowed,  the  defendant  is  entitled  to  his  costs.^  But 
the  court  may,  in  its  discretion,  upon  motion  of  the  plaintiff,  allow 
him  to  amend  his  bill  upon  such  terms  as  it  shall  deem  reasona- 
ble.- When  a  demurrer  ore  tenus  is  sustained,^  the  defendant 
receives  no  costs,  and  perhaps  may  be  ordered  to  pay  costs.^  If 
the  defect  in  the  bill  be  clearly  one  that  goes  to  the  whole  equity 
of  the  plaintiff's  case,  leave  to  amend  will  not  be  granted.^  Ac- 
cording to  Lord  Cottenham, "  it  is  not  usual,  upon  allowing  a  gen- 
eral demurrer,  to  give  leave  to  amend ;  but  it  may  be  done.  It  is 
in  the  discretion  of  the  court  so  to  do."  ^  And  although  courts 
are  now  very  liberal  in  allowing  amendments,  leave  to  amend  may 
be  refused  when  the  case  of  the  defendant  is  a  hard  one,  and  he 
is  free  from  wrong-doing,  while  the  plaintiff  has  had  an  oppor- 
tunity to  plead  the  new  matter  when  his  l)ill  was  first  drawn." 
Leave  to  amend  is  usually  granted  ;  and  almost  invariably  when 
the  defect  in  the  bill  consists  in  the  misjoinder  of  parties,^  or  the 
omission  of  those  who  can  be  served  without  ousting  the  court  of 
jurisdiction.^  It  has  been  held  that  a  paper  defective  as  a  bill  in 
ei^uity  may  be  sustained  as  a  petition  on  an  appeal  from  condem- 
nation proceedings  under  a  special  statute.^^ 

15  Thorpe  v.  Macauley,   5  Madd.  218,  Bell,  2  Myl.  &  Cr.  89  ,  Lowe  v.  Farlie,  2 

231.  Madd.  101 ;  Walker  v.  Powers,  104  U.  S. 

1+  Glegg  r.  Legli,   4  Madd.   193,  207;  245. 

Baker  r.  Mellisli,  11  Ves.  70;  Atwill  v.  ^  Wellesley  v.  Wellesley,  4  Myl.  &  Cr. 

Ferrett,  2  Blatchf.  39,  49  554,  558. 

§  123.    1  Rule  34.  "  Dowell  v.  Applegate,  8  Fed.  R.  698, 

2  Rule  34.  s.  c.  7  Sawyer,  232. 

3  Taylor  v.  Holmes,  14  Fed.  R.  498;  «  Aylwin  v.  Bray,  2  Y.  &  J.  .518,  note; 
Briiikerhoff  c.  Brown,  6  J.  Cli.  (N.  Y.)  Tryon  r.  Westminster  Improvement  Coni- 
149  ;  Langdell's  Eq.  PI.  §  95  ;  Story's  Eq.  missioners,  6  Jurist  N.  s.  1324. 

PL  §  464;  Daniell's  Ch.'Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  ^  M'Elwain  v.  Willis,  3  Paige  (N.  Y.). 

C72.  505.     See   Walker  v.  Powers,  104  U.  S. 

*  Langdell's  Eq.  PI.  §  95;  Lord  Clar-  245,252. 

endon's  Orders,  May  22,  1661 ;  1  Sanders'  ^^  Cherokee  Nation  v.  Southern  Kansas 

Orders,  298.  Railway  Co.,  135  U.  S.  641,  651. 

»  Langdell's  Eq.   Pi.  §  96;    Tyler  v. 
VOL.  I.  —  15 


226  PLEAS.  [chap.  IX. 


CHAPTER   IX. 

PLEAS. 

§  124.  Definition  and  Classification  of  Pleas.  —  A  plea  is  a 
pleading  which  sets  up  some  reason  not  apparent  upon  the  face 
of  the  bill  why  the  defendant  should  not  be  obliged  to  answer 
the  whole  or  a  part  thereof.  Lord  Redesdale  defines  a  plea  as 
"  a  special  answer  to  a  bill,  differing  in  this  from  an  answer  in 
the  common  form,  as  it  demanded  the  judgment  of  the  court,  in 
the  first  instance,  whether  the  special  matter  urged  by  it  did  not 
debar  the  plaintiff  from  his  title  to  that  answer  which  the  bill 
required."  1  A  plea  may  be  to  the  whole  or  to  a  part  of  the  bill.^ 
Usually  but  a  single  ground  of  defense  can  be  presented  by  a 
plea,  which,  though  it  may  state  more  than  one  fact,  must  bring 
the  matters  in  issue  to  a  single  point.^  Otherwise,  it  is  open  to 
the  charge  of  duplicity  and  multifariousness,  and  will  be  over- 
ruled.* But  if  a  bill  contain  different  prayers  for  relief  based 
upon  different  grounds,  the  defendant  may  file  a  plea  to  each 
part  of  the  relief.^  And  in  other  cases,  where  great  incon- 
venience can  thus  be  saved,  the  court  may  upon  motion,  after 
notice  to  the  complainant's  solicitor,  give  special  leave  to  file  a 
double  plea,^  or  rather,  according  to  Professor  Langdell,"  two 
separate  pleas,  each  containing  a  single  defense.  Thus,  in  Eng- 
land, a  defendant  to  a  bill  for  an  injunction  against  the  infringe- 
ment of  a  patent  and  for  an  account  was  allowed  to  file  a  double 

§  12t.  1  Roche  V.  Morgell,  2  Sch.   &  London  v.  Corporation   of  Liverpool,  3 

Lef.  721,725.  Anst.  738;  Watkins  i-.  Stone,  2  Simons, 

2  Rule  32.  49;  Saltus  v.  Tobias,  7  J.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  214  ; 

3  Whitbread  v.  Brockhurst,  1  Brown,  Giant  Powder  Co.  v.  Safety  Nitro  Powder 
Ch.C.404,410,  note  9 ;  8.  c.  2  Ves.  &  Bea.  Co.,  19  Fed.  R.  509;  M'Closkey  f.  Barr,  38 
154,  note;  Watkins  v.  Stone,  2  Simons,  Fed.  R.  165;  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §§  653-655. 
49  ;  Rhode  Island  v.  Massachusetts,  14  But  see  Reissner  v.  Anness,  12  Off.  Gaz. 
Pet.  210,  259  ;  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  654.  842  ;  s.  c.  3  Bann.  &  A.  Pat.  Cas.  148. 

*  Rhode  Island   v.   Massachusetts,   14  ^  Emmott  v.  Mitchell,  14  Simons,  432. 

Pet.   210,  259;    Gaines  v.  Mausseaux,  1  ®  Gib.son  v.  Whitehead,  4  Madd.  241; 

Woods,  118;    Wliitbread  r.   Brockhurst,  Kay  r.  Marshall,  1  Keen,  190. 

1  Brown,  Ch.  C.  404,  41G,  note  9 ;  s.  c.  "^  Langdell's  Eq.  PI.  §  98. 

2  Ves.  &  Bea.  154,  note ;  Corporation  of 


§  124]  DEFINITION   AND    CLASSIFICATION   OF   PLEAS.  227 

plea,  "  namely,  first,  that  the  invention  was  not  useful,  and 
secondly,  that  it  was  not  new."**  It  has  been  held  that  the 
question  whether  a  patent  has  been  infringed  cannot  be  raised 
by  a  plea.^  A  plea  must  not  contain  inconsistent  allegations,^*^ 
as  ''a  plea  of  the  Statute  of  Limitations  and  of  liability  never 
incurred."  '^  Nor,  it  has  been  said,  can  a  plea  properly  raise  by 
averment  an  issue  not  "raised  by  the  bill."  ^^  But,  if  the  plea 
be  otherwise  good,  immaterial  allegations  will  not  vitiate  it.^^ 
Matters  that  have  occurred  since  the  filing  of  the  bill  may  be 
set  up  by  plea  provided  the  time  for  filing  the  plea  has  not 
elapsed.^*  Otherwise,  such  matters  can  only  be  pleaded  by  a 
supplemental  answer  or  cross-bill. ^^  A  plea  should  state  facts, 
not  arguments  and  conclusions  of  law,  which  will  be  disregarded. ^'^ 
Thus,  it  has  been  held  that  pleas  which  state  that  defendant  "is 
the  sole  owner  in  fee  simple  of  the  entire  title  of"  the  land  which  is 
the  subject  of  the  suit ;  "  that,  at  the  time  of  the  bringing  of  this 
suit  and  long  prior  thereto,  this  defendant  was  and  still  is  in  the 
open,  notorious,  continuous,  and  exclusive  possession  of  the  said 
premises  as  the  sole  owner  thereof,  and  claiming  and  holding  ad- 
versely to  the  complainants  and  all  the  world  ; "  and  "  that  the 
said  complainants  were,  at  the  time  of  bringing  this'  suit  and 
long  prior  thereto,  ousted  and  disseissed  and  out  of  possession  of 
said  premises,"  are  bad.  Pleas  are  either  pure,  negative,  or  anom- 
alous. A  pure  plea  sets  up  new  matter  as  a  defense  which  is  not 
apparent  upon  the  face  of  the  bill.i'  A  negative  plea,  which  is 
sometimes  also  termed  an  anomalous  plea,  merely  denies  certain 
allegations  contained  in  the  bill.^^  An  anomalous  plea  sets  up  a 
fact  in  avoidance  of  the  bill,  but  one  which  the  bill  has  antici- 


*  Kay  V.  Marshall,  1  Keen,  190,  102.        "  Earl  of  Leicester  v.  Perry,  1  Brown, 

But  see  Reissner  v.  Anness,  12  Off.  Gaz.  Ch   C.  305;  Turner  i;.  Robinson,  1  Sim.  & 

842 ;  s.  c.  3  Bann.  &  A.  Pat.  Cas.  148.  S.  3. 

9  Korn  V.  Wiebuscli,  33   Fed.  R.  50;        i^  Miller  v.  Fenton,  11  Paige  (N.  Y.), 

Ilubbell  V.  De  Land,  14  Fed.  R.  471,  474.  18  ;  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (5th  Am.  ed.)  607. 

1"  Emraott  V.  .Mitchell,  14  Simons,  432;         ^^  Beames  on  Pleas,  22,  23;  Jerrard  v. 

Story's  Kq.  PI.  §§  656,  057.  Saunders,  2  Ves.  Jr.  187  ;  National  Bank 

11  Emmott  V.  Mitchell,  14  Simons,  432,  v.  Insurance  Co.,  104  U.  S.  54  ;  Wood  v. 

430.  Mann,    1    Sumner,    506 ;    McCloskey    v. 

1-  Emmott  V.  :\Iitchell,  14  Simons,  4.32,  Barr,  38  Fed.  R.  165  ;  Emma  Silver  Min- 

435.     But  see  Rhode  Island  v.  Massachu-  ing  Co.  v.  Emma   Silver  Mining  Co.  of 

setts,  14  Pet  210,  270.  New  York,  1  Fed.  R.  39. 

•■J  Rhode  Island   i:  Massachusetts,  14         '"  M'Closkey  v.  Barr,  38  Fed.  R.  165. 
Pet.  210,  270;  Claridge  ;;.  Hoare,  14  Ves.        is  story's  Eq.  PL  §  651. 
59. 


228  PLEAS.  [chap.  IX. 

pated  and  without  confessing  replied  to.^^  Now  that  the  benefits 
of  discovery  can  be  obtained  at  common  law,  negative  and 
anomalous  pleas  are  rarely  used  ;  and  the  learning  and  subtlety 
which  have  been  displayed  in  discussing  their  characteristics  are 
of  little  service,  except  as  a  means  of  mental  discipline  or  for  the 
gratification  of  an  antiquarian  taste.  Those  interested  in  study- 
ing their  history  and  refinements  are  referred  to  the  works  of 
Heames  on  Pleas.  Wigram  on  Discovery,  and  Langdell  on  Equity 
Pleading,  where  they  will  find  the  sul)ject  discussed  at  length, 
with  full  references  to  the  cases.  Pleas  are  either  to  the  relief 
or  to  the  discover}'  ;  and  pleas  to  the  relief  are  either  pleas  in 
abatement  or  pleas  in  bar. 

§  125.  Pleas  in  Abatement  in  General.  —  The  books  which 
recognize  pleas  in  abatement  include  among  them  pleas  to  the 
jurisdiction,  pleas  to  the  person,  and  pleas  to  the  bill.^  Matters 
in  abatement  can,  in  general,  only  be  set  up  by  plea  or  demurrer ; 
and  a  defendant,  by  answering  or  pleading  in  bar,  waives  any 
such  objection.^  But  the  act  of  March  3,  1875,  provides  "that 
if  in  any  suit  commenced  in  a  circuit  court,  or  removed  from  a 
State  court  to  a  circuit  court  of  the  United  States,  it  shall  ap- 
pear to  the  satisfaction  of  said  circuit  court,  at  any  time  after 
such  suit  has  been  brought  or  removed  thereto,  that  such  suit 
does  not  really  and  substantially  involve  a  dispute  or  controversy 
properly  within  the  jurisdiction  of  said  circuit  court,  or  that  the 
parties  to  said  suit  have  been  improperly  or  collusively  made  or 
joined,  either  as  plaintiffs  or  defendants,  for  the  purpose  of  cre- 
ating a  case  cognizable  or  removable  under  this  act,  the  said 
circuit  court  shall  proceed  no  further  therein,  but  shall  dismiss 
the  suit  or  remand  it  to  the  court  from  which  it  was  removed  as 
justice  may  require,  and  shall  make  such  order  as  to  costs  as 
shall  be  just."^     The  objection  that  there  is  no  jurisdiction  in 

)5  LangclcH's  Eq.  PI.  §102;  Story's  Eq.  liffe  v.  Owings,  27  How.  47.  52;  Rubber 

PI.   §651;    M'DonaUl    v.    Salem  Capital  Co.  r.  Goodyear, <J  Wall.  788,  792  ;  Wood  i-. 

Flour  Mills  Co.,  31  Fed.  R.  577;  M'Clos-  IMann,  1  Sumner,  5UG;  Dodge  v.  Perkins, 

key  V.  Barr,  o8  Fed.  R.  105;   Hilton  v.  4    Mason,   435;    Cittredge   v.    Claremont 

Guyott,  42  Fed.  R.  249.     But  see  Milligan  Bank,  :!  Story,  5U0  ;  Doggctt  v.  Emerson, 

V.  Miliedge,  3  Cr.  220.  1  Woodb.  &  M.  196;  Blackburn  v.  Selma, 

§  125.  "i'  See  Beames  on  Pleas,  cli.  2 ;  M.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  2  Flippin,  525. 
Story's   Eq.    PI.    §§705-708;    Rule   39;  »  Act  of  March  3, 1875,  §  5;  U.  S.  R.  S. 

Memphis  City  v.  Dean,  8  Wall.  64.  1  Supp.  175;  18  St.  at  L.  470;  reenacted 

2  Beames  on  Pleas  (1st  Am.  ed.)  63-  March  8   1887,  24  St.  at  L.  ch.  373.     See 

G4  ;  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  708  ;  Rule  89  ;  Liv-  Nashua  &  Lowell  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Boston  & 

ingston  V.  Story,  11  Pet.  851,  893;  Wick-  Lowell  R.  R.  Co.,  136  U.  S.  356,  474. 


§  127.]  PLEAS  TO  THE  PERSON.  229 

equity  because  the  complainant  has  an  adequate  remedy  at  law 
may  be  taken  by  demurrer,  plea,  or  answer.*  Otherwise,  the 
defendant  waives  the  right  to  make  it,'^  although  the  court  may 
for  its  own  protection  dismiss  a  bill  for  this  reason  at  the  final 
hearing  when  the  pleadings  are  silent  upon  the  subject.^  The 
reference  of  the  matter  in  dispute  to  an  arbitrator,  under  an 
agreement  that  his  award  shall  be  made  the  basis  of  a  decree,  is 
a  waiver  of  such  an  objection." 

§  126.  Pleas  to  the  Jurisdiction.  —  Pleas  to  the  jurisdiction  are  : 
(1)  That  the  subject  of  the  suit  is  not  within  the  jurisdiction  of 
a  court  of  equity  ;  ^  (2)  that  some  other  court  of  equity  has  tlie 
proper  jurisdiction  ;2  (3)  that  the  defendant  has  not  been 
properly  served  with  process.^ 

§  127.  Pleas  to  the  Person.  —  Pleas  to  the  person  are :  (1) 
That  the  plaintiff  has  not  the  legal  capacity  to  sue  either  at  all 
if  an  alien  enemy, ^  or  alone  if  an  infant,^  or  without  leave  from 
the  court  as  a  receiver.^  (2)  That  the  plaintiff  is  not  the  person 
whom  he  pretends  to  be,  or  does  not  sustain  the  character  which 
he  assumes;  as,  for  example,  that  he  is  not  executor,'*  or  not  as- 
signee,^  or  not  a  corporation,"  when  suing  as  such  ;  or  that  the 
suit  is  brought  in  the  name  of  a  fictitious  person  i""  or  that  it  is 
brought  in  the  name  of  a  person  who  sues  for  the  benefit  of 
another,  through  collusion  or  champerty  ;^  or,  it  seems,  in  a  stock- 
holder's suit  founded  upon  a  right  which  may  properly  be  as- 
serted by  the  coi'poration,  that  the  corporation  has  not  refused  to 
sue.^  It  has  been  held  that  the  objection  that  the  plaintiff  is  a 
lunatic  and  cannot  sue  without  a  next  friend  cannot  be  taken  by 

4  Reynesi'.Dumont.loO  United  States,  2  story's    Eq.   PI.    §   725.      But    see 

354,  395  ;  Wylie  v.  Coxc,  15  Howard,  415  ;  Dudgeon  r.  Watson,  23  Fed.  K.  161. 
Kilbourn  v.  Sunderland,  130  U.  S.  505.  ^  See  Newman  v.  Moody,  19  Fed.  R. 

s  Keynes  v.  Dumont,  DO  U.  S.  354;  858. 
Wylie  V.  Coxe,  15  How.  415.  *  See  Rubber  Co.  y.  Goodyear,  0  Wall. 

^  Parker  v   Winnipiseogee  Lake  C.  &  788,  792  ;  Ord  v.  Huddleston,  2  Dickens, 

W.    Co.,   2   Black,  545,    550;    Lewis    v.  510;  Story's  Eq.  Pi.  §  727. 
Cocks,  23  Wall.  400 ;  (Jelrichs  v.  Spain,  ^  Nicholas  v,  Murray,  5  Saw.  320. 

15  Wall.  211.  6  Dental  Vulcanite  Co.  v.  Wetherbee, 

7  Strong  V.  Willey,  104  U.  S.  512.  2  Cliff.  555;  Blackburn  v.  Selma,  M.  & 

§  120.  1  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §§  710-713.  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  2  Flippin,  525. 

2  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §§  714-^716.  ''  Chapman  v.  School  District  No.  1, 

3  Earned  v.   Griffin,  12  Fed.  R.   590;  D-ady,  108,  116. 

Williams  v.  Empire  Transportation  Co.,  ^  Dinsmore  v.  Central  R.  R.   Co.,   19 

1  N.  J.  L.  J.  315.  Fed.    R.   1.53.      But   seo    Sperry    v.   Erie 

§  127.  1  Albrech  i:  Sussman.  2  V.  &  B.  Ry.  Co.,  0  Blatchf.  425. 
323;  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  721;  Mumford  v.         »  Newby  >.  Oregon  Central  Ry.  Co.. 

Mumford,  1  Gall.  3GG.  1  Saw.  03.  07 


230  PLEAS.  [chap.  IX. 

plea,  and  that  tlie  proper  course  for  the  defendant  is  to  move 
either  to  strike  the  bill  off  the  file  on  account  of  the  complain- 
ant's mental  incapacity,  or  for  a  stay  of  proceedings  until  a 
committee  or  next  friend  is  appointed. i*^  (3)  That  the  defendant 
cannot  be  sued  except  upon  the  happening  of  some  event  which 
has  not  occurred,  as  that  he  is  a  receiver,  and  no  leave  to  sue 
him  has  been  obtained  from  the  court  by  which  he  was  ap- 
j)ointed.^^  (4)  That  the  defendant  is  not  the  person  he  is 
alleged  to  be,  or  does  not  sustain  the  character  which  he  is 
alleged  to  bear  ;  ^^  or  that  the  person  named  as  a  defendant  is 
not  a  corporation  when  sued  as  such,  —  in  which  case  the  person 
served  with  process  on  its  behalf  may  file  the  plea  in  his  own 
name,^^  or  was  not  incorporated  under  the  laws  of  the  State 
which  is  named  in  the  bill  as  its  creator  ;!•*  or  that  the  defendant 
has  become  a  bankrupt  or  insolvent,  and  his  interest  in  the  sub- 
ject-matter has  passed  to  liis  assignee.^^ 

§  128.  Pleas  to  the  Bill.  —  Pleas  to  the  bill  are :  (1)  That 
there  is  another  suit  depending  in  a  domestic  court  of  equity 
for  the  same  matter.     (2)  That  there  is  a  want  of  proper  parties. 

(3)  That  the  bill  will  cause  an  improper  multiplicity  of  suits. 

(4)  Multifaiiousness.i  Of  these  tlie  first  two  are  the  only  ones 
of  much  practical  importance.  It  is  doubtful  whether  either  of 
the  last  two  has  ever  been  successfully  maintained. ^  Judge  Story 
thus  speaks  of  them  :  "Thirdly,  the  plea  of  multiplicity  of  suits. 
This  objection  also  may  be  taken  by  way  of  plea,  for  it  is  against 
the  whole  policy  of  courts  of  equitj'  to  encourage  multiplicity 
of  suits.  Indeed,  this  constitutes  one  main  ground  of  the  ob- 
jection of  the  want  of  sufficient  parties,  since  its  tendencj'  is  to 
multiply  litigation.  Fourthly,  the  plea  of  multifariousness,  or  of 
joining  and  confounding  distinct  matters  in  one  bill.  Generally 
this  objection  is  apparent  on  the  face  of  the  bill,  and  then  it 
could  be  taken  by  way  of  demurrer.     But,  in  case  the  bill  is  so 

1"  Dudgeon  v.  Watson,  23  Fed.  R.  101.  i*  Blackburn  r.  Selma.  M.  &  M.  R.  R. 

11  Barton  v.   Barbour,  104  U.  S.  I'iG ;  Co.,  2  Klippin,  525. 

.Jerome  v.  McCarter,  94  U.  S.  734,  I'M  ;  i*  Kittredge    v.    Claremont     Bank,    3 

In  re  Young,  7  Fed.  R.  855.     But  see  24  Story,  590 ;  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  732.     See 

St.  at  L.  cb.  373,  §  3.  also  Doggett  v.  Emerson,  1  Woodb.  &  M. 

1^  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §§  732-734.  196. 

13  Kelley  v.  Mississippi   Central  R.  R.  §  128.  i  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §§  7.35-748. 

Co.,   1   Fed.   R.  564;    s.  c.  2  Flippin,  .581.  2  B,,nson  v.  Iladfield,  4   Hare,  32,  39; 

See  also  Williams  v.  EtTij>ire  Trausporta-  M'Ciuskey  v.  Burr,  38  Fed.  R  105. 
lion  Co.,  1  N.  J.  L.  J.  315. 


^  129.]       PLE.VS  OF  PENDENCY  OF  ANOTHER  SUIT.  231 

artfully  fnimcd  that  from  that  or  from  some  other  cause  the 
objection  does  not  appear  on  the  face  of  the  bill,  the  defendant 
may  take  advantage  thereof  by  setting  forth  the  special  matter 
by  a  plea." 2  The  following  plea  was  held  bad  and  overruled: 
where  the  bill  was  filed  to  restrain  the  infringement  of  five 
patents,  and  stated  that  the  defendant  made  and  sold  for  use 
"soda-water  fountains,  each  made  according  to,  and  employing 
and  containing,  the  inventions  described  and  claimed  in  each 
of  the  above-named  letters-patent  and  reissued  letters-patent." 
The  plea  set  up  as  a  defense  that  all  of  the  letters-patent  de- 
scribed in  the  bill  were,  as  the  bill  showed,  for  separate  and 
distinct  inventions,  "which  several  alleged  inventions  are  not, 
in  point  of  fact,  connected  together  in  use  or  operation,  and  are 
not,  in  point  of  fact,  conjointly  embodied  in  any  of  the  soda- 
water  and  other  fountains  manufactured,  used,  or  sold,  by  this 
defendant ;  so  that  the  said  plaintiff,  by  his  single  bill  of  com- 
plaint aforesaid,  seeks  to  compel  this  defendant  to  unite  five 
separate  and  distinct  defences  depending  upon  distinct  and  dif- 
ferent proofs,  so  as  to  complicate  the  defence  and  embarrass  this 
defendant  in  his  answer  to  the  said  complaint ;  and  that  it  is  not 
true,  as  alleged  in  said  bill,  that  the  said  defendant  has  made, 
constructed,  used,  and  vended  to  others  to  be  used,  soda-water 
and  other  fountains,  each  made  according  to,  and  employing  and 
containing  the  inventions  described  and  claimed  in  each  of  the 
above-named  letters-patent  and  reissued  letters-patent."^ 

§  129.  Pleas  of  Pendency  of  another  Suit.  — A  plea  that  another 
suit  in  equity  is  pending  for  the  same  cause  in  the  same  court  is, 
if  true,  a  sufficient  defense  to  a  bill.^  The  pendency  of  an  action 
at  law  for  the  same  matter  is  not,  however,  in  itself  a  defense.  ^ 
For  the  very  fact  that  relief  cannot  be  had  at  law  is  the  usual 
ground  for  resorting  to  equity.  If,  however,  there  appears  to  be 
no  sufficient  reason  for  the  maintenance  of  both,  the  court  at 
equity  may,  after  the  defendant  has  answered,  put  the  plaintiff 
to  his  election,  whether  he  will  proceed  at  law  or  in  equity  ;  and 

3  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §§  74(3,  740.     See  also  Ch.  Ca.  241 ;  Tarleton  v.  Barnes,  2  Kt'cn, 

Benson  v.  Hadfield,  4  Ilarc,  32.  632,   635 ;    Insurance   Co.   v.    Brune,    96 

■»  Matthews  v.  Lalance  &  G.  Manuf.  U.  S.  588,  592,  593.     See  also   Memphis 

Co.,  2  Fed.  R.  232.  City  r.  Dean,  8  Wall.  64. 

§129.    1    Mitford's    PI.    ch.    2,    §    2,  2  Graham  v.  Meyer,  4  Rlatchf.   129; 

part  2;  .Story's  Eq.   PI.  §  736;  Urlin  v.  Thorne  r.  Towanda  Tanning  Co.,  15  Fed. 

Hudson,  1   Vern.  332;  Foster  i'.  Vassall,  R.  289,  292. 
3   Atk.    587.  590;  Crofts   v.   Wortley,  1 


232 


PLEAS. 


[chap.  IX. 


if  he  elects  the  latter,  then  his  proceeding  at  law  will  be  en- 
joined ;  if  the  forraer,  his  hill  will  be  dismissed.^  The  pendency 
of  another  suit  in  a  court  of  another  of  the  United  States,  or  of  a 
foreign  country,  is  not  a  bar  to  a  suit  for  the  same  relief  in  a  Cir- 
cuit Court  of  the  United  States.^  Nor,  it  seems,  although  there 
the  authorities  are  conflicting,^  is  the  pendency  of  a  similar  suit 
in  a  court  held  within  the  same  State  where  the  Federal  court  is 
lield.^  The  effect  of  the  pendency  of  another  suit  for  the  same 
cause  in  another  court  of  the  United  States  has  never  been  ex- 
pressly decided  ; '''  but  there  seems  to  be  no  difference  in  prin- 
ciple between  such  a  suit  and  one  in  a  court  of  another  State, 
except  that  proceedings  in  such  a  case  in  a  Federal  court  could 
be  enjoined  by  a  Federal  judge.^  A  plea  that  another  suit  is 
pending,  in  which  the  complainant  might  obtain  by  cross-bill  the 
relief  now  sought  by  him,  is  bad.^  A  plea  of  lis  j^^i^dens  should 
set  forth  the  commencement  of  the  former  suit,  its  general  nature, 
character,  and  objects,  the  relief  prayed,  and  how  far  it  has  pro- 
gressed ;  ^*^  it  should  then  aver  specifically  that  the  second  suit  is 
for  the  same  subject-matter  ^^  as  the  first,  and  seeks  the  same,  or 
similar,  relief;  ^^  and  further,  that  the  former  suit  is  still  depend- 
ing.^3  It  must  show  that  the  defendant  was  served  or  has  ap- 
peared in  the  former  suit.^*    "  For  it  is  no  suit  depending  till  the 


3  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  742 ;  Beanies' 
Orders  in  Chancery,  11,  12  ;  Mitford's 
Pleadings,  ch.  2,  §  2,  part  2  ;  Royle  v. 
Wynne,  1  Craig  &  Pii.  252  ;  Tiiorne  v. 
Towanda  Tanning  Co.,  13  Fed.  R.  289, 
292. 

<  Insurance  Co.  v.  Brune,  9G  U.  S. 
688,  592,  593;  Stanton  v.  Embrey,  93 
U.  S.  548  ;  Lord  Dillon  v.  Alvares,  4  Ves. 
357.     See  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  747. 

5  See  Radford  v.  Folsom,  14  Fed.  R. 
97 ;  Brooks  v.  Mills  County,  4  Dill.  524. 

«  Latham  v.  Chafee,  7  Fed.  R.  520; 
Whiter.  Whitman,  1  Curt.  494 ;  Sharon 
r.  Hill.  22  Fed.  R.  28  ;  Washburn  &  Moen 
Manuf.  Co.  v.  Scutt,  22  Fed.  R.  710  ;  Lor- 
ing  V.  Marsh,  2  ClifE.  322 ;  Gordon  v. 
Gilfoil,  99  U.  S.  168,  178 ;  Dwight  v.  Cen- 
tral Vermont  R.  R.  Co.,  9  Fed.  R.  785; 
Crescent  City  Live  Stock  Co.  v.  Butchers' 
Union  Live  Stock  Co.,  12  Fed.  R.  225. 

^  See  Wheeler  v.  McCormick,  8 
Blatchf.  2G7;  Steiger  v.  Ileidclbergcr,  4 
Fed.  R.  455;  s.  c.  18  Blatchf.  420; 
Brooks  V.  Mills  County,  4  Dill.  524,  527. 


^  See  Massachusetts  Mutual  Life  Ins. 
Co.  ('.  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.,  13  Fed.  R.  857; 
Beauchamp  v.  Marquis  of  Huntley,  Ja- 
cobs, 516  ;  Erie  Ry.  Co.  r.  Ramsey,  45 
N.  Y.  637. 

^  Washburn  &  Moen  Manuf.  Co.  v. 
Scutt,  22  Fed.  R.  710. 

10  Crescent  City  Live  Stock  Co.  v. 
Butchers'  Union  Live  Stock  Co.,  12  Fed. 
R.  225;  Foster  v.  Vassall,  3  Atk.  589, 
690  ;  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  737. 

11  Devie  v.  Lord  Brownlow,  2  Dickens, 
611  ;  Mitford's  Pleadings,  ch.  2,  §  2,  part 
2;  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  737. 

12  Belirens  v.  Sieveking,  2  Myl.  &  Cr. 
602  ;  Wheeler  v.  McCormick,  8  Blatchf. 
267  ;  Jenkins  v.  Eldredge,  3  Story,  183  ; 
Storv's  Eq.  PI.  §  737. 

»3  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  737.  See  Urlin  t'. 
Hudson,  1  Vern.  3.32;  Mitford's  Plead- 
ings, ch.  2,  §  2,  part  2. 

1*  Moor  V.  Welsh  Copper  Co.,  1  Eq. 
Cas.  Abr.  39,  pi.  14. 


^'  129.]       PLEAS  OF  PENDENCY  OF  ANOTHER  SUIT.  233 

parties  have  appeared  or  been  served  to  appear,  but  only  a  piece 
of  parchment  thrown  into  the  office,  which  may  lie  there  foiever, 
and  never  come  to  a  suit,"^^  ''  It  is  not  necessary  to  the  suffi- 
ciency of  the  plea  that  the  former  suit  should  be  precisely  between 
the  same  parties  as  the  latter.  For  if  a  man  institutes  a  suit, 
and  afterwards  sells  part  of  the  property  in  question  to  another, 
who  files  an  original  bill  touching  the  part  so  pui'chased  by  him, 
a  plea  of  the  former  suit  depending  touching  the  whole  property 
will  hold.^^  So  where  one  part-owner  of  a  ship  filed  a  bill  against 
the  husband  for  an  account,  and  afterwards  the  same  part-owner 
and  the  rest  of  the  owners  filed  a  bill  for  the  same  purpose,  the 
pendency  of  the  first  suit  was  ]ield  a  good  plea  to  the  last ;  ^''  for 
though  the  first  bill  was  insufficient  for  want  of  parties,  yet  by 
the  second  bill  the  defendant  was  doubly  vexed  for  the  same 
cause.  The  course  wliich  the  court  has  taken  in  such  case  has 
been  to  dismiss  the  first  bill,  and  to  direct  the  defendant  in  the 
second  cause  to  answer  upon  being  paid  the  costs  of  the  plea 
allowed."  ^^  Wliere  a  former  suit  had  been  brought  for  a  part, 
but  not  the  whole  of  the  relief  sought  in  the  case  at  bar,  the 
court  held  its  pendency  no  defense,  but  said  that  proceedings  in 
it  might  be  stayed  until  the  determination  of  the  second  suit.^^ 
"  Where  a  second  bill  is  brought  by  the  same  person  for  the  same 
purpose,  but  in  a  different  right,  as  where  the  executor  of  an 
administrator  brought  a  bill  conceiving  himself  to  be  the  personal 
representative  of  the  intestate,  and  afterwards  procured  adminis- 
tration de  bonis  non,  and  brought  another  bill,  the  pendenc}''  of 
the  former  bill  is  not  a  good  plea.^*^  The  reason  of  this  determi- 
nation seems  to  have  been,  that,  the  first  bill  being  wholly  irregu- 
lar, the  plaintiff  could  have  no  benefit  from  it,  and  it  might  have 
been  dismissed  upon  demurrer.  Where  a  decree  is  made  upon  a 
bill  brought  by  a  creditor  on  behalf  of  himself  and  all  otlier  cred- 
itors of  the  same  person,  and  another  creditor  comes  in  before 
the  master  to  take  the  benefit  of  the  decree,  and  proves  his  debt, 
and  then  files  a  bill  on  behalf  of  himself  and  the  other  creditors, 


15  Moor  V.   Welsh  Copper  Co.,   1  Eq.  2,  citing  Crofts  v.  Wortlcy,  1   Cli.  Cas. 

Cas.  Abr.  39.  241. 

1^  Moor  V.  Welsh  Copper  Co.,  1  Eq.         "'^  Massachusetts  Mutual  Life  Ins.  Co. 

Cas.  Abr.  39.  v.  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.,  13  Fed.  R.  857. 

I''  DuranJ  v.  Hutchinson,  Mich.  1771,        '"  Huggins   v.   York   Building   Co.,   2 

m  Clian.  Atk.  44. 

*^  Mitford's  Pleadings,  ch.  2,  §  2,  part 


234  PLEAS.  [chap.  IX. 

the  defendants  may  plead  the  pendency  of  the  former  suit ;  for  a 
man  coming  in  under  a  decree  is  quasi  a  party."  '^^  When,  after 
a  bill  had  been  filed  to  restrain  the  infringement  of  a  patent  and  to 
obtain  an  account  of  profits,  the  defendant  continues  his  infringe- 
ments, the  pendency  of  the  first  is  no  objection  to  a  second  bill 
seeking  an  injunction,  and  an  account  founded  upon  the  subse- 
quent infringements.^^  According  to  Lord  Redesdale,  "  as  the 
pendency  of  the  former  suit,  unless  admitted  by  the  plaintiff,  is 
made  the  immediate  subject  of  inquiry  by  one  of  the  masters,  a 
plea  of  this  kind  is  not  put  in  upon  oath."  ^^ 

§  130.  Plea  of  "Want  of  Parties.  —  The  plea  of  want  of  parties 
is  sometimes  included  among  pleas  in  bar.^  The  same  defense 
may  be  made  by  answer  ;2  and  in  a  recent  case  the  court  refused 
to  allow  it  to  be  set  up  by  plea  upon  the  ground  that  the  same 
defense  can  be  considered  with  more  convenience  and  expedition 
when  pleaded  in  an  answer.^  Such  a  plea  must  state  the  names, 
if  known,  of  all  the  persons  for  whose  omission  the  defendant 
claims  that  the  bill  is  defective*  It  should  also  state  that  they 
are  living,  and,  unless  they  are  in  every  aspect  of  the  bill  indis- 
pensable parties  to  it,  that  they  are  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
court.^  After  a  plea  for  want  of  parties  has  been  sustained,  and 
the  bill  amended  by  adding  thereto  the  parties  named  in  the  plea, 
a  second  plea  further  objecting  to  the  bill  for  the  omission  of 
other  parties  not  named  in  the  first  plea  cannot  be  filed. ^  A 
plea  to  the  whole  bill  for  want  of  parties  will  be  overruled  if, 
in  any  aspect  of  the  bill,  the  parties  therein  named  would  not  be 
necessary." 

§  131.  Pleas  of  Statutes.  —  Pleas  in  bar  set  up  some  reason 
founded  on  the  substance  of  the  case,  why  the  plaintiff  is  not 
entitled  to  relief.     They  rest  upon  some  matter  created  either  by 

21  Mitfonl's  PI.  c1i.  2,  §  2,  part  2,  citing  2.     See,  liowever,  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  744, 

upon  last  point  Neve  v.  Weston,  3  Atk.  ami  citations. 
[)o7.  -,  3  Uniteil  States  r.  Gillespie,  6  Fed. 

■^^  Wiieeler  v.   McCormick,  8  Blatelif.  R.  803.     See  Rule  52. 
207  .  Roemer  v.  Newwan,  lU  Fed.  R.  98  ;  *  Attorney  General  v.  Jacksoii,  11  A'cs 

Iligliy  V.  Columbia  Ruliber  Co.   18  Fed.  .T)7,  o()0;  Cook  v.  Mancius,  3  Joiiiis.  cli. 

R.  001.     Coiilni,  Gold  &  Stock  Telegraph  (N.  Y.)  427  ;  Dwiglit  r.  Central  Vermont 

Co.  y.  Pearce,  I'J  Fed.  R.  419.  R.  R.   Co.  9  Fed.  R.  785;    Campbell  r. 

33  Milford's  Pleadings,  cli.  2,  §  2,  part  James,  2  Fed.  R.  338,  .348. 
2;  citing  Urlin  v.  Hudson'  1  Vern.  33:i.  ^  Goodyear  i\  Toby,  6  Rlatclif.  138. 

But  see  the  positive  language  of  Rule  ''  Rawlins  r.  Dalton,  3  Y.  &  Coll.  447. 
31.  ^  Homan  v.  Shiel,  2  Jones  (Irish),  164 

§  130.     1  Mitford's  PI.  ch.  2,  §  2,  part 


§  131.]  PLEAS  OF  STATUTES.  235 

statute,  matter  of  record,  or  matter  in  j^ais,  which  last  term  sig- 
nifies a  matter  of  fact  which  is  not  of  record,  and  is  not  given  by 
statute  special  effect.  Pleas  founded  upon  matter  that  is  made 
a  bar  by  statute  rest  upon  the  statute  of  limitations,  the  statute 
of  frauds,  or  less  frequently  some  other  statute.  Federal  courts 
of  equity  arc  not  bound  by  State  statutes  of  limitation,^  except 
in  cases  where  their  jurisdiction  is  concurrent  with  the  jurisdic- 
tion at  common  law;^  but  they  will  usually  follow  them,^  unless 
injustice  would  otherwise  be  done,^  thus  enforcing  the  doctrine 
of  equitable  laches;  and  they  will  do  so  especially  when  suits 
are  brought  against  executors,^  or  to  foreclose  mortgages.^  More- 
over, the  lapse  of  time  for  a  shorter  period  than  the  statute  of 
limitations,  and  in  cases  to  which  that  statute  does  not  apply, 
will  often  be  held  such  laches  as  to  bar  the  complainant.^  It  is 
not  laches  for  a  complainant  to  delay  asserting  his  rights  until 
the  determination  in  another  suit,  brought  by  himself  or  another 
in  a  similar  position,  of  a  doubtful  question  of  law  materially 
affecting  their  validity.^  The  United  States  is  not  bound  by 
laches;^  and  the  State  statutes  of  limitations  do  not  affect  it, i*^ 
even,  it  has  been  said,  if  specially  named  therein.^'  An  indi- 
vidual seeking  to  enforce  by  subrogation  the  rights  of  a  State  may 
be  estopped  by  laches  of  the  State  which  would  not  have  affected 
the  State  itself.^-  Municipal  corporations  and  counties  may  be 
estopped  by  laches. ^■^  The  plea  of  the  statute  of  limitations  is  in 
substantially  the  same  form  as  a  similar  plea  in  an  action  at  law, 
but  no  special  form  is  essential.^*  If  the  bill  charge  fraud  or 
other  matters,  which,  if  true,  would    prevent  the  statute  from 

§  131.     1   Jolinson    >\  Roe,   1   Feci.   R.  s  Buxton  v  James,  5  Dc  Gex  &  Sm.  80, 

692  ;  Etting  v.  Marx's  Executor,  4  Fed.  84 ;  Rumfonl  Clicniical  Works  v.  Vice, 

R.   67.3.     But   see   Pratt   v.  Northam,   5  14  Blatclif.  179,  180,    Green  v.  Barney, 

Mason,   95.  19  Fed.   R.  420;    People   v.   Cooper,   22 

2  Wagner  v.  Baird,  7  How  2?.4.  258;  Hun  (29  N.  Y.  S.  C.  R.).  515,  517.  See 
Godden  y.  Kimmell,  99  U.  S.  201;  Wilson  Illinois  G.  T.  Ry.  Co.  i,'.  Wade,  140 
V.  Koontz,  7  Cranch,  202.  U.  S.  65. 

3  Godden  v.  Kimmell,  99  U.  S  201  ;  9  U.  S.  r.  Beebe,  127  U.  S.  3.S8  ;  U.  S. 
Meath  v.  Pliillips  Co..  108  U.  S.  553.  v.  Insley,  130  U.  S.  2G3  ;  U.  S.  v.  Dalles 

■i  Fogg  V.  St.  Louis  II.  &  K.  R.  R.  Co.,  Military  Land  Co.,  140  U.  S.  599. 

17  Fed.  R.  871,  873.  i'  Gibson   v.  Chouteau,    13    Wall.  92; 

5  PuUiara   -•    Pulliam,  10  Fed.   R.  53;  U.  S.  r.  Thompson,  98  U.  S.  486. 
Broderick's  Will,  21  Wall   503.  ^i  U   S.  r.  Thompson,  98  U.  S.  486,  490. 

6  Cleveland  Ins.  Co.  v.  Reed,  1    Biss.  ''^  Cressy  i:  Meyer,  138  U.  S.  525. 
180.  13  Boone  County  >■.  Burlington  &  M.  R. 

'  Brown  r.  Connty  of  Buena  Vista,  95     R.  R.  Co.,  139  U.  S.«84. 
U.  S.  157,  IGl.  1*  Harpending,  v.  Reformed  Protestant 


236  PLEAS.  [chap.  IX. 

depriving  the  complainant  of  relief,  the  pica  must  deny  them.^^ 
It  is  not  sufficient  to  deny  them  in  an  answer  in  support  of  the 
plea.^^  The  statute  of  frauds  will  be  followed  by  the  federal 
courts. ^*^  If  the  bill  sliows  that  the  complainant's  case  is  repug- 
nant to  tlie  statute  of  frauds,  it  is  demurrable.^''  Tliis,  however, 
is  rarely  the  case,  and  the  statute  is  usually  referred  to  by  plea 
or  answer.^"  The  rule  is  thus  stated  by  Lord  Chancellor  Cran- 
worth :  "  It  was  argued  that  the  statute  of  frauds  was  not  open  to 
the  defendant,  by  reason  of  his  not  having  insisted  upon  the 
statute  as  a  defence  ;  but  this  is  a  mistake.  Where  a  defendant 
admits  the  agreement,  if  he  intends  to  rely  on  the  fact  of  its  not 
being  in  writing  and  signed,  and  so  being  invalid  by  reason  of 
the  statute,  he  must  say  so ;  otherwise  he  is  taken  to  mean  that 
the  admitted  agreement  was  a  written  agreement  good  under  the 
statute,  or  else  that  on  some  other  ground  it  is  binding  on  him  ; 
but  where  he  denies  or  does  not  admit  the  agreement,  the  burden 
of  proof  is  altogether  upon  the  plaintiff,  who  must  then  prove  a 
valid  agreement  capable  of  being  enforced."  ^*  The  facts  which 
show  that  the  statute  applies  must  be  stated  specifically.^^  Other- 
wise the  plea  is  bad.^^  An  act  of  Congress  ratifying  the  con- 
struction of  an  otherwise  illegal  structure  will,  if  constitutional, 
abate  a  suit  for  an  injunction  against  the  further  maintenance  of 
the  structure,  although  not  set  up  by  plea,  answer,  or  demurrer."'^^ 

§  132.  Pleas  of  Matter  of  Record.  —  A  plea  founded  upon  matter 
of  record  sets  up  the  judgment  or  decree  of  a  court  of  record 
upon  the  same  matter  and  between  the  same  parties,  or  those  in 
privity  with  them,  in  a  cause  of  which  it  had  jurisdiction.  Pleas 
of  matter  of  record  are  in  some  of  the  books  distinguished  from 
pleas  of  matter  as  of  record.  This  distinction  was  due  to  the 
fact  that,  in  England,  the  Court  of  Chancery  in  its  ecpiitable 
jurisdiction,  the  Court  of  Admiralty  and  ecclesiastical  courts 
were  deemed  courts  not  of  record,  although  their  decrees  had 


Dutcli  Church,  10  Pet.  455;  West  Port-  G.  077,  689.     But  see  Ileys  r.  Astley,  9 

land   Iloinestoad  Assoc,  v.  Lownsdale,  17  Law  Times  N.  s.  350. 

Fed.  R.  205;  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  7.52.  i^  Bailey    v.    Wright,    2    Bond,     181; 

15  Stearns  v.  Page,  1  Story,  204.  IM'Closkey  v.  Barr,  ."8  Fed.  R.  105,  ItlO. 

16  Randall    v.   Howard,   2   Black,  585,  ■^>  Tiie  Clinton  Bridge,  10   Wall.  454. 
589.  But  see  Griffing  v.   Gibb,  2  Black,  519; 

1'  For  an  illustration  of  the  plea,  see  Liverpool,    New    York,    &    Philadelphia 

Jackson  i .  Ogiander,  2  II.  &  M.  405.  S.   S.  Co.   v.  Commissioners  of  Emigra- 

i*'  Ridgway  v.  Wharton,  3  De  G.  M.  &  tion,  113  U.  S.  33,  38. 


§  132.]  PLEAS   OF   MATTER   OF   RECORD.  237 

the  same  effect  as  the  judgments  of  courts  of  record.^  Judge 
Curtis  held  at  circuit,  that  a  judgment  in  a  court  of  a  foreign 
country  cannot  be  pleaded  in  bar; 2  but  in  the  present  state  of 
the  law,  the  soundness  of  his  decision  may  be  doubted.^  A 
decree  of  a  court  of  equity  dismissing  a  bill  to  i-cmove  a  cloud  on 
title  is  not  so  far  res  adjudicata  as  to  prevent  the  j)laintiff  from 
succeeding  in  a  subsequent  action  of  ejectment  against  the  same 
defendant,  although  the  court  of  equity  in  its  opinion  stated  that 
the  title  of  plaintiff  was  bad.*  A  decree  of  a  court  of  equity 
declaring  void  a  conveyance  of  land  beyond  its  jurisdiction,  but 
not  directing  a  reconveyance  of  such  land,  is  void,  and  does  not 
bind  a  court  within  the  jurisdiction  of  which  such  land  is  sit- 
uated.^ A  decree  of  a  court  of  equity  will  not  be  a  bar  if  it 
resulted  in  the  dismissal  of  a  l)ill  without  prejudice ;  ^  or  for  want 
of  prosecution;'  or  for  a  slip  in  practice;^  or  by  the  former 
English  practice,  if  it  had  not  been  signed  and  enrolled,  although 
it  could  then  be  insisted  on  by  answer  as  a  good  defense.^  No 
judgment  or  decree  rendered  after  a  proceeding  not  in  rem,  in 
which  the  defendant  therein  was  not  served  with  process  ;^^  or  in 
which  the  unsuccessful  party  was  denied  a  hearing,^i  or  some 
such  other  gross  injustice  was  perpetrated  as  to  render  the  so- 
called  judicial  proceeding  not  due  process  of  law,  is  of  any  effect. 
Judgments  or  decrees  obtained  l^y  fraud  are  not  conclusive  when 
properly  impeached. ^'-^  It  seems  that  a  decree  upon  a  bill  taken 
as  confessed  concludes  the  defendant  in  another  suit.^^  In  plead- 
ing a  judgment  or  decree,  it  is  not  necessary  to  set  it  forth,  or  the 

§  132.     1  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  778.  ^^  Durant  v.  Essex  Company,  7  Wall. 

2  Lyman  v.  Brown,  2  Curt.  559.  See  107,  109;  House  v.  Mullen,  22  Wall.  42, 
Burnham  v.  Webster,  1  W.  &  M.  172.  46 ;  Walclen  i:  Bodley,  14  Pet.  158;  Gist 

3  See  Hilton  v.  Guyott,  42  Fed.  R.  249  ;  i-.  Davis,  2  Hill  Cli.  (S.  C.)  335  ;  Grubb 
INIartin  v.  Nicolls,  3  Simons,  458 ;  Story,  v.  Clayton,  2  Hayw.  (N.  C.)  378.  See, 
Conflict  of  Laws,  §§  600-608.  however,  Starr  i:  Stark,  1  Saw.  270. 

<  Phelps  V.  Harris,  101  U.  S.  370.     But  9  Anon.,  3  Atk.  809 ;  Sto.  Eq.  PI.  §  700. 

see  State  v.  BuUer,  47  Fed.  R.  415.  w  Pennoyer  v.  Neff,  95  U.  S.  714;  Life 

^  Carpenter  l:  Strangp,  141  U.  S.  87.  Insurance  Co.  i-.  Bangs,  103  U.  S.  780; 

6  Durant  v.  Essex   Co.,  7  Wall.   107  ;  St.  Clair  v.  Cox,  106  U.  S.  350. 

House  c.  Mullen,  22  Wall.  42,  46;  North-  n  Bischoff  r.  Wethered,  9  Wall.  812; 

ern  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v.  St.  Paul,  M.  &  M.  Windsor  v.    IMcVeigh,    93  U.   S.    274  ; 

Ry.  Co.,  47  Fed.  R.  5.36  ;  mfra,  §  600.  Bradstreet  v.  Nept.  Ins.  Co.,  3  Sum.  601. 

7  American  Diamond  Rock  Boring  Co.  ''■-  Pac.  R.  R.  of  Mo.  i*.  Mo.  Pac.  Ry. 
V.  Sheldon,  17  Blatchf.  208  ;  s.  c.  4  Rnnn.  Co  ,  111  U.  S.  505. 

&  A.  551  ;  Keller  v.  Stolzcnbach,  20  Fed.  !■'  Thompson  v.  Wooster,  114  U.  S.  104, 
R.  47  ;  Conn  v.  Penn,  5  Wheat.  424,  427  ;  111,  112  ;  Ogilvie  v.  Heme,  13  Ves.  563. 
Badger  v.  Badger,  1  Cliff.  241. 


238  PLEAS.  [chap.  IX. 

proceedings  upon  which  it  was  founded,  at  length  ;  ^*  but  so  much 
of  the  decree  and  pleadings  should  be  set  forth  as  will  show  that 
the  same  point  Avas  then  in  issue,^^  and  the  court  may  requii-e  the 
decree  to  be  pleaded  at  length  ;^^  or  if  the  plea  sets  up  matter 
of  record  in  the  same  court,  to  show  the  record  before  the  plaintiff 
is  required  to  take  action  upon  the  plea.^" 

§  133.  Pleas  of  Matter  in  Pais.  —  Pleas  founded  upon  matter  in 
pais  state  some  other  reason,  for  example,  a  release,  or  an  account 
stated,  or  a  purchase  without  notice  for  a  valuable  consideration, 
why  the  plaintiff  should  not  have  relief.^  A  plea  of  purchase 
without  notice  for  a  valuable  consideration  should  deny  notice 
positively,^  and  should  state  the  amount  of  the  consideration.^  It 
is  insufficient  to  plead  that  the  defendant  ])aid  a  "  good  and  val- 
uable consideration,  to  wit,  a  certain  sum  of  money."  ^  A  plea  to 
a  bill  for  an  injunction  to  restrain  the  infringement  of  a  reissued 
patent,  which  set  up  that  the  claim  had  been  unlawfully  expanded 
so  as  to  embrace  subsequent  improvements  covered  by  later 
patents,  was  held  good.*  A  plea  to  a  bill  filed  under  §  4918  of 
the  Revised  Statutes  against  the  owner  of  a  patent  interfering 
witli  that  of  the  complainant,  which  set  up  that  the  invention 
described  in  the  complainant's  patent  was  described  in  a  previous 
English  patent  published  in  the  United  States,  and  filed  in  the 
Patent  Office  here  before  the  issue  of  the  complainant's  patent, 
was  held  bad  and  overruled.^ 

§  134.  Pleas  to  the  Discovery.  —  Pleas  to  the  discovery  set  up 
new  matter,  showing  (1)  that  the  plaintiff's  case  is  not  such  as 
entitles  a  court  of  equity  to  assume  jurisdiction  to  compel  a  dis- 
covery in  his  favor ;  (2)  that  the  plaintiff  has  no  such  interest  in 
the  subject-matter  of  the  action  as  entitles  him  to  call  upon  the 
defendant  for  a  discovery  ;  (3)  that  the  defendant  has  no  such 
interest  in  the  subject-matter  of  the  action  as  will  entitle  the 
plaintiff  to  call  upon  him  for  a  discovery;  (4)  that  the  situation 
of  the  defendant  renders  it  improper  for  a  court  of  equity  to  com- 

»  Kicanlo  >:  Gnrcias,  12  CI.  &  F.  .308;  §  13-3.     i  Story's    Eq.  PI.  §§  795-815- 
Story  Kq.  PI.  §  783.  -  Wood  v.  Mann,  1  Sumner,  506. 

1^  Garci.Ts  r.  Ricardo,  14  Simons,  205 ;  ^  Secombe  v.    Campbell,    18  Blatcbf 

Story  Eq.  Pi.  §  701  ;  Emma  Silv.  Mln.  Co.  108. 

>'.  Emma  Silv.  Min.  Co.  of  N.  Y.,  1  FeJ.  R.  *  Hubbell  v.  De  Land,  14  Fed.  R.  471. 

3!)  5  Pentlarpe  v.  Pentlarge,  19  Fed.  R. 

'c  Emma  Silv.  Min.  Co.  r.  Emma  Silv.  817;  s  c.  22  Fed.  R.  412.     But  see  Fos- 

Min.  Co.  of  N.  Y.,  1  Fed.  R.  39.  ter  v.  Lindsay,  3  Dill.  126,  131. 

1-  Ibid. 


§  136.]  FRAME   OF   A   PLEA.  239 

pel  him  to  make  a  discovery. ^  Of  them,  Professor  Langdell  says  : 
"  But  it  should  be  added  that,  while  demurrers  to  discovery  are 
common,  tliere  are  few  instances  of  pleas  of  that  kind ;  and  the 
cases  are  few  in  which  it  would  be  advisable  to  resort  to  such  a 
plea,  since  the  question  can  be  raised  equally  well  by  answer,  and 
then  the  defendant's  own  statement  of  the  facts  will  be  equally 
conclusive."^ 

§  135.  When  a  Plea  must  be  filed.  —  Unless  the  defendant's  time 
has  been  enlarged,  for  cause  shown,  by  a  judge  of  the  court,  upon 
motion  for  that  purpose,  the  plea  should  be  filed  on  the  rule-day 
next  succeeding  that  of  entering  the  defendant's  appearance.^ 

§  136.  Frame  of  a  Plea.  —  A  plea  is  entitled  in  the  cause,  and 
is  headed  as  follows :  ••'  The  plea  of  the  above-named  defendant 
(or,  of  A.  B.,  one  of  the  above-named  defendants)  to  the  bill  of 
complaint  of  the  above-named  })laintiff  (or  plaintiffs)."  When 
put  in  by  more  than  one  defendant,  the  heading  runs  as  follows  : 
"  The  joint  and  several  plea  of  the  above-named  defendants  (or 
of  A.  B.  and  C.  D.,  two  of  the  above-named  defendants)  : "  ^  but 
if  filed  by  husband  and  wife  in  the  wife's  interest  only,  the  words 
"  and  several "  should  be  omitted  ;  though  their  use,  being  mere 
surplusage,  will  not  vitiate  the  plea.^  The  title  of  the  plea 
should  agree  with  that  of  the  cause  as  stated  in  the  bill.  Any 
corrections  which  are  desired  to  be  made  must  be  put  in  the 
heading,  thus :  "  The  plea  of  the  above-named  defendant,  John 
Aber  (in  the  bill,  by  mistake  called  Henry  Aber)  ; "  or,  "  The 
plea  of  Henry  Curtis  and  Mary  his  wife,  lately,  and  in  the  bill 
called  Mary  Robinson,  spinster  "  (or  widow,  as  the  case  may  be).^ 
When  accompanied  by  an  answer  or  demurrer,  it  should  be 
headed  :  "  The  plea  and  answer  ; "  or  "  The  joint,"  or  "  joint 
and  several  plea  and  answer  ; "  or  "  The  joint  and  several  plea, 
answer,  and  demurrer,"  etc.,  according  to  the  circumstances.* 
Like  a  demurrer,  it  is  usually,  but  not  necessarily,  introduced  by 
a  useless  protestation  against  the  confession  of  the  truth  of  any 
matter  contained  in  the  bill.^  After  the  protestation,  the  de- 
fendant should  state  in  the  plea  the  extent  to  which  it  goes ; 

§  134.  1  Mitford's  PI.  ch.  2,  §  2,  part  2.         3  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (5th  Am.  ed.)  G81, 

■^  Langdell's  Eq.  PI.  §  148.  682. 

§  135.     1  Rule  18.  *  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (5th  Am.  ed.)  R82. 

§  136.     1  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (5th   Am.  5  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (5tli  Am.  ed.)682; 

ed.)  681.  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  694. 
^  Fitch  v.  Chapman,  2  Sim.  &  S.  31. 


240 


PLEAS. 


[chap.  IX. 


as  whether  it  is  to  the  whole  bill,  or  to  part  only,  and  in  the 
latter  case  the  part  to  which  it  is  intended  to  applj'.^  Next 
should  come  the  substance  of  the  plea  together  with  such  aver- 
ments as  are  necessary  to  support  it.'  If  these  matters  are 
within  the  defendant's  knowledge  he  should  state  them  posi- 
tively.^ Otherwise,  upon  information  and  belief.^  The  allega- 
tions must  be  made  with  certainty  and  not  by  way  of  argument, 
inference,  or  conclusion. i*^  The  })lea  cannot  properly  allege 
and  rely  upon  matters  all  of  Mhich  are  apparent  upon  the  face 
of  the  bill.^^  The  conclusion  of  the  plea  is  usually  a  repetition 
that  the  matters  so  offered  are  relied  upon  as  an  objection  to  the 
jurisdiction,  or  to  the  person  of  tlie  plaintiff  or  defendant,  or  to 
the  frame  of  the  bill  and  suit,  or  in  bar  of  the  suit ;  praying 
the  judgment  of  the  court,  whether  the  defendant  ought  to  be 
compelled  to  make  any  further  or  other  answer  to  the  bill,  or  so 
much  thereof  as  the  plea  extends  to.^^  It  does  not  appear  that 
any  particular  form  of  conclusion  is  necessary  to  a  plea  in 
equity .1^  Every  plea  must  be  sui)ported  by  a  certificate  of  coun- 
sel, that  in  his  opinion  it  is  well  founded  in  point  of  law,  and  by 
the  afiidavit  of  the  defendant,  that  it  is  not  interposed  for  delay, 
and  that  it  is  true  in  point  of  fact.^*  When  the  facts  alleged 
in  the  plea  are  within  the  defendant's  knowledge,  he  must  swear 
to  them  positively.  Otherwise,  upon  information  and  belief.^^ 
Whether  the  certificate  of  counsel  is  required  when  the  defend- 
ant defends  in  person  has  never  been  decided. ^^  If  the  affidavit 
or  certificate  are  omitted,  the  proper  remedy  would  seem  to  be 
a  motion  to  take  the  paper  purporting  to  be  a  plea  off  the  file  ;  ^^ 
but,  according  to  the  language  of  a  recent  opinion  of  the  Supreme 
Court,  the  plea  might  then  be  disregarded.^-     By  setting  down 


s  Mitford's  PI.  cli.  2,  §  2,  part  2  ; 
Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  094. 

"  xMitford's  PI.  ch.  2,  §  2,  part  2  ; 
Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  694. 

s  Foster  i:  Va.ssall,  8  Atk.  587  ;  Boone 
r.  Chiles,  10  Pet.  176,  210-213;  Story's 
Eq.  PI.  §  002. 

3  Boiton  r.  Gardner,  3  Paige  (N.  Y.), 
273  ;  Story's  Kq.  PI.  §  062. 

1''  Emma  Silver  Mining  Co.  r.  Emma 
Silver  Mining  Company  of  New  York, 
1  Fed.  R.  'S'J;  Nabob  of  Arcot  v.  East 
India  Co.,  3  Brown,  Ch.  C.  292;  Story's 
Eq.  PI.  §  002. 


11  Billing )-.  Flight,  1  Madd.  230  ;  Story's 
Eq.  PI.  §  600. 

1'^  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  094;  Mitford's  PI. 
ch.  2,  §  2,  part  2. 

13  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  {5th  Am.  ed.)  GS8. 

n  Kiile  31. 

15  Ewing  V.  Blight,  3  Wall.  Jr.  134. 

i«  See  U.  S.  P.  S.  §  747  ;  1  Hoffman's 
Ch.  Pr.  97;  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (5th  Am. 
ed.)  311,  note  7. 

1"  Ewing  V.  Blight,  3  Wall.  Jr.  134. 

1^  National  Bank  r.  Insurance  Co.,  104 
U.  S.  54. 


§  137.]  ANSWERS   WITH    PLEAS.  241 

the  pica  for  argument,  such  a  defect  is  waived. '^  Like  all  other 
proceedings  in  equity,  a  plea  must  contain  no  scandalous  or 
impertinent  matter.  If  it  does,  the  same  proceedings  may  be 
taken  upon  it  as  when  scandal  or  impertinence  is  contained  in 
an  answer.-*^  Only  one  plea  can  be  filed  unless  by  special  leave 
of  the  court. -^ 

§  137.  Answers  with  Pleas.  —  Although  the  purpose  of  a  plea 
is  usually  to  avoid  discovery,  yet  in  certain  cases  it  must  be  ac- 
companied by  an  answer.  If  the  plea  be  to  a  part  only  of  the 
bill,  it  must  ordinarily  be  accompanied  by  an  answer  or  demurrer 
to  the  residue.^  "  In  every  case  where  the  bill  specially  charges 
fraud  or  combination,  a  plea  to  such  part  must  be  accompanied 
with  an  answer  fortifying  the  plea  and  explicitly  denying  the 
fraud  and  combination,  and  the  facts  on  which  the  charge  is 
founded."  ^  Negative  and  anomalous  pleas  must  usually  be  ac- 
companied by  an  answer  giving  the  discovery  required  by  the  bill.'^ 
This  subject  is  now  of  comparatively  little  importance,  as  the 
objections  raised  by  such  pleas  can  now  be  taken  by  answer* 
wdth  more  safety  and  convenience.  The  clearest  statement  and 
explanation  of  the  rule  with  which  the  writer  is  acquainted,  is 
that  by  Professor  Langdell.  "  If  the  defence  which  is  set  up  by 
a  plea  has  been  antici|)ated  by  the  bill,  and  evidence  has  been 
charged  in  disproof  of  the  defence,  the  defendant  must  answer 
such  charges  of  evidence,  notwithstanding  his  plea,  for  an  answer 
to  that  extent  will  be  needed  in  trying  the  truth  of  the  plea.  The 
defendant,  therefore,  incorporates  an  answer  with  his  plea  ;  and 
then  the  answer  is  said  to  support  the  plea.  Such  an  answer,  it 
will  be  observed,  contains  discovery  only,  and  it  is  called  an 
answer  in  support  of  a  plea,  to  distinguish  it  from  the  case  where 
a  defendant  defends  by  answer  as  to  part  of  the  bill,  and  by  plea 
as  to  part."  ^  "  If  a  bill  anticipates  a  defence,  and,  without  ad- 
mitting its  truth,  replies  to  it  afhrmatively,  and  the  defendant 

1''  Goodyear  17.  Toby,  6  Rlatchf.  130.  C.  0.  49-3.      But  see   Hilton   v.   Guvott. 

•-'  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2(1   Am.  ed.)  686.  42  Fed.   R.   249. 

See  Di.Kon  i'.  Olmius,  1  Cox,  Eq.  412.  -  Hule  32;  Pintt  v.  Oliver,  1  McLean, 

-1  Wlieeler  v.   McCormick,  8   Biatclif.  29.5;    Lewis   v.   Baird,    3   McLean,    uO; 

267  ;  Lamb  v.  Starr,  Deady,  3.51;  Noyes  Bailey  v.  Wright,  2  Bond,  181.     But  see 

v.    Willard,  1    Woods,   187;     Reissner  r.  Hilton  r.  Guvott,  42  P>d.  R  249. 

Anness,  12  Off.  Gaz.  842;  s.  c.   :]  Bann.  »  Dwigbt  r.  Central  Vt.  R.  R.  Co.,  9 

&    A.  148.  Fed.  R.  785  ;  Langdell  Eq.  PI.  §§  101-114. 

§137.     1  Rules  18,  .32;  Langdell's  Eq.  ^  Rule  39. 

Pi.    §    99;     Ferguson   v.   O'Harra,   Pet.  *  Langdell  s  Eq.  PI.  §  100. 

VOL.  I. —  16 


242  PLEAS.  [chap.  IX. 

wishes  to  set  up  the  defence  by  plea,  it  is  obvious  that  he  must 
traverse  the  anticipatory  replication ;  for  otherwise,  in  tlie  event 
of  issue  being  taken  upon  the  truth  of  the  plea,  the  affirm ative 
replication  will  be  admitted  to  be  true.  A  negative  rejoinder, 
therefore,  must  be  incorporated  with  the  affirmative  plea.  Such 
pleas  have  become  common  in  modern  times ;  and  being  partly 
affirmative  and  partly  negative,  they  are  distinguished  by  the 
name  of  anomalous  pleas.  If  the  defendant  should  not  be  pre- 
pared to  deny  the  truth  of  the  affirmative  replication,  and  should 
wish  to  set  up  an  affirmative  answer  to  it,  of  course  both  branches 
of  his  plea  should  be  affirmative ;  but  no  instance  of  such  a  plea 
has  been  found  in  tiie  reported  cases.  If  an  anomalous  plea  be 
put  in  issue,  it  will  be  seen  that  each  party  has  something  to 
prove ;  namely,  the  defendant  his  affirmative  defence,  and  the 
plaintiff  his  affirmative  replication  ;  and  the  plaintiff  is,  therefore, 
entitled  to  discovery  as  to  the  latter.  Consequently,  an  anom- 
alous plea  must  always  be  supported  by  an  answer  as  to  the 
allegations  which  constitute  the  replication,  and  as  to  all  charges 
of  evidence,  if  any,  in  support  of  such  allegations."  ^  Such  an 
answer  is  usually  prefaced  by  an  averment  that  the  defendant 
does  not  thereby  waive  his  plea,  but  wholly  relies  thereon." 

§  138.  Proceedings  of  the  Plaintiff  when  a  Plea  is  filed  —  If 
the  allegations  in  a  plea  are  sufficient  and  true,  but  the  plaintiff 
can  produce  new  matter  which  will  avoid  its  effect,  he  must 
amend  his  bill,  introducing  by  way  of  pretence  or  otherwise  a 
statement  of  the  matters  contained  in  the  plea,  and  also  a  sub- 
stantive allegation  of  the  new  matter  by  which  he  avoids  it. 
In  such  a  case,  at  common  law  or  by  the  earlier  chancery  prac- 
tice, he  would  reply  by  confession  and  avoidance  ;  but  si>ecial 
replications  are  no  longer  used  in  equity,  their  purpose  being 
sufficiently  answered  by  the  practice  of  amendment.^  Other- 
wise, the  plaintiff  may  either  move  to  take  the  plea  off  the  file 
for  irregularity ,2  or  set  down  the  plea  to  be  argued,'^  or  move 
for  a  reference  to  a  master,"*  or  take  issue  upon  the  plca.^     If 

G  Langdell's  Eq.  El.  §  101.     See  also  SS4  ;  Rules  20,  G6  ;  Story's  Eq.  PI.  clis, 

LansideU's  Eq.   PI.   §§    102-114  ;  Story's  xix.,  xx. 

Eq.  PI.  §§  6G8--(;74  ;  Foley  c.  Hill,  3  Myl.  2  Ewin^  v.  Blight,  3  Wall.  Jr.  134. 

&  Cr.  476.  3  Rule  33. 

7  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  695.  *  Tarleton  v.  Barnes,  2  Keen,  632. 

§  138.     1  Mason  v.  Hartford,  Provi-         5  Rule  33. 
dence  &  Fishkill  K.  R.  Co.,  10  Fed.  R. 


§  139.]  MOTION    TO    TAKE   A    PLEA    OFF   THE   FILE.  243 

he  neither  amends  nor  takes  any  of  these  proceedings  before 
the  rule-day  next  after  that  on  which  the  same  was  filed,  he  is 
deemed  to  admit  the  truth  and  sufficiency  of  the  plea,  and  his 
bill  will  be  dismissed  as  of  course,  unless  a  judge  of  the  court 
shall  allow  him  further  time  for  the  purpose.^  More  indulgence 
in  this  respect  will  be  allowed  to  States  than  to  individuals," 
and  the  plaintiff  is  not  obliged  to  take  notice  of  a  plea  until  it 
has  been  entered  in  the  order  book  or  served  upon  hini.^  In 
case  of  a  motion  to  take  the  plea  off  the  file,  it  will  be  more 
prudent  to  obtain  an  extension  of  time  wherein  to  reply  or  set 
down  the  pica,  in  case  it  should  be  allowed  to  remain.^  No  one, 
except  the  defendant  who  files  a  plea,  can  take  advantage  of 
the  failure  of  the  plaintiff  to  act  upon  it.^*^  Where  the  plaintiff 
had  taken  no  action  upon  the  ])lea  for  eight  months,  it  was  held 
that  the  defendant  might  withdraw  it  and  file  an  answer.^^ 
Otherwise,  neither  party  is,  in  general,  at  liberty  to  take  any 
step  in  a  cause  after  the  filing  of  a  plea,  until  the  plea  is  dis- 
posed of.^^  If  the  defendant  pleads  to  the  relief  only,  and  pro- 
poses to  answer  the  whole  discovery  required,  the  plaintiff  may 
file  exceptions  to  the  answer.^^  This,  it  was  formerly  held,  he 
could  not  do  unless  by  special  leave  of  the  court,  without 
thereby  admitting  the  truth  of  a  plea  which  extended  to  any 
part  of  the  discovery.^*  In  an  extraordinary  case,  a  motion  for 
an  injunction  might  be  made  while  a  i)lea  was  pending ;  but  the 
more  usual  course  is  to  pray  the  court  to  expedite  the  hearing 
of  the  plea.^'^  When  a  plea  and  a  demurrer  were  filed  at  the 
same  time,  it  was  held  that  action  on  the  plea  should  be  post- 
poned till  tlie  hearing  on  the  demurrer.^^ 

§  139.  Motion  to  take  a  Plea  off  the  File.  —  A  motion  to  take  a 
plea  off  the  file  is,  it  seems,  the  proper  remedy,  when  the  plea 
was  filed  too  late,^  or  has  such  an  irregularity  in  form  as  the 

^  I^ule  38.  13  Picrot  i'.  Stace,  2  Dickens,  496 ;  Sid- 

■  Rhode   Island    v.  Massacluisetts,  14  ney  v  Perry,  2  Dickens,  602. 

Pet.  210.  14  Darnell    v.    Reyny,    1    Vern.    344 ; 

8  Newby  v.  Oregon  Central  Ry.Co.,  1  Brownell  v.  Curtis,  10  Paige  (N.  Y.),  210. 
Saw.  63,  65.  i5  Ewing  v.   Bliglit,   .3  Wall.  Jr.    139; 

9  See  Rule  38.  Ilumplireys   v.  Humphreys,  3  P.   Wms. 
1''  Chicago  &  Alton  R.  R   Co.  r.  Union     303. 

Rolling  Mill  Co.,  100  U.  S.  702,  717.  i«  Cambell  v.  Mayer,  33  Fed.  R.  795. 

"  Oliver  V.  Decatur,   4  Cranch   C.  C.  §  139.  i  McKewan  r.  Sanderson,  L.  R. 

458.  16  Eq.  31G  ;  Ewing  r.  Blight,  3  Wall.  Jr. 

1-  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (5th  Am.  ed.)  691 ;  134, 
Buchanan  v.  Hodgson,  11  Beav.  368. 


244  PLEAS.  [chap.  IX. 

omission  of  the  requisite  affidavit  and  certificate.'-^  In  a  patent 
case,  a  plea  which  simply  denied  infringement  was  stricken  from 
the  files  as  improper  in  form.-'^  When  two  pleas  are  filed  with- 
out special  leave,  the  defendant  will  be  obliged  to  elect  between 
them  within  ten  days.  Otherwise,  both  will  be  ordered  to  stand 
for  an  answer,*  or  possibly  be  stricken  out.^  Unless,  however, 
an  objection  to  such  a  defect  is  si)ecifically  made,  it  will  lie 
considered  waived.^ 

§  140.  Argument  of  a  Plea.  —  "  If  the  plaintiff  conceives  a  plea  to 
be  defective  in  point  of  form  or  substance,  he  may  take  the  judgment 
of  the  court  upon  its  sufficiency.  And  if  tlie  defendant  is  anxious 
to  have  the  point  determined,  he  may  also  take  the  same  jirocecd- 
ing."^  A  plea  is  set  down  for  argument  in  the  same  manner  as  is 
a  demurrer,  and  the  proceedings  at  the  argument  ai-c  also  substan- 
tially the  same.  A  plaintiff  has  been  allowed,  although  the  practice 
is  irregular,  to  file  a  demurrer  to  a  plea  ;  in  which  case  the  demurrer 
presents  the  question  of  the  sufficiency  of  the  bill  as  well  as  the 
plea.2  The  sufficiency  of  the  bill  as  to  substance  is  also  tested 
when  the  plea  is  set  do*vn  for  argument ;  but  it  has  been  said 
that  the  allegations  therein  arc  not  taken  so  strictly  against  the 
comi)lainant  as  in  case  of  a  demurrer.^  It  has  been  said  that  when 
a  plea  is  set  down  for  argument,  the  com[)lainant  cannot  take  any 
exception  to  its  regularity  or  form.'*  For  the  purpose  of  the  argu- 
ment, all  allegations  in  the  pica  which  arc  not  inconsistent  with 
each  other  are  presumed  to  be  true  ;^  but  if  a  document  is  referred 
to  in  the  plea  and  annexed  thereto,  its  language  will  control  the 
description  of  it  set  forth  in  the  body  of  the  plea.^  Upon  argument, 
a  ])lea  may  be  allowed,  or  the  benefit  thereof  may  be  reserved  to  the 
hearing,  or  it  may  be  ordered  to  stand  for  an  answer,  or  it  may  be 

2  Ewing  V.   Blight,  3  Wall.  Jr.  1.34;  2  Beard  v.  Bowler,  2  Bond,  13;  Good- 
Sharp   V.    Reissner,   20   Blatchf.    10,    13.  year  y.  Toby,  6  Blatchf  130.    See  Stead's 
But  see  National  Bank  v.  Insurance  Co.,  Executors  r.  Course,  4  Craiich,  403,  410. 
104  U.  S.  54,  7G;    Secor  r.  Singleton,  9  ^  Rumbold  i'.  Forteatli,  2  Jur.  n.  s.  686. 
Fed.  B.  809;  s.  c.  3  McCrary,  230.  ■*  Green,  J.,  in   Kellner  ;•.  Mutual  Life 

3  Sharp   V.   Beissner,  20  Blatchf.   10,  Ins.  Co.,  48  Fed.  B.  023,  62(3. 

13,  5  Melius    r.    Thompson,    1    Cliff    12-); 

*  Reissner r.  Anness,  12  Off.  Gaz.  i^42;  Ex'rs  of  Gallagher  ?.-.  Roberts,  1   Wasli. 

s.  C.  3  Bann.&  A.  148;    Noyos  r.  Willard,  320;  Farley    r.  Kitson,    120   U.    S.    .30:!; 

1  Woods,  187.  Kellner  v.  Mutual   Life  Ins.  Co  ,  43  Fed. 

8  Newby  v.  Oregon  Central  By.  Co.,  1  B.  623,  626. 

Saw.  63,  67.  '''  Wheeler   v.   McCormick,   8   Blatchf 

G  Sharon  v.  Hill,  22  Fed.  R.  28.  267. 

§  140.  1  Mitford's  PI.  ch.  2,  §  2,  part  2. 


§  140.]  AEGUMINT   OF    A    PLEA.  245 

overruled  J  "  In  the  first  case  the  plea  is  determined  to  be  a  full 
bar  to  so  much  of  the  bill  as  it  covers,  if  the  matter  pleaded,  with 
the  averments  necessary  to  sup])ort  it,  are  true."  ^  If,  therefore,  a 
plea  is  allowed  upon  argument  the  pkuntiff  may  take  issue  upon 
it,  and  have  a  trial  of  tiie  truth  of  the  facts  ujton  which  it  is 
sought  to  be  sui)ported.^  "  If  a  plea  accompanied  by  an  answer 
is  allowed,  the  answer  may  be  read  at  the  hearing  of  the  cause  to 
counterprove  the  plea."  ^  If  upon  the  hearing  any  demurrer  or 
plea  be  allowed,  the  defendant  is  entitled  to  his  costs.  But  the 
court  may,  in  its  discretion,  upon  motion  of  the  plaintiff,  allow 
him  to  amund  his  bill  upon  such  terms  as  it  shall  deem  rea- 
sonable.^ "  If,  upon  argument,  the  benefit  of  a  plea  is  saved 
to  the  hearing,  it  is  considered  that  so  far  as  appears  to  the 
court  it  is  a  full  defence,  but  that  there  may  be  matter  disclosed 
in  evidence  which  would  avoid  it,  supposing  the  matter  pleaded 
to  be  strictly  true ;  and  the  court  therefore  will  not  preclude 
the  question."  ^^  In  such  a  case,  the  truth  of  the  plea  must  be 
established,  and  at  the  hearing  the  plaintiff  may  avoid  it  by  other 
matter,  which  he  is  at  liberty  to  prove.^^  ''  When  a  plea  is 
ordered  to  stand  for  an  answer,  it  is  merely  determined  that  it 
contains  matter  which  may  be  a  defence,  or  part  of  a  defence  ; 
but  that  it  is  not  a  full  defence,  or  it  has  been  informally  offered 
by  way  of  plea,  or  it  has  not  been  properly  supported  by  answ^er, 
so  that  the  truth  of  it  is  doubtful.  For  if  a  plea  requires  an 
answer  to  support  it,  upon  argument  of  the  plea  the  answer 
may  be  read  to  counterprove  the  plea  ;  and  if  the  defendant 
appears  not  to  have  sufficiently  supported  his  ])lea  by  his  answer, 
the  plea  must  be  overruled,  or  ordered  to  stand  for  an  answer 
only.  A  plea  is  usually  ordered  to  stand  for  an  answer  where 
it  states  matter  which  may  be  a  defence  to  the  bill,  though 
perhaps  not  proper  for  a  plea,  or  informally  pleaded.  But  if  a 
})lea  states  nothing  which  can  be  a  defence,  it  is  merely  over- 
ruled. If  a  plea  is  ordered  to  stand  for  an  answer,  it  is  allowed 
to  be  a  sufficient  answer  to  so  much  of  the  bill  as  it  covers, 
unless  by  the  bill  liberty  is  given  to  except.  But  that  liberty 
may  be  qualified,  so  as  to  protect  the  defendant  from  any  par- 

7  Mitford  PI.  ch.  2.  §  2,  part  2;  See  R.         i"  Mitfonl's  PI.  ch.  2.  §  2,  part  2. 

I  V.  Mass.,  14  Pet.  21o!^  2r,7--2r>9.  u  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  698;  Kliode  Island 

8  Mitford's  PI.  cli.  2,  §  2,  part  2.  r.  Massachusetts,  14* Pet.  210,  257-259. 
^  Rule  35. 


246  PLEAS.  [chap.  IX. 

ticular  discovery  which  we  ought  not  to  be  compelled  to  make : 
and  if  a  plea  is  accompanied  by  an  answer,  and  is  ordered  to 
stand  for  an  answer  without  liberty  to  except,  the  plaintiff  may 
yet  except  to  the  answer  as  insufticient  to  the  parts  of  the  bill 
not  covered  by  the  plea."  ^^  Where  one  defense  is  made  by  the 
plea  and  another  by  an  answer  filed  with  it,  the  plea  may  be 
ordered  to  stand  for  an  answer.^^ 

A  plea  formerly  might  have  been  overruled  for  three  reasons  ; 
because  it  was  bad,  as  defective  in  foi'm,  or  insufficient  in  point 
of  law ;  because,  though  good  as  to  a  part  of  the  bill,  it  was  filed 
to  more  than  it  could  cover  ;  and  because  the  defendant  anwered 
some  or  all  of  the  matters  covered  by  it.^"*  Now,  however,  a 
pure  plea,  though  filed  to  the  whole  bill,  may  be  sustained  as 
to  a  part  only.^^  But  an  answer  to  the  whole  bill  will  over- 
rule a  plea  in  bar  filed  by  the  answering  defendant. ^"^  "  The 
rule  that  no  plea  is  to  be  held  bad  only  because  the  answer 
may  extend  to  some  part  of  the  same  matter  as  may  be  covered 
by  the  plea,  is  not  a])plicaljle  where  the  answer  extends  to  the 
whole  of  the  matter  covered  by  the  plea."  ^"  If  upon  the  hear- 
ing any  plea  is  overruled,  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  his  costs  in 
the  cause  up  to  that  period,  unless  the  court  is  satisfied  that  the 
defendant  has  good  ground,  in  point  of  law  or  fact,  to  interpose 
the  same,  and  it  was  not  interposed  vexatiously  or  for  delay. 
And  upon  the  o^■erruling  of  any  plea,  the  defendant  is  assigned 
to  answer  the  bill,  or  so  much  thereof  as  is  covered  by  the  plea, 
the  next  succeeding  rule-day,  or  at  such  other  period  as,  con- 
sistently with  justice  and  the  rights  of  the  defendant,  the  same 
can  in  the  judgment  of  the  court  be  reasonably  done ;  in  default 
whereof,  the  bill  is  taken  against  him  pro  confesso,  and  the 
matter  thereof  proceeded  in  and  decreed  accordingly.^^  Under 
this  rule  it  has  been  held  that  permission  to  answer  cannot  be 

12  Mitford's  PI.  ch.  2,  §  2,  part  2.  505.      But   see   Milligan   v.   IMilledge,  3 

1=^  Lewis  V.  Baird,  o  McLean,  56,  62.  Crancli,  220. 

14  Wijrram  on  Discovery  (Isted.),  172-  i"  Grant  v.  Phoenix  Life  Ins.  Co.,  121 
181  ;  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §§  688,  G93 ;  Tliring  U.  S.  105,  115;  Dakin  v.  Union  Pacific 
V.  Edgar,  2  Sim.  &  S.  274;  Salkeld  v.  By.  Co.,  5  Fed.  R.  665;  Crescent  City 
Science,  2  Vcs.  Sen.  107  ;  Cliamberlain  Live  Stock  Co.  v.  Butchers'  Union  Live 
r.  Agar,  2  V.  &  B.  250 ;  Stearns  r.  Page,  Stock  Co.,  12  Fed.  R.  225.  But  see 
1  Story,  204  ;  Ferguson  v.  O'llarra,  Pet.  Hayes  v.  Dayton,  8  Fed.  R.  702,  706. 

C.  C.  49.1  "  Grant  r.  Piioenix  Life  In3.  Co.,  121 

15  Rules  86.  .37;  Wytlie  v.  Pahiier,  .3     U.  S.  105,  115. 
Saw.  412 ;  Kirkpatrick  v.  Wliite,  4  Wash.        18  Rule  36. 


§  142.]  HEAPJNG   UPON    PLEAS.  247 

denied  the  defendant.^^  Upon  the  overruling  of  a  plea,  permis- 
sion to  amend  it  may  he  given ;  ^o  or  a  second  plea  upon  a 
different  ground  may  he  interposed,  hut  only  hy  leave  of  the 
court.^^  If  put  in  without  leave,  such  a  new  plea  will,  on 
motion,  he  taken  off  the  file.^  It  seems  that  after  his  plea  is 
overruled,  the  defendant  may  demur,  at  least  to  a  part  of  the 
hill,  hy  leave  of  the  court.'^-^ 

§  141.  Motion  for  a  Reference  of  a  Plea.  —  There  are  SOme  pleas 
upon  \vhich  no  issue  is  taken.  Such  were  pleas  of  outlawry  and 
excommunication,  which  were  always  pleaded  sub  sic/illo,  that  is, 
under  the  seal  of  the  court  which  had  pronounced  the  sentence. 
The  truth  of  the  fact  pleaded  in  them  could,  therefore,  be  ascer- 
tained from  the  form  of  pleading.  The  plaintifi'  was,  however, 
at  liberty  to  show  that  the  plea  was  defective  in  form,  or  that  it 
did  not  apply  to  the  particular  case  ;  and  for  these  purposes  he 
might  have  the  plea  argued.^  "  Pleas  of  a  former  decree,  or  of 
another  suit  depending,  are  generally  in  the  same  predicament, 
being  referred  to  a  master  to  inquire  into  the  fact.  If  in  any  of 
these  cases,  the  master  reports  the  fact  true,  the  bill  stands 
instantly  dismissed,  uuless  the  court  otherwise  orders.  But  the 
plaintiff  may  except  to  the  master's  report,  and  bring  on  the 
matter  to  be  argued  before  the  court ;  and  if  he  conceives  the 
plea  to  be  defective,  in  point  of  form  or  otherwise,  independent 
of  the  mere  truth  of  the  fact  pleaded,  he  may  set  down  the  plea 
to  be  argued  as  in  the  case  of  pleas  in  general."  ^  Where  it  is 
manifest  upon  the  face  of  the  plea  that  the  two  suits  are  not 
alike,  no  reference  will  be  ordered.^  By  the  English  practice,  if 
the  plaintiff  set  down  a  plea  for  argument,  he  admitted  its  truth; 
and  if  good  in  form  it  was  sustained.* 

§  142.  Hearing  upon  Pleas,  —  If  the  complainant  deems  a  plea 
sufficient  in  form,  or  it  has  been  so  held  by  the  court,  he  can 

19  Wooster  v.  Blake,  7  Fed.  R.  816.  bel,  1  Ves.  Sen.  240  ;  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr. 

-^  Sanders  v.  King,  6  Madd.  61  ;  Loving  (5tli  Am.  ed.)  702. 
V.  Fairchild,  1  McLean,  333  ;  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  141.   i  Mitford's  Vl  ch.  2,  §  2,  part  2. 

§  954.  2  Mitford's  VI  cli.  2.  §  2,  part  2.     See 

-1    McKewan   v.   Sanderson,   L.   R.   16  also  Emma  Silver  Mining  Co.  v.  Emma 

Eq.    316  ;     Cliadwick    v.    Broadwood,   3  Silver  Mining  Company  of   New  York, 

Beav.  316;  Lamb  2-.  Starr,  Dendy,  350;  1    Fed.    R.    39;     Jones   v.    Segueira,     1 

Wiieeler   i-.    McCormick,   8    Blatchford,  Phillips,   82;    Story's    Eq.   PI.    §§    700, 

267.  743,  744. 

^^  McKewan    v.    Sanderson,  L.    R.    10  ^  Loring  r.  Marsh,  2  Cliff.  .311. 

Eq.  316.  *   Tarleton  v.   Barnes,   2   Keen,   632. 

23  The  East  India  Company  v.  Camp-  See  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §§  743,  744. 


248  PLEAS.  [chap.  IX. 

still  test  its  truth  by  taking  issue  upon  it.^  He  does  this  by 
filing  the  general  replication.^  The  proceedings  in  taking  testi- 
mony, and  bringing  the  cause  to  a  hearing,  are  substantially  the 
same  as  after  an  issue  raised  upon  an  answer.^  At  the  hearing, 
the  defendant  has  the  right  to  open  and  close  the  argument,  and 
the  burden  of  proof  rests  upon  him.'*  If  the  })lea  be  then  found 
false,  the  plaintiff  may,  if  he  so  choose,  have  the  bill  taken  pro 
eonfesso/'  "  Having  put  the  plaintiff  to  the  trouble  and  delay  of 
an  issue,  the  defendant  cannot,  after  it  has  been  found  against 
him,  claim  the  right  to  file  an  answer,  although,  if  the  complain- 
ant desires  a  discovery,  which  the  plea  is  sought  to  avoid,  he  may 
undoubtedly  insist  upon  it."  '^  In  an  extraordinary  case,  how- 
ever, the  court  might  still  allow  the  defendant  to  answer.'^  If 
the  plea  were  found  true,  according  to  the  former  practice  the 
plea  was  held  a  complete  defense  to  so  much  of  the  bill  as  it  was 
intended  to  apply  to  ;  and  if  filed  to  the  whole  bill,  the  bill 
would  be  dismissed  as  of  course,  irrespective  of  the  sufficiency  of 
the  plea.^  Now,  however,  the  equity  rules  provide  that  "  if, 
upon  an  issue,  the  facts  stated  in  the  plea  be  determined  for  the 
defendant,  they  shall  avail  him  as  far  as  in  law  and  equity  they 
ought  to  avail  him."  ^  Under  this  rule,  it  has  been  held  that  after 
a  replication  has  been  filed  and  testimony  taken,  the  court  may, 
without  examining  the  testimony,  overrule  the  jilea  for  insuffi- 
ciency and  allow  the  defendant  to  answer.^^  If,  however,  the 
trutli  of  a  plea  upon  which  issue  has  been  joined  is  not  estab- 


§  142.       1  Mitfnrd's  PI.    ch.   2,   §  2,  Taney,  in  Poultney  r.  City  of  La  Fayette, 

part  2 ;  Khode  Island  v.  Massachusetts,  12  Pet.  472,  474. 

14  Pet.  210  257.  ^  Hughes   v.   Blake,   6   Wheat.   453; 

2  Hughes  !'.  Blake,  6  Wheat.  453.  s.   c.    1   Mason,   515;    Rliode    Island   v. 

3  Reissner  v.  Anness,  13  Off.  Gaz.  7 ;  Massachusetts,  14  Pet.  210,  257  ;  Myers 
Lilienthal  v.  Washburn,  8  Fed.  R.  707  ;  r.  Dorr,  13  Blatchf.  22  ;  Theberath  i: 
Hughes  r.  Blake,  6  Wheat.  453,  472;  Rubber  &  Celluloid  Harness  Trimming 
Farlev  v.  Kittson,  120  IT.  S.  303.  Co.,     5    Bann.     &    A.   584 ;     Cottle     r. 

4  Stead's  Executors  v.  Course,  4  Krcmentz.  25  Fed.  R.  494 ;  Birdseye  v. 
rrnnch,  403,  413;  Gernon  v.  Boecaline,  Heilner.  20  Fed.  R.  147;  Bean  v.  Clark, 
2    Wa.^ii.    109;     Farley   v.    Kittson,    120  30  Fed.  R.  225. 

V    S.    .303;   Lilienthal   v.   Washburn.    8  9  i{„ip  :;;^.     But  see  Myers  »•.  Dorr,  13 

Fed.   R.   707  ;    Sharon  v.    Hill,    22   Fed.  Blatchf.  22. 

11   28.  ^^  Mattl\ews  v.   Lalance  &  G.  Manuf. 

5  Kennedy  v.  Creswell.  101  U.  S.  641,  Co.,  2  Fed.  R.  232.  But  see  Myers  v. 
644;  Mitford's  PI.  ch.  2.  §  2,  part  2.  Dorr,  13  Blatchf.  22  ;  Theberatli  >■.  Ruh- 

6  Mr.  Justice  Bradley  in  Kennedy  v.  her  &  Celluloid  Harness  Trimminti  Co., 
Creswell,  101  U.  S.  041,  644.  5  Bann.  &  A.  584  ;  Cottle  v.   Krementz, 

T  In  the  language  of    Chief  Justice  25  Fed.  R.  494. 


§  143.]  GENERAL    REMARKS   UPON    PLEAS.  249 

lished,  the  bill  cannot  before  answer  be  dismissed  for  want  of 
equity. ^1  Leave  to  withdraw  the  replication  and  amend  or  to  set 
down  the  plea  for  argument  may  under  special  circumstances  he 
obtained.^2  By  replying  to  a  plea,  objections  to  its  form  or  for  a 
failure  to  support  it  by  answer  are  waived. ^^ 

§  143.  General  Remarks  upon  Pleas.  —  In  conclusion,  it  may  be 
remarked  that  the  cautious  practitioner  will  act  wisely  in  eschew- 
ing the  use  of  pleas,  unless  he  desires  to  plead  matter  in  abate- 
ment, or  in  extraordinary  cases.  For  it  is  as  true  now  as  in  the 
time  of  Beames,  that  the  subject  of  pleas  in  equity  is  one  "  con- 
cerning which  so  much  still  remains  to  be  elucidated,  that  it  may 
be  said  of  them,  77iaxi77ia  j^i^rs  eoi'um  quae  scimus  est  minima  eoi'um 
quae  igyioraynus.^^  ^ 

11  Farley  v.  KiUson,  120  U.  S.  303.  "    Stead's    Executors    v.    Course,    4 

1-  Cottle  I'.  Krenientz,  25  Fed.  R.  404;  Cranch,  403;  Farley  v.  Kittson,  120  U.  S. 

Hughes  V.  Blake,   6    Wheat.   453,    473:  303. 

Rules  29  and  35.  §  143.     i  Beames  on  Pleas,  61. 


250  ANSWEES   AND   DISCLAIMERS.  [CHAP.  X. 


CHAPTER  X. 

ANSWERS    AND    DISCLAIMERS. 

§  144.  Pleading  Defenses  in  an  Answer.  —  An  answer  in  equity 
serves  two  purposes,  the  setting  up  of  the  defenses  to  the  suit,  and 
discovery.  It  cannot  ordinarily  pray  relief  against  the  complain- 
ant, and  never  against  a  co-defendant.^  If  a  defendant  desires 
such  relief  he  must  ordinarily  file  a  cross-bill.^  The  defendant  is 
entitled  in  all  cases  by  answer  to  insist  upon  all  matters  of  defense 
(not  being  matters  of  abatement,  or  to  the  character  of  the  parties, 
or  matters  of  form),  in  bar  of  or  to  the  merits  of  the  bill,  of  which 
he  may  be  entitled  to  avail  himself  by  a  plea  in  bar.^  Matters  in 
abatement,  such  as  lis  pendens,  which  do  not  affect  the  jurisdic- 
tion, cannot  be  set  up  by  answer.^  An  answer  may  contain  de- 
fenses which  have  been  previously  raised  by  plea  or  demurrer  and 
overruled .5  Facts  that  have  occurred  since  the  filing  of  the  bill 
may  be  pleaded  in  an  answer.^  The  defenses  must  not  be  incon- 
sistent with  each  other.^  If  so,  it  seems,  that  both  will  be  disre- 
garded,^ unless  the  inconsistent  allegations  are  trifling,  when  they 
may  be  treated  as  surplusage.^  It  is  not  considered  inconsistent 
for  a  defendant  l)oth  to  deny  the  complainant's  title  and  to  allege 
that  he  has  waived  a  right  which  he  claims  under  it.^'^  The  de- 
fense of  a  license  from  the  plaintiff  to  commit  the  acts  complained 
of  is,  in  the  absence  of  special  covenants  or  recitals  in  the  license, 
not  inconsistent  with  other  defenses  impugning  the  validity  of 

§  144.   1  Ford  y.  Douglas,  5  How.  143;  Cli.  C.  305;  Turner  v.  Robinson,  1  Sim. 

Hubbard   v.    Turner,    2     McLean,    519 ;  &  S.  3. 

Morgans.  Tipton, 3  McLean,  339  ;  Cliapin  ■?  Chapman  r.  School  District  No.   1, 

V.  Walker,  6  Fed.  K.  794;  s.   c.  2  Me-  Deady,  108,  115;  .Jesus  College  r.  Gibbs, 

Crary,  175.  1  Y.  '&,  C.  145,  147  ;  Leech  v.  Bailey,  6 

2  See  cliapter  XIII.,  Cross-Bills.  Price,  504;  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (5th  Am. 

3  Rule  39.  ed.)  714. 

*  Pierce  v.  Feagans,  39  Fed.  R.  587  ;  ^  Jesus  College   v.  Gibbs,   1   Y.  &  C 

jr(/;)w,  §  125.  145 ;  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (5th  Am.  ed.)  714. 

6  Crawford   v.  The  William    Penn,   3  ^  Jenkinson  v.  Royston,  5  Price,  496, 

Wash.  484  ;  Burnley  v.  Town  of  Jeffer-  510;  Daniell's  Cli.  Pr.  (5th  Am.  ed.)  714. 

sonville,  3  McLean,  336;   Storms  v.  Kan-  i"  Carte  v.  Ball,  3  Atk.  490,  499 ;  Com- 

sas  Pacific  Ry.  Co.,  5  Dill.  480;  Rhode  stock  v.  Herron,  45  Fed.  R.  600;  Daniell's 

Island  V.  Massachusetts,  14  Pet.  210.  Ch.  Pr.  (5th  Am.  ed.)  714. 

s  Earl  of  Leicester  v.  Perry,  1  Brown 


§  145.]       DEFENSES  PECULIAR  TO  PATENT  CASES.         251 

complainant's  patent.^^  The  defenses  must  be  pleaded  witli  suffi- 
cient certainty ;  ^^  although  it  seems  that  the  same  degree  of  cer- 
tainty is  not  required  in  an  answer  as  in  a  bill,^^  or  a  plea.^*  It 
has  been  said  that  "  the  respondent  cannot  set  up  as  a  defense 
that  if  comi)lainant's  patent  be  so  construed  as  to  cover  the  ma- 
chine made  and  sold  by  him,  then  the  machine  embraced  in  said 
patent  was  known  and  used  prior  to  the  invention  thereof  by  the 
patentee."  ^^  An  averment  that  a  patent  "  was  obtained  upon 
false  and  fraudulent  representations  by  the  plaintiffs,  or  some  of 
them,  made  to  the  commissioner  of  patents,  and  is  wholly  void  at 
law,"  is  also  too  uncertain  to  be  sufficient  to  constitute  a  defense. ^^ 
The  general  rule  is  that  no  affirmative  defense  can  be  proved  un- 
less it  has  been  set  u})  in  the  answer.^'  In  a  suit  to  restrain  the 
infringement  of  a  patent,  a  license  is  an  affirmative  defense. ^^  It 
has  been  said  that,  if  a  defendant  states  in  his  answer  certain  facts 
as  evidence  of  a  particular  case,  which  he  represents  to  be  the 
consequence  of  those  facts,  and  upon  which  he  rests  his  defense, 
he  is  not  permitted  afterwards  to  make  use  of  the  same  facts,  for 
the  purpose  of  establishing  a  different  defense  from  that  to  which, 
by  his  answer,  he  has  drawn  the  plaintiff's  attention. ^'^  Thus  it 
has  been  said  that  where  fraud  is  set  up  in  the  answer  "  the  party 
making  the  charge,  if  it  is  denied  in  a  proper  pleading,  will  be 
confined  to  that  issue."  ^'^ 

§  145.  Defenses  peculiar  to  Patent  Cases.  —  The  Revised  Statutes 
provide  that  the  defendant  to  a  suit  in  equity  for  relief  against 
an  alleged  infringement  of  a  patent  may  set  up  in  his  answer  any 
one  or  more  of  the  following  defenses,  and  give  notice  therein 
that  he  will  offer  proof  of  the  same  :  "  First,  that  for  the  purpose  of 
deceiving  the  public  the  descri[)tion  and  specification  filed  by  the 
patentee  in  the  Patent  Office  was  made  to  contain  less  than  the 
whole  truth  relative  to  his  invention  or  discovery,  or  more  than 
is  necessary  to  produce  the  desired  effect ;  or,  second,  that  he  had 

11  National   Manuf.   Co.   v.   Meyers,  7  (S.  C.)   Eq.  509,  520;  Burnham  v.  Dai- 
Fed.  R.  355.  ling,  3  C.  E.  Green  (18  N.  J.  Eq.),  132  ; 

12  Graham  v.  Mason,  4  Cliff.  88;   Arm-  Daniell's  Cli.  Pr.  (.5th  Am.ed.)  712  ;  Black 
strong  V.  Lear,  8  Pet.  52.  v.  Thorne,  10  Blatchf.  66,  84 ;  Sperry  v. 

i»  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (5th  Am.  ed.)  714.  Erie  My.  Co.,  0  Blatchf.  425. 

1*  Maury  v.  Mason,  8  Porter  (Ala.), 213,  '»  Watson  v.  Smith.  7  Fed.  K.  .350. 

228.  1"  Lanedell's  Eq.  PI.  §  79;  Bennett  v. 

15  Graham  v.  Mason,  4  Cliff.  88.  Neale.  Wightwick,  -324. 

1''  Clark  V.  Scott,  5  Fisher,  245.  -^  French  ('.  Shoemaker,  14  Wall.  314, 

1"  Stanley  v.  Robinson,  1  Russ.  &  M.  335.     See  §  70. 
527 ;    Cummings   v.    Coleman,    7    Rich. 


252  ANSWERS   AND   DISCLAIMEKS.  [CHAP.  X. 

surreptitiously  or  unjustly  obtained  the  patent  for  that  which  was 
in  fact  invented  by  another,  who  was  using  reasonable  diligence  in 
adapting  and  perfecting  the  same  ;  or,  third,  that  it  had  been  patent- 
ed or  described  in  some  printed  publication  })rior  to  his  supposed 
invention  or  discovery  thereof ;  or,  fourth,  that  he  was  nut  the  origi- 
nator and  first  inventor  or  discoverer  of  any  material  and  substantial 
part  of  the  thing  patented  ;  or,  fifth,  that  it  had  been  in  public  nse 
or  on  sale  in  this  country  for  more  than  two  years  before  his  appli- 
cation for  a  patent,  or  had  been  abandoned  to  the  public.  And  in 
notices  as  to  proof  of  previous  invention,  knowledge,  or  use  of  the 
thing  patented,  the  defendant  shall  state  the  names  of  patentees  and 
the  dates  of  their  patents,  and  when  granted,  and  the  names  and 
residences  of  the  persons  alleged  to  have  invented,  or  to  have  had 
the  prior  knowledge  of  the  thing  patented,  and  where  and  by  whom 
it  had  been  used  ;  and  if  any  one  or  more  of  the  special  matters  al- 
leged shall  be  found  for  the  defendant,  a  decree  shall  be  entered  in 
his  favor  with  costs."  ^  Such  a  notice  need  not  be  under  oath,  and 
a  consent  to  an  order  that  the  answer  be  considered  as  amended  by 
the  insertion  of  such  defense  and  notice  is  a  waiver  of  any  further 
oath.2  Under  this  statute,  it  has  been  held  that  no  evidence  can 
be  admitted  in  support  of  any  of  these  defenses,  unless  it  has  been 
properly  pleaded  and  the  requisite  notice  has  been  given  to  the  com- 
plainant ;^  but  that  the  respondent,  after  pleading  these  defenses  or 
some  of  them,  with  the  names  of  such  of  the  persons  therein  referred 
to  as  he  then  knows,  may  also  plead  a  general  allegation,  "that  the 
same  had  been  previously  invented  and  known  and  used  by  many 
other  persons,  whose  names  are  unknown  to  the  respondent,  which, 
when  known,  the  respondent  prays  leave  to  insert  and  set  forth  in 
the  answer.""*  Upon  the  subsequent  discovery  of  any  such  persons, 
testimony  concerning  them  may  be  taken,  and  leave  obtained  from 
the  court  to  insert  their  names  in  the  answer  by  amendment  nunc 
•pro  tunc.  An  order  to  this  effect  may  be  obtained  before  or  after  the 
testimony  has  been  taken.*  It  seems  that  when  a  previous  patent 
has  not  been  referred  to  in  an  answer,  such  patent  may  still  be 

§  145.     1  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  4920.  54  ;  Salam.ander  Co.  r.  Haven,  .3  Dill.  131  ; 

2  Campbell  v.  Mayor  uf  N.  Y.,  45  Fed.  Jennings  v.  Pierce,  15  Blatchf.  42;  Will- 

R.  243.  liams  v.  Boston  &  A.  R.  K.  Co.,  17  Blatclif. 

^  Teese  I'.  Huntington,  2.J  How.  2  ;  Aga-  21;  Decker  i\  Grote,  10  Biatclif.  o31. 

warn  Co.  V.  Jordan,  7  Wall.  583;  Bianchard  <  Koemer  r.  Simon,  Uo  U.  S.  214,  220  ; 

V.  Putnam,  8  Wall.  420  ;  Bates  r.  Coe,  08  Brown  v.  Hall,  G  Blatchf.  405. 
U.  S.  31 ;  Pitts  V.  Edmonds,  2  Pislier,  52, 


§  145.]       DEFENSES  PECULIAR  TO  PATENT  CASES.  253 

proved,  as  evidence  of  a  prior  use  of  the  invention,  which  has  heen 
properly  pleaded,^  to  show  the  state  of  the  art  at  the  date  of  the 
complainant's  alleged  invention.^  It  is  unsettled  whether  the  de- 
fense of  insufficient  description  can  be  set  up  without  alleging  an 
intent  to  deceive  the  public."  It  has  been  said  concerning  the 
defense  of  want  of  novelty :  "  Where  the  thing  patented  is  an 
entirety,  consisting  of  a  separate  device  or  of  a  single  combina- 
tion of  old  elements  incapable  of  division  or  separate  use,  the 
respondent  cannot  make  good  the  defense  in  question  by  proving 
that  a  part  of  the  entire  invention  is  found  in  one  prior  patent, 
printed  publication,  or  machine,  and  another  part  in  another, 
and  so  on  indefinitely,  and  from  the  whole  or  any  given  number 
expect  the  court  to  determine  the  issue  of  novelty  adversely  to 
the  complainant."  ^  "  Defenses  of  the  kind,  if  the  thing  patented 
is  an  entirety,  incapable  of  division  or  of  separate  use,  must  be 
addressed  to  the  invention,  and  not  to  a  part  of  it,  or  to  one  or 
more  claims  of  the  patent,  if  less  than  the  entire  invention. 
More  than  one  patent  ma}'  be  included  in  one  suit,  and  more 
than  one  invention  may  be  secured  in  the  same  patent ;  in  which 
cases  the  several  defences  may  be  made  to  each  patent  in  the 
suit,  and  to  each  invention,  to  which  the  charge  of  infringement 
relates."  ^  It  has  been  said  that  a  defense  charging  that  the  origi- 
nal patentee  "  fraudulently  and  surreptitiously  obtained  the 
patent  for  that  which  he  well  knew  was  invented  by  another, 
unaccompanied  by  the  further  allegation  that  the  alleged  first 
inventor  was  at  the  time  using  reasonable  diligence  in  adapting 
and  perfecting  the  invention,  is  not  sufficient  to  defeat  the 
patent,  and  constitutes  no  defense  to  the  charge  of  infringe- 
ment." ^^  The  question  whether  a  defendant  has  an  interest  in 
the  patent  which  is  the  foundation  of  the  bill,  and  whether  he 
has  a  license  to  use  such  patent,  cannot  be  considered  unless 
specifically  raised  by  plea  or  answer.^^ 

5  Atlantic  Works  v.  Brady,  107  U.  S.  1 92.  »  Mr.  Justice  Clifford  in  Parks  v.  Booth, 

But  see  Parks  v.  Bootli,  102  U.  S.  9(3,  105.  102  U.  S.  96,  104  ;  citing  Bates  v.  Coe,  98 

« American    Saddle    Co.    r.    Un^g,    1  U.  S.  31. 

Holmes,  133;  s.  c.  0  Fisiier,  67;  Steven-  ^  Mr.  Justice  Clifford  in  Parks  i-.  Booth, 

son  V.  Magowan,  31  Fed.  K  824.  102  U.  S.  96,  104,  105. 

■?  Loom  Co.  V.  Higgins,  105  U.  S.  580,  i'  Mr.  Justice  Clifford  in  Agawam  Co 

588,  589;  Grant  v.  Raymond,  6  Pet.  218;  v.  Jordan,  7  Wall.  583,  597. 

Whitiemore  v.  Cutter,  1  Gall.  429;  Low-  "  Puetz  v.  Brausford,  31  Fed.  R.  458. 
ell    V.    Lewis,   1    Mason,   182 ;    Gray   v. 
James,  Pet.  C.  C.  394. 


254  ANSWERS   AND   DISCLAIMERS.  [CHAP,  X. 

§  146.  Admissions  and  Denials  independent  of  Discovery.  —  Ac- 
cording to  Professor  Ltingdell,  "  If  the  defendant  has  no  affirma- 
tive defense,  the  answer  need  contain  nothing  but  discovery, 
unless  the  defendant  proposes  to  offer  a  line  of  evidence  in  dis- 
proof of  the  bill  which  may  take  the  plaintiff  by  surprise  ;  in 
which  case  it  will  be  prudent  to  indicate  the  nature  of  such  evi- 
dence in  the  answer.  This  should  be  done  also  whenever  it  is 
at  all  doubtful  whether  the  evidence  establishes  an  affirmative 
defence  or  is  in  denial  of  the  bill."  ^  Although  the  weight  of 
authority  is  in  support  of  the  rule  that  a  failure  to  deny  an  alle- 
gation in  the  bill  does  not  operate  as  an  admission  of  its  trutli, 
provided  some  answer  is  made,^  it  is  more  prudent  and  is  cus- 
tomary, even  when  an  answer  under  oath  is  waived,  for  the 
defendant  to  deny  or  admit  every  allegation  in  the  bill  ;  and  out 
of  abundant  caution  a  general  traverse  denying  the  unlawful 
combination  charged  in  the  bill,  and  all  other  matters  therein 
contained,  is  still  often  inserted  after  the  specific  denials.^  The 
statement  that  the  respondent  believes  an  allegation  to  be  true  is 
equivalent  to  an  admission;'*  but  the  statement  that  he  has  no 
knowledge  upon  the  subject  seems  to  be  equivalent  to  a  denial,^ 
although,  if  full  discovery  be  required,  it  is  subject  to  exception 
for  insufficiency.^  The  denial  of  a  conclusion  of  law  is  of  no 
effect.^  Thus,  when  the  bill  alleged  that  the  defendant  executed 
and  delivered  a  deed,  a  denial  by  the  defendant  of  its  delivery, 
accompanied  by  an  admission  that  he  made  the  deed  and  placed 
it  upon  record,  is  equivalent  to  an  admission  of  its  deliver}-.^ 
There  is  no  need  of  a  denial  of  the  common  confederacy  clause 
unless  accompanied  by  special  charges  of  combination,^  When 
defendants  avoided  answering  specific  interrogatories  concerning 
a  charged  infringement,  but  merely  denied  the  use  of  any  ma- 

§  146.    1  Langdcll's  Eq.  PI.  §  79.  6  Kittredge  v.  Claremont  Bank,  1  W. 

2  Young   V.    Grundy,    G    Crancli,    51 ;     &  M.  244. 

Brown  (J.  Pierce,  7  Wall  205,  211;  Brooks  ''Adams    v.    Adams,   21    Wall.   185; 

D.Byam,l  Story,  290,302;  Rule  61.     But  Union    Mutual  Ins.    Co.    v.   Commercial 

see  Commercial  Mutual  Marine  Ins.  Co.  Mutual   Marine   Ins.   Co.,  2   Curt.  524  ; 

V.  Union  Mutual  Ins.  Co.,  19  How.  .318,  s.  c.  on  appeal,  as  Commercial  Mutual 

323 ;    Agawam    Co.    v.  Jordan,  7    Wall.  Marine   Ins.  Co.    r.   Union    Mutual   Ins. 

58.3,  GOO ;    Webb  v.  Powers,  2  W.  &  M.  Co.   19  How.  318,  319. 
497, 510 ;  Meyers  v.  Busby,  -32  Fed.  R.  G70.  *"  Adams  v.  Adams,  21  Wall.  185. 

3  See  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  870.  ^  Story's  Eq,  PI.  §§  30  with  note,  and 
*  Brooks  V.  Byam,  1  Story,  296,  311.  856 ;  Rule  32. 

5  Brown  v.  Pierce,  7  Wall.  205,212; 
Brooks  V.  Byam,  1  Story,  296. 


§  147.]  LMPEKTINENCE   AND   SCANDAL.  255 

cTiinery  "  in  violation  and  infringement  of  any  rights  of  the  plain- 
tiff, or  that  they  are  using,  or  have  made,  or  sold,  or  used  any 
machines  not  protected  or  covered  by  the  proviso  in  the  act  of 
Congress,"  it  seems  that  they  thereby  presumptively  admit  in- 
fringement.i^  An  admission  in  an  answer  that  the  defendants  had 
made  locks  of  the  kind  described  in  the  patent  sued  upon,  "  is 
satisfied,  by  assuming  that  the  smallest  number  of  locks  were  made 
consistent  with  the  use  of  that  word  in  the  plural,  and  with  the 
use  by  the  defendants  of  any  part  of  the  patent  which  is  valid."  ^^ 
An  admission  that  a  deed  bears  a  certain  date  does  not  estop  the 
respondent  from  showing  that  it  was  fraudulently  antedated. ^^ 

§  147.  Impertinence  and  Scandal.  —  An  answer  should  contain 
no  impertinence  or  scandal.^  What  constitute  scandal  and  imper- 
tinence has  been  explained  in  the  chapter  on  Bills.-  Usually 
nothing  is  considered  scandalous  which  is  relevant  or  responsive 
to  the  allegations  of  the  bill.^  But  in  an  English  case  brought 
by  a  clergyman,  wiiere  the  defendant  included  in  a  schedule  of 
accounts  a  charge  for  money  paid  by  him  for  an  order  of  filiation 
of  a  bastard  made  upon  the  plaintiff,  the  court  held  the  item, 
although  relevant,  a  proper  subject  of  exception,  because  the 
mode  of  bringing  it  forward  was  intended  to  drive  the  plaintiff 
out  of  his  parish.*  It  may  be  doubted  whether  so  much  respect 
for  the  cloth  would  be  shown  by  an  American  court.  An 
allegation  that  a  previous  decree  was  made  "  without  a  full 
reading  of  the  proofs  in  the  cause,  or  a  careful  consideration  of 
the  briefs  of  the  counsel  filed  therein,"  and  not  "  after  full  con- 
sideration," is  not  scandalous  ;  for  it  contains  no  imputation  upon 
the  court.^  "Exceptions  for  impertinence  are  only  allowed 
when  it  is  apparent  that  the  matter  excepted  to  is  not  material  or 
relevant,  or  is  stated  with  needless  prolixity.  If  it  may  be  mate- 
rial, the  exception  will  not  be  allowed,  as  that  would  leave  the 
defendant  without  remedy,  but  the  allegations  excepted  to  will 

w  Agawam  Co.  v.  Jordan,  7  Wall.  583,  2  See  §  68. 

GOO.  3  Peck  V.  Peck,  Mosely,  45;   "Woods 

11  Mr.  Justice  Miller  in  Jones  u.  More-  v.  Morrell,  1  J.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  103,  106; 
head,  1  Wall.  1-55,  165.  But  compare  Fisher  v.  Owen,  L.  R.  8  Ch.  D.  645,  653  ; 
Troy  Iron  &  Nail  Factory  v.  Corning,  6  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  862. 

Blatchf .  328,  336,  337.  ■*  Attorney-General  v.  Hewit,  in  Chanc. 

12  Holbrook  v.  Worcester  Bank,  2  Curt.  July,  1801  ;  cited  in  Cooper's  Eq.  PI.  319; 
244.  St Jry's  Eq.  PI.  §  862. 

§  147.   1  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §§  861-863  ;         ^  Miller  v.  Buchanan,  5  Fed.  R.  366. 
Langdon  r.  Goddard,  3  Story,  13. 


256  ANSWERS   AND   DISCLAIMERS.  [CHAP.  X. 

be  allowed  to  remain  in  the  answer,  and  the  effect  thereof,  if 
found  to  be  true,  determined  on  the  final  hearing."*^  It  has 
been  held  that  a  short  sentence  inserted  out  of  abundant  caution 
will  not  be  expunged  as  impertinent/  Neitlier  is  new  matter 
not  responsive  to  the  bill,  setting  up  an  insufficient  defense,  the 
I)roper  subject  of  an  exception  for  impertinence  ;  ^  although  such 
matter  has  been  expunged  by  motion.^  A  demurrer  to  an  answer 
is  not  permitted^*'  Exceptions  to  answers  for  scandal  and  imper- 
tinence are  taken  and  disposed  of  in  substantially  the  same  man- 
ner as  exceptions  to  bills  for  the  same  reasons.^^  Exceptions  for 
impertinence  should  be  filed  and  disposed  of  before  exceptions 
for  insufficiency  are  filed. ^^ 

§  148.  Discovery.  —  Discovery,  or  answer  under  oath,  which 
was  formerly  one  of  the  principal  grounds  of  equitable  juris- 
diction, is  now  of  little  practical  importance.  For  the  statutes 
of  the  United  States,^  as  well  as  those  of  all  of  the  individual 
members  of  the  American  Union  with  which  the  writer  has 
any  acquaintance,  allow  the  full  benefits  of  discovery  to  be  ob- 
tained by  the  oral  examination  of  any  party  or  person  otherwise 
interested  in  the  cause  on  trial.  Moreover,  a  recent  amendment 
to  the  equity  rules  provides  that,  "  if  the  complainant,  in  his 
bill,  shall  waive  an  answer  under  oath,  or  shall  only  require  an 
answer  under  oath  with  regard  to  certain  specified  interroga- 
tories, the  answer  of  the  defendant,  though  under  oath,  except 
such  part  thereof  as  shall  be  directly  responsive  to  such  inter- 
rogatories, shall  not  be  evidence  in  his  favor,  unless  the  cause  be 
set  down  for  hearing  on  bill  and  answer  only ;  but  may  never- 
theless be  used  as  an  affidavit,  wath  the  same  effect  as  heretofore 
upon  a  motion  to  grant  or  dissolve  an  injunction,  or  on  any 
other  incidental  motion  in  the  cause ;  but  this  shall  not  prevent 
a  defendant  from  becoming  a  witness  in  his  own  behalf  under 
section  3  of  the  act  of  Congress  of  July  2,  1864."  2     (U.  S.  R.  S. 

"  Deady,  J.,   in   Chapman   i-.    School  ^'^  Crouch  v.  Kerr,  "8  Fed.  R.  540. 

District  No.  1,  Deady,  108,  110.  n  See  Rules  20  and  27  ;   Hood  v.  In- 

'  Desplaces  v.  Goris,  1  Edward's  Ch.  man,  4  J.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  4.37  ;   Langdon  v. 

(N.  Y.)  350.  Goddard,  .3  Story.  13  ;  §  68. 

**  Adams  v.  Bridg.  Iron  Co.,  6  Fed.  R.  -'-  Patriotic  Bank  »•.  Bank  of  Washing- 

179;  Bower  Barff   Rustless   Iron   Co.   v.  ton,  5  Cranch  C.  C.  602. 

Wells  Rustless  Iron  Co.,  43  Fed.  R.  391.  §  148.   i  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  858. 

But  see  Ford  i".  Douglas,  5  How.  143, 165.  2  Amendment  of  December,  1871,  to 

^  Armstrong  r.  Chem.  Nat.  Bank,  37  Rule  41.     See  Woodruff  v.  Dubuque  &  S. 

Fed.  R.  466;  Adams  v.  Bridg.  Iron  Co.,  6  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  30  Fed.  R.  91. 
Fed.  R.  179 ;  Gilchrist  v.  Helena,  &c.  R. 
Co.,  47  Fed.  R.  593. 


§  1-13.]  .  DISCOVERY.  257 

Sec.  858.)  Consequently,  an  answer  under  oath  is  now  usually 
waived  by  the  coni[)lainant."^  AViien  no  such  waiver  is  made, 
liowever,  the  old  rule  still  prevails  ;  and  the  sworn  statement  by 
the  defendant  in  direct  response  to  an  allegation  in  the  bill  is 
deemed  to  be  true,  unless  contradicted  by  two  witnesses,  or  a 
single  witness  and  corroborating  circumstances.*  Irresponsive 
allegations  are  not  evidence.^  Neither  are  allegations  upon 
information  and  belief,*^  nor  allegations  sworn  to  positively,  con- 
cerning facts  of  which  it  is  evident  that  the  respondent  can  have 
no  personal  knowledge."  The  admissions  of  the  defendant  are 
bindhig  upon  him  ;  and  unless  he  can  obtain  leave  to  amend  his 
answers  by  withdrawing  them,  he  cannot  disprove  them  at  the 
hearing.^  When  discovery  is  required,  the  defendant  must 
answer  every  allegation  in  the  bill  which  is  material  to  the  plain- 
tiff's case,  and  an  answer  admitting  which  would  not  expose  him 
to  a  penalty,  forfeiture,  or  criminal  prosecution,  or  expose  a 
privileged  communication.^  ''It  is  not  a  sufficient  foundation  of 
exception  that  a  fact  charged  in  a  bill  is  not  answered,  unless  the 
fact  is  material  and  might  contribute  to  support  the  equity  of  the 
plaintiff's  case,  and  induce  the  court  to  give  the  relief  sought  by 
the  bill.''  ^^  The  former  practice  required  that  if  a  defendant 
submitted  to  answer,  he  must  in  general  answer  fully  ;  and  that 
he  could  usually  protect  himself  from  a  full  discovery  only  by  a 
plea  or  demurrer  to  the  objectionable  part  of  the  bill.^i  Now, 
however,  the  Equity  Rules  provide  that  "  the  rule  that  if  a  de- 
fendant submits  to  answer  he  shall  answer  fully  to  all  the 
matters  of  the  bill,  shall  no  longer  a[)ply  in  cases  where  he 
might  by  plea  protect  himself  from  such  answer  and  discover3\ 
And  the  defendant  shall  be  entitled  in  all  cases  by  answer  to 
insist  upon  all  matters  of  defense  (not  being  matters  of  abate- 

3  See   Slcssinger   v.    Buckingham,    17  9  Cranch,  153,  IGl ;  Allen  v.  O'Donald, 

Fed.  R.  454,  450.  28  P'eil.  R.  17. 

*  Clark's  Executors  r.  Van  Rienisdyk,  *  Gold  &  Silver  Ore  Separating  Co.  v. 

9    Cranch,    153,    160  ;    Union    Bank    of  U.  S.  Disintegrating  Ore  Co.,  G  Blatchf. 

Georgetown    i;.    Geary,    5   Pet.  99,    110;  307,310.     See  Troy  Iron  &  Nail  Factory 

Seitz    V.    Mitchell,   94    U.    S.   580,    582  ;  v.  Corning,  0  Blatchf.  328,  336. 

Vigel  V.  IIopp,  104  U.  S.  441  ;  Slessinger  »  Atwill  v.  Ferrett,  2  Blatchf.  39. 

V.  Buckingham,  17  Fed.  R.  454,  456.  i"  Ciiief  Justice  Taney   in   Hardeman 

^  Sargent    v.    Larned,    2    Curt.    340  ;  v.  Harris,  7  How.  726. 

Seitz  r.  Mitchell,  94  U.  S.  580.  i'   Hare  on  Discovery,  pp.  247,  296,297  ; 

6  Berry   v.   Sawyer.   19  Fed.  R.   286;  Story's    Eq.   PI.   §§   605,  606,    009,  846; 

Allen  V.  O'Donald,  28  Fed.  R.  17.  Mazarredo  v.  Maitland,  3  Madd.  (iO,  72  ; 

■^  Clark's  Executors  v.  Van  Riemsdyk,     c.  Harrison,  4  Madd.  252. 

vou.  I.  — 17 


25S  ANSWERS    AND    DISCLAIMERS.  [CHAP.  X. 

nient,  or  to  the  character  of  the  parties,  or  matters  of  form)  in 
bar  of  or  to  the  merits  of  the  bill,  of  which  he  may  be  entitled  to 
avail  himself  by  a  plea  in  bar ;  and  in  such  answer  he  shall  not 
be  compellable  to  answer  any  other  matters  than  he  would  be 
compellable  to  answer  and  discover  upon  filing  a  plea  in  bar  and 
an  answer  in  support  of  such  plea,  touching  the  matters  set  forth 
in  the  bill,  to  avoid  or  repel  the  bar  or  defense.  Thus,  for  ex- 
ample, a  bona  fide  purchaser  for  a  valuable  consideration 
without  notice,  may  set  up  that  defense  by  way  of  answer  instead 
of  plea,  and  shall  be  entitled  to  the  same  protection,  and  shall 
not  be  compellable  to  make  any  further  answer  or  discovery  of 
his  title  than  he  would  be  in  any  answer  in  support  of  such 
plea."  ^  "  A  defendant  shall  be  at  liberty,  by  answer,  to  decline 
answering  any  interrogatory,  or  part  of  an  interrogatory,  from 
answering  which  he  might  have  protected  himself  by  demurrer  ; 
and  he  shall  be  at  liberty  so  to  decline,  notwithstanding  he  shall 
answer  other  parts  of  the  bill  from  which  he  might  have  pro- 
tected himself  by  demurrer."  ^^  If  the  plaintiff  is- the  only 
person  who  can  enforce  a  penalty  or  forfeiture,  and  he  waives  it 
in  his  bill,  the  defendant  may  be  compelled  to  answer  disclosing 
his  liability  thereto.'*^  There  has  been  much  controversy  as  to 
whether  the  defendant  to  a  bill  demanding  an  account  can  be 
obliged  to  give  discovery  as  to  the  account  when  he  answers 
denying  the  equity  of  the  bill  and  the  complainant's  right  to  an 
account.^^  The  better  opinion  seems  to  be  that  he  can.  Such 
is  the  doctrine  of  Professor  Langdell,^^  and  of  the  last  English 
case  upon  the  subject.^"  No  discovery  can  be  required  of  an 
infant,^^  or  other  person  under  a  disability  ;  ^^  nor,  it  seems,  of  a 
corporation,^'^  or  a  public  officer  when  sued  in  his  official  ca- 
pacity .'^^     But  it  has  been  held  that,  although  a  corporation  can- 

1-  Rule  39.  13  Mickletliwaitcr.  Atkinson,!  Coll  ITo. 

1-^  Rule  44.  -"  Union  Bank  of  Georgetown  r.  Geary, 

1*  Lord  Uxbriflge  v.  Staveland,  1  Ves.  5    Pet.   99,    110  ;    Wallace    v.    Wallace, 

Sen.    5G;   Atwill    v.   Ferrett,   2    Blatchf.  Halst.    (N.  J.)    Dig.    17.'];    Smith    v.    St. 

39.  Louis  Mutual  Life  Ins.  Co.,  2  Tenn.  Ch. 

15  The  authorities  have  been  well  col-  599 ;    Burpee  v.   First  National  Bank,  5 

lected  by  Chancellor  Cooper  in  French  v.  Biss.  405.     But  see   Kittredge   v.   Clare- 

Rainey,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  G40.  mont  Bank,  .3  Story,  590 ;  s.  c.  1  W.  &  M. 

i«  LangdeU's  Eq.  PI.  §§  70-73.  245. 

1'  Elmer  v.  Creasy,  L.  R.  9  Ch.  69,  71.  -i  Davison  r.  Attorney-General,  5  Price, 

18  Copeland  v.  Wheeler,  4  Brown   Ch.  .398,  note;  Attorney-General  r.  Lambirth, 

C.  2.56;    Lucas   v.  Lucas,  13  Ves.  274;  5  Price,  .380,  398  ;'u.  S.  i-.  McLaughlin, 

Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  214.  24  Fed.  R.  823. 


§  148.]  DISCOVEKY.  259 

not  be  compelled  to  answer  under  oath,  it  can  be  compelled  to 
answer,  and  to  answer  fuiiy.^^  The  defendant  must  answer  spe- 
ciiically  and  categoricall}',  distinguishing  between  matters  w  ithin 
his  personal  knowledge  and  those  witiiin  his  information  and  be- 
lief.-^ If  he  asserts  ignorance  as  to  any  matter,  he  must  aver  that 
he  is  ignorant  both  of  his  own  knowledge  and  as  to  information 
and  belief.^^  He  cannot  deny  that  he  has  no  knowledge  as  to  a 
subject  wdiich  the  bill  charges  as  a  personal  transaction  in  which 
he  took  part.^^  This  last  rule,  it  has  been  said,  applies  to  officers 
of  corporations.^*"  If  new  officers  have  succeeded  those  in  oliice 
at  the  time  when  the  matters  charged  aie  said  to  have  occurred, 
it  is  their  duty,  when  called  upon  for  discovery,  to  ascertain  the 
facts  by  searching  the  records  of  the  cor[)oration  and  by  inquiry 
of  their  predecessors.^''  It  has  been  said  that  "  a  corporate 
answer  should  he  made  by  the  principal  officer  of  the  corporation, 
who  should  be  able  to  admit  or  deny  the  facts  charged  and  inter- 
rogated about,  or  to  state  want  of  knowdedge  clearly  and  truly 
as  a  reason  for  not  doing  it."-''  It  is  insufficient  to  deny  any 
"■  recollection  or  belief  as  to  a  transaction  in  which  the  defendant 
is  said  to  have  been  personally  engaged."  ^^  "  The  defendant  in 
his  answer  must  state  the  facts  as  the}^  then  are."  '^*^  But  where  a 
bill  charged  that  the  defendant  would  in  future  infringe  a  patent 
as  he  was  charged  to  have  done  before,  it  was  held  insufficient  for 
him  to  merely  deny  that  he  had  done  so  since  the  tiial  of  an 
action  at  law  which  established  the  complainant's  rights.^'  He 
had  also  to  answer  as  to  his  future  intentions. ^2  In  drawing  such 
an  answei',  it  is  usual  and  often  advantageous  to  interweave  the 
discovery  with  a  narrative  of  tlie  transactions  from  the  defend- 
ant's point  of  view  in  a  continuous  statement,  so  that  it  will  be 
hard  for  the  plaintiff  to  read  as  evidence  the  defendant's  admis- 

"  Hale  V.  Continental  Life   Insurance         -'  Kittredge  v.  Claremont  Bank,  1  W. 

Company,  16  Fed.  R.  718 ;  s.  c.  '20  Fed.  &  M.  244. 
R  344.  -'^  Wheeler,  J.,  in  Hale  v.  Continental 

-^  Brooks  V.  Byam,  1  Story,  296;  Kit-  Life  Insurance  Co.,  IG  Fed.  R.  718,  71'.!. 
tredjre  v.  Claremont  Bank,  3  Story,  .5".iG;         -'•'  Taylor  v.  Luther,  2  Sumner,  228. 
s.  c.  1  VV.  &  M.  244.                          "  ^^  Sir  Thomas  Plumer,  V.  C,  in  Kniglit 

•-■4  Brooks  r.  Byam,  1  Story,  20G  ;  Kit-  r.  Matthews,  1  Madd.  5(')G. 
trcdger.  Claremont  Bank,  1  W.  &  M.  244.         -^^  Poppenhusen   v.  N.  Y.  Gutta-Percha 

-'>  Burpee    v.   First   National    Bank,  5  Comb  Co.,  4  Blatchf.  185 ;  s.  c.  2  Fisher, 

Biss,  405.  74. 

-"  Burpee    r.  First   National    Bank,   5         *-  Poppenhusen  r.  N.  Y.  Gutta-Perclia 

Biss.  405  ;    Kittredge  f.  Claremont  Bank,  Comb  Co.,  4  Blatchf.  185  ;  s.  c.  2  Fisher, 

1  \V.  &  M.  244.  74. 


260  ANSWERS    AND    DISCLAIMERS.  [CHAP.  X. 

sions    without   also   reading    the   lattei's   own   explanation    and 
account  of  the  controversy. 

§149.  Proceedings  to  compel  Answ.er.  —  The  defendant  nuisfc 
file  in  tlie  clerk's  office  on  the  rule-day  next  succeeding  that  of 
entering  his  appearance,  an  tmswer  to  so  much  of  the  bill  as  he 
does  not  cover  by  a  plea  or  demurrer.  In  default  thereof,  unless 
his  time  to  answer  has  been  enlarged,  for  cause  shown  by  a  judge 
of  the  court,  upon  motion  for  that  purpose,  the  bill  may  be 
taken  against  him  pro  confesso.^  When  a  plea  or  demurrer  is 
overruled,  with  leave  to  the  defendant  to  answer  within  a  certain 
time,  and  he  fails  so  to  do,  the  bill  may  tlien  also  be  taken  jjro 
confesso?  Otherwise  the  plaintiff,  if  he  requires  any  discovery  or 
answer  to  enable  him  to  obtain  a  proper  decree,  is  entitled  to  pro- 
cess of  attachment  against  the  defendant  to  compel  an  answer, 
and  the  defendant,  when  arrested  upon  such  process,  is  not  dis- 
charged therefrom  unless  upon  filing  his  answer,  or  otherwise 
complying  with  such  order  as  the  court  or  judge  thereof  may 
direct,  as  to  pleading  to  or  fully  answering  the  bill,  within  a 
period  to  be  fixed  by  the  court  or  judge,  and  undertaking  to 
speed  the  cause.^  If  the  attachment  is  returned  non  est  inventus, 
a  commission  of  rebellion  will  issue.*  If  this  proves  insufficient, 
it  will  be  followed  by  a  writ  of  sequestration.^ 

§  150.  Frame  of  Answer.— An  answer  should  be  entitled  in  the 
cause,  so  as  to  agree  with  the  names  of  the  parties  as  they  appear 
in  the  l)ill  at  the  time  the  answer  is  filed. ^  It  seems  that  the 
defendant  may  not  correct  or  alter  the  names  of  the  parties  as 
they  appear  in  the  bill,  and  that  if  there  is  a  mistake  he  must 
correct  it  in  the  part  following  the  title  of  the  cause  ;  thus,  "  The 
answer  of  the  defendants,  the  Mayor,  Aldermen,  and  commonalty 
in  the  bill  called  the  Mayor,  Aldermen,  and  citizens  of  the  city 
of  New  York. "2  The  answer  should  begin  substantially  thus: 
"  The  answ^er  of  Joljn  Aber,  one  of  the  above-named  defendants, 
to  the  bill  of  complaint  of  the  above-named  plaintiff;  "  if  the  bill 
has  been  amended  after  answer,  "to  the  amended  bill  of  com- 

§  149.    1  Rule  18.     See  Cliapter  VI.  6  Smith's  Cli.  Pr   (2cl  ed.  A.  D.  1837) 

-  Suydam  v.  Bcals,  4  McLean,  12.  183-188. 

3  Rule  18.  §  150.   1  Danicll's   Ch.   Pr.   (5th   Am. 

*  Boudinot   v.   Symmcs,   Wall.  C.    C.  ed.)  731. 

139  ;  Smitli's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  ed.  A.  D.  1837),  -  Attorney-General  v.  Worcester  Cor- 

183-180.  poration,  1   C.   P.  Cooper,  18  ;  Daniell's 

Cli.  Pr.  (5th  Am.  ed.)  731. 


§  150.]  FRAME    OF   ANSWER.  261 

plaint."  ^  If  two  oi-  more  defendants  join  in  the  same  answer,  it 
usually  begins,  "  The  joint  and  several  answer  ; "  '*  unless  they  are 
iiu>band  and  wife,  when  it  is  ''The  joint  answer  "^  but  an  answer 
is  not  defective  if  [Uit  in  by  several  as  a  joint  answer  merely.^ 
When  discovery  is  required,  all  of  the  defendants  who  join  in  an 
answer  must  swear  to  the  same."  When  the  same  solicitor  is 
employed  for  two  or  more  defendants,  and  separate  answers  are 
filed,  or  other  proceedings  had  by  two  or  more  defendants  sepa- 
rately, costs  are  allowed  for  such  separate  answers  or  other  pro- 
ceedings, unless  a  master,  upon  reference  to  him,  certifies  that 
such  separate  answers  and  other  proceedings  were  necessarj'  or 
])roper,  and  ought  not  to  have  been  joined  together.^  A  female 
defendant  who  has  married  since  tlie  filing  of  the  bill  usually 
begins  :  "  The  answer  of  John  Aber  and  Anna,  his  wife,  lately 
in  the  bill  called  Anna  Brown,  spinster,"  or  widow,  as  the  case 
may  be.^  A  title,  "  The  several  answer  of  John  Peck,  Esq.,  one 
of  the  defendants  to  the  bill  of  complaint  of  Anna  Baines,  alias 
Green,  assumuig  to  herself  the  name  of  Anna  Peck,  as  pretended 
wife  of  John  Peck,  Esq.,  deceased,  and  of  Anna  Maria  Green, 
assuming  to  herself  the  name  of  Anna  Maria  Peck,  as  daughter 
of  the  said  John  Peck,  Esq.,  deceased,"  was  held  scandalous. ^^ 
An  aftswer  by  a  person  defending  by  guardian  or  next  friend 
should  state  that  fact:  "James  Fifield  by  Edward  Jennings,  his 
next  friend."  When  an  answer  and  another  pleading  are  united, 
it  should  so  state :  "  The  demurrer,  plea,  and  answer  of,"  &c.^^ 
Next  followed  formerly  a  clause  reserving  to  the  defendant  any 
and  all  advantages  that  might  be  taken  by  exception  to  the  bill.^- 
This  always  was  and  still  is  useless, ^^  although  man}^  practition- 
ers still  use  it.  Then  comes  the  substantive  part  of  the  answer, 
setting  up  the  matters  of  affirmative  defense  and  giving  the  dis- 
covery required.^*  The  answer  usually  closes  with  a  general 
traverse  inserted  out  of  abundant  caution,  denying  the  unlawful 
combination  charged  in  the  bill,  and   all  other  matters  therein 


3  Daniell's  Ch  Pr.  (5th  Am.  ed.)  731  ;  »  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (5th  Am.  ed.),  731. 

Kigby  1-.  Rigby,  9  Bcav.  .311,  313.  lo  Peck  i:  Peck,  Mosely,  45. 

^  Davis  V.  Davidson.  4  McLean,  1.36.  "  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (5th  Am.  ed.),  731 

5  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (5th  Am.  ed.)  731.  i'^  Mitford's    PI.    ch.    2,    §    2,    part    3. 

6  Davis  r.  Davidson,  4  McLean,  136.  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  870. 

7  Baihn-    Washing     Machine    Co.     v.  i^  Story's  Eq    PI.  §  870 ;  Rules  39,  44. 
Younir,  ri'niatclif.  lyy.  i*  Mitford's  PI.  ch.  2,  §  2,  part  3. 

»  Rule  62. 


262 


ANSWERS    AND    DISCLlIMEKS. 


[chap.  X. 


contained. ^^  In  the  answers  of  infants  and  ocher  persons  under 
D  disability,  the  reservation  and  general  traverse  have  always 
been  deemed  properly  omitted. ^"^  The  answer  in  such  cases  gen- 
erally is  that  the  infant  knows  nothing  of  the  matter,  and  there- 
fore neither  admits  nor  denies  the  charges,  but  leaves  the 
plaintiff  to  prove  them  as  he  shall  be  advised,  and  throws  liimself 
on  the  protection  of  the  court.^^  But  if  such  a  defendant  has 
any  substantive  defence,  he  should  plead  the  same.^^ 

§151.  Signature  and  Oath  to  Answer. — An  answer  must  be 
signed  by  the  defendant  making  it ;  even,  it  seems,  when  an 
answer  under  oath  has  been  waived,^  unless  he  answer  by  guar- 
dian, when  the  latter  should  sign  it,^  or  unless  an  order  has  been 
obtained  dispensing  with  such  signature  on  account  of  the  de- 
fendant's absence,  or  for  some  other  reason. ^  A  person  answering 
in  a  dual  capacity  need  sign  but  once.*  An  answer  by  a  cor- 
poration must  be  under  its  corporate  seal.^  In  such  a  case  it  is 
advisable  to  have  the  seal  attested  by  one  of  the  corporate  ofh- 
cers.*^'  When  an  answer  is  made  without  oath,  the  signature  of 
the  defendant  should  also  be  attested. ■*■  Tliis  is  usually  done  b}' 
his  solicitor.^  The  answer,  unless  it  is  taken  by  commissioners, 
should  also  be  signed  by  counsel.^  Unless  an  answer  under  oath 
is  waived  in  the  bill,  the  defendant,  if  a  natural  peison,  must 
swear  ;  ^"^  or,  ''if  conscientiously  scrupulous  of  taking  an  oath,  in 
lieu  thereof  make  solemn  affirmation  to  the  truth  of  the  facts 
stated  by  him."  ^^  The  oath  or  affirmation  may  be  taken  before 
a  justice  or  judge  of  any  court  of  the  United  States,  or  before  a 
commissioner  appointed  by  a  Circuit  Court  to  take  testimony  or 
depositions,  or  before  a  master  in  chancery  appointed  by  a  Cir- 


15  Mitford's    PI.    ch.    2,    §    2,    part   3 ; 
Story's  Kq.  PI.  §  870. 
i«  Story's  P:q.  PI.  §  871. 


4  Anon  ;  2  ,T.  &  W.  55?.. 

5  Haight  r.  Proprietors  of  the  Morris 
Aqueduct,  4   Wasli.   GOl,  005;    Daniell's 


1"  Ciiancellor  Kent  in   Mills  v.  Dennis,     Ch.  Pr.  ^5th  Am.  ed.)  735,  and  note  2. 


3.1.  Ch.  (N.  Y.),  3t)7,  3G8. 

i8  Hoklen  v.  Ilearn,  1  Beav.  445,  455 ; 
Lane  v.  Hardwicke,  9  Beav.  148,  149. 

§  151.  1  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  875  ;  Davis  v. 
Davidson,  4  McLean,  136;  Bayley  v.  De 
Walkiers,  10  Vcs.  441 ;  Fulton  Bank  v. 
Beach,  2  Paige  (N.  Y.),  307;  Denison  v. 
Bassford,  7  Paige  (N.  Y.),  370. 

2  Anon  ;  2  J.  &  W.  553  ;  Daniell's  Ch. 
Pr.  (5th  Am.  od.)  733. 

'■'  Story's  Eti-  Pi.  §  875 ;  v.  Lake, 

G  Vcs.  171  ;  V.  Gwillini,  G  Ves.  285. 


6  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (5th  Am  ed.)  735, 
note  2. 

"  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (5t!i  Am.  ed  )  738. 

8  Dariell's  Cli.  Pr.  (5th  Am.  ed.)  738. 

^  Davis  V.  Davidson,  4  McLean,  13G; 
Story's  Kq.  PI.  §  87(). 

1"  Fulton  Bank  v.  Bcacli,  2  Paige 
(N.  Y),  307;  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (5th  Am. 
ed.)  735. 

11  Rule  91.    See  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  5013. 


§  152]  MOTIONS   TO    TAKE    ANrfWEHb    OFF    THE    FILE.  263 

cuit  Court,  or  before  a  judge  of  a  court  of  a  State  or  Territory  ; '' 
or  before  a  notary  public,  when  acting  within  the  limits  of  their 
res[)ective  jurisdictions. ^^  An  answer  can  be  verified  without  the 
United  States  before  coinniissioners  appointed  for  that  purpose  ;  ^^ 
or  probably  before  any  secretary  of  legation  or  consular  officer  at 
the  post,  port,  place,  or  within  the  limits  of  his  legation,  consulate, 
or  commercial  agency. i'*  The  following  form  of  oath  or  affirmation 
is  given  by  Daniell  in  his  valuable  work  on  Chancery  Practice  : 
"  You  swear,  or  solemnly  affirm,  that  what  is  contained  in  this 
your  answer  (or  plea  and  answer),  as  far  as  concerns  your  ov\  n 
act  and  Cumil,  is  true  to  your  own  knowledge,  and  that  what 
relates  to  the  act  and  deed  of  an}'  other  person  or  persons,  you 
believe  to  be  true."  ^^  When  sworn  to  in  a  foreign  country,  it 
seems  that  it  must  be  "  administered  in  the  most  solemn  form 
observed  by  the  law  s  and  usages "  of  that  country.^^  Every 
alteraiion  and  interlineation  in  the  answer  should  be  authenti- 
cated by  the  initials  of  the  officer  who  administers  "the  oatli." 
When  the  verification  of  an  answer  is  in  the  form  of  an  affidavit, 
tlie  name  of  the  defendant  making  it  must  be  subscribed  at  the 
foot  of  the  affidavit.  When  in  the  form  of  a  certificate  of  the 
officer  administering  the  oath,  the  defendant's  name  should  be 
subscribed  at  the  foot  of  the  answer.^" 

§  152.  Motions  to  take  Answers  off  the  File.  —  When  an  an- 
swer is  in  any  respect  irregular,^  or  is  filed  by  a  person  not 
named  as  a  defendant  in  the  bill,^  or  is  filed  too  late,  it  may 
upon  the  plaintiff's  motion  be  taken  off  the  file.^  This  may  also 
be  done  when  the  paper  purporting  to  be  an  answer  is  so  evasive 
that  it  is  in  fact  no  answer.^  If  it  is  taken  off  the  file  for  an 
error  in  form,tlie  court  may  allow  the  same  paper  to  be  corrected, 
and  then  filed  anew.^     By  setting  the  cause  down  for  a  hearing 


12  Rule  59.   L.1876,  eh  3^4.  §152.   i  Bailey  Washing  Machine  Co. 

^3  Read  v.  Consequa,  4  Wash.  335.  v.  Young,  12  Blatchf.  l'J9. 

1*  U.  S.  R.  S.  §   1750.      But  see   Itead  -  Putnam  v.  New  Albany,  4  Biss.  3G5, 

V  Consequa,  4  Wasli.  335.  367. 

1^  2  Daniell's  Cli.  Pr.  ch.  15  §2,  p.  270;  »  Allen  r.  The  Mayor  and  Board  of 

Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  872,  note  4.  Education    of    New    York,    18    Blatchf. 

^«'Rea.l  r.  Consequa,  4  Wash.  335.  231>. 

"  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (5th  Am.  ed.)  743;  •*  Tomkin   v.  Lethbridge,  9  Ves.  178; 

Hathaway   v.   Scott,   11    Paige    (N.   Y.),  Smitli  c  Searle,  14  Ves.  415. 

173.  17H  :    Pincers  i'.  Robertson,  9  C.  E.  ^  Bailey     Washing    Machine    Co.     i;. 

Grceii  (24  N.  J.  Eq.J,  348.  Young,  12  Blatchf.  199. 


264  ANSWERS    AND   DISCLAIMERS.  [CHAP.  X. 

upon  bill  and  answer,  or  by  filing  exceptions  or  the  general  repli- 
cation, such  a  defect  would  be  waived.^  A  failure  to  enter  an 
order  taking  a  bill  as  confessed,  does  not  authorize  the  filing  of 
an  answer  after  the  prescribed  time.' 

§  153.  Exceptions  for  Insufficiency.  —  After  an  answer  is  filed 
on  any  rule-day,  the  plaintiff  is  allowed  until  the  next  rule-day 
to  file  in  the  clerk's  office  exceptions  thereto  for  insufficiency, 
and  no  longer,  unless  a  longer  time  is  allowed  for  the  purpose, 
upon  cause  shown  to  the  court  or  a  judge  thereof;  and  if  no  ex- 
ceptions are  filed  thereto  witliin  that  period,  the  answer  is  deemed 
and  taken  to  be  sufficient. ^  The  time  may,  however,  under  extra- 
ordinary circumstances  be  abridged  by  the  court.'^  The  court 
may,  to  avoid  delay,  allow  the  bill  to  be  amended,  and  exceptions 
to  be  filed  at  the  same  time  to  the  answer  to  the  original  bill ; 
requiring  the  defendant  to  at  once  answer  the  amended  bill  and 
the  exceptions.^  Exceptions  to  an  answer  for  insufficiency  can  be 
filed  after  exceptions  for  impertinence  have  been  filed  and  dis- 
posed of.^  Tt  seems  that,  if  a  plea  is  ordered  to  stand  for  an 
answer,  without  leave  to  accept  being  granted  in  the  order,  no 
exception  for  insufficiency  can  be  taken  to  so  much  of  the  answer 
as  is  covered  by  the  plea;^  and  that  where  an  answer  is  accom- 
panied by  a  demurrer  or  plea  to  the  discovery,  and  the  com- 
plainant excepts  to  the  answer  before  the  otlier  pleading  has  been 
disposed  of,  he  thereby  admits  the  lattei-  to  be  good,  and,  if  set 
down  for  argument,  it  may  be  stricken  off  the  calendar.^  In  the 
latter  case  leave  to  withdraw  the  exceptions  may  be  given."  No 
exceptions  for  insufficiency  can  be  filed  to  the  answer  of  an  infant 
or  other  person  under  a  disability.^  It  has  been  held  that  excep- 
tions will  lie  for  insufficiency,  and  discovery  may  be  required 
although  an  answer  under  oath  is  waived.^     After  exceptions  for 

6  Fulton    Bank    v.    Beach,    2    Paiere  See,  however,  Darnell  v.  Keyny,  1  Vern. 

(N.    Y.),  307;  Glassington   v.    Thwaites,  344. 

2  Russell,  4.58,  461.  '  Boyd  v.  Mills,  1-3  Ves.  85. 

^  Allen  V.  Mayor,  7  Fed.  H.  48-3.  **  Copeland  v.  Wheeler,   4  Brown,   Ch. 

§  153.     1  Rule  61.  C.  256;  Lucas    r.   Lucas,    13    Ves.   274; 

2  Read  i\  Conseqna,  4  Wash.  33.'i.  Mickietiiwaite    v.   Atkinson,    1     Collyer, 

3  Kittredge  v.  Ciaremont  Bank,  3  173;  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (5th  Am.  ed.) 
Story,  5<»0.  160. 

*  Patriotic  Bank  r.  Bank  of  Washing-  ^  Uhlmann    v.     Amholt    &    Schaeffer 

ton,  5  Cranoh  C.  C.  602.  Brewing  Co.,  41  Fed.  R.  369;  Colgate  r. 

5  Sellon  V.  Lewen,  3  P.  Wms.  2-30.  Compagnie  Francaise.  23  Fed.  R.  82.     But 

t>  Brownell  i:  Cnrtis,   10  Paige  (N.  Y.)  see  United  States  »•.  McLnnuhlin,  24  Fed. 

210,   211;    Mitf.  PI.   ch.  2,   §   2,  part  3.  R.  823;   McCorraick  v.  Chamberlin,   11 


§  153.]  EXCEPTIONS   FOR   INSUFFICIENCY.  265 

insufficiency  have  been  filed,  no  new  exceptions  can  regularly  be 
added  ;i^  but  leave  to  amend  those  on  file  may  under  special  cir- 
cumstances be  obtained. ^^  When  defendants  answer  separately, 
separate  exceptions  should  be  filed  to  each  answer.^^  Exceptions 
to  an  answer  for  insufficiency  must  be  in  writing,^^  and  signed  by 
counsel.^*  It  seems  that  they  must  specify  that  the  answer  ex- 
cepted to  is  an  answer  to  the  bill.^^  They  should  state  the  charges 
in  the  bill  and  the  interrogatory  applicable  thereto,  to  which  the 
exceptionable  part  of  the  answer  should  be  addressed,  and  then 
state  the  terms  of  that  part  of  the  answer  verbatim^  so  that  the 
court,  without  searching  the  bill  and  answer  throughout,  may  at 
once  perceive  the  ground  of  the  exception,  and  asceitain  its  suffi- 
ciency.^^ An  exception  to  an  answer,  "  because,  in  stating  in  the 
said  answer  what  he  has  been  informed  of  by  the  said  Byam,  he 
does  not  say  whether  he  actually  believes  the  same  to  be  true," 
was  said  to  be  irregular  in  form.^"  Such  an  objection,  or  any 
irregularity  in  the  form  of  an  exception  for  insullicicncy,  can  be 
raised  by  a  motion  to  take  the  exception  off  tlie  file.^^  By  setting 
the  exception  down  for  a  hearing,  an  objection  for  irregularity  is 
waived. 19  AVhere  exceptions  have  been  filed  to  an  answer  for 
insufficiency,  within  the  period  prescribed,  if  the  defendant-  do 
not  submit  to  the  same  and  file  an  amended  answer  on  the  next 
succeeding  rule-day,  the  plaintiff  should  forthwith  set  them  down 
for  a  hearing  on  the  next  succeeding  rule-day  thereafter,  l)efore 
a  judge  of  the  court,  and  should  enter,  as  of  course,  in  the 
order-book  an  order  for  that  purpose  ;  and  if  he  do  not  so  set 
down  the  same  for  a  hearing,  the  oxcejitions  are  deemed  aban- 
doned, and  the  answer  deemed  sufficient ;  but  the  court  or  any 
judge  thereof,  may,  for  good  cause  shown,  enlarge  the  time  for 
filing  exceptions  or  for  answering  the  same,  in  his  discretion, 
upon  such  terms  as  he  may  deem  reasonable.-*^     It  has  been  said 

Paige  (N.  Y.)  54.3;   Slieppard   r.  Akers,  i*  Yates  !•.  Hardy,  Jacob,  223. 

1  Tenn.  Ch.  326.  is  Earl  of  Lichfield    v.  Bond,  5  Bcav. 

10  Partridge  v.  Hay  craft,   11   Ves.  570,  513. 

575.  i«  Brooks  r.  Byam,  1    Story,  298,  ,303  ; 

u  Dolder  v.  Bank  of  England,  10  Ves.  Bower  Barff  Rustless  Iron  Co.  v.  Wells 

284;    Bancroft    v.    Wentworth,    10    Ves.  Rustless  Iron  Co.,  43  Fed.  R.  391. 

285  n. ;    Northcote  v.  Northcote,  1    Dick.  i^  Brooks  v.  Byam,  1  Story,  298,  303. 

22.  1^  Yates  v.  Hardy,    Jacob,  223;    Wil- 

1-  Sydolph  V.  Monkston,  2  Dick.  609.  liams  v.  Davies,  1  Sim.  &  S.  426. 

13  Brooks  V.  Byam,  1  Story,  296  ;  Yates  i"  Brooks  v.  Byam,  1  Story,  298,  803. 

V.  Hardy,  Jacob,  223;  Woods  r.  Morrell,  20  Rule  63. 
1  J.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  103. 


266  ANSWERS   AND   DISCLAIMERS.  [CHAP.  X. 

that  to  refer  such  exceptions  to  a  master  on  a  day  not  a  rule-day 
"  is  to  do  what  is  not  authorized  by  the  rules,  and,  unless  af- 
firmed or  cured  by  some  subsequent  action  of  the  court,  is  a 
nullity."  2^  If,  at  the  hearing,  the  exceptions  are  allowed,  the 
defendant  is  bound  to  put  in  a  full  and  complete  answer  thereto 
on  the  next  succeeding  rule-day  ;  otherwise  the  plaintiff  will, 
as  of  course,  be  entitled  to  take  the  bill,  so  far  as  the  matter  of 
such  exceptions  is  concerned,  as  confessed,  or  at  his  election,  he 
may  have  a  writ  of  attachment  to  compel  the  defendant  to  make 
a  better  answer  to  the  matter  of  the  exceptions ;  and  the  de- 
fendant, when  he  is  in  custody  upon  such  writ,  cannot  be  dis- 
charged therefrom  but  by  an  order  of  the  court,  or  of  a  judge 
thereof,  upon  his  putting  in  such  answer,  and  complying  with 
such  other  terms  as  the  court  or  judge  may  direct.^  If,  upon 
argument,  the  plaintiff's  exceptions  are  overruled,  or  the  answer 
adjudged  insufficient,  the  prevailing  party  is  entitled  to  all  the 
costs  thereby  occasioned,  unless  otherwise  directed  by  the  court, 
or  the  judge  thereof,  at  the  hearing  upon  the  exceptions.^^  An 
exception  for  insufficiency  may  be  allowed  in  part  and  overruled 
in  part.^  Where  an  exception  for  insufficiency  was  sustained, 
and  a  further  answer  put  in,  which  the  i)laintiff  deemed  still 
insufficient,  by  the  former  English  practice  he  had  three  weeks 
wherein  to  refer  the  same  to  a  master  upon  the  old  exceptions  ; 
otherwise  the  further  answer  was  deemed  sufficient.^^  If  the 
further  answer  was  found  insufficient,  the  defendant  was  required 
to  put  in  a  third  answer ;  and  if  that  too  was  found  insufficient, 
he  was  committed  to  the  Fleet,  and  examined  upon  interrogato- 
ries.2*^  When  an  order  was  obtained  after  answer,  allowing  the 
plaintiff  to  amend  his  bill,  and  requiring  the  defendant  to  answer 
the  amendments  and  the  exceptions  to  the  answer  to  the  original 
bill  together ;  upon  such  answer  the  plaintiff  could  only  file  new 
exceptions  for  a  failure  to  fully  answer  the  amendments.^"  A 
further  answer  is  in  every  respect  similar,  and  is  considered  a 
part  of  the  original  answer.  If,  therefore,  it  repeats  any  matter 
contained  in  a  former  answer,  the  repetition,  unless  it  varies  the 

21  La  Vega  v.  Lapsley,  1   Woods,  428,     247;    Hoffmann  v.  rostill,   L.  R.  4  Cli. 

432,  Woods,  .1.  App.  gt;;. 

•z-2  Huie  (54.  -^  -Smith  Cli.  Pr.  (2d  ed.  18:1(1),  285. 

23  Rule  Cr,.  -6  Smitli  Cli.  Pr.  (2d  ed.  1800),  285,  280. 

24  E.  I.  Co.   V.  Campbell,  1  Ves.  Sen.        27  Partridge  r.  Haycraft,  11   Ves.  570, 

581  ;  Smith  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  ed.  1836),  286. 


§  155.]  DISCLAIMERS.  267 

defence  in  point  of  substance,  or  is  otherwise  necessary,  is  con- 
sidered as  impertinent.^^  The  criterion  of  the  materiality  of  an 
interrogatory  is  not  whether  an  affirmative  answer  will  prove  the 
bill,  but  whether  it  will  tend  to  })rove  the  bill.-'^ 

§  154.  Supplemental  Answers.  —  A  supplemental  answer  is 
filed  to  bring-  to  .the  attention  of  the  court  some  fact  which  was 
not  inserted  in  the  original  answer  through  mistake  or  igno- 
rance,^ or  which  has  occurred  subsequently  to  the  filing  of  the 
same.2  They  can  only  be  filed  by  leave  of  the  court,  which  may 
impose  terms  upon  the  applicant.^  The  rules  regulating  supple- 
mental answers  of  the  former  class  will  be  found  in  the  chapter 
upon  Amendments.  Those  of  the  second  class  have  been  little 
considered  in  the  books.  Their  functions  may  also  be  performed 
by  cross-bills.'*  It  is  too  late  after  answer  and  decree  to  object 
to  the  regularity  of  a  proceeding  in  which  facts  were  set  up  by 
petition  when  a  cross-bill  or  supplemental  answer  would  have  been 
the  proper  practice.^ 

§  155.  Disclaimers.  —  A  disclaimer  is  a  pleading  by  which  the 
defendant  renounces  all  claim  to  property  which  the  plaintiff 
seeks  in  his  bill  to  obtain.'  It  is  said  that  it  is  distinct  in  its 
substance  from  an  answ^er,  although  sometimes  confounded  with 
one.2  It  must,  however,  in  most  cases  be  accompanied  by  an 
answer,  for  where  a  defendant  has  been  made  a  party  by  mis- 
take, having  had  an  interest  with  wdiich  he  has  parted,  the 
plaintiff  may  require  an  answer  sufficient  to  ascertain  what  the 
facts  are,  and  to  whom  he  has  transferred  his  interest.^  More- 
over, a  defendant,  although  he  may  disclaim  an  interest,  cannot 
disclaim  a  liability.^  The  only  cases  in  which  a  disclaimer  with- 
out an  answer  is  sufficient  seem  to  be  those  where  the  bill  simply 

•-»  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  8G8.     See  Gier  v.  5  Kelsey  r.  Hobby,   IG  Pet.    2fi9,  277 ; 

Greggr,  4  McLean,  208.  Coburn  v.  Cedar  Valley  L^nd  &  Coal  Co., 

■^  Ulilmann  c.  Ainholt   &   S.   Brewing  138  U.  S.  196,  222. 

Co.,  41  Fed.  R.  369.     See  supra,  §  82.  §  155.   ^  Mounsey  v.  Burnliam,  1  Hare, 

§  154.     1  Smith  r.  Babcoek,  3  Sumner,  15. 

583;  Williams   v.  Oibbes,  20  How.  535;  ^  Story's  Eq   PI.  §  8-38. 

Caster  (.-.  Wood,  Baldwin,  289;    Suydam  "  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  838.    See  Ellsworth 

V.  Triiesdale,  6  McLean,  4-59  v.  Curtis,  10  Paige  (N.  Y.),  105  ;  Carring- 

-  Kelsey   r.  Hobby,  16  Pet.  269,  277 ;  ton  r.  Lentz,  40  Fed.  R.  18. 

Talmage  v.  Pell,  9  Paige  (N.  Y.),  410,  413.  *  Glassington  v.  Thwaites,  2  Puss.  4.58  ; 

^  Smith   r.   Babcoek,  3  Sumner,  583;  Graham  r.  Coape,  U  Simons,  93,  102  ;  s.  c. 

Caster  v.  Wood,  Baldwin,  289.  3  Myl.  &  Cr.  638. 

*  Kelsey  v.  Hobby,  16  Pet.  269,  277  ; 
ii)/ra,  §  171. 


^68  ANSWEES   AND   DISCLAIMERS.  [CIIAP.  X. 

alleges  that  the  defendant  claims  an  interest  in  the  property  in 
question  without  specifying  the  claim.^  Under  very  special  cir- 
cumstances, a  disclaimer  may  be  withdrawn,  and  an  answer  filed 
setting  up  a  claim.^  Where  a  disclaimer  is  made,  and  it  ajjpears 
that  the  defendant  was  made  a  party  without  apparent  reason, 
the  bill  will  be  dismissed  with  costsJ  Otherwise,  a  decree  may 
be  entered  without  costs  against  the  defendant  and  all  claiming 
under  him  since  the  filing  of  the  bill.^  The  plaintiff  should  not 
file  a  replication  to  a  disclaimer  alone.^  When  the  disclaimer  is 
insufficient  it  may  be  stricken  off  the  file  upon  motion,  or  excep- 
tions to  it  for  insufficiency,  if  filed,  will  be  sustained. i*^  A  dis- 
claimer may  be  accompanied  by  a  plea,  answer,  or  demurrer,  or 
all  of  these,  provided  that  each  refers  to  a  separate  ])art  of  the 
bill.^^  If  a  disclaimer  and  answer  by  the  same  defendant  are 
inconsistent,  the  matter  will  be  taken  most  strongly  against  the 
defendant  upon  the  disclaimer. ^2  ^]^q  following  is  a  form  of  a 
mere  disclaimer  :  "  The  disclaimer  of  Richard  Flagg,  the  defend- 
ant, to  the  bill  of  complaint  of  Robert  Aber,  complainant.  This 
defendant,  saving  and  reserving  to  himself  [here  follows  the  usual 
general  reservation  in  an  answer],  saith,  that  he  doth  not  know 
that  he,  this  defendant,  to  his  knowledge  and  belief,  ever  had, 
nor  did  he  claim  or  pretend  to  have,  nor  doth  he  now  claim,  any 
right,  title,  or  interest  of,  in,  or  to  the  estates  and  premises,  situate 
[describing  them],  in  the  said  complainant's  bill  set  forth,  or 
any  part  thereof;  and  this  defendant  doth  disclaim  all  right, 
title,  and  interest  to  the  said  estate  and  premises  in  [naming 
their  situation],  in  the  said  comi)lainant's  bill  mentioned,  and 
every  part  thereof."  A  disclaimer  concludes  in  the  same  way  as 
an  answer.^3 

6  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  888.  See  Graliam         i"  Graham  v.  Coape,  9  Simons,  03,  102  ; 
r.  Coape,  0  Simons,  93,  102  ;  s.  c.  3  xMyl.     s.  c.  3  Myl.  &  Cr.  638. 

&  Cr.  (138.  "  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  839 ;  Mitford's  PI. 

6  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  841.  ch.  2,  §  2,  part  3. 

'  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  842.  ^-  Mitford's  PL  di.  2,  §  2,  part  2. 

«  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  842.  13  Story's  Eq.  Pi.  §  844,  note  0. 

3  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  842.  ,.           . 


§  156.]  DEFINITION"   AND   HISTORY   OF   REPLICATIONS.  269 


CHAPTER   XI. 

REPLICATIONS. 

§  156.  Definition  and  History  of  Replications.  —  A  replication 
is  a  pleading  bj  which  the  plaintiff  puts  in  issue  the  matters 
pleaded  in  a  defendant's  answer  or  plea.  No  replication  can  be 
filed  to  a  demurrer.^  Replications  were  formerly  of  two  kinds, 
general  and  special."^  A  general  replication  consists  of  a  general 
denial  of  the  truth  of  the  defendant's  plea  or  answer,  and  of  the 
sufficiency  of  the  matter  alleged  therein  to  bar  the  plaintiff's  suit, 
together  with  an  assertion  of  the  truth  and  sufficiency  of  the  bill.^ 
A  special  replication  sets  up  new  matter  in  avoidance  of  a  sub- 
stantive defence  contained  in  the  answer  or  plea.*  To  this  the 
defendant  was  obliged  to  file  a  rejoinder,  giving  the  discovery 
required  in  it.^  This  might  then  be  succeeded  by  a  sur- 
rejoinder and  a  rebutter.''  Special  replications  and  their  con- 
sequences were,  on  account  of  the  inconvenience  therefrom 
resulting,  almost  obsolete  by  the  time  of  Lord  Eldon.'^  A 
special  replication  to  an  answer  is  forbidden  by  the  Equity 
Rides,  which  provide  that  "  no  special  replication  to  any  answer 
shall  be  filed.  But  if  any  matter  alleged  in  the  answer  shall 
make  it  necessary  for  the  plaintiff  to  amend  his  bill,  he  may 
have  leave  to  amend  the  same  with  or  without  the  payment  of 
costs,  as  the  court  or  a  judge  thereof  may  in  his  discretion 
direct."  ^  It  has  been  held,  that  a  special  replication  is  equally 
improper  to  a  plea.^  Allegations  of  new  matter  in  a  replication 
will  therefore  be  disregarded,  and  the  pleading,  if  allowed  to 
remain  upon  the  file,  will  be  given  no  more  effect  than  if  it  were 
simply  general. ^*^     The   proper  course,  however,  is  for  the  de- 

§156.    1   Mason    v.    Hartford,    Provi-  6  Mitford's  PI.  ch.  3;    Story's  Eq,  Pi. 

dence,  &  Fishkill  U.  R.  Co.,  10  Fed.  K.  §  878. 

334.  -  Mitford's  PI.  ch.  3 ;   Story's    Eq.  PI. 

2  Mitford's  PI.  ch.  3.  §  878. 

3  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  878.  8  Rule  45. 

<  Story's  Eq,  PI.  §  878.  ^  Mason    i-.    Hartford,    Providence   & 

5  Mitford's   PI.  cii.  3;  Story's  Eq.  PI.     Fishkill  U.  R.  Co,  10  Fed.  R.  Z^L 
§  878.  1'  Vattier  v.  Hinde,   7  Pet.  252,  273 ; 


270  EEPLICATIONS.  [CHAP.  ?:T. 

fendant  to  move  the  special  replication  off  the  file.^^  After  the 
disuse  in  England  of  special  replications,  it  was  customary  for 
the  plaintiff  to  sue  out  and  serve  upon  the  defendant  a  subpoena 
to  rejoin. ^2  This  practice  never  prevailed  generally  in  the 
United  States  ;^2  and  the  Equity  Rules  provide  that  "in  all  cases 
where  the  general  replication  is  filed,  the  cause  shall  be  deemed 
to  all  intents  and  purjioses  at  issue,  without  any  rejoinder  or 
other  pleading  on  either  side."  ^^ 

§  157.  When  a  Replication  should  be  Filed.  —  The  equity  rules 
provide  that  if  the  plaintiff  does  not  reply  to  any  plea,  or  set  it 
down  for  argument  on  the  rule-day  when  the  same  is  filed,  or  on 
the  next  succeeding  rule-day,  he  shall  be  deemed  to  admit  the 
truth  and  sufficiency  thereof,  and  his  bill  shall  be  dismissed  as  of 
course,  unless  a  judge  of  the  court  shall  allow  him  furtiier  time 
for  the  purpose.^  Whenever  the  answer  of  the  defendant  is  not 
excepted  to,  or  is  adjudged  or  deemed  sufficient,  the  plaintiff 
must  file  the  general  replication  thereto  on  or  before  the  next 
succeeding  rule-day  thereafter.^  If  the  plaintiff  omits  or  refuses 
to  file  such  replication  within  tlie  prescribed  period,  the  de- 
fendant is  entitled  to  an  order,  as  of  course,  for  a  dismissal  of  the 
suit  ;  and  the  suit  is  thereupon  dismissed,  unless  the  court,  or  a 
judge  thereof,  shall,  upon  motion  for  cause  shown,  allow  a  repli- 
cation to  be  filed  nunc  pro  tunc,  the  plaintiff  submitting  to  speed 
the  cause  and  to  such  other  terms  as  may  be  directed.^  It  has 
been  held  that  such  an  order  may  be  entered  by  the  clerk  w^ith- 
out  an}'  application  to  the  judge.*  No  replication  need  or  should 
be  filed  when  the  cause  is  set  down  for  hearing  upon  bill  and 
answer.^  Where  tliere  are  several  defendants  a  replication 
should  be  filed  within  the  prescribed  time  after  one  of  them  has 
filed  an  answer  or  plea,  although  the  others  may  not  have  done 
so,^  It  is  the  safer  practice  to  file  a  separate  replication  after 
tlie  other  answers  have  come  in.'  The  court  may  grant  leave  to 
withdraw  a  replication,  and  amend,  or  have  the  cause  set  down 

Duponti  i\  Mussy,  4  Wasli.  128  ;  Wren  v.  2  T^nlc  fi6. 

SpL-ncer  OpticalManuf.  Co.,  18  Off.  Gaz.  »  Rule  66. 

8o7.  *  Kobinson  v.  Satterlce,  3  Saw.  l?A. 

"   Mason    r.    Ilartfonl,    Providence   &  ^  i^ey^olds  r.  Crawfordsville  First  Nat. 

Fisiikill  R.  R.  Co.,  10  Fed.  R.  334.  Rank,  112  U.  S.  405;  Gaines  v.  Agncliy, 

1-  Story's  Eq.  Rl.  §  87!).  1  Woods,  2.38. 

!'5  Story's  Eq.  RI.  §  879,  note  5.  ^  Coleman  v.  Martin,  6  Rlatehf.  291. 

1*  Rule"  66.  ^  See  Smitli's   Cli.   Rr.   (2d    Kng.   ed  ) 

§  157.   1  Rule  38.  vol.  i.  p.  330. 


§  150.]  FRAME    OF   A    REPLICATION.  271 

for  a  hearing  upon  bill  and  answer.^  It  has  been  held  that  the 
pendency  of  a  motion  affecting  the  plea  or  answer  will  excuse 
the  plaintiff  from  replying  before  the  motion  has  been  decided.^ 
Only  a  party  whose  plea  or  answer  lias  received  no  proper  reply 
can  have  a  bill  dismissed  for  a  failure  to  comply-  with  these  rules.^° 
The  court  exercises  great  liberality  in  allowing  a  replication  to 
he  filed  nu7ic  pro  tunc,^^  or  in  allowing  one  filed  too  late  to 
stand. ^  The  taking  of  testimony  by  the  defendant,  or  any  other 
proceeding  taken  by  him  in  the  cause,  would  probably  be  held 
a  waiver  of  his  right  to  have  a  bill  dismissed  for  want  of  a  repli- 
cation.^^ An  objection  upon  this  ground  cannot  be  raised  for 
the  first  time  upon  appeal. i'*  After  a  cause  has  been  heard  upon 
bill  and  answer  the  court  will  rarely  allow  a  replication  to  be 
filed.15 

§  158.  Effect  of  a  Replication.  —  The  complainant,  by  filing  a 
general  replication,  admits  the  suflEiciency  as  regards  discovery,^ 
but  not  as  a  defense,^  of  the  plea  or  answer  to  which  it  is  filed, 
and  denies  every  allegation  in  the  plea  or  answer  which  is  not 
directly  responsive  to  the  bill.^ 

§  159.  Frame  of  a  Replication.  —  The  full  title  of  the  cause,  as 
it  stands  at  the  time  the  replication  is  filed,  must  be  set  forth  in 
the  heading  of  the  replication,  but  only  the  names  of  such  of  the 
defendants  as  have  appeared  should  be  inserted  or  referred  to  in 
the  body.  If  a  defendant's  name  has  been  misspelt  by  the 
plaintiff,  and  such  defendant  has  corrected  the  same  by  his  an- 
swer, but  the  plaintiff  has  not  afterwards  amended  his  bill  with 
respect  to  such  name,  the  correction  should  be  shown  in  the 
title  of  the  replication  ;  in  the  body  of  the  replication,  however, 

^  Ixo^crs  V.  Goore,  17  Ves.  130 ;  Brown  Blatchf.  26  ;  Reynolds  t\  Crawfordsville 

V.  Ricketts,  2  J.  Cli.  (N.  Y.)   425;  Dan-  First  Nat.  Bank"  112  U.  S.  405. 

iell's   Ch.    Pr.  (2d   Am.    ed.)    479;   Ibid  "  Clements    v.    Moore,    G   Wall.  299; 

(3d  Am.  ed.)  830.  Fretz  v.  Stover,  22  Wall.  198. 

9  AUis  V.  Stowell,  5  Fed.  R.  203.  i^  Bullinger    v.    Mackey,    14    Blatchf. 

"  Chicago  &  Alton  R.  R.  Co.  r.  Union  355 ;    Peirce    v.   West's   Executors,   Pet. 

Rolling  Mill  Co.,  109  U.  S.  702,  717.  C.  C.  351. 

"  Pierce    v.    West's    E.xecutors,    Pet.  §  158.    1  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  877  ;  Hughes 

C.  C.  351 ;    Sayles  v.  Erie  Railway  Co.,  v.  Blake,  0  Wheat.  453. 

2  N.  J.  L.  J.  212";  Fischer  v.  Hayes,  6  Fed.  -  Rule  33  ;    Matthews  v.  Lalance  &  G. 

R.  76 ;    s.  c.   19   Blatchf.   2(3 ;    Jones   v.  Manuf.    Co.,   2    Fed     R.    232.     But   see 

Brittan,  1  Woods,  6(57.  Myers  v.  Dorr,  13  Blatchf.  22  ;  Theberath 

1-  Fischer  v.  Hayes,  6  Fed.  R.  76  ;  s.  0.  v.  Rubber  &  Celluloid  Harness  Trinmiing 

19  Blatchf.  26.       '  Co.,  5  Bann.  &  A.  584. 

13  Jones    V.   Brittan,    1    Woods.    667;  3  Humes  r.  Scruggs,  91  U.  S.  22. 
Fischer  v.  Ilnyes,  0  Fed.  R.  70  ;    s.  c.   19 


272  REPLICATIOMS.  [CHAP.  XI. 

the  correct  name  only  should  be  inserted.  When  any  defendant 
has  died  since  the  bill  was  filed,  the  words  "  since  deceased  " 
should  follow  his  name  in  the  title,  but  liis  name  should  be 
omitted  in  the  body  of  the  replication.  If  the  plaintiff  joins 
issue  with  all  the  defendants  their  names  need  not  be  repeated 
in  the  body;  it  is  sufficient  in  such  case  to  designate  them  as 
''  all  the  defendants ; "  but  if  he  does  not  join  issue  with  all,  the 
names  of  the  defendants  must  be  set  out  in  the  body.^  If  the 
defendant  has  filed  both  a  plea  and  answer,  the  replication  should 
refer  to  both.^  The  body  of  a  genei-al  replication  is  substantially 
as  follows  :  "  This  repliant,  saving  and  reserving  to  himself  all 
and  all  manner  of  advantage  of  exception,  which  may  be  had 
and  taken  to  the  manifold  errors,  uncertainties,  and  insufficiencies 
of  the  answer  of  the  said  defendants  for  replication  thereunto, 
saith,  that  he  doth  and  will  aver,  maintain,  and  prove  his  said 
bill  to  be  true,  certain,  and  sufficient  in  the  law  to  be  answered 
unto  by  the  said  defendants,  and  that  the  answer  of  the  said 
defendants  is  very  uncertain,  evasive,  and  insufficient  in  law,  to 
be  replied  unto  by  this  repliant;  without  that,  that  any  other 
matter  or  thing  in  the  said  answer  contained,  material  or  effectual 
in  the  law  to  be  replied  unto,  and  not  herein  and  hereby  well 
and  sufficiently  replied  unto,  confessed  or  avoided,  traversed  or 
denied,  is  true  ;  all  which  matters  and  things  this  repliant  is 
ready  to  aver,  maintain,  and  prove  as  this  honorable  court  shall 
direct,  and  humbly  prays  as  in  and  by  his  said  bill  he  hath  al- 
ready prayed."'^  A  replication  should  be  signed  by  the  plaintiff's 
solicitors.  The  signature  of  counsel  is  unnecessary.*  A  repli- 
cation, like  all  other  papers  in  a  suit  in  equit}-,  should  contain  no 
scandal  or  impertinence.  Proceedings  thereon  on  account  of  its 
containing  scandalous  or  impertinent  matter  are  similar  to  those 
upon  an  answer  of  that  character.  In  Queen  Elizabeth's  time, 
the  plaintiff,  for  putting  in  too  long  a  replication,  was  fined  ten 
pounds,  and  imprisoned,  and  a  hole  made  through  the  replication, 
which  was  hung  about  his  neck,  while  he  was  obliged  to  go  thus 
carrying  it  from  bar  to  bar.^ 

§  159.    1  Danicll'sCh.Pr.  (4th  Am.ed.)  ^  Story's  Eq.  Tl.  §  881;  DanicU's   CIi. 

830,  831.  Pr.  (4th  Am.  ed.)  830. 

■■^  Niccol  V.  ■Wiseman,  2  Vern.  40.  ^  Mihvard  v.  Wt'ldcn,  8  Eliz.  li.  B.  fo. 

3  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  878,  note  4.  678;   Tothill,  101. 


§  161.]  WHEN    BILLS   CAN    BE    AMENDED.  273 


CHAPTER   XII. 

AMENDMENTS. 

§160.  Amendments  in  General.  —  "In  reference  to  amend- 
ments of  equity  pleadings  the  courts  have  found  it  impracticable 
to  lay  down  a  rule  that  would  govern  all  cases.  Their  allowance 
must,  at  everv  stage  of  the  cause,  rest  in  the  discretion  of  the 
court ;  and  that  discretion  must  depend  largel}'  on  the  special 
circumstauces  of  each  case.  It  may  be  said,  generall}^  that  in 
passing  upon  applications  to  amend,  the  ends  of  justice  should 
never  be  sacrificed  to  technical  lules  of  practice.  Undoubtedly 
great  caution  should  be  exercised  where  the  application  comes 
after  the  litigation  has  continued  for  some  time,  or  when  the 
granting  of  it  would  cause  serious  inconvenience  or  expense  to 
the  opposite  side  "  ^  The  Revised  Statutes  provide  that  the  court 
"  may  at  any  time  permit  either  of  the  parties  to  amend  any  de- 
fect in  the  process  or  pleadings,  upon  such  conditions  as  it  shall, 
in  its  discretion  and  by  its  rules,  prescribe."  ^  States,^  charities,* 
infants,^  idiots,  and  lunatics,  are  allowed  to  amend  in  cases  where 
courts  might  hesitate  to  grant  the  privilege  to  others. 

§  161.  When  Bills  can  be  Amended.  —  The  equity  rules  regu- 
late the  amendment  of  bills  as  follows:  "The  plaintiff  shall  be 
at  liberty,  as  a  matter  of  course,  and  without  payment  of  costs, 
to  amend  his  bill,  in  any  matters  whatsoever,  before  any  copy 
has  been  taken  out  of  the  clerk's  office,  and  in  any  small  matters 
afterwards,  such  as  filling  blanks,  correcting  errors  of  dates,  mis- 
nomer of  parties,  misdescription  of  premises,  clerical  errors,  and 
generally  in  matters  of  form.  But  if  he  amend  in  a  material 
point,  as  he  may  do  of  course,  after  a  copy  has  been  so  taken, 
before  any  answer  or  pica  or  demurrer  to  the  bill,  he  shall  pay 

§  IGO.    1  Mr.  Justice  ITarlan  in  Hardin  *  President   of    St.    Mary   Magdalen's 

V.  IJoyd,  li:?  U.  S.  75G,  701.     See  Nellis  College  v.  Sibthorp,  1  Russ.  154. 

V.  Pennock  Mannf.  Co.,  38  Fed.  K.  379.  ^  Serlo  v.  St.  Eloy,  2  P.   Wms.  386; 

2  U.  S.  R.  S.  § 'J54.  Pritcliard    i-.    Quinchant,    Ambler,   147; 

3  Rhode  Island    v.  Massachusetts,    13  Store's  Kq.  Pi.  §§  51),  892. 
Pet.  23. 

VOL.  1.  —  18 


274  AMENDMENTS.  [CHAP.  XIT. 

to  the  defendant  the  costs  occasioned  theiehy,  and  shall,  -without 
delay,  furnish  him  with  a  fair  copy  thereof,  free  of  expense,  with 
suitable  references  to  the  places  where  the  same  are  to  be  in- 
serted. And  if  the  amendments  are  numerous,  he  shall  furnish 
in  like  manner  to  the  defendant  a  copy  of  the  whole  bill  as 
amended  ;  and  if  there  be  more  than  one  defendant,  a  copy  shall 
be  furnished  to  each  defendant  affected  thereby."  ^  For  the 
purposes  of  this  rule,  an  answer  which  has  been  held  or  admitted 
to  be  insufficient  is,  it  seems,  considered  as  no  answer.^  It  has 
been  held  that,  after  an  insufficient  answer,  the  eoniplainaiit  can- 
not amend  by  leaving  out  the  defendant's  name,  and  thus  discon- 
tinuing the  suit  witliout  costs.^  After  an  answer,  or  plea,  or 
demurrer  is  put  in,  and  befoi'e  replication,  the  plaintiff  may,  upon 
motion  or  petition,  without  notice,  obtain  an  order  from  any 
judge  of  the  court  to  amend  his  bill  on  or  before  the  next  suc- 
ceeding rule-day,  upon  payment  of  costs  or  without  payment  of 
costs,  as  the  court  or  a  judge  thereof  may  in  his  discretion  direct. 
But  after  replication  filed,  the  plaintiff  shall  not  be  permitted  to 
withdraw  it  and  to  amend  bis  bill,  except  upon  a  special  order 
of  a  judge  of  the  court,  upon  motion  or  petition,  after  due  notice 
to  the  other  party,  and  upon  proof  by  affidavit  that  the  same  is 
not  made  for  the  purpose  of  vexation  or  delay,  or  that  the  matter 
of  the  proposed  amendment  is  materia],  and  could  not  with 
reasonable  diligence  have  been  sooner  introduced  into  the  bill, 
and  upon  the  plaintiff's  submitting  to  such  other  terms  as  may 
be  imposed  by  the  judge  for  speeding  the  cause.^  This  rule 
applies  only  where  leave  to  amend  is  asked  before  a  demurrer  or 
plea  is  allowed.^  "  If  the  plaintiff  so  obtaining  any  order  to 
amend  his  bill  after  answer,  or  plea,  or  denuurer,  or  after  repli- 
cation, shall  not  file  his  amendments  or  amended  bill,  as  the  case 
ma}'  require,  in  the  clerk's  office  on  or  before  the  next  succeed- 
ing rule-day,  he  shall  be  considered  to  have  abandoned  the  same, 
and  the  cause  shall  proceed  as  if  no  application  for  any  amend- 
ment had  been  made."  ^  "  No  special  replication  to  au}^  answer 
shall  be  filed.  But  if  any  matter  alleged  in  the  answer  shall 
make  it  necessary  for  tiie  plaintiff  to  amend  his  bill,  he  may  have 

§  101.    1  Rule  28.  i  TJuio  29. 

■■^  Daniell's  Cli.  I'r.   (2il  Am.  ed.)  473.  ^  National  Bank  f.  Carpenter,  101  U.S. 

See  Chase  v.  Dunham,  1  Paipe(N.  Y.)..")72.  0G7,  508. 

3  Chase  v.  Dunliam,  1  I'aige   (N.  V.),  c  ^ule  30. 
572. 


§  162.]         FORM   AND   EFFEQT   OF   AMENDMENT    OF    A    BILL. 


0-n 


leave  to  amend  the  same  with  or  without  the  payment  of  costs, 
as  the  court  or  a  judge  thereof  may  iu  his  discretion  direct." " 
Such  an  amendment  must  be  asked  for  whenever  the  plaintiff 
wishes  to  avoid  and  not  merely  deny  a  defense  in  the  answer 
which  has  not  been  anticipated  in  the  original  bill.*'  Thus,  where 
an  answer  to  a  bill  for  an  injunction  against  the  infi'ingement  of 
a  patent  set  up  a  license,  the  complainant  was  not  allowed  to 
prove  the  abandonment  of  the  license  because  the  bill  containeil 
no  allegation  to  that  effect.^  If  upon  a  hearing  any  demurrer  or 
plea  is  allowed,  the  court  may,  in  its  discretion,  upon  motion  of 
the  plaintiff,  allow  him  to  amend  his  bill  upon  such  terms  as  it 
shall  deem  reasonable. ^^  When  the  plaintiff  wishes  to  amend 
the  bill  after  replication  by  the  addition  of  new  facts  or  charges, 
the  regular  practice  is  for  him  to  appl}'  for  leave  to  withdraw 
his  replication  and  amend. ^^  An  amendment  may  be  allowed  by 
the  court  at  any  time  even  after  a  final  decree. ^^ 

§  162.  Form  and  Effect  of  Amendment  of  a  Bill.  —  "Wherever 
leave  to  amend  the  bill  is  granted,  it  is  more  proper  to  file  an 
amended  bill  than  to  interline  the  original  bill,  particularly  if 
some  of  the  defendants  had  before  answered  that  bill."  ^  "The 
rule  is  that  the  amended  bill  should  state  no  more  of  the  original 
bill  than  may  be  necessary  to  introduce,  and  to  make  intelligible, 
the  new  matter,  which  should  alone  constitute  the  chief  subject 
of  the  bill.  The  reasons  for  this  rule  are  obvious.  Not  only  is 
the  incorporating  of  the  old  bill  into  the  amended  bill  unneces- 
sary, but  it  increases  the  costs,  and  exposes  the  defendants,  par- 
ticularly those  who  have  answered  the  original  bill,  to  the  trouble 
of  searching  out  and  separating  the  old  from  the  new  matter,  at 
the  peril  of  having  their  answer  excepted  to  if  any  mistake  should 
happen,  and  all  the  matter  of  tiie  amended  bill  should  not  be 
answered."  ^  Accordingly,  an  amended  bill  which  was  obnoxious 
to  this  rule  was  held  impertinent.^  It  is  the  better  practice  for 
the  counsel  to  sign  the  amendments,  if  they  are  not  as  to  matteis 
of  mere  form.*     The  amendment  of  a  bill  is  usually  considered 

7  Rule  45.  §  102.    '  Peirce  v.  West's  Executor,  3 

8  Wilson    V.   StoUey,  4   McLean,  275;     Wash.  .354,  355. 

Piatt  )\  Vatticr,  9  I'et.  40.5.  '^  IVirce  v.  West's  Executor,  3  Wash. 

y  Wilson  V.  Stolley,  4  McLean,  275.  354.  .35.5. 

^^  Rule  .3.5.  a  Peirce  r.  West's  E.xecutor,  3  Wash. 

"  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2(1  Am   p-l  )  470.  354,  3.55. 
1-  Tremaine  c.  Hitchcock,  23  Wall.  518.        *  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (5th  Am.  ed.)  313. 


276  AMENDMENTS.  [CHAP.  XII. 

as  an  admission  of  the  sufficiency  of  the  answer  as  regards  dis- 
coverv;^  but  an  aniendaient  which  merely  brings  in  a  new  de- 
fendant does  not  have  this  effect;^  and  the  court  may,  to  prevent 
delay,  entertain  a  motion  to  amend  a  bill  in  equity  at  the  same 
time  that  exceptions  to  the  answer  are  filed,  and  may  then  re- 
quire the  defendant  to  answer  the  amendments  and  the  excep- 
tions together.'^  An  amendment  of  a  bill,  at  least  before  answer, 
will  not,  it  seems,  dissolve  an  injunction  previously  granted.^  It 
is,  however,  the  usual  and  the  safer  practice  to  have  a  clause 
inserted  in  the  order  stating  that  the  amendment  may  be  made 
without  prejudice  to  the  injunction.^  Unless  otherwise  provided 
in  the  order,  it  seems  tiiat  an  amendment  of  a  bill  will  discharge 
all  contempt  proceedings  2:)reviously  instituted. i'^ 

§  163.  What  Amendments  to  Bills  may  be  made.  —  "  An  amend- 
ment should  rarely  if  ever  be  permitted  where  it  would  materially 
change  the  very  substance  of  the  case  made  by  the  bill,  and  to 
which  the  parties  have  directed  their  proofs."  ^  Thus,  where  a 
bill  was  filed  fur  the  enforcement  of  a  judgment  lien  upon 
specified  property  filed  against  certain  specified  defendants,  an 
amendment  was  refused  after  a  hearing,  when  it  was  sought  to 
seek  discovery  and  relief  against  all  purchasers  of  both  the  prop- 
erty referred  to  in  the  original  bill  and  other  property  of  the 
judgment  debtor,^  A  bill  to  restrain  the  infringement  of  a 
patent  cannot  be  amended  so  as  to  allege  that  the  title  to  the 
patent  is  in  a  different  person  from  the  one  who  in  the  original 
bill  is  alleged  to  hold  it.^  But  such  a  bill  may  be  amended  so  as 
to  set  up  a  reissue  of  the  original  patent,  w^hich  occurred  before 
the  original  bill  was  filed,  but  was  not  mentioned  therein.*  Such 
a  bill  may  also  be  amended  so  as  to  include  claims  for  damages 
and  profits  due  previous  owners  of  the  patent,  who  have  assigned 
them  to  the  complainant.^     The  allegation  that  certain  machines 

5  Smith's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Eng.  erl  )  307.  §  163.    i  Mr.  Justice  Harlan  in  Hardin 

6  Taylor  v.  Wrench,  9  Ves.  31.5.  v.  Boyd,  113  U.  S.  756,  761. 

^  Kittredge  t'.  Claremont  Banli,3Story,  -  Snead  u.  McCoull,  12  How.  407,  422. 

590.  3  Goodyear  v.  Bourn,  3  Blatchf.  266. 

»  Read  v.  Consequa,  4  Wasli.  174, 180 ;  See  Bylands  v.  LaTouclie,  2  Bligh,  .586. 

Sniitli's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Eng.  ed  )  306;  Dan-  *  Tiie    Tremolo    Patent,    Tremaine   v. 

iell's  Ch.  Pr.  (5th  Am.  ed.)  424,  42-5.  Hitclicock,  23  Wall.  518;  Reay  r.  Hay- 
s' Read  v.  Consequa,  4  Wasii.  174  ;  Dan-  nor,  19  Fed.  R.  308  ;    Reay   v.   Berlin  & 

iell's  Ch.  Pr.  (5th  Am.  ed.)  424,  42.5.  Jones  Envelope  Co.,  30  Fed.  R.  448.    But 

1"  Smith's  Ch.  Pr.   (2d  Eng.  ed.)  .305;  see  Jones  r.  Barker,  11  Fed.  R.  5',t7. 

Gray  c  Campbell,  1  U.  &  M.  323;  Synionds  ^  New  York  (Irapc  Sugar  Co.  r.  Buffalo 

V.  Duchess  of  Cumberland,  2  Cox,  411.  Grape  Sugar  Co.,  20  Fed.  li.  505. 


§  163.]  WHAT   AMENDMENTS    MAY    BE    MADE.  277 

alleged  to  be  used  in  violation  of  a  patent  were  infringements 
when  made,  may  also  be  added  by  amendment.*^  It  v/as  held  that 
a  bill  for  a  new  trial  of  an  action  for  the  price  of  stock  alleged 
to  have  been  sold  the  defendant,  could  not  be  changed  b}'- 
amendment  so  as  to  charge  that  the  defendant  held  the  stock  in 
trust  for  the  complainant.''  It  is  unsettled  whether  a  bill  for 
discovery  can  be  amended  so  as  also  to  pray  relief^  It  was  held 
that  a  bill  filed  against  persons  in  their  individual  capacity  cannot 
be  amended  so  as  to  sue  them  as  officers  of  a  corporation.^  A 
bill  filed  by  several  creditors  praying  tlie  sale  of  their  debtor's 
land  in  one  State,  and  the  satisfaction  of  their  claims  out  of  the 
proceeds  of  such  sale,  cannot  be  changed  by  amendment  so  as  to 
pray  relief  to  one  against  another  of  the  plaintiffs,  in  respect  to 
the  receipt  by  the  latter  of  the  proceeds  of  the  sale  of  other  land 
of  the  same  debtor  situated  in  another  State,  and  sold  under  a 
decree  in  another  suit  in  another  conrt.^^  A  bill  by  the  Land 
Company  of  New  Mexico  to  enforce  an  executory  contract  by 
the  defendant  Smoot  for  the  sale  of  an  interest  in  land  of  which 
the  defendant  Elkins  had  the  legal  title,  and  which  it  was  alleged 
that  Smoot  was  about  to  assign  to  the  defendant  Butler  with 
Elkins's  connivance,  was  held  not  amendable  "  by  omitting  all 
the  parties  but  Elkins,  and  proceeding  against  him  upon  the 
theory  that  complainant  has  acquired  Smoot's  interest  by  an 
al,)Solute  and  unconditional  transfer."'^*  A  bill  to  set  aside  a 
sheriff's  sale  may  be  amended  so  as  to  add  a  tender  of  the  pur- 
chase-price and  a  prayer  for  a  redemption  of  property.^^  A  bill 
to  set  aside  a  contract  for  the  sale  of  land  as  obtained, by  fraud 
may  be  amended  by  the  addition  of  an  alternative  prayer  for  the 
specific  performance  of  the  contract. ^^  A  bill  to  remove  a  cloud 
upon  the  title  to  laud  may  be  amended  so  as  to  seek  the  enforce- 
ment of  trusts  relating  to  the  same  property.^^     It  has  been  said, 

«  Eeay  v.  Raynor,  19  Fed.  R.  308.  w  Smith  v.  Woolfolk,  115  U.  S.  143, 

"  Ogleshy  v.  Attrill,  14  Fed.  R.  214.  148. 

^  See  llorsburg  v.  Baker,   1  Pet.  2o2  ;        i^  Land  Co.  of  New  Mexico  v.  Elkins, 

Butterworth  v.  Bailey,  15  Ves.  358  ;   Hild-  20  Fed.  H.  545. 

yard  v.  Cressy,  3  Atlc.  .303 ;  Crow  v.  Tyr-         i-  Graffam  v.  Burgess,  117  U.  S.  180. 
ell,   2    Madd.   397  ;    Jackson    v.    Strong,         '^  Hardin  v.  Boyd,  113  U.  S.  750.  dis- 

1   McClel.  245;    Lousada   v.  Templer,  2  tinguisliing  Shields  v.  Barrow,  17  How. 

Kiiss.  5C)5;  Daniell's  Ch.  Tr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  130. 
403-465.  1*  Partee  v.  Thomas,  11  Fed.  R.  769. 

3  Tyler  r.  Onlloway,  13  Fed.  R  477.  See  also  Neale  v.  Neales,  9  Wall.  1  ;  Bat- 
But  see  Woniersley  y  Merritt,  L.  K.  4  Eq.  tie  r.  Mutual  Life  Ins.  Co.,  10  Blatchf. 
Oj5.  417  ;  Burgess  v.  Graffam,  10  Fed.  R.  216, 


278  AMENDMENTS.  [CHAP.  XII. 

that  where  the  bill  originally  sets  out  one  agrGement  which  it 
seeks  to  enforce,  and  the  answer  admits  the  execution  of  another 
agreement  of  a  similar  character,  but  with  provisions  different 
from  those  alleged  in  the  bill,  the  plaintiff  may  amend,  abandon- 
ing the  agreement  first  pleaded  by  him,  and  obtain  the  enforce- 
ment of  that  admitted  by  the  defendant ;  but  that  he  cannot, 
while  still  praying  the  enforcement  of  the  agreement  as  set  out 
by  him,  amend  so  as  to  seek,  in  case  he  fail  in  proving  that,  an 
enforcement  of  the  one  admitted  in  the  auswer.^^  A  cross-bill 
may  be  amended  so  as  to  radically  change  the  ground  of  the  re- 
lief sought,  when  the  proofs  which  make  the  amendment  neces- 
sary have  been  furnished  by  the  complainant  in  support  of  the 
latter's  original  bill.^*'  It  was  held  that  a  creditor's  bill,  filed  to 
obtain  tlie  appointment  of  a  receiver  of  the  property  of  a  city, 
and  the  application  by  him  of  its  assets  to  the  satisfaction  of  its 
debts,  could  not  be  amended  so  as  to  seek  relief  against  a  receiver 
and  back-tax  collector,  appointed  by  a  subsequent  statute  of  the 
State  to  collect  tlie  city's  assets.^"  When  the  suit  was  begun  in  a 
Federal  court,  that  court  may  allow  an  amendment  setting  forth 
the  facts  essential  to  the  Federal  jurisdiction.^^  Allegations  in  a 
remittitur  filed  after  judgment  cannot  be  considered  as  amend- 
ments to  the  pleading.'^  Great  liberality  is  allowed  as  to  amend- 
ments which  strike  out  parties,-*^  or  bring  in  new  parties,^' 
except  as  to  bills  for  discovery,  to  which  in  England  no  new  ])ar- 
ties  could  be  added.^^  A  bill  filed  by  a  married  woman  can  al- 
most always  be  amended  by  the  addition  of  the  name  of  a  next 
friend  when  necessary .-^  A  bill  filed  on  behalf  of  one's  self  and 
others  may  be  amended  by  striking  out  the  invitation  to  otliers  to 
join,  provided  none  of  them  have  come  in  ; -^  and  a  bill  filed  in 
one's  own  name  may  be  amended  ))y  the  addition  of  words  suffi- 
cient to  make  it  a  bill  in  behalf  of  a  class.-'^     A  bill  filed  against 

15  Lindsay  v.  Lynch,  2  Sell.  &  Lef.  1,  0,  20  Conolly  v.  Tavlor,  2  Pet.  556 ;  Dwiglit 

i«  Cliicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Hy.  Co.  v.  Third  v.  Humpiireys,  3  McLean,  104. 

National  Bank  of  Chicago,  134  U.  S.  27(),  -i  Fisher  r.  Rutlierford,   Baldwin,  188  ; 

28!).  Patterson  r   Stapler,  7  Fed.  R.  210 

1^  Meriwether  ?'.  Garrett,  102  U.  S.472,  '--  Marqui.s  Cliolmondeiey  r.  Lord  Clin- 

502.    But  see  Richmond  v.  Irons,  121  U.  S.  ton,  2  Meri.  71. 

27.  -J  Douiilas  r.  Butler,  G  Fed.  R.  228. 

18  Continental   Ins.  Co.  v.   Rhoads,  110  2t  Yates  c.  Arden,  5  Cranch   C.  C  52(>. 

U.  S.  237;  Halsted   v.  Buster,   119  U.  S.  2i  Riohnmnd   v.   Irons,   121   U.    S.   27; 

341  ;  Denny  v.  Pironi,  141  U.  S.  121,  124.  Good  v.  Blewitt,  13  Ves.  397,  401  ;  Attor- 

"  Denny  v.  Pironi,  141  U  S.  121.  ney-General  y.  Newcombe,   14  Ves.  1,  (3; 


§  164.]  AMENDMENTS   ADDING   MATTER   SUBSEQUENT.  279 

a  defendant  as  executor  may  be  amended  so  as  to  charge  him  as 
administrator  of  the  same  pcrson.^^  In  an  Entilish  case,  a  hill 
in  behalf  of  a  charity  was  changed  by  amendment  into  an 
information.^" 

§  164.  Amendment  by  Pleading  Matters  subsequent  to  the  Filing 
of  the  Bill.  ^  Tiie  general  rule  is  that  nothing  which  has  occurred 
since  the  filing  of  a  bill  can  be  added  to  it  by  amendment.^  Such 
matters,  when  admissible,  should  ordinarily  be  introduced  by  a 
supplemental  bill.^  It  was  held  incompetent  to  amend  a  bill, 
stating  that  certain  notes  and  mortgages  were  executed  under  a 
threat  by  the  defendant  that  he  would  kill  the  complainant  if 
they  were  not  executed  and  paid  at  their  maturity,  by  adding  the 
allegation,  "  that  in  pursuance  of  such  threat  the  defendant  did, 
subsequently  to  the  commencement  of  this  suit,  take  the  life  of 
the  original  comi)lainant."  ^  Such  a  murder  does  not  add  to  the 
complainant's  cause  of  action,  although  it  might  be  put  in  evi- 
dence as  tending  to  prove  the  original  duress.*  An  amendment 
therefore  speaks  as  of  the  date  of  the  original  bill  ;  and  an 
amendment  alleging  the  requisite  difference  of  citizenship  in  the 
present  time  is  sufficient  to  establish  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
court.^  A  bill  may  perhaps  be  amended  before  answer,  demur- 
rer, or  plea,  l)y  alleging  new  matter  that  has  occurred  since  it 
was  first  filed.^  And  it  has  been  held  that  where  a  plaintiff  has, 
at  the  time  of  filing  his  original  bill,  an  inchoate  right,  to  perfect 
which  a  formal  act  alone  is  necessary,  and  such  formal  act  is  not 
performed  till  afterwards ;  as  where  an  executor  files  a  bill  be- 
fore probate,  and  subsequently  proves  the  testament,"  or  the  next 
of  kin  files  a  bill  to  protect  the  personal  estate  of  an  intestate 
and  subsequently  procures  her  appointment  as  administratrix,*^ 
or  a  foreign  administrator  files  a  bill  before  obtaining  ancillary 
letters  of  administration,  and  sucli  letters  are  subsequently  issued 

Keese  River  Silver  Mining  Co.  v.  Atweli,  '■^  Lyster  r.   Stickney,  12  Feci.  R.  609, 

L.  R.  7  Eq.  347.  010. 

••2«  Randolph  v.  Barrett,  16  Pet.  138.  ■•  Lyster  r.  Stickney,  12  Fed.  R.  609. 

-1  President  of  St.  Mary  Magdalen  Col-  ^  Birdsall  v.  Perego,  5  Blatchf.  251. 

lege  V.  Sibthorp,  1  Russ.  154.  o  Story's   Eq.   PI.  §   885 ;    Candler   v. 

§  164.     1  Wrayr.  Hiitciiinson,  2  Myl.  Pettit,   I'Paige    (N.   Y.),  168;  Ogden   v. 

&  k.  235;  Mason  n.  Hartford,  Providence  Gibbons,  Halst  N  J.  Dig.  172. 

&  Fislikill   R.    U.   Co.,   10  Fed.   R.  334;  "  Belloat  r.   Morse,  2    Hayw.  (N.  C.) 

Copen  V.  Flesber.  1  Bond,  440;  Lyster  v.  157;  Daniell's  Ch.   Pr.  (2d  Am.   ed.)  460. 

Stickney,  12  Fed.  R.  609.  *  Humphreys    v.    Humphreys,    3     P. 

2  See  Chapter  XIV.  Wms.  .348;  Bradford  v.  Felder,  2  M'Cord 

(S.  C),  Ch.  170. 


280  AMENDMENTS.  [CHAP.  XII. 

to  him  ;  ^  the  introduction  of  the  fact  by  amendment  will  be  per- 
mitted.^^ It  has  been  also  held  in  England  that  the  "  defendant, 
when  he  puts  in  his  answer,  must  state  the  facts  as  they  then 
are  ;  and  if  circumstances  are  then  introduced  in  the  answer 
which  occurred  subsequent  to  the  filing  of  the  bill,  the  plaintiff 
must  be  allowed  to  make  amendments  to  the  bill,  so  as  to  show 
that  such  new  circumstances  mentioned  in  the  answer  are  not  of 
the  color  he  represents  them,  and  so  as  to  obtain  a  complete 
answer  as  to  such  circumstances."  ^^ 

§  165.  Proceedings  upon  an  Amended  Bill.  —  When  the  amend- 
ment merely  brings  in  new  parties  defendant,  they  alone  need  be 
served  with  a  new  subpoena.^  If,  however,  a  bill  is  substantially 
amended  by  the  addition  of  new  charges,  according  to  the  Eng- 
lish practice  a  subpcena  to  answer  the  amendments  had  to  be 
sued  out  and  served  upon  all  the  defendants.^  Where  the  bill  is 
amended  before  answer  or  plea,  no  matter  how  trivial  the  amend- 
ment may  be,  the  defendant  may  demur  to  it,  although  a  de- 
murrer to  the  original  bill  has  been  overruled.^  If,  however,  a 
defendant  has  answered  the  original  bill,  he  cannot,  without  ob- 
taining leave  to  withdraw  his  first  answer,  demur,  plead,  or  answer 
to  any  more  than  the  new  matter,  unless  the  amendments  virtu- 
ally make  a  new  case.*  For  if  the  answer  whicli  still  remains 
upon  the  record  applies  to  any  part  of  the  amended  bill,  it  will 
overrule  a  general  demurrer.^  Where  the  amendments  seek  to 
introduce  new  matter  which  is  properly  the  subject  of  a  supple- 
mental bill,  the  defendant  must  raise  that  objection  by  demurrer.^ 
plea,  or  answer.'''  Otherwise,  the  objection  will  be  waived.^  The 
equity  rules  provide  that,  "  In  any  case  where  an  amendment  shall 

^  Swatzel    V.    Arnold,    Woolw.    338;  Lean,  514;  Angerstein  t\  Clarke,!  Ves. 

Black  V.  Henry  G.   Allen   Co.,  42  Fed.  Jr.  2.3U  ;  Skeffington  v. ,  4  Ves.  6G. 

R.  018,  624.     Contra,   Mason  v.  Hartford,  2  Cooker.  Davies,  T.  &  R.  309;  Bram- 

Providence   &  Fishkill  R.  R.  Co.,  10  Fed.  ston  r.  Carter,  2  Simons,  458.     See  Ken- 

R.  3.d4.  dall  V.  Beckett,  1  Russ.  152. 

If  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am   ed.)   400,  ''■  Bosaiiquet    r.   Marsham,    4  Simons, 

4G1  ;  Swatzel  v.  Arnold,  Woolw.  ."jH:]  ;  573;  Bancroft  c  Warden,  2  Dickens,  672. 
Black  ('.   Henry  G.  Allen  Co.,  42  Fed.  R.  ^  Keeiiei'.Wheatley,  9  American   Law 

filB,  624;  Humphreys  v.    Humphreys,  3  Register,  33,  00 ;  Atkinson  ;•.   Han  way,  1 

P.  Wms.  348.     ('outni.  Mason  r.  Hartford,  Co.\  Kq.  300;  Ellice  v.   Goodson.  3  m'.  & 

Providence  &  Fishkill  R.  R.  Co.,  10  Fed.  C.  053  ;  Ritchie  v.  Aylwin,  15  Ves.  70. 
R.  3.34.  '^  Ellice  v.  Goodson,  3  M.  &  C.  05.3, 

11  Sir  Thomas  Plumer,  V.  C.,in  Knight  •■  Brown  r.  Iligden,  1  Atk.  291. 

V.  Matthews,  1  Madd.  566.  '  Wray  r.  Ilutclnnson,  2  M.  &  K.  235. 

§  165.     1  Longwortli   v.  Taylor,  1  Me-  **  Archbishop  of   York  v.  Stnpleton,  2 

Atk.  136. 


§  167.]  AMENDMENT  OF  ANSWERS.  2S1 

be  made  after  answer  filed,  the  defendant  shall  put  in  a  new- 
answer  or  supplemental  answer  on  or  before  the  next  succeeding 
rule-day  after  that  on  which  the  amendment  or  amended  bill  is 
filed,  unless  the  time  is  enlarged  or  otherwise  ordered  by  a  judge 
of  the  court ;  and  upon  his  default,  the  like  proceedings  may  be 
had  as  in  cases  of  an  omission  to  put  in  an  answer."  ^  An  an- 
swer to  an  amended  bill  is  imi)ertinent  if  it  contains  any  matter 
which  was  pleaded  in  the  answer  to  the  bill  before  amendment.^*' 
It  seems  to  have  been  the  English  rule  that  an  answer  to  an 
amended  bill  might  set  up  an  entirely  new  defense  inconsistent 
with  that  in  his  former  answer.^^  The  court  may  after  amend- 
ment refuse  leave  to  file  an  answer  which'  does  not  plead  a  de- 
fense to  the  new  matter.'^ 

§  166.  Amendments  of  Demurrers,  Pleas,  and  Replications.  —  The 
court  may  allow  a  demurrer  to  be  amended  as  to  matters  of  form,^ 
and  also  in  substance  by  narrowing  ^  its  extent,  and  otherwise. 
When  a  substantial  amendment  of  a  demurrer  is  allowed,  it  is 
customary  to  give  the  plaintiff  leave  to  amend  his  bill  at  the  same 
time.^  An  amendment  of  a  plea,  except  as  to  a  matter  of  form,* 
is  less  frequently  allowed ;  and  only  upon  an  application  in  which 
the  court  must  be  told  precisely  what  the  amendment  is  to  be, 
and  how  the  slip  happened  which  it  is  to  correct.^  In  sacli  a  case, 
the  defendant  is  usually  given  a  very  short  time  within  which 
to  amend.^  The  amendment  of  a  replication  will  almost  always 
be  allowed.' 

§  167.  Amendment  of  Answers.  —  The  equity  rule  affecting 
the  amendment  of  answers  is  as  follows :  "  After  an  answer  is 
put  in,  it  may  be  amended,  as  of  course,  in  any  matter  of  form, 
or  by  filling  up  a  blank,  or  correcting  a  date,  or  reference  to 
a  document,  or  other  small  matter,  and  be  resworn  at  any  time 
before  a  replication  is  put  in,  or  the  cause  set  down  for  hearing 

9  Rule  46.  r.  Mellisli,  11   Ves.   70;  Story's  Eq.   PI. 

1''  Gier  v.  Gregg,  4  McLean,  202.  §  894. 

11  Daniell's  Cli.  Pr.  (2(1   Am.  ed.)  468  ;         3  Gregg  v.  Legli,  4  Madrlock,  198,  207  ; 

citing  Bolton   r.   Bolton,  MS.      See  also  Atwill  v.  Ferrett,  2  Blatclif.  39,  49. 
Trust  &  Fire  Insurance  Co.  v.  Jenkins,  8         «  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  954. 
Paige  (N.  Y.),  589.  5  Story's  Fq.   PI.  §  895.      See  Giant 

'2  Chicago,  M.  &.  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Tliinl  Powder  Co.  v.  Safety  Nitre  Powder  Co.,  19 

Nat.  Bank  of  Chicago,  184  IJ.  S.  276,  289.  Fed.  R.  509. 

§  166.     1  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  954.  e  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  895. 

3  Gregg  V.  Legh,  4  Madd.  19.3,  207  ;  ^  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (4th  Am.  ed.)  831. 
Atwill  V.  Ferrett,  2  Blatchf.  39,  49  ;   Baker 


282  AMENDMENTS.  [CHAP.  XII. 

upon  bill  and  answer.  But  after  replication,  of  such  setting 
down  for  hearing,  it  shall  not  be  amended  in  any  material 
matters,  as  by  adding  new  matters,  facts,  or  defenses,  or  quali- 
fying or  altering  the  original  statements,  except  by  special 
leave  of  the  court,  or  of  a  judge  thereof,  upon  motion  and  cause 
shown,  after  due  notice  to  the  adverse  party,  sui)ported  if  re- 
quired, by  affidavit;  and  in  every  case  where  leave  is  so  granted, 
the  court  or  the  judge  granting  the  same  may,  in  his  discretion, 
require  that  the  same  be  separately  engrossed,  and  added  as  a 
distinct  amendment  to  the  original  answer,  so  as  to  be  distin- 
guishable therefrom."  ^  The  principles  upon  which  the  courts 
proceed  in  allowing  such  amendments  is  thus  stated  by  Judge 
Story.  "  In  mere  matters  of  form,  or  mistakes  of  dates,  or  ver- 
bal inaccuracies,  courts  of  equity  are  very  indulgent  in  allowing 
amendments.  But  when  application  is  made  to  amend  an  answer 
in  material  facts,  or  to  change  essentially  the  grounds  taken  in 
the  original  answer,  courts  of  equity  are  exceedingly  slow  and 
reluctant  in  acceding  to  it.  To  support  such  applications,  they 
require  very  cogent  circumstances,  and  such  as  to  repel  the  no- 
tion of  any  attempt  of  the  party  to  evade  the  justice  of  the  cause, 
or  to  set  up  new  and  ingeniously  contrived  defenses  or  subter- 
fuges. When  the  object  is  to  let  in  new  facts  and  defenses 
wholly  dependent  upon  parol  evidence,  the  reluctance  of  the  court 
is  greatly  increased,  since  it  has  a  natural  tendency  to  encourage 
carelessness  and  indifference  in  making  answers,  and  leaves 
much  room  for  the  introduction  of  testimony  manufactured  for 
tlie  occasion.  But  when  tlie  new  facts  sought  to  lie  introduced 
are  written  papers  or  documents,  which  have  been  omitted  by 
accident  or  mistake,  there  the  same  reason  does  not  apply  in 
its  full  force  ;  for  such  papers  and  documents  cannot  be  made  to 
speak  a  different  language  from  that  which  originally  belonged 
to  them.  The  whole  matter  rests  in  the  sound  discretion  of 
the  court."  ^  "  It  seems  to  me  that  before  any  court  of  equity 
should  allow  such  amended  answers,  it  should  be  perfectly  sat- 
isfied that  the  reasons  assigned  for  the  application  are  cogent 
and  satisfactory ;  that  the  mistakes  to  be  corrected,  or  the 
facts  to  be  added  are  made  highly  probable,  if  not  certain;  that 
they  are  material  to  the  merits  of  the  case  in  controversy  ;  that 

§  167.    1  Rule  60.  2  Smith  v.  Babcock,  .3  Sumner,  583, 

586. 


§  167.]  AMENDMENT   OF   ANSWERS.  283 

the  party  has  not  been  guilty  of  gross  negligence  ;  and  that  the 
mistakes  have  been  ascertained,  and  the  new  facts  have  come  to 
the  knowledge  of  the  party,  since  the  original  answer  was  put  in 
and  sworn  to.  Where  the  party  relies  upon  new  facts  which 
have  come  to  his  knowledge  since  the  answer  was  put  in,  or 
where  it  is  manifest  that  he  has  been  taken  by  surprise,  or  where 
the  mistake  or  omission  is  manifestly  a  mere  inadvertence  and 
oversight,  there  is  generally  less  reason  to  object  to  the  amend- 
ment than  there  is  where  the  whole  bearing  of  the  facts  and 
evidence  must  have  been  well  known  before  the  answer  was  ))ut 
in."  ^  An  amendment  of  an  answer  changing  the  character  of 
the  defense  will  rarely  be  allowed  after  the  court  has  rendered  an 
opinion  adverse  to  the  position  originally  taken  by  the  defendant.* 
The  defendant  will  rarely  be  allowed  to  withdraw  an  admission 
which  he  has  made.'^  Leave  to  amend  will  be  denied  when  the 
complainant  proves  by  affidavit  that  the  new  matter  sought  to 
be  introduced  is  false.^  Ordinarily,  leave  to  amend  an  answer 
will  be  denied  when  the  defendant  knew  of  the  facts  which 
lie  wishes  to  introduce,  at  the  time  his  original  answer  was 
drawn;"  or  might  have  then  discovered  them  by  the  exercise 
of  reasonable  diligence.*^  An  omission  due  to  a  mistake  of 
law  cannot  ordinarily  be  cured  by  amendment.^  The  court  may 
refuse  to  allow  an  amendment  which  would  introduce  an  uncon- 
scientious defense,  sucli  as  the  statute  of  limitations,^*^  the  statute 
of  frauds,^!  or  that  a  contract  made  by  a  complainant  corpora- 
tion was  not  authorized  by  its  charter.^^  When  the  proposed 
amendment  is  trivial  the  answer  may  be  removed  from  the  file, 
altered,  resworn  to,  and  refiled;!^  but  if  it  is  of  any  length,  it 
is  customary  to   file   a   supplemental  answer  setting  it  forth. ^* 

3  Smith  V.  Babcock,  .3  Sumner,  583,  8  Blatchf.  85;  Webster  Loom  Co.  v.  Hig- 

586.  gins,  13  Blatclif.  349. 

*  Calloway  v.  Dobson,  1  Brock.  IID.  ■>  Webster  Loom  Co.  v.    Wiggins,  13 

See   Waklen   v.   Bodley,    14    Pet.    150;  Blatchf.  349;  Cross  y.  Morgan,  0  Fed.  R. 

Hamilton   v.  Nevada  G.  &  S.  Min.  Co.,  241. 
33  Fed.  K.  562,  568.  i*  Cock  ».  Evans,  9  Yerg.  (Tenn.)  287. 

5  Ruggles  V.  Eddy,  11  Blatchf.  524.  "  Cook  c.  Bee,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  344. 

6  Hicks  V.  Otto,  17  Fed.  11.  539.  '-  Tiiird  Avenue  Savings  Bank  v.  Di- 
^  India  Rubber  Comb  Co.  v.  Phelps,  mock,  9  C.  E.  Green  (24  N.  J.  Eq.),  20. 

8  Blatclif.  85;  Webster  Loom  Co.  ?'.  Hig-  i-^  Bailey    Washing    Machine    Co.    r. 

gins,  13  Blatchf.  349;    Cross  v.  Morgan,  Young,  12  Blatchf.  190. 

6  Fed.  R.  241 ;   Suydam  r.   Truesdale,  6  '^  Dolder  v.  Bank  of  England,  10  Yes. 

McLean,  4-50.  284,  285  ;  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (5tli  Am.  ed.) 

8  India  Rubber  Comb  Co.  v.  Phelps,  779,  780. 


284  AMENDMENTS.  [CHAP.  XII. 

Leave  to  withdraw  an  answer  and  file  a  demurrer  or  plea  may  ^^ 
but  very  rarely  will  be  granted. ^"^ 

§  168.  Practice  in  obtaining  Leave  to  Amend.  —  The  application 
for  leave  to  amend  must  be  in  writing,  stating  the  new  matter 
which  the  applicant  desires  to  introduce  by  amendment,  and 
must  be  supported  by  an  affidavit,  stating  the  reason  why  this 
matter  was  not  included  in  the  original  jilcading.^  Where  the 
former  pleading  was  verified,  oath  must  be  made  to  the  truth 
of  the  proposed  amendments.^  Where  the  proposed  amendment 
consists  of  matters  disclosed  by  documentary  evidence,  the  docu- 
ments themselves  must  be  produced  if  possible.^  The  court  may 
impose  terms  as  a  condition  precedent  to  amendment ;  for  ex- 
ample, a  disclosure  of  the  names  of  the  witnesses  whom  the  party 
expects  to  call  to  prove  the  new  matter.*  The  order  allowing  the 
amendment  should  state  the  new  matter  to  be  inserted.^  If  the 
amended  pleading  states  new  matter  not  allowed  by  the  order,  it 
may  be  stricken  from  the  file.^  The  court  upon  ap[)eal  will  dis- 
regard an  amended  pleading  filed  without  leave,"  unless  the  other 
party  has  treated  it  as  valid,  when  he  cannot  raise  the  objection 
for  the  first  time  upon  appeal.^  When  both  parties  have  con- 
ducted the  case  as  if  the  i)leadings  contained  certain  allegations 
therein  omitted,  an  amendment  inserting  sucli  allegations  may  be 
allowed  at  almost  any  stage  of  the  cause.^  The  Supreme  Court 
may,^^  but  rarely  will,^i  reverse  a  decree  for  an  error  in  refusing 
permission  to  make  an  amendment ;  never  unless  the  proposed 
amendment  appears  upon  the  record. ^^  It  has  been  said  tliat  a 
decree  will  not  be  reversed  for  an  error  in  allowing  an  amend- 
ment. ^^     The    Supreme    Court  will    not  allow   a   pleading  to  be 

15  U.  S.  V.  American  Bell  Tel.  Co.,  39  ^  Strange  v.  Collins,  2  V.  &  B.  1G3, 
Fed.  R.  716.  1C7. 

16  Piielps  V.  Elliott,  30  Fed.  K.  306.  1  Terry  v.  McLure,  103  U.  S  442. 
§  108.     1  Snead    v.    M'CouU,   12   How.  «  Clements  r.  Moore,  6  Wall.  299. 

407,   422 ;  National    Bank    v.    Carpenter,  ^  Tremaine    v.    Ilitciicock,    2o    Wall. 

101  U.  S.  507,   568;    Wells  v.  Wood,    10  518. 

Ves.  401;   Nabob  of  tlie  Carnatic  v.  East  w  Ri,Mie  v.  Wliiteliill,  135  U.  S.  021, 

India  Co.,  1  Ves.  Jr.  .374,  385;  Kod^jers  v.  027,  040. 

Kodgers,  1  Paige  (N.  Y.),  424;    Daniell's  n  National   Bank  v.  Carpenter,   101  U. 

Ch.  IV.  (5tli  Am.  ed.)  781.  S.  507,  508.     But  see  Riddle  r.  Wiiitebill, 

2  Rodgers  i:  Rodger?,  1  Paige  (N.  Y.),  135  U.  S.  621,  027,  040 

424.  1-  National  Bank  v.  Carpenter,   107  U. 

•5  Churton  v.  Frewen,  L.  R.  1  Eq.  238 ;  S.  507,  608. 

Daniell's  Cii.  Pr.  (5tii  Am.  ed.)  781.  '3  Ciiapman  v.  Barney,  120  U.  S.  077, 

■«  Caster  r.  Wood,  1  Baldwin.  280.  081. 

6  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (5th  Am.  ed.)  410. 


§  168.]  PKACTICE   IN    OBTAINING    LEAVE   TO    AMEND.  285 

amended  upon  appeal  to  it  i*  except  by  coiisent.i^  j^  l^as  been 
held,  however,  that  a  Circuit  Court  has  power  to  allow  an  amend- 
ment to  a  pleading  when  hearing  an  appeal  from  a  District 
Court.16 

14  Pacific  Railroad  of  Mo.  v.  Ketchum,        i^  Kennedy  v.  Georgia  State  Bank,   8 
95  U.  S.  1.  How.  586. 

16  Warren  v.  Moody,  9  Fed.  R.  673. 


286  CROSS-BILLS.  [chap.  XIIL 


CHAPTER   XIIL 

CliOSS-BILLS. 

§  169.  Definition  and  Origin  of  Cross  Bills.  —  A  cross-bill  IS  a  hill 
filed  by  a  defendant  in  a  suit  in  equity  against  one  or  more  of  the 
other  parties,  in  order  to  obtain  either  discovery  of  facts  in  aid 
of  his  defence,  or  complete  relief  to  all  parties  as  to  the  mat- 
ters charged  in  the  original  bill.^  It  was  borrowed,  through  the 
canon,  from  the  reconventio  of  the  later  civil  law;^  and  from 
it  is  derived  the  counterclaim  of  code-pleading.^  It  was  origi- 
nally used  chiefly  for  the  purpose  of  set-off  and  discovery, 
which  modern  statutory  enactments  have  made  it  now  possible 
to  obtain  in  a  simpler  way. 

§  170.  When  a  Cross-Bill  should  be  Filed.  —  A  cross-bill  is  filed  by 
one  of  the  defendants  to  a  suit  in  equity  either  for  his  own  pro- 
tection, or  by  the  direction  of  the  court  at  the  hearing,  if  the 
pleadings  are  then  insufficient  to  enable  it  to  determine  the 
rights  of  all  the  parties  sufficiently  to  make  a  complete  decree 
upon  the  subject-matter  of  the  suit.^  This  latter  case  most 
frequently  happens  when  persons  in  opjaosite  interests  are  co- 
defendants.  Although  a  defendant  can  by  his  answer  obtain 
the  benefit  of  any  defense  he  may  have  against  the  plaintiffs 
claim,  he  can,  except  in  a  very  few  cases,  obtain  no  relief 
against  the  latter  in  the  same  suit  beyond  what  results  neces- 
sarily from  the  denial  of  the  jirayer  of  the  original  bill.^  ''  If 
the  facts  which  a  defendant  wishes  to  set  up  destroy  the  plain- 
tiff's apparent  cause  of  action,  they  constitute  a  defense,  and 
should  be  set  up  by  answer  or  plea;  but  if  they  only  furnish 
a  reason  why   the   court  should   make  a  decree    depriving    the 

§100.    1  Mr.  Justice  Nelson  in  Ayrcs  Field   i'.    SchieffL'lIn,    7   J.    Ch.    (N.    Y.) 

V.  Carver,  17  How.  5U1,  at  page  5%.  250. 

'^  Story's   Eq.   PI.   §   402;    Langdell's  ^  Carnochan    v.   Christie,    11    Wlicat. 

Eq.  Pi.  §§  152,  154.  446 ;  Ford  c.  Douglas,  5  How.  143 ;  Chapin 

3  See  Brande  v.  Gilchrist,  18  Fed.  R.  v.  Walker,  G  Fed.  R.  794 ;  Brande  v.  Gil- 

465.  Christ,  18  Fed.  R.  405;  Denver  &  R.  G. 

§  170.   1  Langdell's    Eq.    PI.    §    124  ;  Ry.  Co.  v.  Denver,  S.  P.  &  P.  R.  Co.,  17 

Dauiell's   Ch.   Pr.    (5th   Am.  ed.)   1550;  Fed.  R.  807. 


§  171.]  WHEN   A   CROSS-BILL   SHOULD   NOT   BE   FILED.  287 

plaintiff  of  his  cause  of  action,  they  must  be  set  up  by  a  cross-bill ; 
and  in  the  latter  case  the  defendant's  answer  to  the  original  bill 
should  strictly  contain  nothing  but  discovery."  ^  Where  the 
plaintiff's  right  depends  upon  an  instrument  or  conveyance  which 
is  not  void,  but  merely  voidable  on  account  of  fraud  or  otherwise, 
the  defendant  can  in  most  cases  only  set  up  the  facts  showing  its 
invalidity  by  a  cross-bill.*  In  a  suit  to  set  aside  a  contract,  the 
defendant  cannot  have  the  contract  enforced  unless  he  files  a 
cross-bill.5  It  has  been  held  that  a  discharge  in  bankruptcy  must 
be  pleaded  in  a  cross-bill.*^  There  are  very  few  cases '  in  which 
a  court  can  give  one  defendant  relief  against  another,  unless  the 
former  files  a  cross-bill.^  In  a  case  where  the  original  bill  prayed 
a  confirmation  of  a  title  under  a  deed  absolute  in  form,  a  cross-bill 
by  one  of  the  defendants,  claiming  that  the  deed  be  declared  a 
trust  deed  for  her  sole  benefit,  was  held  to  be  germane  to  the 
subject-matter  of  tlie  suit,  and  sufficient  to  support  a  decree  bind- 
ing the  other  defendants  as  well  as  the  plaintiff,^  No  party  is 
obliged  to  file  a  cross-bill  unless  the  court  orders  him  to  do  so. 
Otherwise,  he  may  seek  by  an  independent  bill  the  relief  which 
he  desires.^*'  A  cross-bill  may  be  filed  at  any  time  before  the 
final  hearing  if  not  at  any  time  before  the  final  decree. ^^ 

§  171.  When  a  Cross-Bill  should  not  be  Filed.  —  There  are  two 
important  classes  of  cases  in  which  tlie  court  gives  relief  to  the 
defendant  without  a  cross-bill.  Suits  for  an  account,  in  which,  if 
it  finally  appears  that  the  balance  is  in  favor  of  the  defendant, 
the  court  will  give  him  a  decree  for  the  sum  found  to  be  due  to 
him ;  ^    and  bills  for  the  specific  performance  of   contracts,  in 

3  Langdell's  Eq.  §  15-5.  ^  s,„it|^   „.  Woolfolk,  115   U.  S.   143, 

*  Ford  V.  Douglas,  5  How.  14.3  ;  Lang-  148  ;    Clianiley  r.  Lord  Dunsany,  2  Sch. 

dell's  Eq.  PI.   §  131  ;   Jacobs  v.  Kichard,  &  Lef.  690,718;  Conry  y.  Caulfield,  2Ball 

ISBeav.  300;  Beddoes  y.  Fugh,  20  Heav.  &  Beatty,  255;    Elliott   t:  Pell,  1   Paige 

407,410,  417;    llolderness  o.   Kaiikin,  2  (N.  Y.),  263;    Langdell's  Eq.  PI.  §§  155, 

l)e  Gex,  F.  &  J.  258;  Eddleston  v.  Col-  156.     See  §  172. 

lins,  3  De  Gex,  M.  &  G.  1,  16;  Cliapin  s  Langdi-11's  Eq.  PI.  §§  15-5,  156;  Tal- 

r.    Walker,    2    M'Crary,    175.     But    see  bot  ?;.  Mc(iee,  4  Monroe  (Kv.),  375,  379; 

Dayton  i'.  Melick,  27  N.  J.  Eq.  (12  C.  E.  Beacli  v.  Rice,  131  U.  S.  293. 

Green)   862;  Pitts   v.  Powledge,  66  Ala.  »  Kingsbury    v.   Buckner,    134   U.   S. 

147  ;  Kennedy  v.  Green,  3  My.  &  K.  699,  650,  677. 

718;   Eyry  ;;.  Huglies,  2  Cli.  D.  148;  Os-  w  Washburn    &   Moen    Manuf.  Co.  i;. 

borne  v.  Barge,  30  Fed.  R.  805.  Scutt,  22  Fed.  R.  710. 

5  Meissnerc.  Buck,28Fed.R.161;  Car-  "  Neal    r.    Foster,  34    Fed.    R.    496; 

noclian  r,  Christie,  11  Wheaton,  446,  447.  Rogers  v.  Reissner,  31  Federal  Reporter, 

^  Banque  Franco-Egyptienne  i;.Brown,  592. 

24  Fed.  R.  106,  107.  §  171.  i  Clarke  v.  Tipping,  4  Beav.  588; 


288  CROSS-BILLS.  [chap.  XIII. 

which,  if  the  parties  differ  as  to  the  terms  of  the  contract,  and 
that  question  is  decided  in  the  defendant's  favor,  the  court  will 
compel  the  plaintiff  to  perform  the  contract  thus  established.^ 
But  these  exceptions  illustrate  the  rule ;  for  they  proceed  dis- 
tinctly upon  the  theory  that  the  court  only  entertains  such  bills 
upon  the  condition  that  the  plaintiff  will  consent  to  the  same 
justice  being  rendered  to  the  defendant  that  he  asks  for  himself ; 
and  formerly  this  consent  was  required  to  be  expressly  given  in 
the  bill.^  So,  when  a  question  had  been  fully  litigated  between 
a  plaintiff  and  one  defendant,  and  it  appeared  that  the  latter 
was  liable,  not  to  the  former,  but  to  a  co-defendant,  who  was 
himself  liable  to  the  plaintiff  to  the  same  extent,  the  court  has 
allowed  a  decree  in  favor  of  the  latter  defendant  against  the 
other  without  the  filing  of  any  cross-bill.*  "  When  the  decision 
of  a  controversy  between  a  plaintiff  and  two  defendants  raises 
an  incidental  and  collateral  question  between  the  co-defendants, 
the  court  will  sometimes  dispose  of  the  latter  by  means  of  a  ref- 
erence to  a  master,  and  thus  save  the  expense  of  a  separate  suit,^ 
and  the  same  course  has  been  taken  when  it  was  impossible  to 
give  the  plaintiff'  the  relief  to  which  he  was  entitled  without  first 
deciding  a  question  between  co-defendants."  ^  "  When  the  right 
claimed  by  a  defendant  consists  simply  in  excluding  the  plaintiff 
from  the  right  asserted  by  the  latter,  of  course  there  is  no  occa- 
sion for  a  cross-bill.  Therefore,  when  a  bill  is  filed  by  a  mort- 
gagor against  a  mortgagee  for  redemption,  if  the  defendant  can 
show  that  the  plaintiff  is  not  entitled  to  redeem,  he  can  obtain 
the  benefit  of  a  foreclosure  witliout  filing  a  cross-bill  for  the  pur- 
pose ;  for  the  dismissal  of  a  bill  to  redeem  upon  its  merits  is  itself 
a  foreclosure." '  It  has  been  said  that  where  an  original  bill 
seeks  to  enforce  an  equitable  title  against  several  defendants,  it  is 
improper  for  a  defendant  to  file  a  cross-bill  seeking  the  enforce- 

Toulmin  r.  Reid,  14  Beav.  499  ;  Jervis  v.  14  Beav.  505  ;    Kennington  v.  Hougliton, 

Berridge,   L.   R.  8  Ch.  357 ;    Campbell  v.  2  Y.  &  C.  N.  R.  630. 

Campbell,  4  Halst.  Eq.  (N.  J.)  740;  Little  •'La    Touclie    v.    Lord    Dmisany,    1 

r.  Merrill,  62  Me.  328.  Sclioales  &  Lefroy,  137,  IGO,  167  ;  s.  c.  ms 

2  Fife  y.  Clayton,  13  Ve.s.  540  ;  Stapyl-  Cliamley   r.    Lord   Diiiisany,   2    SL-lioale* 

ton   V.   Scott,   13  Ves.  425;    Bradford  v.  &   Lefroy,  690,  718;    Langdell's  Eq.  VI 

Union  Bank  of  Tennessee,  13   How.  57  ;  §  125. 

Northern  Railroad  v.  Ogdensburg  &Lake  ^  Hood  v.  Clapham,  19  Beav.  90.    See 

Champlain    R.  R.   Co.,    18  Fed.  R.  815.  Elliott  r.  Pell,  1  Paige  (N.  Y.),  263. 
But  see  s.  c  20  Fed.  R.  347.  "  Langdell's  Eq.  PI.  §  125. 

■i  LangdeU's  Eq.  PI.  §  122;    Clarke  v.  '  Langdell's  Eq.  PI.  §  123.    See  Hilton 

Tipping,  4  Beav.  588;   Toulmin  j;.  Reid,  r.  Barrow,  1  Ves.  Jr.  284. 


§  171.]  WHEN   A   CROSS-BILL   SHOULD   NOT   BE   FILED.  289 

meiit  of  a  title  paramount  against  his  co-defendants.^  It  was 
held,  where  a  bill  was  filed  by  one  tenant  in  common  of  a  mort- 
gage against  the  two  others,  who  .had  bought  in  separate  parcels 
the  mortgaged  property,  the  complainant  seeking  to  recover  from 
them  his  share  of  the  purchase-money,  that  a  cross-bill  could  not 
be  filed  by  one  defendant  against  the  other  to  recover  a  balance 
due  him  "  resulting  from  the  price  severally  paid  and  to  be  paid 
by  them,  as  compared  with  the  respective  amounts"  of  their 
interests  in  the  mortgage.^  Where  a  bill  was  filed  to  restrain  a 
sale  under  an  execution,  the  defendant  was  allowed  to  file  a  cross- 
bill praying  a  decree,  declaring  that  he  had  a  lien  upon  the  prop- 
erty on  which  he  had  levied,  appointing  a  receiver,  and  directing 
the  sale  of  such  property.!^  Where  the  mortgagee  filed  a  bill  to 
collect  rents  from  a  lessee  and  a  sub-lessee  of  the  mortgaged  rail- 
road, and  for  a  declaration  that  the  lease  was  binding  upon  the 
sub-lessee,  a  cross-bill  by  the  lessee  against  the  mortgagor,  who 
was  a  defendant  to  the  original,  seeking  a  cancellation  of  the 
lease,  was  held  properly  filed."  Where  the  original  bill  prayed 
for  an  injunction  against  the  infringement  of  a  patent  relating  to 
electric  signals  granted  William  R.  Sykes,  leave  to  file  a  cross- 
bill praying  an  injunction  against  the  use  by  complainant  of  the 
term  "The  Sykes  System"  was  denied.^^  In  a  suit  to  enjoin  the 
alleged  infringement  of  a  patent,  a  cross-bill  seeking  an  injunc- 
tion against  the  publication  of  circulars  by  plaintiff  to  defendant's 
customers,  threatening  them  with  suits  and  penalties  if  they 
use  defendant's  wares,  which  are  charged  to  be  infringements  of 
plaintiff's  patent,  has  been  held  improper.^^  Where  a  bill  was 
filed  against  the  stockholders  of  an  insolvent  corporation  to  col- 
lect out  of  their  unpaid  subscriptions  the  amount  of  a  judgment 
against  it,  a  cross-bill  filed  by  one  who  had  paid  a  larger  pro- 
portion of  his  subscription  than  the  rest,  praying  for  an  account- 
ing, and  that  the  others  be  compelled  to  pay  the  judgment,  was 
held  bad  upon  demurrer."     Where  a  bill  was  filed  by  a  remainder- 

8  Ayres  I'.  Carver,  17  How.  591.  59-3.  ^^  International    Tooth-Crown    Co.   v. 

y  Weaver  v.  Alter,  3  Woods,  152.  Carniichael,  44   Fed.  R.  350.     See  Fou- 

10  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co. !'.  Third  geres   v.   Murbarger,  44   Fed.  292,  cited 

Nat.  Bank  of  Chicago,  134  U.  S.  276.  supra,  §  74.     Contra,  Ide  i;.  Ball   Engine 

"  Jesup  V.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.,  43  Fed.  Co.,  31  Fed.  R.  901. 

R.  483.  ^*  Putnam  v.  New  Albany,  4  Biss.  365, 

1-  Johnson   R.  R.  Signal  Co.   r.  Union  373. 
Switch  &  Signal  Co ,  43  Fed.  R.  331. 

VOL.   1.  —  19 


290  .  CROSS-BILLS.  [chap.  XIII. 

man  under  a  will,  claiming  that  certain  provisions  of  the  will 
establishing  prior  estates  to  his  own  were  invalid,  and  praying 
that  the  trustees  appointed  by  the  will  convey  the  property 
devised,  either  to  him,  or  to  the  heirs-at-law,  or  to  the  State,  a 
bill  filed  by  the  heirs-at-law,  not  impugning  the  estate  of  the 
equitable  tenant  for  life,  but  praying  that  the  estates  in  remainder, 
some  of  which  were  to  persons  yet  unborn,  should  be  declared 
invalid,  was  held  improper  as  a  cross-bilL^^  A  cross-bill  should 
not  be  filed  merely  to  procure  the  appointment  of  a  receiver.!^ 
Where,  on  a  bill  by  several  persons  to  restrain  the  infringement 
of  a  patent  and  for  an  account,  the  defenses  being  invalidity  of 
the  patent  and  a  license,  the  court  sustains  the  patent  and  decrees 
damages ;  a  bill  cannot  be  sustained  as  a  cross-bill,  which  sets  up 
a  judgment  in  another  suit  against  one  of  the  complainants,  and 
prays  that  they  all  set  forth  and  discover  what  share  of  the  dam- 
ages is  claimed  by  each,  so  that  the  defendant  who  files  the  cross- 
bill may  set  off  his  judgment  against  the  share  claimed  by  his 
judgment  debtor.^'''  A  cross-bill  in  a  suit  to  restrain  the  infringe- 
ment of  a  patent  will  not  be  sustained  when  filed  by  a  defendant 
who  claims  no  title  to  the  patented  invention,  for  the  sole  pur- 
pose of  a  discovery  of  the  weakness  of  the  complainant's  title,  an 
injunction  against  his  suing  to  enforce  his  patent,  and  a  decree 
declaring  the  patent  void.^®  It  has  been  held  that,  in  such  a  suit, 
a  third  party  who  has  been  allowed  to  intervene  cannot  file  a 
cross-hill  which  could  not  have  been  maintained  by  the  original 
defendant.^^  It  has  been  held  that  in  a  suit  brought  under  U.  S. 
R.  S.  §  4918,  touching  interfering  patents,  affirmative  relief  may 
be  given  the  defendant  upon  his  answer ;  and  that  a  cross-bill  is 
unnecessary ,20  but  may  be  filed  if  the  defendant  so  chooscs.^^  An 
answer  in  such  a  suit  cannot  be  treated  as  a  bill  to  enjoin  an 
infringement.^^     Cross-bills  were  formerly  used  to  bring  to  the 

15  Cross  V.    DeValle,  1  Wall.   5.     See  ^o  Lookwood  v.  Cleveland,  6  Fed.   R. 

Neal  V.  Foster,  34  Fed.  R.  490,  408;  Os-  721;     Foster   v.   Lind!<ay,   3   Dill.    127; 

borne  v.  Barge,  oO  Fed.  U.  805.  Electrical     Accumulator    Co.    v.    Brush 

i*^  Indiana  Southern  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Liver-  Electric  Co.,  44  Fed.  R.  002. 

pool,  London  &  Globe  Ins.  Co  ,  109  U.  S.  -i  American  Clay  Bird  Co.  v.  Ligowski 

108.  Clay-Pigeon  Co.,  31  Fed.  R.  406;  Electri- 

1^  Rubber    Company    i'.    Goodyear,    9  cal   Accumulator   Co.   v.  Brush   Electric 

Wall  807.  Co.,  44  Fed.  R.  002,  607.    Contra,  Lock- 
is  Young  V.  Colt,  2  Blatchf.  373.  wood  v.  Cleveland,  6  Fed.  R.  721,  727. 
19  Curran  v.  St.  Charles   Car  Co.,  ,32  --  Electrical  Accumul.-itor  Co.  v.  Brush 

Fed.  R.  8.35.     But  see  Lie  v.  Ball  Engine  Electric  Co.,  44  Fed.  R.  002,  000. 

Co.,  31  Fed.  R.  901. 


§  172.]  FRAME   OF   A   CKOSS-BILL.  291 

attention  of  the  court  facts  constituting  a  defense,  which  had 
occurred  since  the  answer  was  filed,  thus  answering  the  purpose 
of  a  lAoa  puis  darrein  continuance  at  law.^^  Now,  however,  it  is 
more  customary  to  plead  such  matters  in  a  supplemental  answer.'^* 
Matters  which  regularly  should  be  included  in  a  cross-bill  may  by 
consent  be  set  up  in  an  answer,  and  relief  granted  as  if  a  cross- 
bill had  been  filed ;  ^^  and  by  consent  a  cross-bill  may  be  filed 
when  an  answer  is  all  that  is  required  to  protect  the  rights  of  the 
defendant.^^  When  matter  which  should  regularly  have  been 
set  up  by  a  cross-bill  or  supplemental  answer  has  been  pleaded 
in  a  petition,  it  is  too  late  to  object  to  the  regularity  of  the 
procedure  after  answer  and  decree.^' 

§  172.  Frame  of  a  Cross-Bill.  —  A  cross-bill  should  state  the 
previous  proceedings  in  the  suit,  setting  forth  specifically  the 
parties,  the  objects,  and  the  prayer  of  the  original  bill ;  and 
the  rights  of  the  party  exhibiting  the  cross-bill,  which  are  neces- 
sary to  be  made  the  subject  of  a  cross  litigation,  or  the  ground  on 
which  he  resists  the  claims  of  the  plaintiff  in  the  original  bill, 
whichever  is  the  object  of  the  cross-bill.^  It  should  not  intro- 
duce new  and  distinct  matters  not  embraced  in  or  germane  to  the 
original  suit.  For  as  to  such  matters  it  would  be  an  original 
bill ;  and  they  could  not  properly  be  examined  at  the  hearing 
upon  the  former  bill.^  It  should  not  contain  any  statements  in- 
consistent with  those  in  the  answer  of  the  defendant  filing  it.  If 
so,  they  may  be  disregarded ;  ^  or  if  principally  composed  of  such, 
the  cross-bill  may  be  dismissed.'*  It  would  be  sustained  even  if 
the  requisite  difference  of  citizenship  do  not  exist  between  the 
plaintiffs  and  defendants  in  it,  as  it  is  merely  auxiliary  to  the 
principal  suit  of  which  the  court  has  already  obtained  jurisdic- 

23  Mitford's  PI.  ch.  1,  §  3;   Hayne  v.  Coburn   v.  Cedar  Valley  Land   &   Cattle 

Ilayne,   3    Ch.   R.    19.      See    Kelsey   v.  Co.,  138  U.  S.  196,  222. 

Hobby,  16  Pet.  269,  277.  §  172.     i  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  401  ;    Mit- 

2*  See  Suydam  v.  Truesdale,  6  McLean,  ford's  PI.   ch.  1,  §  3.     But   See  Neal   r. 

459;  Kelsey  v.  Hobby,  16  Pet.  269,  277;  Foster,  34  Fed.  R.  496. 

Talmage  r.  Pell,  9  Paige  (N.  Y.  1,410,413;  ^  Story's  Eq.    PI.   §  401;   Weaver   v. 

Electrical  Accumulator  Co.  v.  Brush  Elec-  Alter,  3   Woods,  152 ;  Cross  i'.  DeValle, 

trie  Co.,  44  Fed.  R.  602,  607.  1  Wall.  5  ;  Ayres  v.  Carver,  17  How.  591 ; 

25  Heath  v.  Erie  Ry.  Co.,  9  Blatchf.  316.  Rubber  Company  v.  Goodyear,  9  Wall. 

See  Kelsey  v.  Hobby,  16  Pet.  269.  807. 

-'>  Northern  Railroad  v.  Ogdensbursj  &  ^  Savage  v.  Carter,  9  Dana  (Ky.),  409, 

Lake  Champlain  R.  R.  Co,,  18  Fed.  R.  815;  414. 

s.  c.  20  Fed.  R.  347.  *  Hudson  >-.  Hudson,  3  Randolph  (Va.), 

«•   Kelsey  !?.    Hobby,  16   Pet.  269,277;  117. 


292  CROSS-BILLS.  [chap,  xiil 

tion.^  Where  a  stranger  bj  leave  of  the  state  court  niterveiied 
and  then  removed  the  case,  and  after  removal  the  complainant 
amended  his  bill  so  as  to  omit  all  allegations  affecting  the  inter- 
venor,  and  then  moved  to  remand  ;  the  fact  that  the  intervenor 
had  filed  a  cross-bill  against  the  original  parties  to  the  suit  was 
held  no  bar  to  the  remand.^  It  seems  that  a  cross-bill  may  in 
some  cases  pray  relief  which  could  not  be  obtained  by  original 
bill  because  of  a  remedy  at  law.  Thus,  it  has  been  held  that  a 
defendant  who  is  not  in  possession  of  land,  when  a  bill  is  filed 
against  him  to  remove  a  cloud  to  the  title  to  the  same,  may,  if 
he  can  show  a  better  title  than  that  of  the  complainant,  obtain 
possession  of  tlie  land  by  cross-bill.'  A  cross-bill  filed  simply  for 
discovery  need  show  no  equity  for  discovery,  as  the  court's  juris- 
diction for  that  purpose  is  sufficiently  supplied  by  the  original  bill.^ 
When  a  cross-bill  is  brought  by  one  defendant  against  another,  it 
seems  that  the  original  complainant  must  be  made  a  party  to  it.^ 
It  has  been  said  by  a  judge  of  great  authority  that  "  new  parties 
cannot  be  introduced  into  a  cause  by  a  cross-bill."  ^^  It  was  then 
held  that  this  could  not  be  done  when  the  result  would  be  to  ar- 
range parties  of  the  same  citizenship  upon  different  sides  of  a 
controversy  over  which  a  Federal  court  would  have  no  original 
jurisdiction.^^  It  has  been  said,  however,  that  such  an  objection 
can  be  raised  only  by  the  new  parties  thus  sought  to  be  brought 
in.'^  And  in  a  suit  to  restrain  the  infringement  of  a  patent,  a 
cross-bill  was  sustained  which  brought  in  as  defendant  to  it  a  new 
party,  the  assignor  of  the  patent  to  the  original  complainant ; 
claimed  that  that  assignor  had  previously  assigned  the  equitable 
title  thereto  to  the  orator  of  the  cross-bill,  and  that  the  legal  as- 
signee had  bought  with  notice  thereof ;  and  prayed  a  conveyance 
of  the  patent  and  an  injunction  against  further  annoy ance.^^     A 

6  Peay  I'.Schenck  &  Bliss,  Woolw.  175;  ch.    1,   §  3;   Doble  i'.  Potman,  Ilardres, 

Cross  V.  beValle,  1  Wall.  5  ;  Osborne  Co.  160. 

V.  Barpc,  80  Fed.  R.  805;  Jesup  v.  Illinois  ^  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  17-17  ; 

Cent.    R.  Co.,  4.3  Fed.  R.  48o;    Morgan's  Putnam    i'.    New   Albany,    4    Biss.    S65, 

La.  &  T.  R.  R.,  S.S.  Co.  v.  Texas  Central  373. 

Ry.  Co.,  137  U.  S.  171.     But  see  Veach  i^  Mr.  Justice  Curtis  in  Shields  ?•.  Bar- 

V.  Rice,  131  U.  S.  203,  318.  row,  17  How.  130,  145.     See  Randolph  v. 

6  Iowa  Homestead  Co.  r.  Dcs  Moines  Robinson,  2  N.  J.  L.  J.  171. 

Nav.  &  R.  R.  Co.,  8  Fed.  R.  97.  "  Shields  v.  Barrow,  17  How.  130. 

■^  Greenwalt  v.  Duncan,  10  Fed.  R.  35.  '-  Brandon   Manuf.    Co.  v.  Prime,   14 

Contra,  Calverley  v.  Williams,  1  Ves.  Jr.  Blatchf.  371,  373. 

211,213;  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  398.  '^  Brandon    Manuf.    Co.    i'.   Prime,    14 

8  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §399;   Mitford's  PI.  Blatchf.   371.     See  also  Blodgett   v.  Ho- 


§  173.]  PROCEEDINGS   UPON   CROSS-BILLS.  293 

stranger  to  a  suit  cannot  file  a  cross-bill  without  permission  from 
the  court.^*  A  cross-bill  filed  by  a  stranger  without  such  permis- 
sion may  be  stricken  from  the  file.^^  It  is  the  better  practice  for 
a  defendant  to  apply  for  leave  before  filing  a  cross-bill. ^^  In 
England  a  cross-bill  could  be  filed  in  a  different  court  from  that 
where  the  original  bill  was  pending  ;  ^^  but  a  cross-bill  cannot  be 
filed  in  a  State  court  to  a  bill  pending  in  a  Circuit  Court  of  the 
United  States.^^  It  is  no  objection  to  a  cross-bill  in  a  Federal 
court  that  an  original  bill  for  the  same  relief  was  previously  filed 
in  a  court  of  the  State  where  the  Federal  court  was  held  ;  ^^  but 
after  a  removal  of  the  suit  begun  in  the  State  court,  the  two  suits 
may  be  consolidated.^*^  A  cross-bill  should  be  signed  by  counsel.'^^ 
In  other  respects  cross-bills  should  conform  to  the  requirements  of 
original  bills.-^  It  is  irregular  to  unite  a  cross-bill  and  an  answer 
in  the  same  pleading.^^  A  petition  "  by  way  of  a  cross-bill "  filed 
by  a  defendant,  "  referring  to  the  case  by  title,  and  stating  that 
'  the  facts  fully  appear  in  the  case,'  praying  the  reverse  of  what 
the  complainant  had  prayed,  but  not  making  anybody  defendant 
nor  praying  process,  and  under  which  no  process  was  obtained," 
was  held  a  mere  nullity,  which  should  have  been  stricken  from 
the  file,  and  was  disregarded  by  the  court  upon  appeal. ^^  It 
seems  that  a  bill  filed  as  a  cross-bill,  if  irregular  in  that  respect 
alone,  may  yet  be  sustained  as  an  original  bill.'-^^  A  bill  in- 
tended as  a  bill  of  review,  but  defective  in  that  respect,  may  be 
sustained  as  a  cross-bill.^^ 

§  173.    Proceedings  upon  Cross-Bills.  —  It  has  been  held  at  cir- 

bart,  18  Vt.  414  ;  Hurd  v.  Case,  32  111.  45 ;  21  Smith's  Ch.  Pr.  Book  II.  ch.  i. 

Jones  V.  Smith,  14  111.  229.  22  Smith's  Ch.  Pr.  Book  II.  ch.  i. ;  Dan- 

i*  Bronson  v.  La  Crosse  &  Milwaukee  iell's  Ch.  Pr.  (5th  Am.  ed.)  ch.  xxxiv.  §  1. 

R.  R.  Co.,  2  Wall.  283;  Forbes  u.  Mem-  See  Mason  v.  Gardiner,  4  Brown  Ch.  C. 

phis.  El   Paso   &  Pacific   R.   R.   Co.,   2  436;  Greenwalt  i'.  Duncan,  16  Fed.  R.  .35. 

Woods,  323.  23  Hubbard  v.  Turner,  2  McLean,  510, 

1^  Bronson  v.  La  Crosse  &  Milwaukee  540;  Morgan  v.  Tipton,  3  McLean,  839, 

R.  R.  Co.,  2  Wall.  283,  294,  303;  Putnam  344.     But  see  Talbot  v.  McGee,  4  Monr. 

V.  New  Albany,  4  Biss.  365,  367.  (Ky.)  375,  378. 

1®  See  International  Tooth-Crown  Co.  -*  Washington   R.  R.  v.   Bradleys,   10 

i;.  Carmichael,  44  Fed.  R.  350.  Wall.  299,  300,  303. 

'^  Parker    v.    Leigh,    6    Madd.     115  ;  '^^  Foss  u.  First  Nat.  Bank,  1  McCrarv, 

Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  400.  474. 

18  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  400.  2g  Houghton   v.  West,   2  Brown   Pari. 

19  Brandon   Manuf.  Co.   v.   Prime,    14  Rep.,  by  Tomlins,  88,    Story's    Eq.   PI. 
Blatchf.  371.  §  401a. 

20  Wabash,  St.  L.,  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Cen- 
tral Trust  Co.  of  N.  Y.,  23  Fed.  R.  513. 


294  CEOSS-BILLS.  [chap.  XIII. 

cuit  that  a  subpoena  to  answer  a  cross-bill  may,  by  express  leave 
of  the  court,  be  served  by  substitution  upon  the  attorney  for  the 
complainant  to  the  original  bill  when  his  client  is  beyond  the  ju- 
risdiction of  the  court.i     In  that  case  the  original  bill  was  filed 
to  foreclose  a  mortgage,  of  which  the  cross-bill  prayed  a  cancella- 
tion.    The  court  said :  "  The  reason  of  this  rule  would  seem  to 
limit  it  in  equity  cases  to  cross-bills,  either  wholly  or  partly  de- 
fensive in  their  character,  and  to  deny  its  application  to  cross- 
bills setting  up  facts  not  alleged  in  the  original  bill,  and  which 
new  facts,  though  they  relate,  as  they  must,  to  the  subject-matter 
of  the  original  bill,  are  made  the  basis  for  the  affirmative  relief."  ^ 
Leave  to  make  substituted  service  was  refused  in  a  case  where 
the  plaintiffs  offered  to  stipulate  that  the  matter  sought  to  be 
pleaded  by  cross-bill  might  be  set  up  by  answer.^     Service  by 
publication  of  a  subpoena  upon  a  cross-bill  is  improper.*   "  Where 
a  defendant  in  equity  files  a  cross-bill  for  discovery  only  against 
the  plaintiff  to  the  original  bill,  the  defendant  to  the  original  bill 
shall  first  answer  thereto  before  the  original  plaintiff  shall  be 
compellable  to-  answer  the  cross-bill.     The  answer  of  the  original 
plaintiff  to  such  cross-bill  may  be  read  and  used  by  the  party  fil- 
ing the  cross-bill  at  the  hearing,  in  the  same  manner  and  under 
the  same  restrictions  as  the  answer  praying  relief  may  now  be 
read  and  used."^     By  amending  his  bill,  the  plaintiff  was  held  in 
England  to  lose  the  benefit  of  a  similar  rule,*^  provided  that,  when 
he  made  the  amendment,  he  knew  that  the  cross-bill  had  been 
filed.''     The  testimony  taken  under  the  cross-bill  may  be  read  for 
or  against  the  original  bill ;  and  the  testimony  taken  under  the 
original  bill  can  be  read  for  or  against  the  cross-bill.     In  either 
case  a  formal  order  granting  leave  to  do  this,  "  saving  all  just 
exceptions,"  should  first  be  obtained   ex  imrte?     Both  bills  are 
usually  heard  together  both  in  the  first  instance  ^  and  upon  ap- 

§  173.  1  Lowenstein  I'.  Glidewell,  5Dill.  <  Webster  Loom  Co.  v.  Sliort,  10  Off. 

.325 ;  Kingsbury  v.  Buc-kner,  i:}4  U.  S.  650,  Gaz.  1019. 

67F),    Peiiy  r.  Sobenck   &   Bliss,  Woolw.  &  Rule  72. 

175;   Johnson  K.  K.   Signal  Co.  c   Union  «  NoeW'.  King,  2  Madd.  392  ;  Hannah  r. 

Switch  &  Signal  Co.,  43  Fed.  R.  331.    Rut  Hodgson,  30  Beav.  19. 

see  Rubber  Co.  v.  Goodyear,  9  Wall.  807,  ^  Gray  v.  Haig,  13  Beav.  65. 

810,  811  ;  §  96  and  citations.  ^  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (5th  Am.  ed.)  1552, 

2  Caldwell,  J.,  in  Lowenstein  v.  Glide-  1553;  Lubiere  v.  Genou,  2  V^es  Sen.  579. 
v^ell,  5  Dill.  325,  .328.     See  Rubber  Co.  v.  «  Ayres  v.  Carver,  17  How.  591  ;  Moore 
Goodyear,  9    Wall.   807,   810,    811;   and  iv  Huntington,  17  Wall  417,  4-22  ,  /v.'/wr/e 
supra,  §  96.  Railroad  Co.,  95  U   S.  221  ;   Daniell's  Ch. 

3  Heath  v.  Erie  Ry.  Co.,  9  Blatchf.  316.  Tr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1751. 


§  173.]  PEOCEEDINGS   UPON    CROSS-BILLS.  295 

peal.i^  Where  a  decree  had  been  made  dismissing  a  cross-hill 
before  a  decree  upon  the  original  bill,  it  was  held  that  an  appeal 
therefrom  taken  before  a  decree  upon  the  original  bill  must  be 
dismissed.i^  A  decree  upon  the  original  bill  will  supersede  a  pre- 
vious decree  upon  a  cross-bill  if  the  two  are  inconsistent.^^  Where 
tiie  cross-bill  seeks  relief,  the  voluntary  dismissal  of  the  original 
bill  will  not  dismiss  the  cross-bill.^^  It  is  otherwise  where  the 
cross-bill  merely  seeks  discovery.!'^  It  has  been  held  that  a  dis- 
missal of  the  original  bill  by  the  court  after  a  hearing  operates 
as  a  dismissal  of  a  cross-bill  between  the  defendants,  even  though 
the  cross-bill  show  a  good  case  for  relief ;  "  but  as  a  cross-bill,  it 
must  follow  the  fate  of  the  original  bill."  ^^  A  cross-bill  should 
not  be  filed  before  the  answer  to  the  original  bill.^^  It  should 
regularly  be  filed  with,  or  immediately  after,  the  defendant's 
answer,^^  but  may  be  allowed  any  time  before  the  final  decree. ^^ 
But  a  creditor  who  has  come  in  under  a  decree  for  the  benefit  of 
creditors  may  file  a  cross-bill  without  leave  of  the  court,  if  his 
rights  cannot  be  otherwise  adequately  protected. ^^  In  a  case 
where  the  defendant,  after  answer,  learned  of  facts  tending  to 
show  that  the  plaintiff  had  before  suit  parted  with  all  interest  in 
the  subject-matter  to  a  citizen  of  the  same  State  as  the  defendant, 
the  proceedings  were  stayed  until  the  complainant  answered  a 
cross-bill  charging  such  a  transfer.^o  When  an  abatement  takes 
place  after  a  cross-bill  has  been  filed,  it  seems  that  there  should 
be  a  bill  of  revivor  filed  in  both  the  orginal  and  the  cross  cause.^^ 
Otherwise,  proceedings  upon  cross-bills  are  substantially  the 
same  as  those  upon  original  bills.^ 

10  Ayres  v.  Carver,  17  How.  591 ;    Ex  Coast  L.  J.  211 ;  Jesup  v.  Illinois  Cent.  R. 

parte   Railroad  Co.,  95  U.  S.  221.  Co.,  4.3  Fed.  R.  483. 

"  A3Tes  V.  Carver,  17  How.  591.  ^6  Allen  v.  Allen,  Hempst.  58. 

i'^  Ex  parte  Railroad  Co.,  95  U.  S.  221,  i"  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  {2d  Am.  ed.)  1745; 

22-5.  White  y.  Buloid,   2   Paige    (N.   Y.),  164; 

1-^  Lowenstein  v.  Glidewell,  5  Dill.  325  ;  Allen  v.  Allen,  Hempst.  58. 

Chicago   &   Alton    R.   R.    Co.   v.   Union  is  Neal    v.   Foster,    34    Fed.   R.    49G ; 

Rolling  Mill  Co.,  109  U.  S.  702.  Rogers  v.  Reissner,  31  Fed.  R  592. 

"  Donohoe  r.  Mariposa  Land  &  Mining  ^^  La  Touche  v.  Lord  Dunsany,  1  Sch. 

Co.,  1  Pacific  Coast  L.  J.  211,  219.  &  Lef.  137  ;  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  397. 

1'^  Mr.  Justice  Field  in  Dows  v.  Chicago,  -"  Young  v.  Pott,  4  Wash.  521. 

11    Wall.    108,    112.      See   also    Cross   v.  21  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  303. 

DeValle,  1  Wall.  5, 14.     But  see  Wabash,  22  See,  however,   Lautz   r.  Gordon,   28 

St.  L.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  I'.  Central  Trust  Co.  Fed.  R.  204;  Puetz  v.  Bransford,  31  Fed. 

of  N.  Y.,  22  Fed.  R.  138, 142  ;  Donohoe  v.  R.  458. 
Mariposa  Land  &  Mining  Co.,  1  Pacific 


296  BILLS   OF   KEVIVOK,    ETC.  [CHAP.  XIV. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

BILLS   OF   REVIVOR,   SUPPLEMENTAL   BILLS,   BILLS   OF   REVIVOR   AND 
SUPPLEMENT,   AND   BILLS   IN   THE   NATURE    OF   THE   SAME. 

§  174.  Abatement.  —  If  any  event  happens  after  the  fihno:  of  a 
hill  ill  equity  which  makes  it  necessary  to  hring  in  a  new  party, 
either  plaintiff  or  defendant,  in  order  to  ohtain  a  complete  or 
satisfactory  determination  of  the  controversy,  the  suit  will  either 
abate  or  become  defective.^  The  abatement  or  defect  must  be 
remedied  by  the  filing  of  a  bill  of  revivor,  a  bill  in  the  nature  of 
a  bill  of  a  revivor,  a  supplemental  bill,  a  bill  in  the  nature  of  a 
supplemental  bill,  or  a  bill  of  revivor  and  supplement.^  An  abate- 
ment takes  place  by  the  death  of  one  of  tlie  parties,  or,  where  a 
married  woman  is  under  a  disability,  by  the  marriage  of  a  female 
plaintiff.^  An  action  entirely  abates  by  the  death  of  any  of  the 
plaintiffs :  ■*  unless  his  interest  therein  wholly  ceases  by  his 
death,^  or  survives  to  another  party  to  the  suit,^  or  he  has  been 
previously  discharged  by  a  decree  in  an  interpleader ''  suit,  or  a 
suit  in  the  nature  of  an  interpleader  ;  when  it  does  not.  Formerly 
a  suit  abated  by  the  marriage  of  a  female  plaintiff ;  ^  but  it  may 
be  doubted  whether  this  rule  would  be  followed  where  a  married 
woman  has  the  same  power  over  her  property  as  if  she  were 
single.^  By  the  marriage  of  a  female  defendant,  a  suit  never 
abated,  though  her  husband  had  to  be  named  in  all  subsequent 
proceedings.^'^  When  the  husband  of  a  female  plaintiff  died,  by 
the  former  practice  she  could  at  her  option  continue  the  suit 
without  filing  any  bill  of  revivor  ;  but  if  she  did  not,  it  was  con- 
sidered abated  and  she  was  not  liable  for  the  costs.^^  A  suit 
abates  upon  the  death  of  a  defendant  who  has  appeared  so  far  as 

§  174.     1  Mitford's  PI.  c)i.  I,  §  S.  '  Anon.,    1    Vern.    351  ;    Ji'nnings  v. 

'•^  Mitford's  PI.  cli.  1,  §  3.     See  infra,  Nugent,  1  Molloy,  \Zi;  Daniell's  Cii.  Pr. 

§  373,  for  proceeding.^  at  coniraon  law.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1765. 

•^  Mitford'-s  Pi.  oil.  1,  §  3.  »  Mitford's  PI.  cli.  1,  §  8;  Story's  Eq. 

*  Mitford's  PI.  oh.  1,  §  3  ;  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  354. 
PI.  §  .354.  9  Lorillard  v.  Standard  Oil  Company, 

5  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  IG98 ;  2  P'ed.  R.  Wl. 

Mitford's  PI.  ch.  I,  §  .3.  J '  Mitford's  PI.  ch.  1  §  3 ;  Story's  Eq. 

6  Fallowes  v.  Williamson,  11  Ves.  .309;     PI.  §  351. 

Boddy    c.    Kent.   1   Mer.  3G4  ;  Fisher  v.         "  Mitford's  PI.  ch.  1,  §  3. 
Kutherford,   Baldw.   188;   Daniell's   Ch. 
Pr.  (2d  Am   ed.)  1099. 


§  174.]  ABATEMENT.  297 

proceedings  against  him  or  his  interest  arc  concerned,  and  if  he 
were  an  indispensable  party  to  a  decree  all  proceedings  must  be 
suspended  till  his  representatives  have  been  brought  in.^^  If, 
however,  his  interest  wholly  ceases  by  his  death,  or  wholly  sur- 
vives to  one  of  the  other  parties,  no  revivor  will  be  necessary .^"^ 
A  suit  al)ates  by  the  death  of  a  member  of  a  firm  during  a  suit 
against  it.^*  The  death  of  a  defendant  before  appearance  does 
not  abate  the  suit.  For,  according  to  the  former  practice,  till 
his  appearance,  or  a  decree  taken  against  him  i^ro  confesso,  there 
was  no  cause  against  him  :  but  a  bill  had  to  be  filed  against  his 
representative,  which  was  an  original  bill  as  far  as  respected  the 
defendant,  but  a  supplemental  bill  with  respect  to  the  suit.^^  It 
has  been  held  that  the  death  of  a  sole  defendant  to  a  suit  for  an 
injunction  against  the  infringement  of  a  patent  and  for  an  ac- 
counting, when  it  occurs  before  a  decree  for  an  account,  abates 
and  terminates  so  much  of  the  suit  as  seeks  an  injunction,  so 
that  it  cannot  be  revived  against  his  executor,  unless  it  be  shown 
that  the  latter  continues  the  infringement ;  ^'^  but  that  the  suit  may 
be  continued  against  his  personal  representative  for  an  accounting 
of  profits  and  for  damages.^'  After  an  interlocutory  decree  for  an 
accounting,  such  a  suit  may  be  revived  against  the  personal  repre- 
sentatives of  the  deceased  defendant. ^*^  Unless  there  be  some 
clause  in  its  charter  to  the  contrary  a  suit  by  or  against  a  corpora- 
tion ordinarily  abates  by  the  dissolution  of  the  corporation ;  ^^  but 
it  has  been  held  that  the  entrance  into  liquidation  and  the  closing 
of  the  business  of  a  national  banking  association  does  not  abate  a 
suit  brought  in  its  name.^*^  After  a  decree  has  been  reversed 
upon  appeal,  and  the  cause  sent  back  with  a  special  mandate 
directing  the  further  proceedings  to  be  taken,  or  affirmed  upon 
appeal  and  sent  back  with  a  mandate  directing  its  enforcement, 
it  is  too  late  to  claim  for  the  first  time  that  the  suit  has  abated 

12  Story's  Eq  PI.  §  369.  Co.,  44  Fed.  R.  539.     But  see  Draper  v. 

"  Mitford'sPl.  ch.  1,  §3  ;  Daniell's  Ch.  Hudson,  1  Holmes,  208. 

Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1698,  1699;  Story's  Eq.  i^  Atterbury  v.  Gill,  13  Off.  Gaz.  276. 

PI- §357.  19  Nat.  Bank   v.  Colby,   21    Wall.  609; 

»  Wilson  V.  Seligman,  10  Repr.  651,  Greeley  i-.  Smith,  3  Story,  658;  Mumma 

A.  D.  1880.  v.    Potomac   Co.,   8   Pet.    281.      But  see 

1^  Sliadwell,  V.  C,  in  Crowfoot!'.  Man-  Lake  Superior  Iron  Co.  v  Brown,  Bonnell 

der,  9  Simons,  396.     See   United  States  &  Co.,  44  Fed.  R.  539;  as  to  municipal 

V  Fields,  4  Blatclif.  326.  corporations,  Hemingway  v.  Stansell.  106 

1''  Draper  v.  Hudson,   1  Holmes,  208;  U.  S  399 ;  Grantland  ;•  Memphis,  12  Fe<l. 

Walker  ou  Patents.  §  700.  R.  287;  as  to  tbe  effect  of  a  consolidntinn 

1"  Kirk   V    Du  Bois,   28  Fed.  R.  460;  of  two  corporations,  Edison  Electric  Light 

Hohorst  V.  Howard,  37  Fed.  R.  97  ;  Lake  Co.  r   Westinghouse,  34  Fed.  R.  2-^2. 

Superior   Iron  Co.  v.   Brown,   Bonnell  &  -'  Nat.  Bankc  Ins  Co.,  101  U  S.  54,72. 


298  BILLS   OF   REVIVOR,    ETC.       *  [CHAP.  XIIL 

by  the  death  of  the  complainant  before  the  entry  of  the  decree 
from  which  the  appeal  was  taken.^^ 

§  175.  Effect  of  Abatement.  —  "  An  abatement,  in  the  sense  of 
the  common  law,  is  an  entire  overthrow  or  destruction  of  the  suit, 
so  that  it  is  quashed  and  ended.  But  in  the  sense  of  courts  of 
equity,  an  abatement  signifies  only  a  present  suspension  of  all  pro- 
ceedings in  the  suit,  from  the  want  of  proper  parties  capable  of 
proceeding  therein.  At  the  common  law,  a  suit,  when  abated,  is 
absolutely  dead.  But  in  equity,  a  suit,  when  abated,  is  (if  such 
an  expression  be  allowable)  merely  in  a  state  of  suspended  ani- 
mation, and  it  may  be  revived."  ^  Upon  the  total  abatement  of 
a  suit  the  cause  is  completely  suspended  while  the  abatement 
continues ;  and,  in  general,  all  orders  made  pending  such  abate- 
ment will  be  considered  nugatory  and  may  be  discharged.^ 
Applications  may,  however,  be  made  by  parties  affected  thereby, 
to  discharge  process  of  contempt  issued  or  executed  pending  the 
abatement.'^  Applications  have,  moreover,  been  granted  during  an 
abatement  for  the  payment  of  money  out  of  court,  when  the  right 
thereto  had  been  previously  established  ;  ^  for  the  preservation 
of  the  property  in  disiuite  ;  ^  for  the  ])unishmcnt  of  a  party  for 
breach  of  an  injunction;^  and  to  set  aside  irregular  proceedings 
pending  the  abatement.'  So,  too,  a  decree  previously  made  could 
be  enrolled;^  and  it  has  been  held  in  England  that  depositions 
might  be  taken  under  a  commission  previously  issued.^  Orders 
previously  made  continue  in  force  until  discharged. ^"^  But  the 
time  given  a  party  within  which  to  do  a  certain  act  is  always 
suspended  by  an  abatement.^^  Where  a  preliminary  injunction 
has  been  previously  granted,  the  court  may  issue  an  order  re- 
quiring that  the  representatives  of  a  deceased  plaintiff  revive 
within  a  certain  time,  usually  a  fortnight  after  notice,  or  that  the 
injunction  be  dissolved. ^^     No  such  order  will  be  granted  after  a 

21  ^.r;)r7WeSory,  12  Pet.  339,342;  Lake  ^  Hawley  r.  Bennett,  4  Paige  (N.  Y.), 

Superior  Iron  Co.  v.  Brown,  Bonnell  &  Co.,  163. 

44  Fed.  K.  589.  "  Quackenbush   v.   Leonard,  10  Paige 

§  175.     1    Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  .354.     See  (N.  Y),  131. 

also  Hoxie  v.  Carr,  1  Sumner,    173,  17b;  **  Daniell's  Cli.  Pr.    (2d  Am.  ed.)  1715. 

Melius  r.  Thompson,  1  Cliff.  12.5,  129.  ">  Thompson  r.  Took,  1  Dickens,  115; 

2  Daniell's  Cli.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1714;  Peters  r.  Robinson,  1  Dickens,  IIG;  Sin- 
Griswold  ('.  Hill,  1  Paine,  483.  clair  v.  James,  1  Dickens,  277. 

3  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  171-5.         i"  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  171G ; 
*  Finch    V.    Lord    VVinchelsea,    1     Eq.     Lee  r.  Lee,  1  Hare,  022 ;  Ilawley    i;.  Ben- 

Cas.  Abr.  2;  Roundell  v.    Currer,   6  Ves.  nett,  4  Paige  (N.  Y.),  103. 

250;  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1715.         "  Gregson  v.  Oswald,  1  Cox  Eq   343. 

^  Wa.sliington  Insurance  Co.  v.  Slee,  2         '^  Jones   r.  IMasscy,  Brown  r.  Warner, 

Paige  (N.  Y.),  .305,  3G8.  Turner  i\  Cole,  all  quotoil   in  Cliowick  v. 


§  176]     WHEN  A  SUIT  MAY  BE  REVIVED  AND  EFFECT  OF  REVIVOR.     299 

decree  for  a  perpetual  injunction  ;  for  that  "  would  be  in  effect 
decreeing  a  perpetual  suit."  ^^  The  power  of  the  court  to  make  an 
order  that  the  representatives  of  a  deceased  plaintiff  revive  within 
a  certain  limited  time  after  notice  to  them,  or  that  the  bill  be  dis- 
missed, is  doubtful.i^  Where  the  abatement  is  partial,  as  where  it 
is  caused  by  the  death  of  a  defendant,  it  prevents  those  proceed- 
ings only  by  which  his  interest  may  be  affected.^^  Thus,  if  there 
be  a  decree  against  trustees  and  the  beneficiary  of  their  trust  for  a 
conveyance,  and  the  beneficiary  die,  the  trustees  may  still  be  obliged 
to  convey ;  ^^  and,  after  the  death  of  one  defendant,  process  of  con- 
tempt may  be  issued  and  executed  against  the  others. ^'^  It  has  also 
been  held  that  the  death  of  a  defendant  after  hearing  but  before 
a  decree  does  not  necessarily  prevent  judgment ;  ^^  and  that,  if 
practicable,  a  decree  made  before  a  defendant's  death,  for  ex- 
ample, a  decree  for  a  sale,  may  bo  enforced  without  revivor.^^ 

§  176.  When  a  Suit  may  be  Revived  and  Effect  of  Revivor.  —  A 
suit  which  has  abated  may  generally  be  revived  when  anything 
further  remains  to  be  done  therein.^  But  a  suit  will  not  be 
allowed  to  be  revived  merely  for  costs  which  are  untaxed,  and 
liave  not  been  previously  directed  to  be  paid  out  of  a  par- 
ticular estate  or  fund,  or  decreed  against  an  executor  out  of 
assets.^  Nor  can  a  bill  of  revivor  be  brought  upon  a  bill  filed 
merely  for  discovery,  after  the  discovery  required  thereby  has 
been  obtained.^  A  suit  cannot  be  revived  seven  years  after 
its  dismissal  for  a  defect  of  parties  caused  by  a  failure  to 
revive,'*  Where  the  abatement  is  by  the  death  or  marriage  of  a 
plaintiff,  an  order  to  revive  the  suit  places  it  and  all  proceedings 
in  it  in  precisely  "  the  same  plight,  state,  and  condition  that  the 

Dimes,  3  Beav.  290,  202.  293  ;  Chester  v.  i'  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2(1  Am.  ed.)  1716. 

Life  Assoc,  of  America,  4  Ferl.  R.  487.  '^  Davies  v.  Davies,  9  \^es.  461;  Dan- 

13  Askew  V.  Townsend,  2  Dickens,  471.  iell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1717. 

^*  Compare  dictum  of  Judge  Story  in  i^  Wliiting   v.   Bank    of    tlie     United 

Hoxie  V.  Carr,   1  Sumner,  173,  178,  and  States,    13   Pet.   6. 

the  case  of  Chowick  i\  Dimes,  3  Beav.  §  176.     ^  Gilbert's  Forum  Romanum, 

290,  where  Lord  Langdale,  M.  R.,  granted  181;  Jolinson  c.  Peck,  2  Ves.  wSen.  465; 

such  an  order;  witli  that  of  Lee  v.  Lee.  Fitzpatrick  v.  Domingo,   14  Fed.  R.  216; 

1  Hare,  617,  wliere  Vice-Chanceller  Wig-  Daniell's  Ch-  Pr.  (2d  Am.  pd.)  1694. 

ram  lield  that  the  court  had  no  power  to  ^  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1694- 

make  one.  1697;    Story  Eq.  PI.    §  371;    Blower  v. 

15  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1716  ;  Morrets,  3  Atk.  772;  Kemp  v.  M.ackrell, 

Finch   V.   Lord  Winchelsca,   1    Eq.  Cas.  3  Atk.  812;   Travis  v.  Waters,  IJ.   Ch. 

Abr.  2.  (N.  Y.)  85. 

'"  Finch  r.  Lord  Winchelsea,  1  Eq.  Cas.  ^  Horsburg  v.  Baker,  1  Pet.  232. 

Abr.  2;    Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  <  Houth  v.  Owens,  30  Fed.  R.  910. 
1716. 


300  BILLS    OF   KEVIVOE,    ETC.  [CHAP.  XIV. 

same  were  in  at  the  time  when  tlie  abatement  took  place."  ^ 
The  new  plaintiff  may  then  take  the  same  proceedings  that  the 
original  plaintiff  might  have  done.^  Thus,  tlie  new  plaintiff  may 
prosecute  process  of  contempt  against  the  defendant,  taking  it 
up  where  it  stood  at  the  abatement ;  and  if  a  process  has  been 
previously  issued  it  will  be  revived  with  the  revivor  of  the  suit.° 
But  where  the  abatement  is  caused  hy  the  death  of  a  defendant, 
"the  process,  being  personal,  cannot  be  revived."''  In  general, 
however,  an  order  to  revive  against  the  representatives  of  a  de- 
ceased defendant,  will  place  the  suit  as  fully  in  the  same  position 
with  regard  to  such  representatives  as  can  be  done  with  refer- 
ence to  the  change  of  the  individuals  before  the  court.^  After 
revivor  testimony  previously  taken  can  be  used.^ 

§  177.  Who  may  Revive  a  Suit.  —  It  is  generally  necessary  in 
order  to  entitle  one  to  revive,  that  there  should  be  a  privity 
between  him  and  the  j^arty  whose  death  caused  the  abatement. 
Therefore,  upon  the  death  of  one  suing  in  a  representative  capa- 
city, the  defect  can  usually  be  remedied  only  by  a  supplemental 
bill,  and  not  by  a  bill  of  revivor.^  It  has  been  held,  however, 
that  upon  the  death  of  an  administrator,  the  administrator  de  boriis 
71071  may  file  a  bill  of  revivor,  "  though  there  is  no  actual  privity 
between  him  and  the  original  plaintiff."  ^  But  Judge  Story  sug- 
gests that  a  bill  in  the  nature  of  a  bill  of  revivor  would  be  more 
appropriate.^  It  is  said  by  Lord  Redesdale  that  in  the  case  of  a 
bill  by  creditors  on  behalf  of  themselves  and  other  creditors,  any 
creditor  may  revive  ;  ^  but  according  to  Daniell,  in  practice  the 
form  of  a  bill  in  such  a  case  is  that  of  a  supplemental  bill  in  the 
nature  of  a  bill  of  revivor,  and  not  of  a  mere  bill  of  revivor.^  Be- 
fore decree,  a  suit  can  only  be  revived  by  one  or  all  of  the  sui-- 
viving  plaintiffs,  or  the  representatives  of  one  that  has  died.'^  If 
any  of  these  refuse  to  join,  he  must  be  made  a  defendant  to  tlie 
bill  filed  to  revive  the  suit.''     If  the  suit  concerned  solely  thi- 

5  Gregson  v.  Oswald,  1  Cox  Eq.  344.  2  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2cl  Am.  ed.)  IGU? ; 

6  Vattier  v.  Hinde,  7  Pet.  'lb'2,  266;  Mitford's  PI.  cli.  1,  §  3;  Iluggins  v.  York 
Philips  V.  IJerbic,  1  Dickens,  98;  Hyde  Building  Co.,  2  Eq.  Cas.  Abr.  3;  Owen  v. 
V.  Forster,  I  Dickens,  132;  Daniell's  Ch.  Curzon,  2  Vern.  237. 

Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1778.  a  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  882,  note  4. 

'  Hyde   i:   Forster,   1    Dickens,   132;  *  Mitford  PI.  oh.  1,  §  3. 

Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1778.  ^  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)1703. 

«  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1778.  <^  Daniell's  Cli.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1700; 

^  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1778.  Chester  v.  Life  Association  of  America, 

i'^  Vattier  v.  Hinde,  7  Pet.  252,  206.  4  Fed.  R.  487. 

§  197.      1  Daniell's  Ch.   Pr.    (2d   Am.  ^  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1700; 

ed.)  1G97  ;  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  310.  Fallowes  v.  AVilliamson,  11  Ves.  SOU. 


§  178.]  MANNER   OF   EEVIVOR    IX    GENERAL.  301 

real  estate  of  a  deceased  plaintiff,  his  heirs  alone  are  entitled  to 
represent  him  therein  ;  ^  if  solely  his  personal  estate,  his  execu- 
tor or  administrator  ;  ^  if  both,  separate  bills  may  be  revived  by 
both  his  heirs  and  personal  representatives,  and  the  neglect  of 
one  to  revive  will  not  prejudice  the  other.^*^  In  the  case  of  a 
suit  by  a  corporation  sole,  the  death  of  the  plaintiff,  if  he  were 
entitled  to  the  subject-matter  for  his  own  benefit,  caused  an 
abatement ;  and  the  suit  could  be  revived  by  his  personal  repre- 
sentative.^^ If,  however,  he  were  only  entitled  to  the  subject- 
matter  in  his  corporate  capacity,  the  suit  became  defective,  and 
could  only  be  continued  by  his  successor  by  means  of  an  original 
bill  in  the  nature  of  a  supplemental  bill.^-  After  a  decree,  a  suit 
may  be  revived  by  any  defendant,  or  by  the  representative  of  any 
deceased  defendant,  Avho  has  acquired  any  right  thereunder,  as 
well  as  by  any  plaintiff. ^-^ 

§  178.  Manner  of  Revivor  in  General.  —  "  When  a  suit  became 
abated  after  a  decree  signed  and  inrolled,  it  was  anciently  the 
practice  to  revive  the  decree  by  a  subpoena  in  the  nature  of  a 
scire  facias,  upon  the  return  of  which  the  party  to  whom  it  was 
directed  might  show  cause  against  the  reviving  of  the  decree,  by 
insisting  that  he  was  not  bound  by  the  decree,  or  that  for  some 
other  reason  it  ought  not  to  be  enforced  against  him,  or  that  the 
person  suing  the  subpoena  was  not  entitled  to  the  benefit  of  the 
decree.  If  the  opinion  of  the  court  was  in  his  favor  he  was  dis- 
missed with  costs.  If  it  was  against  him,  or  if  he  did  not  oppose 
the  reviving  of  the  decree,  interrogatories  were  exhibited  for  his 
examination  touching  any  matter  necessary  to  the  proceedings. 
If  he  opposed  the  reviving  of  the  decree  on  the  ground  of  facts 
which  were  disputed,  he  was  also  to  be  examined  upon  interrog- 
atories, to  which  he  might  answer  or  plead  ;  and  issue  being 
joined,  and  witnesses  examined,  the  matter  was  finally  heard  and 
determined  by  the  court.  But  if  there  had  been  any  proceeding 
subsequent   to   the  decree,   this    process   was   ineffectual,   as   it 

8  Mitford's  Equity  Pleadinpr,  ch.  1,  125;  Ferrers  v.  Cherry,  1  Eq.  Cas.  Abr. 
§  .3 ;  Ferrers  v.  Cherry,  1   Equity  Cases     3,  4. 

Abridsred,  3,  4;  Melius  v.   Thompson,  1  "  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.    (2d  Am.    ed)  28, 

Cliff.  125.  1701  ;  1  Kyd  on  Corporations,  77. 

9  Mitford's  PI.  ch.  1,  §  3;  Melius  v.  i-^  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2(1  Am.  ed.)  28  & 
Thompson,  1  Cliff.  125;  Ferrers  v.  Cherry,  1701 ;  2  Bac.  Abr.  Corporation,  E.  2. 

1  Eq.  Cas.  Abr.  3,  4.  13  Williams    v.    Cooke,    10    Ves.    406 ; 

l'3  Mitford's  PI.  ch.  1.  §  3;  Story's  Eq.  Devaynes  v.  Morris,  1  Myl.  &  Cr.  213, 
PI.  §  367;   Melius  i'.  Thomson,  1   Cliff.     225. 


302  BILLS   OF   REVIVOR,   ETC.  [CHAP.  XIV. 

revived  the  decree  only,  and  the  subsequent  proceedings  would 
not  be  revived  but  by  bill,  and  the  inrollment  of  decrees  being 
now  much  disused,  it  is  become  the  practice  to  revive  in  all  cases 
indiscriminately  by  bill."  ^  The  writer  is  not  acquainted  with 
any  instance  of  such  practice  in  the  United  States.  The  only 
methods  of  reviving  a  suit  in  equity  in  the  Federal  courts  seem 
to  be  a  bill  of  revivor,  a  bill  in  the  nature  of  a  bill  of  revivor,  a 
bill  of  revivor  and  supplement,  or  a  supplemental  bill  in  the 
nature  of  a  bill  of  revivor.  It  was  held  in  one  case  that  the 
personal  representatives  of  a  deceased  defendant  may  voluntarily 
come  in  and  be  made  a  party  upon  motion.^  When  a  board  of 
public  officers  was  abolished  by  statute  and  a  new  board  sub- 
stituted for  it,  it  was  held,  without  determining  whether  or 
not  a  revivor  was  necessary,  that  the  members  of  the  new  board 
could  properly  be  made  parties  to  the  suit  by  means  of  a  bill  of 
revivor.^ 

§  179.  Definition  of  Bills  of  Revivor  and  Parties  to  the  Same. — 
A  bill  of  revivor  is  a  continuance  of  the  original  bill,  when,  by 
death,  some  party  to  it  has  become  incapable  of  prosecuting  or 
defending  a  suit,  or  a  female  plaintiff  has  by  marriage  incapaci- 
tated herself  from  suing  alone.^  "  Whenever  a  suit  abates  by 
death,  and  the  interest  of  the  person  whose  death  has  caused  the 
abatement  is  transmitted  to  that  representative  which  the  law 
gives  or  ascertains,  as  an  heir-at-law,  executor,  or  administrator  ; 
so  that  the  title  cannot  be  disputed,  at  least  in  the  court  of  chan- 
cery, but  the  person  in  whom  the  title  is  vested  is  alone  to  be 
ascertained  ;  the  suit  ma}"  be  continued  by  bill  of  revivor  merel}'. 
If  a  suit  abates  by  marriage  of  a  female  plaintiff,  and  no  act  is 
done  to  affect  the  rights  of  the  party  but  the  marriage,  no  title 
can  be  disputed  ;  the  person  of  the  husband  is  the  sole  fact  to  be 
ascertained;  and  therefore  the  suit  may  be  continued  in  this  case 
likewise  by  bill  of  revivor  merely."^  The  persons  who  may  be 
plaintiffs  in  a  bill  of  revivor  have  been  specified  in  a  preceding 
section.3  If  the  abatement  be  caused  by  the  death  or  marriage 
of  a  plaintiff,  all  previous  defendants  to  the  suit  must  be  made 

§  178.   Mitfonl's  Clianccrv  Pleadings,  164 ;  Allen  v.  The  Mayor,  18  Blatchf.  230 ; 

ch.  1,  §  3.  '  8.  c.  7  Fed.  R.  483. 

2  Griswold  r.  Hill,  1  Paine,  48.3.     See  §  179.   i  Mitford's  PI.  cli.  1,  §  3;  Fitz- 

U.  S.  K.  S.  §  055.  Patrick  v.  Domingo,  14  Fed.  R.  210. 

8  Hemingway   v.   Stansell,  106  U.  S.  -  Mitford's  PI.  ch.  1,  §  3. 

399,402.    SeealsoTheSapphire,  11  Wall.  »  §  177. 


§  180.]  FKAME   OF   A    BILL    OF   REVIVOR.  303 

parties  to  the  bill  of  revivor ;  unless  it  be  file d  after  a  decree, 
when  all  whose  rights  or  duties  have  been  fixed  and  ascertained 
thereby  must  be  joined.*  If  any  of  the  previous  plaintiffs  refuse 
to  join  in  the  continuance  of  the  suit,  they  also  must  be  made 
defendants  to  the  bill  of  revivor.^  If  the  abatement  be  caused  by 
the  death  of  a  defendant,  only  his  heirs  or  personal  representa- 
tives, or  both,  according  as  the  suit  affected  his  interest  in  real 
or  personal  property,  should  be  made  defendants  to  the  bill  of 
revivor ;  ^  unless  the  bill  be  filed  after  a  decree,  when  all  parties 
interested  thereunder  should  be  joined.'^  There  is  no  need  of  any 
difference  of  citizenship  among  the  different  parties  to  such  a  bill, 
provided  that  the  court  had  jurisdiction  of  the  original  suit.^  A 
bill  of  revivor  cannot  be  filed  against  the  representatives  of  a  de- 
fendant not  served  with  process  under  the  original  bill.^  They 
can  only  be  brought  in  by  a  bill  in  the  nature  of  an  original 
bill.io 

§  180.  Frame  of  a  Bill  of  Revivor.  — A  bill  of  revivor  must  state 
the  filing  of  the  original  bill,  and  the  several  proceedings  thereon, 
and  the  abatement ;  ^  but  it  need  not  set  forth  any  of  the  state- 
ments in  the  original  suit,  unless  the  special  circumstances  of  the 
case  require  it.^  "  It  must  show  a  title  to  revive,  and  charge 
that  the  cause  ought  to  be  revived,  and  stand  in  the  same  condi- 
tion with  respect  to  the  parties  in  the  bill  of  revivor  as  it  was  in 
with  respect  to  the  parties  to  the  original  bill  at  the  time  the 
abatement  happened  ;  and  it  must  pray  that  the  suit  may  be  re- 
vived accordingly.  "  ^  If  a  bill  of  revivor  seeks  simply  to  revive 
the  suit,  it  prays  only  for  a  subpoena  to  revive.  If  it  requires  an 
answer,  it  should  pray  a  subpoena  to  revive  and  answer.*  This 
is  usually  only  required  in  two  classes  of  cases.  Where  the  bill 
is  filed  against  an  executor  or  administrator,  and  requires  an 
admission  of  assets,  the  prayer  usually  is,  not  only  that  the  suit 
may  be  revived,  but  also  that,  in  case  the  defendant  shall  not  ad- 

*  Danicll's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  cd.)  1703,  9  United  States  v.  Fields,  4  Blatclif. 

1704.  326. 

»  Finch  r.Lord  Winchelsca,!  Eq.  Cas.  w  See  §  174. 

Abr.  2;  Danieli's  Ch.   Pr.   (2d  Am.  ed.)  §  180.    i  Mitford's  PI.  ch.  1,  §  3. 

1700.  2  Rule  58. 

6  Bettes    V.    Dana,    2    Sumner,   383;  ^  Mitford's  PI.  cli.  1,  §  3. 

Danieli's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1704.  *  Mitford's  PI.  ch.   l'  §  3;   Danieli's 

7  DanicH's  Ch.  Pr.  1704.  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.J  1707. 
s  Clarke  v.  Mathewson,  12  Pet.  164; 

8.  c.  2  Sumner,  262. 


304  BILLS   OF   EEVIVOR,    ETC.  [CHAP.  XIV. 

mit  assets  to  answer  the  purposes  of  the  suit,  an  account  of  the 
estate  of  the  deceased  party  may  be  taken  ;  "  and  so  far  the  bill 
is  in  the  nature  of  an  original  bill."  ^  "  If  a  defendant  to  an 
original  bill  dies  before  putting  in  an  answer,  or  after  an  answer 
to  which  exceptions  have  been  taken,  or  after  an  amendment  of 
the  bill  to  which  no  answer  has  been  given,  the  bill  of  revivor, 
though  requiring  in  itself  no  answer,  must  ptay  that  the  person 
against  whom  it  seeks  to  revive  the  suit  may  answer  the  original 
bill,  or  so  much  of  it  as  the  exceptions  taken  to  the  answer  of 
the  former  defendant  extend  to,  or  the  amendment  remaining 
unanswered."^  A  bill  of  revivor  should  be  signed  by  counsel, 
and  in  general  comply  so  far  as  is  practicable  with  the  require- 
ments for  original  bills.'^ 

§  181.  Proceedings  upon  Bills  of  Revivor.  —  The  Equity  Rules 
provide  that  "  whenever  a  suit  in  equity  shall  become  abated  by 
the  death  of  either  party,  or  by  any  other  event,  the  same 
may  be  revived  by  a  bill  of  revivor,  or  a  bill  in  the  nature  of  a 
bill  of  revivor,  as  the  circumstances  of  the  case  may  require, 
filed  by  the  proper  parties  entitled  to  revive  the  same,  which 
bill  may  be  filed  in  the  clerk's  office  at  any  time  ;  and  upon 
suggestion  of  the  facts,  the  proper  process  of  subpoena  shall,  as 
of  course,  be  issued  by  the  clerk,  requiring  the  projjer  reiDresen- 
tatives  of  the  other  party  to  appear  and  show  cause,  if  any  they 
have,  why  the  cause  should  not  be  revived.  And  if  no  cause 
shall  be  shown  at  the  next  rule-day  which  shall  occur  after  fourteen 
days  from  the  time  of  the  service  of  the  same  process,  the  suit 
shall  stand  revived,  as  of  course."^  The  Revised  Statutes  pro- 
vide that  "  when  either  of  the  parties,  whether  plaintiff,  peti- 
tioner, or  defendant,  dies  before  final  judgment,  the  executor  or 
administrator  may,  if  the  suit  survives,  prosecute  or  defend  to 
final  judgment.  The  defendant  shall  answer,  and  the  cause 
will  be  heard  and  determined,  and  judgment  rendered  for  or 
against  the  executor  or  administrator.  If  the  executor  or  ad- 
ministrator neglects  or  refuses  to  become  a  party  twenty  days 
after  being  served  with  a  scire  facias,  the  court  mav  nevertheless 
render  judgment  against  the  deceased  party.  The  executor  or 
administrator  on  becoming  a  party  is  entitled  to  a  continuance 

5  Mitford's  PI.  ch.  1,  §  3.  §  181.   i  Rule  56.    See  Oliver  v.  Deca- 

6  Mitford's  PI.  cli.  1.  §  3.  tur,  4  Cranch  C.  C.  692. 

7  Danidl's  Ch.  Pr.  ('Jd  Am.  ed.)  1707. 


§  181.]  PKOCEEDIXCS   UPON   BILLS   OF  REVIVOR.  305 

until  the  next  term."^  The  form  of  the  subpoena  upon  a  bill  of 
revivor  is  the  same  as  that  upon  an  original  bill,  except  that  it 
states  the  nature  of  the  bill  to  which  the  defendant  is  required 
to  appear,  and  the  time  allowed  him  by  the  rules  in  which  to  do 
so.^  The  subpoena  is  also  sued  out  and  served  in  the  same  man- 
ner as  one  upon  an  original  bill;*  but  substituted  service  of  the 
subpoena  upon  the  attorney  of  the  defendant  to  the  original  bill 
may  be  allowed  when  the  original  defendant  is  beyond  the  reach 
of  process.^  But  it  has  been  held  that  a  suit  cannot  be  revived 
against  the  foreign  executor  or  adminstrator  of  a  deceased  de- 
fendant who  has  not  taken  out  letters  within  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  court,  and  has  no  assets  there.^  If  the  defendant  refuses  to 
appear,  process  of  contempt  may  be  issued  against  him.'  A 
defendant  who  wishes  to  oppose  the  revivor,  should  demur  or 
plead  to  the  bill,  or  perhaps  show  cause  by  affidavit  to  the  con- 
trary.^ Where  an  answer  is  required  that  should  probably  accom- 
pany the  demurrer  or  plea.  It  is  not  expedient  to  take  in  the 
answer  any  objection  to  the  revivor.  For  the  English  rule  was 
that  an  objection  thus  taken  would  not  prevent  the  order  to 
revive,  and  the  point  could  then  only  be  determined  by  bring- 
ing the  cause  regularly  to  a  hearing.^ 

■  A  bill  of  revivor  is  demurrable  if  it  does  not  show  a  sufficient 
ground  for  reviving  the  suit  or  any  part  of  it,  either  by  or 
against  the  person  by  or  against  whom  it  is  filed  ;^*^  for  want  of 
parties  apparent  upon  its  face,  though  not  for  the  omision  of 
such  as  had  not  appeared  before,  or  were  not  before  the  court  at 
the  time  of  the  abatement ;  ^^  and  for  any  serious  defect  in  form. 
Upon  a  demurrer  to  a  bill  of  revivor,  the  sufficiency  of  the 
original  bill  cannot  be  considered. ^^  Should  however,  the 
original  bill  fail  to  state  facts  giving  the  Federal  courts  juris- 


2  U.  S.  R.  S..§  955.     See  Griswold  v.  Lewis  i'.  Bridgjman,  2  Simons,  465;  Cod- 
Hill,  1  Paine,  483.  rington  v.  Houlditch,  5  Simons,  286. 

3  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1707.  ^"  Harris  v.  Pollard,  3  P.  Wms.  348; 
*  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1707.  University   College    v.  Foxcroft,   2   Ch. 

5  Dunn  V.  Clarke,  8  Pet.  1,2  ;  Norton  v.  Rep.  244  ;  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.) 
Hepworth,  1  Hall&  Tw.  158.    See  §  96.  1709,  1710  ;  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §§  G17,  829. 

6  Melius  V.  Thompson,  1  Cliff.  125.  'i  Metcalfe  v.  Metcalfe,  1  Keen,  74  ; 
■^  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1707.  Crowfoot  v.  Mander,  9  Simons,  396  ;  Dan- 
»  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1709,  iell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1710. 

1710;  Rule  58.  i-  Mason  v.  Hartford,  P.  &  F.  Ry.  Co., 

9  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1700,  19  Fed.  R.  5.3,  55;  Sharon  v.  Terry.  36 

1711;  Harris  r.  Pollard,  3  P.  Wms.  348;  Fed.  K.  337. 
VOL.  I.  —  20 


306  BILLS    OF  KEVIVOR,   ETC.  [CHAP.  XIV. 

diction,  tlmt  objection  may  be  raised  by  a  demurrer  to  the  bill 
of  revivor. ^^  If  a  bill  of  revivor  be  brought  without  sufficient 
cause  to  revive,  and  this  be  not  apparent  upon  its  face,  or  if 
the  plaintiff  is  not  entitled  to  revive  the  suit  at  all,  though  a 
title  is  stated  in  the  bill  so  that  it  is  not  demurrable,  the  de- 
fendant may  set  up  his  objections  to  it  by  plea.^*  The  running 
of  the  statute  of  limitations  after  the  time  when  a  person  became 
entitled  to  revive  is  also  in  most  cases,  except  after  a  decree  for 
an  account,^'^  a  defense  and  a  bar  to  a  bill  of  revivor,  wliich  may 
be  set  up  by  plea.^°  No  plea  can  be  put  in  against  a  bill  of 
revivor  which  has  been  pleaded  to  the  original  bill  and  over- 
ruled, although  if  a  plea  has  been  put  in  and  the  suit  abated 
before  argument,  it  may  subsequently  be  pleaded  anew  to  the 
original  bill.^'  When  an  answer  to  a  bill  of  revivor  is  required, 
it  must  be  confined  to  such  matters  as  are  called  for  by  the  bill, 
or  as  would  be  material  to  the  defense  with  reference  to  the 
order  made  upon  it.^^  Allegations  which  might  have  been 
pleaded  before  abatement  to  the  original  bill  will  be  considered 
as  impertinent,^^  and  disregarded.^*^  It  will  not,  however,  be  im- 
pertinent, if  it  states  matters  of  defense  which  have  occurred 
since  the  answer  to  the  original  bill  was  filed,  though  these  do 
not  affect  the  title  of  the  plaintiff  to  revive.^^  Such  an  answer 
is  impertinent  when  it  describes  and  complains  of  irregularities 
in  the  suit  before  the  abatement.-^  Such  an  answer  should  be 
signed  by  counsel  ;^^  and  exceptions  will  lie  to  it  for  insufficiency, 
scandal,  and  impertinence.-'*  If  it  does  not  admit  the  plaintiff's 
title  to  revive  or  state  any  circumstances  which  he  is  desirous  of 
controverting,  it  must,  if  the  abatement  has  taken  place  after 
decree  or  issue  joined  in  the  original  cause,  be  replied  to.^^ 
Otherwise,  a  separate  replication  will  be  unnecessar}^  and  one 
replication  will  put  in   issue   both  tlie   allegations  in   that  and 

13  Sharon  v.  Terry,  36  Fed.  R.  337.  "  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.   (2*d  Am.  ed.)  1711  ; 

»  Daniell's  Ch.  Tr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1710;  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  808  a. 
Lewis  V.  Brid<?man,  2  Simons,  465.  ^^  Nanney  v.  Tottey,  11  Price,  117. 

15  HoUiiitrshead's  Case,  1  P.  Wms.  742 ;        20  Qunnell   v.  Bird,  10  Wall.  304,  308  ; 

Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1711.  Fretz  v.  Stover,  22  Wall.  198,  204. 

18  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1710;        21  Langley  c.  Overton,  10  Simons,  345. 
Colt  V.  Campbell,  82  N.  Y.  50'J  ;  Perry  v.       22  Waj^rstaff  v.  Bryan,  1  R.  &  M.  28. 
Jenkins,  1  Myl.  &  Cr.  122;  Mason  v.  Hart-       23  Daniell's  Ch   Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1712. 
ford,  P.  &  F.  liy.  Co.,  19  Fed.  R.  53,  50 ;        24  Wa.ijstaff  v.   Bryan,    1  R.  &  M.  28  ; 

Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  831.  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1712. 

IT  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1711.  25  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1712. 


§  182.]     BILLS  IN  THE  NATURE  OF  BILLS  OF  REVIVOR.       307 

those  in  the  original  answer.''^^  In  all  other  respects,  the  form 
and  the  proceedings  upon  demurrers,  pleas,  and  answers  to  bills 
of  revivor  should  conform  as  nearly  as  possible  to  those  of  and 
upon  similar  pleadings  to  original  bills. ^''  A  bill  of  revivor  need 
not  be  set  down 'for  a  hearing,  unless  it  prays  other  relief  than  a 
mere  revivor.^^  Where  a  bill  of  revivor  seeks  merely  an  ad- 
mission of  assets  and  a  revivor,  and  the  defendant  admits  assets, 
the  cause  may  proceed  upon  the  order  of  revivor  merely .^^  If, 
however,  any  issue  is  joined  upon  the  answer  to  it,  a  hearing 
will  be  necessary .^^  The  sole  questions  before  the  court  when  a 
bill  of  revivor  is  filed  are  the  competency  of  the  parties  by  and 
against  whom  it  is  filed,  and  the  frame  of  the  bill.^^  A  cause  is 
not  revived  until  an  order  of  revivor  has  been  entered. ^^ 

§  182.  Bills  in  the  Nature  of  Bills  of  Revivor  in  general.  —  A  bill 
in  the  nature  of  a  bill  of  revivor  is  a  bill  filed  "•  to  obtain  the 
benefit  of  a  suit  after  abatement  in  certain  cases  wliich  do  not 
admit  of  a  continuance  of  the  original  bill,"  ^  "  If  the  death  of  a 
party  whose  interest  is  not  determined  by  his  death  is  attended 
with  such  a  transmission  of  his  interest  that  the  title  to  it,  as 
well  as  the  person  entitled,  may  be  litigated  in  the  court  of  chan- 
cery," as  in  the  case  of  a  devise -or  conveyance^  of  real  estate, 
"the  suit  is  not  permitted  to  be  continued  by  a  bill  of  revivor. 
An  original  bill  upon  which  the  title  may  be  litigated  must  be 
filed,  and  this  bill  will  so  far  have  the  effect  of  a  bill  of  revivor 
that  if  the  title  of  the  representative  substituted  by  the  act  of 
the  deceased  party  is  established,  the  same  benefit  may  be  had 
of  the  proceedings  upon  the  former  bill  as  if  the  suit  had  been 
continued  by  a  bill  of  revivor."'*  "  The  bill  is  said  to  be  original 
merely  for  want  of  that  privity  between  the  party  to  the  former 
and  the  party  to  the  latter  bill,  though  claiming  the  same  in- 
terest, which  would  have  permitted  the  continuance  of  the  suit 
by  bill  of  revivor.     Therefore,  when  the  validity  of  the  alleged 

26  Catton  V.  Earl  of  Carlisle,  5  Madd.       3i  Bettes  v.  Dana,  2  Sumner,  383. 
427  ;  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2(1  Am.  ed.)  1712.         ^-  Atterbury  v.  Gill,  13  Off.  Gaz.  276. 

27  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1711,        §  182.   i  Mitford  PI.  ch.  1,  §  3.     See 
1712.  Slack   V.    Walcott,  3   Mason,    508,   512; 

28  Pruen  v.  Lunn,  5  Russ.  3  ;  Daniell's  Sliaron  v.  Terry,  36  Fed.  R.  337,  353. 
Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1713.  2  slack  v.  Walcott,  3  Mason,  508. 

29  Mitford's   PL    ch.  1.    §  3;    Daniell's         3  Sharon  i-.  Terry,  36  Fed.  R.  337. 
Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1713.'  "  Mitford's  PL  ch.  1.  §  3.    See  Slack  l: 

■'»'  Daniell's  Ch,  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1713 ;     Walcott,  3  Mason,  508. 
Mitford's  PI.  ch.  1,  §  3. 


308  BILLS    OF   REVIVOR,    ETC.  [CHAP.  XIV. 

tiansraission  of  interest  is  established,  the  party  to  the  new  bill 
shall  be  equally  bound  by,  or  have  advantage  of  the  proceedings 
in  the  original  bill,  as  if  there  had  been  such  a  privity  between 
him  and  the  party  to  the  original  bill  claiming  the  same  interest; 
and  the  suit  is  considered  as  pending  from  the  time  of  the  filing 
of  the  original  bill,  so  as  to  save  the  statute  of  limitations,  to 
have  the  advantage  of  compelling  the  defendant  to  answer 
before  an  answer  can  be  compelled  to  a  cross-bill,  and  every 
other  advantaofe  which  would  have  attended  the  institution  of 
the  suit  by  original  bill,  if  it  could  have  been  continued  by  bill 
of  revivor  merely."  ^  So  the  pleadings  filed  and  any  testimony 
taken  in  the  original  cause  can  be  used  in  the  same  manner  in 
the  second  cause  after  a  bill  in  the  nature  of  a  bill  of  revivor 
has  been  filed.*^  Such  a  bill  can  only  be  tiled  for  the  purpose 
of  bringing  in  a  person  who  claims  in  privity  with  the  party 
whose  deatli  caused  the  abatement.''  Thus,  if  a  bill  is  filed  by  a 
devisee  under  a  will,  and  afterwards  a  subsequent  will  is  proved, 
the  devisee  under  the  second  will  can  in  no  way  avail  himself  of 
the  proceedings  in  the  suit ;  for  there  is  no  privit}'  between  him 
and  the  original  plaintiff.  If,  however,  a  bill  has  been  filed  by 
the  devisor  himself  for  some  matter  concerning  the  estate  de- 
vised, the  second  devisee  may  file  a  supplemental  bill  in  the 
nature  of  a  bill  of  revivor,  even  if  the  first  devisee  have  already 
filed  such  a  bill ;  for  he  derives  his  title  to  do  so  solely  from 
the  devisor  independently  of  the  first  devisee.®  When  the  court 
had  jurisdiction  of  the  original  suit,  a  want  of  difference  of 
citizenship  between  the  parties  to  the  bill  in  the  nature  of  a  bill 
of  revivor  will  not  be  a  defect  in  it.^ 

§  183.  Frame  of  Bills  in  the  Nature  of  Bills  of  Revivor  and  Pro- 
ceedings upon  them.  —  A  bill  in  the  nature  of  a  bill  of  revivor 
"  must  state  the  original  bill,  the  proceedings  upon  it,  the  abate- 
ment, and  the  manner  in  which  the  interest  of  the  party  dead 
has  been  transmitted ;  and  it  must  charge  the  validity  of  the 
transmission,  and  state  the  rights  which  have  accrued  by  it."  ^ 

5  Mitford's  VI  ch.  1,  §  .3.  8  Oldham    v.    Eboral,    Cooper    Select 

«  Slack  r.  Walcott,  8  Mason,  508  ;  Vat-  Cases,  27. 

tier  r.  Ilinde,  7  Pet. -252,  200;  Story's  Eq.  ^  Clarke   v.   Matliewson,  12  Pet.  104; 

PI.    §§   371-387;    Daniell's   Ch.   Pr.    (2d  s.  c.  2  Sumner.  202;    Minnesota  Co.  v. 

Am.  ed.)  1719.  St.  Paul  Co..  2  Wall.  00'.). 

'  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  1720  ;  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  183.   i  Mitford's  Eq.  PI.  ch.  1,  §  3. 
§  :ls.-) ;  l{ylands  r.  Latoiiche,  2  P.lifih,  585 ; 
Tonkin  v.  Lethbridge,  G.  Cooper,  43. 


§  185.]  SUPPLEMENTAL    BILLS,    ETC.  309 

It  usiiiilly  prays  that  the  original  suit  may  be  revived,  and  the 
party  filing  it  have  the  benefii  of  the  former  proceedings  therein.^ 
Probably  a  subpoena  issued  in  accordance  with  its  prayer  may  be 
served  upon  the  attorney  of  an  absent  defendant,  who  had 
already  appeared,  in  the  same  manner  as  a  subpoena  upon  a  bill 
filed  to  stay  proceedings  at  law.^  Otherwise  the  form  and  the 
proceedings  upon  bills  in  the  nature  of  bills  of  revivor  are  the 
same  as  those  upon  bills  of  revivor;  *  and  the  difference  between 
the  two  is  practically  one  of  mere  nomenclature.^ 

§  184.  Bills  of  Revivor  and  Supplement.  —  A  bill  of  revivor  and 
supplement  is  a  bill  which  revives  a  suit  after  an  abatement,  and 
at  the  same  time  supplies  a  defect  which  has  arisen  in  it  since  its 
institution.!  Thus,  where  by  the  death  of  a  defendant  new  rights 
accrue  to  the  plaintiffs,  a  bill  of  revivor  and  supplement  is  neces- 
sary to  state  those  rights  ;  ^  and  where,  in  a  suit  to  restrain  the 
infringement  of  a  patent,  the  complainant  assigned  his  interest 
and  died,  it  was  held  improper  for  the  assignee  to  revive  the  suit 
by  a  bill  of  revivor,  the  court  saying  that  a  "  supplemental  bill," 
but  evidently  intending  thereby  a  bill  of  revivor  and  supplement, 
must  be  filed.^  It  has  been  held  in  England  that  by  such  a  bill 
a  defect  apparent  upon  the  face  of  the  original  bill  cannot  be 
cured.*  A  bill  of  revivor  and  supplement  is  merely  a  compound 
of  a  bill  of  revivor  and  a  supplemental  bill,  and  in  its  separate 
parts  must  be  framed  and  proceed  in  the  same  manner.^  It 
seems  that  it  may  be  held  good  as  to  the  revivor,  and  bad  as  to 
the  supplemental  matter.^  All  parties  to  the  original  bill  should 
be  made  parties  to  a  bill  of  revivor  and  supplement,  although  a 
revivor  Is  sought  against  but  one  defendant." 

§  185.  Supplemental  Bills  in  the  Nature  of  Bills  of  Revivor.  —  A 
supplemental  bill  in  the  nature  of  a  bill  of  revivor  is  a  bill  filed 
to  cure  an  abatement  when  the  person  by  or  against  whom  the 

2  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  1721  ;    Story's  Eq.  »  Met^l  Stamping  Co.  v.  Crandall,  18 
PI.  §  ,386.  Off.  Gaz.  IGai. 

3  Norton  v.  Hepwortli,  1   Hall  &  Tvv.  *  Bampton   v.  Birchall,  5  Beav.  330; 
158  ;  Dunn  v.  CLarke,  8  Pet.  1,  2.      See  8.  c.  on  appeal,  1  Phil.  568. 

§96.  s  Mitford's  PI.  ch.  1,  §3;  Story's  Eq. 

*  Paniell's  Ch.  Pr.  1720, 1721 ;  Rule  .56.  PI.  §§  387,  627  ;    Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  1722. 

5  Grew  V.  Breed,  12  Met.  (Mass.)  369.  1723;  Pendleton  (•.  Fay,  3  Paige  (N.  Y.J, 

§  184.    1  Mitford's  PI.  ch.  1,  §  2 ;  Story's  204. 

Eq.  PI.  §§  .387,  627;  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  «  Randolph  r.  Dickerson,  5  Paigc(N.Y.), 

Am.  ed  )  1722,  1723.  517.    But  see  Bampton  f.  Birchall,  5  Beav. 

-  Westcott  V    Cady,  5  J.  Ch.   (N.  Y.)  330;  s.  c.  on  ay)ppal,  1  Phil.  568. 

334,  342.  ■'  Lake  v.  Austwiek,  4  Jur.  314. 


810  BILLS    OF    REVIVOR,    ETC.  [CHAP.  XIV. 

suit  is  to  be  continued,  although  chiiming  under  tlie  individual 
whose  death  caused  the  abatement,  is  not  the  representative 
whom  the  law  allows  to  be  recognized,  but  is  one  whose  title 
could  not  have  been  litigated  in  the  English  Court  of  Chancery, 
but  might  have  been  disputed  before  another  tribunal.^  It 
has  also  been  held  that  where  during  the  pendency  of  a  suit  a 
trustee  died,  and  the  court  appointed  a  successor  to  him,  the 
new  trustee  could  only  be  brought  in  by  a  supplemental  bill  in 
the  nature  of  a  bill  of  revivor.^  Upon  the  death  of  an  assignee 
in  bankruptcy  or  insolvency  his  successor  is  brought  in  by  a  bill 
of  this  character.^  Such  a  bill,  however,  although  designated 
as  being  in  the  nature  of  a  bill  of  revivor,  is  neither  more  nor 
less  than  a  supplemental  bill.** 

§  186.  What  renders  a  Suit  defective.  —  If,  after  the  institution 
of  a  suit  in  equity,  a  person  who  is  a  necessary  party  thereto 
comes  into  being,  or  any  other  event  occurs,  which,  without 
abating  the  suit,  occasions  such  an  alteration  in  the  interest  of 
any  of  the  original  parties,  or  gives  any  person  not  a  party  such 
an  interest  therein,  as  makes  it  necessary  that  the  change  of  in- 
terest shall  be  brought  to  the  attention  of  the  court,  and  the  per- 
son not  already  a  part}^  brought  before  it,  the  suit  is  said  to  become 
defective.^  The  circumstances  causing  the  change  of  interest 
must  then  be  alleged,  and  the  new  party  brought  in  by  a  supple- 
mental bill,  or  a  bill  in  the  nature  of  a  supplemental  bill.^  An 
assignment,  whether  voluntary^  or  by  operation  of  law,^  during 
the  pendency  of  a  suit,  of  the  wliole  or  a  part  of  a  party's  interest 
therein,  does  not  make  the  suit  defective,  nor  affect  the  rights  of 
the  other  parties,  since  the  assignee  takes  the  same  rights  and  is 
subject  to  the  same  obligations  as  his  assignor,  and  is  equally 
bound  or  benefited  by  the  decree.  The  assignee  need  not,  there- 
fore, be  made  a  party ,'^  unless  the  assignment  disables  the  assignor 
from  performing  the  decree  of  the  court,  when  he  should  be 
brought  before  it ;  *'  but  he  may  at  any  time  be  brought  in  at  his 

§185.    1  Danidl's  Ch.  Pr.  (2dAm.ecl.)  PI.    ch.    1,    §    .3;    Daniell's    Ch.    Pr.    (2(1 

1721.  Ara.  ed.)    1GG3. 
2  Greenleaf  v.  Queen,  1  Pet.  1.38,  148.  3  /^-.^  parte  Railroad  Co.,  95  U.  S.  221. 

a  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1721.  ■»  Ilewett    v.    Norton,    1    Woods,    68; 

*  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1721.  Eystcr  v.  Gaff,  91  U.  S.  521. 

§186.    1  Jones    v.  .lones,  3  Atk.   217;  ^  Eyster  f.  Gaff,  91  U.S.  52\  ;  E.r parte 

Mitford's  PI.  ch.  1,  §  3  ;  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  Railroad  Co.,  95  U.  S.  221. 

(2d  Am.  ed.)  16G3.  e  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1004. 

*  Jones  I'.  Jones,  3  Atk.  217  ;  Mitford's 


§  187.]  SUPPLEMENTAL   BILLS.  311 

own  request."  It  has  l)een  said  that  a  person  entitled  to  the  ben- 
efit of  a  decree  by  his  subsequent  acquisition  of  an  interest  in 
the  subject-matter  in  controversy  is  not  entitled  to  invoke  the 
aid  of  the  court  or  take  further  action  until  he  has  made  him- 
i^eli  a  party  by  a  supplemental  bill  or  other  appropriate  plead- 
ing, and  has  thus  brouglit  in  the  representatives  or  successors 
in  interest  of  the  original  parties,  plaintiff  or  defendant.^  In  a 
case  in  admiralty,  it  was  held  that  a  suit  brought  in  tlie  name 
of  Napoleon  III.,  on  account  of  an  injury  to  property,  —  a  French 
ship  held  by  him  in  his  sovereign  capacity,  —  did  not  abate  by 
his  deposition  and  the  succession  of  the  French  Republic  to  the 
French  Empire,  and  that  the  name  of  the  plaintiff  could  at  any 
time  be  changed  by  order.^ 

§  187.  Supplemental  Bills.  —  A  supplemental  bill,  according  to 
Lord  Redesdale,  is  merely  an  addition  to  the  original  bill.^  At 
first  supplemental  bills  were  filed,  not  only  for  the  purposes  men- 
tioned in  the  last  section,  but  also  to  supply  such  defects  as  might 
have  been  cured  by  amendment  after  the  time  to  perfect  a  bill 
by  amendment  had  expired.^  Now,  however,  that  amendments 
may  be  allowed  at  any  stage  of  a  suit,^  they  are  no  longer  needed 
for  that  purpose  ;  and  as  the  fact  that  the  matter  pleaded  in  a 
supplemental  bill  may  be  inserted  in  the  original  bill  by  amend- 
ment, was  also  a  good  ground  of  demurrer,*  it  is  very  doubtful 
whether  they  can  be  any  longer  so  used.^  When  an  event 
happens  subsequently  to  the  filing  of  an  original  bill  which 
gives  a  new  interest  in  the  matter  in  dispute  to  any  person, 
whether  or  not  already  a  party,  without  depriving  all  of  tlie 
original  plaintiffs  suing  in  their  own  right  of  their  interest,  the 
defect  arising  from  this  event  may  be  supplied  by  a  supple- 
mental  bill.^    A  i-emaiuder-man  may  also,  in  this  same  man- 

''  Foster?;.  Deacon,  Mad.  &  Geld.  59;  299;  Mosgrove  v.  Kountze,   14  Fed.   R. 

Eyster  v.  Gaff,  91  U.  S.  521 ;    Ex  parte  315. 
Railroad  Co.,  95  U.  S.  221,  226.  '^  Rule  29. 

8  Secor  V.  Singleton,  41  Fed.  R.  725,  *  Mitford's  PI.  ch.  2,  §  2,  part  1  ;  Dan- 
726.  iell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1081. 

9  The  Sapphire,  11  Wall.  1G4.  See  ^  Tubman  v.  Wa.son  Manuf.  Co.,  44 
Allen  ?\  The  Mayor,  7  Fed.  R.  483 ;  s.  c.  Fed.  R.  429;  Electrical  Accumulation 
18  Blatchf.  239 ;"  Hemingway  v.  Stansoll,  Co.  v.  Brush  Electric  Co.,  44  Fed.  R.  602. 
100  U.  S.  399,  402.  See,  however,  Davies  v.  Williams,  1  Sim- 

§  187.     1  Mitford's  PI.  ch.  1,  §  2.  ons,  5. 

2  Mitford's  PI.  ch.  1,  §  3  ;  Daniell's  Ch.  6  Hobson  v.  McArthur,  16  Pet.    182  ; 

Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  165.3-1063;    Story's  Eq.  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  106.3-1675  ;  Story's  Eq. 

PI.  §  334;  Jenkins  v.  Eldredge,  3  Story,  PI.  §§  3C6-343;  Mitford's  PI.  ch.  1  §  3. 


3J2  BILLS    OF   REVIVOR,    ETC.  [CHAP.  XIV. 

ner,  be  made  a  party  to  a  suit  brought  by  or  against  a  tenant 
in  tail  upon  the  determination  of  the  latter's  estate,  and  the 
acquisition  by  the  former  of  the  present  interest  to  the  property 
in  litigation.'  A  supplemental  bill  which  brings  in  a  new  party 
may  be  original  as  to  him,  but  supplemental  as  to  the  rest.^  If, 
pending  a  suit,  a  tenant  in  tail  of  an  estate  thereby  affected  by 
it  is  born;^  or  if,  pending  a  suit  against  a  husband  and  wife 
concerning  the  latter's  estate,  the  man  dies,  and  the  wife  thus 
acquires  a  new  interest ;  ^^  or  if  one  of  two  or  more  plaintiffs 
suing  in  their  own  right  is  entirely  deprived  of  his  interest,  by 
any  other  event  than  an  assignment  of  it ;  ^^  or  if  the  interest 
of  a  sole  plaintiff  suing  in  a  representative  capacity  entirely  de- 
termines by  death  or  otherwise,  and  some  other  person  becomes 
entitled  to  the  same  property  under  the  same  title,^-  —  the  defect 
in  the  suit  thereby  occasioned  must  be  cured  by  a  supplemental 
bill.  So,  if  pending  a  suit  a  party  becomes  a  lunatic,  or  if  pend- 
ing a  suit  by  or  against  a  lunatic  and  his  committee  a  new  com- 
mittee is  appointed,  the  committee  should  be  brought  in  by  a 
supplemental  bill.^'^  According  to  Lord  Redesdale,  upon  the  death 
of  one  suing  in  behalf  of  himself  and  others  in  the  same  posi- 
tion with  him,  if  his  representative  do  not  choose  to  file  a  bill  of 
revivor,  any  one  of  the  class  on  behalf  of  whom  he  sued  may 
revive  ;  ^*  but  it  seems  that  the  more  proper  course  would  be  for 
the  one  wishing  to  continue  the  suit  to  do  so  by  means  of  a  sup- 
plemental bill,  which  he  can  only  obtain  leave  to  file  upon  notice 
to  the  representatives  of  the  deceased  plaintiff,  as  well  as  to  the 
defendants. ^^  Where,  however,  a  suit  brought  by  one  in  a  repre- 
sentative capacity  becomes  defective  by  his  death,  and  another 
acquires  the  right  to  continue  it  under  a  different  title,  —  as  upon 
the  death  of  an  executor  or  administrator  succeeded  by  an  admin- 
istrator de  bonis  non,  according  to  Lord  Redesdale  and  Daniell, 
the  latter  may  continue  by  a  bill  of  revivor,^'^  according  to  Judge 

7  Lloyd  V.  Jolines,9  Ves.  .37  ;  Daniell's  i*  Mitfonl's  PI.  ch.  1,  §  3  ;  Daniell's  Ch. 
Ch.  Pr.  (2(1  Am.    eil.)  1G68-1G72.  Pr.  (2.1  Am.  ed.)  10(J4 

8  Mitfonl's  Pi.  ell.  1,  §  8.  ^  »  Mitfonl's  PI.  cli.  1,  §  3. 

9  Mitfonl's  PI.  ch.  1,  §  3.  15  Unulditch  v.  Marquis  Donnegall,  1 
1^  Daniell's  Cii.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  cd.)  160?..  Sim.  &  S.  4',tl  ;  Dixon  v.  Wyatt,  4  Madd. 
11  Mitfonl's  PI.  oil.  1,  §  3  ;  Daniell's  Ch.     ;)!)2 ;  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1H71, 

Pr.  (2d  Am  ed.)  KJGl.  1672;  Story's  Kq.  PI.  §  305. 

i-i  Mitfonl's  PI.  ch.  1  §  3  ;  Daniell's  Ch.  ">  Mitfonl's  PI.  ch.  l",  §  3  ;  Daniell's  Ch. 
Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1(505;  Marriott  v.  Tarp-  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1665;  Owen  r  Curz  ii, 
ley,  9  vSimons,  279.  2  Vern.  237  ;   Iliiirfiiiis  r.  York   Biiildiii<fs 

Co.  2Eq.  Abr.  3  pi.  U. 


§  188.]        PARTIES    AND    FRAME    OF   A    SUPPLEMENTAL   BILL,  313 

Story,  only  by  a  bill  in  the  nature  of  revivor  ;i"  in  no  case  by  a 
supplemental  bill.  It  has  been  held  that  in  a  case  where  the 
defendant  is  entitled  to  aflirniativc  relief  in  his  answer  without 
a  cross-bill,  as  a  suit  under  §  491 8  of  the  Revised  Statutes,  the 
complainant  may  plead  in  a  supplemental  bill  any  matter  in  de- 
fence to  such  a  claim  for  aihrmative  relief  that  he  might  have 
pleaded  by  supplemental  answer  to  a  cross-bill,  had  one  been 
filed. ^^  A  supplemental  bill  must  not  be  inconsistent  with  the 
original  bill.  Thus,  where  the  original  bill  stated  that  the  de- 
fendants claimed  to  be  a  cor{)orati()n,  but  were  not  incorporated, 
it  was  held  improper  to  tile  a  supplemental  bill  claiming  relief 
upon  the  ground  that  the  defendants  were  a  corporation.^^ 

188.    Parties   and   Frame   of   a   Supplemental  Bill.  —  As  a  general 

rule,  all  parties  to  the  original  suit  must  be  made  such  to  a  sup- 
j)lemental  bill  filed  to  supply  a  defect  in  it,^  unless  such  a  bill 
be  filed  to  bring  in  a  mere  formal  defendant,  or  to  allege  mat- 
ter which  cannot  possibly  affect  a  decree  against  more  than  one 
defendant,  when  the  others  need  not  be  made  parties  to  it.^  An 
objection  for  want  of  parties  must,  however,  be  made  by  demurrer, 
plea,  answer,  or  when  the  motion  for  leave  to  file  the  bill  is 
argued.  It  will  be  too  late  to  make  it  at  the  hearing.'^  If  Ihe 
court  had  jurisdiction  of  the  original  bill  it  will  take  jurisdicticjii 
of  the  supplemental  bill,  no  matter  what  may  be  the  citi/X'ushii) 
of  the  new  j)arties;*  provided  at  least  that  they  have  a  right  to 
sue  and  be  sued  in  a  Federal  court.'"'  "  Sui)plenieutal  bill  must 
state  the  original  bill,  and  the  ])roceedings  thereon,  and  if  the 
supplemental  bill  is  occasioned  by  an  event  subsequent  to  the 
original  bill,  it  must  state  that  event,  and  the  consequent  alter- 
ation with  respect  to  the  parties.^  The  equity  rules  provide  that 
"  it  shall  not  be  necessary  in  any  supplemental  l)ill  to  set  forth  any 
of  the  statements  in  the  oi'iginal  suit,  unless  the  special  circum- 

'■J  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  382,  n.  1.  kinson  r.  Fowkes,  9   Hare,    19.3;  Story's 

18  P:iectrical  Act-nmnlatiori  Co  v.  Brush  Eq.  PI.  §  343. 
Electric  Co.,  44  Feil.  K.  (502,  GOT  ;  supra,  3  jones  r.  Jones,  3  Atk.  217. 

§§  154,  171.  ■*  Miiinesolii    Co.    v.    St.    Paul  Co.,  2 

" '  •'■•  Maynanl  v.  Green,  .30  Fe<l.  R.  043.  Wall.  009      Sec  §  21. 

§188.  1  Daniell's  Ch.Pr.  (2(1  Am.  0(1.)  ^  See  Adams   Express  Co.   v.  Denver 

1078;  Jones  r.  Jones,  3  Atk.  217;  Dyson  &  R.   G.  Railway  Co.,   16  Fed.  R.  712; 

V   Morris,  1  Flare,  41.3  ;  Jones  r.  Howells,  Gnialia  Horse  Railway  Company  v.  Cable 

2  Hare,  342.  Tramway  Company  of  Omalia,  33  Fed.  R. 

"  Greenwood   v.  Atkinson,  5    Simons,  089. 
419;  Dyson  i:  Morris,  1  Hare,  413;  Wil-         «  Mitford's  PI.  ch.  1,  §  3. 


314 


BILLS   OF   EEVIVOR,   ETC. 


[chap.  XIV. 


stances  of  the  case  require  it.'"^  This,  however,  althouoh  copied 
from  an  English  Chancery  order,^  is  merely  a  reafiirmance  of  the 
pre-existing  practice.^  If  the  bill  brings  in  no  new  party,  there 
is  never  any  need  of  its  containing  any  of  the  statements  in  the 
original  pleadings. ^*^  When,  however,  it  brings  in  a  new  party, 
as  it  is  in  fact  original  as  to  him,  it  must  state  enough  of  the 
former  proceedings  to  show  an  equity  against  him.i^  This  need 
not  be  averred  positively ;  but  it  will  be  sufficient  to  state  that 
such  matters  were  alleged  in  the  former  bill  or  answer,!^  ^j^^  Q,jiy 
so  much  of  the  original  pleadings  need  be  averred  as  suffice  to 
show  an  equity  against  the  new  party.^^  The  prayer  of  a  su|)ple- 
mental  bill  is  adapted  to  the  object  for  which  it  is  exhibited.  It 
formerly  always  concluded  with  a  prayer  for  process  in  the  usual 
form.i'*  Whether  tiiis  is  now  necessary  when  no  new  defendants 
are  brought  in  may  be  doubted. ^^  It  should  be  signed  by  coun- 
sel, and  in  other  respects  conform  to  the  form  of  an  original 
bill.^*^  A  supplemental  bill  may  be  filed  at  any  time  during  the 
progress  of  a  suit,  as  well  after  as  before  a  decree,^''  and  even 
during  the  pendency  of  an  appeal.^^  It  seems,  however,  that  if 
the  matters  which  make  it  necessary  or  advisable  were  known 
to  the  party  filing  it  before  the  entry  of  the  decree,  afterwards 
it  will  be  too  late  ;  ^^  though  such  an  objection  must  be  taken 
before  the  hearing  upon  the  supplemental  bill.^'^ 

§  189.  Proceedings  upon  Supplemental  Bills.  —  "  Wlicnevcr  any 
suit  in  equity  shall  become  defective  from  any  event  liaj)pening 
after  the  filing  of  the  bill  (as,  for  example,  by  change  of  interest 
in  the  parties),  or  for  any  other  reason  a  supplemental  bill,  or  a 
bill  in  the  nature  of  a  supplemental  bill,  may  be  necessary  to  be 


7  Rule  58. 

8  See  Order  47  in  Cliancery,  of  August, 
1841. 

9  Daniell's  Cli.  Pr.  (2tl  Am.  ed.)  1075- 
1678. 

1*  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr  (2,1  Am.  ed  ) 
1075. 

11  Baldwin  v.  Mackown.  3  Atk.  817  ; 
Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  l(]7.j,  1676. 

i'^  Lloyd  V.  Jolines,  9  Ves.  37  ;  Daniell's 
Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1670. 

13  Vigers  v.  Lonl  Audle3%  0  Simons,  72  ; 
Attorney-General  v.  Foster,  2  Hare,  81 ; 
Dan'ell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.ed  )  1676,  1677. 

14  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  1680. 

15  See  Shaw  v.  Bill,  95  U.  S.  10. 


10  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1680. 

1"  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1659. 
1660;  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §§  .^.'^8,  .338  a;  2 
Rarhour's  Ch.  Pr.  167  ;"  O'Hara  r.  Shep- 
herd, 3  Maryland  Ch.  Dee.  306  ;  Jenkins 
r.  Kldredge,  3  Story,  299;  Woodward  r. 
Woodward,  1  Dickens, 33;  Dormerr.  For- 
teseue,  3  Atk.  124  ;  Secor  r.  Singleton, 
41  Fed.  U.  725. 

'**  Woodward  v.  Woodward,  1  Dickens, 
33. 

!■'  Pendleton  v.  Fay,  3  Paige  (N.  Y  ), 
204  ;   Story's  Kq.  PI.  §  338  n. 

-"  Fnlton  Hnnk  r.  New  York  &  Sharon 
Canal  Co.,  4  Paige  (N.  Y.),  127. 


§  189.]  PROCEEDINGS   UPON    SUPPLEMENTAL    BILLS.  315 

filed  in  the  cause,  leave  to  file  the  same  may  be  granted  by  any 
judge  of  the  court  on  any  rule-day,  ui)on  ])roper  cause  shown 
and  due  notice  to  the  other  party.  And  if  leave  is  granted  to 
file  such  a  supplemental  bill,  the  defendant  shall  demur,  plead, 
or  answer  thereto,  on  the  next  succeeding  rule-day  after  tlie  sup- 
plemental bill  is  filed  in  the  clerk's  office,  unless  some  other  time 
shall  be  assigned  by  a  judge  of  the  court."  ^  The  petition  for 
leave  to  file  such  a  bill  need  not  state  the  averments  which  are 
intended  to  be  inserted  therein  ;  but  must  state  sufficient  to 
advise  the  opposite  parties  and  the  court  of  the  ground  upon 
which  the  relief  is  sought.^  It  has  been  held  that  upon  the  re- 
turn of  the  order  to  show  cause  an  objection  which  is  a  proper 
ground  for  a  demurrer  cannot  be  raised.^  The  objection  that  a 
supplemental  bill  was  filed  without  leave  is  not  a  ground  of  de- 
murrer, but  only  for  a  motion  to  dismiss  which  rests  in  the  dis- 
cretion of  the  court.*  A  motion  will  not  lie  to  take  a  sup])le- 
mental  bill  off  the  file  for  irregularity  upon  the  ground  that  it  does 
not  state  supplemental  matter.^  The  proper  course  in  such  a  case 
is  to  demur,  or  to  object  to  the  order  allowing  it  to  be  filed.^  Such 
a  motion  might,  however,  be  granted  if  a  bill  filed  should  be  dif- 
ferent from  that  which  the  order  allowed.  A  supplemental  bill 
filed  without  leave  may  by  a  suljsequent  order  be  allowed  to 
remain  on  the  file."  No  subpoena  need  be  issued  upon  such  a 
l)ill  unless  new  defendants  are  to  be  brought  in ;  and  then  they 
only  need  be  served  w^ith  process.*'  Such  a  subpcena  is  in  the 
same  form  as  one  issued  upon  the  filing  of  an  original  bill, 
except  that  it  specifies  the  nature  of  the  bill  uj)on  which  it  is 
issued.^  A  demurrer  to  a  supplemental  bill  is  in  general  subject 
to  the  same  rules,  except  as  to  the  time  of  filing  the  same,  and 
will  lie  for  the  same  reasons  as  if  the  bill  were  original ;  ^'^  but 
there  are  some  grounds  of  demurrer  peculiar  to  bills  of  this  class. 
Thus,  a  demurrer  will  lie  if  it  appears  upon  the  face  of  the  bill 
that  it  pleads  matters  which  occurred  before  the  institution  of 

§  180.     1  Rule  57.  «  Bnwyer   r.    Briijlit,    LS   Price,  316; 

2  Parkhurst  v.  Kinsman,  2  Blatclif.  C.     DanieU's  Cii.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  IGS2. 

C.  72.  "  Mackintosh  v.  Flint  &  P.  INI.  R.  Co., 

3  Oreson   &  TranscontinentRl  Co.    v.     34  Fed.  R.  582. 

Northern  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  32  Fed.  R.  428.  »  Shaw  r.  Bill,  05  U.  S.  10,  14. 

*  Henry  v.  Travelers'  Ins.  Co.,  45  Fed.  »  DanieU's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  16S0 

R.  290,  303.  1''  DanieU's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  od  )  1681  ; 

5  Bowyer    v.    Bright,  13  Price,    316;  Secor  r.  Singleton,  41  Fed    R.  725. 
DanieU's  Cli.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed  )  1682. 


316  BILLS    OF   REVIVOR,    ETC.  [CHAP.  XIV. 

the  suit,  and  which  it  is  not  too  late  to  insert  by  amendment 
into  the  original  bill.^^  A  supplemental  bill  is  demurrable  where 
it  shows  on  its  face  that  the  plaintiff  knew  the  facts  therein  al- 
leged before  his  time  to  amend  had  expired. ^'-^  A  su])plemental 
bill  is  demurrable  if  when  filed  after  a  decree  for  an  account  it 
pleads  matter  which  it  shows  that  the  plaintiff  knew  before  the 
decree.^^  A  supplemental  bill  is  demurrable  when  filed  to  intro- 
duce a  claim  founded  upon  a  title  entirely  distinct  from  that  in 
the  original  bill  ;  as,  when  a  man  first  sued  claiming  as  heir-at- 
law,  and  afterwards  sought  by  supplemental  bill  to  plead  a  pur- 
chase of  the  interest  of  the  true  heir-at-law.^^  A  suj)plemental 
bill  is  demurrable  if  it  is  brought  against  a  person  who  neither 
has  nor  claims  any  interest  in  the  subject-matter  of  the  original 
snit.^-5  In  a  suit  to  restrain  the  infringement  of  a  patent,  "  where 
the  patent  expires  and  is  extended  pending  the  litigation,  and  the 
infringement  by  the  respondent  is  continued  in  respect  to  the 
extended  patent,  a  supplemental  bill  is  a  proper  pleading  to  pro- 
long the  suit,  as  in  that  state  of  the  case  the  complainant  may 
well  claim,  if  he  is  the  original  and  first  inventor  of  the  improve- 
ment, to  recover  of  the  respondent  the  gains  and  profits  made  by 
the  infringement,  both  before  and  subsequent  to  the  extension  ; 
l)nt  the  rule  is  otherwise  where  the  original  patent  is  surren- 
dered, as  the  effect  of  the  surrender  is  to  extinguish  the  patent, 
and  hence  it  can  no  more  be  the  foundation  for  the  assertion  of 
a  right  than  can  a  legislative  act  which  has  been  repealed  with- 
out any  saving  clause  of  pending  actions.  Consequently,  the  in- 
fringement of  the  reissued  patent  becomes  a  new  cause  of  action 
for  which,  in  the  absence  of  any  agreement  or  implied  acquies- 
cence of  the  respondent,  no  remedy  can  l)o  had  except  by  the 
commencement  of  a  new  suit."  ^'^  Where,  however,  the  defend- 
ant made  no  objection  to  the  complainant's  filing  a  supplemental 
})ill  setting  forth  an  infringement  of  the  reissued  patent,  but  filed 


11  Mitford's   PI.   cli.    2,    §    2,    part  1;  i^  Balflwin  v.   Maokown,  3  Atk.  817; 

Story's   Eq.  PI.  §  614  ;  Stafford  r.   How-  Mitford's  PI.  cli.  2,  §  2,  part  1  ;  Daniell's 

lett,  1  Paige  (N.  V.),  200.  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1(!8L 

1-  Henry  I'.  Travelers' Ins.  Co.,  45  Fed.  i"^  Mr.    Jiistiee    Clifford    in    TJeedy    v. 

R.  209,  002.  Scott,  2:]  Wall.  .352,  .'■.(U,  "-fio.      See" also 

1^  Henry  r.  Travelers'  Ins.  Co  ,  45  Fed.  Fry  v.  Qiiinlan,  18  Blatelif.  205;  Jones  r. 

R.  290,  30o.  Barker,  11    Fed.   K.  597.      But  compare 

1^  Tonkin  r.  Lethbridge,  G.  Cooper,  43  ;  Wood  worth  r.  Stone,  3  Story,  719  ;  Reay 

Daniell's  CIi.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed  )  1081.  v.  Baynor,  10  Fed.  R.  308. 


§  189.]  PROCEEDINGS   UPON    SUPPLEMENTAL    BILLS.  3 17 

to  it  a  plea  similar  to  tliut  which  he  had  previously  filed  to  the 
original  bill,  it  was  held  that  he  had  Avaived  his  right  to  object 
upon  appeal  that  the  suit  was  improperly  continued,  and  that  an 
original  bill  should  have  been  filed. ^^  After  the  complainant  had 
finished  taking  testimony  in  a  suit  for  the  infringement  of  a  pat- 
ent and  an  account,  he  was  allowed  to  file  a  supplemental  bill 
setting  up  infringements  which  had  occurred  after  the  filing  of 
the  original  bill.^^ 

Any  objections  to  a  su{)plemental  bill  which  do  not  appear 
upon  its  face  may  be  taken  by  plea  or  answer,  which,  in  general, 
are  subject  to  the  same  rules  as  pleas  and  answers  to  original 
bills.19  If  a  defendant  has  not  answered  the  original  bill,  his 
successor  may  be  called  upon  in  the  suj)plcmental  bill  to  do  so.^'' 
When  that  is  done,  the  usual  course  is  to  include  the  answer 
to  the  original  and  that  to  the  supplemental  bill  in  the  same 
pleading,^^  although  it  is  not  absolutely  irregular  to  separate 
them.22  A  defense  cannot  be  ])leaded  to  a  supplemental  bill 
which  has  previously  been  ])leaded  to  the  original  bill  and  over- 
ruled.-'^ If  the  plaintiff  wish  to  join  issue  upon  averments  in  the 
answer,  he  may  file  a  replication  to  it.^*  If  there  has  been  no 
replication  filed  in  the  original  suit,  however,  a  single  general 
replication  will  apply  to  the  whole  record,  and  put  at  issue  the 
allegations  in  both  answers.^^  If  the  new  matter  in  the  supple- 
mental bill  is  not  admitted,  it  must  be  proved,  or  the  bill  will  be 
dismissed  wnth  costs.^''  For  this  purpose  evidence  may  be  taken 
and  a  hearing  had  as  ujion  an  original  bill.^'  If  there  has  been 
no  previous  hearing  and  decree,  both  bills  may  be  brought  to  a 
hearing  together,  and  a  single  decree  Avill  suffice  for  both.^^  If 
the  suj»plemcntal  bill  is  heard  alone,  the  evidence  taken  in  the 
original  suit  may  be  read  in  support  of  or  in  opposition  to  it.-^ 
The  effect  of  a  supplemental  bill  when  sustained  is  to  put  the 
suit  in  the  same  condition  as  if  the  supplemental  matter  had 

1'  Reedv  v.  Scott,  23  Wall.  .S52.  2^  Catton  v.  Earl  of  Carlisle,  5  Madd. 

18  Turrell  v.  Spaeth,  9  Off.  Gaz.  1163.  427. 

19  Daniell's  Cli.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1082.  -«  Daniell's  Cli.  Pr   (2d  Am.  ed.)  1G83 ; 
2'^  Vigersf'.  Lord  Audley,!)  Simons,  408.  Pedrick  v.  Wiiite,  1  Met.  (Mass.)  76. 

•21  Vltrers  r.  Lord  Audley ,  9  Simons,  408.  -'''  Lloyd  v.  Johnes,  9  Ves.  37  ;  Daniell's 

22  Sayle  r.  (Jraliam,  5  Simons,  8.  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  168.3. 

23  Peiitlarge  v.  Pentlarge,  22  Fed.  R.  -s  Mitford's  PI.  ch.  1,  §  3;  Daniell's  Ch. 
412  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1684,  1685. 

2*  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr  (2d  Am  ed.)  1683;  -s  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1684; 
IVrkiiis  r.  Hendryx,  31  Fed    K.  b-I2.  Turrell  v.  Spaeth,  9  Off   Gaz.  1163. 


318  BILLS    OF   REVIVOR,   ETC.  [CHAP.  XIV. 

been  alleged,  and  the  new  party,  if  any,  brought  in  at  its 
institution.30 

§  190.  Bills  in  the  Nature  of  Supplemental  Bills  in  general.  —  A 
bill  in  the  nature  of  a  supplemental  bill  is  a  bill  liled  to  obtain 
the  benefit  of  a  suit,  either  after  an  abatement  which  cannot  be 
cured  by  a  bill  of  revivor  or  a  bill  in  the  nature  of  a  bill  of  re- 
vivor, or  after  the  suit  has  become  defective  in  cases  which  do 
not  admit  of  a  supplemental  bill  to  supply  that  defect.^  Cases 
frequently  occur  in  practice  where  the  interest  of  an  original 
j)arty  to  a  suit  is  completely  determined,  and  another  })erson 
becomes  interested  in  the  subject-matter  by  a  title  not  derived 
from  the  other,  but  in  such  a  manner  as  to  make  it  proper  that 
the  benefit  of  the  former  proceedings  should  be  had  by  or  against 
the  latter,  without  incurring  the  expense  of  commencing  an  en- 
tirely new  proceeding.  In  such  a  case,  the  benefit  of  the  former 
proceedings  may  be  obtained  by  means  of  a  bill  called  an  original 
bill  in  the  nature  of  a  supplemental  bill,  or  a  bill  in  the  nature  of 
a  supplemental  bill.^  Such  a  bill  must  also  be  filed  to  bring  into 
a  suit  the  assignee  of  a  sole  plaintiff  who  had  acquired  his  inter- 
est during  its  pendency .-^  The  reason  given  for  this  is  the  doc- 
trine of  maintenance,  in  consequence  of  which  "  it  is  not  enough 
for  the  new  plaintiff  to  state  that  his  assignor  instituted  a  suit 
and  assigned  to  him  the  benefit  of  it ;  he  must  show  that  his 
assignor  had  the  property  in  respect  of  which  the  suit  was  insti- 
tuted, and  that  that  property  has  been  assigned  and  carries  with 
it  the  right  to  sue."  ^  So,  where  a  defendant  dies  before  appear- 
ance or  a  decree  against  him  jjro  eonfesso^  his  successor  can  only 
be  brought  in  by  a  bill  in  the  nature  of  a  supplemental  bill, 
which,  however,  is  considered  merely  supplemental  as  to  the 
other  defendants.^ 

§  191.  Frame  of  a  Bill  in  the  Nature  of  a  Supplemental  Bill.  — 
A  bill  in  the  nature    of   a   supplemental    bill  ""  must    state   the 

35  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  eil.)  1006,  Tappan  v.  Smith,  5  Biss.  73.       But  .«ee 

1(JG7.  Hoxie  v.  Carr,  1  Sumner,  173;  Sedgwick 

§100.     1  Mitford's   PI.    ch.    1,    §    3;  r.  Cleveland,  7  Paige  (N.  Y.),  200. 
Campbell  v.  New  York,  35  Fed.  R.  14 ;  ^  White  on  Supplement  and  Bevivor, 

Tappan  r.  Smith,  5   Biss.  73.      But  see  120,  174;  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.) 

Secor  V.  Singleton,  41  Fed.  B.  725,  720.  10G7. 

'^  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1685;  ^  United   States  v.  Fields,  4   Blatchf. 

Mitford's  PI.  ch.  1,  §  3.  326 ;  Crowfoot  v.  Mander,  9  Simons,  396; 

3  Daniells  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1607;  Ashee   v.   Shipley,   Mad.   &    Geld.   2U6; 

Campbell  v.  New   York,  35  Fed.  K.  14;  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1073. 


§  192.]        BILLS   IN   THE    NATURE   OF   SUPPLEMENTAL   BILLS.  319 

original  bill,  the  proceedings  upon  it,  the  event  which  has  deter- 
mined the  interest  of  the  party  by  or  against  whom  the  former 
bill  was  exhibited,  and  the  manner  in  which  the  property  has 
vested  in  the  person  become  entitled.  It  must  then  show  the 
ground  upon  which  the  court  ought  to  grant  the  benefit  of  the 
former  suit  to  or  against  the  person  so  become  entitled,  and  pray 
the  decree  of  the  court  adapted  to  the  case  of  the  plaintiff  in  the 
new  bill."  ^  It  will  not  be  impertinent  for  it  to  restate  allega- 
tions of  the  bill  or  answer  in  the  original  suit,  nor  to  charge 
new  matter  which  occurred  before  the  original  bill  was  filed,  for 
the  purpose  of  meeting  a  defense  in  the  original  answer.^  But 
a  bill  in  the  nature  of  a  supplemental  bill  need  contain  no  more 
of  the  allegations  in  the  original  bill  than  suffices  to  show  a 
cause  of  action  against  the  defendants  to  it.^  Otherwise,  its  form 
should  be,  as  far  as  possible,  in  comj)liance  with  that  of  an  origi- 
nal bill.  If,  however,  its  object  be  merely  to  obtain  the  benefit  of 
the  proceedings  in  the  original  suit,  the  want  of  the  difference  of 
citizenship  necessary  to  support  an  independent  original  bill  will 
not  deprive  the  court  of  jurisdiction  of  it,  provided  the  first  suit 
were  properly  brought.* 

§  192.  Proceedings  upon  Bills  in  the  Nature  of  Supplemental 
Bills.  —  A  bill  in  the  nature  of  a  supi)lemental  bill  is  filed  in  the 
same  manner  as  a  supplemental  bill,  and  the  same  rule  governs 
the  time  of  the  filing  of  pleadings  to  it.^  Otherwise,  proceedings 
upon  bills  in  the  nature  of  supplemental  bills  resemble  those 
upon  indei)cndent  original  bills.^  According  to  Lord  Rcdesdale, 
"•a  new  defense  may  be  made;  the  pleadings  and  depositions 
cannot  be  used  in  the  same  manner  as  if  filed  or  taken  in  the 
same  cause ;  and  the  decree,  if  any  has  been  obtained,  is  no 
otherwise  of  advantage  than  as  it  may  be  an  inducement  to  the 
court  to  make  a  similar  decree."^  As  has  been  remarked  by 
Lord  Eldon,  this  passage  contains  an  obscurity  of  language  whicli 
is  due  to  an  obscurity  in  the  subject."*  But  the  probable  meaning 
and  the  view  of  the  matter  best  supported  by  authority  is,  that 

§  191.  1  Mitford's  PI.  ch.  1,  §  .3.  *  Minnesota   Co.   i'.   St.   Paul   Co.,   2 

'  Woods  V.  Woods,   10  Simons,   197 ;  Wall.  COO. 
Attorney-General  r.  Foster,  2  Hare,  81  ;  §  102.    i  Rule  57.     See  §  189. 

Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1667,  1008.  -^  Mexican  Ore  Co.  v.  Me.xican  Guada- 

3  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed)  107;")-  liipe  Mininn:  Co.,  47  Fed.  R.  351,  350. 
1677;  Vigers  v.  Lord  Audley,  9  Simons,  ^  Mitford's  PI.  ch.  1,  §  3. 

72.  4  Lloyd  v.  Johnes.  9  Ves.  37,  56. 


320  BILLS    OF    KEVIVOR,   ETC.  [CHAP.  XIV. 

upon  the  filing  of  what  is  called  a  bill  in  the  nature  of  a  supple- 
mental bill,  no  further  benefit  of  the  proceeduigs  ui  the  onpnal 
suit  can  be  obtained  than  would  be  if  it  were  styled  merely  an 
original  bill;  and  the  admission  of  the  evidence  and  admissions 
and  the  benefit  of  the  decree  in  the  former  suit  will  only  be 
allowed  when  the  parties  to  the  second  are  in  privity  with  those 
to  the  first  suit.^ 

6  Daniell's  Cb.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1685-1688. 


§  195.]  MOTIONS   OF   COURSE.  321 


CHAPTER   XV. 

INTERLOCUTORY   APPLICATIONS   AND   PETITIONS. 

§  193.  Definition  and  Classification  of  Interlocutory  Applications. 
—  An  interlocutory  application  is  a  request,  not  incorporated  in 
a  bill,  made  to  the  court  for  its  interference  in  a  matter  arising  in 
a  cause  either  before  or  after  a  decree.  An  interlocutory  appli- 
cation is  made  by  motion  on  petition. 

§  194.  Definition  and  Classification  of  Motions.  —  A  motion  has 
been  defined  as  "  an  application  either  by  a  party  or  his  coun- 
sel, not  founded  upon  any  written  statement  addressed  to  the 
court."  ^  But  the  rules  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States  provide  that  "  all  motions  hereafter  made  to  the  court 
shall  be  reduced  to  writing,  and  shall  contain  a  brief  statement 
of  the  facts  and  objects  of  the  motion."  "^  And  most  motions 
are  supported  by  affidavits.  Motions  are  either  of  course  or 
special.     Special  motions  are  either  ex  parte  or  upon  notice. 

§  195.  Motions  of  Course.  —  Motions  of  course  are  those  which, 
by  some  rule  or  practice  of  the  court,  are  invariably  granted  with- 
out notice,  and  to  which  no  opposition  is  allowed. ^  In  Federal 
equity  practice,  the  term  is  usually  confined  to  such  motions  as 
are  granted  as  of  course  by  the  clerk  without  the  intervention 
of  a  judge  of  the  court.^  The  equity  rules  provide  that  "  all 
motions  and  applications  in  the  clerk's  office  for  the  issuing  of 
mesne  process  and  final  process  to  enforce  and  execute  decrees ; 
for  filing  bills,  answers,  pleas,  demurrers,  and  other  pleadings  ; 
for  making  amendments  to  bills  and  answers  ;  for  taking  bills  pro 
confesso  ;  for  filing  exceptions  ;  and  for  other  proceedings  in  the 
clerk's  office  which  do  not  by  the  rules  hereinafter  prescribed 
require  any  allowance  or  order  of  the  court,  or  of  any  judge 
thereof,  shall  be  deemed  motions  and  applications  grantable  of 

§194.    1  Danioll's  Ch.  Pr.  (2(1  Am.  ed.)  §195.   i  Danicll's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Ani.ed.) 

1787.     See  tlie  language  of  Folger,  J.,  in  1599:  United  States  v.  Parrott,  1  McAll. 

Shaft  V.  PhcEiii.x  ]\Iutual  Life  Ins.  Co.,  67  447,  454. 
N.  Y.  544,  547.  2  Robinson  v.  Satterlee,  3  Saw.  134, 

^  Supreme  Court  Rule  6.  141. 

A'OL.  I.  —  21 


322  INTERLOCUTORY    APPLICATIONS    AND    PETITIONS.       [CHAP.  XV. 

course  by  the  clerk  of  the  court.  But  the  same  ma}^  be  sus- 
pended, or  altered,  or  rescinded  by  any  judge  of  the  court,  upon 
special  cause  shown."  ^  The  order  dismissing  a  bill  for  an  omis- 
sion to  duly  file  a  replication  is  an  order  as  of  course.'*  It  has 
been  held  that  an  order  for  the  issue  of  a  commission  is  not.^ 
"  The  clerk's  office  shall  be  open,  and  the  clerk  shall  be  in  at- 
tendance therein,  on  the  first  Monday  of  every  month,  for  the 
purpose  of  receiving,  entering,  entertaining,  and  disj)Osing  of  all 
motions,  rules,  orders,  and  other  pioceedings,  which  are  grantable 
of  course  and  applied  for,  or  had  by  the  parties  or  their  solici- 
tors, in  all  causes  pending  in  equity,  in  pursuance  of  the  rules 
hereby  prescribed."  ^  ''  All  motions,  rules,  orders,  and  other  pro- 
ceedings made  and  directed  at  chambers,  or  on  rule-days  at  the 
clerk's  office,  whether  special  or  of  course,  shall  be  entered  by  the 
clerk  in  an  order  book,  to  be  kept  at  the  clerk's  office,  on  the 
day  when  they  are  made  and  directed,  which  book  shall  be  open 
at  all  office  hours  to  the  free  inspection  of  the  parties  in  any  suit 
in  equity,  and  their  solicitors.  And,  except  in  cases  where  per- 
sonal or  other  notice  is  specially  required  or  directed,  such  entry 
in  the  order-book  shall  be  deemed  sufficient  notice  to  the  parties 
and  their  solicitors,  without  further  service  thereof,  of  all  orders, 
rules,  acts,  notices,  and  other  proceedings  entered  in  such  order- 
book,  touching  any  and  all  tlie  matters  in  the  suits  to  and  in 
which  they  are  parties  and  solicitors." " 

§  196.  Special  Motions  without  Notice.  —  A  special  motion  is  a 
motion  which  can  only  l)e  granted  by  a  judge  of  the  court  under 
special  circumstances  or  in  his  discretion. ^  Such  motions  are 
either  upon  notice  or  without  notice.  Orders  granted  upon 
motions  without  notice  are  said  to  be  ex  farte  ;  and  the  same 
term  is  applied  to  the  motions  upon  which  they  are  granted. 
An  ex  parte  special  motion  must  be  supported  by  an  affidavit.^ 
Ex  parte  special  motions  are  not  common.^  They  are  usually 
granted  to  prevent  some  irreparable  injurj^  to  the  moving  party 
which  would  otherwise  occur  within   the  time  limited  for  notice, 

3  Kule  5.  1789;  United  States  r.  Parrott,  1  McAU. 

*  Robinson  v.  Satterlce,  3  Saw.  131,  447,  454. 

141.  -  Daniell's  Cli.  Tr.  (2d  Am.  cd.)  1789. 

'  United   States  v.  Parrott,  1   McAll.  ^  McLean  v.  The  Lafayette   Bank,  3 

447.  McLean,  503;   United  States  v.  Parrott, 

6  Rule  2.  1    McAli..447;  Marshall    v.   Mellersh,    5 

1  Rule  4.  Peav.  496 ;   Grav  v.  Chicago,  la.  &  Neb- 

§  196.   1  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  R  R.  Co.,  1  Woolw.  63. 


§  196. J  SPECIAL   MOTIONS   WITHOUT   NOTICE.  323 

when  the  same  is  required  ;  and  tlie  court  should  alwa3's  lend  a 
willing  ear  to  an  application  to  discharge  or  set  aside  an  ex  'parte 
order.^  Writs  of  rie  extat  repuhlica  are  usually  granted  exparte.^ 
So  are  applications  for  extensions  of  time  to  plead,  or  take  other 
proceedings  in  a  cause.  The  equity  rules  provide  that  "  when- 
ever an  injunction  is  asked  for  by  the  bill  to  stay  proceedings  at 
law,  if  the  defendant  do  not  enter  his  appearance,  and  plead, 
demur,  or  answer  to  the  same  within  the  time  prescribed  there- 
for by  these  rules,  tlie  plaintiff  shall  be  entitled  as  of  course, 
upon  motion,  without  notice,  to  such  injunction.  But  special 
injunctions  shall  be  grantable  only  upon  due  notice  to  the  other 
paity  by  the  court  in  term,  or  by  a  judge  thereof  in  vacation, 
after  a  hearing,  which  may  be  ex  parte,  if  the  adverse  party  does 
not  appear  at  the  time  and  place  ordered.  In  every  case 
where  an  injunction  —  either  the  common  injunction  or  the  special 
injunction  —  is  awarded  in  vacation,  it  shall,  unless  previously 
dissolved  by  the  juilge  granting  the  same,  continue  until  the 
next  term  of  the  court,  or  until  it  is  dissolved  by  some  other 
order  of  the  court."  ^  The  Revised  Statutes,  however,  make  an 
exception  to  this  rule,  in  providing  tliat  "  whenever  notice  is 
given  of  a  motion  for  an  injunction  out  of  a  Circuit  or  District 
Court,  the  court  or  a  judge  thereof  may,  if  there  appears  to  be 
danger  of  irreparable  injury  fi'om  delay,  grant  an  order  restrain- 
ing the  act  sought  to  be  enjoined  until  the  decision  upon  the 
motion  ;  and  such  order  may  be  granted  with  or  without  secu- 
rity, in  the  discretion  of  the  court  or  judge."  "  The  rule  was, 
moreover,  thus  construed  by  Mr.  Justice  Miller  :  "  The  justices 
of  the  Supreme  Court  have  power  to  grant  injunctions  which  do 
not  expire  by  the  commencement  of  the  next  succeeding  term. 
To  injunctions  thus  granted,  the  latter  part'  of  the  rule  applies, 
namely, — that  they  continue  until  dissolved  by  some  other 
order  of  the  court.  To  injunctions  granted  by  the  judges  oi 
the  district  courts,  the  other  alternative  of  the  disjunctive  sen- 
tence applies,  merely  reiterating  the  provision  of  the  statute,  that 
they  continue  till  the  next  term  of  the  court,  unless  otherwise 
ordered  by   the  court."  ^     Ex  parte  orders  may  be   obtained  at 

*  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (•2(\  Am.  cd.)  1789,  "  Rule  55.    Seo  also  Yuengling  y.  John- 

1790  ;  Isiiard  v.  Cazeaux,  1  Paiiie  (N.  Y.),  son,  1  Iltigrlies,  607. 
39 ;  Hart  v.  Small,  4  Paige  (N.  Y.),  551.  '  U.  S.  11.  S.  §  718. 

5  Collinsoii  V. ,  18  Vcs.  8-5:] ;  Dan-  ^  gray  v.  Chicago,  la.  &  Neb.  R.  R.  Co., 

iell's  Ch.  Pr.  ('id  Am.  ed.)  1789,  1937.  1  Woolw.  03,  08. 


324  INTERLOCUTORY    APPLICATIONS    AND    PETITIONS.      [CIIAP.  XV. 

any  time  and  in  any  place  within   the  jurisdiction  of  tlie  judge, 
whether  in  court  or  elsewhere.^ 

§  197.  Notice  of  Motion.  —  The  equity  rules  provide  that  "  all 
motions  for  rules  or  orders  and  other  proceedings,  which  are  not 
grantable  of  course  or  without  notice,  shall,  unless  a  different 
time  be  assigned  by  a  judge  of  the  court,  be  made  on  a  rule-day, 
and  entered  in  the  order-book,  and  shall  be  heard  at  the  rule-day 
next  after  that  on  which  the  motion  is  made.  And  if  the  adverse 
party,  or  his  solicitoi',  shall  not  then  appear,  or  shall  not  show 
good  cause  against  the  same,  the  motion  may  be  heard  by  any 
judge  of  the  court  ex  parte,  and  granted,  as  if  not  objected  to,  or 
refused,  in  his  discretion."  ^  "  Any  judge  of  the  Circuit  Court,  as 
well  in  vacation  as  in  term,  may,  at  chambers,  or  on  the  rule-days 
at  the  clerk's  office,  make  and  direct  all  such  interlocutory  orders, 
rules,  and  other  proceedings,  preparatory  to  the  hearing  of  all 
causes  upon  their  merits,  in  the  same  manner  and  with  the  same 
effect  as  the  Circuit  Court  could  make  and  direct  the  same  in 
term,  reasonable  notice  of  the  application  therefor  being  first 
given  to  the  adverse  party,  or  his  solicitor,  to  appear  and  show 
cause  to  the  contrary,  at  the  next  rule-day  thereafter,  unless  some 
other  time  is  assigned  by  the  judge  for  the  hearing."  ^  It  has 
been  held,  that  the  foregoing  rule  does  not  apply  to  a  motion 
made  in  term  and  in  the  presence  of  counsel  for  the  opposing 
side.^  "Except  in  cases  where  personal  or  other  notice  is  specially 
required  or  directed,  such  entry  in  the  order-book  shall  be  deemed 
sufficient  notice  to  the  parties  and  their  solicitors,  without  further 
service  thereof,  of  all  orders,  rules,  acts,  notices,  and  other  pro- 
ceedings, entered  in  such  order-book,  touching  any  and  all  mat- 
ters in  the  suits  to  and  in  which  they  are  parties  and  solicitors. 
And  notice  to  the  solicitors  shall  be  deemed  notice  to  the  parties 
for  whom  they  appear  and  whom  they  represent,  in  all  cases 
where  personal  notice  on  the  parties  is  not  otherwise  specially 
reciuired.  Where  the  solicitors  for  all  the  parties  in  a  suit 
reside  in  or  near  the  same  town  or  city,  the  judges  of  the  Cir- 
cuit Court  may,  by  rule,  abridge  the  time  for  notice  of  rules, 
orders,  or  other  proceedings  not  requiring  personal  service  on  the 
parties,  in  their  discretion."'*     This  subject  is  usually  regulated 

9  Danu'U's  Cli.  Tr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1789;  '^  McLean  v.  TIk-  Lafayette  Bank,  3 

Rule  3.  McLean,  503,  505. 
§  197.   »  Rule  6.  *  Rule  4. 

2  Rule  3. 


§  197.]  NOTICE   OF   MOTION-.  325 

by  rule  or  local  practice  differently  in  the  several  circuits.  In 
tlie  Circuit  Court  for  the  Southern  District  of  New  York,  four 
days'  notice  personally  served,  together  with  a  copy  of  the  hill 
and  of  the  affidavits  intended  to  be  used  in  support  of  the  motion, 
is  all  that  is  usually  required.^ 

x\ll  notices  of  motion  for  any  process  of  contempt  or  commit- 
ment must  be  served  personally  on  the  party  against  whom  the 
process  is  sought,^  except,  perhaps,  when  an  order  for  substituted 
.•service  has  been  previously  obtained.'^  In  England,  under  special 
circp.nistances,  notice  of  a  motion  could  be  made  upon  an  agent 
of  a  person  without  the  jurisdiction.^ 

A  notice  of  motion  should  be  properly  entitled  in  the  cause  or 
matter  in  which  it  is  made.^  It  should  be  addressed  to  the  soli- 
citor of  the  party  intended  to  be  affected  by  it,  or  to  the  party 
himself  when  he  ap])ears  in  person  or  personal  service  is  intended. 
It  should  be  dated, '"^  and  signed  by  the  solicitor  for  the  moving 
party,  or  by  that  party  himself  if  he  appear  in  person. ^^  It  lias 
been  held  in  New  York  that  a  notice  signed  in  person  by  a  defend- 
ant who  has  previously  appeared  by  a  solicitor  who  has  not  been 
removed  is  irregular.^^  A  iiotice  of  motion  should  state  the  day, 
place,  and  hour  at  which  the  motion  will  be  made.^*^  It  is  usual, 
however,  to  designate  the  hour  by  the  expression  "at  the  open- 
ing of  the  court  on  that  da}^"  and  to  add  the  words  "  or  as  soon 
thereafter  as  counsel  can  be  heard."  ^*  Where  the  motion  can 
be  made  only  by  leave  of  the  court,  the  notice  ought  to  mention 
that  it  is  so  made  ;  or,  otherwise,  it  seems  that  it  may  be  disre- 
garded.^^     Where  the  object  of  the   motion  is  to  discharge  an 

5  See  Rule  105  of  the  Rules  of   the  i'^  Barbour's  Ch.   Pr.  570  ;    Moody  r. 

U.  S.  C.  C.  for  the  Southern  District  of  Hebberd,    11    Jur.   941  ;    Hutcliinson   v. 

New  York.  Horner,  9  Jur.  615  ;  Parker  v.  Francis,  9 

«  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1794  ;  Jur.  616,  note. 

Gray  v.  Chicago,  la.  &  Neb.  R.  R.  Co.,  1  "  Barbour's    Ch.    Pr.    570  ;    Perry  v. 

Woolw.  63.  Walker,  4  Beav.  452. 

7  Hope  V.  Hope,  4  De  G.,  M.  &  G.  328.  i-  Halsey  v.  Carter,  6  Robertson  (N.  Y.), 

8  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr  (2d  Am.  ed  )  1794;  535;  AVebb  v.  Dill,  18  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.) 
Hope  V.  Hope.  4  De  G.,  M.  &  G.  328 ;  204. 

Cooper  V.  Wood,  5  Beav.  391;   Pulteney  *^  Barbour's  Ch.  Pr.  570;   Bodwell  v. 

V.   Shelton,   5  Ves.  147  ;   Hunt  v.  Lever,  Willco.x,  2   Caines  (N.  Y.),  104  ;  Anon., 

5  Ves.  147  ;  and  §  96.  1  J.  R.  (N.  Y.)  143. 

9  Barbour's  Ch.  Pr.  570  ;  Rowlatt  v..  "  Barbour's  Cii.  Pr.  570 ;  In  re  Electric 
Catteli,  2  Hare,   180  ;    Salomon  v.  Stal-  Tel.  Co.  of  Ireland,  10  W.  R.  4. 

man,  4  Beav.   243;   Davis  v.  Barrett,  7         '^  Hill  i-.  Rimell,  8  Simons,  0-32  ;  Jack- 
Beav.  171;   Morrall  r.  Prichard,  11  Jur.     lin  v.  Wilkins,  0  Beav  007. 
(X.  s)  969. 


326  INTERLOCUTORY    APPLICATIONS   AND    PETITIONS.       [CHAP.  XV. 

order  for  irregularity,  it  is  usual  for  the  notice  to  state  the 
ground  of  the  application.^*^  It  is  usual  for  the  nutice  also  to 
state  before  what  judge  the  motion  will  be  made;  and  to  specify 
the  affidavits  and  other  documents  which  will  be  used  in  its  sujj- 
port.i"  The  notice  must  state  clearly  the  terms  of  the  oi'der 
which  will  be  asked  for,  and  everything  which  the  jiarty  would 
have  should  be  expressed ;  as  the  court  will  not  extend  the  order 
beyond  the  notice. ^'^  For  this  reason,  it  is  usual  to  add  a  notice 
of  a  motion  for  general  relief;  that  is, "  for  such  other  or  further 
order  or  relief  as  to  the  court  shall  seem  just;"  under  which,  other 
.relief  germane  to  tliat,  a  motion  for  which  has  been  specifically 
noticed,  may  be  granted. ^^  A  general  appearance  and  consent  to 
an  adjourmnent  waives  a  defect  in  a  notice  of  motion.^*^  It  has 
been  held  that  on  the  hearing  of  a  motion  for  the  production  of 
])apers  under  a  subpana  duces  tecum  coupled  with  a  prayer  for 
general  relief,  if  the  other  party  appears  by  counsel,  an  order 
may  be  granted  committing  him,  or,  if  a  corporation,  committing 
its  officers,  for  contempt  for  disobedience  to  tlie  subjjoena.^^  It 
has  been  held  that  a  motion  for  the  appointment  of  a  receiver 
cannot  be  made  at  the  hearing,  ujton  a  motion  for  an  injunction 
against  an  interference  with  a  raih'oad  claimed  to  be  in  the  pos- 
session of  the  moving  party .^^  "  A  motion  to  supress  depositions 
brings  up  the  regularity  of  an  ex  parte  order  directing  them  to  be 
taken,  as  well  as  the  competency  of  the  witnesses  examined,  if 
the  party  moving  to  su])press  has  never  done  anything  to  waive 
the  objection."  -^ 

A  motion  may  l)e  made  by  any  party  to  a  cause  except  one 
who  is  in  contempt.-^  A  party  in  contempt  cannot  move  for  any 
other  purpose  than  to  discharge  the  contempt  proceedings,^'  or  to 
expunge  scandal  from  the  i-ecord.-*^  And  it  has  been  said  that, 
in  such  cases,  he  should  aj)j»ly  by  petition.-'     Xo  one  should  join 

i«  Brown  r.  -Robertson,  2  Pliil.  17?. ;  Al-  "  St.  L.  K.  C.  &  C.  I?y.  Co.  v.  Dewees, 

exander  i'.  Esten,  1  Caines  (N.  Y),  1.5'2;  2?,  Fed.  R.  GUI. 

Jackson  v.  Sides,  1  Cowen  (N.  Y.),  184.  '^'-^  Mr.   Justice    Bradley    in    Eslava   v. 

1"  Daniell's  Cli.  I'r.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  179.'};  Mazanfie,  1  Woods,  02:;,  027. 

Clement   v.    Grittith.    C     P.    Coop.    470,  -*  Daniell's  Cli.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed  )  1787 ; 

Brown  v.  Ricketts  2  .1   Cli.  (N.  Y.)  425.  Nidiol.son  '•.  Squire,  10  Ves.  259,  200. 

'!^  Barbour's    Ch.    Pr.    570;    Mann    i:  -^  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  554- 

Kinfi.  18  Ves    29?  5.W.  17H7;  Anon.,  5  Ves.  050 

'■'  Barbour's  (^h.  Pr.  570.  -"  Everett  v.   Prytlierfjcli,   12   Simons, 

2"  Marye  v.  Strouse,  0  Sawyer.  204.  303. 

2'   Edison  Electrir   Lisrlit  <'o    /■    I'    S.  ■-'  I^nrd  Eldon  in  Nie.'liolson   r.  Squire, 

Electric  Lighting  Co.,  44  Eed.  K.  2'J4,  oOO.  10  Ves.  2.5',t,  200. 


§   198.]  ARGUMENT   OF   MOTIONS.  327 

in  a  notice  iov  a  motion  in  wliich  he  is  not  directly  interested.^^ 
The  joinder  of  one  disinterested  party  with  otliers  who  liad  an 
interest  was  held  in  England  a  sulHcicnt  reason  for  refusing  the 
whole  niotion.^^  A  motion  in  the  course  of  proceedings  under  an 
information  cannot  be  made  on  behalf  of  the  relators,  but  only  on 
behalf  of  the  attorney-general  or  district  attorney z^*^  Where  it 
is  clearly  for  the  interest  of  a  person  under  a  disability  to  make 
a  motion,  and  he  has  no  next  friend,  or  his  next  friend  refuses  to 
do  so,  a  next  friend  for  the  purposes  of  the  application  may 
move  on  his  behalf.^^ 

A  number  of  objects  not  inconsistent  with  each  other,  and 
even  inconsistent  objects,  if  prayed  for  in  the  alternative,  may 
be  included  in  the  same  notice  and  motion.^^  The  court  will 
discourage  when  directing  as  to  costs  the  making  of  separate 
motions  for  objects  which  might  have  been  conveniently  obtained 
by  a  single  application. -"^^ 

§  198.  Argument  of  Motions.  —  The  maimer  of  bringing  motions 
to  a  hearing  is  regulated  by  local  rule  or  usage  differently  in 
the  different  circuits.  Lord  Campbell  has  thus  described  the 
former  English  practice,  which  was  abolished  by  Lord  Mansfield, 
whose  rules  for  the  hearing  of  motions  at  common  law  were  fol- 
lowed by  the  Court  of  Chancery  :  "  Day  by  day  during  the  term, 
each  counsel  when  called  upon  had  been  accustomed  to  make  as 
many  motions  successively  and  continuously  as  he  pleased.  The 
consequence  was,  that  by  the  time  the  Attorney  and  Solicitor- 
General,  and  two  or  three  other  Dons,  had  exhausted  their 
motions,  the  hour  had  arrived  for  the  adjournment ;  and  as  the 
counsel  of  highest  rank  was  again  called  to  at  the  sitting  of  the 
court  next  morning,  juniors  had  no  opportunity  of  making  any 
motions  with  which  they  might  be  intrusted  till  the  last  day  of 
term,  when  it  was  usual,  as  a  fruitless  compliment  to  them,  to 
begin  with  the  back  row,  —  after  the  time  had  passed  by  when 
their  motions  could  be  made  with  any  benefit  to  their  clients. 
The  consequence  was,  that  young  men  of  promise  were  unduly 
depressed,  and  more  briefs  were  brought  to  the  leaders  than  there 

28  Dauiell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1793;     Guy  v.   Guy,   2  Beav.  460;    Furtado  v. 
FoUand  v.  Latnotte,  10  Simons,  48G,  Furtado,  6  Jur.  227. 

29  Folland  v.  Lamotte,  10  Simons,  486.         ^-  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1792, 
3*  Attorney-General  v.  Wriglit,  3  Beav.     1703. 

447.  '  3.'i  Hawke  v.  Kemp,  3  Beav.  288. 

31  Cox  r.   Wriglit,  9  Jur.   (n.  s.)  981; 


328  INTEKLOCUTORY    APPLICATIONS    AND   PETITIONS.       [CHAP.  XV. 

was  time  for  them  to  read,  even  had  they  been  toiling  all  night 
at  their  chambers  instead  of  sitting  np  in  the  House  of  Commons, 
absorbed  in  party  struggles.  Thus  the  interests  of  the  suitors 
were  in  danger  of  being  neglected,  and  the  judges  did  not  receive 
the  fair  assistance  from  the  bar  in  coming  to  a  right  conclusion 
which  they  were  entitled  to  expect.  To  remedy  these  evils,  a 
rule  was  made  that  the  counsel  should  only  make  one  motion 
a-piece  in  rotation ;  and  that  if  by  chance  the  court  rose  before 
the  whole  bar  had  been  gone  through,  the  motion  should  begin 
next  morning  with  him  whose  turn  it  was  to  move  at  the  adjourn- 
ment. The  business  was  thus  both  more  equally  distributed  and 
much  better  done."  ^  This  custom,  however,  if  it  ever  did  pre- 
vail, was  early  abolished  in  this  country  ;  and  here  usually  either 
no  method  is  observed,  and  motions  are  made  by  counsel  as 
they  catch  the  judge's  eye,  or  a  calendar  npon  which  motions  are 
placed  by  the  clerk  in  the  order  in  which  they  were  first  brought 
to  his  attention,  is  made  and  called.  In  the  Supreme  Court  of 
the  United  States  the  Attorney-General  and  the  Solicitor-General 
take  precedence. 

Wiien,  at  the  hearing  of  a  motion,  the  opposite  party  is  not 
represented,  proof  of  service  must  be  shown  by  entry  in  the 
order-book,  affidavit,  or  admission  ;  and  the  hearing  may  then 
proceed  ex  'parte?  When  the  moving  party  does  not  then  ap- 
pear, his  motion  will  be  dismissed.  When  both  sides  are  repre- 
sented, the  moving  party  has  the  right  of  opening  and  rc})lying.^ 
The  English  rule  was  that,  "in  injunction  cases,  where  upon  an 
order  to  dissolve  an  injunction  niu  the  plaintiff  shows  cause 
npon  the  merits  confessed  in  the  answer  ;  then  no  reply  is  al- 
lowed, the  motion  for  the  order  nhi  being  considered  as  the 
application,  to  which  the  plaintiff  answers  by  showing  cause 
upon  the  merits  ;  after  this,  the  defendant's  counsel  is  allowed  to 
argue  against  the  cause  shown  by  the  plaintiff,  and  this  is  con- 
sidered as  the  reply."  '^  As  a  general  rule,  no  person  can  be 
heard  in  support  of  a  motion  unless  he  has  been  oxie  of  the  par- 
ties who  gave  notice  of  it.''  But  when  the  object  of  a  motion  is 
to  reverse  the  conclusion  of  a  master,  it  seems  that  all  persons 

§  198.  1  CamplK'H's  Lives  of  the  Cliicf  »  DanicH's  CIi.  Pr.  (2(1  Am.  ed.)  1799. 

Justices,  ch.  xxxiv.   pp    ;]98.   399.     See  ■»  Daiiiell's  Cli.  Pr.  (2(1  Am.  ed.)  1799. 

also  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1797.  ■'  Stnl)bs  i-  Sargon,  .3  Beav.  408;  Dan- 

■■i  Rule  G.  iell's  Ch   Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1793. 


§  199.]  PETITIONS    IN    GENERAL.  329 

interested  in  the  master's  report  are  entitled  to  be  heard  in  its  sup- 
port.^ At  the  hearing,  if  the  English  practice  slionld  be  followed, 
any  affidavit  might  be  read  by  either  party  that  hud  been  filed  in 
the  clerk's  office  before  the  iiearing.  If  an  affidavit  were  filed 
too  late  for  the  other  side  to  take  a  copy  of  it,  or  to  obtain  an 
affidavit  controverting  facts  stated  in  it,  that  was  a  ground  for 
moving  to  postpone  the  hearing.  No  affidavit  filed  previous  to 
the  entry  of  the  motion  could  be  used  by  the  moving  party,  un- 
less he  had  in  his  notice  of  motion  stated  specifically  that  he 
intended  to  use  it.  A  separate  notice  to  that  effect,  if  served  a 
reasonable  time  before  the  hearing  of  the  motion,  would,  liow- 
ever,  probably  be  sufficient."  This  subject  is,  however,  by  local 
rule  t)r  custom  regulated  differently  in  the  different  circuits. 
Where  an  order  is  made  by  which  a  particular  act  is  to  be  done, 
unless  the  other  party  shall  within,  or  rather,  as  is  the  usual 
American  custom,  at  a  certain  time,  show  cause  to  the  contrary  ; 
which  order  is  called  in  England  an  order  nisi,  in  the  United 
States  usually  an  order  to  show  cause ;  the  party  obtaining  it 
must,  on  the  return-day,  move  for  another  order  "  to  confirm 
the  previous  order  nisi  absolute."  Tlie  motion,  in  this  case, 
requires  no  notice,  but  the  application  must  be  supported  by  an 
affidavit  to  prove  due  service  of  the  order  nisi,  similar  to  the 
proof  of  service  of  a  notice  of  motion,  unless  a  different  mode  or 
time  of  service  be  directed  by  the  judge  granting  it.^  By  rule,  in 
the  Circuit  Court  for  the  Southern  District  of  New  York,  "  all 
special  motions,  in  reference  to  matters  of  practice,  may  be  made 
in  open  court,  or  before  a  judge  at  chambers."  ^ 

§  199.  Petitions  in  General.  —  A  petition  is  a  request  in  writing 
directed  to  the  judge  or  judges  of  the  court,  and  showing  some 
matter  or  cause  whereupon  the  petition  prays  some  direction  or 
order.i  It  may  be  made  by  one  who  is,  or  by  one  who  is  not, 
a  party  to  a  cause  pending  in  the  court.  Lord  Erskint>  said 
formerly :  "  I  do  not  find  tliat  there  are  any  precise  or  posi- 
tive boundaries  between  motions  and  petitions,  as  they  are  to 
be  ap})lied  to  carry  into  effect  decrees  and  orders,  so  as  to  ex- 
clude all  discretion  in  the  court  to  grant  or  refuse  them,  accord- 

/ 

6  Johnston  v.  Todd,  5  Beav.  394  ;  Dan-  «  Dnniell's  Ch  Pr.  (5th  Am.  ed.)  1593 

iell's  CU.  Pr.  (2(1  Am.  ed  )  1793.  "  U.  S.  C.  C,  S.  1).  N.  Y.     Kule  HI. 

"  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1797,  §  199.  i  2  Barbour's  Cli.  Pr.  579. 

1798. 


330  INTEKLOCUTORY    APPLICATIONS    AND    PETITIONS.       [^.HAP   XV. 

ing  to  circumstances  ;  but,  generally  speaking,  motions  which 
have  for  their  object  the  giving  effect  to  decree?  or  orders, 
should  be  confined  to  cases  wliere  the  order  which  is  to  be  made 
upon  the  motion  arises  out  of  recent  proceedings  upon  which 
there  is  no  doubt  ;  for  as  the  adverse  party  knows  nothing  but 
by  the  notice,  containing  only  the  name  of  the  cause  and  what 
is  prayed  of  the  court,  the  proceedings  ought  to  be  recent  and 
notorious,  so  as  that  the  adverse  party  may  be  su}i})0sed  to  be 
perfectly  conusant  of  all  the  steps  and  proceedings  in  the  cause, 
as  much  as  if,  at  a  greater  expense,  they  were  recited  in  the 
petition."  ^  But  petitions  are  now  rarely  filed  by  a  party  to  a 
cause,  since  any  relief  which  he  desires  can  usually  be  obtained 
equally  well  by  a  motion  supported  by  an  affidavit  containing 
the  allegations  which  would  be  necessary  in  a  petition.  Petitions 
are  usually  filed  by  some  person  not  a  party  in  order  to  obtain 
the  benefit  of  })roceedings  in  a  cause  pending  in  the  court,  or 
else  to  obtain  an  order  in  relation  to  some  matter  which  is  not 
the  subject  of  any  litigation  in  it.  Petitions  which  are  made 
in  a  cause  are  termed  cause  ])etitions.'^  The  most  common  in- 
stances of  cause  petitions  are  petitions  for  the  appointment  of  a 
next  friend,  petitions  of  intervention,  petitions  for  payment  out 
of  a  fund  in  the  hands  of  an  officer  of  the  court,  and  petitions  for 
leave  to  sue  a  receiver.  The  most  common  instances  of  petitions 
which  are  not  cause  petitions  are  petitions  for  the  appointment, 
removal,  or  resignation  of  a  trustee,  and  petitions  for  the  ap- 
pointment of  the  guardian  of  an  infant,  and  tlie  maintenance  of 
the  infant  out  of  his  jiroperty.  But  in  most,  if  not  all,  of  these 
cnses  the  ajiplication  can  also  be  made  Ity  motion,  unless  a  long 
statement  of  facts  is  needed  to  show  the  right  of  the  ajijilicant 
to  relief.^  After  a  decree  which  jturports  to  finally  dispose  of 
the  suit,  one  plaintiff  cannot  obtain  relief  against  another  by 
means  of  a  petition  setting  up  matters  which  could  not  have 
been  introduced  by  an  amended  or  suj))^lemental  bill  ;  at  least 
without  notice  to  the  party  ngainst  whom  he  seeks  relief.^  Ordi- 
narily, a  petition  cannot  be  presented  in  a  cause  before  the  bill 
has  been  filed.^     A  petition  for  leave  to  sue  in  forma  pauperis 

2  Lord   Sbipbrooke  v.   Lord    Flinchin-  ■*  Jones   v.   Roberts,   12   Simons,  189; 

brook,  18  Ves.  387,  393.     See,  liowever,  Barker  r.  Todd,  IT)  Fed    H.  2t>ri. 

Nicholson  v.  Squire,  16  Ves.  'JoO,  -im  °  Smith  v.  Woolfolk.  11')  U.  S.  143. 

=i  Daniel's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1801.  ^  ]):,nieU's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am   ed  )  180L 


§  200.]       PETITIONS   FOR   LEAVE    TO    SUE    IN    FORMA   PAUPERIS.        331 

is  an  exception  to  this  rule ;  and  in  an  extraordinary  case  a  stay- 
order  might  perhaps  be  granted  uj)un  a  jjctitiun  before  the  liling 
of  a  bill.'  The  ol)jection  that  a  party  who  has  proceeded  by  a 
petition  sliould  have  filed  a  cross-bill,  a  supplemental  bill,  or  a 
supplemental  answer,  is  too  late  when  not  taken  till  after  an 
answer  to  the  petition  and  a  decree  thereupon.^ 

§  200.  Petitions  for  Leave  to  Sue  in  forma  pauperis.  —  "  The 
right  to  sue  in  forma  pauperis  originated  in  the  statute  of  Hen. 
Vn.  This  and  the  subsequent  statute  of  Hen.  VUL  are  con- 
fined to  actions  in  the  courts  of  common  law,  and  do  not  extend 
to  defendants.  The  courts  of  equity  have  adopted  the  principle 
of  these  statutes,  and  proceeding  further,  have  extended  the  relief 
to  the  case  of  defendants."  ^  An  infant  may  sue  or  defend  in 
this  manner  2  in  equity,  but,  unless  so  authorized  by  State  statute, 
not  at  common  law.-'^  In  the  Southern  District  of  New  Yorlv,  it 
has  been  held  that  a  non-resident  may  sue  in  forma  pauperis  at 
common  law.*  A  party  may  take  an  appeal^  to  the  Supi'eme 
Court,  or  sue  out  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus  ^  there  in  forma  pauperis. 
A  person  suing  or  being  sued  in  a  representative  capacity  could 
not  obtain  an  order  of  this  character."  According  to  the  English 
practice,  the  person  desiring  permission  to  sue  or  defend  in  forma 
pauperis  was  obliged  to  present  a  petition  to  the  Master  of  the 
Rolls,  containing  a  short  statement  of  his  case  or  defense,  and  of 
the  proceedings,  if  any,  which  had  been  had  in  the  cause,  and 
praying  to  be  admitted  to  sue  in  forma  pauperis,  and  that  a  coun- 
sel and  solicitor  might  be  assigned  to  him.^  The  petition,  when 
filed  by  a  complainant,  had  to  be  accompanied  by  a  certificate 
signed  by  counsel  "  that  he  conceives  the  plaintiff  has  just  cause 
to  be  relieved  touching  the  matter  of  the  petition  for  which  he 
has  exhil)ited  his  bill;"  and  in  all  cases  by  the  affidavit  of  the 
party  himself  "  that  he  is  not  worth  in  all  the  world  the  sum  of 

^  Mnyor  of  London  v.  Bolt,  5  Ves  129  ;  «  Ilecknian  v  Mackey,  ?,2  Fed.  R.  574. 

Daniell's  Cli.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1801.  ^  ^ee  In  ?v  Mills,  135  U.  S.  263. 

8  Kelsey  v.  Hobby,  16  Pet.  269,  277 ;  ^  /,,  ,.^  jviiHg^  135  u.  S.  263. 

Coburn  I'.  Cedar  Valley  Coal  &  Land  Co.,  "  Oldfield    v.   Cobbett,    1    Phil.   61.3; 

138  U.  S.  196,  222.  Dnniell's  Cb.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed  )  44;  Anon., 

§  200.  1  Lord  Lyndbnrst  in  Oldfield  v.  1   Ves.  Jr.  409.     But  see   Tbompson    v. 

Cobbett,  1   Phil.  613,  61-5.     See  Ferguson  Thompson,  cifpii  in  1  Turner  &  V.  Chan. 

V.  Dent,  15  Fed.  R.  771.  Pr.  513;  Ferguson  v.  Dent,  15  Fed.  R. 

2  Ferguson  t\  Dent,  15  Fed.  R   771.  771. 

3  Rov  V   Louisville,  N.  O.  &  T.  U.  Co.,  «  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  46. 
34  Fed   R  276 


332  INTERLOCUTORY    APPLICATIONS    AND    PETITIONS.      [CHAP.  X"V. 

5^.  after  payment  of  his  just  debts,  his  wearing  apparel  and  the 
matters  in  question  in  the  cause  only  excepted."'  ^  When  the 
petition  was  approved,  the  Master  of  the  Rolls  underwrote  an 
order  admitting  the  petitioner  to  sue  or  defend  in  forma  pauperh, 
and  assigned  a  counsel  and  solicitor  to  act  on  his  behalf.^"  Such 
counsel  or  solicitor  could  not  refuse  so  to  act  unless  excused  by 
the  court  for  a  sufficient  reason. ^^  They  could  not  take  any  fee, 
profit,  or  reward  of  the  pauper  for  the  desijatch  of  business,  while 
the  cause  was  pending  and  the  party  continued  in.  forma  panperis, 
except  paupers'  fees,  which  were  twopence  a  sheet  for  the  labor 
of  copying.'^  Nor  could  any  agreement  be  made  for  the  payment 
of  any  recompense  afterwards. ^^  For  an  offence  in  either  of 
these  respects,  both  the  lawyer  and  the  client  were  guilty  of  con- 
tempt of  court ;  and  the  client  was  dispaupered,  and  forever 
dis(]ualified  from  suing  as  a  pauper  in  the  same  suit.^^  When 
it  was  made  to  appear  to  the  court  that  a  pauper  had  sold  or 
contracted  for  the  benefit  of  his  suit,  or  any  part  thereof,  while 
the  same  was  depending,  his  suit  was  dismissed  absolutely.^^ 
No  fees  except  paupers'  fees  could  be  collected  from  the  ))auper, 
nor  could  costs  be  decreed  against  him,!^  except  for  scandal.^' 
In  case  of  success,  however,  the  court  might  allow  him  full 
costs.  "  For  though  he  is  at  no  costs,  or  but  small  expense,  yet 
the  counsel  and  clerks  do  not  give  their  labor  to  the  defendant, 
but  to  tlie  pauper."  ^^  The  order  permitting  a  party  to  sue  or 
defend  in  forma  pauperis  had  to  be  served  upon  the  opposite 
party  as  soon  as  possible.  For  the  pauper  was  liable  for  all 
costs  decreed  against  him  before  the  service  of  the  order.^^  A 
party  could  be  dispaupered  for  improper  or  vexatious  conduct  in 
the  suit."^° 

§  201.  Petitions  of  Intervention.  —  A  petition  of  intervention 
is  filed  in  a  pending  cause  by  a  person  who  is  not  a  party  to  it; 
and  prays  permission  to  intervene   and  become   a  party,  either 

9  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  4G  ;  Scatclimer  v.  Foulkard.  1  Eq.  Cases  Abr. 

Wilkinson   v.   Helslier,  2  Brown    Ch.   C.  125. 

272.  iMiattray  !'.  Georfie,  16  Ves  2:>2.    Sec 

i'^  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  47.  also  Murphy  r.Oldis,  2  Molloy,  475  :  Kii^h- 

1'  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  47,48.  ardson  v.  Kichardson,  5  Paisie  (N.  Y.)  58 

12  Daniell's  Ch.  l^r.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  47.  i*  Scatclimer  v.  Foulkard,  1    Eq   Cases 

i'5  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr   (2d  Am.  ed.)  47.  Abr.   125:    Rattray   v.   Genr<re,    10    Ves. 

i«   Daniell's  Ch    Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  47.  232  :  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed  )  ¥J,  50. 

15  DMuiell's  ("h.  I'r    (2d  Am   ed.)  47.  i"  Ballard  i-.  Catling.  2  Keen,  mO. 

i«  Daniell's  Ch.   Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  49;  '-^o  VVagner  i-   Mears,  o  Simons,  127. 


§  201.]        •  PETITIONS   OF   INTERVENTION.  333 

]»l;iintiff  or  defendant.  The  general  rule  is  that  the  court  has 
no  j)o\ver  to  allow  a  stranger  to  a  cause  "to  be  heard  therehi 
either  by  petition  or  motion,  except  in  certain  cases  arising  from 
necessity,  as  where  tlie  pleadings  contain  scandal  against  a 
stranger,  or  where  a  stranger  purchases  the  subject  of  litigation 
pending  the  suit,  and  the  like."  ^  In  a  suit  brought  by  a  member 
of  a  class  on  behalf  of  himself  and  others  similarly  interested, 
another  member  of  the  class  who  desires  the  success  of  the  com- 
plainant ^  can  always  intervene,^  even  after  a  decree  for  a  sale, 
provided  there  has  been  no  distribution  of  the  assets,'*  upon  pay- 
ment of  his  share  of  the  costs,  expenses,  and  reasonable  counsel 
fees  which  have  been  previously  paid  or  incurred.^  Ordinarily, 
such  a  person  will  be  joined  as  plaintiff.  ■  If  he  is  citizen  of  the 
same  State  as  one  of  the  defendants,  that  will  not  in  most,  if  in  any 
cases,  deprive  the  court  of  jurisdiction.*^  If  there  should  ))e  any 
danger  that  it  would,  he  may  be  joined  as  a  defendant."  If  he 
intends  to  act  in  hostility  to  the  original  complainant,  the  court 
may,  in  its  discretion,  add  him  to  the  defendants.^ 

In  suits  brought  by  or  against  a  trustee,  or  otherwise  affecting 
trust  property,  the  beneficiaries  of  the  trust,  such  as  trusthold- 
ers,  will  frequently  be  allowed  to  intervene  for  the  purpose  of 
protecting  their  interests  ;  ^  but  ordinarily  the  right  to  intervene 
will  be  denied  them  in  the  absence  of  fraud,  neglect,  inability, 
collusion,  or  bad  faith  by  the  trustee.^'^     In  suits  brought  by  or 

§  201.   1  Mr.  Justice  Bradley  in  Aiidor-  5  Central  Railroad  );.  Pettiis,  113  U.  S. 

son  v.  J.icksonville,   P.  &  M.    K.   R.  Co.,  116;  Trustees   o.   Greenougli,    105  U.  S. 

2  Woods,  G28,  029.     See  also  Searles  i:  527. 

Jacksonville,     P.    &    M.    R.    R.    Co,    2  «  Stewart  y.  Dunliam,  115  U.  S.  61. 

Woods,  021,  025  ;  Shields  v.  Barrow,   17  "  Brown    v.    Piicific   Mail  S.  S.  Co  ,  5 

How.  l:]0,  145;  Bronson  i:  Railroad  Co.,  Blalclit'  525,  535. 

2    Black,    524;    Coleman    r.    Martin,    0  **  Galveston  R.  R.  r.  Cowdrey,  11  Wall. 

Blatclif.    119;    Drake    v.    Gooilridye,    0  450,  478 ;   Forhes  w.  Memphis,  El  Paso  & 

Blatchf.   151;    Page  v.    Holmes   Burglar  Pacific  II.  R.  Co.,  2  Woods,  32:!. 
Alarm  Tel  Co.,  ISBlatchf.  118.  !•  Williams  (•.  Morgan,  111    U.  S.  084; 

-  Forbes  y.  Memphis,  El  Paso  &  Pacific  Drew  >-.    Harman,  5  Price,  31 '.»;  Saviors 

R.  R.  Co.,  2  Woods,  323.  c.    Saviors,  3    Heisk.  (Tenn.)   525;   Bird- 

3  Ogilvie   V.   Kno.\   Ins.    Co.,  2    Black,  song   r.   Birdsong,  2   Head    (Tenn),  280; 

630;  s.  c.  22  How.   380;  Myers  r.  Venn.  Carter  v.  New   Orleans,   19  Fed.  R.  059  ; 

5  Wall.  205  ;  Er  parte  Jord'ui.  94   U.  S.  F.   L.  &  Tr.   Co.  v.  Mo.  I.  &  N.   Ry.   Co  , 

248;  First  Nat.  Ins.  Co.  r.  Salisbury.  130  21  Fed.  R.  204. 

Mass.  303;    Hallett   v.    H;illett,  2    Paige         "  Richards  r.  Che'^apeike  &  ().   R.  R. 

(N.    Y.),    432;    Leigh  r.  Thomas,  2   Ves.  Co.,  1  Hughes.  28,30  :   Ski<l<lv  r.  Atlantic 

Sen.  312  ;  Story's  Kq.  PI.  §  90.  M.  &  ().  R.  H.  Co.,  3    Hughes,  320,  350- 

■*  George  r.  St.  Louis  Cable  &  W.  Ry.  352  ;  per  Bond,  J.,  Hughes,  J.,  dissenting. 
Co.,  44  Fed.  R.  117. 


334  INTEKLOCUTOKY   APPLICATIONS   AND    PETITIONS.       [CHAl'.  XV.  . 

ag-ainst  a  corporation,  stockholders  may  be  allowed  to  intervene 
if  there  is  any  danger  of  their  being  injured  by  fraud,  neglect,  or 
collusion  on  the  part  of  the  officers ;  ^^  and  in  some  such  cases 
stockholders  have  been  allowed  to  file  an  answer  and  defend  the 
suit  in  the  name  of  the  corporation.^^  hi  the  absence  of  fraud, 
neglect,  or  collusion  by  the  officers  of  the  corporation,  stock- 
holders will  not  be  allowed  to  intervene  before  a  decree. ^^  New 
parties  can  always  intervene  by  the  consent  of  the  original  i)ar- 
ties.^^  Persons  interested  in  disputing  the  validity  of  a  patent 
have  been  allowed  to  move  to  set  aside  a  decree  recognizing  the 
validity  of  the  ])atcnt  entered  by  collusion  in  a  suit  to  which  they 
were  strangers.'^  But  such  persons  were  not  allowed  to  inter- 
vene in  a  suit  to  restrain  the  infringement  of  a  patent  when  they 
relied  upon  a  distinct  defense  not  raised  therein. ^"^ 

A  person  claiming  a  right  to  share  in  a  fund  in  court,  or  claim- 
ing the  title  to  property  in  the  hands  of  a  receiver,  is  usually 
allowed  to  intervene  j;ro  interesse  siio.^'  A  party  claiming  the 
e(|uitable  title  to  land  held  by  a  railway  company  of  which  the 
receiver  had  not  taken  possession,  and  which  was  exempted  from 
the  receivership  by  order,  and  not  otherwise  mentioned  in  the 
proceedings,  was  denied  leave  to  intervene  in  a  suit  to  foreclose 
a  mortgage  on  the  property  of  the  railroad. ^^  The  Attorney- 
General  of  the  United  States  may  intervene  for  the  lu'otection 
of  the  Federal  government  in  a  suit  between  two  States  affect- 
ing their  boundaries. ^^ 

A  petition  for  leave  to  intervene  should  describe  the  proceed- 
ings ill  the  cause  in  which  it  is  filed,  so  that  the  court  can  see 
the  nature  and  condition  of  the  suit.-*^     It  mav  also  contain  a 


11  Bavliss  r.  Lafhvette,  M.  &  B.  R.  Ry.  ^'''  Page  v.  Holmes  Burglar  Alarm  Tel. 

Co  ,  8  liiss.  19.;.       "  Co.,  18  Blatelif.  118  ;  s  c.  2  Fed.  R.  330  ; 

1-  Bronson  r.  La  Crosse  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  Coclirane  v.  Decner,  !t5  U.  S.  355 ;  Thomas 

2  Wall.  28.3.  H.  El.  Co.  v.  Sperry  Co  ,  46  Fed.  R.  75. 

1'*  Forbes  v.  Memphis  E.  P.  &  P.  H    R.  '''  See  Lord  Pelliam  v.  Duchess  of  New- 
Co.,  2  Woods,  32;;,  33.3.     For  a  peculiar  castle,   3  Swanston,   2'.t0  ;   Daniell's   Cli. 
case,  see   (>)ffin    v.   Cliattanoogu    Water  (2d  Am.  ed.)  12()3,  1270. 
&  Power  Co.,  44  Fed.  f)-)!).  '**  Cutting  v.  Florida  Ry.  &Nav.  Co.,  45 

"  Galveston  Railroad   r.  Cowdroy,  U  Fed.  R.  444. 

Wall.    459,  464;    French   v.  Gapen,    105  ^'■>  Florida    r.   Georgia,   17    IIow.   478; 

U.  S.  500,  525.  supra,  §  14. 

ij  Barker  v.  Todd.  15  Fed.  R.  265.  But  -'  Ransom  v.  Davis'  Adm'rs,   18  How. 

see  Washurn  Jvr   Moen  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Col-  295. 
well  Steel  Harl.  Feiu'c  Co  .  1  Fed.  R.  225; 
Cochrane  v.  Dt-eiier,  95  U    S.  355. 


§  1^02.]      FOKM  OF  rETrno>.'s  and  tkactice  upon  them.  335 

statement  of  the  petitioner's  view  of  the  case,  and  pray  in  addi- 
tion to  intervention  the  final  relief  which  he  desires.^^  A  paper 
termed  a  cross- bill,  if  otherwise  correct  in  form,  may  be  sustained 
as  a  petition  of  intervention.-^  If  any  of  the  original  parties  de- 
sires to  contest  the  petitioner's  right  to  intervene,  he  must  do  so 
specifically  at  the  hearing-  upon  the  petition.^^  Leave  to  intervene 
when  granted  should  be  given  by  order  ;  ^^  but  by  proceeding  with- 
out objection  an  omission  to  enter  such  an  order  will  be  waived.^^ 
After  intervention  the  new  parties  are  treated  to  all  intents  and 
purposes  as  if  they  had  been  original  jnirtics  to  the  suit.^^  Their 
citizenship,  if  tlic  suit  is  pending  in  a  Federal  court  at  the  time 
of  their  intervention,  docs  not  affect  the  jurisdiction.^"  If  the 
suit  is  then  pending  in  a  State  court,  in  a  proper  case  they  may 
remove  it.-^  ^i'hey  liave  the  right  to  appeal  from  the  final  decree, 
and  can  then  object  to  all  interlocutory  proceedings  taken  after 
tlieir  intervention.^^ 

§  202.  Form  of  Petitions  and  Practice  upon  Them.  —  A  petition 
sbould  be  properly  entitled  in  the  cause  in  wbich  it  is  presented, ^ 
When  not  a  cause  petition,  a  petition  is  entitled  "  In  the  matter 
of  the  application  of,"  &c.  The  petitioner,  if  not  a  party  to  a 
cause  in  which  the  petition  is  filed,  should  state  his  name,  resi- 
dence, and  description.^  A  petition  should  contain  no  scandal  or 
impertinence ;  for  which,  like  any  otlier  proceeding,  it  may  be 
referred.^  A  petition  need  not  be  signed  by  counsel  unless  it 
seeks  a  rehearing  or  an  appeal.*  Petitions  are  usually  signed  by 
the  pai'ty  making  them,  either  ])ers(mally  or  by  his  solicitor.^ 

''  Petitions  are  either  for  orders  of  course,  or  for  special  orders. 
Petitions  for  orders  of  course  are  fortliwith  granted,  without  any 
attendance  being  ordered  ;  if  they  are  for  special  matters  a  day 
is  appointed  for  hearing  them.  Most  things  which  may  be  moved 
for  of  course,  may  also  be  obtained,  as  of  course,  upon  petition."  ^ 

■21  French  v.  Gapen,  105  U.  S.  509,  519,  Fed.  R.  356.    But  !=ee  Town   Homoste.nd 

520.  Co  p.  Des  Moines  Nav.  &  R.  R.  Co  ,  8 

•■^■2  French  v.  Gapen,  10.')  U   S.  509,  519.  Fed.  R.  97. 

-3  French  v.  Gapen,  105  U.  S.  509,  525;  ^^  Ex  parte  Jordan,  94  U.  S.  248,  252; 

Myers  v.  Fenn,  5  Wall.  205.  Williams  v.  Morgan,  111  U.  S.  684. 

'-■'  For  ihe  form  of  an  order,  see  £'.r;7n!We  §  202.  ^  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am  ed.) 

Jordan,  94  U.  S.  248,  249.  1802. 

■^5  Myers  V.  Fenn,  5  Wall  205.  ^  Glazbrook  ;;.  Gillatt,  9  Beav.  492. 

■-"  French  r.  Gapen,  105  U.  S.  .509,  525.  3  Danieli's  CIi.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed  )   1803. 

•-"  Krippeiidorf  !•.  Hyde,  110  U.  S.  270,  «  Danieli's  Cli   Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed  )    1803, 

28.V284,  5  n.inieH's  Ch,  Pr,  (2d  Am,  ed.)  180:]. 

2«  Hack  r.  Ciiicago  &  G,  S,  Ry,  Co.,  23  «  Danieli's  Cii,   Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed,)  1802, 


336  INTERLOCUTORY   APPLICATIONS   AND    PETITIONS.       [CIIAP.  XV. 

All  petitions  which  are  for  matters  not  granted  as  of  course 
must  be  served  upon  all  parties  interested  in  the  matter  prayed 
for  in  them.  Service  is  made  substantially  in  the  same  way  and 
at  the  same  time  before  the  hearing  as  that  of  notices  of  motions.' 
If  actual,  and  not  constructive,  service  is  required,  it  seems  that 
it  must  be  made  by  delivering  a  copy  of  the  petition,  and  at  the 
same  time  showing  the  original  to  the  person  served,^  unless  tlie 
court  otherwise  directs. 

Objections  to  the  form  of  a  petition  can  only  be  taken  by  de- 
murrer.^ By  answering  a  respondent  loses  his  right  to  demur,^*^ 
and,  it  has  been  held,  waives  the  objections  that  the  petitioner 
bad  a  complete  and  adequate  remedy  at  law,^^  that  he  should 
have  proceeded  by  bill  instead  of  by  jietition;^-  and,  if  a  receiver, 
that  he  has  not  obtained  leave  to  sue.^^  Adverse  parties  may 
file  answers  denying  the  facts  stated  in  a  petition,  or  setting  up 
other  facts  in  avoidance.  Such  answers  should  be  verified  by 
affidavit.^*  If  the  parties  are  at  issue  as  to  the  facts,  accord- 
ing to  the  more  formal  practice  testimony  may  be  taken  as  in 
the  regidar  course  of  a  suit ;  ^^  but  the  more  usual  course  is  for 
the  parties  on  either  side  to  support  their  claim  by  affidavits,  in 
the  same  manner  as  when  supporting  or  opposing  a  motion. ^^ 
Proceedings  upon  the  hearing  of  petitions  are  similar  to  those 
upon  the  hearing  of  motions.^'  It  has  been  said  by  Daniell  that 
a  petition  cannot  be  amended  by  adding  to  it  a  statement  of  facts 
which  have  occurred  since  it  was  filed  ;  ^^  but  an  English  judge 
has  held  otherwise. ^^ 

§  203.  Orders.  —  An  order  IS  a  direction  of  the  court  or  a 
judge  thereof  in  writing.  Wiicn  contained  in  a  decree,  an  order 
is  termed  a  decretal  order. ^  Orders  may  be  made  at  any  place 
within  the  territorial  jurisdiction  of  the  court  ;  and  in  a  Circuit 
Court,  if  all  judges  authorized  to  sit  therein  are  absent  from 
the  circuit,  it  seems  that  they  may  be  made  by  a  justice  of  the 

7  Sec   Rules   .5  &(>;  DanieU's  Cli.  Pr.         i^  Mitford's  &  Tyler's  PI   448. 

(2.1  Am.  c(l.)  1804.  ^''  DanieU's  Cii.  I'r.  (otli  Am.  ed.)  1608 

»  DanieU's  Oh.    Pr   ('id  Am   ed  )  ISOi.  ''  DanieU's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1805. 

8  U.S.  11.  S  §  954 ;  .Vewnian  c.  Moody,  i**  DanieU's  Cli.  Pr.  (5Ui  Am.  ed.)  1010. 
19  Fed.  11.  858.                                            '  ''■>  .Malins,  V.   C.      In   re   Westbrook's 

i«  Newman  v.  Moody,  10  Fed.  R   8.-8.  Trusts,  L.  R.  11  Eq.  252. 
11  Newman  v.  Moody,  U)  Fed.  R.  858.  §  203      i  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  719.     See  Good- 
ie Newman  r   Moody,  19  Fed.  U.  858.  year   Dental    Vulcanite  Co.  v   Folsom,  3 
i-i  Newmnn  r.  MoodV.  P.i  Fed   R.  858.  Fed.  R.  509. 
1*  Mitford's  &  Tvler's  IM  448. 


§  203.]  ORDERS.  337 

Supreme  Court  sitting  anywhere  within  the  United  States.^  It 
has  been  held,  that  when  a  district  judge  has,  under  the  order 
of  the  circuit  judge,  tried  a  case  in  another  district  than  his  own, 
he  may  hear  in  his  own  district  a  motion  for  a  new  trial  when 
the  counsel  for  all  parties  waive  his  return  to  the  district  of  the 
trial  for  the  purpose  of  hearing  and  deciding  the  motion.^  Orders 
upon  interlocutory  applications  should  be  served  upon  the  solici- 
tor of  the  opposite  party.  If  the  other  party  takes  a  step  in  the 
action  after  an  ex  imrte  order  has  been  obtained  but  before  its 
service,  "  that  step  being  in  itself  regular,  the  order  which  had 
been  obtained  and  not  served  cannot  afterwards  be  acted  upon, 
if  it  will  interfere  with  the  step  so  taken."  *  If  it  is  intended  to 
enforce  the  order  by  contempt  proceedings,  it  should  be  served 
personally  upon  the  party  to  be  affected  by  it,-^  unless  possibly 
in  an  extraordinary  case  an  order  should  be  granted  allowing 
substituted  service.^ 

Interlocutory  orders  made  upon  motion  may  be  altered  or  va- 
cated at  any  time  ;'  and  orders  made  ex  parte  upon  petition  may 
also  be  discharged  upon  motion  for  irregularity.^  According  to 
the  English  practice,  orders  made  after  a  hearing  upon  a  peti- 
tion could  not  be  altered  or  discharged  without  the  filing  of  a 
petition  for  a  rehearing,  or  upon  appeal.^  A  court  has,  during 
the  term  at  which  it  is  entered,  the  power  to  review  and  mod- 
ify or  set  aside  any  order  or  decree,  interlocutory  or  final.^*^  It 
has  been  held  that  even  in  a  criminal  case  the  court  may  nunc 
pro  tunc  at  a  term  after  final  judgment  enter  an  order  correcting 
a  clerical  error  nunc  pro  tunc  as  of  the  preceding  term.^^  An 
order  granted  after  a  hearing  before  one  judge  of  a  court  will, 
unless  under  extraordinary  circumstances,  not  be  modified  or  va- 

2  United    States   v.   Louisville    &    P.  1807 ;  Eslava  v.  Mazange,  1  Woods,  623, 
Canal  Co.,  4  Dill.  601  ;  Searies   v.  Jack-  627;  Nelson  ;•.  Barker,  3  McLean,  370. 
sonville,   V.  &  M.  R.    R.   Co.,   2  Woods,  8  /„    re  Marrow,    Craitr,    &  I'M.  142  ; 
621  ;  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  71'J ;  8  Ry.  &  Corp.  L.  Daniell's  Cli.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1807. 

J.  200.  0  Bishop  v.    Willis,  2  Ves.   Sen.   113; 

3  Cheesman  v.  Hart,  42  Fed.  R.  98,  lOo.     In  re  Marrow,  Craiar  &  Ph.  142  ;  Daniell's 
<  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1789  ;     Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1808.     But  see  In  re 

Church  y.  Marsh,  2  Hare,  652.  Dovenhj'   Hospital.   1    Myl.    &   Cr.  279; 

6  Re  Cary,  10  Fed.  R.  622.  West  v.  Smith,  ?,  Reav.  306 

6  Hunter  (7. .  6  Simons,  420 ;  Lnr-  "  Doss  v.  Tyack.   14   How.  297,  313; 

ton  r.  Seaman,  9  Paige,    (N.    Y),    600;  Basset  ?•.  United   States,  9  Wall.  38,41; 

People  V.  Brower,  4  Paige  (N.  Y.),40-5;  Henderson   v.   Carbondaie  Coal  &   Coke 

Stafford  V.  Brown,  4  Paige  (N.  Y.),  360.  Co.,  140  U.  S.  2-5,  40. 

7  Daniel's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  eil.)   imO,         "  In  re  Wight,  134  U.  S.  136. 
VOL.   I,  —  22 


338  INTERLOCUTORY   APPLICATIONS    AND    PETITIONS.       [CHAP.  XV". 

cated  by  another  except  upon  appeal.^-  Unless  limited  by  their 
terms,  or,  as  in  the  case  of  injunctions  granted  by  district  judges, 
by  statute,^'^  orders  within  tlie  jurisdiction  of  the  judge  or  court 
that  grants  them  remain  in  force  until  discharged  by  a  subse- 
quent order  ;  i*  or  until  the  final  decree,  when,  unless  renewed 
by  its  terms,  all  orders  expire. ^^  Before  the  Evarts'  Act,  no  ap- 
peal lay  before  the  final  decree  from  an  interlocutory  order  which 
was  not  final  in  its  nature.^^  It  has  been  said  by  Chief  Justice 
Taney,  that  "  In  this  respect  tlie  practice  of  the  United  States 
chancery  courts  differs  from  the  English  practice.  For  appeals 
to  the  House  of  Lords  may  be  taken  from  an  interlocutory  order 
of  the  chancellor,  which  decides  a  right  of  property  in  dispute  ; 
and  therefore  there  is  no  irreparable  injury  to  the  part}'  by  order- 
ing his  deed  to  be  cancelled,  or  the  property  he  holds  to  l)e  deliv- 
ered up,  Ijecause  he  may  immediately  appeal,  and  the  execution  of 
the  order  is  suspended  until  the  decision  of  the  appellate  court. 
But  the  case  is  otherwise  in  the  coui'ts  of  the  Uuitcd  States,  where 
tlie  right  to  appeal  is  by  law  limited  to  final  decrees.  And  if  bv 
an  interlocutory  order  or  decree  he  is  required  to  deliver  up  prop- 
erty which  he  claims,  or  to  pay  money  which  he  denies  to  be  due, 
and  the  order  is  immediately  carried  into  execution  l)y  the  Cir- 
cuit Court,  his  right  of  appeal  is  of  very  little  value  to  him,  and 
he  may  be  ruined  before  he  is  permitted  to  avail  himself  of  the 
right.  It  is  exceedingly  important,  tlierefore,  that  the  Circuit 
Courts  of  the  United  States,  in  framing  their  interlocutory  or- 
ders, and  in  carrying  them  into  execution,  should  keep  in  view 
the  difference  between  the  riglit  of  appeal,  as  practised  in  the 
English  chancery  jurisdiction,  and  as  restricted  by  tlie  act  of 
Congress,  and  abstain  from  changing  unnccessai'ily  the  possession 
of  property,  or  compelling  the  i)ayincnt  of  money  by  an  inter- 
locutory order."  1"  By  the  Evarts'  Act  an  ajipeal  lies  to  the  Cir- 
cuit Court  of  Appeals  from  an  interlocutory  order  or  decree  grant- 
ing or  continuing  an  injunction. ^^ 

§  204.    Judges  who  may  grant  Orders.  —  An  order  may  be  made 
by  any  judge  authorized  to  sit  in  the  court  in  which  the  cause  is 

'-  Cole   Silver  Mininsr  Co.  v.  Virn;inia  ^■'  Gardner   r.    Gartlner.  87  N.    Y.  14  ; 

&  G.  II.  \V.  Co.,  1  Saw.  685,  689  ;  Oglcsby  DanicU's  Cli.  Pr.  (2(1  Am.  ed.)  H)02. 

V.  Attrill,  14  Fed.  R.  214.  ^'"'  See  i))frn,  Cliapter.s  on  Writ.s  of  Krror 

13  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  719;  Gray  r.  Chicago,  and  Appeals. 

I.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  1  Woolw.V)8.  1-  Forfiay  /•.  Conrad,  ('>  How.  201,  20-5. 

14  Eslava  c.  Mazange.l  Woods, 62-3,627.         is  26  St.  at  L.  cli.  517,  §  11,  p.  829. 


§  204.]  JUDGES  WHO  may  grant  orders.  839 

pending.  In  the  Supreme  Court  it  is  the  custom  for  each  justice 
to  refer  to  the  full  bench  every  application  of  importance  which 
is  made  to  him.^  An  order  in  a  case  pending  in  a  Circuit  Court 
may  be  made  by  the  justice  of  the  Supreme  Court  allotted  to  that 
circuit; 2  or  by  any  justice  of  the  Supreme  Court  requested,  in 
writing,  by  the  circuit  justice  to  hold  court  in  his  circuit ;  ^  or  if 
there  is  no  justice  of  the  Supreme  Court  allotted  to  that  circuit, 
by  any  justice  of  the  Supreme  Court  requested  by  the  Chief  Jus- 
tice to  hold  court  there  ;^  l)y  the  circuit  judge  of  that  circuit  ;^  by 
the  district  judge  of  that  district  ;'^  or  by  any  judge  authorized  to 
hold  the  District  Court  in  that  district ;'  or  by  any  two  of  those 
judges.*^ 

There  are  nine  circuits.^  The  first  circuit  includes  the  districts 
of  Rhode  Island,  Massachusetts,  New  Hampshire,  and  Maine. ^'^ 
The  second  circuit  includes  the  districts  of  Vermont,  Connecticut, 
and  New  York. ^^  The  third  circuit  includes  the  districts  of  Penn- 
sylvania, New  Jersey,  and  Delaware. ^^  The  fourth  circuit  includes 
the  districts  of  Maryland,  Virginia,  West  Virginia,  North  Carolina, 
and  South  Carolina.^-^  The  fifth  circuit  includes  the  districts  of 
Georgia,  Florida,  Alabama,  Mississippi,  Louisiana,  and  Texas. ^* 
The  sixtli  circuit  includes  the  districts  of  Ohio,  Michigan,  Ken- 
tucky, and  Tcuncssec.^^  The  seventh  circuit  includes  the  districts 
of  Indiana,  Illinois,  and  Wisconsin. i*^  The  eighth  circuit  includes 
the  districts  of  Arkansas,  Colorado,  Nebraska,  ^linnesota,  Iowa, 
Missouri,  Kansas,  North  Dakota,  South  Dakota,  and  Wyoming,^" 
and  the  Territories  of  New  Mexico,  Oklahoma,  and  Utah.^^  The 
ninth  circuit  includes  the  districts  of  California,  Oregon,  Nevada, 
Washington,  Montana,  and  Idaho,^^  and  the  Territories  of  Alaska 
and  xVrizona.^*^ 


§  204.    1  Spies  v.  Illinois,  123  U.  S.  VM.        "  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  604. 

2  U.  S.  R.  S.  §§  605,  606,  (iOO.  "  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  604. 

»  U.  S.  R.   S.  §  617.      See    Supervisors  is  u.  S   R.  S.  §  604. 

V.  Rogers,  7  Wall.  175.  i8  U.  S.  U.  S.  §  604. 

4  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  618.  1-  U.  S.  H.   S.  §  604  ;  25  St.  at  L.  ch. 

5  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  600.  180,  §  21  ;  26  St.  at  L.  cli.  664,  §  16,  p. 
G  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  609.  225. 

^  U.  S.  R.  S.  §§  591-003.  IS  26  St.  at  L.  cli.  517,  §  15,  p.  830  ;  1.39 

8  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  600.  U.  S.  707. 

9  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  604  ;  supra,  §  26.  ^'■>  U.  S.  R.   S.  §   604 ;  25  St.  at  L.  ch. 
If  U.  S.  K.  S.  §  604.  180,  §  21  ;  act  of  July  3,  1890;  26  St.  at 

11  U.  S.  R  S.  §  604.  L.  ch.  6.56,  §  16,  p  217. 

12  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  004.  2"  20  St.  at  L.  ch.  517,  §  15,  p.  830. 


340  INTERLOCUTORY   APPLICATIONS    AND    PETITIONS.       [CHAP.  XV. 

An  order  in  a  case  pending  in  a  District  Court  may  be  made 
by  the  judge  of  that  district ;  or,  if  such  office  is  vacant,  by  the 
judge  of  any  other  district  within  the  same  State  ;2^  in  case  of 
the  disability  of  the  district  judge  for  that  district,  or  such  an 
accumulation  or  urgency  of  business  as  to  make  the  public  inter- 
est require  his  appointment,  by  any  other  district  judge  within  the 
same  circuit  designated  and  appointed  after  a  certificate,  under 
the  court's  seal,  by  the  clerk  as  to  those  facts,  by  the  circuit  jus- 
tice or  circuit  judge  of  the  circuit,  or,  if  both  of  them  are  absent 
from  the  circuit  and  unable  to  make  such  designation  and  appoint- 
ment, by  the  Chief  Justice  of  the  United  States  ;2^  in  the  District 
Court  for  the  Northern  District  of  New  York,  when  the  judge 
thereof  is  disabled  and  so  notifies  the  judge  of  the  Southern  Dis- 
trict of  New  York,  by  the  latter  judge  ;23  in  the  District  Court 
for  the  Southern  District  of  New  York,  when  the  judge  thereof  is 
disabled  and  so  notifies  the  judge  of  the  Eastern  District,  by  the 
latter  judge;-'*  in  the  same  court,  by  the  judge  of  the  Eastern 
District  of  New  York,  whenever  the  judge  of  the  Southern  Dis- 
trict deems  it  desirable  on  account  of  the  pressure  of  public  busi- 
ness that  the  former  shall  perform  judicial  duties  in  his  district, 
and  has  entered  an  order  to  that  effect  ;2^  in  one  of  the  District 
Courts  of  Florida,  by  the  judge  of  the  other  district,  in  a  place 
where  a  term  of  such  court  is  I'cgularly  held,  when  the  judge  of 
the  district  has  filed  in  the  clerk's  office  a  certificate  stating  that 
he  is  disabled  to  hold  a  term  of  court  there,  and  requesting  the 
judge  of  the  other  district  to  hold  the  same.^'^'  An  order  made  by 
the  district  judge  of  another  district  in  the  same  State  who  was 
not  sitting  nor  designated  to  sit  in  the  district  where  the  suit  was 
ponding,  the  office  of  district  judge  of  the  latter  district  not  being- 
vacant,  was  held  null  and  void.'-^"  An  order  signed  by  a  judge 
after  his  successor  has  been  appointed  and  he  has  received  notice 
thereof  is  void.^^ 

-1  U  S.  K.  S.  cm  ;  Amorican   Lnnn  &  "■'  U.  S.  K.  S.  §  509. 

Trust  Co.  V.  Kast  &  West  H.  Co.,  40  Fed.  -*   U.  S.  H.  S.  §  5'.)(). 

R.  182.  ^-  U.  S.  K.  S.  §  600. 

22  U.  S.  R.  S  §Sj  .^ai-.WO.     The  appoint-  ^o  u.  S.  K.  S.  §  598. 

mcnt  should  be  filed  in  tlie  cleric's  office  ^t  Anierican  Loan  &  Trust  Co.  v.  East 

of  tlie  District,  nnt  of  the  Circuit  Court,  &  West  R.  Co.,  40  Fed.  R.  182. 

but  a  failure  to  file  the  same  does  not  in-  '-'**  U.  S.  r.  Alexander.  40  Fed.  R.  728; 

validate  the  judjie's  acts.     National  Home  Norton  r.  Shelby  County,  118  U.  S.  425. 

of  Disabled  Volunteers  v.  Rutler,  33  Fed.  But  see  Manning  v.  Weeks,  F'.D  U.  S.  504; 

R.  374.  Ball  v.  United  States,  140  U.  S.  118. 


§  206.]  INJUNCTIONS.  341 


CHAPTER   XVI. 

INJUNCTIONS. 

§  205.  Definition,  Classification,  and  Objects  of  Injunctions.  —  All 
injunction  is  a  writ  issued  from  a  court  of  equity  commanding  a 
person  to  do  an  act  or  acts  other  than  the  payment  to  the  cora- 
pLainant  of  a  sum  of  money,  or  not  to  do  an  act  or  acts  specified 
therein.  According  to  the  different  aspects  from  which  they  are 
considered,  injunctions  are  chissified  as  judicial  writs,  and  writs 
remedial ;  as  mandatory  and  prohibitory  ;  as  provisional  and 
perpetual  ;  or  as  common  and  special.  Before  describing  the 
different  characteristics  of  each  of  these  classes,  it  may  be  well 
to  refer  briefly  to  the  different  occasions  for  the  issue  of  the  writ. 
Injunctions  may  be  obtained  to  enforce  a  trust  or  other  purely 
equitable  right,  to  compel  obedience  to  a  covenant  or  other  con- 
tract affecting  land,  to  compel  the  obedience  of  corporations  to 
their  charters,  to  prevent  a  multiplicity  of  suits,  and  generally  to 
prevent  an  irreparable  injury  for  which  damages  at  law  would  be 
no  adequate  remedy,  and  also  in  cases  in  which  they  are  ex- 
pressly authorized  by  statute. 

§  206.  Injunctions  to  enforce  Trusts  and  other  purely  Equitable 
Rights.  —  As  trusts  and  other  purely  equitable  rights  are  not 
recognized  in  courts  of  law,  equity  will  always  inteifere  to  pro- 
tect them  by  injunction  when  they  are  threatened  with  infringe- 
ment.^ On  this  account  an  injunction  may  be  obtained  to  prevent 
the  revelation  or  use  of  a  secret  of  manufacture  b}^  a  workman 
who  has  learned  it  under  an  express  or  implied  promise  of 
secrecy,  or  one  to  whom  such  a  person  has  disclosed  it ;  ^  and  to 
restrain  the  publication  of  lectures,^  manuscripts,*  or  works  of 

§  206.   1  Scott  V.  Becher,  4  Price  346 ;  body  v.  Norfolk,  98  Mass.  452.     But  see 

In  re  Chertsy  Market,  6  Price,  26 1 ;  SIoo  v.  Newbery  r.  James,  2  Meriv.  446. 
Law,  3  Blatchf.  4o0  ;    Draper    v.   Davis,  »  Abernetliy  «.  Hutchinson,  3  L.  J.  Cli. 

104  U.  S.  347  ;   Co%Yles   v.  Wliitman,  10  209. 

Conn.  121 ;  Bisphani's  Eq.  §  425  ;  Kerr  on  *  Staplcton   v.  Forcisn  Vineyard  As- 

Injunctions,  172,  17-1  sociatinn,  12  W.  R.97G  ;  ScIieiler.Brakell, 

-  Yovatt  V.  Winyard,  1  Jac.  &  Walk.  11   W.  H.  796.     See,  bnwevtr,  Southey  v. 

3)4;  Morison  v.  Moat,  9  Hare,  241  ;  Pea-  Sherwood,  2  ^leriv  435. 


342  INJUNCTIONS.  [chap.  XVI. 

art^  heard  or  obtained  under  au  express  or  implied  agreement  not 
to  publish  or  reproduce  them.  Whether  or  not  the  publication 
of  private  letters  which  liave  no  value  as  literaiy  productions 
can  be  restrained  at  the  prajer  of  their  writer,  upon  the  ground 
that  it  would  be  a  breach  of  an  implied  trust,  is,  under  the 
authorities,  an  open  question.^ 

§  207.  Injunctions  to  restrain  Corporations  from  violating  their 
Charters.  —  Tlie  charters  of  curjiorutions  are  considered  '' in  the 
light  of  contracts  made  by  the  legislature  on  behalf  of  every 
person  interested  in  anything  to  be  done  under  them."  ^  On 
account  of  the  irreparable  injury  that  would  otherwise  ensue, 
and  in  the  case  of  coi'porations  to  whom  the  State's  right  of  emi- 
nent domain  is  delegated,  because  they  are  trustees,-  the  diso- 
bedience of  a  corporation  to  its  charter  may  be  restrained  by 
injunction,  either  at  the  suit  of  the  attorney-general^  of  the  State 
to  which  it  owes  its  existence,  or  of  any  individual  who  suffers 
special  injury  thereby.*  This  rule  applies  whether  the  act  com- 
plained of  has  been  forbidden  expressly,  or  merely  by  implication 
as  not  included  within  the  powers  expressly  given  to  the  corpor- 
ation and  those  which  are  necessary  for  their  proper  exercise.^ 
*'  It  is,"  said  Lord  Hatherley,  ""  a  principle  of  public  policy  that 
where  Parliament  has  authorized  a  comjiany  to  I'aise  a  large 
capital  for  a  specified  purpose,  the  privilege  confers  no  right 
upon  the  company  to  employ  their  capital  in  competition  with 
the  general  public  upon  speculations  of  a  different  character."  ^ 
"  It  is  because  these  companies,  being  armed  with  the  power 
of  raising  large  sums  of  money,  if  they  were  allowed  to  apply 
their  funds  to  purposes  other  than  those  for  which  they  were 
constituted,  might  acquire  such  a  preponderating  influence  and 
command   over  some  particular  branch   of  trade   or  commerce, 

5  I'riiice  Albert  v.  Strange,  1  Macn.  &  2  M'Coy  v.  Chicago,  I.  St.  L.  &  C.  R. 

G.  25,  42.  R.  Co.  13  Fed.  R.  3. 

*"  Woolscy  r.  Judd,4  DuiT  (N.Y.),  .iTO;  ^  Attorney-General  y.  Great  Nortliern 

and  Eyre  v.  Higtiee,  3.')  B:irb.  (N.  Y.),  502,  Ry.  Co.,  1  Dr.  &  Sin.  154  ;  Attorney-Gen- 

hold  that  they  can  :  and  Judiie  Story  con-  eral  y.  Railroad  Companies,  35  Wis.  425. 

curs  in  this  view,  in  Story's  Eq.  Jur.  §§  But  see   Attorney-General    ;•.  Utica  Ins. 

946-948.     But  the  opposite  view  is  main-  Co.,  2  Joims.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  371. 
tained    in   Gee    ;•.    Pritchard,    2    Swanst.  *  Bostock  v.  North    Staffordshire   Ry. 

4)2;   Wetmore  r.    Scovell,  3   Edw.   Ch.  Co.,  3  Sni.  &  Giff.  283;  Colman  v.  The 

(N    Y.)  615;  and   High  on  Injunctions,  Eastern  Counties  Ry.  Co.,  10  Bcav.  1. 
§  1012.  ^  Attorney-General  v.  Great  Nortliern 

§207.  '   Blakemore  !'.  Glatriorizanshire  Ry.  Co.,  1  Dr.  &  Sni.  154. 
Canal  Navigation,  1  Myl.  &  K.  154,  102.  ''  Cited  in  Kerr  on  Injunctions,  p.  473. 


§  207.]  INJUNCTIONS   AGAINST   COKPOEATIONS.  343 

as  would  enable  them  to  drive  the  ordinary  private  trader  from 
the  field,  and  create  in  their  own  favor  a  practical  monopoly, 
whereby  the  interests  of  the  public  would  be  most  seriously 
injured."'^  When  the  corporation  violates  its  charter  by  re- 
fusing to  perform  an  act  thereby  expressly  or  impliedly  com- 
manded, it  has  been  held  that  the  attorney-general  cannot 
compel  its  obedience  by  a  mandatory  injunction,  but  should 
in  such  a  case  apply  for  a  mandamus.^  A  private  individual 
suing  to  enjoin  a  corporation  from  violating  its  charter  must 
show  some  special  damage  caused  to  himself  by  the  breach.^  A 
shareholder  in  a  company  is  considered  to  incur  special  damage 
by  its  diverting  its  funds  to  other  purposes  than  its  charter  auth- 
oiizes,  and  can  obtain  an  injunction  to  restrain  its  so  doing,^'' 
even,  it  has  been  held,  if  he  bought  shares  in  the  company  for 
the  very  object  of  preventing  it;^^  provided  that  he  sues  in  good 
faith,  and  does  not  act  as  the  mere  puppet  of  a  rival  corpora- 
tion ;i2  jiiid  ti^at  the  suit  is  not  brought  "against  the  corporation 
and  other  parties,  founded  on  rights  which  may  properly  be 
asserted  by  the  corporation."  ^^  The  holder  of  a  security  for  an 
indebtedness  of  a  corporation  is  also,  it  seems,  entitled  to  an  in- 
junction in  a  similar  case  ;  ^*  but  not  an  unsecured  creditor,^^ 
except  under  very  extraordinary  circumstances.^^  One  whose 
land  has  been  taken  from  him  for  the  use  of  a  corporation  by  the 
exercise  of  the  State's  right  of  eminent  domain  can  obtain  an  in- 
junction to  restrain  the  use  of  the  land  for  any  other  purpose  than 
is  allowed  by  the  company's  charter,^"  provided  at  least  that  he 
can  show  that  he  is  thereby  injured.^^     It  is,  however,  no  proper 

T  Attorney-General  y.  Great  Northern  don,    B.  &  S.   C.   Ry.    1    H.    &  M.  489; 

Ry.  Co.,  1  Dr.  &  Sra.  154,  159,  IGO.  Robson  v.  Dodds.L.  R.8  Eq.  301  ;  Rogers 

8  Attorney-General  v.  Birminghnm  &  c.  Oxford,  Worcester,  &  Wolverhampton 
Oxford  Junction  Ry.  Co.,  15  Jur.  1024  ;  Ry.  Co.,  2  De  G.  &  J.  002. 

The  People  1-.  The  Albany  &  Vt.  R.  R.  Co  ,         i3  Rule   94;   Hawes   v.   Oakland,    104 

24  N.  Y.  2(31.  U.  S.  450.     See  supra,  §§  12,  70,  87. 

9  Chamberlaine  v.  Chester  &  B.  Ry.  1*  Bagshaw  y.  Eastern  Union  Ry.  Co.,  2 
Co.,  1  Exch.  8G9,  877;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Macn.  &G.  389;  Herrick  y.  Grand  Trunk 
EUerman,  105  U.  S.  1G6,  173,  174.  Ry.  Co.,  7  Up.  Canada  Law  Journal,  240. 

10  Colnian  y.  The  Eastern  Counties  Ry.  is  Syers  v.  Brighton  Brewery  Co.,  11 

Co.,  10  Beav.  1.  L.  T.  (n.  s.)  560;  Mills  v.  Northern  Ry.  of 

1-  Colnian  v.  The  Eastern  Counties  Ry.  Buenos  Ayres  Co.,  2.3  L.  T.  (n.  s.)  719. 

Co.,    10    Beav.    1  ;    Attorney-General    v.  !<>  Evans  v.  Coventry,  5  De  G.  M.  &  G. 

Great   Northern   Ry.   Co.,  1   Dr.  &  Sm.  911. 

154  ;  Bloxam  v  Met.  Ry.  Co.,  L.  R.  3  Ch.  i'  Bostock  v.  North  Staffordshire  Ry. 

337.  Co.,  3  Sm.  &  Giff.  283. 

12  Forrest  v.  Manchester,  S.  &  L.  Ry.  is  p^ast  &  West  India  Docks  &  Birming- 

Co.,  4  De  G.  F.  &  J.  120;  Filder  v.  Lon-  ham  Junction  Ry.  Co.  v.  Dawes,  11  Hare, 


344  INJUNCTIONS.  [chap.  XVI, 

ground  for  complaint  by  an  individual  that  a  corporation  by 
exercising  po\^ers  not  conferred  upon  it  by  its  charter  enters  into 
competition  with  him,  and  thereby  diminishes  the  profits  of  his 
trade  or  calling. ^^  An  English  judge  has  said  :  ''  Where  a  statute 
prohibits  the  doing  of  a  particular  act  affecting  the  public,  no 
person  has  a  right  of  action  against  another  merely  because  he 
has  done  the  prohibited  act.  It  is  incumbent  on  the  party  com- 
plaining to  allege  and  prove,  that  the  doing  of  the  act  prohibited 
has  caused  him  some  special  damage,  some  peculiar  injury,  be- 
yond that  which  he  may  be  supposed  to  sustain  in  common  with 
the  rest  of  the  Queen's  subjects,  by  an  infringement  of  the  law. 
But  where  the  act  prohibited  is  obviously  ])rc)hil)ited  for  tlie 
protection  of  a  particular  party,  there  it  is  not  necessary  to  allege 
special  damage."  ^o 

§  208.  Injunctions  to  enforce  the  Specific  Performance  of  Cov- 
enants and  other  Contracts  affecting  Laud.  —  As  no  two  pieces  of 
land  are  exactly  alike,  equity  considers  that  in  no  case  can  dam- 
ages in  money  be  adequate  compensation  for  the  breach  of  a 
covenant  or  other  contract  affecting  land.^  Accordingly,  the 
specific  performance  of  contracts  for  the  purchase  or  sale  of  land 
and  of  covenants  affecting  the  same,  will  be  specifically  enforced 
with  the  aid  of  an  injunction,  whenever  they  are  mutual,^  cer- 
tain,^ not  unconscionable  ;  ^  and  their  enforcement  would  be 
practicable.^  The  rule  concerning  the  enforcement  of  cove- 
nants affecting  land  has  been  thus  stated  :  "  If  the  construction 
of  the  instrument  be  clear  and  the  breach  clear,  then  it  is 
not  a  question  of  damage,  but  the  mere  circumstance  of  the 
breach  of  covenant  affords  sufficient  ground  for  the  court  to 
interfere  by  injunction."^     This  is,  however,  subject  to  the  ex- 

36.3;  Lee  r.  Milner,  2  Y.  &  C.  (Ul  ;  Ware  *  Surpet  r.Byers,Hempst.715;  Eound- 

V.  Kcgents  Canal  Co  ,  o  De  G.  &  J.  212.  tree  r.  McLaiii,  Hernpst.  245;  Miss.  &  Mo. 

!>'  Railroad  Co.  v.  Ellerman,  103  U.  S.  K.  R.  Co.  r.  Cromwell,  91  U.  S.  643;  Bis- 

160,  173,  174.  pliani's  Eq.  §  37G.     See  Kaiulolph's  Ex'r. 

-"  Pollock,   C.  B  ,  in  Clianiberlaine  r.  v.  Quidnick  Company,  135  U.  S.  457. 
Chester  &  B.  Ry.  Co.,  1  E.xcheqiier,  869,  &  Ross  v.  Union  Pacific  R.  R.   Co  ,  I 

877.     See  Blakemore  r.  Giamnrganshire  Woohv.  26  ;  Fallon  v.  Railroad  Co.,  1  Dill. 

Canal  Navigation,  1  Mylne  &  Keen,  154,  121  ;  Texas  &  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  i:  Marshall, 

162.  130  U.  S.  393;  Bispham's  Eq.  §  377. 

§  208.     1  Adderlcy  r.  Di.xon,  1  Sim.  &  ^  Vice  Chancellor  Wood  in  Tipping  v. 

Stu.  007;  Bispham's  Eq.  §  375.  Eckersloy,  2  K.  &  J.  264.     See  also  Lord 

2  Dorsey  v.  Packwood,  12  How.  120;  IManners  v.  .Johnson,  L.  R.  1  Ch.  D.  073; 
Bispham's  Eq.  §  377.  Lloyd  r.  London,  Chatham,  &  Dover  Ry. 

3  Colson  V.  Tiiompson,  3  Wheat.  336  ;  Co."  2  De  G.  J.  &  S.  508  ;  Trustees  of  Co- 
Bispiiam's  Eq.  §  377.  himhia  College  v.  Lynch,  70  N.  Y.  404. 


§  209.]      INJUNCTIONS    TO    RESTRAIN    A    MULTIPLICITY    OF    SUITS.      345 

ception  that  if  it  would  be  against  public  policy  to  enforce  the 
covenant,  —  for  example,  if  a  change  of  circumstances  have  ren- 
dered it  improper  to  use  land  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  a 
covenant  regulating  its  use,  or  if,  on  account  of  such  a  change, 
the  object  of  the  parties  to  the  covenant  would  not  be  accom- 
plished by  its  enforcement,  —  equity  will  not  interfere.'^ 

§  209.  Injunctions  to  restrain  a  Multiplicity  of  Suits. — Injunc- 
tions are  granted  in  order  to  prevent  a  multiplicity  of  suits  under 
bills  of  peace.  Bills  of  peace  are  bills  to  restrain  a  number  of 
persons  from  endeavoring  to  enforce  in  different  suits  the  same 
or  similar  claims  ;  ^  or  to  prevent  a  single  person  from  reiterating 
in  several  successive  suits  the  same  unsuccessful  claim ;  ^  or  to 
prevent  a  person  from  levying  a  tax,  the  payment  of  which  will 
subject  the  plaintiff  to  the  hazard  of  a  number  of  suits  from  other 
parties  ;^  bills  of  interpleader"^  and  in  the  nature  of  interpleader  ;^ 
bills  to  enjoin  a  continuing  trespass,^  nuisance,'^  infringement 
of  patents,^  copyrights^  and  trade-marks;^^  and  bills  to  quiet 
possession.^^  Each  of  these  classes  of  bills,  except  the  last  two, 
have  been  already  sufficiently  described.  Injunctions  to  restrain 
a  continuing  trespass,  nuisance,  and  the  infringement  of  patents, 
coj^yrights  and  trade-marks,  are  more  often  said  to  be  granted 
to  prevent  irreparable  injury,  and  will,  therefore,  be  considered 
under  that  head.  An  injunction  to  quiet  the  possession  before 
the  hearing  formerly  issued  to  restrain  the  party  to  whom  it  was 
directed  from  taking  forcible  possession  of  lands  pending  litiga- 
tion concerning  them.  It  was  issued  at  the  request  of  either  a 
plaintiff  or  a  defendant  to  a  suit,  if  the  applicant  had  had  peace- 
able possession  of  the  premises  for  the  three  years  preceding  the 

'  Duke  of  Bcilford  r.  British  Museum,  •       *  Louisiana  State  Lottery  Co.  r.  Clark, 

2  M.  &  K.  65ii ;  Troy  &  B.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  16  Fed.  R.  20 ;  s.  c.  4  Woods,  169 ;  jMc- 

Boston,  II.   T.  &   W.  Ry.   Co.,  86  N.  Y.  Lauj^'ldin  v.   Swann,  18  How.  217;   City 

107 ;    Trustees   of   Columbia    College    v.  Bank  v.  Skelton,  2  Blatchf.  14.    8ee  §  88. 

Thacher,  87  N.  Y.  311 ;  Leake's  Digest  of  ^  Dorn  c.  Fox,  Gl  N.  Y.  264.    See  §  89. 

tlie  Law   of  Contracts,   1152.      But  see  ^  Northern  Pacific  R.  R.  Co.  v.   Bur- 

Lloj'd  V.  London,  Cliatham,  &  Dover  Ry.  lington  &  ^lissouri  R.  R.  Co  ,  2  McCrary, 

Co  ,  11  Jur.  (n   s  )  380.  203.     See  §  215. 

§  209.  1  Sheffield  Water  Works  v.  Yco-  "!  Woodruff  r.  North  Bloomfield  Gravel 

mans,  L.  R.  2  Ch.  App.  8.  Mining  Co.,  18  Fed.  R.  753.    See  §  214. 

2  Earl  of  Bath  v.   Sherwin,  4   Brown  8  u.  S.  R.  S.  §  4921.     See  §  216. 
Parliamentary  Cases,  373.  9  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  4970.     See  §  217. 

3  Cunnnings  v.  National  Bank,  101  i^  Shaw  Stocking  Co.  v.  Mack,  12  Fed. 
U.  S.  153,  157  ;  Pelton  v.  National  Bank,  R.  707.    See  §  218. 

101  U.  S.  143,  148;  Hills  v.  Exchange  "  Hughes  v.  Mordcn  College,  1  Ves. 
Bank,  105  U.  S.  319.      See  sn/mi,  §  12.         Sen.  188.     See  supra,  §  7. 


346  INJUNCTIONS.  [chap.  XVI. 

filing  of  the  bill,  and  his  interest  therein  had  not  been  determined 
by  forfeiture,  surrender,  or  other  lawful  means.  He  was  required 
to  swear  to  these  facts  in  his  bill,  and  according  to  the  practice 
before  Lord  Bacon's  time,  to  give  a  bond  to  the  amount  of  £10 
as  a  security  that  the  information  so  given  was  true.^^  Such 
injunctions  were  formerly  very  common  ;  but  have  now  fallen 
into  disuse.  The  last  reported  instance  of  one  was  in  Lord 
Hardwicke's  time.^^ 

§  210.  Injunctions  to  prevent  Irreparable  Injury  for  Avhicli  the 
Remedy  at  Law  is  inadequate  ;  in  general.  —  The  most  ordinary 
ground  u})on  which  an  injunction  issues,  and  one,  indeed,  which 
includes  all  but  the  first  of  those  previousl}^  mentioned,  is  that, 
otherwise,  the  plaintiff  would  suffer  an  irreparable  injury,  for 
which  damages  at  law  would  be  no  adequate  remedy.  It  would 
be  impossible  specifically  to  mention  here  all  the  different  in- 
stances in  wdiich  an  injunction  issues  for  this  reason  ;  but  the 
following  is  an  enumeration  of  those  of  more  frequent  occurrence 
which  have  not  been  previously  described.  An  injunction  will 
issue  on  account  of  the  inadequacy  of  the  remedy  at  common 
law  ;  to  stay  proceedings  in  otlier  courts,  either  of  law,  equit}', 
or  admiralty  ;i  to  restrain  the  indorsement  or  negotiation  of  notes 
and  bills  of  exchange,  the  sale  of  land,  the  sailing  of  a  ship,  the 
transfer  of  stock,  or  the  alienation  of  a  specific  chattel  ;2  to 
restrain  the  commission  of  every  species  of  waste  or  act  in  the 
nature  of  waste  ;^  to  suppress  the  continuance  of  a  public  or  pii- 
vate  nuisance  ;^  to  prevent  a  threatened  destructive  trespass  ;^  to 
prevent  the  infringement  of  patents  ;*^  to  prevent  the  violation  of 
cop}Tight,  whether  by  printed  publications,  or  theatrical  represen- 
tation, or  otherwise;'  to  prevent  the  unauthorized  use  of  trade- 
marks,^ and  the  opening  of  private  letters;^  to  com[)el  the  j)er- 
formance  or  prevent  the  breach  of  contracts  other  than  those 
for  the  payment  of  money  only  ;  ^°  and,  under  very  extraordinary 
circumstances,  to  compel  the  deliverv  of  personal  properly 
wrongfully  withheld. ^^ 

§  211.  Injunctions  to  stay  Proceedings  in  other  Courts.  —  In- 
junctions to  stay  proceedings  in  other  courts   are  of  much   less 


'-  Eck'ii    on    Injunctions,    ch.  xvi.    p. 

8  §  213. 

8  §218. 

210. 

*  §  214. 

»  §219. 

13  Iliiglies  V.  Morden  College,   1   Ve3. 

5  §  215 

10  §  220. 

Sen.  188. 

6  S  210. 

"  §221. 

§210.     1  §211.                 2  §212. 

■?  §217. 

§  211.]   INJUNCTIONS  TO  STAY  TKOCEEDINGS  IN  OTHER  COUKTS.   347 

frequent  occurrence  now  that  discovery  and  the  inspection  of 
documents  can  be  obtained  at  common  law  without  the  aid  of 
equity  than  they  were  formerly  ;  but  they  are  still  occasionally 
issued,  especially  in  banlcruptcy.^  Such  injunctions  must  not 
be  confounded  with  writs  of  i)rohibition,  which  are  addressed  to 
the  judges  of  a  court,  whereas  injunctions  are  directed  to  the 
])arties  to  the  proceedings  which  it  is  desired  to  restrain.^  Ordi- 
narily, when  two  courts  have  a  concurrent  jurisdiction  over  the 
same  thing,  whichever  court  was  first  possessed  of  the  cause 
has  a  right  to  proceed  with  the  same,  and  proceedings  in  it 
will  not  be  prohibited  or  restrained  in  another,'^  Tiie  Revised 
Statutes  of  the  United  States  expressly  provide  that  "  The  writ 
of  injunction  shall  not  be  granted  by  any  court  of  the  United 
States  to  stay  proceedings  in  any  court  of  a  State,  except  in 
cases  where  such  injunction  may  be  authorized  by  any  law  re- 
lating to  proceedings  in  bankruptcy."  *  Accordingly  a  Federal 
court  has  refused  to  enjoin  a  railway  company  from  taking  pos- 
session of  land  upon  the  termination  of  condemnation  proceed- 
ings in  a  State  court.^  A  State  court  has  no  power  to  stay  by 
injunction  a  proceeding  in  a  court  of  the  United  States.^  It  has 
been  held,  however,  that  a  Federal  court  has  power  to  issue  an 
injunction  to  stay  proceedings  in  a  State  court  which  interfere 
with  the  enforcement  of  one  of  its  own  judgments,  and  to  stay 
proceedings  which  have  been  instituted  or  continued  after  the 
beginning  or  the  removal  of  the  suit  in  the  Federal  jurisdiction.' 

§211.  1  McLean  r.  Lafayette  Bank,  3  Blatchf.   48;  Yick   Wo   v.   Crowley,   26 

McLean,  185.     In  re  Scliwarz,  14  Fed.  R.  Fed.  U.  207. 

787.  6  Dillon  v.  Kansas  City  S.  B.  Ry.  Co., 

^  See   Eden    on   Injunctions,    ch.    ii. ;  43  Fed.  R.  109. 

Peck  V.  Jenness,  7  IIow.   624;  Dillon  v.  ^  McKim  v.  Voorliies,  7  Cranch,  279  ; 

Kansas  City  S.  B.  Ky.  Co.,  43  Fed.  R.  Duncan  v.  Darst,  1  How.  301-30G ;  City 

109,  111.  Bank  of  New  York  (-.  Skelton,  2  Blatchf. 

^  Niciiolas   V.   Nicholas,  Prec.    in    Ch.  14. 

516;  Daniel's  Cli.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1845;  ^  French     r.     Hay,     22     Wall.     250; 

supra  §§  9,  10.      But  see  the  Erie  Ry.  Co.  Dietzsch  c.  Iluidekopcr,  103  U.  S.  4'.l4 ; 

V.  Ramsey,  45  N.  Y.  637.  Fisk    i-.    Union    Pacific    R.    R.    Co ,    10 

4  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  720.     See  the  Slaughter  Blatchf.  518;    Sharon  v.  Terry,  36  Fed. 

House   Cases,    10   Wall.  273;    Haines   v.  R.  3.37;  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Ford, 

Carpenter,  91   U.  S.  254;    Dial  v.  Rey-  35  Fed.  R.  170. 

nolds,  96  U.  S.  340 ;  Rensselaer  &  S.  R.  R.  Jesup  v.  Wabash,  St.  L.  &  P.  Ry.  Co., 

Co.  V.  Bennington  &  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  Fed.  44  Fed.  R.  663,  664-667.  per  Ricks,',!.  :  — 

R.  617  ;  Missouri,    K.    &  T.    Ry.  Co.   v.  "  The  plaintiff,  in  his  petition  in  said 

Scott,    13  Fed.   R.  793;    .s.  c    4  Woods,  court  of  common  pleas,  bases  his  right  to 

386;    Hamilton    v.    Walsh,    23    Fed.    R.  recover  against  tlie  defendant,  as  the  re- 

420;  Tifft  r.  Iron    Clad   Miinuf.  Co.,   10  organized    railroad    company    and    pur- 


348 


INJUNCTIONS 


[chap.  XVI. 


Such  an  injunction  will  rarely  be  issued.^  But  proceedings  in 
a  State  court  cannot  be  enjoined  upon  the  sole  ground  that 
they  are  taken  under  a  State  statute  which  is  repugnant  to  the 


chnser  of  tlie  property  foreclosed,  as  above 
biateil,  upon  tlie  giuuud  that  the  circuit 
courts  of  the  United  States,  in  foreclos- 
ing said  property,  made  a  decree  or  order 
providing  tliat  the  said  receiver,  John 
McNulty,  should  turn  over  to  the  pur- 
chasers of  said  railroad  property  all  the 
assets,  books,  vouchers,  accounts  and 
property  in  his  custody  as  such  receiver, 
and  be  discharged  from  all  further  liabil- 
ity as  such  receiver,  upon  tlie  following 
conditions,  which  I  quote  from  the  order 
of  the  court :  — 

" '  Tlie  court  orders  the  delivery  of 
such  receivership  assets,  papers,  and  prop- 
erty to  the  Wabash  Railroad  Company, 
on  the  express  condition  that  the  last- 
named  corporation  agrees  to  pay,  satisfy, 
and  finally  discharge  all  the  debts  and 
liabilities  of  such  receivership  oi  every 
kind  now  remaining  unpaid,  and  that  it 
may  further  defend  in  the  name  of  such 
receiver  all  litigated  claims  or  demands 
against  such  receivership  now  pending  in 
this  or  other  courts,  and  will  fully  abide 
by  and  pay  any  and  all  judgments  and 
recoveries,  together  with  costs,  which 
may  be  rendered  in  any  of  such  actions 
or  litigations,  and  always  protect  and 
save  liarmless  the  said  receiver  from  such 
claims  or  any  of  tiiem.' 

"  This  order  was  made  by  this  court 
after  the  confirmation  of  the  sale  there- 
tofore made,  ami  the  conditions  therein 
required  to  be  performed  by  the  purchaser 
were  substantially  and  in  fact  a  part  of 
the  consideration  exacted  from  such  pur- 
chasers for  said  railroad  projierty.  This 
court  authorized  tlie  receiver  to  deliver 
to  the  said  purchaser  all  of  the  assets  and 
.  property  in  his  hands,  upon  the  condition 
that  said  purchaser  would  save  harmless 
the  said  receiver  from  all  claims  of  every 
kind  that  might  be  preferred  against  him. 
It  is  therefore  clearly  the  duty  of  this 
court  to  see  that  such  purchaser  is  not 
required  to  pay  or  satisfy  any  claim  or 
judgment  of  any  kind  that  would  not  be 
a  proper  and   just  liability   of   said   re- 


ceiver. If  this  court  had  not  discharged 
said  receiver  upon  the  conditions  recited 
•in  the  order,  releasing  him  from  further 
responsibility  in  connection  with  this  prop- 
erty, it  would  have  retained  the  assets, 
books,  and  vouchers  in  his  hands,  and 
adjusted  all  the  liabilities  incurred  by 
him  as  receiver,  by  and  through  the  pro- 
ceedings customary  in  such  cases.  It  is 
clearly  the  duty  of  this  court  to  protect 
the  purchaser  of  this  property  to  the  same 
extent,  and  in  the  same  manner,  that  it 
would  have  protected  the  receiver  if  he 
had  been  retained  for  the  purpose  of  set- 
tling all  these  outstanding  claims.  When 
the  purchaser  bought  tliis  {)roperty  it  pur- 
chased it  upon  the  conditions  named  in 
the  decree  and  order  of  sale.  The  pur- 
chase price  so  obtained  became  a  fund  in 
the  hands  of  this  court  for  distribution  to 
the  beneficiaries  imder  its  decree.  The 
court  would  certainly  protect  tiiis  fund 
from  being  diverted.  It  would  take  every 
precaution  to  see  that  no  party  received 
any  portion  of  it  unless  just!}'  entitled 
thereto.  But  this  agreement  to  pay  sucli 
just  claims  as  might  be  allowed  against 
the  receiver,  as  before  stated,  is,  in  fact, 
a  part  of  the  price  paid  by  the  said  pur- 
chaser for  the  road,  and  it  is  the  duty  of 
the  court  to  protect  it  against  any  unjust 
claims,  by  the  same  diligence  and  care 
that  it  would  protect  the  fund  if  actually 
in  the  registry  of  the  court  for  distribu- 
tion. The  distributioti  of  this  fund,  and 
the  allowance  of  claims  against  the  re- 
ceiver, which  is  in  fact  a  part  of  the  pur- 
chase price,  is  exclusively  within  the 
control  of  this  court.  As  the  court  would 
not  allow  any  other  tribunal  to  distribute 
any  part  of  the  purchase  price,  so  it  can- 
not properly  or  safely  allow  any  other 
tribunal  to  say  what  are  proper  claims 
against  the  receiver  to  be  paid  out  of  this 
fund,  or  by  the  purchaser  as  a  part  of  its 
purchase  price,  for  the  property.  In 
order  to  so  fully  protect  the  purchaser 
and  fairly  retain  control  of  all  claims 
against  the  receiver  which  such  purchaser 


^  Frishman  v.  Insurance  Co.,  41  Fed.  II.  449. 


§  211.]      INJUNCTIONS  TO  STAY    PROCEEDINGS  IN  OTHER  COURTS.      349 


Federal  Constitution.^  A  judge  of  a  Circuit  or  District  Court 
has  no  power  to  enjoin  the  enforcement  of  a  judgment  in  a  State 
court  after  an  appeal  to  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States 


sliouhl  be  required  to  pay,  tliis  court 
must  retain  jurisdiction  of  all  cases  which 
involve  the  liability  of  its  receiver.  It 
must  retain  or  acquire  such  jurisdic- 
tion in  order  that  such  liability  may  be 
adjusted  and  determined  according;  to  the 
equitable  principles  controlling  this  court 
in  such  proceedings.  The  plaintiff  in 
this  case  had  the  right,  under  the  act  of 
August,  1888,  to  sue  tliis  receiver  in  the 
Court  of  Common  Pleas  of  Defiance 
County  for  the  torts  committed  by  iiini 
as  such  receiver.  He  had  the  right  to 
bring  such  action  without  the  leave  of 
this  court.  Any  judgment  that  he  might 
have  obtained  in  such  court  would  have 
been  subject  to  the  equitable  scrutiny  of 
this  court  before  it  would  have  been 
allowed  as  a  valid  claim  against  the 
receiver;  but  the  plaintiff's  right  to  sue 
the  receiver  was  fixed  and  indisputable. 
He  chose  not  to  avail  himself  of  this 
right  while  it  existed,  but  after  the  dis- 
charge of  the  receiver,  and,  when  the 
purchaser  of  the  foreclosed  railroad  prop- 
erty assumed  the  possession  and  manage- 
ment of  it,  he  institutes  this  suit  against 
such  purchaser,  and  seeks  to  hold  it 
liable  for  torts  committed  by  the  receiver 
during  his  management  of  said  property 
under  the  orders  of  this  court.  While  he 
bases  his  right  to  recover  upon  the  ex- 
press stipulation  of  the  purchaser,  made 
in  this  court,  that  it  would  pay  all  the 
liabilities  of  tlie  receiver  upon  condition 
that  the  assets  of  the  receiver  and  the 
control  of  the  property  purchased  were 
turned  over  to  it,  yet  the  plaintiff  elected 
to  bring  this  suit  against  the  purcliascr 
instead  of  the  receiver,  because  of  some 
supposed  legal  advantage  he  could  derive 
by  reason  of  a  suit  against  the  former 
instead  of  the  latter.  But  liis  right  of 
action  no  longer  exists  against  the  re- 
ceiver, because  the  receiver  has  been  dis- 
charged, and  released  from  all  liabilit}' 
by  express  order  of  this  court.  He  ought, 
therefore,  to  liave  no  greater  right  against 
the  purchaser  than  he  has  against  the 


receiver.  Whatever  right  or  claim  he 
has  is  against  the  fund  in  this  court 
arising  from  the  sale  of  said  mortgaged 
properly. 

"  The  promise  and  agreement  of  the 
purchaser  constituted  an  adilitional  con- 
sideration, and  thereby  added  to  said 
fund,  as  we  have  before  stateil ;  but  in 
good  faith  to  said  purchaser  it  is  the  duty 
of  this  court  to  sift,  scrutinize,  and  finally 
determine  what  claims  shall  be  paid,  and 
what  claims  shall  be  rejected.  In  order 
to  do  this  satisfactoril}'  this  court  should 
require  all  parties  who  assert  any  claim 
against  such  fund,  or  who  claim  any  riglit 
to  recover  against  said  purchaser  because 
of  the  stipulation  and  covenant  made  in 
this  court,  to  establish  such  claim  in  this 
tribunal  by  proceedings  usual  in  this 
class  of  cases.  But  if  the  said  Potterf 
were  permitted  to  prosecute  his  action  in 
the  State  court,  and  recover  a  judgment 
thereon,  lie  would  have  a  right  to  satisfy 
said  judgment  out  of  any  property  sub- 
ject to  levy  in  the  hands  of  the  purchaser, 
the  Wabash  Railway  Company  ;  where- 
as, under  the  covenants  and  agreements 
made  in  this  court  between  the  court  and 
the  jmrchaser,  placing  upon  said  cove- 
nants the  legal  construction  hereinbefore 
given,  any  claim  he  might  have  against 
the  receiver  was  to  be  satisfied  out  of  t!ie 
fund  arising  from  the  sale  of  tiiis  mort- 
gaged property.  While  counsel  in  argu- 
ing the  case  assured  the  court  that  they 
expected,  in  case  they  recovered  a  judg- 
ment, to  come  to  this  court  and  ask  to 
have  it  allowed  and  paid  by  the  purchaser 
on  this  covenant,  to  wliich  reference  has 
been  made,  yet  there  is  no  legal  barrier 
which  would  prevent  the  plaintiff  from 
satisf^'ing  such  judgment  by  levy  and 
sale  of  subsequently  acquired  property 
in  the  hands  of  the  purchaser.  This 
places  him  in  a  more  advantageous  legal 
position  than  he  occupied  with  a  claim 
against  the  receiver,  which  could  be  satis- 
fied only  out  of  the  fund  or  property  in 
the  receiver's  control. 


9  Pensselaer  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Bennington  &  R.  R.  Co.,  18  Fed.  R.  fil7. 


350 


INJUNCTIONS. 


[chap.  XVI. 


and  a  supersedeas}^  That  can  only  be  done,  if  at  all,  by  a  justice 
of  the  Sii|)rerae  Coui-t.^^  It  has  been  held  that  a  Federal  court 
may  enjoin  proceedings  in  a  State  court  which  would  deprive  a 
citizen  of  the  United  States,  or  other  person  within  the  jurisdic- 
tion thereof,  of  any  right,  privilege,  or  immunity  secured  by  the 
Constitution  or  laws  of  the  United  States  ;  ^'^  that  a  Federal  court 
can  prevent  by  injunction  the  levy  of  a  State  sheriff  under  State 
process  against  a  State  judgment-debtor  upon  the  property  of  a 
stranger  to  the  suit  and  process  ;  ^^  that  a  Federal  court  may 
enjoin  the  inequitable  use  of  a  judgment  of  a  State  court  when 
the  validity  of  the  judgment  is  not  thereby  impaired  ;  ^^  that 
under  the  act  of  Congress  limiting  the  liability  of  the  owners  of 
shi|)S,  a  District  Court  of  the  United  States  may  issue  a  stay-order 
restraining  proceedings  previously  begun  in  State  courts ;  ^^  and 
that  when  a  creditor  of  a  corporation  has  begun  proceedings  in  a 
Federal  court  to  enforce  his  claim  against  the  corporation,  the 
defendant  corporation  may  be  enjoined  "  from  taking  proceedings 
for  its  own  dissolution,  or  for  the  appointment  of  a  receiver 
of  its  effects,  or  for  the  distribution  thereof  among  its  stock- 


"  But  it  is  further  contended  by  coun- 
sel that  tlie  Wabash  Railway  Company 
cannot  now  ask  for  this  stay  of  proceed- 
ings because  it  entered  its  ajipearance  in 
the  State  court,  and  thereby  conceded 
its  jurisdiction.  Tlie  appearanc.'e  entered 
by  tlie  counsel  for  the  said  railway  com- 
pany would  not  have  prevented  it  from 
askiig  the  State  court  to  remove  said 
case  to  this  court  if  tlie  citizenship  of 
the  parties  and  the  amount  involved  had 
l>pen  such  as  to  justify  such  a  request, 
and  I  do  not  think  it  prevents  the  said 
railway  company  from  asking  the  relief 
it  now  demands.  The  jurisdiction  of  tlie 
court  of  common  pleas,  so  far  as  tlie  resi- 
dence of  the  parties  is  concerned,  is  un- 
disputed. It  is  because  of  the  subject- 
matter  of  said  contention  that  this  court 
acquires  jurisdiction.  The  exact  cliar- 
actcr  and  nature  of  the  suit  were  only 
developed  by  tiie  motions  made  by  the 
counsel  for  tlie  defemlant  in  tlie  State 
court  after  tlie  original  suit  was  insti- 
tuted ;  and  when  the  pleadings  properly 
revealed  the  actual  basis  upon  which  the 
plaintiff  founded  his  action,  the  petitioner 
at  once  invoked   tlie  jurisdiction   of  tiiis 


court  to  restrain  said  proceedings  because 
of  the  nature  thereof.  For  these  reasons 
I  think  tlie  order  heretofore  made  re- 
straining said  plaintiff  from  further  pro- 
ceeding against  the  receiver  in  the  State 
court  was  properly  ahowed,  and  an  order 
may  now  be  drawn  authorizing  an  injunc- 
tion to  issue  perpetually  restraining  iiim 
from  further  prosecuting  said  suit.  If 
said  Potterf  chooses  to  avail  himself  of 
the  privilege  of  filing  liis  claim  in  this 
court,  against  the  receiver,  he  may  do  so, 
and  such  further  jiroceedings  will  be  di- 
rected as  the  equities  of  the  case  demand. 
A  decree  may  be  prepared  in  accordance 
with  this  opinion."  See  infra,  §  "251. 
i«  Murray  r.  Overstoltz,  8  Fed.  \\.  110. 

11  Murray  r.  Overstoltz,  8  Fed.  H.  110. 

12  Tucliman  v.  Welch,  42  Fed.  R.  -548; 
reversed  s.  c.  4.5  Fed.  R.  28;3;  criticised 
in  24  American  Law  Review,  G61.  See 
U.  S.  R.  S.  §  1079. 

'■^  Cropper  v.  Coburn,  2  Curt.  4()5. 

1'  Linton  v.  Mosgrove,  14  Fed   R.  543. 

y^  In  re  Long  Island,  N.  S.  P.  &  F. 
Transportation  Co  ,  5  Fed.  R.  509.  See 
Providence  &  N.  Y.  S.  S.  Co.  v.  Hill 
Mnnuf  (\),  109  U.  S.  578,600. 


§  211.]  INJUNCTIONS  TO  STAY  PROCEEDINGS  IN  OTHER  COURTS.   351 

holders  and  any  otlicr  persons,  and  from  making  any  distribu- 
tion or  transfer  of  any  of  its  effects."  ^^  An  injunction  granted 
by  a  State  court  to  stay  proceedings  in  the  same  or  another  tri- 
bunal of  the  State  remains  in  force  after  a  removal  to  a  Federal 
court  of  the  suit  in  which  it  was  granted,^"  although  such  an  in- 
junction could  not  be  originally  issued  in  the  Federal  court  in  a 
suit  removed  from  a  State  court.^*^  Except  in  an  extraordinary 
case  to  prevent  irreparable  injury  to  property  or  business  inter- 
ests/-^ an  injunction  will  not  be  issued  to  stay  a  criminal  pro- 
ceeding,-'^ a  proceeding  in  its  nature  criminal,  as  for  the  removal 
of  an  officer,-^  or  an  a{)plication  for  a  mandamus. -^  "  This  court," 
said  Lord  Hardwicko,  "  has  no  jurisdiction  to  stay  proceedings  on 
a  mandamus ;  nor  to  an  indictment ;  nor  to  an  information ;  nor 
to  a  writ  of  prohibition,  that  I  know  of."  '^'^  Judge  Billings  re- 
cently said :  "  The  extent  to  which  such  a  bill  will  lie  is  well 
defined.  It  is  when  the  parties  sought  to  be  enjoined  have,  as 
plaintiffs,  submitted  themselves  to  the  court  by  a  bill  in  equity  as 
to  the  matters  affected  by  or  involved  in  the  criminal  procedure. 
In  such  case  the  court  will  by  a  decree  affecting  the  parties  so 
situated  personally  enjoin."  -"^  It  has  been  doubted  whether  a 
Federal  Circuit  Court  has  the  power  to  enjoin  the  prosecution  of 
a  suit  in  a  Federal  court  in  another  circuit.^'^  Such  an  injunc- 
tion has  been  refused  when  sought  by  a  defendant  to  a  patent-suit 
for  the  purpose  of  enjoining  the  prosecution  of  suits  previously 
brought  upon  the  same  patent.^^  The  subsequent  commencement 
of  suits  upon  the  same  patent  has  been  enjoined.-"     It  was  at  first 

iG  Fisk  I-  Railroad  Co.,  10  Bliitclif.  518.  Noble,  31   Fed.  E.   855;   Fn   re   Sawyer, 

But  see  Kessler  c.  Continental,  C.  &  I.  124  U.    S.   200.     But    see   M.  Scliandler 

Co.,  42  Fed.  R.  258.  Bottling  Co.  v.  Weldi,  42  Fed.  R.  561; 

i"  Smith   y.    Schwed,   6    Fed.    R.  455;  reversed  s.  c.  45  Fed.  R.  288. 

Perry  <;.  Sharpe,  8  Fed.  R.  15.     But  see  ^i  In  re  Sawyer,  124  U.  S.  200. 

Lawrence  v   Morgan's  R.  R.  &  S.  S.  Co.,  "-  Lord  Montagne  i\  Dudman,  2  Ves. 

121  U.  S.  634.  Sen.  ?.9G,  398. 

1=*  Diggs  V   Wolcott,  4  Crancli,  170.  -^  Lord  Montague  r.  Dudman,  2  Ves. 

19  M.  Schandler  Bottling  Co.  v.  Welch,  Sen.  396,  398. 

42  Fed.  R.  .561  ;  Tuchman  v.  Welch,  42  ■^^  Spink  r.  Francis,  19  Fed.  R.  670,  071  ; 

Fed.   R.   548.      Same   cases  reversed,  45  s.  c     20  Fed.  R.  507,  569.      So    held    in 

Fed.  R.  283  ,  criticised   in  24  American  Mayor  of  York  v.  Piikington,  2  Atk.  302. 

Law  Review,  661.  -5  Kelley  r.  Ypsilanti  Dress  Stay  Manuf. 

-'  Lord  Montague  v    Dudman,  2  Ves.  Co.,  44  Fed.  \l    19,20, /)er  Brownj!  ,1. 

Sen.  396,    Attorney-General    v.    Cleaver,  -''  Kelley  r.  Ypsilanti  Dress-Stay  Manuf 

18  Ves  211,  220;  Saull  v.   Browne,  L.  R.  Co.,  44  Fed.  R.  19. 

10  Ch.  App.  64  .  Spink  v  Francis,  19  Fed.  27  Birdsall  c.  Manuf.  Co.,  1  Hughes,  64. 
R.  670;  s.  c    20  Fed.  R.  567;    Suess  v. 


352  INJUNCTIONS.  [chap.  XVI. 

held  that  a  court  had  no  power  to  restrain  a  defendant  from  suing 
in  a  foi'eigii  court  ;2^  but  it  seems  now  to  be  established  that  it 
can  do  so,'"^^  though  such  a  power  is  exercised  with  great  caution.^*' 
It  has  been  held  that,  in  a  suit  by  tlie  United  States  to  vacate 
a  patent  for  an  invention,  a  preliminary  injunction  will  not  be 
granted  to  restrain  the  prosecution  by  the  defendant  of  suits  for 
the  infringement  of  the  patent.-^^  Where  a  plaintiff  is  bringing 
suits  upon  the  same  patent  against  different  defendants,  who  rely 
upon  the  same  defenses,  the  court  may  stay  proceedings  in  all  but 
one  till  the  validity  of  the  patent  has  been  finally  determined  in 
the  excepted  case.^^  But  where  some  of  the  defendauts  set  up 
different  defenses,  it  was  held  that  the  court  "  could  not  restrain 
in  part  and  permit  in  part  the  prosecution  of  the  cases.  It  would 
have  no  right  to  issue  an  injunction  which  should  [sic]  have  the 
effect  to  split  up  the  cases,  enjoining  their  prosecution  as  to  some 
branches  of  the  controversy  and  permitting  it  as  to  the  others."  ^■'^ 
An  injunction  order  providing  "  that  all  suits  and  proceedings 
on  the  part  of "  certain  persons  "  against  the  said  bankrupt,  to 
collect  the  debt  set  forth,  be,  and  tbe  same  are  hereby  stayed,  to 
await  the  determination  of  the  Court  in  bankruptcy  on  the  ques- 
tion of  the  discharge  therein,"  was  held  violated  by  those  who, 
after  discontinuing  a  suit  then  pending,  subsequently  instituted 
another  to  recover  the  same  claim,  with  new  allegations  charging 
fraud.3-1 

§  212.  Injunctions  to  restrain  the  Alienation  of  Property.  —  lu- 
junctions  may  be  obtained  to  prevent  the  alieuation  of  property 
"  where  it  would  work  irremediable  or  gross  injustice."  ^  An 
injunction  will,  therefore,  issue  to  prevent  the  transfer  of  notes, 
bills  of  exchange,  and  other  documents,  whether  negotiable  or 
not,  whose  possession  gives  their  holder  a  presumptive  title  to 
the  rights  which  they  evidence,^  when  obtained  from  the  plain- 

28  Love  y.  Baker,  1  Cli.  Cas.  07,  flec'ided  •''■-  Birdsell   v.    Hagerstowii    Afj.    Imp. 

b\' Lord  Clarendon  ;  but  the  reporter  add-  Man.  (^o.,  1  IIuf;hes,64;  Kninford  Cliein- 

ed,  "  sfid  qnare,  for  all   the   bar   was   of  ical  Works  c.  Hecker,  5  Off.  Gaz.  C44  ; 

another  opinion.''  Allis  r.  Stowell,  10  Fed.  R.  78:> ;  Nat.  Cash 

2"  Banbury  >k  Bunbury,   1    Beav.  ol8;  Retjister  Co   v.  Boston  Cash  I.  &  R.  Co, 

Pehon    V.  Foster,  4  Allen  (Mass.),   545.  41  Fed.  R.  51. 

Enfiel  V.  Sclieuerman,  40  Ga.  '20Q;  Massie  ^^  Dyer,  .1.,  in  Allis  v.  Stowell,  16  Fed. 

V.  Watts,  0  Cranch,  148.  R.  788"  700. 

3'  Vail  V.  Knapp,  49  Barb.  (X.Y.),299;  ^*  In  tlie  Matter  of  Schwarz,  14   Fed. 

Story's  Eq.  Jnr.  §§  81)9,  900.  R.  787. 

31 'United  States  v.  Colgate,  21  Fed.  R.  §  -^12.  ^  Story's  Eq.  Jur.  §  953. 

318.  2  Osborn   v.    United    States   Bank,   9 


§  213.]  INJUNCTIONS  TO   PREVENT   WASTE.  353 

tiff  bj  the  defendant  through  duress,  fraud,  or  other  iniquity ;  or 
when  forged ;  ^  or  when,  though  the  holder  may  have  properly 
obtained  them,  he  threatens  or  is  about  to  use  them  in  an  in- 
equitable manner.*  An  injunction  may  be  granted  to  prevent  a 
party  from  making  vexatious  alienations  of  land  pending  a  suit 
concerning  the  title  to  the  same.^  For  it  was  said  that,  otherwise, 
the  plaintiff  might  be  put  to  the  expense  of  making  each  vendee 
or  grantor  a  party  to  the  proceedings  ;  and,  at  all  events,  his 
title,  if  he  prevails  in  the  suit,  may  be  embarrassed  by  the  new 
outstanding  claims  of  title  under  the  threatened  transfer.^  The 
sale  or  transfer,'  or  removal  beyond  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  ^ 
of  a  chattel,  the  loss  of  which  could  not  be  compensated  in 
damages,  may  also  be  thus  restrained ;  and  so  has  been  the  sale 
of  other  personal  property.^  Injunctions  have  also  been  granted 
at  the  suit  of  a  part-owner  to  prevent  the  sailing  of  a  ship  until 
his  share  could  be  ascertained,  and  a  bond  given  to  secure  him 
against  loss  upon  the  voyage ;  ^^  to  prevent  the  removal  of  timber 
wrongfully  cut  down  ;  ^^  and  to  prevent  the  trustees  of  a  dissent- 
ing chapel  from  appointing  as  a  minister  a  person  not  duly  quali- 
fied according  to  its  constitution.^^ 

§  213.  Injunctions  to  prevent  Waste.  —  An  injunction  will  isSue 
to  prevent  waste,  whether  legal  or  purely  equitable. ^  Waste  is  a 
permanent  injury  to  real  estate  committed  by  a  person  in  pos- 
session with  a  limited  interest  in  the  same.  Legal  waste  consists 
of  such  acts  as  would  be  considered  waste  at  common  law; 
equitable  waste,  of  such  acts  as  at  law  would  not,  under  the  cir- 
cumstances of  the  case,  be  considered  waste,  but  which  are  so 

Wlieat.   738,   845 ;    Lloyd   v.   Gurdon,  2  »  Bateau  v.  Bernard,  3  Blatchf.  244  ; 

Swanst.  180;  Hood  v.  Aston,  1  Russ.  412  ;  Higgins  v.  Jenks,  3  Ware,  17. 

Lord  Cliedwortli  c.  Edwards,  8  Ves.  46  ;  lo  Haly  r.  Goodson,  2  Mer.  77 ;  Christie 

Reeve  v.  Parkins,  2  J.  &  W.  .390;  Scher-  v.  Craig,  2  Mer.  137.     But  see  Wilkinson 

merhorn  v.  L'Espenasse,  2  Dall.  360.  v.  Dobbie,  12  Blatchf.  298. 

8  Esdaile  v.  La  Naiize,  1  Y.  &  C.  394.  "  Bradley  i;.  Reed,  2  Pittsb.  (Pa.)  519; 

4  Anon.,  6Madd.  10.  Anon.,  1  Ves.  Jr.  93;   Daniell'a  Ch.  Pr. 

£  Daly  V.  Kelly,  4   Dow,  417;    Echliff  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1874. 

V.  Baldwin,  16  Ves.  267.     But  see  Turner  i^  Milligan  r.  Mitchell,  1  M.  &  K.  446. 

t.  Wight,4Beav.  40.  §  213.     i  Garths.  Cotton,  1   Dickens, 

6  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1873.  183  ;  Thruston  i-.  Mustin,  3  Cranch  C.  C. 

7  Gibson  V.  Lewis,  11  Phila.  (Pa.)  476;  335;  United  States  v.  Gear,  3  How.  120; 
Lady  Arundell  y.  Phipps,  10  Ves.  139;  Fletcher  ?•.  New  Orleans  N.  E.  R.  R.  Co., 
Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  cd.)  1872.  20  Fed.  R.  345 ;  Lanier  v.  Alison,  31  Fed. 

8  Green  v.  Hanberry,  2    Brock.   403  ;  R.  100 ;  Bispham's  Eq.  §§  429-432. 
Haly  V.  Goodson,  2  Mer.   77 ;  Christie  v. 

Craig,  2  Mer.  187. 
VOL.  I.  —  23 


354  INJUNCTIONS.  [chap.  XVI. 

esteemed  in  the  view  of  a  court  of  equity,  from  their  manifest 
injury  to  the  inheritance,  though  not  inconsistent  with  the  legal 
rights  of  the  party  committing  tliem.^  Such  is  wilful  and  wanton 
injury  to  land  committed  by  a  tenant  without  impeachment  for 
waste.^  The  interference  of  equity  in  cases  of  this  kind  is  justi- 
fied, not  only  by  the  fear  of  irremediable  injury,  but  also  because 
the  tenant  for  life  or  years  is  considered  to  stand  in  a  trust  rela- 
tion toward  the  remainder-man.  So  anxious  is  equity  to  prevent 
waste,  that  it  has  sustained  a  bill  praying  such  an  injunction  filed 
in  behalf  of  a  child  in  its  mother's  womb.'*  An  iuj unction  will 
be  granted  to  restrain  acts  in  the  nature  of  waste  committed  by 
one  in  possession  of  land  the  title  to  which  is  in  litigation.^  It 
has  been  held  that  an  applicant  for  the  purchase  of  government 
land  whose  claim  is  disputed  in  the  land  office  cannot  obtain  an 
injunction  to  prevent  acts  of  waste  by  county  officers.*^ 

§  214.  Injunctions  to  prevent  the  Continuance  of  a  Nuisance.  — 
The  interference  of  equity  to  enjoin  the  continuance  of  a  nui- 
sance is  not  only  due  to  the  fact  that  the  acts  complained  of 
produce  irre])arable  injury,  but  also  is  allowed  to  prevent  the 
multiplicity  of  suits  that  would  be  necessary  were  the  jjlaintiff 
confined  to  his  remedy  at  common  law.^  Nuisances  are  of  two 
kinds :  those  which  are  injurious  to  the  public  at  large,  and 
those  which  are  injurious  to  the  rights  and  interests  of  private 
persons.^  The  use  of  this  remedy  to  suppress  a  public  nuisance 
is  of  very  ancient  date.^  It  was  applicable  in  England,  both  to 
nuisances  strictly  so  called  and  to  purpre8tures.  "  By  jnirpres- 
ture  is  meant,  in  its  present  acceptation,  an  incroachment  upon 
the  Crown,  either  upon  part  of  the  demesne  lands,  or  upon  the 
high  roads,  rivers,  j)orts,  or  streets ;  and  the  difference  between 
purprcstures  and  nuisances  consists  in  this,  that  where  the  jus 
jyrivatum  of  the  Crown  is  invaded  it  is  a  j)urpresture.,  but  where 
the  jus  p)uhUcum  is  violated  it  is  a  nuisance.     In  cases  of  pur- 

2  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2cl  Am.  ed.)  1854,  ^  United  St;ites  v.  Parrott,  1  IMcAll. 
1855.  271 ;  Lanier  v.  Alison,  .31  Fed.  R.  100. 

3  Vane  v.  Lord  Barnard,  2  Vern.  738  ;  ^  McBride  v.  Board  of  Commissioners 
Garth  ?;.  Sir  Jolm  Hind  Cotton,  1  Dickens,  of  Pierce  Countj-  44  Fed.  R.  17. 

183;    s.  0.  1   Wiiite  &  Tudor's  Leading  §  214.     ^  Fislnnongers'  Co.  v.  East  In- 

Cases  in  Equity  (Gth  ed.),  806 ;  Bispham's  dia  Co.,  1  Dickens,  lOM  ;  Attorney-General 

Eq.  §  4.34.  V.  Nicbol,  16  Vcs.  3.38,  .34-3. 

*  Miiscrrave   r.   Parry,  2   Vern.  710;  2  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1857. 

Lutterel's  Case,  cited  Free.  Ch.  50;  3  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1857. 
Scattervvood   v.  Edge,   1    Salk.   229. 


§  214.]   TO  PEEVEXT  THE  CONTIXUAXCE  OF  A  NUISANCE.      355 

prcsture  the  remedy  is  cither  by  infovniation  for  an  intrusion  at 
the  common  law,  or  by  information  in  equity  at  the  suit  of  the 
attorney-general.  The  consequence  of  a  judgment  at  common 
law  being  the  abatement  of  the  erection  or  grievance  complained 
of,  whether  it  is  or  is  not  a  nuisance,  whilst  upon  an  information 
in  equity,  where  the  trespass  does  not  produce  any  })ublic  injury, 
the  court  may  direct  an  inquiry  whether  it  is  most  beneficial  to 
the  Crown  to  abate  the  purpresture,  or  to  suffer  the  erection  to 
remain  and  be  assessed  as  a  part  of  the  legal  revenue."  *  Cases 
of  j)ublic  nuisance  may  be  enjoined  at  the  suit  of  the  attorney- 
general,  who  in  England  sues  by  information.^  A  public  nuisance 
may  also  be  restrained  at  the  suit  of  any  who  have  suffered  by  it 
special  damage  distinct  from  that  which  it  causes  to  the  public 
at  large  ;  but  not  otherwise.^  A  bill,  for  example,  may  be  filed 
by  a  State  to  enjoin  the  erection  of  a  bridge  across  a  navigable 
stream  which  will  injure  her  commerce;'  but  not  by  a  city  for 
a  similar  reason,^  unless  its  property,  for  example,  a  wharf,  is 
thereby  injured.^  The  United  States  may  obtain  an  injunction 
against  a  nuisance  which  threatens  injury  to  works  in  aid  of  com- 
merce which  are  constructed  under  the  authority  of  the  national 
government. ^°  A  private  nuisance  is  an  act,  or  series  of  acts, 
unaccompanied  by  an  act  of  trespass,  which  causes  a  substantial 
injury  to  a  person's  property,  health,  or  comfort.  It  will  always 
be  restrained  when  it  would  otherwise  cause  an  irreparable  injury 
or  a  multiplicity  of  suits.^^  "  It  used  to  be  thought,  that  if  a  man 
knew  there  was  a  nuisance,  and  went  and  lived  near  it,  he  could 
not  recover,  because,  it  was  said,  it  is  he  that  goes  to  the  nuisance, 
and  not  the  nuisance  to  him.     This,  however,  is  not  the  law 


*  Daniell's  Cli.  Pr.  (id  Am.  ed)  1857.  ^  Georgetown  r.  Alexandria  Canal  Co., 

citing   Attorney-General    i'.    Richards,  2  12  Pet.  91. 

Anst.  G03;  Attorney-General  r.  Johnson,  9  St.  Louis  r.  Knapp  Co.,  104   U.   S. 

2  J.  Wil.  87.     See  also   United   States  v.  658. 

Gear,  3  How.  120.  ^>  United  States  v.  Mississippi  &  R.  R. 

&  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am  ed.)  1858  Boom   Co,  3  Fed.  R.  548;    s.  c.   1  Mc- 

8  Baines  v.  Baker,  Anib.  158 ;  Missis-  Crary,  601. 
Bippi  &  Missouri  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ward,  2  "  Osburne  v.  Barter  &  Goddins,  anno 
Black,  485;  Georgetown  v.  Alexandria  26  Eliz.,  Choyce  Cases  in  Chancery  (ed. 
Canal  Co.,  12  Pet.  91  ;  Irwin  v.  Dixion,  9  of  1870),  p.  176  ;  Parker  f.  Winnipiseogee 
How.  10;  Spooner  v.  McConnell,  1  Mc-  Lake  C.  &  W.  Co.,  2  Black,  545;  Wood- 
Lean,  337  ;  Works  v.  Junction  R.  R.,  5  ruff  v  North  Bloomfield  Gravel  Mining 
McLean,  425.  Co.',  18  Fed.  R.  753;  St.  Helen's  Smelting 

^  Pennsylvania!'.  Wlieeling&  Belmont  Co.  y.  Tipping,  11  H.  L.  C.  642. 
Bridge  Co.,  13  How.  518. 


356  INJUNCTIONS.  [chap.  xyi. 

now."  ^2  Formerly,  an  injunction  was  rarely  issued  to  restrain  a 
nuisance  until  the  plaintiff's  right  of  action  had  been  established 
at  law ;  "  but  now  a  suit  at  law  is  no  longer  a  necessary  prelimi- 
nary, and  the  right  to  an  injunction,  in  a  proper  case,  in  England 
and  most  of  the  States,  is  just  as  fixed  and  certain  as  the  right  to 
any  other  provisional  remedy."  ^^  Formerly,  it  was  a  fundamen- 
tal objection  to  an  order  for  an  injunction  to  restrain  a  nuisance 
to  land  when  the  legal  title  was  disputed,  that  the  order  con- 
tained no  provision  for  putting  the  question  in  a  course  of  legal 
investigation.^* 

§  215.  Injunctions  to  restrain  Trespass.  —  Injunctions  to  restrain 
trespass  are  of  quite  recent  origin.  The  first  that  is  to  be  found 
in  the  books  was  granted  by  Lord  Thurlow.^  They  are  only 
granted  when  the  trespass  is  destructive  or  continuous.  The 
rule  upon  the  subject  has  been  thus  stated  by  yice-Chancellor 
Kindersley  :  "  Where,  therefore,  the  plaintiff  is  in  possession  and 
the  person  doing  the  acts  complained  of  is  an  utter  stranger, 
not  claiming  under  color  of  right,  the  tendency  of  the  court 
is  not  to  grant  an  injunction,  unless  there  are  special  circum- 
stances, but  to  leave  the  plaintiff  to  his  remedy  at  law;  though, 
where  the  acts  tend  to  the  destruction  of  the  estate,  the  court 
will  grant  it.^  But  where  the  party  in  possession  seeks  to  re- 
strain one  who  claims  by  adverse  title,  then  the  tendency  will  be 
to  grant  the  injunction,  at  least  where  the  acts  done  either  did  or 
might  tend  to  the  destruction  of  the  estate."  ^  The  destruction 
of  credit  by  an  illegal  seizure  of  one's  stock  in  trade,"*  and  the 
injury  to  a  farm  done  by  the  illegal  taking  of  all  tlie  stock  and 
tools  upon  it,  have  been  held  instances  of  such  irreparable  injury.^ 
An  attempt  by  a  railroad  company  to  build  its  road  upon  private 
property  without   payment  of  compensation,  may  be  thus  pre- 

^'-  Byles,  J.,  in  Hole  v.  Barlow,  4  C.  B.  Lord  Eldon  in  Hanson  v.  Gardiner,  7  Yes. 

y.  s.  .334.     See  St.  Helen's  Smelting  Co.  305.    For    injunctions   against    the   col- 

V.  Tipping,  11  H.  L.  C.  642;  Campbell  v.  lection  of  an  illegal  tax,  see  supra,  §  12. 

Seaman,  15.3  N.  Y.  568.  2  See  Jerome  i'.  Boss,  7  J.  Ch.  (N.  Y.) 

18  Judge  Earl  in  Campbell  r.  Seaman,  315;  Troy  &  B.   R.   R.  Co.  r.  Boston,  H. 

63  N.  Y.  508,  582.    See,  bowever,  Irwin  r.  T.   &  W.   Ry.  Co.  86  N.  Y.    107;    Van 

Dixion,  9  How.  10 ;  Murtagh  v.  Pbiladel-  Norden  v.  Morton,  99  U.  S.  378. 

phia,  1  Weekly  Notes  of  Cases,  37.     But  ^  Lowndes  v.  Bettle,  33  L.  J.  Ch.  4G1. 

see  McBride  v.  Board  of  Commissioners  *  Watson  v.   Sutherland,  5  AVall.  74  ; 

of  Pierce  County,  44  Fed.  R.  17.  Cropper  v.  Coburn,  2  Curt.  465  ;  North 

"  Harman  v.  Jones.    Cr.  &   Ph.  299;  t-.  Peters,  1-38  U.  S.  271. 

Sanxter  v.  Foster,  Cr.  &  Ph.  802.  ^  Breeden  v.  Lee,  2  Hughes,  484. 
§  215.      1  Flamang's    case,  cited    by 


§  216.]         TO   RESTRAIN   THE   INFRINGEMENT   OF   PATENTS.  357 

vented.^  It  is  not  certain,  M^hether  tlie  fact  that  a  person  who 
threatens  to  commit  a  wrong  is  insolvent  and  unable  to  pay  any 
damages  which  could  be  recovered  at  law,  is  in  itself  a  sufficient 
ground  for  the  interference  of  equity  by  injunction;  but  the 
weight  of  authority  seems  to  hold  that  it  isJ  It  was  held,  where 
there  was  a  dispute  as  to  the  possession  and  as  to  right  to  the 
possession  of  a  railroad  track,  that  the  court  would  not  interfere 
by  injunction  to  assist  in  "  a  scramble  for  possession."  ^  A  num- 
ber of  cases  decided  in  the  courts  of  different  States  hold  that  an 
injunction  cannot  be  obtained  to  restrain  an  illegal  arrest;  since 
it  is  said  that  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  followed  by  an  action  for 
damages  always  affords  an  adequate  remedy  for  any  injury  re- 
sulting therefrom ;  ^  but  if  the  result  of  the  arrests  would  be  an 
irreparable  injury  to  the  business  of  the  complainant,  an  injunc- 
tion might  perhaps  be  issued.^'^ 

§  216.  Injuuctious  to  restrain  the  Infringement  of  Patents.  — 
Injunctions  to  restrain  the  infringement  of  patents  and  copy- 
rights are  of  ancient  use  in  equity.  They  are  founded  upon  both 
the  irreparable  injury  that  would  otherwise  be  caused  to  the  com- 
plainant, and  the  desire  of  the  court  to  prevent  a  multiplicity  of 
suits. 1  This  inherent  power  of  the  courts  is  confirmed  in  the 
United  States  by  statute.  The  provision  of  the  Revised  Statutes 
authorizing  injunctions  to  restrain  the  infringement  of  patents  is 


«  Northern  Pacific  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Burling-  «  St.  Louis,    K.    C.    &  C.  Ry.   Co.   v. 

ton  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.,2  McCrary,  203;  s.  c.  Dewees,  2.i   Feil.  R.   691.    See   Latham 

4  Fed.  R.  298.     See  also  Missouri,  K.  &  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  45  Fed.  R.  721. 

T.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Texas  &  St.  Louis  Ry.  Co.,  ^  Cohen   v.  Commissioners   of   Gokls- 

10  Fed.  R.  497.  boro,  77  N.  C.  2  ;  Burnett  v.  Craig,  30 

"  Connolly  v.  Belt,  5  Craneli  C.  C.  405;  Ala.  135;  Burch  v.  Cavanaugh,  12  Abb. 

M'Elroy  i*.  Kansas  City,  21   Fed.  R.  257,  Pr.  n.  s.  (N.  Y.)  410;  Davis  v.  American 

262;  Agar  v.  Regent's  Canal  Co.,  cited  in  Society  for  Prevention  of  Cruelty  to  An- 

1  Swanst.    250;  Musselman   v.   Marquis,  imals,  6  Daly  (N.  Y.),  81  ;  s.  c.  on  appeal, 

1  Bush  (Ky.),  463  ;  Hicks  v.  Compton,  18  75  N.  Y.  .362.    See  also  Yick  Wo  v.  Crow- 

Cal.  206  ;  Britton  v.  Hill,  12   C.  E.  Green  ley,  26  Fed.  R.  207 ;  and  supra,  §  211. 

(N.  J.),  389;  Lloyd  (!.  Heath,  Busbee'sEq.  i"  Louisiana  State  Lottery  Co  w.  Fitz- 

(N.  C.)  39;  Cause  v.  Perkins, 3  .Jones  Eq.  patrick,  3  Woods,  222  ;  Dinsmore  v.  New 

(N.   C.)  177;  Chesapeake  &  Ohio  R.  R.  York  Board  of  Police,  12  Abb.  N.  Cas. 

Co.  V.  Patton,  5  W.  Va.   234  ;  Bispham's  (N.  Y.)  436 ;  Manhattan  Iron  Works  Co. 

Eq.  §  436;  Caro  v.  Met.  El.  Ry.    Co.,  40  v.  French,  12  Abb.  N.  Cas.  (N.  Y.)  440. 

N.  Y.  Super.  Ct.  138.     Contra,  Heilman  v.  §  216.    i  Eden  on  Injunctions,  chs.  xii. 

The  Union  Canal   Co.,  37  Pa.  St.  100;  and  xiii. ;  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (.5th  Am.  ed.) 

Thompson    v.    Williams,    1    Jones    Eq.  1G42-1648;   Hogg  m.  Kirby.  8   Ves.  215; 

(N.  C.)  176;  Nessle   v.   Reese,    19  Abb.  Wilkins  r.  Aikin,  17  Ves.  422. 
Pr.  (N.  Y.)  240;    Higli   on   Injunctions, 
§18. 


358  INJUNCTIONS.  [chap.  xvi. 

as  follows  :  "  The  several  courts  vested  with  jurisdiction  of  cases 
arising-  under  the  patent  laws  shall  have  power  to  grant  injunc- 
tions according  to  the  course  and  princi})les  of  courts  of  equity, 
to  prevent  the  violation  of  any  right  secured  by  a  patent,  ujion 
such  terms  as  the  court  may  deem  reasonable  ;  and  upon  a  decree 
being  rendered  in  any  such  case  for  an  infringement,  the  com- 
plainant sliall  be  entitled  to  recover,  in  addition  to  the  profits  to 
be  accounted  for  by  the  defendant,  the  damages  the  complainant 
has  sustained  thereby ;  and  the  court  shall  assess  the  same  or 
cause  the  same  to  be  assessed  under  its  direction.  And  the 
court  shall  have  the  same  power  to  increase  such  damages,  in  its 
discretion,  as  is  given  to  increase  damages  found  by  verdicts  in 
actions  in  the  nature  of  actions  of  trespass  upon  the  case,"^  It 
seems  to  have  been  formerly  the  oi)inioii  that  courts  of  equity 
would  not  interfere  to  protect  a  patent  right  by  injunction,  until 
the  right  had  been  establislied  at  law;  but  since  Lord  Ehlon's 
time  their  jurisdiction  to  thus  interfere,  when  tlie  title  of  a 
complainant  is  established  l)y  the  ])reponderance  of  evidence, 
has  been  undisj)uted.-'^  In  a  recent  case  Judge  Lowell  said : 
"The  princi})lcs  which  govern  courts  in  granting  or  refusing 
preliminary  injunctions  in  })ateiit  cases  are  well  established.  As 
a  general  rule,  if  the  plaintiff  had  made  out  a  clear  title,  and  the 
question  of  iiifi'ingemcnt  lu'esents  no  difiiculty,  an  injunction 
will  be  granted.  The  hearing  is  had  u{)on  e.r-  'parte  affidavits, 
and  if  the  questions  to  be  decided  are  difficult  and  complicated, 
especially  if  they  involve  disputed  facts  which  have  never  been 
passed  ujion  by  a  court  or  jury,  then,  although  the  court  may 
be  inclined  to  think  the  complainant  is  right,  yet  it  will  not 
interfere  at  this  stage  of  the  cause,  whether  the  questions  relate 
to  title  or  to  infringement.  And  even  where  the  title  is  clear, 
yet  if  there  are  peculiar  circumstances  which  show  that  the 
defendant's  interests  would  be  injuriously  affected  by  an  injunc- 
tion, while  thoso  of  tlie  plaintiff  would  not  be  so  affected  by 
refusing  it,  it  may  1»(^  refused.  8uch  were  the  cases  of  Howe 
V,  Morton,  Fisher's  Pat.  Cases,  vol.  i.  o8G,  decided  by  Judge 
Sprague,  and  the  Burring-machine  cuf^c,  Morris  \.  Loivell  3I'f^g 

■-  U.S.  H.  S.  §  4021.     See  .w/>m,  §§  77,  Tliompson,    ."^  Meriv.    022;    Pierpont  v. 

144.  '  Fowle,  2  W.  &  M.   2:1;  Motto  ?•.  Bennett, 

■*  Universities    of    Oxforil    .and    Cam-  2  Fisher,  042 ;  Kerr  on  Iiijimctions,  272. 
bridge  v.  Ricliardson,  G  Ves.  089;  Hill  v. 


§  216]         TO   KESTRAIN   THE   INFRINGEMENT   OF   PATENTS.  359 

Co.,  Fisher's  Pat.  Cases,  vol.  iii.  67,  which  came  before  me  ;  in 
both  of  which  the  patent  was  about  to  expire,  and  the  defend- 
ant's business  would  be  very  seriously  interfered  with  for  the  few 
weeks  that  the  exclusive  right  would  remain  in  force,  only  to  be 
resumed  again  immediately  afterward  at  great  expense  and  loss. 
There  is,  therefore,  always  an  element  of  discretion  entering  into 
the  consideration  of  this  question,  and  all  that  a  complainant  is 
entitled  to  is  the  best  judgment  of  the  court  upon  a  question  of 
judicial  discretion,  and  not  absolutely  to  an  injunction  on  any 
given  state  of  facts.  .  .  .  These  cases  being  tried,  as  I  have 
said,  on  ex  parte  evidence,  must  be  decided  on  broad  views  of 
the  riglits  of  the  parties.  It  is  usual  to  present  proof,  either 
of  long  and  general  acquiescence  in  the  plaintiff's  exclusive 
rights,  or  of  tlieir  having  been  sustained  by  the  courts.  The 
ground  on  which  acquiescence  is  important  is  that  it  shows 
exclusive  possession,  which,  if  it  has  been  of  long  standing,  open 
and  notorious,  is  a  clear  foundation  of  a  presumption  of  title. 
It  is  not  always,  however,  so  satisfactory  as  positive  adjudica- 
tions, because  it  may  have  arisen  from  the  comparatively  small 
commercial  value  of  the  invention,  and  in  that  case  shows  only 
that  no  one  has  thought  it  worth  infringing."  *  If  serious  public 
inconvenience  would  result  from  a  preliminary  injunction,  the 
application  may  be  denied.^  If  previous  adjudications  in  the 
same  or  other  Circuit  Courts  have  established  the  validity  of 
the  plaintiff's  patent,  a  preliminary  injunction  will  be  granted 
him  almost  as  of  course  in  a  subsequent  suit,  to  prevent  the 
infringement  of  the  same  by  a  person  not  a  party  to  tliose  suits,^ 
unless  the  latter  can  produce  new  evidence,'  or  show  that  such 
judgments  were  obtained  by   consent,   collusion,  or  fraud.^     In 

1  Potter  V.  Whitney,  1   Lowell,  87,  88,  5  Fisher,  130;  Kirby  Bung  Jlanuf.  Co.  v. 

89,     See  also  Hill  r.  Thompson,  3  Meriv.  White,  1  Fed.   R.  604 ;  High  on   Injunc- 

622  ;  Wasliburn  &  Moen  Manuf.  Co.    v.  tions,  §§  953-950 ;  Kerr  on  Injunctions, 

Haish,  4  Fed.   R.  900;  Foster  v.  Moore,  273.     Rut  see  Many  i-.  Sizer,  1  Fisiier  Pat. 

1  Curt.  279 ;  McKay  r.  Dibert,  5  Fed.  R.  Cas.  31. 

587  "  Page  v.  Holmes  Burglar  Alarm  Tel. 

*  Southwestern  Brush  E.  L.  &  P.  Co.  Co.,   2    Fed.    R.   300;  s.    c.    18    Blatchf. 

V  Louisiana  El.   L.   Co.,  45  Fed.  R.  893 ;  118. 

Bliss  V.  City  of  Brooklyn,  4  Fisher's  Pat.  ^  American  Nicolson  Pavement  Co.  v. 

Cas.  59G;    Robinson  on   Patents,  §    1200  City  of  Elizabeth,  4  Fisher,  189;  Pager, 

and  cases  cited.  H.  B.  A.  Tel.  Co.,  2  Fed.  R.  330  ;  Amer- 

6  Newall    V.    Wilson,  2    DeG.,  M.  &  G.  ican    Middlings  Purifier    Co.  v.    Vail,  15 

280;  Orr  v.   Littlefield,   1   W.   &   i\I.  13;  Blatchf.  315.     But  see  Orri-.  Littlefield, 

Thayer  v.   Wales,  9  Blatchf.   170  ;  s.  c.  1  W.  &  M.  13. 


360  INJUNCTIONS.  [chap.  xvi. 

such  cases  the  courts  will  usually  examine  only  the  question  of 
the  infringement.^  But  it  may,  and  before  granting  a  perpetual 
injunction  often  does,  reconsider  the  whole  question.^^  Other- 
wise, however,  when  the  patent  is  of  recent  issue,  and  its  validity 
is  denied  by  sufficient  evidence  to  raise  a  reasonable  doubt  in  the 
mind  of  the  judge  as  to  a  question  either  of  fact  or  of  law;  a 
preliminary  injunction  will  usually  be  refused  ;^^  although  now 
that,  in  the  Federal  courts,  the  same  judges  sit  both  at  law  and 
in  equity,  and  when  sitting  in  equity  have  the  power  to  submit  a 
disputed  question  of  fact  to  a  jury,  such  a  court  usually  deter- 
mines the  whole  question  upon  its  final  decree,  without  adopting 
the  circuitous  method  of  first  directing  a  trial  at  law.^^  Formerly 
the  custom  was,  when  any  doubt  remained  in  the  mind  of  the 
court  after  the  final  hearing,  to  deny  the  complainant  a  perpetual 
injunction  at  that  time  ;  but  to  direct  that  the  cause  "  stand  over 
a  reasonable  time  for  the  bringing  of  a  suit  at  law  against  the 
defendants  for  an  infringement ;  and,  if  such  a  suit  is  brought, 
until  a  sufficient  time  for  the  trial  thereof  has  elapsed.  And  if, 
in  such  suit,  there  shall  be  final  judgment  for  the  ]>laintiffs,  they 
will  be  entitled  to  a  decree  for  injunction  and  account,  as  prayed 
for  in  the  bill ;  and  if,  in  such  suit,  thei'c  shall  be  final  judgment 
for  the  defendants,  the  bill  will  be  dismissed  with  costs ;  and  so, 
also,  it  will  be  dismissed  with  costs  on  an  aj)plication  of  the 
defendants,  if  such  suit  is  not  brought  within  a  reasonai>le  time, 
and  prosecuted  with  reasonable  diligence."  ^'^  An  ex  parte  appli- 
cation for  an  injunction  to  restrain  the  infringement  of  a  patent 
should,  it  seems,  be  supported  by  an  affidavit,  or  an  allegation  in 
a  bill  verified  by  affidavit  of  the  plaintiff,  stating  that  he  believes 
that  the  person  to  whom  the  patent  was  issued  was  the  original 
invcnt-or  thereof,  or  that  the  invention  was  new,  or  had  not  been 

"  Robertson    v.   Hill,    G    Fislier,  465;  Fisher  Pat.   Cas.   181;  Mowry  y.  Grand 

Odorless  E.xcavating   Co.  v.  Lauman,  12  Street  &  N.  R.  Co.,  10  Blatchf.  89  ;  s.  c.  5 

Fed.  R.  788.  Fisher,  586 ;  Smith  v.  Cummings,  1  Fislier 

ii^  Many  I'.  Sizer,  1  Fisher  Pat.  Cas.  31  ;  Pat.   Cas.   152  ;  IMcGuire  v.   Fames,    15 

Day  f.  Hartshorn,  .3  Fisher,  32;  Parker  Blatchf.  312  ;  Kirby  Bmig  Manuf.  Co.  v. 

V.  Sears,  1  Fisher   Pat.  Cas.  93 ;  Poppen-  Wiiite,  1  Fed.  R.  (;64. 

husen  v.  Faulko,  4  Blatclif .  4!»3 ;  Sargent  i-  See  Pierpont  v.   Fowle,   2  W.  &  M. 

Manuf.  Co.  v.  Woodruff,  5  Biss.  444.  23,  30. 

"  Parker  v.  Sears,  1  Fisher  Pat.  Cas.  '''  Judge  Hall  in  Muscan   Hair  Manu- 

93;  American  Nicolson  Pavement  Co.  ?-.  facturing  Co.    v.    American    Hair  iManu- 

City  of  Klizabeth,  4  Fisher,  189;  Dodge  facturing   Co.,    1    Fisher   Pat.   Cas.   320, 

t'.  Card,  2  Fisher,   116;  Sullivan   v.  Red-  325. 
field,  1  Paine,  441 ;  Winans  v.   Eaton,  1 


§  217.]      TO   RESTRAIN   THE  INFRINGEMENT   OF   COPYRIGHTS.  361 

introduced  into  public  use  in  the  United  States  for  more  than  two 
years  prior  to  the  application  upon  which  the  patent  was  issued.^* 
After  the  expiration  of  a  patent  an  injunction  inay  issue  to  pre- 
vent the  use  of  a  machine  made  while  the  patent  was  in  force ; 
and  an  injunction  previously  issued  will,  until  dissolved  by  order, 
remain  in  force  so  as  still  to  forbid  such  a  use.^^  But  a  bill 
praying-  for  such  an  injunction  must  allege  either  that  the  de- 
fendant is  using  macliincs  manufactured  during  the  term  of  the 
patent  and  in  violation  of  it,  or  that  the  plaintiff  has  cause  to 
fear  such  a  usc.^''  An  injunction  against  the  manufacture  or  sale 
of  articles  in  violation  of  a  patent  right  is  violated  by  their  sale 
or  manufacture  within  the  United  States,  but  beyond  the  juris- 
diction of  the  court.^''  "  In  deciding  whether  a  given  complainant 
has  made  out  a  prima  facie  case  for  a  preliminary  injunction  to 
restrain  infringement  of  a  patent,  the  judge  is  guided  by  the 
presence  or  absence  of  two  presumptions  and  one  certainty. 
Those  presumptions  relate  to  the  validity  of  the  patent  and  to 
the  defendant's  infringement  thereof,  and  that  certainty  relates 
to  the  complainant's  title  thereto.  If  that  certainty  or  either  of 
those  presumptions  are  absent  in  a  given  case,  no  preliminary 
injunction  will  be  granted ;  but  such  a  writ  will  not  be  granted 
whore  they  are  all  present,  unless  the  defendant  interposes  some 
good  defence  to  the  motion,  or  unless  the  court  takes  a  bond  from 
the  defendant  instead  of  subjecting  him  to  an  injunction."  ^^ 

§  217.  Injunctions  to  restrain  the  Infringement  of  Copyrights.  — 
The  Revised  Statutes  authorize  injunctions  to  prevent  the  in- 
fringement of  copyrights,  as  follows  :  "  The  circuit  courts,  and 
district  courts  having  the  jurisdiction  of  circuit  courts,  shall  have 
powder,  upon  bill  in  equity,  filed  by  any  party  aggrieved,  to  grant 
injunctions  to  prevent  the  violation  of  any  right  secured  by  the 
laws  respecting  copyrights,  according  to  the  course  and  prin- 
ciples of  courts  of  equity,  on  such  terms  as  the  court  may  deem 
reasonable."  ^     This  statute  is,  however,  merely  declaratory  of 


^*  Hill   V.  Thompson,   3  Meriv.    622  ;  house  v.  Carpenter,  4.3  Fed.  1\.  894 ;  infrn, 

Sturz  V.  De  La  Rue,  5  Kuss.  322,  329 ;  §  230. 

Sullivan  v.  Kedfiekl,  1    Paine,  441 ;  Q.  S.  ^'^  American  Diamond  Rock  Borinc;  Co. 

R.  S.  §§  4886,  4887.  v  Rutland  Marhle  Co.,  2  Fed.  R.  355. 

1^  American  Diamond  Rock  Boring  Co.  i"  Macaulay  v.  White  Sewing  Machine 

V.  Rutland  Marhle  Co.,  2  F\'d.  R.  3.5(5.  But  Co.,  1)  Fed.  R.  098. 

see  American  Cable  Ry.  Co.  v.  Chicago  ^^  Walker  on  Patent?,  §  6G5. 

City  Ry.  Co.,  41  Fed.  R.  522  ;  Westing-  §  217.  i  U  S.  R.  S  §  4970. 


362  INJUNCTIONS.  [chap.  XVI. 

the  previous  rule  in  equity  which,  it  was  said  by  Lord  Eldon, 
was  "  founded  upon  this  ;  that  the  law  does  not  give  a  complete 
remedy  to  those  whose  literary  property  is  invaded ;  for  if  })ubli- 
cation  after  |)ublication  is  to  be  made  a  distinct  cause  of  action^ 
the  remedy  would  soon  become  worse  than  the  disease.  This 
court,  therefore,  interposes  by  injunction  ;  but  not  in  cases  where 
an  action  cannot  be  maintained."  ^  The  rules  regulating  the 
issue  of  injunctions  to  prevent  the  infringement  of  copyrights  are 
in  general  similar  to  those  regulating  the  issue  of  injunctions 
restraining  the  infringement  of  patents.  The  plaintiff  must  show 
a  clear  title  to  his  copyright,  and  an  infringement  or  threat- 
ened infringement  by  the  defendant.^  The  injunction  will  be 
denied  if  the  defendant  shows  that  the  plaintiff  has  consented  to 
his  infringement,  or  has  been  guilty  of  unreasonaljle  delay  after 
he  learned  that  it  had  occurred  or  was  threatened.'*  How  long 
a  time  must  have  elapsed  to  bar  the  plaintift"*s  right  to  an  in- 
junction has  not  been  definitely  settled.  In  has  been  held  in 
England,  however,  that  an  injunction  may  be  obtained  after  the 
copyright  has  been  infringed  to  the  plaintiff's  knowledge  during 
four  years.^  ]\Ioreover,  delay  will  not  prejudice  him,  if  solely 
caused  by  liis  waiting  until  the  result  of  litigation,  whetlier 
prosecuted  by  himself  or  others,  to  settle  a  doubtful  question  of 
law  involving  the  validity  of  his  title.*^  As  has  been  said,  an 
injunction  will  not  be  granted  unless  the  plaintiff  shows  a  plain 
title  to  the  copyright  which  he  claims  ;  but  "  the  copyright  is 
prima  facie  evidence  that  he  is  the  author,  and  the  burden  of 
})roof  is  upon  the  defendant  to  show  the  contrary,"  '  or  that,  for 
some  other  reason,  tliere  is  a  defect  in  the  title  claimed.^  And 
the  court  will  protect  an  equitable  title  against  infringement 
unless  the  defendant  possesses  su})erior  equities  to  those  of  the 
complainant.^     The  com])lainant  is  not  obliged  to  prove  damage 

2  Lawrence  v.  Smith,  Jacob,  471,  472.     G7 ;  Miller  v.  M'Elroy,  1  Ain.  Law   Reg. 

3  Cliasc  V.  Sanborn,  6  Off.  Gaz.  932;     198. 

Parkinson  v.  Laselle,  o  Saw.  330;  Law-         ^  Hogg  i'.  Scott,  L.  R.  18  Eq.  444,454; 

rc-nce  v.  Dana,  4   Cliff.  1;  Yuengling  v.  Drone  on  Copyright,  504,  512. 
Schile,  12  Fed.  R.  97  ;  Drone  on  Coi)y-  «  Buxton  u.  James,  5  De  G.  &  Sm.  80; 

right,  ch.  .xi.  pp.  490-543.  Runifonl    Cliemical    Works    v.    Vice,   14 

•*  Rundcll     V.    Murray,    Jacob,    311  ;  Blatchf.  179. 
Saunders  ;•.    Smitli,  3   Myl.  &   Cr.   711;  '^  Chief    Justice    Taney    in    Reed    v. 

Cliappcll    ('.    Slieard,    1   ,Tur.    n.  s.    09()  ;  Carusi,  Taney,  72,  74. 
Tinsh'V '•.  Lacv,  1  Mom.  &M.  747;  Keene  "  Drone   on    Coyiyright,   490;    Story's 

V.  Clarke,  5  Robertson   (N.   Y.),   38,  GG,  Eq.  Jur.  §  03r),  note  (?. 

y  Little  V.  Gould,  2  Blatchf.  105. 


§  217.]      TO    RESTRAIN   THE    INFRINGEMENT   OF   COrYRIGHTS.  363 

from  the  breach  of  copyright.^''  If  there  is  any  doubt  concerning 
the  infringement,  and  its  ascertainment  will  necessitate  the  ex- 
amination of  a  great  deal  of  matter,  the  court,  in  this  country, 
usually  directs  a  reference  to  a  master  to  hear  testimony  and 
state  the  facts,  together  with  his  oi)inion  for  its  consideration, 
before  granting  an  injunction.'^  Such  a  reference  is  usually 
ordered  before  the  final  hearing,  but  may  be  at  the  decree. ^^  j^ 
England,  however,  laborious  examinations  have  frequently  been 
made  by  the  judges  themselves,  unassisted,  except  by  counsel.^^ 
Instead  of  a  reference,  an  issue  at  law  may  l)e  directed.^^  The 
plaintiff  need  not  specify  in  either  his  bill  or  his  affidavit  the 
parts  of  the  defendant's  publication  which  he  thinks  have  been 
taken  from  his  work.  A  general  allegation  of  infringement 
accompanied  by  a  verification  by  affidavit  of  the  two  works  is 
sufficient.'-^  The  practice  has  been  that,  "  wh.en  the  injunction 
has  been  moved  for,  the  two  works  have  been  brought  into 
court,  and  the  counsel  have  pointed  out  to  the  court  the  passages 
which  they  rely  upon  as  showing  the  piracy."  ^^  Clearer  proof 
and  a  stronger  case  than  would  be  sufficient  to  entitle  a  plaintiff 
to  an  injunction  after  the  hearing  is  often  required  before  he  can 
obtain  an  interlocutory  injunction. i"  The  difticLdty  of  accurately 
determining  the  damages  resulting  from  an  unauthorized  publi- 
cation of  his  work  will  often  have  weight  in  leading  the  court  to 
grant  a  preliminary  injunction,  when  otherwise  it  might  refuse 
one.^^  But,  on  the  other  hand,  the  court  will  often  refuse  an 
injunction  before  the  hearing,  when  it  is  plain  that  the  defendant 
would  suffer  more  injury  from  being  obliged  to  discontinue  the 
publication  than  will  result  to  the  plaintiff'  from  his  continuing 
it.^^     It  has  been  held  in  England  that  if  a  work  is  libellous,  im- 

10  Reed  r.  HoUiday,  10  Fed.  R.  325,  .327.  i^  Jollie  v.  Jaqiics,  1  Elatclif.  G18. 

11  Folsom  V.  Marsh,  2  Story,  100 ;  Webb  i^  Farmer  r.  Calvert  Lithojjiraphing:  Co., 
V  Powers,  2  W.  &  M.  497;  Story  v.  1  Flippin,  228,  235 ;  Sweet  v  Maugham, 
Derby,  4  McLean,  160  ;  Greene  v.  Bishop,  11  Simons,  51  ;  Drone  on  Copyright,  513. 
1  Cliff.  186  Lawrence  v.  Dana,  4  Cliff.  i*^  Sweet  t-.  Maugham,  11  Simons,  51,53. 
1 ;  Drone  on  Copyright,  513.  But  see  "  Johnson  ;•.  Wyatt,  2  De  G.  J.  &  S. 
Smith  V  Johnson,  4  Blatchf.  2-52.  18;  Drone  on  Copyriglit,  517,  518. 

1-  Lawrence  v   Dana,  4  Cliff.  1 ;  Drone  i**  Matthewson  v.   Stockdale,    12    Ves. 

on  Copyright,  513,  270;  Wilson   v.  Luke,  1   Victorian   Law 

13  Lewis  V.  Fullarton,  2  Beav,  G ;  Mur-  Rep.   127 ;  Prince    Albert    >\    Strange,   1 

ray  v.   Bogue,  1    Drew.  353;   Jarrold  (;.  Mac.    &  G.    25,   46;    Little   i:   Gould,   2 

Houlston,3  Kay  &  J   70S;  Pike  c  Nicho-  Blatchf.  165;  Drone  on  Copyright,  516- 

las,    L.   R.   5  Ch.  251 ;  Drone  on  (^opy-  519. 

rigiit,  513.  !'•*  Spottiswoode  v.  Clarke,  2  Phil.  154- 


364  INJUNCTIONS.  [chap.  XVI. 

moral,  or  blasphemous,  which  last  named  term  would  include  one 
*■'  which  impug-ned  the  doctrines  of  the  immateriality  and  immor- 
tality of  the  soul,"  '^^  there  can  be  no  copyright  therein,  and  a 
piratical  edition  thereof  will  not  be  enjoined.^i  These  decisions, 
however,  one  of  which  stigmatized  as  unworthy  of  protection 
Byron's  "  Cain,"  2-  have  been  severely  criticised,-^  and  it  is  not 
likely  that  they  would  be  fully  sustained  if  the  question  should 
be  raised  in  the  United  States ;  although  in  a  case  in  the  Federal 
courts  Judge  Deady  assigned  as  one  among  several  reasons  for 
refusing  to  enjoin  an  unauthorized  representation  of  "  The  Black 
Crook,"  that  it  "  only  attracts  attention  as  it  panders  to  a  pru- 
rient curiosity  or  an  obscene  imagination  by  very  questionable 
exhibitions  and  attitudes  of  the  female  person."  ^^  The  injunc- 
tion forbids  the  publication  of  only  so  much  of  the  defendant's 
work  as  infringes  upon  the  copyright  of  the  ])laintiff.-'^ 

§  218.  Injunctious  to  restrain  the  Unlawful  Use  of  Trade-marks. 
—  Injunctious  to  restrain  the  use  of  trade-marks  by  others  than 
their  owners  are  granted  by  courts  of  equity,  it  has  been  said, 
partly  to  prevent  the  fraud  upon  tlie  })ublic  which  would  other- 
wise be  perpetrated,  and  partly  on  account  of  the  ditiliculty  of 
estimating  the  injury  which  would  be  caused  the  owner  of  a 
trade-mark  from  its  improper  use.^  The  former  ground  of  the 
interference  of  the  court  has,  however,  been  expressly  repudiated 
by  a  great  judge,  Lord  Westbury,  who  said,  when  Lord  Chan- 
cellor, in  delivering  the  judgment  in  a  leading  case  :  "  Imposi- 
tion upon  the  public  becomes  the  test  of  the  property  in  the 
ti'adc-mark  having  been  invaded  and  injured,  but  not  the  ground 
on  whicli  the  Court  rests  its  jui'isdiction."  -     "•  Trade-marks  are 

Cox  V.  Land  &  Water  Jourii.al  Co.,  L.  R.  -^  Judge  Deady  in   Martinetti  v.  Ma- 

9  Eq.  324  ;  Lodge  v.  Stoddart,  9  Reporter,  guire,  1  Deady,  216,  22.3. 

1.37.    But  see  Emerson  v.  Davies,  3  Story,  -^  Webb  v.  Powers,  2  W.  &  M    497  ; 

708.                                                                '  Story    v.    Holcombe,    4    McLean,    806; 

2'  Lawrence  v.  Smitli,  Jacob,  471.  Farmer  v.  Elstner,  33  Fed.  R.  494. 

21  AValcot  t'.  Walker,  7  Ves.  1  ;  Stock-  §  218.  i  Perry  v.  Truefit,  6  Beav.  66, 

dale  c  Onwliyn,  5  Barn.  &  Cr.  173;  Mur-  7-3;  Croft  v.   Day,  7  Beav.  84;  Leatlicr 

ray    r.    Benbow,   6    Petersd.    Abr.    659  ;  Clotli  Co.  v.  The  American  Leatlier  Clotb 

Lawrence  v.  Smitli,  Jacob,  471 ;  Soutliey  Co.,  10  Jur.  (n.  s.)  81 ;  Walton  v.  Crow- 

i'.  Sherwood,  2  Meriv.  4;5.5.     But  see  Bur-  ley,  3  Blatchf.  440;  Sliaw   Stocking  Co. 

nett  V.  Chetwood,  2  Meriv.  441.  v.  Mack,  12  Fed.  K.  707. 

2""i  Murray  v.  Benbow,  6  Petersd.  Abr.  ^  'phe  Leather  Cloth  Co.  v.  The  Amer- 

559.  ican  Leatlier  Cloth  Co.,  10  Jur.  (n.  s.)  81. 

-^  Campbell's  Lives  of  the  Lord  Chan-  But  see  the  langnage  of  Judge  Coxe  in 

cellors,  ch.  ccxiii.;  Drone  on  Cojiyright,  Shaw  Stocking  Co.  v.  Mack,  12  Fed.  R. 

181-196.                                ■              '  707,  710. 


§  218.]      TO   RESTKAIN   THE   UNLAWFUL   USE   OF  TRADE-MARKS.      365 

of  two  kinds.  They  may  consist  of  pictures  or  symbols  or  a 
peculiar  form  and  fashion  of  label,  or  simply  of  a  word  or  words, 
which,  in  whatever  form  printed  or  represented,  continue  to  be 
the  distinguishing  mark  of  the  manufacturer  who  has  appropri- 
ated it  or  them,  and  the  name  by  which  his  products  are  known 
and  dealt  in."  ^  "  Where  the  trade-mark  consists  of  a  picture  or 
symbol,  or  in  any  peculiarity  in  the  appearance  of  the  label,  the 
imitation  must  be  such  as  to  amount  to  a  false  representation, 
liable  to  deceive  the  public,  and  enable  the  imitator  to  pass  off 
his  goods  as  those  of  the  person  whose  trade-mark  is  imitated. 
And  wlien  there  is  such  an  absence  of  resemblance  that  ordinary 
attention  would  enable  customers  to  discriminate  between  the 
trade-marks  of  different  parties,  the  court  will  not  interfere."  ^ 
"  But  where  the  trade-mark  consists  of  a  word,  it  may  be  used 
by  the  manufacturer  who  has  appropriated  it,  in  any  style  of 
print,  or  in  any  form  of  label,  and  its  use  by  another  is  unlawful. 
The  statute  "  of  New  York  "  requires  only  that  the  imitation 
should  be  either  the  same  to  the  eye,  or  in  sound  to  the  ear,  as 
the  genuine  trade-mark,  and  this  accords  with  the  authorities."  ^ 
"  To  make  an  exclusive  right  to  use  a  name  or  symbol  as  a  trade- 
mark, such  use  must  be  new  ;  if  ever  before  used  as  applicable  to 
a  like  article,  it  cannot  be  exclusively  appropriated.  If  the  arti- 
cle is  known  to  commerce  in  general,  by  the  term  claimed,  as  a 
trade-mark,  the  claim  is  ill-founded.  If  the  term  employed  indi- 
cates the  nature,  kind,  or  quality  of  the  article,  instead  of  show- 
ing its  origin,  an  exclusive  right  to  its  use  is  not  maintainable."  ^ 
In  accordance  with  the  maxim  that  he  who  seeks  equity  must 
come  with  clean  hands,  it  is  well  established  that,  if  the  trade- 
mark for  which  protection  is  sought  contains  representations  cal- 
culated to  deceive  the  public,  an  injunction  will  be  denied  the 
plaintiff."  An  act  of  Congress  allowing  suits  to  enjoin  the  use 
of  trade-marks  to  be  brought  in  a  Federal  court  against  a  citizen 
of  the  same  State  as  the  complainant,  was  held  unconstitutional.^ 

3  Judge  Rapallo  in  Hier  v.  Abrahams,  ^  Leather  Cloth  Co.  r.  The  American 

82  N.  Y.  519,  523.  Leather  Cloth  Co.,  11  H.  L.  C.  523  ;  s  c. 

■4  Judge  Rapallo  in  Hier  i;.  Abrahams,  in   a   lower  court,   10  Jur.    (n.    s.)    81; 

82  N,  Y.  519,  523,  Fowle  v.  Spear,  7  Penn.  L.  J.  176;  Heath 

*  Judge  Rapallo  in  Hier  v.  Abrahams,  v.  Wright,  3  Wall.  Jr.  141 ;  Ginter  v.  Kin- 

82  N,  Y.  519,  524.  ney  Tobacco  Co.,  12  Fed.  R.  782. 

6  Van   Beil  v.  Prescott   (The   Rye   &         »  Trade-Mark  Cases,  100  U.  S.  82. 
Rock  Case),  82  N.  Y.  630. 


366  INJUNCTIONS.  [chap.  xyi. 

A  subsequent  act  of  Congress  gives  the  Federal  courts  jurisdic- 
tion of  such  a  suit  when  the  plaintiff  has  registered  his  trade- 
mark for  use  in  foreign  commerce  or  commerce  with  the  Indian 
tribes,  and  the  defendant  has  used  such  registered  trade-mark  in 
such  commerce.^ 

§  219.  Injunctions  to  prevent  the  Opening  of  Letters. — In  Eng- 
land an  injunction  has  been  issued  to  prevent  the  tenants  of  a 
building  formerly  occupied  by  the  members  of  another  firm  from 
opening  letters  addressed  to  the  latter. ^ 

§  220.  Injunctions  to  compel  the  Performance  or  prevent  the 
Breach  of  Contracts  not  affecting  Land.  —  The  performance  of  a 
contract  not  affecting  lands  will  be  enforced  in  equity  by  means 
of  an  injunction  when,  and  only  when,  a  judgment  for  damages 
would  be  no  adequate  remedy  for  its  breach;^  and  it  docs  not 
require  a  purely  personal  act  which  it  would  be  impossible  for 
the  court  to  enforce.^  The  inadequacy  of  tlie  remedy  at  law 
which  will  entitle  one  to  specific  performance  of  a  contract  may, 
it  lias  been  held,  be  proved  by  the  fact  that  the  damages  in 
money  cannot  be  ascertained.^  In  some  cases  an  injunction  may 
be  obtained  to  restrain  a  defendant  from  violating  a  negative 
promise  contained  in  a  contract,  although  the  court  has  no  power 
specifically  to  enforce  the  affirmative  promises  contained  therein. 
Thus,  when  opera  singers  had  contracted  to  sing  at  the  plaintiffs' 
theatre  and  nowhere  else,  injunctions  have  been  granted  to  re- 
strain them  from  singing  in  rival  establishments,  although  they 
could  not  be  compelled  to  sing  for  the  plaintiffs.*  The  rule  has 
been  thus  stated  by  Judge  Lowell :  "  I  think  the  fair  result  of  the 
later  cases  may  be  thus  expressed  :  If  the  case  is  one  in  which 
the  negative  remedy  of  injunction  will  do  substantial  justice  be- 
tween the  parties,  by  obliging  the  defendant  either  to  carry  out 
his  contract  or  lose  all  benefit  of  the  breach,  and  the  remedy  at 
law  is  inadequate,  and  there  is  no  reason  of  policy  against  it,  the 
court  will  interfere  to  restrain  conduct  which  is  contrary  to  the 

9  21  St  at  L.  502  (1  Snpp  U   S   R.  S.  -  Clarke  v.  Price,  2  Wilson  Ch  Cases. 

600);  Graveley  v.  Gravelev,  42  Fed.  K.  1-57;  Mair  v.  Himalaya  Tea  Co.,  L.  K.  1 

2G4.  '  Eq  411 

§  219.  1  Scheile  v.  Brakell,  11  W  R.  ^  Adderley  r.  Dixon,   1    Sim.  &  Stu. 

796.  G07  ;  Sullivan  v.  Tuck,  1  Md.  Ch  59  ;  Fin- 

§  220.  1  Buxton  v.  Lister,  .3  Atk.38.3;  ley  v.  Aiken,  1   Grant's  Cases   (Pa.),  83; 

Robinson  v.  Catlicart,  2  Cranch  C.  C  590  ;  Bispliam's  Kq  §  369. 
Tayloe   v.   Merchants'   Fire   Ins.    Co.,   9  *  Lumley  v.  Wagner,  1  He  G.,  M.  &  G. 

How.  390;  Very  v.  Levy,  13  How  345.  601 ;  McCaull  v.  Braham,  16  Fed   K.  37. 


§  222.]  INJUNCTIONS    AUTHORIZED   BY    STATUTE.  367 

contract,  although  it  may  be  unable  to  enforce  a  specific  per- 
formance of  it."^  But  where  the  affirmative  promise  cannot  be 
specifically  enforced^  the  court  will  not  import  into  it  a  negative 
covenant,  neither  expressly  nor  by  a  fair  implication  contained 
therein.*^ 

§  221.  Injunctions  to  compel  the  Delivery  of  Personal  Property 
tortiously  withheld.  —  Under  very  extraordinary  circumstances, 
equity  Avill  interfere  to  compel  by  injunction  the  delivery  or  re- 
turn of  letters,  documents,  or  other  articles  of  such  a  unique 
character  that  it  would  be  imi)ossible  to  replace  them,  when  they 
are  tortiously  withheld  from  their  rightful  owners.^ 

§  222.  Injunctions  authorized  by  Statute.  —  The  statutes  of  the 
United  States  also  authorize  an  injunction  in  the  following  cases, 
besides  those  arising  from  infringements  of  patents  and  copy- 
rights :  "  Any  person  who  considers  himself  aggrieved  by  any 
warrant  of  distress  issued  under  the"  provisions  of  the  statutes 
authorizing  one  to  be  issued  by  the  Solicitor  of  the  Treasury 
against  an  officer  in  default  for  not  accounting  for  and  paying 
over  public  money  received  by  him,  "  may  j)rcfer  a  bill  of  com- 
plaint to  any  district  judge  of  the  United  States,  setting  forth 
therein  the  nature  and  extent  of  the  injury  of  which  ho  com- 
plains ;  and  thereupon  the  judge  may  grant  an  injunction  to  stay 
proceedinTS  on  such  warrant  altogether,  or  for  so  much  thereof 
as  the  nature  of  the  case  requires.  But  no  injunction  shall  issue 
till  the  party  applying  for  it  gives  bond  with  sufticient  security, 
in  a  sum  to  be  prescribed  by  the  judge,  for  the  performance  of 
such  judgment  as  may  be  awarded  against  him  ;  nor  shall  the 
issuing  of  such  injunction  in  any  manner  impair  the  lien  pro- 
duced by  the  issuing  of  the  warrant.  And  the  same  |)roceedings 
shall  be  had  in  such  injunction  as  in  other  cases,  except  that  no 
answer  shall  be  necessary  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  ;  and 
if,  upon  dissolving  the  injunction,  it  appears  to  the  satisfaction 
of  the  judge  that  the  application  for  the  injunction  was  merely 

5  Singer  Co.  v.  Union  Co.,  1  Holmes,  Birmingham  Ry.  Co.,  3  De  G.,  INI.  &  O. 
253,  258.  See  also  Goddard  ;;.  Wilde,  17  914  ;  Bispliam's  ICq.  §  4G-1 ;  Kerr  on  In- 
Fed.   R.  845;  W.  U.  Tel.   Co.  v.   Union    junctions,  524. 

Pacific  Ry.   Co.,  3  Fed.   R.  423;  W.  U.  §  221.  i  Pusey  v.  Pusey,  1  Vern.  273; 

Tel.  Co.  V.  St.  Joseph  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  3  Duke  of  Somerset  v.  Cookson,  3  P.  Wins. 

Fed.  R.  430.  389 ;  Clarke  v.  White,  12  Pet.  178 ;  Prince 

6  Clarke  v.  Price,  2  Wilson  Ch.  C.  157  ;  Alhert  v.  Strange,  1  Macn.  &  G.  25,  42; 
Pickering  v.  Bishop  of  Ely,  2  Y.  &  C.  McGowin  v.  Remington,  12  Pa.  St.  66. 
Ch.  C.  249;   Johnson   v.  Shrewsbury  & 


368  INJUNCTIONS.  [CIIAP.  XYI. 

for  delay,  the  judge  may  add  to  the  lawful  interest  assessed  on 
all  sums  found  due  against  the  complainant  such  damages  as, 
with  such  lawful  interest,  shall  not  exceed  the  rate  of  ten  per 
centum  a  year.  Such  injunction  may  be  granted  or  dissolved  by 
the  district  judge  either  in  or  out  of  court."  ^  "  When  the  dis- 
trict judge  refuses  to  grant  an  injunction  to  stay  proceedings  on 
a  distress  warrant,  as  aforesaid,  or  dissolves  such  injunction  after 
it  is  granted,  any  person  who  considers  himself  aggrieved  by  the 
decision  in  the  premises  may  lay  before  the  circuit  justice,  or  cir- 
cuit judge  of  the  circuit  within  which  such  district  lies,  a  copy  of 
the  proceeding  had  before  the  district  judge  ;  and  thereupon  the 
circuit  justice  or  circuit  judge  may  grant  an  injunction,  or  permit 
an  appeal,  as  the  case  may  be,  if,  in  his  opinion,  the  equity  of  the 
case  requires  it.  The  same  proceedings,  subject  to  the  same  con- 
ditions, shall  be  had  upon  such  injunction  in  the  circuit  court  as 
are  prescribed  in  the  district  court."  ^  "  Whenever  an  association 
against  which  proceedings  have  been  instituted,  on  account  of  any 
alleged  refusal  to  redeem  its  circulating  notes  as  aforesaid,  denies 
having  failed  to  do  so,  it  may,  at  any  time  within  ten  days  after 
it  has  been  notified  of  the  appointment  of  an  agent,  as  provided 
in  section  fifty-two  hundred  and  twenty-seven "  of  the  Revised 
Statutes  of  the  United  States,  "  apply  to  the  nearest  circuit,  or 
district,  or  territorial  court  of  the  United  States  to  enjoin  fur- 
ther proceedings  in  the  premises ;  and  such  court,  after  citing  the 
Comptroller  of  the  Currency  to  show  cause  why  further  proceed- 
ings should  not  be  enjoined,  and  after  the  decision  of  the  court  or 
finding  of  a  jury  that  such  association  has  not  refused  to  redeem 
its  circulating  notes,  when  legally  presented,  in  the  lawful  money 
of  the  United  States,  shall  make  an  order  enjoining  the  Comp- 
troller, and  any  receiver  acting  under  his  direction,  from  all 
further  proceedings  on  account  of  such  alleged  refusal."  ^  A 
district  attorney  of  the  United  States  acting  under  the  direction 
of  the  Attorney-General  may  upon  a  petition  obtain  an  injunc- 
tion to  restrain  a  contract,  combination  in  the  form  of  a  trust 
or  otherwise,  or  a  conspiracy  in  restraint  of  trade  or  commerce, 
or  a  monopoly  of  any  part  of  trade  or  commerce  among  the 
several  States  or  with  foreign  nations.*     Compliance  with  the 


§  222.  1  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  3636.  »  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  5237. 

2  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  3637.  4  26  St.  at  L.  ch.  647,  p.  209. 


§  223.]  WHEN   INJUNCTIONS   WILL   NOT   ISSUE.  369 

Inter-State  Commerce  Act  may  also  in  certain  cases  be  com- 
pelled by  an  injunction.^ 

§  223.  When  Injunctions  will  not  Issue.  —  As  a  general  rule,  it 
may  be  stated  that  an  injunction  will  not  issue  at  the  prayer  of 
one  who  will  suffer  no  pecuniary  injury  from  the  act  which  he 
wishes  to  prevent.^  Thus,  one  will  not  bo  granted  at  the  suit 
of  a  State  to  prevent  the  invasion  of  a  purely  political  right  ;^  or 
of  adjacent  property  owners  and  church  members  to  prevent  a 
railroad  from  outraging  their  religious  feelings  by  running  cars 
upon  Sunday ;  ^  nor  at  the  suit  of  minister  of  the  gospel  to  pre- 
vent the  use  of  his  building  for  theatrical  purposes,  under  a  lease 
the  validity  of  which  he  disputes.*  The  Emperor  of  Austria  and 
King  of  Hungary,  however,  was  allowed  an  injunction  to  prevent 
Kossuth  and  his  associates  from  manufacturing  in  England  paper 
currency  not  })urporting  to  be  issued  by  imperial  authority, 
intended  for  circulation  in  Hungary,  upon  the  ground  that  his 
property  rights  were  thereby  injured.^  An  injunction  will  not 
issue  to  prevent  an  injury  which  is  not  actually  threatened  to  the 
complainant.^  Thus  an  injunction  will  not  be  granted  to  pre- 
vent an  injury  to  a  navigable  stream,  at  the  suit  of  an  individual 
who  is  not  engaged  in  navigating  the  same;'  nor,  at  the  suit  of 
a  coupon  holder  who  is  not  liable  to  the  payment  of  taxes  to  a 
State,  to  prevent  the  State  officers  from  refusing  to  receive  his 
coupons,  when  tendered  by  others  to  whom  he  has  agreed  to 
assign  them  for  the  payment  of  their  taxes,  in  pursuance  of  a 
contract  made  by  the  State  with  its  creditors  and  their  successors.^ 
"  No  court  sits  to  determine  questions  of  law  m  thesir  ^  A  threat 
of  irreparable  injury  to  a  right  actually  enjoyed  and  exercised  by 
the  complainant,  or  acts  indicating  a  preparation  to  commit  such 
a  wrong,  are,  however,  always  a  ground  for  the  issue  of  an 
injunction. ^"^     And  after  a  defendant  has  once  infringed  a  patent 

5  24  St.  at  L.  380;   2-5  St.  at  L.  855;  '  Spooner    c.    McConnell,   1    McLean, 

Interstate    Commerce     Commission      v.  337.     See  also  Mason  v.  Rollins,  'I  Biss. 

Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co..  43  Fed.  R.  37.  99.     Compare  Works  v.  Junction  R.  R., 

§  223.     1  High  on  Injunctions,  §  20.  5  McLean,  42.5. 

-  Georgia  v.  Stanton,  6  Wall.  50.  ^  Virginia    Conpon   Cases,    Marj-e    v. 

8  Sparkawk  v.  Union  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  54  Parsons,  114  U.  S.  325. 

Pa.  St.  401.  ^  Mr.   Justice    Matthews    in  Virginia 

*  Bodwell  I'.  Crawford,  26  Kan.  202.  Coupon    Cases,   Marye   i-.   Parsons,   114 

5  Emperor  of  Austria  v.  Day,  2  Giff  628 ;  U.  S.  325,  330. 

8.  c.  on  appeal,  3  De  G.,  F.  &  J.  217.  ^"'  St.  Louis  v.  Knapp  Co.,  104  U.  S. 

6  Slessinger   i'.  Buckingham,   17  Fed.     658;  Sherman  c.  Nutt,  35  Fed.  R.  149; 
R.  454.  Butz  Thermo-Electric  Regulator  Co.   v. 

VOL.  I.  —  24 


370  INJUNCTIONS.  [chap.  xvI. 

owned  by  the  plaintiff,  it  seems  that  the  court  will  usually  enjoin 
him  from  doing  so  in  the  future,  even  though  lie  swears  that  he 
has  no  intention  of  doing  so  again ;  unless  in  addition  to  so 
swearing  he  shows  that  he  has  paid  all  damages  occasioned  by 
his  infringement,  and  has  desisted  from  it.^^  The  Circuit  Court 
for  the  Southern  District  of  New  York  has  refused  to  grant  a 
preliminary  injunction  to  restrain  an  obstruction  to  navigation  in 
a  navigable  channel  coming  up  from  the  Bay  of  New  York,  caused 
by  a  structure  projecting  from  the  New  Jersey  shore.^^  ^^ 
injunction  cannot  be  issued  against  the  United  States ;  ^^  nor 
against  an  officer  to  interfere  with  the  exercise  of  his  dis- 
cretion ;  ^*  nor,  it  has  been  suggested,  against  an  officer  of  the 
United  States  to  prevent  the  infringement  of  a  patent  by  liim 
while  in  the  exercise  of  his  official  duties. ^^  The  Revised  Stat- 
utes provide  that  "  No  suit  for  the  purpose  of  restraining  the 
assessment  or  collection  of  any  tax "  imposed  by  the  United 
States  for  purposes  of  internal  revenue,  "  shall  be  maintained  in 
any  court."  ^^'  Under  this  provision,  it  has  been  held  that  wher- 
ever a  tax  is  imposed  by  a  person  in  office  having  authority  over 
the  assessment  of  taxes  for  the  United  States,  and  acting  under 
color  of  a  statute,  no  injunction  will  be  issued  to  restrain  its  col- 
lection, no  matter  how  erroneous  the  assessment  may  be,  and 
althougli  the  person  against  wliom  the  assessment  is  made  does 
not  own  the  property  taxed.^^  "  It  is  sufficient  that  a  statute  has 
authorized  the  assessor  to  entertain  the  general  subject  of  tax- 
ation ;  that  it  was  in  fact  entertained,  and  a  judgment,  lawful  or 
unlawful,  was  rendered  concerning  it."  ^^  It  seems  tliat  the 
unconstitutionality    of    tlie    statute    imposing   the    tax    will    not 

Jacobs  Electric  Co.,  36  Fed.  R.  191 ;  Mc-  Walker  v.  Smith,  21  How.  579  ;  McElrath  ' 

Arthur  v.  Kelly,  5  Uliio,  139;    Frearson  v.  Mcintosh,  1  Law  Repr.  (n.s.)  399. 

V.  Loe,  L.   R.  9  Ch.  D.   48.       See   also  i^  james  r.  Campbell,  104  U.   S.  356; 

Piek  I'.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  6  Biss.  Hollister  v.  Benedict  &  B.  Manaf.  Co.,  113 

177.  U.  S.  69,  67. 

11  Jenkins  v.  Greenwald,  1  Bond,  126;  le  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  3224. 

s.  c.  2  Fisher,  37;  Sickeis  v.   Mitchell,  3  H  Kensett  v.  Stivers,  10  Fed.  R.  517; 

Biatchf.  548;  Poppenhusen  r.  New  York  Pullan    v.  Kinsinger,  2  Abb.   U.  S.  94; 

Giitta  Pcrcha  Comb  Co.,  4  Biatchf.  184;  Rowland  v.  Soule,  Deady,  413;  Delaware 

Celluloid  Manuf.  Co.  r.  Arlington  Manuf.  R.  Co.  v.  Prettyman,  17  int.  Rev.  Rec.  99  ; 

Co.,  34  Fed.  R.  324.  Alkan  v.  Bean,  23  Int.  Rev.  Roc.  351 ;  Kis- 

1-  Atlantic    Dredging   Co.    r.    Bergen  singer  r.  Bean,  7  Biss.  60;  United  States 

Neck  Ry.  Co.,  44  Fed.  R.  208.  v.  Black,  11  Biatchf.  538.  But  see  Frayser 

13  United  States  v.  McLemore,  4  IIow.  v.  Russell,  3  Hughes,  227. 

286;  Hill  v.  United  States,  9  How.  .386.  i«  Emmons,  J.,  in  Pullan  v.  Kinsinger, 

1*  Mississippi  v.  Johnson,  4  Wall.  475 ;  2  Abb.  U.  S.  94,  99. 


§  223.]  WHEN    INJUNCTIONS    WILL    NOT   ISSUE.  371 

authorize  the  issue  of  an  injunction. ^^  It  lias  been  lield  that  an 
injunction  will  not  be  granted  to  restrain  the  Commissioner  of 
Patents  from  issuing  letters-patent.^''  An  injunction  cannot  be 
issued  against  a  State  at  the  suit  of  a  citizen  of  another  State  or 
of  a  foreign  State.-^  Nor  can  a  mandatory  injunction  be  issued 
against  an  officer  of  a  State  so  as  to  compel  the  action  of  the 
State  against  its  expressed  will.-^  But  an  otticcr  of  a  State  may 
be  enjoined  from  an  invasion  of  private  rights  which  would  cause 
irreparable  injury,  when  about  to  act  under  an  unconstitutional 
act  of  the  legislature  of  the  State.^^  As  has  been  said  before,  an 
injunction  will  not  ordinarily  be  granted  to  stay  proceedings  in  a 
State  court.-*  In  England,  a  person  may  be  restrained  from 
petitioning  or  applying  to  the  legislature  in  order  to  procure  the 
passage  of  an  act  relating  solely  to  private  interests,  provided  he 
be  under  an  express  or  implied  agreement  not  to  do  so,  or  his 
doing  so  would  amount  to  a  breach  of  trust.-"^  This  doctrine  has, 
however,  never  been  upheld  in  the  United  States,  and  in  a  well- 
considered  case  in  New  Jersey  was  expressly  repudiated.-^  The 
early  English  cases  held  that  an  injunction  would  not  issue  to 
restrain  the  publication  of  a  slander  or  libel,  no  matter  how  inju- 
rious it  might  be  to  the  complainant.^'  Since  the  passage  of  the 
Judicature  Act,  however,  such  injunctions  have  been  granted 
there  in  order  to  protect  rights  of  property .^^  An  injunction  was 
denied  when  sought  to  prevent  a  defendant  from  advertising  that 
a  patent  was  void,  and  it  appeared  that  he  honestly  believed  it  to 
be  so,  and  published  the  statement  for  the  sole  purpose  of  pro- 
tecting what  he  believed  to  be  his  rights.-^     "Whether  a  Federal 

'9  Kobbins  v.   Freelaml,  14   Int.    Rev.  Works  Co.,  2  Russ.  &  M.470  ;  Tlie  Stnck- 

Rec.  28.  ton  &  H.  Ry.  Co.  r.  The  Leeds  &  Th.  Ry. 

2'  Illingworth  v.  Atha,  42  Fed.  R.  141.  Co.,    2    Pli"iL   Gf.6 ;    Heathcote   v.   North 

-1  Eleventh    Amendment  of   the  Con-  Staffordshire  Ry.  Co.,  2  Mac.  &  G.  100. 

stitution.  2e  Story  v.  The  Jersey  City  &  Bergen 

2-  Louisiana  v.  Jumel,  107  U.  S.  711;  Point  Phink  Road  Co.,  1  C.  E.  Green  (16 

Antoni  v.  Greenhow,  107  U.  S.  769,  782-  N.  J.  Eq.)  1.3. 

784 ;    Cunningliam    v.    Macon    &   Bruns-  -^  Prudential  Assur.  Co.  v.  Knott,  T.,.R. 

wick  R.  R.  Co.,  100  U.  S  44G.  10  Ch.  142  ;  Clark  v.  Freeman.  11  Beav. 

■-'3  0<born  f.  Bank  of  the  United  States,  112.      See     also  Brandreth    r.  Lance,  8 

0  Wiieat.  738  ;  Davis  v    Gray,  16  Wall.  Paige  (N.  Y.)  24. 

203 ;  Board  of  Liquidation  v.  McComb,  92  ~»  Thorley's  Cattle  Food  Co.  v.  Massam, 

U.  S.  531;  Virginia  Coupon   Cases,    114  L.  R.  6  Ch.  D.  582  ;  Saxby  r>.  Easterbrook, 

U.   S.  269.     See,  however,  In  re  Avers,  L.  R.  3  C.  P.  D.  339;  Wren  v.   Weild, 

123  U.  S.  443.                                       '  L.  R.  4  Q  B  730. 

2*  U.  S.  R.  §  720:  supra,  §  211.  -9  Ilalsey  v.  Brotherhood,  45  L.  T.  n.  8. 

25  Ware  i-.  The  Grand  Junction  Water  640 ;  Celluloid  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Goodyear 


372  INJUNCTIONS.  [chap.  XVI. 

court  will  in  any  case  grant  an  injunction  against  the  publication 
of  a  libel  is  a  disputed  question.^*'  It  has  been  held  that  an 
injunction  may  be  granted  against  the  publication  and  circulation 
of  posters  and  handbills  in  aid  of  a  boycott.^^  An  injunction  will 
not  issue  to  assist  in  the  maintenance  of  a  monopoly  injurious  to 
public  policy  ;  ^  nor  in  any  other  case  when  its  operation  would 
be  repugnant  to  public  policy .^^  An  injunction  will  not  be  issued 
when  the  moving  party  has  a  plain,  adequate,  and  complete 
remedy  at  law.^ 

§  224.  Distinction  between  the  Judicial  Writ  and  the  "Writ 
Remedial.  —  Injunctions  were  formerly  either  judicial  writs  or 
writs  remedial.  A  judicial  writ  was  a  direction  to  yield  up,  to 
quiet,  or  to  continue  the  possession  of  lands,  and  is  said  to  be  in 
tlie  nature  of  a  writ  of  execution.^  It  was  issued  in  aid  of,  and 
only  after  a  final  decree  in  equity  ;  and,  in  extraordinary  circum- 
stances, in  aid  of  a  judgment  at  law.^  Under  the  equity  rules, 
however,  it  is  never  necessary ;  and  it  had  previously  fallen  into 
disuse  in  England.     All  other  injunctions  are  writs  remedial. 

§  225.  Distinction  betw^een  Mandatory  and  Prohibitory  Injunc- 
tions.—  Injunctions  are  either  mandatory  or  prohibitory.  A 
mandatory  injunction  is  one  that  commands  a  defendant  to  per- 
form a  certain  act  or  acts ;  a  prohibitory  injunction,  one  that 
forbids  a  defendant's  doing  a  certain  act  or  acts.  Mandatory  are 
far  less  common  than  are  prohibitory  injunctions.  Those  most 
frequently  issued  have  been  such  as  commanded  a  defendant  to 

Dental   Vulcanite  Co.,  13  Blatchf.  375;  C,   E.   D.    Wis,    by    Jenkins    J.      See 

Pentiarge  v.  Pentlarge,  14  Repr.  579.  Francis  v.  Flinn,  118  U.  S.  385  ;  Kelley 

3'     Held   that   it   can,   in   Ide  v.   Ball  v.  Ypsilanti,  D.  S.  M.Co.,  44  Fed.K.  19,  23. 

Engine  Co.,  31  Fed.  R.  901,  U.  S.C.  C,  S.  3i  Casey  v.  Cincinnati   Typographical 

1).  Illinois,  by  Allen  J. ;  Emack  v.  Kane,  Union  No.  3,  45  Fed.  R.  135. 

31  Fed.  R.  46,  U.  S.  C.  C,  N.  D.  Illinois,  ^'-  Pullman  Palace  Car  Co.  r.  Texas  & 

by  Blodgett,  J.    Cf.  Palmer  r.  Travers,  Pacific  Ry.  Co.,  11  Fed.  R.  625;    s.  c.  4 

20  Fed.  R.  501,  U.  S.  C.  C,  S.  D.  N.  Y.,  Woods,  317  ;  Foil's  Appeal,  91   Pa.   St. 

by  Wheeler.  J. ;  Celluloid   Manuf.  Co.  v.  434,  438. 

Goodyear  D.  V.  Co.,  13  Blatchf.  375,  U.  ^^  Bryant  v.  W.  U.  Tel.  Co.,  17  Fed  R. 

S.  C.  C,  S.  D.  N.  Y.,  by  Hunt,  J.    Held  825  ;  Blake   v.   Greenwood  Cemetery,  U 

that  it  cannot,  in  Kidd   v.  Horrv,  28  Fed.  Blatchf.  342  ;    Denehey  v.  Ilarrisburg,  i; 

R.  773,  U.  S.  C.  C,  E   D.  Pa.,  bv  Bradley  Pearson  (Pa.),  330,  334. 

and    McKennan,    JJ.  ;     Baltimore    Car-  ^4  u.  S.  R.  S.  §  723. 

Wheel  Co.  v.  Bemis,  29  Fed.  R.  95,  U.  S.  §  224.     i  Eden  on  Injunctions,  chs.  ;. 

C.  C,  D.  Mass.,  by  Colt  and  Carpenter,  and  xvii.,pp.  1-2,  201-262;   Beames'  Or. 

JJ. ;  Fougeres  v.  Murbarger,  44  Fed.  R.  ders,  8,  16. 

292,  U.  S.  C.  C.,D.  Indiana,   by   Woods,  ^  ^oult  v.  Blunt,  Gary,  72;   Eden  on 

J. ;    International    Tooth-Crown    Co.    v.  Injunctions,  262. 
Carmichael,  44  Fed.  R.  350,  351,  U.  S.  C. 


§  225.]      DISTINCTION  BETWEEN  MANDATORY  AND  PEOHIBITORY.       373 

abate  a  nuisance,^  or  to  deliver  the  possession  of  land.^  They 
have  also  been  granted  to  compel  the  return  of  letters  and  other 
docmnents,^  the  delivery  of  personal  property  whose  loss  could 
not  be  compensated  in  damages,'*  the  giving  of  collateral  security 
in  obedience  to  a  contract,^  the  making  of  a  policy  of  insurance,* 
the  stopping  and  receiving  freight  by  a  railroad  company  at  a 
particular  place,'  and  the  performance  of  a  contract  by  one  rail- 
road company  to  send  freight  over  the  lines  of  another  railroad.^ 
The  court,  in  a  case  involving  the  constitutionality  of  certam 
Kentucky  statutes,  refused  a  mandatory  injunction  compelling  a 
distribution  of  the  money  raised  by  a  tax  upon  white  people 
partly  among  public  schools  for  colored  children,  in  the  absence 
of  any  contract  right  or  legislative  authority  for  such  a  distribu- 
tion ;  but  it  granted  "  a  decree  enjoining  and  restraining  the 
proper  parties  from  applying  to  the  use  of  the  schools  organized 
for  and  at  which  white  children  only  are  allowed  to  attend,  one- 
fourth  of  the  money  heretofore,  or  which  may  be  hereafter, 
collected  under  the  authority  of  the  act  of  1871  and  its  amend- 
ments." ^  Mandatory  injunctions  are  usually  issued  in  a  neg- 
ative form,  restraining  a  defendant  from  desisting  or  refusing  to 
do  an  act.^*^  They  are  very  rarely  granted  upon  an  interlocutory 
motion. 1^ 

§  225.     1  Lane  v.  Newdigate,  10  Ves.  »  Cliicago  &  A.  Ry.  Co.  v.  N.  Y.,  L.  E. 

192 ;  Robinson  v.  Lord  Byron,  1  Bro.  C.C.  &  W,  R.  Co.,  34  Fed.  R.  516. 

588;    Hervey  v.  Smith,  1  K.  &  J.    389;  ^  Barr,    J.    in    Clay  brook    v.    City    of 

Rankin  v.  Huskisson,  4  Simons,  13;  Bick-  Owensboro,  23  Fed.  R.  034,  63G. 

ett  V.  Morris,  L.  R.  1  H.  L.  Sc.  47 ;  Cole  "  Southern  Express  Co.  v.  St.  Louis, 

Silver  Mining  Co.  v.   Virginia  &   G.  H.  Iron  M.,  &  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  10  Fed.  R. 

Water  Co.,  1  Saw.  470.  210, 869 ;  Smith  v.  Smitli,  L.  R.  20  Eq  500, 

-  Hepburn    v     Auld,  5   Cranch,    2G2  ;  504 ;  Cole  Silver  Mining  Co.  v.   Virginia 

Hepburn  v.  Dunlop,  1  Wiieat.  179 ;  Find-  &  G.  H.  Water  Co.,  1  Saw.  470. 

lay  V.  Hinde,  1  Pet.  241.  "  Denver  &  N.  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Atchison, 

3  Evitt  V.  Price,  1  Simons,  483;  Seton  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.,  13  Fed.  R.  54G ;  Mc- 

on   Decrees    (4th   ed.),    179.       See   also  Cauley  t-.  Kellogg,  2  Woods,  13  ;  Camblos 

Clarke  v.  White,  12  Pet.  178.  v.  The  Philadelphia  &  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  9 

*  Pusey  V.  Pusey,  1  Vern.  273;  Duke  Phila.  (Pa.)  411;  s.  c.  4  Brewster  (Pa.), 
of  Somerset  v.  Cookson,  3  P.  Wms.  389  ;  563 ;  Rogers  Locomotive  Works  v.  Erie 
Greatrex  v.  Greatrex,  1  De  G.  &  Sm.  092  ;  Ry.  Co.,  5  C.  E.  Green  (20  N.  J.  Eq),  379. 
McGowin  v.  Remington,  12  Pa.  St.  56.  But  see  Dinsmore  v.  Louisville,  C.  &  L. 

*  Robinson  v.  Cathcart,  2  Cranch  C.  C.  Ry.  Co.,  2  Fed.  R.  46.5 ;  Disnmore  v. 
590.  Louisville,  N.  A.  &  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  3  Fed. 

"  Union  Mutual  Ins.  Co.  I'.  Commercial  R.    593;    Coe  i'.  Louisville    &   Nashville 

Mut.  Marine  Ins.  Co.,  2  Curt.  524.  R.  R.  Co.,  3   Fed.    R.   775;    Ormsby  r. 

'  Coe  V.  Louisville  &  Nashville  R.  R.  Union  Pacific  R.  R.  Co.,  4  Fed.  R.  706; 

Co.,  3  Fed.  R.  775;  McCoy  i'.  Cincinnati,  Texas   Express    Co.  v.   Texas  &  Pacific 

I.,  St.  L.  &  C.  R.  Co.,  13  Fed.  R.  3.  Ry.  Co.,  6  Fed.  R.  420;  Chicago  &  A. 


374  INJUNCTIONS.  [chap.  XVI. 

§  226.  Distinction  between  Provisional  and  Perpetual  Injunc- 
tions. —  Provisional,  also  called  preliminary  or  interlocutory, 
injunctions  arc  such  as  are  to  continue  until  a  certain  time 
usually  specified  therein  ;  for  example,  until  the  coming"  in  of 
the  defendant's  answer,  the  hearing  of  the  cause,  the  master's 
report,  or  the  further  order  of  the  court.^  Perpetual,  also  called 
final,  injunctions  are  those  which,  as  their  name  denotes,  per- 
]jetually  restrain  the  defendant  from  the  same  act  or  acts.  Pro- 
visional injunctions  may  be  granted  at  any  time  during  the 
progress  of  a  suit.  Perpetual  injunctions  can  never  he  granted 
except  at  the  time  of  the  entry  of  the  decree.^  The  setting  up 
of  outstanding  terms  can,  it  has  been  said,  only  he  restrained 
by  a  perpetual  injunction.^  JNIandatory  injunctions  also  will  very 
rarely  be  granted  before  a  decree^  "■  It  is  a  rule  of  practice  in 
the  Circuit  Courts  of  the  United  States  not  to  allow  an  injunction 
to  stay  an  ejectment  suit  until  it  can  Ije  investigated  in  equity, 
unless  a  judgment  be  entered  therein."  ° 

§  227.  Distinction  between  Common  and  Special  Injunctions.  — 
Injunctions  were  formei'ly  of  two  kinds,  common  and  special. 
Common  injunctions  were  those  which  were  granted,  as  of  course, 
upon  the  defendant's  default  either  in  appearing  or  answering, 
and  wci'e  only  applicaljle  to  restrain  proceedings  at  common  law.^ 
Special  injunctions  were  those  which  were  granted,  not  as  a  mat- 
ter of  course,  but  upon  the  special  circumstances  of  the  case  as 
disclosed  by  the  answer  of  the  defendant  or  upon  afifidavits.^ 
Common  injunctions,  although  recognized  by  the  ecpiity  rules,^ 
have,  it  has  been  lield,  been  aljolished  I)y  the  Revised  Statutes.^ 

Ry.  Co.  r.  N.  Y ,  L.  E.  &  W.  R.  Co  ,  34  &  Macliiiie  Works  v    Erie   Ky.   Co.,  5  C. 

Fed.  R.  516  ;  C.  S.  M.  Co.  v.  V.  &  (;.  II.  E.  Gret-n  (N.  J.)  o79.     But  see  Dinsmore 

W.   Co.,  1  Saw.  68o ;  Chicago,  B.  &   Q.  v.  Louisville,  C.  &  L.  Ry.  Co.,  2  Fed.  R. 

Hy.  Co.  V.  Burlin,c:ton,  C.  R.  &  X.  Ry.  46.5;  Coe  u.  Louisville  &  Nashville  R.  R. 

Co.  .34  Fed.  R.  481.  Co.,  3  Fed.  R.  775,  and  other  cases  cited 

•     §226.    1  Daniell'sCh.Pr.  (2dAm.  ed.)  under  §  225. 
1810;  Eden  on  Injunctions,  ch.  xv.  ^  Billing*,  J.,  in  Heirs  of  Szy  wauski  r. 

■^  Daniell's  Cli.  I'r.  (2d  Am.  ed  )  190:3;  Zunts,  20  Fed.  R.  o(Jl,  oG;5 ,  citing  Turner 

Adams  y.  Crittenden,  17  Federal  Reporter,  r   American    Bapt.    Missionary  Union,  5 

42.  McLean,  344. 

3  Hylton  r.  Morgan,  r.  Vps.  20?, :  Byrne  §  227.     i  Daniell's  CIi.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.) 

V  Byrne,  2  Sch.  &  Lef.   o:!7  ;   Barmy   r.  1877. 

Luckett,   1   Sim.  &  S.   41U  ;    Nortliey  v.  '^  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1833. 

Pearce,  1  Sim.  &  S.  420.  '  3  i^,ie55. 

*  Camblos   r.   The  Plnladelpliia  &  R.  «  Pprry  v.  Parker,  1    W.   &  M.   280; 

R   R.    Co.,   9   Phila.  (Pa.)  411;    s.   c   4  Lawrence  i^.  Bowman,  1  McAU.  419. 
Brcw.^ter  (Pa.),  -503;  Rogers  Locomotive 


§  229.]  INJUNCTIONS   NOT    PKAYED   FOR   IN   THE    BILL.  375 

Tlic  learning-  upon  the  subject,  which  is  very  technical,  seems 
now,  therefore,  useless,  and  will  not  be  repeated  here.^ 

s^  228.  Time  and  Place  of  Applications  for  Interlocutory  Injunc- 
tions.—  An  injunction  may  be  obtained,  at  any  time,  as  well  in 
vacation  as  in  term,  and  whether  the  court  be  sitting  or  not,  at 
any  place  within  which  the  judge  granting  it  has  jurisdiction, 
and  at  almost  any  stage  of  the  cause.^  In  England  it  has  been 
held,  that,  in  a  very  extraordinary  case,  an  injunction  may  be 
granted  upon  petition  before  the  hling  of  a  bill  or  the  service  of 
a  subjxjena;^  and  in  the  courts  of  the  United  States  an  injunc- 
tion has  been  issued  upon  the  filing  of  the  bill  and  before  ser- 
vice of  the  subpfjcna.^  An  injunction  will  not  usually  be  granted 
while  a  demurrer  or  plea  to  the  bill  is  pending.^  But  in  cases 
of  emergency,  the  court  may  order  the  sufficiency  of  such  a  plead- 
ing to  be  argued  before  the  regular  time  for  such  a  proceeding, 
together  with  the  motion  for  the  injunction;^  or  even  grant  a 
stay-order  without  waiting  for  the  argument.*^  Should  a  motion 
be  heard  while  a  demurrer  is  on  the  file  and  undisposed  of,  it 
seems  that  upon  the  hearing  of  the  motion  the  allegations  in  the 
bill  will  be  considered  as  admittedJ  An  application  for  an  in- 
junction has  been  refused  because  the  bill  had  been  referred  for 
scandal.''^ 

§  229.  Injunctions  not  prayed  for  in  the  Bill.  —  The  English 
rule  was  that  an  injunction  would  not  issue  against  a  person 
not  made  a  party  to  a  bill  specifically  praying  an  injunction 
against  him;^  and  the  injunction  had  to  be  prayed  for  not  only 
in  the  prayer  for  relief,  but  also  in  the  prayer  for  process.^  To 
this,  however,  there  were  four  exceptional  classes  of  cases.  If 
the  court  had  by  its  decree  taken  the  distriliution  or  control  of 
property  into  its  own  hands,  it  would  prevent  injury  thereto  either 
by  the  parties  litigant  or  others,  although  no  injunction  had  been 

^  See  Daniell'sCh.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  ^  Anon  >:  Britlsjewater  Canal  Co.,   9 

1811-18::!3.  Simons,  378  ;  Darnell's  Ch.  Pr.  (5th  Am. 

§  228.  1  Daniell's  Cli.  Pr  (5th  Am.ed.)  ed.)  1G71, 
1663;    Kerr    on    Injunctions,     543-545;  ^  Wardle   u.  Claxton,  9  Simons,  412; 

Bacon  v  Jones,  4  Myl.  &  Cr  433.  MaUby  v.  Bobo,  14  Blatchf.  53  ,  Fremont 

^  Mayor  of  London  v.  Bolt,  5  Ves.  129.  v.  Merced  Mining  Co.,  1  McAll.  267. 

3  Scliermerhorn  (^  L'Espenasse,  2  Dall.  ^  Bayerque  y.  Cohen,  McAII.  113. 
CUO.                                                                         ''  Davenport   v.    Davenport,  6    Madd. 

4  Cousins  V.  Smith,  13  Ves.  164  ;  Ket-  251. 

chum  y.  Drijrgs,  6  McLean,  13;    Anon.,  §  229.     '  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (5th    Am. 

2Atk.  113;    Daniell's  Ch    Pr.  (5th  Am.     ed  j  1614-1G17. 

ed.;  1671.  ^  Wood  v.  Beadell,  3  Simons,  273. 


376  INJUNCTIONS.  [chap.  XVI. 

prayed  by  the  bill.^  Thus,  in  a  foreclosure  suit,  it  would  restrain 
waste  by  the  mortgagor  after  a  decree  for  an  account;*  and  alter 
a  decree  for  the  administration  of  the  assets  of  a  dead  man,  it 
would  enjoin  a  creditor  not  a  party  to  the  suit  from  proceeding 
at  law  against  the  testator's  or  intestate's  estate  to  satisfy  his 
individual  claim,  provided  that  the  executor  made  an  affidavit 
stating  what  assets  he  had  in  his  hands,  or  had  previously  ad- 
mitted their  amount.^  If  the  suit  were  brought  by  a  legatee, 
such  a  statement  or  admission  was  not  indispensable.'^  Secondly, 
an  injunction  was  granted  without  a  bill  being  filed,  for  the  ex- 
press purpose  of  preventing  a  plaintiff  from  suing  both  at  law 
and  in  equity  at  the  same  time  and  for  the  same  matter,  and 
to  compel  him  to  make  an  election.^  Thirdly,  an  injunction  could 
always  be  obtained  to  compel  respect  and  enforce  obedience  to 
the  decrees  and  orders  of  the  court.  Thus,  puljlications  which 
were  disrespectful  to  the  court,  or  which  unfairly  reported  its 
proceedings,  could  be  enjoined.^  .So,  too,  an  injunction  could 
issue  to  restrain  an  action  at  law  to  recover  damages  for  false 
imprisonment  under  process  of  contempt  improperly  issued;^  to 
compel  compliance  with  the  terms  and  spirit  of  a  decree  by  one 
who  had  bought  land  under  it;^*'  to  compel  compliance  with  his 
lease  by  the  tenant  of  a  receiver  ;i^  and  to  prevent  an  unauthor- 
ized action  against  a  receiver.^^  And  fourthly,  there  seems  to  be 
a  class  of  cases  not  clearly  defined  in  which  the  court  granted 
an  injunction,  when  without  it  "  the  whole  object  of  the  pro- 
ceedings would  be  defeated,"  although  it  was  not  prayed  for  in 
the  biU.i^ 

§  230.  Special  Practice  of  the  Federal  Courts  in  the  Issue  of 
Injunctions.  —  The  following  regulations  control  the  practice  in 
issuing  injunctions  in  the  Federal  courts.  "  The  ])rayer  of  the 
bill  shall  ask  the  special  relief  to  which  the  plaintiff  supposes 

3  Daniell'sCIi.  Pr.  (5tli  Am.  ed.)  1614.  ett   v.  Commissioners  of  Heme  B.ay,  24 

«  Wright  V.  Atkyns,  1  V.  &  B.  313.  W.  K.  845.     But  see  U.  S.  II.  S.  §  725. 

^  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (5th  Am.  ed  )  1617;  «  Frowd  r.  Lawrence,  1  J  &  W.  G55; 

Paxton  y.  Douglas.  8  Ves.   520;  Thomp-  Er  p< trie  Clarke,!  K.&M.  GG3  ;  Daniell's 

son  V.  Brown,  4  J.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  619.  Ch.  Pr.  511. 

6  Katcliffe  r.  Winch,    16  Reav.    57G  ;  >"  Casamajor  »•.  Strode,  1   Sim.  &  Stu. 

Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (5th  Am.  ed.)  1617.  381 ;  Kerr  on  Injunctions,  543. 

'  Rogers  v.  Vosburgh,  4  J.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  n  Walton  v   Johnson,  15  Simons,  352. 

84.  1-^  Angel  v.  Smith,  9  Ves.335. 

8  Anon.,   2  Ves.    Sen.  520;    Brook  v.  is  Blomfield  ir  Eyre,  8  Beav.  250.    See 

Evans,  29  L.  J.  Ch.  610  ;  Coleman  ».  West  Shainwald  v.  Lewis,  6  Fed.  K.  766. 
Hartlepool  Ry.  Co.,  8  W.  R.  734  ;  Mack- 


§  230.]  FEDERAL  PRACTICE  AS   TO   INJUNCTIONS.  377 

himself  entitled,  and  also  shall  contain  a  prayer  for  general 
relief ;  and  if  an  injunction,  or  a  writ  of  ne  exeat  regno ^  or  any 
other  special  order,  pending  the  suit,  is  required,  it  shall  also 
be  specially  asked  for."  ^  "  Whenever  an  injunction  is  asiicd  for 
by  the  bill  to  stay  proceedings  at  law,  if  the  defendant  do  not 
enter  his  appearance,  and  plead,  demur,  or  answer  to  the  same 
witliin  the  time  prescribed  therefor  by  these  rules,  the  plaintiff 
shall  be  entitled  as  of  course,  u[)on  motion,  without  notice  to 
such  injunction.'-^  But  special  injunctions  shall  be  grantable  only 
upon  due  notice  to  the  other  party  by  the  court  in  term,  or  by 
a  judge  thereof  in  vacation,  after  a  hearing,  which  may  be  ex 
parte  if  the  adverse  party  does  not  appear  at  the  time  and  [)lace 
ordered.  In  every  case  where  an  injunction  —  either  the  com- 
mon injunction  or  a  s})ecial  injunction  —  is  awarded  in  vacation, 
it  shall,  unless  previously  dissolved  by  the  judge  granting  the 
same,  continue  until  the  next  term  of  the  court,  or  until  it  is 
dissolved  by  some  other  order  of  the  court."  ^  "  Whenever  notice 
is  given  of  a  motion  for  an  injunction  out  of  a  circuit  or  dis- 
trict court,  the  court  or  judge  thereof  may,  if  there  appears  to 
be  danger  of  irreparable  injury  from  delay,  grant  an  order  re- 
straining the  act  sought  to  be  enjoined  until  the  decision  upon 
the  motion  ;  and  such  order  may  be  granted  with  or  without 
security,  in  the  discretion  of  the  court  or  judge."  "^  "Writs  of 
injunction  may  be  granted  by  any  justice  of  the  Supreme  Court 
in  cases  where  they  might  be  granted  by  the  Supreme  Court, 
and  by  any  judge  of  a  circuit  court  in  cases  where  they  might 
be  granted  by  such  court.  But  no  justice  of  the  Supreme  Court 
shall  hear  or  allow  any  application  for  an  injunction  or  restrain- 
ing order  in  any  cause  pending  in  the  circuit  to  wliich  he  is 
allotted,  elsewhere  than  within  such  circuit,  or  at  such  place  out- 
side of  the  same  as  the  parties  may  stipulate  in  writing,  except 
when  it  cannot  be  heard  by  the  circuit  judge  of  the  circuit  or 
the  district  judge  of  the  district.  And  an  injunction  shall  not 
be  issued  by  a  district  judge,  as  one  of  the  judges  of  a  circuit 
court,"  except  when  holding  such  court,^  "  in  any  case  where  a 
party  has  had  a  reasonable  time  to  apply  to  the  circuit  court  for 

§  230.     1  Kiile  21.     But  see  SliainwaUl         ■»  U.  S.  K.  S.  §  718.     See  Yupn-rlintry. 

V.  Lewis,  6  Fed.  R.  76G.  Johnson,  1   Hufjiios,  (307 ;  C.  B.  &  Q.  Wy. 

■^  Perry  v.  Parker,  1  W.  &  M.  280.  Co.  v.  B.  C.  R.  &  N.  Ry.  Co.,  34  Fed.  R.  48L 

3  Rule  55.  ^  Goodyear  Dental   Vulcanite  Co.    i». 

Folsoni,  3  Fed.  R.  509. 


378  INJUNCTIONS.  [chap.  xvi. 

the  writ ;  nor  shall  any  injunction  so  issued  by  a  district  judge 
continue  longer  than  to  the  circuit  court  next  ensuing,  unless  so 
ordered  by  the  circuit  court."  ^  It  has  been  held  under  the  fore- 
going statutory  provision  that  absence  or  illness  of  the  circuit 
and  district  judges  is  such  a  disability  as  authorizes  the  circuit 
justice  to  hear  and  grant  the  application  at  a  place  outside  of 
the  circuit;-"  and  that,  if  the  circuit  justice  as  well  as  the  cir- 
cuit and  district  judges  be  absent  from  the  circuit,  the  application 
may  be  heard  and  the  writ  granted  by  any  justice  of  the  Supreme 
Court  in  any  jiart  of  the  United  States.^  A  denial  by  the  Circuit 
Court  of  an  application  to  dissolve  an  injunction  granted  by  a 
district  judge  may  be  treated  as  an  order  for  its  continuance.^ 
But  if  no  order  continuing  it  is  made,  such  an  injunction  is  dis- 
solved without  an  order. ^"^ 

In  the  Circuit  Court  for  the  Southern  District  of  Xew  York 
the  rules  provide  as  follows  :  — 

'•'  \o  motion  for  an  injunction  (except  to  stay  waste)  shall  be 
heard  unless  a  copy  of  the  bill  and  of  the  depositions  to  be  offered 
in  its  support  shall  be  served  on  the  adverse  party,  or  his  attor- 
ney, at  least  four  days  before  motion  made."  ^^  "  The  defendant 
may  show  cause  against  the  allowance  of  an  injunction,  cither  by 
plea,  answer,  or  demurrer  to  the  bill,  or  by  parol  excci)tion  to  its 
legal  sufficiency,  or  by  deposition,  disproving  the  equity  on  which 
the  motion  is  founded."  ^-  "  Suppletory,  or  supporting,  proofs 
may,  at  the  discretion  of  the  court,  or  judge,  be  offered  by  the 
complainant  to  rebut  the  cause  shown  by  the  defendant ;  but  the 
reception  of  such  additional  proofs  is  not  to  permit  the  intro- 
duction of  further  proofs  in  opposition  thereto  by  the  defendant, 
previous  to  the  final  hearing  upon  the  merits."  ^^  "  Hereafter, 
on  motions  for  an  injunction,  because  of  the  infringement  of  a 
patent  right,  the  complainant  shall  not  be  permitted  to  give  evi- 
dence to  rebut  the  cause  shown  by  the  defendant  against  the 
allowance  thereof,  other  than  to  a  denial  that  the  defendant  uses 


6  U.  S.  n.  S.  §  710.      See    Dudley's  12  Wlieat.  5G1.     See  Gray  v.  Chicago,  I. 

Case,  1  Penn.  L.  J.  302.  &  N.  R.  11.  Co.,  1  Woolw.  63. 

'  Searles  v.  Jaciksonvillc,  P.  &  M.  R.  "  Parker   ;;.    The  Jutli^^es    of    Circuit 

R.  Co.,  2  Woods,  (321.  Court,  12  Wlieat.  561  ;  Gray   v.  Chicago, 

*>  United    States    v.    Louisville    &    P.  I.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  1  Woolw.  03. 

Cnnal  Co..  1  Dill.  GOO.  "  U.  S.  C.  C,  S.  D.  N.  Y.  Rule  105. 

y  Parker  c.   Judges  of  Circuit  Court,  i-  U.  S.  C.  C,  S.  D  N.  Y   Pvule  100. 

1^  U.  S.  C.  C,  S.  D.  N.  V.  Rule  107. 


§  231.]  APPLICATION   FOR   INTERLOCUTORY   INJUNCTION.  379 

tlic  discovery  or  invention  claimed  by  the  complainant,  or  to  a 
claim  by  the  defendant  tliat  he  acts  under  an  assignment  or 
license  from  the  patentee,  and  on  motions  for  injmictions  to  stay 
waste,  only  to  a  defence  set  up  justifying-  the  waste  ;  and  in 
neither  case  shall  such  suppletury  or  supporting  proofs  be  re- 
ceived, unless  the  court,  or  on(i  of  the  judges,  on  satisfactory 
cause  shown,  shall,  by  order  j^reviously  made,  allow  the  same  to 
be  given.  And  so  much  of  rule  107  of  the  standing  Rules  in 
Equity  of  this  court  adopted  April  28,  1838,  as  may  be  incon- 
sistent herewith,  is  repealed.  Motions  for  injunctions  shall  be 
brought  on  by  the  complainant  on  the  day  named  in  the  notice, 
if  the  court  is  then  in  session  ;  and  in  default  thereof,  the  de- 
fendant may  move  that  the  notice  be  discharged  for  the  term, 
with  costs,  unless  further  time  is  given,  or  the  hearing  is  delayed 
by  order  of  the  court."  ^-^ 

§  231.  Notice  of  Application  for  Interlocutory  Injunction.  —  As 
a  general  rule,  notice  of  an  application  for  an  injunction  must 
always  be  given  to  the  person  against  whom  the  injunction  is  de- 
sired ;  but  in  very  pressing  cases,  where  the  mischief  sought  to 
be  prevented  was  serious,  imminent,  and  irremediable,  or  where 
the  mere  act  of  giving  notice  to  the  defendant  of  the  intention  to 
make  the  application  might  have  been  of  itself  productive  of  the 
mischief  apprehended,  by  inducing  him  to  accelerate  the  act  in 
order  that  it  might  be  complete  before  the  time  for  making  the 
application  should  have  arrived,  the  courts  have  always  awarded 
injunctions  without  notice.^  On  an  application  for  an  injunction 
without  notice,  the  plaintiff  should  state  in  his  affidavit  the  time 
when  he  first  learned  of  the  threatened  mischief,-  if  the  injunc- 
tion desired  be  to  restrain  the  infringement  of  a  j)atent  that  he 
believes  that  the  i)erson  to  whom  the  patent  was  issued  was  the 
original  inventor  thereof,  or  that  the  thing  or  process  patented 
was  new  or  had  not  been  introduced  into  public  use  in  the  United 
States  for  more  than  two  years  prior  to  the  application  upon 
which  the  patent  was  issued,^  and  every  material  circumstance 

^i  U.  S.  C.  C,  S.  D.  N.  Y.  -Rule  of  May  2  Calvert  v.  Gray,  2  Cooper's  Cli.  K. 

18,  184(3.  171  n. 

§231.  1  DanieU'sCh.  Pp.  (oth  Am.eil.)  ^  mw   ,.    Thompson,    3   Meriv.    622; 

16G4;  Kerr  on  Injunctions,  545 ;   Wing  y.  Sturz  r.  De  la   Rue,  5  Russ.    322,    321); 

Fairhaven,8Ciishin<;(Mass.),3G3,  Scher-  Sullivan  r.   Hodfield,  1   Paine,  441.     See 

nicrhorn    v.   L'Espenasse,    2    Dall.    360  ;  also  U.  S.  R.  S.  §§  4880,  48b7. 
Yuengling  v.  Johnson,  1  Iluglies,  GOT. 


380  INJUNCTIONS.  [CHAr.  XTI. 

connected  with  the  case,  whether  the  same  bears  for  or  against 
his  application.^  If  his  affidavit  be  defective  in  any  of  these  par- 
ticulars, according  to  the  English  practice,  an  injunction  would 
not  be  issued,  or  if  issued  the  order  for  it  would  be  discharged.^ 
"  The  application  for  a  special  injunction  is  very  much  governed 
upon  the  same  principles  which  govern  insurances,  matters  whicli 
are  said  to  require  the  utmost  degree  of  good  faith,  ^uberrima 
fides.'  In  cases  of  insurance  a  party  is  required  not  only  to  state 
all  matters  within  his  knowledge,  which  he  believes  to  be  mate- 
rial to  the  question  of  the  insurance,  but  all  which  in  point  of 
fact  are  so.  If  he  conceals  anything  that  he  knows  to  be  mate- 
rial, it  is  a  fraud  ;  but  besides  that,  if  he  conceals  anything  that 
may  influence  the  rate  of  premium  which  the  underwriter  may  re- 
quire, although  he  does  not  know  that  it  would  have  that  effect, 
such  concealment  entirely  vitiates  the  policy.  So  here,  if  the 
party  applying  for  a  special  injunction  abstains  from  stating  facts 
which  the  court  thinks  are  most  material  to  enable  it  to  form  its 
judgment,  he  disentitles  himself  to  that  relief  which  he  asks  the 
court  to  grant."  ^  In  the  absence  of  any  local  rule  upon  the  sub- 
ject, the  practice  in  giving  notice  of  an  application  for  an  injunc- 
tion, and  of  proceeding  at  the  time  when  the  application  is  made, 
are  the  same  when  an  injunction  is  asked  for  as  upon  any  other 
interlocutory  application.  It  has  been  said  that  an  application 
for  an  interlocutory  special  injunction,  during  term  and  after 
the  beginning  of  a  suit  and  before  answer,  can  only  be  made  by 
motion  ;  but  that  in  vacation  a  judge  may  grant  such  an  appli- 
cation upon  petition.'  The  usual  practice  is,  however,  to  apply 
by  motion.  It  has  been  held  that  a  mandatory  injunction  can 
only  be  granted  upon  notice.^  It  has  been  further  lield  that  the 
evidence  which  would  prevent  the  issue  of  an  interlocutory  in- 
junction will  be  sufficient  to  induce  the  court  to  dissolve  one 
previously  granted.^ 

§   232.    Affidavits   upon   an   Application   for   an   Injunction.  —  The 
affidavits  upon  which  an  injunction  is  sought  are  usually  sworn 

*  Balglish  V.  Jarvie,  2  Macnaghten  &  ^  Daniell's  Ch.  Vr.  (5th  Am.  ed.)  IG6G ; 

Gordon,  2?,\.  Smith  v.  Clarke,  2  Dick.  455  ;  Nichols  v. 

5  Daltrlisli  V.  Jarvie,  2  Macnaghten  &  Kearsly,  2  Dick.  645. 

Gordon,  201.  s  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  K.  Co.  v.   Burling- 

«  The  Lord  Commissioner,  Mr.  Baron  ton,  C.  R.  &  N.  U.  Co.,  ?A  Fed.  H.  481. 

Tlolfe,  in  Dalglish  v.  Jarvie,  2  Mac.  &  G.  ''  Cary  v.  Domestic  Springbed  Co.,  20 

231,  243,  244.  Fed.  K.  38. 


§  232.]      AFFIDAVITS  UPON  AN  APPLICATION  FOR  AN  INJUNCTION.     381 

to  by  the  plaintiffs  or  one  of  tliem,i  but  may  be  sworn  to  by  any 
person  acquainted  with  the  facts,^  in  which  latter  case  the  afli- 
davit  should,  it  seems,  state  a  s^ood  reason  for  its  not  being  sworn 
to  by  one  of  the  plaintiff s.^  It  is  in  general  necessary  that  a 
])laintiff  should  swear  positively  to  his  title.'*  An  injunction  has 
been  refused  when  a  plaintiff  merely  swore  upon  information  and 
belief  that  he  was  a  remainder-man  under  a  settlement.^  Upon 
an  application  for  an  injunction  to  stay  waste,  he  must  set  out 
his  title  with  particularity.  A  statement  "  that  the  plaintiff  was 
entitled  to  tlie  fee-simple  of  the  estate"  has  been  held  insuf- 
ficient.^ It  has  been  said  that  if  fraud  is  relied  upon  as  a  basis 
for  an  injunction,  it  must  be  sworn  to  positively,  and  not  merely 
upon  information  and  belief^  The  plaintiff  should  also  in  the 
affidavits  show  some  actual  violation  of  his  rights,  or  a  sufficient 
ground  to  aj)i)rehend  it.^  An  injunction  may  be  granted  though 
the  bill  is  not  sworn  to,  provided  that  the  accompanying  affi- 
davits show  a  proper  case  for  it;^  but  not  unless  a  proper  case 
is  made  out  by  the  bill  itself.^*^  If  the  defendant  in  his  opposing 
affidavits  set  up  as  a  defence  new  matter  in  avoidance  of  the  case 
shown  by  the  plaintiff,  the  latter  may  have  leave  to  file  further 
affidavits  in  rebuttal ;  but  generally  no  subseciuent  affidavits  can 
be  filed  by  the  defendant.^i  Rebutting  affidavits  may  also  be  used 
to  support  any  allegations  of  the  bill  denied  in  the  answer  except 
such  as  state  the  plaintiff's  title  to  property  affected  by  the  liti- 
gation.^^  The  authorities  are  conflicting  as  to  whether  or  not  the 
plaintiff's  title,  if  denied  in  the  answer,  can  be  supported  by  re- 

§  232.  '  Daniell's  Cli.  Pr.  (5tli  Am.  ed.)  »  Smith  v.  Schwed,  6  Fed.  R.  455. 

1G69.  i"*  Cooper   v.   Mattlieys,   8    Law   Rep. 

'-  Lord   Byron  v.  Jolinston,  2   Meriv.  413;  Wilson  i\  Stolley,  4  McLean,  272; 

29;  Brooks  &  Hardy  v.  O'llara  Bros.,  8  Leo  v.  Union  Pacific  Ry.  Co.,  17  Fed.  R. 

Fed.  R.  52'.).  273  ;  Land  Co.  of  New  Mexico  v.  Elkins, 

3  Lord  Byron  v.  Johnston,  2  Meriv.  20  Fed.  R.  515  ;  St.  Louis  Type  Foun- 

29;   Spaldin-j;  v.  Keely,  7   Simons,  377;  dry  v.  Carter  &  G.  P.  Co.,  31  Fed.   R. 

Scotson  V.  Gaury,  1  Hare,  99;  Kerr  on  624. 

Injunctions,  548.  *^  Day  v.  New  England  Car  Spring  Co., 

^  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (5th  Am.  ed.)  1CG9.  3  Blatchf.  154.     See  Rule  107  and  Rule 

6  Davis  V.  Leo,  6  Ves.  784.  of  May,  184G,  of  U.  S.  C.  C,  S.  D.  N.  Y., 

"  Whitelegg   v.  Whitelegg,  1    Brown  quoted  supra,  §  230. 

Ch.  C.  57.  12  Brooks  v.  BickncU,  3  McLean,  250  ; 

"  Brooks  &  Hardy  v.  O'Hara  Bros.,  8  P"armer  r.  Calvert  Lithographing  Co.,  1 

Fed.  R.  529.  Flippin,  228.    See  Rule  113  and  Rule  of 

8  Gibson  v.  Smith,  2  Atk.  182;  Jack-  May,  1846,  of  U.  S.  C.  C,  S.  D.  N.  Y. 
son  V.  Cator,  5  Ves.  088 ;  Hanson  v.  Gar- 
diner, 7  Ves.  305. 


382 


INJUXCTIOXS. 


[CIIAP.  XVI. 


butting  affidavits.^^  Where  an  allegation  in  the  bill  is  not  denied 
in  the  answer,  it  is  taken  as  admitted  for  the  purposes  of  a  mo- 
tion for  a  preliminary  injunction.^^  Documentary^  proof,  if  of  equal 
force  with  affidavits,  can  also  be  used  in  support  or  in  opposition 
to  a  motion  for  an  injunction.^^  Upon  the  hearing  of  a  motion 
for  a  preliminary  injunction,  tlic  rules  of  evidence  are  applied 
less  strictly  than  upon  the  final  hearing  of  the  cause  ;  and  con- 
sequently decrees  entered  in  suits  between  strangers  affecting  the 
validity  of  a  patent  in  question  may  be  offered  in  evidence,  in 
support  of  an  application  for  a  preliminary  injunction,  but  not 
in  support  of  an  application  for  one  tliat  is  to  be  perpetual. ^"^ 
Hearsay  evidence  may  also  be  used.^' 

§  233.  Rules  cf  Decision  upon  Applications  for  Interlocutory  In- 
junctions.—  The  issue  of  an  interlocutory  injunction  is  never  a 
matter  of  right,  l)ut  rests  in  the  sound  discretion  of  the  court. 
In  order  to  obtain  one,  the  plaintiff  must  show  either  that  there 
is  no  doubt  of  the  wrongful  nature  of  the  act  sought  to  be  en- 
joined,^ or  that  his  own  claims  of  right  have  been  acquiesced 
in  without  question  for  a  long  period  of  timc,^  or  that  the  injury 
which  will  result  to  himself  from  a  refusal  of  the  injunction  will 
be  very  great,  and  that  to  the  defendant  from  the  issue  thereof 
very  slight.^  Otherwise,  an  interlocutory  injunction  will  be 
denied  hiiu.^     In  a  suit  under  the  act  to  protect  trade  and  com- 


13  Compare  Poor  v.  Carleton,  3  Sum- 
ner, 70 ;  Goodyear  v.  Mullee,  3  Fisher, 
420;  with  Farmer  v.  Calvert  Lithograpli- 
ing  Co.,  1  Flippin,  228 ;  Parker  v.  Sears, 
1  Fisher  Pat.  Cas.  9o ;  United  States  v. 
Parrott,  1  McAll.  271.  See  Kule  107  and 
Kule  of  May,  1«4G,  of  U.  S.  C.  C,  S.  D. 
N.  Y. 

!•*  Young  V.  Grundy,  6  Cranch,  51. 
See  §  146. 

15  Schermerhorn  v.  L'Espenasse,  2  Dall. 
360. 

i«  Buck  V.  Hermance,  1  Rlatchf.  322  ; 
Matthews  v.  Ironclad  Manuf.  Co.,  19  Fed. 
R.  321. 

1"  Casey  i".  Cincinnati  Typographical 
Union  No.  3,  45  Fed.  R.  135,  147  ;  wliere 
Judge  Sage  quotes  this  passage  witli 
approval. 

§  233.  1  Minturn  v.  Larue,  1  McAH. 
370;  Buclianan  r.  Howiand,  2  Fisiier, 
341  ;  Douglity  v.  West,  2  Fislier,  553. 


-  Varick  v.  Mayor  of  New  York,  4 
J.  Cii.  (N.  Y)  53;  Kirby  Bung  Manuf. 
Co.  ('.  Wliite,  1  Fed.  R.  604  ;  McKay  v. 
Dibert,  5  Fed.  R.  587  ;  W.  U.  Tel.  Co.  v. 
Union  Pacific  R.  R.  Co.,  3  Fed.  R.  721; 
Atlantic  &  Pacific  Tel.  Co.  v.  Union  Paci- 
fic Ry.  Co  ,  1  Fed.  R.  745. 

3  W.  U.  Tel.  Co.  V.  St.  Jo.  &  W.  Ry. 
Co.,  3  Fed.  R.  430;  W.  U.  Tel.  Co.  v. 
Burlington  &  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  11  Fed.  R.  1 ; 
American  Union  Tcl.  Co.  v.  Union  Pacific 
Ry.  Co.,  1  McCrary,  188;  Atlantic  &  Pa- 
cific Tel.  Co.  V.  Union  Pacific  Ry.  Co.,  1 
McCrary,  541. 

■*  Cofieen  r.  Brunton,  5  McLean,  256 ; 
Smith  V.  Cunmiings,  1  Fisher  Pat.  Cas. 
152;  French  v.  Brewer,  3  Wall.  Jr.  346  ; 
Pentlarge  v.  Beeston,  1  Fed.  H.  862 ; 
Kirby  Bung  Manuf.  Co.  v.  White,  1  Fed. 
R.  004  ;  Te.xas  &  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  i'.  Inter- 
state Trans.  Co.,  45  Fed.  R.  5. 


§  234.]  THE   WEIT   OF   INJUNCTION.  383 

mercc  against  unlawful  monopolies,  a  preliminary  injunction  was 
refused  when  doubtful  questions  of  law  and  fact  were  involved, 
partly  upon  the  ground  that  as  the  United  States  tendered  no 
bond,  more  injury  would  result  to  the  defendant  from  the  issue 
than  to  the  })laintiff  from  the  refusal  of  the  Avrit.^  A  prelim- 
inary injunction  to  restrain  the  infringement  of  a  patent  will 
nearly  always  be  refused,  if  the  defendant  has  ample  pecuniary 
responsibility,  or  gives  security  against  loss  to  the  plaintiff,  and 
is  willing  to  keep  an  account  of  his  manufacture,  use,  and  sale  of 
the  article  claimed  to  be  patented,  and  the  damages  which  the 
plaintiff  will  suffer  can  be  readily  reckoned  in  money .^  Danger 
of  inconvenience  to  the  public  is  a  ground  for  refusing  a  prelimi- 
nary injunction."  A  preliminary  injunction  may  also  be  refused 
when  the  plaintiff  has  been  guilty  of  laches  in  applying  for  it ; 
even  though  his  delay  has  not  been  such  as  to  disentitle  him  to 
a  perpetual  injunction  after  the  hearing.®  If  an  injunction  has 
been  obtained  by  an  interlocutory  order,  and  it  is  desired  to  con- 
tinue it  provisionally  after  a  hearing,  a  direction  to  that  effect 
should  be  inserted  in  the  interlocutory  decree  then  entered.^ 

§  234.  The  Writ  of  Injunction.  —  Immediately  upon  the  entry 
of  an  order  for  an  injunction,  the  party  who  obtained  it  is  entitled 
to  have  the  writ  issued  from  the  clerk's  office  and  served.^  He 
should  attend  to  this  within  a  reasonable  time.  Where  the  writ 
was  tested  six  weeks  after  the  entry  of  the  order  granting  it  and 
was  not  served  till  nearly  a  year  afterwards,  the  court  refused  to 
punish  the  defendant  for  disobedience,  saying  that,  after  the  lapse 
of  so  much  time,  the  plaintiff  should  have  applied  for  leave  to  use 
the  writ.2  Like  all  other  writs  and  processes  issuing  from  the 
courts  of  the  United  States,  writs  of  injunction  must  be  under 
the  seal  of  the  court  from  which  they  issue,  and  signed  by  the 

5  United  States  r.  Jellico  M.  C.  &  C.  '  Southwestern  Brush  El.  L.  &  P.  Co. 
Co.,  43  Fed.  R.  SOS.                                            v.  Louisiana  El.  L.  Co.,  45  Fed.  R.  893 ; 

6  Foster  v.  .Moore,  1  Curt.  279;  Morris     supra,  §  216. 

V.  Shelbourne,  8  Blatchf .  26(5 ;  Gilbert  &  ^  Gordon    v.  Cheltenham    Ry.   Co.,   5 

B.  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Bussing,  12  Blatchf.  426  ;  Beav.  229  ;  Mundy  v.  Kendall,  23  Fed.  R. 

Swift  V.  Jenks,  19  Fed.  R.  641;  Hoe  r.  591;  Kerr  on  Injunctions,  22,  2.3. 
Boston  Daily  Advertiser  Co.,  14  Fed.  R.  «  Daniell's  cii.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1902. 

914  ;  U.  S.  Annunciator  Co.  v.  Sanderson,  §  234.  i  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.) 

3  Blatchf.   184.     But  see  Gibson  r.  Van  1816,  1817,  1964. 

Dresar,  1  Blatchf.  532 ;  Tracy  v.  Torrey,  -  McCormick   v.   Jerome,   3    Blatchf. 

2  Blatchf  275  :  Parkhurst  t\  Kinsman,  2  486. 
Blatchf.   78;   McWilliams  Manuf.  Co.  v. 
Bluudell,  11  Fed.  R.  419. 


384  INJUNCTIONS.  [chap.  XVI. 

clerk  thereof.  Those  issuing  from  the  Supreme  Court  or  a  Cir- 
cuit Court  must  bear  teste,  from  the  date  of  such  issue,  of  the 
Chief  Justice  of  the  United  States,  or,  when  that  office  is  vacant, 
of  the  associate  justice  next  in  precedence,  and  those  issuing  from 
a  District  Court  must  bear  teste  of  the  judge,  or  when  that  office 
is  vacant,  of  the  clerk  thereof.^  "  The  orders  pronounced  by  the 
Court  in  cases  of  special  injunctions  before  answer,  have  varied 
at  different  periods.  The  form  most  frequently  adopted  enjoined 
the  pavty  '  till  further  order.^  In.  some  cases  the  injunction  has 
been  till  '  appearance  and  further  order  ; '  in  others  till  '  answer 
and  further  order.'  But  the  form  at  present  used,  and  Avhich  is 
estal)lished  by  a  rule  laid  down  by  Lord  Eldon,  is  '  till  answer 
or  further  order.'  This  lias  been  adopted  as  giving  defendant 
the  liberty  to  move,  if  necessary,  to  dissolve  upon  affidavit,  before 
he  has  answered  the  bill."  ^  The  writ  should  contain  a  concise 
description  of  the  particular  acts  or  things  in  respect  to  which 
the  defendant  is  enjoined  ;  ^  and  should  conform  to  the  directions 
of  the  order  granting  the  injunction.^  If,  however,  the  writ  is 
broader  than  the  order  warrants,  the  defendant  should  apply  to 
the  court  for  an  order  setting  it  aside  or  modifying  it.'  It 
seems  that  he  is  not  justified  in  disobeying  it  and  raising  the 
objection  when  a  motion  is  made  for  an  attachment  against  him.^ 
It  seems  that  a  writ  is  insufficient  which  designates  the  acts 
sought  to  be  enjoined  by  a  reference  to  the  bill  without  describ- 
ing them.^  The  English  practice  was  to  mention  in  the  writ  a 
money  penalty  to  be  incurred  by  the  defendant  if  he  disobeyed 
it;  but  that  does  not  seem  to  be  necessary  here.^*^  The  writ 
should  be  addressed  to  the  persons  whom  it  is  desired  to  enjoin.^i 
If  the  injunction  is  against  waste,  or  forbids  the  continuance  of 
a  nuisance,  or  some  other  similarly  inequitable  act,  it  is  usually 
addressed  to  the  defendant,  his  servants,  workmen,  and  agents ;  ^^ 
if  to  restrain  proceedings  in  another  court,  to  the  defendant,  his 
attorneys,  and  agents,!^  gyen  though  tlie  bill  prays  for  an  injunc- 

3  U.  S.  R.  S.  §§  oil,  912.  9  Whipple  v.  Hutcliinson,  4  Blatchf. 

4  Daniell's  Cli.'Pr.  (2(1  Am.  ed.)  1895;     190. 

Read  v.  Consequa,  4  Wasli.  174.  ^"  Low  v.  Hauol,  1  Wnll.  Jr.  345. 

6  Whipple  V.  Hutchinson,  4   Blatchf.  "  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1817. 

190.  1-  Kerr  on  Injunctions,  559;  Daniell's 

•^  Sickehs  r.  Borden,  4  Blatclif.  14.  Ch.  Pr.  (5th  Am.  ed.)  1G73;  Humphreys 

'  Sickels  v.  Borden,  4  Blatchf.  14.  i-.  Roberts,  Scton's  Decrees  (4th  ed.),  173. 

8  Sickels  V.  Borden,  4  Blatchf.  14.  i^  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (5th  Am.  ed.)  1673. 


§  235.]  DISSOLUTION    OF   INTERLOCUTORY   INJUNCTIONS.  385 

tion  against  the  defendant  alone.  But  the  lattcr's  tenants  cannot 
be  thus  enjoined,  unless  they  have  become  such  after  the  com- 
incnccment  of  the  suit  or  have  been  made  parties  to  it.^*  The 
writ  should  be  endorsed  or  subscribed  with  the  name  and  office 
address  of  the  plaintiff's  solicitor,  or  with  the  name  and  residence 
of  the  ])laintiff  if  he  appears  in  person.^'' 

§  235.  Dissolution  of  Interlocutory  Injunctions  in  General,  —  The 
common  injunction  was  dissolved  as  of  course  upon  the  defend- 
ant's putting  in  a  sufficient  answer  to  the  bill.  The  practice  in 
such  a  case  was  for  him  to  obtain  an  order  nisi,  upon  the  return 
of  which  the  injunction  was  always  dissolved,  unless  the  plaintiff 
could  show  that  the  answer  was  insufficient  for  the  purpose  either 
of  defence  or  of  discovery.^  A  special  injunction  can  only  be 
dissolved  by  a  special  motion,  either  in  open  court  or  at  a  special 
hearing  appointed  elsewhere  for  that  purpose  by  a  judge  of  the 
court.2  The  motion  may  be  made  at  any  time  before  decree,^ 
even,  it  seems,  before  the  defendant  has  been  served  with  pro- 
cess,'^ and  before  he  has  aj)peared.°  When  a  special  injunction 
has  been  granted  against  several  defendants,  any  of  them  may 
move  to  dissolve  it  as  against  himself;  but  he  should  in  that 
case  serve  the  others  as  well  as  the  }>laintiff  with  a  notice  of  his 
motion.^  In  one  case  after  answer,  a  notice  left  at  the  office  of 
the  solicitor  for  the  plaintiff  during  his  absence  from  the  city 
three  days  before  the  motion  was  held  sufficient."  If  the  motion 
to  dissolve  is  made  before  answer,  it  must  be  supported  by  affi- 
davits or  documentary  proof  contradicting  the  statements  upon 
which  the  injunction  was  obtained,^  unless  the  defendant  can  show 
that  it  is  plain  upon  the  face  of  the  plaintiff's  bill  and  affidavits 
that  he  was  not  entitled  to  the  injunction.^     When  the  injunction 

i*  Hodson    V.    Copparfl,    29    Beav.    4  ;  Exclianjie  '•.  Chicago  Board  of  Trade,  15 

Kerr  on  Injunctions,  513.  Fed.  K.  847. 

'5  Kerr  on  Injunctions,  559;  Daniell's  ■*  Shields  r.  McChing.  6  W.  Va.  79. 

rii.  Pr.  (5th  Am.  ed.)  1674.  5  Menzies  i'.  liodrigues,  1  Price,  92. 

§235.  1  Daniell's  Ch.Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  ^  Thompson   v.   Geary,  5  Beav.   1-31; 

1820-1829;  Poor  c.  Carleton,  3  Sumner,  Kerr  on  Injunctions,  564.     But  see  Dan- 

70;  New  York  r.  Connecticut,  4  Dall.  1,  iell's  Cii.  Pr.  (5th  Am.  ed  )  1670,  note  1. 
3,  note  1,  per  VVasiiington,  J.  "  Caldwell  v.  Walters,  4  Cranch  C.  C. 

•^  Kerr  on  Injunctions,  561 ;  Daniell's  577. 
Ch.  Pr.  1675;  Wilkins  r.  -lordan,  3  Wash.  8  Daniell's  Cli.  Pr  (5th  Am.  ed.)  1676  ; 

C.  C.  226 ;  Caldwell  r.  Waiters,  4  Cranch  Young  v.  Grundy.  6  Cranch,  51. 
C.  C.  577.  ^  Hudson  r.  Maddison,  12  Simons.  416; 

^  Kerr  on  Injunctions,  560;  Daniell's  Kidweli  v.  Masterson,  3  Crancli  C.  C.  52. 
Ch.  Pr.  (5th  Am.  ed.)  1675;  Met.  G.  &  S. 

VOL.    I.  —  25 


386  INJUNCTIONS.  [chap.  XVI. 

has  been  irregularly  issued,  the  defendant  should  move  to  dis- 
charge the  order  granting  it,^°  If  lie  should  move  to  dissolve  it, 
he  might  be  held  to  have  by  so  doing  recognized  its  regularity.^^ 
It  has  been  held  that  after  a  demurrer  ])ut  in  by  him  to  the  bill 
has  been  overruled  a  defendant  can  only  move  to  dissolve  by 
leave  of  the  court ;  which  was,  in  one  case,  only  granted  upon 
his  affidavit  that  the  demurrer  was  not  interposed  for  delay,  and 
his  giving  security  to  pay  all  damage  to  the  plaintiff  thereby 
caused.^2  Where  the  application  for  dissolution  was  made  after 
answer,  it  was  originally  thought  that  the  plaintiff  could  not 
show  that  any  of  the  allegations  therein  contained  were  false  ;  ^^ 
but  that  doctrine  has  been,  in  this  country  at  least,  exploded,^* 
and  it  is  well  settled  that  the  plaintiff  can  not  only  dispute  the 
truth  of  such  allegations,  whether  they  are  positive  or  negative, 
but  is  at  liberty  to  file  counter  affidavits  in  reply  to  new  matter 
contained  in  the  defendant's  affidavits  or  answcr.^-^  When  a 
stay -order  has  been  made,  and  simultaneous  applications,  by  the 
defendant  to  discharge  the  stay-order,  and  by  the  jilaintiff  for  an 
injunction,  are  heard  together,  the  plaintiff  has  the  riglit  to  open 
and  close  the  argument. ^"^  .If  upon  the  application  to  dissolve  an 
injunction  the  court  is  not  satisfied  that  the  plaintiff  is  entitled 
to  retain  it,  it  will  dissolve  the  injunction,  and  may  then  direct 
an  issue,  an  action  at  law,  or  a  reference  before  the  hearing. i" 
If,  however,  it  is  satisfied  that  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  the  writ, 
the  court  will  direct  the  injunction  to  be  continued  until  the 
hearing.^^  Where  the  court  dissolves  the  injunction  upon  the 
ground  that  it  appears  upon  the  face  of  the  liill  that  the  plaintiff 
is  not  entitled  thereto,  and  that  is  the  only  relief  prayed  for  by 
him,  it  cannot  at  the  same  time  dismiss  the  bill  ;  for  the  plaintiff 
has  still  the  right  to  bring  the  suit  to  a  hcaring.^^     If  the  question 

i»  A7igicr  V.  May,  3  W.  R.  330 ;  Dan-  i^  Day  i:  New  England  Car  Spring  Co., 

iell's  Cli.  Pr.  (5th  Ani.ecl.)  1670;  Kerr  on  8  Blatclif.  154;  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (5tli  Am. 

Injunctions,  564.  ed.)  1676;  Shoemaker  f.  Nat.  Mechanics' 

11  Vipan   r.   Mortlock,    2   Meriv.  476 ;  Bank,  1  Hughes,  101. 

Kerr  on  Injunctions,  564.  i"  Fraser  v.  Wiiallcy,  2  Hem.  &  M.  10. 

i-i  Woodworth  v.  Edwards,  3  W.  &  M.  i'  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1897. 

120.  ''^  Packington   v.   Packington,  1  Dick- 
ie Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (5th  Am.  ed.)  1676,  ens,  101  ;  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (5th  Am.  ed.) 

note  4.  1678. 

'■♦  PoorivCarlet()n.3Sumner, 70;  United  i'-*  Brooke   v.  Clarke,   1    Swanst.   550; 

States  y.  Parrott.l  McAll.  271  ;  Orr  r.  Lit-  Blow  v.  Taylor,  4  Hen.  &  Munf.   (Va.) 

tleficld,  1  W.  &  M.  13 ;  ( )rr  r  Merrill,  1  W.  159. 

&  M.  37(3 ;  Clum  v.  Brewer,  2  Curt.  50G. 


§  236.]  DISSOLUTION   OF   IXJUXCTIOXS.  387 

is  left  in  doubt  upon  tlic  motion  to  dissolve,  it  seems  that  the 
motion  will  be  denied.-'^  The  ambiguity  of  the  order  granting 
the  injunction  is  sufficient  ground  for  its  dissolution  or  modifica- 
tion.-' The  defendant's  delay  in  moving  to  dissolve  the  injunc- 
tion may  deprive  him  of  his  right  to  have  it  dissolved.^^  When 
a  special  injunction  has  been  granted  after  a  full  hearing,  it  will 
not  be  dissolved  except  on  new  evidence.-'^  It  has  been  held 
that  a  preliminary  injunction  will  not  be  dissolved  after  answer 
upon  grounds  shown  by  affidavits,  which,  from  their  not  having 
been  set  up  in  the  answer,  cannot  be  used  at  the  hearing  of  the 
whole  casc.'^^  A  judge  will  very  rarely  dissolve  an  injunction 
granted  Ijy  one  of  his  judicial  brethren.-''  After  an  injunction 
has  been  dissolved,  if  evidence  subsequently  taken  shows  that  it 
was  properly  issued,  it  may  be  issued  anew.^^  The  dissolution  of 
an  ex  parte  injunction  on  account  of  a  suppression  of  material 
facts  does  not  preclude  the  plaintiff  from  applying  for  another 
injunction  on  the  merits.^" 

§  236.  Dissolution  of  Injunctions  for  Causes  arising  after  their 
Issue. — An  injunction  may  also- be  dissolved  if  the  plaintiff  is 
guilty  of  gross  and  inexcusable  delay  in  taking  testimony  or  in 
bringing  the  cause  to  a  hearing  ;  ^  and  in  general  if  from  a  change 
of  circumstances  its  continuance  would  no  longer  serve  any  useful 
purpose.^  The  subsequent  passage  of  an  act  of  Congress  legaliz- 
ing a  structure  which  has  been  enjoined  as  a  nuisance  is  a  reason 
for  the  dissolution  of  an  injunction.^  It  has  been  held  that  an 
injunction  staying  proceedings  at  law  against  a  bankrupt  is  dis- 
solved ipso  facto  by  his  discharge,*  but  remains  unaffected  by 
his  delay  in  applying  for  his  discharge.^      The  expiration  of  a 

-"  Cooper  V.  Mattlieys,  5  Penn.  L.  J.  v.  Iron   Silver  Min.  Co.  .S3  Fed.  R.  354; 

38;  s.  c.  Liuv  Rep.  413;  Fisher  v.  Lord,  Klein  r.  Fleetford,  35  Fed.  R.  98. 

6  West  L.  J.  137  ;  Woodwortli  v.  Hall,  1  -''  Tucker  r.  Carpenter,  Hempst.  440. 

W.  &  M.  389;   Woodwortli  v.  Rogers,   3  "-"  Fitch  v.  Rochfort,  18  L.  J.  Ch.  458; 

W.  &  M.  135;  Sparkinan   v.   Higgins,   1  Kerr  on  Injunctions,  564. 

Blatclif.  205.  §  236.     i  Read  v.  Consequa,  4  Wasli. 

21  Dalglish  V.  Jarvie,  2  Macn.  &  G.  231.  C.  C.  174  ;  Bradley  r.  Heed,  12  Pitts  L.  J. 

"  Florence    Sewing    Machine    Co.   v.  G5;  Shermerhorn  v.  L'Espenasse,  2  Dall. 

Grover   &   Baker   Sewing  ^Machine  Co.,  3CiO ;  In  the  Matter   of  Sclnvarz,  14  Fed. 

110  Mass.  1  ;  Kerr  on  Injunctions,  505.  R.  787. 

-^  Woodworth  v.  Hall,  1  AV.  &  M.  389.  ^  /,,   ,.p  Jackson,    9  Fed.  R.   493;    Re 

-^  Union    Paper   Hag   Maciiine    Co.   v.  Pitts,  9  Fed.  R.  542. 

Newell,  11  Blatchf.  549.  3  ijaird    v.  Shore    Lino     Ry.    Co.,    0 

25  Cole  Silver  Mining  Co.  r.  Virginia  &  Blatchf.  4(51. 

Gold   Hill  Water  Co.,  1  Saw.  ()85  ;  Pres-  ■*  In  re  Thomas,  3  N.  B.  R.  7. 

ton  V.  Walsh,  10  Fed.  R.  315;  Heynolds  ^  /„  j-e  Sohwarz,  14  Fed.  R.  787,  789. 


388  IXJUXCTIONS.  [chap.  XVI. 

patent  does  not  without  the  order  of  the  court  dissolve  an  in- 
junction ao'ainst  its  infringement.^  It  has  been  held  that  at  the 
expiration  of  a  patent  the  court  will  dissolve  an  injunction  against 
its  infringement,  and  leave  the  com[)lainant  no  remedy  except  his 
claim  for  damages  against  the  subsequent  sale  and  use  of  arti- 
cles manufactured  while  the  patent  was  alive,  in  infringement  of 
the  patent."  xVn  injunction  is  not  dissolved  by  an  amendment  of 
the  bill  ^  unless  the  amendment  substantially  changes  the  cause 
of  action.^  But  it  is  customary  to  include  in  the  order  allowing 
an  amendment  a  direction  that  it  be  "  without  prejudice  to  the 
injunction."  The  allowance  of  a  demurrer  to  the  whole  bill  puts 
an  end  to  an  injunction  which  had  previously  been  obtained ;  ^^ 
but  leave  will  usually  be  given  to  amend  without  prejudice  to  the 
injunction,  when  the  demurrer  is  allowed  on  account  of  a  defect 
in  form,ii  such  as  multifariousness.^-  "  The  allowance  of  a  plea 
does  not  dissolve  an  injunction.  There  may  be  some  equity 
shown  to  continue  it.  An  order  for  its  dissolution  must  be  ob- 
tained." ^'^  An  injunction  is  not  dissolved  l)y  an  abatement  or  by 
a  defect  in  the  suit,  but  the  defendant  must,  if  he  wishes  to  be 
freed  from  the  restraint  thereby  imposed,  move  that  the  plaintiff 
or  his  representatives  be  required  to  revive  or  take  such  other 
steps  as  may  be  necessary  within  a  limited  time,  and  that  if  he 
fail  to  do  so  the  injunction  may  be  dissolved.^'* 

§  237.  The  Imposition  of  Terms  upon  the  Issue,  Denial,  Dissolu- 
tion, or  Continuance  of  an  Injunction.  —  As  the  issue  of  a  Special 
injunction  is  in  its  discretion,  the  court  may  impose  terms  upon 
the  i)laintiff  or  defendant  when  granting  or  refusing  the  issue, 
dissolution,  or  continuance  of  the  samc.^     The  usual   terms  are 

^  American  Diamoml  Rock  Boring  Co.  i'  rvawlings  v.  Lambert,  1  J.  &  H.  458  ; 

'•.  Rutland  Marble  Co.,  2  Fed.  R.  .S56.  Kerr   on  Injunctions,  5G5,    5iu; ;  r,eliigli 

7  Wcstinghouse  v.  Carpenter,  43  Fed.  Zinc  &  Iron  Co.  v.  N.  J.  Zinc  &  Iron  Co  , 

R.  804,  Miller  and  Love.  JJ.  ;  American  4o  Fed.  R.  545,  550. 

Cable  Ry.  Co.   v.   Chicago  City  Ry.  Co.,  '-  Lehigh  Zinc  &  Iron  Co.  v.  N.  J.  Zinc 

41  Fed.  R.  522.     But  see  American  D.  R.  &  Iron  Co.,  48  Fed.  R.  545,  550. 

B.  Co.  V.  Rutland   Marble  Co.,  2  Fed.  R.  ^'^  Kerr  on  Injunctions,  566;  Philips  r. 

856 ;  .s»/»v;,  §§  11,  216.  Langhorn,    Dickens,    148;     Ferrand     v. 

«  Reed  >:  Conscqua,  4  Wash.  C.  C.  174  ;  Ilamer,  4  M.  &  C.  14-3. 

Warburton  >•    London  &  Blackwall   Ry.  J'  Chowick  (-•.  Dimes,  3Beav.  200  ;  Lee 

(^o.,  2  Bcav.  253.     But  see  Sharp  v.  Ash-  v.  Lee,  1  Ilare,  622;  Chester  v.  Life  Asso- 

ton,  3  V.  &  B.  144.  elation  of  America,  4  Fed.  R.  487. 

•'  Attorncy-Ceneral     v.     Marsh,      16  §  237.     ^  Russell  v.  Farley,  105  U.  S. 

Simons,  572  ;  Kerr  on  Injunctions,  560  433. 

i»  Sclmeider  v.   Lizardi,  0  Beav.    461, 
4G8  ;  Kerr  on  Injunctions,  565. 


§  237.]  TEEMS   UPON    ISSUE   OF   IX JUNCTIONS.  389 

the  giving  of  a  bond  or  undertaking  with  good  security  to  in- 
demnify the  other  party  against  all  loss  that  may  result  from  the 
issue  or  withholding  of  the  injunction.^  It  is  not  usual  to  re- 
quire security  from  the  United  States  when  a  preliminary  in- 
junction is  granted  at  its  request  in  a  suit  in  which  it  is  i)laintiff.3 
In  some  instances  the  court  has  withheld  an  injunction  to  restrain 
an  infringement  of  a  patent  or  copyright,  upon  the  defendant's 
merely  undertaking  to  keep  an  account  of  the  sales  made  by  him 
during  the  pendency  of  the  suit.'^  Sometimes  the  terms  are  that 
the  defendant  shall  give  an  undertaking  to  abide  by  the  farther 
order  of  the  court.-^  An  injunction  will  never  be  issued  to  re- 
strain the  collection  of  State  taxes,  unless  the  plaintiff  first  pays 
"  what  is  conceded  to  be  due,  or  what  can  be  seen  to  be  due  on 
the  face  of  the  bill,  or  be  shown  by  affidavits,  whether  conceded 
or  not."  ^  Whether  or  not,  if  the  court  upon  the  final  hearing 
decides  after  a  preliminary  injunction  has  been  denied  that  a 
perpetual  one  should  issue,  or  dissolves  an  injunction  pre- 
viously granted,  the  finally  successful  party  can  have  his  dam- 
ages assessed  and  the  bond  or  undertaking  given  as  security 
enforced  by  the  court,  or  must  bring  an  action  at  law,  is  under 
the  authorities  an  open  question.  Mr.  Justice  Curtis  held  at 
circuit  that  he  must  sue  at  law ; "'  but  a  recent  opinion  of 
the  Supreme  Court,  although  expressly  reserving  the  question, 
seems  to  intimate  that  a  court  of  equity  has  the  power  to  assess 
the  damages  and  enfoi'ce  payment  of  the  bond.^  The  latter 
view  seems  more  in  harmony  with  the  general  principles  gov- 
erning equity  practice,^  and  has  ])een  adopted  by  Judge  Drum- 
mond  in  a  recent  case  in  a  Circuit  Court. ^"^  Such  a  court  has, 
at  all  events,  the  power  to  absolve  from  all  liability  the  persons 
held   by  the   bond,  and   it  would   take   a   very  strong   case  to 

2  Russell   V.  Farley,  105   U.    S    4:1:1;  4:16;  .Jones  r.  Great  Western  Ry.   Co.,  1 

Kirl.y  Hung  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Wiiite,  1  Fed.  [English]  Railway  Cases,  684. 

R.  004;  Northern  Pacific  R.  R.  Co.  v.  St.  «  State  Railroad  Tax   Cases,  92  U.  S. 

I'aul,  Minneapolis  &  Manitoba  R.  R.  Co.,  575,617;  National  Bank  );.  Kimball,  10:1 

2  McCrary,  260;  s.  c.   4  Fed.  R.  688.  U.  S.  7:12;    Parmley  v.  Railroad   Compa- 

3  United  States   v.  Jellico,  M.  C.  &  C.  nics,  :l  Dill.  25;  Huntington  v.  Palmer,  8 

Co.,  4:1  Fed.  R.  808.  Fed.  R.  449  ;  supra  §  84. 

■*  Furbush  v.  Bradford,  1  Fisher's  Pat.  '^  ^lerryfield  v.  Jones,  2  Curt.  .306.  See 

Cas.  .317;  McCrary  >\   Penn.   Canal  Co,  also  Bein  u.  Heath,  13  How.  168. 

5  Fed.  R.  ;107  ;  Kerr  on  Injunctions,  29,  »  Russell  v.  Farley,  105  U.  S.  4.33. 

30.  »  See    :Moore   v.  'Moore.  25  Bear.  8; 

5  Attornej'-Gcncral    i-.    Mancliesfor  &  Sugden  v.  Hull.  28  Beav.  26:1. 

Leeds  My.  Co.,  1  [Englisli]  Railway  Cases,  '»  Lea  v  Deakin,  Ul  Fed.  K.  514. 


390  IX  J  UNCTIONS.  [chap.  xvi. 

induce  an  appellate  court  to  interfere  with  such  a  decision  bj'  it.^^ 
In  a  recent  case  ^^  the  English  Court  of  Chancery  had  occasion 
to  discuss  the  nature  and  effect  of  an  undertaking  given  on 
obtaining  an  injunction.  Sir  George  Jessel,  the  Master  of  the 
Rolls,  said  that  these  undertakings  were  invented  by  Lord  Jus- 
tice Knight  Bruce  when  Yice-Chancellor,  and  originally  inserted 
only  in  ex  jmrte  injunctions.  They  were  intended  to  protect  the 
court  as  well  as  the  suitor  from  improper  ex  ijarte  applications. 
After  a  time  this  practice  was  extended  to  interlocutory  injunc- 
tions granted  upon  notice  to  the  defendant,  first  in  special  cases, 
then  generally  ;  and  now  it  is  always  inserted  as  a  matter  of 
course.  The  reason  for  the  thing  is  that  on  an  interlocutory 
application  there  is  only  a  short  time  to  get  up  the  case,  and  it 
is  impossible  for  tlie  court  to  obtain  a  complete  knowledge  of 
the  facts.  Further,  these  ajiphcations  are  heard  upon  affidavit 
evidence,  so  that  it  is  impossible  to  say  which  side  will  ulti- 
nuitely  turn  out  to  be  right.  Therefore  the  court  reserves  power 
to  indemnify  the  defendant  in  case  it  should  have  been  induced, 
upon  an  incomplete  hearing  of  the  facts,  to  make  a  wrong  order.^^ 
One  point  gave  rise  to  a  diffci'ence  of  opinion  in  tlie  court ; 
Jessel  holding  that  the  undertaking  could  not  be  enforced  if  the 
injunction  was  dissolved,  on  the  ground  that  the  court  erred  as 
to  the  law.^-  The  other  judges  did  not  concur  in  this,^^  and  Lord 
Justice  Cotton  was  e(]ually  clear  the  other  way.^^  The  judges 
were  also  of  opinion  that  the  plaintiff  could  not  recover  for  the 
loss  of  a  contract  into  which  he  was  ])reveuted  from  entering 
by  the  injunction  ;  since  this,  in  the  absence  of  fraud  and  malice, 
was  too  remote.  The  rule  in  IJadley  v.  Baxendale  ^*  was  applied, 
that  only  the  ])roximate,  ordinary  or  natural  damages  could  be 
recovered,  unless  there  was  notice  of  a  ] (articular  contract  con- 
temjilated.  The  judges  agreed  that  in  this  case  the  alleged 
contract  was  not  made  out  ;  but  lickl  that  if  one  had  been 
proved,  the  jtrevention  of  cariying  it  into  effect  was  not  suf- 
ficient to  sustain  a  claim  to  recover  the  damages  for  its  loss 
by  proceeding  on  the  undertaking.^'' 

11  Kussell  V.  Farley,  105  U.  S.  433.  See  i"  Citing  Novelio  v.  James,  5  De  G.  M. 

also   Deakin  y.  Stanton,  '6  Fed.   R.  485;  &  G.,  87(5. 

Grimily  v.  Youni;-,  2  Cranch  C.   C.  114;  i^  9  Ex.  341. 

Bentk-y  c  Joslin,  Ilcnipst.  218.  i^^  Smith  v.  Day,  21   Ch.  D.   421,  42r,, 

'-  Sniitli   V.   D.iv,  21   Ch.  I).  421,  424,  428,  4:]0.     See  Leiimaii  v.  McQiiown.  31 

42G,  428,  42'J,  4:;i'.  Fed.  \\.  138;  infra  p.  391. 


§  238.]  PERPETUAL  IXJUNCTIOXS.  391 

It  has  beeu  held  that  when  a  bond  has  been  given  to  secure 
an  injunction  against  the  interference  with  the  possession  of  per- 
sonal property,  and  the  injunction  has  been  subsequently  dis- 
solved, damages  can  be  recovered  under  the  bond  for  the  damage 
caused  the  defendant  by  his  delay  in  obtaining  possession  of  the 
property  and  the  proceeds  thereof ;  that  such  damages  include 
any  loss  caused  by  a  fall  in  the  market  price  of  the  property, 
provided  it  were  property  which  had  a  market  price  and  could 
have  been  sold  at  once  on  the  market  for  a  sum  nearly  equal 
to  its  value,  but  not  if  it  were  property  which  had  no  market 
price  and  could  not  have  been  sold  immediately  for  a  sum  "  any- 
thing like  its  value;"  and  that  the  profits  which  the  defendant 
might  have  made  by  the  use  of  the  property  in  his  business 
during  the  time  that  he  was  enjoined,  are  too  remote  and  specu- 
lative to  be  recovered  under  the  bond.^^  It  has  been  held  that 
•'  an  injunction  bond  in  an  action  in  the  District  Court  of  the 
United  States  for  the  District  of  Louisiana,  conditioned  that  the 
obligors  'will  well  and  truly  pay  the'  obligee,  'defendant  in  said 
injunction,  all  such  damages  as  he  may  recover  against  us,  in 
case  it  should  be  decided  that  the  said  writ  of  injunction  was 
wrongfully  issued,'  which  bond  was  made  under  an  order  of  the 
court  'that  the  injunction  be  maintained  on  the  complaining  cred- 
itors giving  bond  and  security  to  save  the  parties  harmless  from 
the  effects  of  said  injunction,'  is  a  sufficient  compliance  with  the 
order  of  the  court,  and  when  construed  with  reference  to  the  rule 
prevailing  in  the  Federal  courts  (contrary  to  that  prevailing  in 
the  State  courts  of  Louisiana),  that  without  a  bond  and  in  the 
absence  of  malice  no  damages  can  be  recovered  in  such  case, 
means  that  the  obligors  will  pay  such  damages  as  the  obligee 
may  recover  against  them  in  a  suit  on  the  bond  itself,  whether 
incurred  before  or  after  the  giving  of  the  bond."^''' 

§  238.  Perpetual  Injunctions.  —  Perpetual  injunctions  can  only 
be  granted  at  the  entry  of  a  decree.^  It  is  irregular  to  grant  one 
upon  affidavits.^  In  patent,  trademark  and  copyright  cases,  how- 
ever, they  are  often  granted  by  an  interlocutory  decree  which  also 
directs  a  reference  to  a  master  for  an  accounting  ;  ^  but  the  court 

^6  Lehman   v.  McQuown,  31  Fed.   11.  2  Adams  v.  Crittenden,  17  Fed.  R.  42. 

138;  l>y  Mr.  Justice  Brewer.  3  Kumford  Chemical  Works  !a  Hecker, 

"  Meyers  ;-.  Block,  120  U.  S.  206.  11  Off.  Gnz.  330;  Brown  r.  Deere,  6  Fed. 

§  238.    1  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  R.  484  ;  s.  c  2  McCrary,  425. 
1903. 


392  INJUNCTIONS.  [CIIAP.  XVI. 

has  the  power  to  suspend  the  injunction  until  an  appeal  can  be 
taken.*  A  perpetual  injunction  is  either  originally  granted,  or 
continued.  They  may  be  granted  originally  in  all  cases  in  which 
temporary  injunctions  might  have  been  granted,  and  also  to  re- 
strain the  setting  up  of  outstanding  terms  when  it  would  be  in- 
equitable to  do  so.^  In  order  to  obtain  a  perpetual  injunction,  it 
is  not  necessary  that  a  provisional  injunction  should  have  been, 
asked  for.^  For  after  the  commencement  of  a  suit  seeking  to  pre- 
A'ent  an  act  upon  the  defendant's  part,  he  is  said  to  proceed  at  his 
peril,  and  if  the  court  finally  decides  in  favor  of  the  plaintiff  it 
may  order  him  to  undo  the  result  of  his  acts  since  he  first  had 
notice  of  the  suit.'''  A  perpetual  injunction  may  be  obtained  in 
a  case  where  a  preliminary  injunction  has  been  asked  for  and 
refused,  or  obtained  and  dissolved.^  If,  however,  the  plaintiff 
has  not  previously  obtained  a  preliminary  injunction  and,  at 
the  hearing  fails  to  make  out  a  clear  title,  he  usually  will  not  be 
allowed  to  use  the  facts  proved  by  him,  as  evidence  of  a  i^rima 
facie  case,  entitling  him  then  to  a  temporary  injunction  till  he 
can  establish  his  case  beyond  a  doubt  ;^  unless  indeed,  the  in- 
junction sought  be  one  that  is  never  granted  before  a  hearing.i^ 
The  most  common  kinds  of  perpetual  injunctions,  however,  are 
those  which  are  made  by  continuing,  or  extending  and  making 
perpetual  preliminary  injunctions  at  the  hearing.  This  can  only 
be  done  by  inserting  a  direction  to  that  effect  in  the  decree." 
In  order  to  support  a  decree  for  a  perpetual  injunction,  it  has 
been  said  that  the  court  requires  that  there  should  be  nothing 
like  a  doubt  in  the  casc.^"'^  The  granting  of  such  an  injunction 
is  in  the  discretion  of  the  court,  and,  like  a  })rovisional  injunc- 

*  Barnard  v.  (libson,  7  How.  650,  658  ;  Spottiswoodc,    1   Rcav.    382  ;    Bacon    v. 

Potter  r.  Mack,  '6  Fisher,  428  ;  Brown  v.  Jones,  4  M.  &  C.  A'oi  ;  Tucker  v.  Carpcn- 

Deere,  6  Fed.   U.  487  ;  Munson  v.   Tlic  ter,  Hempst.  440. 

Mayor,  19  Fed.  II.  3i;3.  '•'  Bacon  v.  Spottiswoode,  1  Beav.  382; 

'^  Askew  V.  PouUerers'  Co.,  2  Ves.Sen.  s.  c.  on  appeal,  suJi  iwm.  Bacon  v.  Jones, 

89;  Duke  of  Buekinsham  v.  Duchess  of  4  M.  &  C.   433,  438;    Daniell's  Ch.  Pr. 

Buckingham,  2  Kq.  Cases  Abr.  527.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  IDOl. 

«  Daniell's  Cli.  Pr.  (2d  Am   ed.)  1000.  lo  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1001. 

See  also  Baily  v.  Taylor.  1  R.  &  M.  73.  See  supra,  §  226. 

■J  Charles    River    Bridge    v.    Warren  "  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1902 ; 

Bridge,  G    Pick.    (Mass.)    376;    Wing  y.  Gardner  y.  Gardner,  87  N.  Y.  14. 

Fuirhaven,  8  Cush.  (Mass.)3()3;  Winslow  i^  -whittingham  i'.   Wooler,  2    Swanst. 

r.  Nayson,  113  Mass.  411  ;  Smith  v.  Day,  428  n.  ;  Troy  &  B.  R.  R.  Co  r.  Boston,  H. 

L.  R.  13  Ch.  I),  (wl.  T.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  86  N.  Y.  107  ;  Daniell's 

^  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1900  ;  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1900. 
Bailey  v.  Taylor,  1  R.  &  M.  73;  Bacon  c. 


§  238.]  PERPETUAL  INJUNCTIONS.  393 

tion,  it  may  be  allowed  ^^  or  refused  ^*  upon  terms.  On  account 
of  the  weight  as  a  precedent  given  to  a  decree  for  a  perpetual 
injunction  in  a  patent  case,  the  court  may  refuse  to  grant  one 
when  the  case  has  been  compromised  and  the  defendant 
abandons  it  at  the  hearing.!^ 

13  Southern  Express  Co.  v.  St.  Louis  R.  367 ;  Brown  y.  Deere,  Mansur  &  Co.,  6 

Iron  iM.,  &  Southern  Ky.  Co.,  10  Fed.  K.  Fed.  R.  487. 

210;  8.  c.  10  Fed.  R.  800.  i5  Hayes  v.  Leton,  5  Fed.  R.  521. 

"  McCrary  v.  Peuu.  Canal  Co.,  5  Fed. 


394  KECEIVERS.  [chap.  XVII. 


CHAPTER  XYII. 

RECEIVERS. 

§  239.  Definition  of  Receiver.  —  A  receiver  is  an  officer  appointed 
b\'  a  court  of  equity  to  assume  the  custody  of  property  pending 
litigation  concerning  the  same.  The  utmost  effect  of  tlie  appoint- 
ment of  a  receiver  is  to  put  the  property  from  that  time  in  his 
custody  as  an  officer  of  the  court,  for  the  benefit  of  the  party  ulti- 
mately proved  to  be  entitled,  but  not  to  change  the  title  or  even 
tlie  right  of  possession  to  the  property.^  In  England  tlie  term 
is  usuallv  applied  only  to  those  appointed  to  receive  the  rents 
and  profits  of  land  and  to  get  in  outstanding  property ;  and  one 
selected  to  carry  on  or  superintend  a  trade  or  business  is  usually 
denominated  "  a  manager,"  or  "  a  receiver  and  manager."  ^  But 
in  the  United  States  both  classes  of  officers  are  called  receivers. 
Tlie  Revised  Statutes  authorize  the  Comptroller  of  the  Currency 
to  appoint  in  certain  cases  a  receiver  of  a  national  banking  asso- 
ciation, whose  powers  and  duties  are  in  many  respects  analogous 
to  those  of  a  receiver  appointed  by  a  court  of  equity.^  But,  as 
the  learning  upon  this  subject  does  not  concern  the  practice  of 
courts  of  equity,  it  will  not  be  considered  here. 

§  240.  When  Receivers  will  be  Appointed. ' —  A  receiver  may  be 
appointed  to  provide  for  the  safety  of  property  pending  litigation 
to  determine  the  title  to  the  same  ;  to  preserve  property  in  danger 
of  being  dissipated  or  destroyed  by  those  having  the  legal  title  to 
its  possession  ;  to  preserve  the  property  of  infants  during  their 
minority,  when  they  have  no  guardian  and  their  parents  are  dead 
or  unfit  to  be  trusted  with  it ;  to  preserve  the  property  of  idiots 
and  lunatics  when  it  is  impossible  to  obtain  a  proper  person  as 
committee  ;  and  when  the  appointment  is  authorized  by  statute.^ 
A  I'cceiver  may  be  ap|»ointed  to  provide  for  tlie  safety  of  property 

§  289.     1  Union  Rank    of   Chicago  v.  U.  S.  R.  S.  21G;  24  St.  at  L.  ch.  28,  p.  8 ; 

Kansas  City  Bank,  136  U.  S.  223,  286.  Price  v.  Abbott,  17  Fed.  R.  50G ;  siij)ra, 

■^  DMiiicll's  {^h.   Pr.  (2(1  Am.  ed.)  2006.  §  15;  and  infm,  §§  210,  330. 

'  Soe  U.  S.  R.  S.  §§  5234-5237  ;  Laws  of         §  240.     i  Kerr  on  Receivers  {2d  Am. 

187G,  ch.  150  (19  St.atL.  G3)  ;  1st.  Supp.  ed.j  3. 


§  240.]  WHEN    KECEIYERS    WILL   BE    APrOINTED.  395 

})cndiiig  litigation  ;  to  determine  the  title  to  the  same,  whether 
the  litigation  is  in  a  com't  of  equity ,2  of  probate,^  of  bankruptcy,'* 
in  a  foreign  court,^  and  sometimes,  though  very  rarely,  in  a  court 
of  law.*^  By  far  the  most  ordinary  cases  where  a  receiver  is 
appointed  are,  however,  suits  in  equity  to  obtain  equitable  assets, 
for  the  foreclosure  of  a  mortgage,  and  for  the  dissolution  or  wind- 
ing up  of  the  affairs  of  a  partnership.  It  was  the  English  rule 
that  a  receiver  could  not  be  appointed  at  the  suit  of  a  first  mort- 
gagee, since  he  had  it  in  his  power  to  take  possession  himself  J 
In  this  country,  however,  receivers  are  frequently  appointed  in 
such  a  casc.^  Asa  general  rule,  a  receiver  of  the  effects  of  a 
partnership  will  not  be  appointed  unless  the  bill  prays  a  disso- 
lution and  shows  a  proper  case  for  the  same.^  But  it  has  been 
said  that  "  where  suits  have  been  instituted  to  compel  partners 
to  act  according  to  the  provisions  of  instruments  into  which  they 
have  entered  ;  in  such  cases,  the  Court  will  take  care  that  the 
decree  shall  not  be  defeated  by  anything  to  be  done  in  the  mean 
time,  and  will  appoint  a  receiver  to  protect  the  property."  ^^ 
Receivers  may  be  appointed  to  preserve  property  in  danger  of 
being  dissipated  or  destroyed  by  those  having  the  legal  title  to 
its  possession,  at  the  suit  of  beneficiaries,  legatees,  next  of  kin, 
or  creditors,  when  a  trustee,^^  executor,^^  or  administrator  ^^  is  in- 

2  Davis  I'.  TlieDukeof  Marlborough,        ^  Goodman  v.  Whitcomb,  1  J.   &   W. 

2  Swanst.  108;  Curling  v.  Marquis  589;  Oliver  v.  Hamilton,  2  Anst.  453; 
Townshend,  19  Ves.  628.  Daniell's  Cli.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1960,  1907  ; 

3  King  V.  King,  6  Ves.  172 ;  Matter  of  Kerr  on  Receivers  (2d  Am.  cd.),  93. 
Colvin,  3  Mil.  Ch.  Dec.  279;  Robinson  r.  i'  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1967; 
Taylor,  42  Fed.  R.  803  ;  Kerr  on   Ueceiv-  Const  v.  Harris,  T.  &  R.  49(i. 

ers  (2d  Am.  ed.),  28-37.  "  McCosker    ;;.    Brady,  1    Barb.    Ch. 

*  Sedgwick  c.  Place,  3  N.  B.   R.  35;  (N.   Y.)  329;  Brodie  v.  Jiarry,  3  Meriv. 

Alabama    &    Chattanooga    R.    R.  Co,  v.  095;    Janeway   i\    Green,    16  Abb.    Pr. 

Jones,  5N.  B.  R.  97  ;  Keenan  ».  Shannon,  (N.    Y.)    215,    note.      In    Benedicts.  St. 

9  N.  B.  R.  441 ;  Kerr  on   Receivers  (2d  Joseph  &  W.  R.  Co.,  19  Fed.  R.   173,  the 

Am.  ed.),  110-113.  fact  that  there  was  a  dispute  between  the 

5  Transatlantic  Co.  i'.  Pietroni,  Johns,  majority  and  a  minority  of  thebondiiold- 

604.  ers,  tlie  former  being  in  possession,  was 

''  Talbot  V.   Scott,  4  K.  &  J.  90  ;  Fin-  held  to  make  the  appointment  of  a  re- 
gal V.   Blake,  2  Molloy,  50;  Whitney  v.  ceiver  necessary. 

Buckman,  26  Cal.  447 ;   Horton  y.  White,  i-  Utterson    r.   Mair,   2    Ves.   Jr.    95; 

84  X.  C.  297  ;  Jefferys  v.  Smith,  1  J.  &  W.  Scott  r.  Becher,   4  Price,  346.     But  see 

298;  Robinson  y.  Taylor,  42  Fed.  R.  803;  Gladdon    v.   Stoneman,  1   Madd.  143  n. ; 

Kerr  on  Receivers  (2d  Am.  ed.),  114-129.  Langley  v.  Hawk,  5  Madd.  46;  Kerr  on 

■^  Berney  v.  Sewell,  1  J.  &  W.  647.  Receivers  (2d  Am.  ed.),  20. 

8  See,  for  example,  Stanton  I'.  Alabama  ^'^  Hervey   r.    Fitzpatrick,    Kaj',    421; 

&  Chattanooga  R.  R.  Co.,  2  Woods,  506  ;  Ware  v.  Ware,  42  Ga.  408. 
Allen  r.  The  Dallas  &  Wichita  R.  R.  Co., 

3  Woods,  316,  326. 


396  KECEIVERS.  [chap.  XVII. 

solvent  and  has  not  given  bonds,  or  is  guilty  of  misconduct ;  or 
when  two  trustees  or  executors  disagree  so  that  it  is  impossible 
for  them  to  act  together  ;  ^^  and  at  the  suit  of  remainder-men, 
when  the  holder  of  the  particular  estate  is  guilty  of  voluntary  or 
permissive  waste,^^  or  improperly  refuses  to  renew  leaseholds. ^"^ 
In  the  case  of  trustees,  the  court  will  thus  interfere  whether  the 
trust  is  express  or  implied. ^^  A  receiver  may  be  a^jpointed  over 
the  property  of  an  infant,^^  when  the  latter  has  no  guardian,  or 
his  guardian  is  insolvent  or  has  been  guilty  of  misconduct  ^^  and 
has  no  parents,  or  his  parents  are  unfit  to  be  entrusted  with  the 
care  of  his  estate.'^'^  Receivers  may  be  aiipointcd  over  the  prop- 
erty of  idiots  and  lunatics,  when  no  person  can  bo  found  disposed 
to  act  as  committee; 2^  or,  it  seems,  when  the  committee  is  in- 
firm, or  the  management  of  the  estate  is  very  onerous,  or  the 
committee  lives  far  from  the  estate."  The  statutes  of  the  sev- 
eral States  authorize  the  appointment  of  a  receiver  in  numerous 
cases,  especially  in  providing  for  the  dissolution  of  corporations. 
The  statutes  of  the  United  States  authorize  the  appointment  of  a 
receiver  of  a  national  bank  by  the  Comptroller  of  the  Currency  in 
certain  specified  cases.^^  Until  the  Comptroller  has  acted,  a 
court  of  the  United  States  may  appoint  a  receiver  of  the  assets 
of  such  a  corporation.^  After  the  appointment  by  the  Comp- 
troller of  such  a  receiver,  it  is  doubtful  whether  a  court  of  the 
United  States  would  appoint  another ;  and  after  the  appointment 
of  a  receiver  by  a  court  of  competent  jurisdiction,  it  is  doubtful 
whether  the  Com})troller  of  the  Currency  could  thus  interfere.-^ 
Independently  of  statutory  authority  a  court  of  equity  will  ordi- 

"  Ball  V.  Tomi)kins,  41  Fed.  R.  486.  -i  Ex  parte    Warren,     10    Ves.    622  ; 

15  Voscc.  Heed,  1  Woods,  647,  050.  Anon.,  1  Atk.  578;    Ex  parte  Kadcliffe, 

!'■■  Bennett  v.  Colley,  2  M.  &  K.  225 :  J  &  W.  639  ;  Kerr  on  Receivers  (2d  Am. 

s.c.  5  Simons,   181,  102  ;  Lord  Montford  ed.),  113,  114. 

V.  Lord  Cadoti'an,  17  Ves.  485.  --  Kerr  on  Receivers  {2d  Am.  ed  ),  118, 

1^  Pritcliard  v.  Fleetwood,  1  Meriv.  54  ;  114,  citing  Re  Birch,  Sliclf.  on  Lun.  14()  ; 

Daniell's  Cli.  I'r.  (5th  Am.  ed.)  1724.  lie  Seaman,  Shelf,  on  Lun.  146. 

i**  Ilicks  V.   Hicks,  3  Atk.  277  ;  Union  '^^  U.  S.  R.  S.  §§  5141,  5191,  5195,  5201, 

Trust   Co.   V.    Illinois   Midland    Railway  5205,  5234,  52:].5,  5236 ;  Laws  of  1876,  ch. 

Co.,  117  U.  S.  4.34;  Sage  v.  Memphis  &  150  (10  St.  at  L.  p.  03)  ;  1st  Supp.   U.  S. 

LiUleRock  R.  R.   Co.,   125  U.   S.  361;  H.  S.  p.  21(i. 

Kerr  on  Receivers  (2d  Am.  ed.)  16-18.  -*  Wright  r.  Merchants'   Nat.   Bank,  1 

1-'  I'itcher    u.    Ilelliar,    Dickens,   580;  Flippin,   568;    Irons    v.     Manufacturers' 

High  on  Receivers,  §§  725-732.  Nat.  Hank,  6  Biss.  301. 

2'  Butler  >\  Freeman,  Amb.  301  ;  Kifiin  -^  Harvey  v.  Lord,  10  Fed.  R.  230. 
r.  Kiffin,  cited  in  1  P.  Wms.  705  ;   Ktrron 
Receivers  (2d  Am.  ed.)  10-18. 


§  240.]       WHEN  EECEIVEES  WILL  BE  APPOINTED.  397 

narily  appoint  a  receiver  of  the  property  of  a  corporation  in  only 
seven  cases  :  ^^  fii'stly,  at  tlic  suit  of  mortgagees  or  other  holders 
of  liens  upon  it  ;^"  secondly,  at  the  suit  of  judgment  creditors  seek- 
ing equitable  assets  after  executions  have  been  returned  unsatis- 
fied, and  the  return  shows  that  there  is  no  corporate  property  upon 
which  a  levy  can  be  made  ;'^'^  thirdly,  at  the  suit  of  persons  inter- 
ested, whether  as  stockholders  or  creditors  in  the  property,  where 
there  is  a  breach  of  duty  by  the  directors,  and  an  actual  or  threat- 
ened loss;-^  fourthly,  where  a  corporation  has  been  dissolved  and 
has  no  officer  to  attend  to  its  affairs  ;  ^'^  fifthly,  where  for  a  long- 
time the  corporation  has  ceased  to  transact  business  and  its  offi- 
cers have  ceased  to  act;^^  sixthly,  where  the  governing  body  is  so 
divided  and  engaged  in  such  mutual  contentions  that  its  members 
cannot  act  together  ;32  and  seventhly,  in  one  case,  a  receiver  was 
appointed  at  the  application  of  the  corporation  itself,  made  before 
a  default  in  the  payment  of  interest  upon  bonds  secured  by  mort- 
gages, where  it  was  for  the  interest  of  the  public  that  the  business 
carried  on  by  the  corporation  —  a  railroad  company  —  should  be 
continued  without  interruption,  and  the  corporation  was  hope- 
lessly insolvent,  and  there  was  danger  of  an  attempt  by  creditors 
to  gain  a  preference  by  attachment  or  otherwise  in  such  a  man- 
ner as  would  have  prevented  the  continuance  of  the  corporate 
business.^^    A  court  of  equity  will  often  appoint  a  receiver  of  a 

25  See  Kerr  on  Eeceivers  ('2d  Am.  ed.),  creditors,  Syers  v.  Brighton  Brewery  Co., 

80-83,  Bispham's  note  ;  Howe  y.  Deuel,  43  11  L.  T.   (n.  s.)  560;    Mills   v.  Northern 

Barb.  (N.  Y.)  504,  507.  Ry.  of  Buenos  Ayres  Co.,  23  L.  T.  (n  s) 

2-  Mihvaukie   &   Minn.    R.   R.   Co.   v.  719. 

Soutter,  2  Wall.  510;  Mercantile  Trust  ^'  The  Late  Corporation  of  the  Church 

Co.  I'.  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  30  Fed.  of  Jesus  Christ  of  Latter  Day   Saints  v. 

R.  221.  United  States,  136  U.  S.  1  ;  Lawrence  v. 

^  Covington  Drawbridge  Co.  i-.  Shep-  The   Greenwich   Fire  Ins.  Co.,  1   Paiga 

herd,  21  How.  112  ;  Siiainwald  v.  Lewis,  (N.  Y.),  587.    See  also  Hamilton  v.  Acces- 

6  Fed.  R.  166,  775;  Buckeye  Engine  Co.  sory  Transit  Co.,  26  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  46; 

V.   Donau  Brewing   Co.,   47   Fed.   R.   6.  Murray   v.  Vanderbilt,  39  Barb,  (N.  Y.) 

See   Brown  v.  Lake   Superior  Iron  Co.,  140. 

134  U.  S.  530,  534  ;  Sage  v.  Memphis  &  3i  Warren  v.  Fake,  49  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.) 

L.  R.  Co.,  125  U.  S.  361.  430,  per  Westbrook,  J. 

-9  Evans  v.  Coventry,  5  De  G.  M.  &  G.  ^-  Featherstone  v.  Cooke,  L.  R.  16  Eq. 

911  ;  Sage  V.  Memphis  &  Little  Rock  R.R.  298;  Trade  Au.xiliary  Co.   r.  Vickers,  L. 

Co.,  125  U.S.  361 ;    Consolidated   Tank  K.  16  Eq.  303. 

Line  Co.  v.  Kansas  City  Varnish  Co.,  43  ^-^  Wabash,  St.  L.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Cen- 

Fed.  R.  204.      See,   as   to   the   right  of  tral  Trust  Co.  of  N.  Y.,  22  Fed.  R.  138; 

bondholders  thus  to  interfere,  Herrick  v.  s.  c.  22  Fed.  R.  272 ;  s.  c.  22  Fed.  K.  518, 

Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co.,  7  Upper  Can.  L.J.  51-5.     See  also   Brassey  i'.   New  York  & 

240.     But  see  also,  concerning  and  aj)-  N.   E.  R.  Co,  19  Fed.   R.  663.     Contra, 

parently  denying  the  right  of  unsecured  Hugh  v.  McRae,  Chase,  460. 


398  EECEIVERS.  [chap.  XYII. 

railroad  in  a  suit  for  the  foreclosiii'e  of  a  mortgage  containing  a 
clause  pledging  its  tolls  and  income,  when  it  would  nut  do  so  if 
no  such  clause  were  included  in  the  mortgage.^*  In  one  case  the 
court  said :  "  The  rights  of  liolders  of  negotiable  bonds  issued  by  a 
railroad  company  and  secured  by  a  mortgage  on  its  property,  are 
not  to  be  measured  by  the  same  rules  as  are  applied  to  an  ordi- 
nary mortgage  on  a  farm  or  house  and  lot,  to  secure  one  or  two 
notes  held  by  one  mortgagee."  ^  Usually  a  receiver  will  not  be 
appointed  at  the  suit  of  subsequent  lienors  over  property  of  which 
a  mortgagee  is  in  possession  ;  but  an  injunction  may  be  issued 
to  prevent  the  mortgagor  from  applying  the  rents  and  profits  to 
any  other  purpose  than  the  satisfaction  of  the  mortgage.^^  It  has 
been  held  that  an  assignment  made  by  a  corporation  for  the  ben- 
efit of  creditors  after  the  filing  of  a  bill  for  the  appointment  of 
a  receiver  will  not  deprive  the  court  of  jurisdiction  to  appoint  a 
receiver.^''  When  a  railroad  is  in  the  hands  of  receivers  pending 
a  foreclosure  suit,  the  court  may  extend  the  receivership  over  a 
portion  of  the  road  for  the  benefit  of  an  intervenor  claiming  a 
prior  lien  thcreupon.^^  Upon  an  interlocutory  application,  in  a 
suit  to  enjoin  the  infringement  of  a  patent  by  an  insolvent  de- 
fendant, a  Circuit  Court  appointed  a  receiver  of  the  profits  made 
by  such  infringement."^ 

A  receiver  will  not  be  appointed  to  assist  a  trust  formed  to 
maintain  a  monopoly,  or  otherwise  to  aid  in  the  prosecution  of  an 
enterprise  against  puljlic  policy .'^'^ 

§  241.  Rules  regulating  the  Appointment  of  Receivers.  —  It  has 
been  said,  that  in  order  to  obtain  the  ap])ointment  of  a  receiver, 
the  moving  party  must  show,  first,  either  that  he  has  a  clear 
right  to  the  property  itself,  or  that  he  has  some  lien  upon  it,  or 
that  the  property  constitutes  a  special  fund  to  which  he  has  a 
right  to  resort  for  the  satisfaction  of  his  claim ;  and,  secondly, 
that  the  possession  of  the  property  by  the  defendant  was  obtained 
by  fraud ;  or  that  the  property  itself,  or  the  income  arising  from 
it,  is  in  danger  of  loss  from  the  neglect,  waste,  misconduct,  or 

8*  Allen  V.  The  Dallas  &  Wichita  R.  R.  8"  Belmont  Nail  Co.  i:  Columbia  Iron 

Co.,  3  Woods,  316  ;  Tysen  v.  Wabasli  R.  &  Steel  Co.,  46  Fed.  K.  8. 

R.  Co.,  8  Biss.  247.  3s  Mercantile  Trust  Co.  v.  Missouri  K. 

35  Allen  V.  The  Dallas  &  Wichita  R.  R.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  41  Fed.  R.  8,  9. 

Co.,  y  Woods,  .'JIG,  326,  per  Woods,  J.  "^  Parkhurst  r.  Kinsman,  2  Blatchf.  78. 

3"^  United  Slates  v.  Marich,  44  Fed.  R.  ■**'  American   Biscuit  &  Manuf.   Co.  v. 

10.  Klotz,  44  Fed   R.  721. 


§  242  ]  ANCILLAEY  RECEIVERS.  399 

insolvency  of  the  defendant.^  The  appointment  of  a  receiver  is 
alwavs  in  the  discretion  ^  of  the  court,  which,  however,  must  be 
exercised  with  great  circumspection,^  and  is  subject  to  review  by 
an  appellate  court.^  It  has  been  said,  tbat  the  appointment  can 
be  made  only  in  accordance  with  the  following  rules:  "1st.  That 
the  power  of  appointment  is  a  delicate  one,  and  to  be  exercised 
Avith  great  circumspection.  2d.  That  it  must  appear  the  claim- 
ant has  a  title  to  the  property,  and  the  court  must  be  satisfied 
by  affidavit  that  a  receiver  is  necessary  to  preserve  the  property. 
3d.  That  there  is  no  case  in  which  the  court  appoints  a  receiver 
merely  because  the  measure  can  do  no  harm.  4th.  That  '  fraud 
or  imminent  danger,  if  the  intermediate  possession  should  not 
be  taken  by  the  court,  must  be  clearly  proved ; '  and  5th.  That 
unless  the  necessity  be  of  the  most  stringent  character,  the  court 
will  not  appoint  until  the  defendant  is  first  heard  in  response  to 
the  application."  '^ 

§  242.  Ancillary  Receivers.  —  An  ancillary  receiver  is  a  receiver 
appointed  in  aid  of  a  receiver  appointed  by  another  court.^  When 
a  receiver  has  been  appointed  by  one  Federal  Circuit  Court,  the 
others  tlirough  judicial  comity  will  usually  appoint  the  same  per- 
son an  ancillary  receiver  of  so  much  of  the  same  estate  as  is 
within  their  jurisdiction.^  In  such  a  case  the  accounting  of  the  re- 
ceivers, and  nearly  all  proceedings  affecting  the  estate,  are  usually 
first  instituted  in  the  court  that  first  made  the  appointment.^  This 
subject,  however,  rests  in  the  discretion  of  the  court  that  has  made 
the  ancillary  appointment,  which  has  full  control  over  the  receiver 
whom  it  appointed.'*     In  a  case  wliere  the  judges  sitting  in  the 

§  241.     1  Chancellor  Buckner  in  Mays  -  Jennings  v.  Ph.&  Reading  R.  R.Co., 

V.  Rose,  Freeman's  Cli.(Miss.)  R.  703,  718.  23  Fed.  R.  56!) ;  Central  Trust  Co.  v.  Wa- 

See  also  Beecher  i'.   Bininger,  7  Blatclif.  bash,  St.  L.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  29  Fed.  R.618, 

170;  Tysen  v.  The  Wabash  R.  R.  Co.,  8  supra,  §  10.     See  also  Parsons  v.  Charter 

Biss.  247.  Oak  Life  Ins.  Co  ,  31  Fed.  R.  305.     But 

-  Owen  V.  Homan,  4  H.LC  997,  1032.  see  Atkins  v.  Wabash,  St.  L.  &  P.  Ry. 

3  Mihvaukie  &  Minn.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Co.,  29  Fed.  R.  161 ;  Central  Trust  Co.  v. 
Soutter,  2  Wall.  521.  Te.xas  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  22  Fed.  R.  135. 

4  Tysen  v.  The  Wabash  R.  R.  Co.,  8  ^  Jennings  v.  Pliila  &  Reading  R.  R. 
Biss.  247.  Co.  23  Fed.  R.  569. 

5  Le  Grand,  C.  J.,  in  Blondheini  v.  *  Atkins  v.  Wabash,  St.  L.  &  P.  Ry. 
Moore.  11  Md.  365,  374.  Co.,  29  Fed.  R.  161  ;  Central  Trust  Co. 'v. 

§  242.     1  .Jennings  v.  Phila.&  Reading     Texas  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  22  Fed.  R.  135. 
R.  R.  Co.,  23  Fed.  R.  509  ;   Williams  v.     But  see  Parsons  ?•.  Charter  Oak  Life  Ins. 
Ilintermeister,  26  Fed.  R.  889.     But  see     Co.,  31  Fed.  R.  305. 
Mercantile   Trust   Co.  v.  Kanawha  &  O. 
Ry.  Co.,  39  Fed.  R.  337 ;  su/ira,  §  10. 


400  RECEIVERS.  [chap.  XVII. 

Circuit  Courts  of  different  districts  in  the  same  circuit  differed  in 
the  instructions  given  by  them  to  the  same  person,  who  had  been 
appointed  receiver  of  the  same  railroad  in  each  district,  the  cir- 
cuit judge  refused  to  interfere.^  A  judgment  against  an  ancillary 
receiver  does  not  affect  the  assets  in  the  jurisdiction  where  a  re- 
ceiver was  first  appointed.*^  "  Where  a  receiver  or  administrator 
or  other  custodian  of  an  estate  is  appointed  by  the  courts  of  one 
State,  the  courts  of  that  State  reserve  to  themselves  full  and  ex- 
clusive jurisdiction  over  the  assets  of  the  estate  within  the  limits 
of  the  State.  "Whatever  orders,  judgments,  or  decrees  may  be 
rendered  by  the  courts  of  another  State,  in  respect  to  so  much 
of  the  estate  as  is  within  its  limits,  must  be  accepted  as  con- 
clusive in  the  courts  of  primary  administration  ;  and  wliatever 
juatters  are  by  the  courts  of  primary  administration  permitted 
to  be  litigated  in  the  courts  of  another  State,  come  within  the 
same  rule  of  conclusiveness.  Beyond  this,  the  proceedings  of  the 
courts  of  a  State  in  which  ancillary  administration  is  held  are 
not  conclusive  upon  the  administration  in  the  courts  of  the  State 
in  which  primary  administration  is  had.  And  this  rule  is  not 
changed,  although  a  party  whose  estate  is  being  administered  by 
the  courts  of  one  State  permits  himself  or  itself  to  be  made  a 
party  to  the  litigation  in  the  other.  Whatever  may  be  the  rule, 
if  jurisdiction  is  acquired  by  a  court  before  administration  pro- 
ceedings are  commenced,  the  moment  they  are  commenced,  and 
the  estate  is  taken  possession  of  by  a  trilnmal  of  a  State,  the  mo- 
ment the  party  whose  estate  is  thus  taken  possession  of  ceases 
to  have  power  to  bind  the  estate  in  a  court  of  another  State, 
either  voluntarily  or  by  submitting  himself  to  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  latter  court," ' 

§  243.  Terms  upon  the  Appointment  of  Receivers,  and  Prefer- 
ences in  Foreclosure  Suits.  —  xVs  the  appointment  of  a  receiver 
is  in  its  discretion,  the  court  may  impose  terms  upon  the  party 
applying  for  it.  Thus,  it  may  insist  as  a  condition  precedent  to 
appointing  a  receiver  to  manage  a  colliery  that  the  moving  party 
advance  the  funds  necessary  to  continue  the  business.^  So,  a  party 
or  person  interested  in  a  suit  was  in  England  rarely  appointed 

5  Central  Trust  Co.  c.  Texas  &  St.  L.  "  Eeynolds  v.  Stockton,  140  U.  S.  2oi, 

Ry.,  22  Fed.  R.  ]-Vy.  272,  per  Mr.  Justice  Brewer. 

«  Reynolds  v.  Stockton,  140  U.  S.  254,  §  243.    i  Gibbs  v.  David,  L.  R.  20  Eq. 

272.  373. 


§  243.]        PREFERENCES  IN  FORECLOSURE  SUITS.  401 

receiver  unless  he  agreed  to  act  without  compensation.^  In  a  lead- 
ing case,  the  Supreme  Court  laid  down  the  rule  as  regards  the 
appointment  of  receivers  in  suits  for  the  foreclosure  of  railroad 
mortgages,  as  follows  :  "  We  have  no  doubt  that  when  a  court  of 
chancery  is  asked  by  railroad  mortgagees  to  appoint  a  receiver  of 
railroad  property,  pending  proceedings  for  foreclosure,  the  court, 
in  the  exercise  of  a  sound  judicial  discretion,  may,  as  a  condi- 
tion of  issuing  the  necessary  order,  impose  such  terms  in  refer- 
ence to  the  payment  from  the  income  during  the  receivership, 
of  outstanding  debts  for  labor,  su[)plies,  equipment,  or  perma- 
nent improvement  of  the  mortgaged  j)roperty  as  may,  under  the 
circumstances  of  the  particular  case,  appear  to  be  reasonable."-^ 
This  is  said  elsewhere  in  the  case  to  depend  upon  the  application 
of  the  maxim  that  he  who  seeks  equity  must  do  equity.*  It  is 
the  better  practice  for  the  court  to  provide  for  preferences  as  a 
condition  upon  the  appointment  of  the  receiver.^  "  If  no  such 
order  is  made  when  the  receiver  is  appointed,  and  it  appears  in 
the  progress  of  the  cause  that  bonded  interest  has  been  paid, 
additional  equipment  provided,  or  lasting  and  valuable  improve- 
ments made  out  of  earnings  which  ought  in  equity  to  have  been 
employed  to  keep  down  debts  for  labor,  supplies,  and  the  like, 
it  is  within  the  power  of  the  court  to  use  the  income  of  the 
receivership  to  discharge  obligations  whicli,  but  for  the  diversion 
of  funds,  would  have  been  paid  in  the  ordinary  course  of  busi- 
ness. This,  not  because  the  creditors  to  whom  such  debts  are  due 
have  in  law  a  lien  upon  the  mortgaged  property  or  the  income, 
but  because,  in  a  sense,  the  officers  of  the  company  are  trustees 
of  the  earnings  for  the  benefit  of  the  different  classes  of  creditors 
and  the  stockholders ;  and  if  they  give  to  one  class  of  creditors 
that  which  properly  belongs  to  another,  the  court  may,  upon  an 
adjustment  of  the  accounts,  so  use  the  income  which  comes  into 
its  own  hands  as,  if  practicable,  to  restore  the  parties  to  their 
original  equitable  rights.  While,  ordinarily,  this  power  is  con- 
fined to  the  appropriation  of  the  income  of  the  receivership 
and  the  proceeds  of  moneyed  assets  that  have  been  taken  from 

2  Wilson  V.  Greenwood,  1  Swanston,  8Biss.  315.     Cow^-rr,  Coo  r.  N.  J.  Midland 

471.  Ry.  Co.,  27  N.  J.  Eq.  37. 

8  Chief  Justice  Waite  in    Fosdick  v.  ■*  Fosdick  r.  Schall.  99  U.  S.  235,  253. 

Solmli,  99  U.  S.  235,  251,  252.     See  also         5  Central  Trust  Co.  v.  St.  Louis  A.  & 

Turner  r.   Indianapolis,  B.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  T.  Ry.  Co.,  41  Fed.  K.  551. 

vor,.  I.  —  2G 


402  EECEIVEUS.  [chap.  XVII. 

the  company,  cases  may  arise  where  equity  will  require  the  use 
of  the  proceeds  of  the  sale  of  the  mortgaged  property  in  the 
same  way.  Thus  it  often  happens  that,  in  the  course  of  the 
administration  of  the  cause,  the  court  is  called  upon  to  take 
income  which  would  otherwise  be  applied  to  the  payment  of  old 
debts  for  current  expenses,  and  use  it  to  make  permanent  im- 
provements on  the  fixed  property,  or  to  buy  additional  equip- 
ment. In  this  way  the  value  of  the  mortgaged  property  is  not 
infrequently  materially  increased.  It  is  not  to  be  supposed  that 
any  such  use  of  the  income  will  be  directed  by  the  court,  without 
giving  the  parties  in  interest  an  opportunity  to  be  heard  against 
it.  Generally,  as  we  know  both  from  observation  and  experi- 
ence, all  such  orders  are  made  at  the  request  of  the  parties  or 
with  their  consent.  Under  such  circumstances,  it  is  easy  to  see 
that  there  may  sometimes  be  a  propriety  in  paying  back  to  the 
income  from  the  proceeds  of  the  sale  what  is  thus  again  diverted 
from  the  current  debt  fund  in  order  to  increase  the  value  of  the 
l)roperty  sold.  The  same  may  sometimes  be  true  in  respect  to 
expenditures  before  the  receivership.  No  fixed  and  inflexible 
rule  can  be  laid  down  for  the  government  of  the  courts  in  all 
cases.  Each  case  will  necessarily  have  its  own  peculiarities, 
which  must  to  a  greater  or  less  extent  influence  the  chancellor 
when  he  comes  to  act.  The  power  rests  upon  the  fact,  that  in 
the  administration  of  the  affairs  of  the  company  the  mortgage 
creditors  have  got  possession  of  that  which  in  equity  belonged 
to  the  whole  or  a  i)art  of  the  general  creditors.  Wiiatever  is 
done,  therefore,  must  be  with  a  view  to  a  restoration  by  the 
mortgage  creditors  of  that  which  they  have  thus  inequitably 
obtained.  It  follows  that  if  there  has  been  in  reality  no  diver- 
sion, there  can  be  no  restoration  ;  and  that  the  amount  of  res- 
toration should  be  made  to  depend  upon  the  amount  of  the 
diversion.  If,  in  the  exercise  of  tliis  ])0wer,  errors  are  com- 
mitted, they,  like  others,  are  open  to  correction  on  aj)peal.  All 
depends  upon  a  proper  application  of  well-settled  rules  of  equity 
jurisprudence  to  the  facts  of  the  case,  as  established  by  the 
evidence."  ^     Orcb'narily,  claims  of  this  nature  are  paid  out  of  the 

0  Chief  Justice  Waite  in   Fosdick   v.  Union  Trust  Co.  t-.  Souther,  107  U.S.  591  ; 

Schall,  09  U.  S.  '2^>o,  -258,  254.     See  also  Union  Trust  Co.  v.  Walker,  107  U.S.  596  ; 

Fosdick  V.  Car  Co.,  99  U.  S    "256  ;  Hale  v-  Burnhani  v.  Rowen,  111  U.  S.  77(1 ;  Blair 

Frost,  99  U.  S.  389;  Miltenbersrer  v.   Lo-  v.  St.  Louis,  H.  &  K.  Ky.  Co.,  22  Fed.  K. 

gansport    Ily.   Co.,  lOG  U.  tS.  2^0,  308;  471,  -174,  with  a  valuable  note  by  Benj.  F. 


§  1^43  ]  rREFERENCES   IN    FORECLOSUKE    SUITS.  403 

earnings  of  the  road,  but  they  are  sometimes  paid  from  the  pro- 
ceeds of  its  sale."  This  doctrine  was  extended  in  a  subsequent 
case  where,  instead  of  a  sale,  the  niortg-agees  sought  a  decree  of 
strict  foreclosure ;  which  was  granted  saving  the  rights  of  inter- 
venors.^  The  Supreme  Court  then  said  again  :  "  As  the  diversion 
of  the  fund  created  in  equrty  a  charge  on  the  property  as  secu- 
rity for  its  restoration,  it  is  clear  that  if  the  mortgagees  prefer  to 
'take  the  property  under  a  decree  of  strict  foreclosure,  they  take 
it  subject  to  the  charge  in  favor  of  the  current  debt  creditor 
whose  money  they  have  got,  and  that  he  can  insist  on  a  sale  of 
the  property  for  his  benefit  if  they  fail  to  make  the  payment 
without."^  "We  do  not  now  hold,  any  more  than  we  did  in 
Fosdick  V.  Schall  [99  U.  S.  235]  or  HuideJcoper  v.  Locomotive 
Works,  99  U.  S.  258,  260,  that  the  income  of  a  railroad  in  the 
liands  of  a  receiver,  for  the  benefit  of  mortgage  creditors  who 
have  a  lien  upon  it  under  their  mortgage,  can  be  taken  away 
from  them  and  used  to  pay  the  general  creditors  of  the  road. 
All  we  then  decided,  and  all  we  now  decide,  is,  that  if  current 
earnings  are  used  for  the  benefit  of  mortgage  creditors  before 
current  expenses  are  paid,  the  mortgage  security  is  chargeable 
in  equity  with  the  restoration  of  the  fund  which  has  been  thus 
improperly  a{)plied  to  their  use."  ^^  In  a  proper  case  the  disburse- 
ments of  a  prior  receiver  appointed  at  the  suit  of  a  junior  incum- 
brancer may  be  thus  given  a  preference  when  they  were  essential 
for  the  maintenance  of  the  mortgaged  property.^* 

In  a  recent  case  the  Supreme  Court  said  :  "  The  appointment 
of  a  receiver  vests  in  the  coi>rt  no  absolute  control  over  the  prop- 
erty, and  no  general  authority  to  displace  vested  contract  liens. 
Because  in  a  few  specified  and  limited  cases  this  court  has  de- 
clared that  unsecured  claims  were  entitled  to  priority  over  mort- 
gage debts,  an  idea  seems  to  have  ol)tained  tliat  a  court  appointing 
a  receiver  acquires  power  to  give  such  j)reference  to  any  general 

liex,  Esq  ,  of  tlie  St  Louis  bar  ;  Porter  '•.  '  Brewer,  J.,  in  Blair  >■  Sr.  Louis,  II.  & 

Pittsburgh  Bessemer  Steel  Co.,  120  U.  S.  K  Py   Co  ,  22  Fed    R  47L  474. 

649,  Douglas  '-.Cline,  12  Bush  (Ky.),  608.  8  Burnham  v.  Bowen,  111  U.  S.  776. 

But  see  Penn  r.  Calhoun,  121  U.  S.  251  ;  9  Chief  Justice  Waite  in  Burnham  v. 

St   Louis,  A.  &  T.  H   R.  R.  Co.  v.  Cleve-  Bowen,  111  U.  S   77fi,  782,  783. 

land,  C  C.  &  I.  Ry.  Co.,  125  U.  S.  058 ;  J"  Chief  Justice  Waite  in  Burnham  v. 

Wood  r.  Guarantee  Trust  &  Safe  Deposit  Bowen,  111  U.  S.  776,  783. 

Co,  128  U.   S.   416,  U.   S.  Trust  Co.  r.  "  Kneeland  t-.  Bass  Foundry  &  Machine 

X    Y.    W,   S.   &   B.    R.   Co.,   25  Fed.  R.  Works,  140  U.   S.   502;  Milteuborger  v 

1*00.  Logansport  Ry.  Co..  lOG  U.  S.  28G.^ 


404  EECEIVERS.  [CIIAP.  XVIT. 

and  unsecured  claims.  It  has  been  assumed  that  a  court  appoint- 
ing a  receiver  could  rightfully  burden  the  mortgaged  property  for 
the  payment  of  any  unsecured  indebtedness.  Indeed,  we  are  ad- 
A'ised  that  some  courts  have  made  the  appointment  of  a  receiver 
conditional  upon  the  payment  of  all  unsecured  indebtedness  in 
preference  to  the  mortgage  liens  sought  to  be  enforced.  Can 
anything  be  conceived  wliich  more  thoroughly  destroys  the  sacred- 
ness  of  contract  obligations  ?  One  holding  a  mortgage  debt  upon 
a  railroad  has  the  same  right  to  demand  and  expect  of  the  court 
respect  for  his  vested  and  contracted  priority  as  the  holder  of  a 
mortgage  on  a  farm  or  lot.  So,  when  a  court  appoints  a  receiver 
of  railroad  property,  it  has  no  right  to  make  that  receivership  con- 
ditional on  the  jiayment  of  other  than  those  few  unsecured  claims 
v.hich,  by  the  rulings  of  this  court,  have  been  declared  to  have  an 
equitable  priority.  No  one  is  bound  to  sell  to  a  railroad  company 
or  to  work  for  it,  and  who  ever  has  dealings  with  a  company  whose 
property  is  mortgaged  must  be  assumed  to  have  dealt  with  it  on 
the  faith  of  its  personal  responsibility,  and  not  in  expectation  of 
subsequently  disi)lacing  the  priority  of  tlie  mortgage  liens.  It  is 
the  exception  and  not  the  rule  that  such  priority  of  liens  can  be 
displaced.  We  emphasize  this  fact  of  the  sacredness  of  contract 
liens,  for  the  reason  that  there  seems  to  be  growing  an  idea,  that 
the  cliancellor,  in  the  exercise  of  his  equitable  powers,  has  unlim- 
ited discretion  in  this  matter  of  tlie  displacement  of  vested  liens. 
Riiilroad  Co.  v.  Railway  Co.^  125  U.  S.  658,  673.  So  that  these 
intervenors  acquired  no  right  of  ])riority  by  virtue  of  their  ante- 
cedent contracts  of  sale.  But  it  is  urged,  and  with  force,  that 
the  court  did  not  allow  contract  price,  but  only  rental,  and  the 
fpiestion  is  asked,  may  a  court,  through  its  receiver,  take  pos- 
session of  proi»erty  and  })ay  no  rental  for  it?  If  it  may  legiti- 
mately compel  the  operation  of  the  railroad  in  the  hands  of  it.", 
i-eceiver,  in  order  to  discharge  the  oV)ligations  of  the  comjjany 
to  the  public,  may  it  not  also,  and  must  it  not  also  l)urden  tb:;t 
receivership,  and  the  property  in  charge  of  the  receiver,  Avith  all 
the  expenses  connected  with  the  operation  of  the  road,  together 
with  reasonable  rentals  for  tlie  property  used  and  necessary  for 
the  operation  of  the  road  ?  As  to  the  general  answer  to  these 
inquiries,  we  have  no  doubt.  A  court  which  appoints  a  receiver 
acquires,  l)y  virtue  of  that  appointment,  certain  rights  and  as- 
sumes certain  obligalious.  and  the  expenses  which  the  court  ere- 


§  243]  PREFERENCES   IN   FORECLOSURE   SUITS.  405 

atcs  in  discharge  of  those  obligations  are  burdens  necessarily  on 
the  property  taken  possession  of,  and  this  irrespective  of  the 
question  who  may  be  the  ultimate  owner,  or  who  may  have  the 
preferred  lien,  or  who  may  invoke  the  receivership.  So  if,  at 
tlie  instance  of  any  party  rightfully  entitled  thereto,  a  court  should 
appoint  a  receiver  of  property,  the  same  being  railroad  property, 
and  therefore  under  an  obligation  to  the  public  of  continued  oper- 
ation, it,  in  the  administration  of  such  receivership,  might  right- 
fully contract  debts  necessary  for  the  operation  of  the  road,  either 
for  labor,  supplies,  or  rentals,  and  make  such  expenses  a  prior 
lien  on  the  property  itself."  ^- 

The  mere  fact  that  money  loaned  to  the  mortgagor  was  ex- 
pended in  paying  interest  upon  the  mortgage  bonds  and  oper- 
ating expenses  so  as  to  enable  the  railway  company  to  maintain 
itself  as  a  going  concern,  is  insufficient  to  entitle  the  lender  to  a 
preference. ^'5 

In  accordance  with  these  principles,  it  has  become  the  practice 
in  the  seventh  circuit  to  impose  as  a  condition  upon  the  appoint- 
ment of  a  receiver  in  a  suit  for  the  foreclosure  of  a  railroad  mort- 
gage, that  debts  for  materials  and  supplies  and  labor  furnished  to 
the  mortgagor  within  the  six  previous  months  be  paid  out  of  the 
net  income  or  the  proceeds  of  the  sale  of  the  road,  before  the  debt 
secured  by  the  mortgage.^*  This  is  called  "  the  six  months  rule."  ^^ 
Other  circuits  adopt  a  similar  practice. ^^  Three  months  is  a  not 
uncommon  limitation  of  time.^''  Claims  due  eight  ^^  and  eleven  ^^ 
months  before  the  receivership  have  been  given  a  preference. 
And  in  one  case  those  who  advanced  money,  after  a  default  in 
interest  but  two  years  before  the  receivership,  to  pay  the  arrears 
of  wages  due  striking  laborers,  under  a  promise  from  the  presi- 

1-  Kneeland  v.  American  Loan  &  Trust  Bay  &  Minn.  R.  R.  Co.,  5  Fed.  R.  840,  851, 

Co.,    130   U.   S.  97,  98,  per  Mr.  Justice  note. 

Brewer.  16  Atkins   i\   Petersburg  R.  R.  Co.,  3 

53  Morgan's  La.  &  T.  R.  R.  &  S.  S.  Co.  Hughes,  307  ;  Blair  r.  iSt.  Louis,  H.  &  K. 

V.  Texas  Central  Ry.  Co.,  137  U.  S.  17L  Ry.  Co.,  22  Fed.  R.  471,  474 ;  Olypliant  v. 

See  George  *'.  St.  Louis  Cable  &  W.  Ry.  St.  Louis  Ore  &  Steel  Co.,  22  Fed.  R. 

Co.,  44  Fed.  R.  117.  170  ;  Taylor  /■.  Pliila.  &  Reading  R.  R. 

1*  lure  Kelly  v.  Receiver  of  Green  Ray  Co.,  7  Fed.  R.  377. 

&  Minn.  R.  R.  Co.,  5  Fed.  R.  846.     See  i"  Fosdick  r.  Scliall,  09  U.  S.  2-35,  238 ; 

Union  Trust  Co.  v.  Souther,  107   U.  S.  Hale  i:  Frost,  99  U.  S.  389  :  Miltenberger 

591,  593  ;  Union  Trust  Co.  v.  111.  Midland  v.  Logansport  Ry.  Co.,  106  l^  S.  286,  308. 

Ry.  Co.,  117  U.S.  434;  Blair  1-.  St.  Louis,  i^  Skiddy    v.    Atlantic,    Miss.   &   Ohio 

H.  &  K.  Ry.  Co.,  22  Fed.  R.  471,  474,  R.  R.  Co.,  3  Huglies,  320. 

i5  In   re   Kelly    v.   Receiver   of   Green  i'-*  Burnham  c.  Bowen,  111  U.  S.  776. 


406  EECEIVERS.  [CIIAr.  XVII. 

dent  of  the  mortgagor  that  they  would  bo  repaid  out  of  the 
current  earnings  of  the  road,  were  given  a  preferences*^  Had 
security  been  taken  and  no  such  promise  been  made,  no  such 
preference  would  probably  have  been  given  them."^^  A  claim 
for  the  price  of  rails  furnished  a  year  before  the  receivership  was 
denied  a  preference.-^  So  was  a  claim  by  a  contractor  for  the 
construction  of  a  part  of  the  road  due  three  years  before  the 
appointment  of  the  receiver.^s  The  ])rice  of  gas  meters  was 
held  not  to  be  a  part  of  the  "  o})crating  expenses "  of  a  gas 
companv.2^  'Yi^q  claim  of  a  secretary  for  a  balance  of  salary  due 
him  within  the  jirescribed  time  has  been  thus  prcferred.^^  A 
president  forfeits  any  right  he  may  })0ssess  to  such  a  preference 
by  publishing  in  the  annual  report  a  statement  that  his  salary 
has  been  paid.'-'^  A  debt  due  an  attorney  for  services  performed 
immediately  before  the  appointment  of  the  receiver  has  been 
preferred  under  this  rule;-'  but  nut,  in  the  absence  of  special 
circumstances,  a  debt  due  for  such  services,  i-endered  more  than 
a  year  before  the  a})pointment ;  -^  nor  for  his  payment,  at  the 
refpiest  of  the  president  of  the  comjiany,  a  few  weeks  before  its 
default,  under  a  promise  of  reimljurscment  within  a  few  months, 
of  judgments  and  other  claims  against  it  for  wages  and  injuries 
to  cattle;-''  nor  for  his  payment  as  suix'ty  upon  appeal  bonds  of 
judgments  against  the  railroad  upon  claims  two  or  three  years 
old,  although  the  appeals  were  taken  a  few  months  before  the 
appointment  of  the  receiver,  and  the  payment  made  after  that 
appointment.'"^*^  When  the  order  of  appointment  gives  a  preference 
to  "  wages  of  employees,"  counsel  fees  due  an  attorney  who  was 
not  employed  as  general  counsel  are  not  included ;  but  if  such 

^'>  Atkins  r.  The  Petersburg  R.  R.  Co.,        2S  Addison  ?•.  Lewis,  75  Va.  701,  713. 
3  Huglies,  307.  -'  Blair  n.  St.  Louis,  H.  &  K.  lly.  Co. 

-1  Duncan  r.  Mobile  &  Ohio  R.  R.  Co  ,  (Norton,    Intcrvenor),    23   Fed.    R.    521. 

2  Woods,  542  ;  Addison  v.  Lewis,  75  Va.  Rut  see  Louisville,  E.  &  St.  L.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

701,  713,  714.  Wilson,  138  U.  8.  501. 

^  Skiddy   v.    Atlantic,    Miss.    &    Ohio         -^  Blair  v.  St.  Louis,  H.  &  K.  Ry.  Co. 

R.  R.  Co.,  3  Hughes,  320.  (Norton,    Intcrvenor),    23    Fed.    R.    521. 

^3  Addison  v.  Lewis,  75  Va.  701,  714,  But  see  Louisville,  E.  &  St.  L.  R.  R.  Co. 

71.-,.  V.  Wilson,  138  U.  S.  501. 

-^  Reyburii  r.  ("onsuniers'  Gas,  Fuel  &         -''  Blair  v.  St.  Louis,  H.  &  K.  Ry.  Co. 

Light  Co  ,  20  Fed.  R.  5r,l.  (Norton,  Intervener),  23  Fed.  R.  521. 

■■^■>  Olyphant  r.  St.  Louis  Ore  &  Steel         •'■'  Blair  r.  St.  Louis,  II.  &  K.  Ry.  Co. 

Co.,  22  Fed.  R.  170.     But  see  Wells  v.  (Norton,  Intcrvenor),  23  Fed.  R.  523.  But 

Southern  Minn.  Ry.  Co.,  1  Fed.  R.  270;  see    Union    Trust    Co.    c.  Morrison,    125 

Addison  v.  Lewis,  75  Va.  701,  712,  713.  U.  S.  591. 


§243.] 


PREFERENCES   IN   FORECLOSURE   SUITS. 


407 


services  resulted  in  a  benefit  to  the  mortgaged  property,  their 
reasonable  value  may  be  paid  the  attorney  before  payment  is 
made  upon  the  bonds,  but  not  otherwise.^^  The  counsel  fees  of 
the  attorney  for  tlie  mortgagor  cannot  be  awarded  a  preference, 
unless  the  mortgage  so  provides.^^  j^  ^  bondholder's  foreclosure 
suit,  the  fees  of  a  counsel  in  a  foreclosure  suit  previously  insti- 
tuted bv  him  at  the  request  of  the  ti-ustees,  and  suspended  under 
their  instructions  without  any  default  on  his  part,  may  be 
allowed  a  preference.^^  Preferences  have  thus  been  given 
to  claims  for  fuel,^*  locomotives,^^  cars,^^  reasonable  car-rent,-^' 
car-springs  and  spirals,-^  repairs,-^^  and  "  limited  amounts  due 
other  aud  connecting  lines  of  road  for  materials  and  repairs, 
and  for  upaid  ticivct  and  freight  balances,  the  outcome  of  indis- 
pensable business  relations,  where  a  stoppage  of  the  continu- 
ance  of   such   business   relations   would   be   a   probable   result. 


31  Louisville,  E.  &  St,  L.  R.  R.  Co.  r. 
Wilson,  138  U.  S.  501.  But  see  Gurney 
>:  Atlantic  &  G.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  58  N.  Y. 
3-58. 

^-  Mercantile  Trust  Co.  v.  Missouri,  K. 
&  T.  Hy.  Co.,  41  Fed.  R.  8,  10.  Coxirn, 
Bound  i\  South  Carolina  R.  Co.,  43 
Fed.  R.  404. 

33  Cowdrey  v.  Galveston,  H.  &  H.  R.  R. 
Co.,  93  U.  S.  .3.52. 

3''  Burnliani  i\  Bowen,  111  U.  S.  776. 

35  Fosdick  V.  Schall,  99  U.  S.  235,  238. 

3-3  Fosdick  V.  Schall,  99  U.  S.  2.35,  238 ; 
Fosdick  V.  Car  Co.,  99  U.  S.  2-56  ;  Frank 
V.  Denver  &  R.  G.  Ry.  Co.,  23  Fed.  R. 
123. 

3"  Thomas  v.  Peoria  &  R.  I.  Ry.  Co  ,  .36 
Fed.  R.  808 ;  Kneeland  v.  American  Loan 
Co.,  136  U.  S.  89-100,  101-103  ;  per  Mr. 
Justice  Brewer:  — 

"  Now,  when  the  holder  of  a  first  lien 
upon  the  realty  alone  asks  the  court  of 
chancery  to  take  possession,  not  only 
of  the  real  but  also  of  personal  property, 
used  for  the  benefit  of  the  real,  that 
application  is  a  consent  on  its  part  that 
the  rental  value  of  the  personalty  thus 
taken  possession  of  and  operated  for  the 
benefit  of  the  realty  shall  lie  i)aid  in  pref- 
erence to  its  own  claim.  The  proposition 
is  a  simple  one.  The  application  may 
not  be  a  consent  that  the  contract  price 
of  the  personalt}' shall  be  paid  in  prefer- 
ence to  his  lien  ;  but  it  certainly  is  a  con- 


sent that  the  rental  value  of  that  person- 
alty, during  the  time  of  the  possession  by 
the  receiver  appointed  at  his  instance, 
may  iiave  priority  to  his  claim." 

"  But  one  answer  can  be  made  to  this 
inquiry,  and  that  is  that  its  application  is 
a  consent  to  the  payment  of  reasonable 
rental  during  the  possession  of  the  re- 
ceiver,—  a  rental  not  based  upon  the  use 
actually  made  l)y  the  receiver,  but  on  the 
ordinar\^  value  of  the  rental  of  such  prop- 
erty. So,  although  it  may  be  true,  as 
claimed  by  counsel,  that  more  was  taken 
possession  of  than  was  needed,  and  that 
there  was  only  a  limited  use  of  each  car 
and  engine,  yet  the  case  is  to  be  taken  as 
though  all  were  needed  and  full  use  made 
of  all ;  and  that  sum  which  would  be  rea- 
sonable rental  value  for  such  use  should 
be  paid.  Such  value  is  not  to  be  deter- 
mined by  the  amount  of  actual  use,  but 
by  what,  in  the  first  instance  and  before 
the  use  had  been  had,  would  be  adjudged  a 
reasonable  rental  value.  Upon  such  basis 
no  complaint  can  be  made  of  the  amount 
fixed  hy  the  court,  reducing  as  it  did  the 
amount  reported  by  the  master."  See 
also  Farmers'  Loan  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Chi- 
cago &  A.  Ry.  Co.,  42  Fed.  R.  26. 

38  Hale  V.  Frost,  99  U.  S.  889. 

3"  Fosdick  V.  Schall,  99  U.  S.  2.35,  2-38; 
Miltenberger  v.  Logansport  Ry.  Co.,  106 
U.  S.  286,  311. 


408  KECEIVERS.  [chap.  XVII. 

in  case  of  non-payment,  the  general  consequence  involving 
largely,  also,  the  interests  and  accommodation  of  travel  and 
traffic.""*^  Where  a  balance  is  due  upon  the  purchase  price  of 
cars  or  locomotives  delivered  to  the  railroad  company  under 
a  contract  of  conditional  sale,  and  the  seller  reclaims  them  or 
the  receiver  rejects  them,  a  claim  for  the  value  of  their  use 
or  for  the  injury  done  to  tliem  while  in  the  possession  of  the 
railroad  is  not  entitled  to  a  preference. ^i  If,  however,  the  re- 
ceiver retains  tliem  with  the  assent  of  the  seller,  the  balance  of 
the  purchase  money,  or  at  least  the  reasonable  value  of  their  use 
by  the  receiver,^''^  may  be  a  preferred  claim  to  that  of  a  prior 
mortgagee,^'^  at  whose  suit  the  receiver  was  appointed,  but  not  the 
value  of  their  use  by  a  former  receiver  appointed  at  the  suit  of  a 
judgment  creditor  to  which  the  mortgagee  was  a  party  ;  **  and 
where  the  value  of  the  purchase  price  is  allowed  a  preference,  it 
is  inferior  to  the  claims  of  laborers  for  service  rendered  immedi- 
ately before  the  appointment  of  the  receiver  and  subsequently  to 
the  delivery  of  the  rolling  stock  to  the  company.^^  In  one  case 
it  was  held,  that  a  claim  for  oil  necessary  for  use  in  operating 
a  railroad,  which  was  furnished  bef()re  a  default  in  interest, 
was  inferior  to  that  of  the  mortgagees ;  but  that  a  claimant  for 
such  oil  furnished  since  a  default  in  the  payment  of  interest 
had  an  equitable  lien  superior  to  the  mortgagees,  when  the 
claimant  had  accepted  a  promissory  note  of  the  railroad  com- 
pany on  account  of  part  of  both  classes  of  indebtedness  ;  which, 
note  he  surrendered  to  the  receiver  upon  petitioning  for  the  pay- 
ment of  his  claim.''''  Where,  before  the  appointment  of  a  receiver, 
a  bondliolder  accepted  a  compromise  which  scaled  down  the  in- 
dcl)tedncss ;  in  pursuance  thereof  surrendered  liis  bonds  and 
coupons,  under  an  agreement  to  receive  in  exchange  new  bonds 
secured  by  a  subsequent  mortgage ;  and  did  receive  new  bonds 

4'^  Miltenberger  v.  Lo^ansport  "Rv.  Co.,  ^  Kneeland  i\  American  Loan  &  Trust 

lOG  U   S.  28(5,  311,  per  Blatelifonl,  J  Co.,  l-W  U.  S.  89,  97.     But  see  Kneeland 

41  Fosdick  V.  Schall,  99  U.  S.  28.5,  2.55;  v.  Bass  Foundry  &  Machine  Works,  140 

Iluidekoper    '■.    Locomotive    Works,   99  U.   R.   592;  Miltcnberger   v.  Logansport 

U.  S.  258;  Kneeland  v.  American  Loan  Ky.  Co.,  106  U.  S.  2S0. 

&  Trust  Co.,  13G  U.  «.  89,  97.  '•^  Frank  o.  Denver  &  K,  G.  Ky.  Co.,  23 

12  Fosdick  V.  Car  Co.,  99  U.  S.  '256 ;  Fed.  R.  123. 

Frank  v.  Denver  &  R  G.  Ry.  Co  ,  23  Fed.  *«  Central  Trust  Co.  v.  Texas  &  St.  L. 

K.  123.  Ry.  Co.,  In  re  Waters  Pierce  Oil  Co.,  In 

43  Kneeland  r.  American  Loan  &  Trust  tervenor,  23  Fed.  R.  703. 
Co.,  136  U.  S.  89,  103. 


§  243.] 


PREFERENCES   IN  FORECLOSURE   SUITS. 


409 


sufficient  to  replace  the  greater  part  of  those  which  he  surren- 
dered; but  there  were  a  few  for  which  no  new  bonds  were  issued, 
apparently  because  no  new  bonds  were  issued  for  so  small  an 
amount,  —  it  was  held  that  his  unadjusted  claim  for  this  balance 
remained  secured  by  the  old  mortgage,  and  was  superior  to 
those  under  the  subsequent  mortgage  given  to  secure  the  new 
bonds."^^  In  two  cases,  decided  by  the  same  judge,  a  preference 
was  given  to  clahns  for  personal  injuries  through  negligence 
within  the  prescribed  time.^*^     Claims   for   damages   by   fire   to 


4"  Blair  v.  St.  Louis,  H.  &  K.  Tty.  Co. 
(Greene,  Intervenor),  23  Fed.  R.  524. 

*8  Central  Trust  Co.  of  N.  Y.  v.  Texas 
&  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  22  Fed.  R.  135 ;  Dow  v. 
Memphis  &  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  Fed.  R.  2G0, 
260,  267,  Caldwell,  J.  But  see  Central 
Trust  Co.  V.  East  Tenn.,  V.  &  G.  R.  Co , 
30  Fed.  R.  895;  Farmers'  Loan  &  Trust 
Co.  V.  Green  Bay,  W.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
45  Fed.  R.  6G4,  066,  667,  per  Jenkins,  J. : 

"  Tlie  principle  is  here  sought  to  be 
extended  to  embrace  a  claim  for  a  death 
occurring  in  the  operation  of  the  road 
within  tlie  limited  period.  In  an  able 
and  ingenious  argument  tlie  counsel  for 
the  petitioner  insists  that,  although  the 
liability  for  the  death  here  rests  upon 
statute  law,  and  is  to  a  stranger  to  the 
contract  of  hiring,  and  arises  from  failure 
of  duty  enjoined  by  the  law  of  master 
and  servant,  3-et  that  the  liability  is  im- 
posed by  the  law  upon,  and  constitutes  a 
term  of,  the  contract  of  hiring,  and  so 
must  be  regarded  as  a  liability  incurred 
in  the  operation  of  the  road,  having  pri- 
ority of  paj'ment  over  a  precedent  mort- 
gage. This  proposition  finds  support  in 
tlie  case  of  Dow  v.  Railroad  Co.,  20  Fed. 
Hep.  2G0.  Tiiere  Judge  Caldwell,  in  ap- 
pointing a  receiver  of  tlie  railway,  pro- 
vided by  his  order  for  the  payment  of  all 
obligations  incurred  for  injuries  to  per- 
sons within  the  six  preceding  months. 
He  states  tliat  failure  by  the  trustee  to 
take  possession  works  an  implied  assent 
that  the  earnings  of  the  road  should  bo 
applied  to  compensate  those  damaged  in 
its  operation,  and  asserts  that  the  rulings 
of  tlie  supreme  court  furnish  ample  au- 
thority for  such  order.  A  careful  reading 
of  all  decisions  of  the  supreme  tribunal 
upon    that    subject   convinces    me    that 


Judge  Caldwell  has  either  misconceived 
the  underlying  principle  of  these  decisions, 
or  seeks  to  extend  it  unduly. 

"  The  Supreme  Court,  as  I  read  the 
opinions,  has  been  most  careful  to  limit 
the  doctrine  to  claims  representing  that 
which  has  inured  to  the  benefit  of  the 
mortgaged  property,  such  as  labor  and 
supply  claims,  amounts  due  to  connect- 
ing roads  for  material,  repairs,  ticket  and 
freiglit  balances,  and  the  like,  allowing 
priority  to  such  claims,  because  their  non- 
payment would  cause  cessation  of  work, 
supplies,  and  running  arrangements,  and 
result  in  stoppage  in  the  operation  of  the 
road,  which,  in  tlie  interest,  as  well  of 
the  bondholder  as  of  the  public,  is  not  to 
be  tolerated.  The  doctrine  is  analogous 
to  that  of  the  adnnralty  allowing  certain 
supplies  to  a  vessel  precedence  over  a 
mortgage  upon  the  vessel,  and  rests  upon 
the  same  principle.  The  vessel  must  not 
be  allowed  to  rot  at  the  wharf.  The 
railway  must  not  be  permitted  to  rust, 
and  its  franchise  to  be  forfeited,  through 
failure  to  operate.  Such  things,  there- 
fore, that  are  done  to  avoid  such  result, 
working  destruction  to  the  mortgage, 
should  be  compensated  in  priority  to  the 
mortgage.  The  protection  accorded  is 
for  tliat  done  for  the  benefit  of  the  res, 
not  that  sufl^ered  in  the  doing,  not  to  the 
individual  right  under  the  contract ;  for 
that  done  in  performance  of  the  contract, 
not  that  suffered  by  breach  of  contract ; 
for  labor  and  supplies  furnished,  not 
wrong  sustained.  A  death  claim  does 
not  come  within  the  principle.  The  loss 
of  life  occurred  in  the  operation  of  the 
road,  but  arose  from  failure  of  duty.  It 
happened  in  the  performance  of  the  con- 
tract, but  not  because   of  performance. 


410 


EECEIVEPtS. 


[chap.  XVII. 


adjuining  property  caused  before  the  appointment  of  the  receiver, 
have  been  denied  a  preference.*^  Where  the  parties  to  a  fore- 
closure suit  waived  a  sale,  and.  entered  an  order  by  consent 
leasing  the  property  to  another  railroad  and  appointing  a  re- 
ceiver of  the  rent,  the  court  directed  that  all  floating  unsecured 
creditors  should  be  paid  out  of  the  rent  before  its  application  in 
discharge  of  the  claims  of  the  bondholders. ^"^  That  a  creditor 
for  supplies  has  taken  notes  of  the  railroad  company  extending 
its  time  of  payment  for  one  month  will  not  prejudice  his  claim 

Its  promoting  cause   was  the  default  of    by  tlie  holJers  after  default  in  payment 


the  comj)any,  not  the  labor  performed. 
The  resulting  death  was  a  detriment,  not 
an  aid,  to  the  road.  It  was  in  no  possible 
sense  of  advantage  to  the  mortgage  inter- 
est. The  rc-s  was  not  benefited,  and  that 
I  take  it,  is  the  test.  If  failure  to  take 
posse.ssion  works  an  implied  assent  that 


of  interest.  Meantime,  unprincipled  di- 
rectors, anxious  to  retain  possession  of 
the  road,  could  contract  indebtedness  — 
given  priority  by  such  ruling —  working 
ruin  to  the  mortgage  interest.  The  bond- 
holder would  be  '  improved  out  of  his 
estate,'  and  his  vested  rights  placed  at 


tlie  earnings  should  be  applied  in  com-     the  mercy  of  hostile  directors.     I  am  un- 


pensation  of  casualties  in  priority  to  the 
mortgage,  why  not  as  to  all  floating  in- 
debtedness, to  all  improvements  upon  the 
road,  and  irrespective  of  time  "*  Wliy 
not  say  that,  through  failure  to  take  pos- 
session, the  bondholders  assent  that  earn- 
ings sliould  be  devoted  to  the  jjayment  of 
all  debts  incurred  after  default  in  the  pay- 
ment of  interest,  and  in  priority  thereto'? 
Why  limit  such  priority  to  the  ])eriod  of 
six  months  prior  to  the  receivership  ?  If 
l)riority  is  to  lie  predicated  upon  implied 
assent,  instead  of  upon  benefit  to  the  res, 


willing  to  assent  to  such  doctrine.  I  do 
not  understand  it  to  be  law.  The  rule  is 
tliat  current  income  should  be  first  de- 
voted to  the  current  expenses  of  operation. 
Liability  for  death  is  not  an  expense  of 
operation  in  any  just  sense  of  the  term. 
It  is  an  unsecured  debt,  and,  as  such, 
cannot  take  precedence  in  payment  over 
prior  and  express  liens.  St.  Louis,  &c. 
R.  Co.  V.  Cleveland,  &c.  Ry.  Co.,  125  U.  S. 
658,  673,  8  Sup.  Ct.  Rep   1011. 

"The  application  was  presented  only 
upon  the  theory  of  priority.     The  record 


it  should  be  allowed  to  all  claims  arising     presents  no  disclosure  touching  income. 


during  failure  to  take  possession  from 
which  assent  is  implied.  The  priority 
siiould  be  co-extensive  in  point  of  time 
with  the  implied  assent.  That  logically 
results  from  the  principle  bottomed  uj)on 
im])lied  assent.  Such  doctrine  is,  to  my 
tiiinking,  a  broad  departure  from  the 
equitable  doctrine  declared  by  the  Su- 
preme Court,  and  would  be  ruinous  in  its 
consequences.  If  conceded,  the  entire 
floating  debt  of  a  railway  company,  oc- 
curring after  default  in  payment  of  inter- 
est, and  during  failure  to  take  possession, 
would  necessarily  and  logically  be  given 
priority.  Vested  rights  of  projierty  would 
be  subjected  to  great  detriment  under 
such  holding.  The  bonds  of  American 
railways  are  scattered  throughout  Europe, 
and  are  held  in  many  hands.  It  requires 
much  time   to  institute  concerted  action 


There  is  no  suggestion  of  its  diversion. 
There  has  been  no  sale  of  the  road.  It 
may  happen  that  the  income  will  more 
than  suffice  to  discharge  the  operating 
expenses  and  the  unjiaid  and  accruing 
interest.  There  may  arise  equities  sanc- 
tioning payment  of  the  claim  not  possi- 
ble now  to  forecast.  The  petitioner  may 
tlierefore  take  order  for  an  issue  to  de- 
termine the  question  of  liability  of  the 
company  and  its  amount,  subject,  with 
respect  to  i)a3-ment,  to  the  ruling  herein 
declared." 

'>^  hi  re  Dexterville  Manuf.  &  Boom  Co. 
V.  Case,  4  Fed.  R.  873 ;  Ililes  r.  Case,  4 
Fed.  R.  141 ;  s.  c.  9  Biss.  549.  Contra, 
Dow  V.  Memphis  &  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  Fed. 
R.  200,  266,  2(i7. 

s"  Farmers'  L.  &  Tr.  Co.  ?-.  Mo.  I.  & 
N.  Ry.  Co.,  21  Fed.  R.  204. 


§  243.]        PREFERENCES  IN  FORECLOSURE  SUITS.  411 

to  a  prcfcrence.^^  Neither  will  his  acceptance  of  a  renewal  of 
these  notes  after  the  receiver's  appointment.'^^  An  assignee  of  a 
preferred  claim  has  all  the  rights  of  his  assignor.^  Where  a 
claim  to  a  preference  is  made  because  money  was  loaned  the 
mortgagor  at  the  request  of  the  bondholders,  a  request  made  by 
all  the  bondholders  must  be  shown  or  the  preference  will  be 
denied.^*  In  a  recent  important  suit  to  foreclose  a  railroad 
mortgage  the  following  order  was  made  :  "  That  all  outstanding 
debts  of  the  said  railway  com[)any  for  labor,  materials,  and  sup- 
plies used  in  the  equipment  or  permanent  improvement  of  the 
said  railroad,  and  all  outstanding  debts  for  necessary  operating 
and  managing  expenses  thereof  in  the  ordinary  course  of  its 
business,  incurred  after  the  first  day  of  September,  1888,  shall 
be  allowed  by  the  master  as  equitable  liens,  prior  in  right  to  the 
lien  of  the  mortgage  sued  on,  irrespective  of  statutory  liens 
therefor.  And  it  is  further  ordered  that  all  such  claims  accru- 
ing on  open  running  accounts  between  said  railroad  and  its  cred- 
itors shall  be  considered  as  embraced  within  this  order,  if  any 
part  of  the  work  was  done,  materials  furnished,  or  expenses 
incurred  after  the  first  day  of  September,  1883,  on  subsisting 
contracts  necessary  for  the  continued  operation  of  the  road  by 
said  receiver ;  otherwise  tlie  demand  will  be  limited  to  what 
accrued  subsequent  to  September  first,"  at  which  date  the  de- 
fault in  payment  of  interest  upon  the  mortgage  occurred."^ 
This  order  was,  subsequently,  thus  expounded :  "  The  various 
rulings  of  the  court  with  respect  to  betterments  and  wages,  not 
within  the  respective  times  stated,  —  to  wit,  six  months  or  other- 
wise,—  have  rested  upon  this  distinct  proposition:  That  supplies 
furnished  or  services  performed  under  a  subsistin[/  contract,  to 
which  and  to  the  continuance  of  which  the  parties  were  respec- 
tively bound,  and  the  termination  of  said  contract  did  not 
happen  except  within  the  time  limited  ;  or  when  such  a  continu- 
ing contract  was  still  in  force  at  the  appointment  of  a  receiver, 

51  Burnham  i;.  Bo  wen,  11 1  U.  S.  776.  &  C.  R.  R.  &  S.  S.  Co.  v.  Texas  Central 

See  also  Central  Trust  Co.  v.   Texas  &  Ry.  Co.  137  U.  S.  171. 

St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  In  re  Waters   Fierce   Oil  ^^  Treat,  J.,  in  Central    Trust    Co.  v. 

Co.,  Intervenor,  23  Fed.  R.  703.  Texas  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  23  Fed.  R.  703; 

^■■^  Burnham  v.  Bowen,  111   U.  S.  776.  cited  and  followed  by  Brewer,  J.,  in  Clair 

53  Union  Trust  Co.  v.  Walker,  107  U.  S.  v.  St.  Louis,  11.  &  K.  Ry.  Co.,  In  re  Merri- 

596;  Burnham  y.  Bowen,  111  U.  S.  776.  wether  and  others,   Intervenors,  23  Fed. 

^*  In  re  Kelly  v.   Green    Bay   &  Minn.  R.  704,  705. 
R.  Co.,  5  Fed.  li.  846.      See  Morgan's  L. 


412  RECEIVERS,  [chap.  XVII. 

the  items  of  such  conthiuing  and  subsisthig  contracts  would  fall 
within  the  prescribed  rules.  No  other  demands,  independent 
in  their  nature,  incurred  before  the  prescribed  time,  are  to  be 
treated  other  than  as  credits  at  large.  If  this  ruling  is  enforced 
there  need  be  no  difiiculty  with  respect  to  what  are  called  '  open 
and  current '  accounts.  Such  accounts  must  be  under  subsisting 
contracts,  not  to  be  terminated  until  within  the  period  of  time 
named ;  otherwise  all  items  previous  to  that  time  must  be  re- 
jected. This  ruling  may  be  subject  to  an  exception  where  the 
local  statute  gives  a  lien  under  a  different  limitation.  In  tlie 
latter  cases  dithculties  may  arise  if  local  decisions  are  followed, 
each  one  of  which  must  depend  upon  its  special  facts."  ^^  It  has 
been  held  that  pending  a  receivership  in  a  Federal  court,  where 
parties  are  entitled  to  a  lien,  and  can  secure  it  by  pixiceedings 
under  a  State  statute,  they  are  not  required  to  go  to  the  expense 
of  such  proceedings,  but  the  Federal  court  will  treat  it  as  though 
all  needful  steps  had  been  taken  to  establish  the  lien  ;  ^"  and  that 
"  where  like  demands  are  presented  from  other  States  in  which 
no  statutory  lien  therefor  exists,  they  shall  be  entitled  to  the 
same  status,  so  that  statutory  and  equitable  liens  may  rest  on  a 
like  basis."  *^  An  entry  upon  the  books  of  the  mortgagor  show- 
ing the  claim  to  be  good  is,  in  the  absence  of  suspicious  circum- 
stances, jyrma/aci'g  proof. ^^  The  attorneys  of  both  the  receiver 
and  the  complainant  should  have  notice  of  the  hearing  of  such  a 
claim  before  a  master.*^'^  An  order  directing  a  receiver  to  carry 
out  his  corporation's  contracts  does  not  necessarily  give  those 
who  claim  damages  for  a  breach  of  those  contracts  a  preference 
over  licn-holdcrs.^^  In  a  recent  case,  the  following  conditions 
were  inserted  in  the  order  ai)i)ointing  a  receiver:  "(1)  That  the 
debts,  if  any,  due  from  the  railroad  company  for  ticket  and  freight 
balances;  and  for  work  and  labor  performed  l)y  its  employes  and 
laborers ;  and  for  supplies  and  materials  furnished  for  equipping, 

^^  Treat,  J.,  ns  quoted  by  Brewer,  J.,  in  ^^  Treat,  J.,  in  Blair  r.  St.  Louis,  H.  & 

Central  Trust  Co.  v.  Texas  &  St.  L.  Ry.  K.  R.  Co.,  19  Fed.  R.  861,  8(52. 

Co.,  Camden  LuTnber  Co.  and  others.  In-  "^  Blair  v.  St.  Louis,  II.  &  K.  R.  Co.,  19 

tervenors,  2:5  Fed.  R.  073  Fed.  R.  8G1,  802,  Treat,  J.  ;  s.  c.  22  Fed. 

5^  Brewer  J.,  in  Central  Trust  Co.  v.  R.  471,  472,  Brewer,  J. 

Te.\as  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  Camden  Lumber  «»  Blair  r.  St.  Louis,  H.  &  K.  R.  Co.,  19 

Co.  and  others,  Intervenors,  23  Fed.    R.  Fed.  R.  861,  8G2. 

(573,  074.  675;  Treat.  J.,  in  Blair  y.    St.  «i  Olyphant  ;;.  St.  St.  Louis  Ore  &  Steel 

Louis,   II.  &  K.   R.  Co.,  I'.t   Fed.   R.  801.  Co.,  28  Fed.  R.  729. 
But  see  Hassall  v.  Wilco.x,  13U  U.  S.  493. 


§  243.]        PREFERENCES  IN  FORECLOSURE  SUITS.  413 

operating,  repairing,  or  improving  the  road ;  and  all  obligations 
incurred  in  the  transportation  of  j)assengers  and  freight,  or  for  in- 
juries to  person  or  property,  which  have  accrued  within  six  months 
last  past,  — shall  be  paid  by  the  receiver  out  of  the  earnings  of  the 
road.  (2)  That  persons  having  demands  or  claims  of  any  char- 
acter against  the  receiver,  may,  without  applying  to  this  court  for 
leave  to  do  so,  bring  suit  thereon  against  the  receiver  in  any  court 
in  this  State  having  jurisdiction,  or  may  file  their  petition  and 
have  their  claim  adjudicated  in  this  court  at  their  election.  This 
clause  shall  not  be  construed  as  authorizing  the  levy  of  any  writ 
or  process  on  the  property  in  the  hands  of  the  receiver,  or  taking 
the  same  from  his  custody  or  possession.  (3)  That  the  debts 
and  liabilities  of  the  railroad  company  which  the  receiver  is 
ordered  to  pay,  together  witli  all  debts  and  liabilities  which  said 
receiver  may  incur  in  ojicrating  said  road,  shall  be  paramount 
and  superior  to  the  lien  of  the  mortgages  set  out  in  the  plaintiff's 
bill,  and  said  lien  shall  continue  until  said  debts  and  liabilities 
are  satisfied ;  and  the  discharge  of  said  property  from  the  cus- 
tody of  the  receiver  shall  not  affect  such  lien,  or  deprive 
claimants  of  the  opportunity  of  proving  their  demands,  but  said 
receiver  or  a  successor  shall  be  continued  in  office  for  the  ad- 
justment of  such  demands,  and  may  be  sued  therefor ;  and 
if  said  demands  are  not  paid  by  the  person  or  corporation  in 
possession  of  said  mortgaged  property,  the  court  may  repossess  or 
may  decree  a  sale  of  tlie  property,  as  shall  seem  most  expedient. 
(4)  The  said  plaintiff  shall  prosecute  this  suit  to  final  decree 
as  speedily  as  the  same  can  be  done  under  the  rules  of  equity 
practice,  and  failing  so  to  do,  the  court  of  its  own  motion  will 
discharge  said  property  from  the  custody  of  the  receiver."  ^^ 
Another  recent  order  was  as  follows :  "  On  this  day  comes  the 
plaintiff,  by  Phillips  and  Stewart,  its  attorneys,  and  the  defend- 
ant, by  J.  M.  &  J.  G.  Taylor,  its  attorneys,  and  the  receivers,  by 
S.  H.  "West,  their  attorney,  and  S.  W.  Fordyce,  one  of  the  receivers, 
in  proper  person,  and  the  proper  order  to  be  made  by  the  court 
on  the  subject  of  the  payment  of  debts  and  liabilities  of  the  defend- 
ant company  by  the  receivers  came  up  for  consideration  ;  and,  the 
court  being  now  well  and  sufficiently  advised  in  the  premises,  it  is 
ordered  that  the  following  debts  and  demands  against  the  com- 
pany which  have  accrued  since  the  execution  of  the  mortgages 

«-  Caldwell,  J.,  in  Dow  i-.  Memphis  &  L.  R.  Ky.  Co.,  20  Fed.  R.  260,  2GG,  267. 


414  RECEIVERS.  [chap.  XVII. 

in  suit;  viz.,  tlic  debts  due  from  the  railroad  company  for  ticl^ets 
and  freiglit  balances,  and  for  work,  labor,  materials,  machinery, 
fixtures,  and  supplies  of  every  kind  and  character,  done,  performed, 
or  fui'uishcd  in  the  construction,  extension,  repair,  equipment,  or 
operation  of  said  road  and  its  branches  in  this  State,  and  all  liabili- 
ties incurred  by  said  company  in  the  transportation  of  freight  and 
passengers,  including  damages  to  person  and  property,  and  for 
breaches  of  contracts  for  the  transportation  of  persons  and  prop- 
erty, and  all  claims  and  demands  upon  which  suit  has  been  here- 
tofore brought  or  judgment  recovered  in  the  United  States  or 
State  court  in  this  State,  together  with  all  debts  and  liabilities 
which  the  receivers  may  incur  in  operating  said  road  in  this  State, 
including  claims  for  injuries  to  persons  and  property, —  shall  con- 
stitute a  lien  on  said  railroad,  and  all  property  appurtenant  thereto, 
superior  and  paramount  to  the  lien  of  the  mortgages  set  out  in  the 
bill,  as  provided  by  the  statute  of  this  State,  and  said  road  shall 
not  be  released  or  discharged  from  said  lien  until  said  debts  and 
liabilities  are  paid.  The  receivers  arc  authorized  and  directed  to 
pay  all  such  debts  and  liabilities  out  of  the  earnings  of  the  road, 
or  out  of  any  fund  in  their  hands  applicable  to  that  jiurpose  ;  and, 
if  not  sooner  discharged,  then  the  same  shall  be  paid  out  of  the 
proceeds  of  the  sale  of  the  road."  ^^  Whether  this  doctrine  applies 
to  the  foreclosure  of  any  except  mortgages  by  railway,  telegraph, 
or  other  companies  to  which  are  delegated  the  right  of  eminent 
domain,  is  very  doubtful.*^'* 

§  244.  Property  over  "which  Receivers  may  be  Appointed.  — 
A  reccivci^  may  be  appointed  to  ])reserve  and  take  possession  of 
every  kind  of  property,  whether  the  same  be  what  is  termed  cor- 
poreal or  incorporeal,  which  can  be  seized  by  execution  at  law 
or  which  constitutes  equitable  assets.^  Thus  receivers  have  been 
appointed  to  collect  and  hold  the  profits  of  a  rectory ,2  of  a  col- 


es Central  Trust  Co.  v.  St.  Louis,  A.  &         §  244.     1  Davis  v.  Gray,  10  Wall.  203, 

T.  Ry.  Co.,  41  Fell.  II.  551,  553-554,  jxr  217;  Davis  v.   Duke  of  Marlborough,  2 

Caldwell,  .J.  Swanst.    108,    127 ;    Blanchard  v.   Caw- 

64  Wood  y.  Guarantee  Trust  &  Safe  De-  thorne,  4   Simons,   566.     See   Palmer^  r. 

posit  Co.,  128  U.  S.  416  ;  Raht  v.  Attrill,  Vauyhan,  3  Swanst.  178;  Meriwether*'-. 

lOG  N.  Y.  423;  Reyburn  v.   Consumers'  Garrett,  102  U.  S.  472,  501. 
Gas,  Fuel  &  Lijrht  Co.,  29  Fed.  R.  5G1  ;  '-  Silvery.  Bishop  of  Norwich,  3  Swanst. 

Fidelity     Ins.   &   Safe    Deposit    Co.    v.  112 ;  White  y.  Bishop  of  Peterborough,  3 

Shenandoah  Iron    Co.,  42    Fed.  R.   372;  Swanst.  109. 
Seventh  Nat.    Bank  of  Philn.  r.  Shenan- 
doah Iron  Co.,  35  Fed.  R.  430 


§  244.]      PEOPERTY  OVER  WHICH  RECEIVERS  MAY  BE  APPOINTED.      415 

lege  fellowship,^  and  of  the  offices  of  a  master  forester  in  a  royal 
forest,*  and  of  a  county  clerk  of  peace,°  tlie  tolls  of  a  turnpike  ;'' 
to  manage  and  collect  the  profits  of  mines,''  plantations,*^  a  the- 
atre,^ a  newspaper,  ^^  and  a  railroad  ;  ^^  to  exercise  the  right  to 
sell  a  conditional  right  of  membership  in  an  exchange  ;  ^^  and  to 
take  possession  of  the  estate  of  an  intestate  with  power  to  apply 
for  letters  of  administration. ^^  After  the  repeal  of  the  charter  of 
tlic  city  of  Memphis,  a  receiver  was  appointed  to  take  possession 
of  all  its  property  which  could  be  subjected  to  the  payment  of  its 
dcbts.i*  In  the  last-mentioned  case  the  Supreme  Court  laid  down 
the  following  propositions:  "1.  Property  held  for  public  uses, 
such  as  public  buildings,  streets,  squares,  parks,  promeuades, 
wharves,  landing-places,  fire-engines,  hose  and  hose-carriages, 
engine-houses,  engineering  instruments,  and  generally  everything 
held  for  governmental  purposes,  cannot  be  subjected  to  the  pay- 
ment of  the  debts  of  the  city.  Its  public  character  forbids  such 
an  appropriation.  Upon  the  repeal  of  the  charter  of  the  city, 
such  property  passed  under  the  immediate  control  of  the  State, 
the  power  once  delegated  to  the  city  in  that  behalf  having  been 
withdrawn.  2.  The  private  property  of  individuals  within  the 
limits  of  the  teri-itory  of  the  city  cannot  be  subjected  to  the  pay- 
ment of  the  debts  of  the  city,  except  through  taxation.  The  doc- 
trine of  some  of  the  States,  that  such  property  can  be  reached 
directly  on  execution  against  the  municipality,  has  not  been  gen- 
erally accepted.  3.  The  power  of  taxation  is  legislative,  and 
cannot  be  exercised  otherwise  than  under  the  authority  of  the 
legislature.  4.  Taxes  levied  according  to  law  before  the  repeal 
of  the  cluirter,  other  than  such  as  were  levied  in  obedience  to  the 
special  requirement  of  contracts  entered  into  under  the  authority 
of  law,  and  such  as  were  levied  under  judicial  direction  for  the 
payment  of  judgments  recovered  against  the  city,  cannot  be  col- 

3  Feistel   I'.  King's  College,  10  Bcav.  ii  Stevens  v.  Davison,  18  Grat.  (Va.) 

491.  819;  Davis  v.   Gray,  16  Wall.  203;  Bar- 

^  Blanchard  v.  Cawthorne,  4  Simons,  ton  v.  Barbour,  104  U.  S.  126. 

566.  i-i  Powell  V.  Waldron,  89  N.   Y.  328; 

5  Palmer  ('.  Vaughan,  3  Swanst.  173.  In    re  Ketolium,    1    Ferl.    R.    840;  I»  re 

6  Knapp  r.  Williams,  4  Ves.  4;)0,  note;  Werrler,  15  Fed.  R.  789;  Hydei-.  Woods, 
Dumvdle  V.  Ashbrooke,  3  Rnss.  98,  note.  94  U.  S.  523 ;  Piatt  v.  Jones,  96  N.  Y.  24. 

"  Jcfferys  v.  Smith,  1  J.  &  W.  208.  '-^  Re  flayer,  L.  R.  3  P.  &  M.  39. 

8  Morris  v.  Elme,  1  Ves.  Jr.  139.  i*  Meriwether  v.  Garrett,  102  U.  S.  472, 

9  Const  V.  Harris,  T.  &  R.  496,  528.  484. 
"•  Chaplin  V.  Young,  6  L.  T.  (x.  s.)  97  ; 

Kelley  f.  Ilutton,  17  W.  R.  425. 


416  RECEIVEKS.  [CHAr.  XYII. 

lectcd  through  the  instrumentality  of  a  court  of  chancery  at  the 
instance  of  creditors  of  tlie  city.  Sucli  taxes  can  only  be  collected 
under  authority  from  the  legislature.  If  no  such  authority  exists, 
the  remedy  is  by  appeal  to  the  legislature,  which  alone  can  grant 
relief.  "Wlietlier  taxes  levied  in  obedience  to  contract  obligations, 
or  under  judicial  direction,  can  be  collected  through  a  receiver 
appointed  by  a  court  of  chancery,  if  there  be  no  public  officer 
charged  with  authority  from  the  legislature  to  perform  that  duty, 
is  not  decided,  as  the  case  does  not  require  it."  ^^  In  a  subse- 
quent case,  the  Supreme  Court  held  that  taxes  already  levied 
could  in  no  case  be  collected  through  a  receiver. ^*^  Until  tlie  pas- 
sage of  a  statute  allowing  it  to  be  done,  the  English  courts  held 
that  a  receiver  could  not  be  appointed  to  manage  a  railroad; ^7 
but  such  an  appointment  is  authorized  and  is  very  frequent  in 
this  country ,^s  and  even  in  England  a  receiver  might  always  be 
appointed  to  receive  the  tolls  of  a  railroad. ^^  A  lugubrious  pic- 
ture of  the  result  of  such  appointments  has  been  drawn  by  Mr. 
Justice  Miller  :  "  The  rapid  absorption  of  the  business  of  the 
country  of  every  character  by  corporations,  while  productive  of 
much  good  to  the  public,  is  beginning  also  to  develop  many  evils, 
not  the  least  of  which  arises  from  their  failure  to  pay  debts  and 
perform  the  duties  which  by  the  terms  of  their  organization  they 
assumed.  One  of  tlie  most  efficient  remedies  for  the  failure  to 
pay,  when  it  arises  from  inability,  is  to  place  the  corporation  in 
the  hands  of  a  receiver,  that  its  affairs  may  be  wound  up,  its 
debts  discharged,  and  the  remaining  assets,  if  any  there  be,  dis- 
tributed among  its  stockliolders.  Of  the  beneficial  results  of  this 
remedy  there  can  be  little  doubt.  When  it  is  applied  with  de- 
spatch, and  the  effects  of  the  insolvent  corporation  are  faithfully 
used  to  meet  its  liabilities,  and  its  dead  body  is  buried  out  of 
sight  as  soon  as  possible,  no  objection  can  be  made  to  the  pro- 
cedure, and  all  courts  and  good  citizens  should  contribute,  as  far 
as  they  may,  to  this  desirable  object.     In  regard,  however,  to  a 

^^  Chief  Justice  Waite  in  Meriwether  y.  ^"^  Gardner  v.  Lnn'lon,  Cliatham  & 
Garrett,  102  U.S.  472.  501.  Upon  the  first  Dover  Ry.  Co.,  L.  K.  2  Ch.  App.  201; 
tlirec  propositions  the  court  was  unani-  Jones  on  Railroad  Securities,  §  456. 
mous.  The  fourth  was  decided  by  a  ma-  ^^  Stevens  v.  Davison,  18  Grat.  (Va.) 
jority  only.  See  a  criticism  of  this  case  819;  Davis  v.  Gray,  16  Wall.  203 ; -Bar- 
by  judge  Bnxier  in  Garrett  v.  City  of  ton  v.  Barbour,  104  U.  S.  12G,  137,  138. 
Memphis,  5  Fed.  H.  860.  ^^  Hopkins  v.  Worcester  &  Birmingham 

•''  Thompson    v.    Allen     County,    115  Canal    Co.,  L.   R.  6   Eq.  437;    Jones    on 

U.  b.  550, 558.               •  Railroad  Securities,  §  456, 


§  24"«.]  POWERS   OF   RECEIVERS   IN   GENERAL.  417 

certain  class  of  corporations,  —  a  class  whose  operations  are  as 
important  to  the  interests  of  tlie  communit}^  and  as  intimately 
connected  with  its  business  and  social  habits  as  any  other,  —  the 
appointment  of  receivers,  as  well  as  the  power  conferred  on  them, 
and  the  duration  of  their  oftice,  has  made  a  progress  which,  since 
it  is  wholly  the  work  of  courts  of  chancery  and  not  of  legislatures, 
may  well  suggest  a  pause  for  consideration.  It  will  not  be  neces- 
sary to  any  observing  mind  to  say  that  I  allude  to  railroad  corpo- 
rations. Of  the  fifty  or  more  who  own  or  have  owned  the  many 
thousand  miles  of  railway  in  my  judicial  circuit,  I  think  I  speak 
within  limits  in  saying  that  hardly  half  a  dozen  have  escaped  the 
hands  of  the  receiver.  If  these  receivers  had  been  appointed  to 
sell  the  roads,  collect  the  means  of  the  companies,  and  pay  their 
debts,  it  might  have  been  well  enough  ;  but  this  was  hardly  ever 
done.  It  is  never  done  now.  It  is  not  the  purpose  for  which  a 
receiver  is  appointed.  He  generally  takes  the  property  out  of  the 
hands  of  its  owner,  operates  the  road  in  his  own  way,  with  an 
occasional  suggestion  from  the  court,  which  he  recognizes  as  a 
sort  of  partner  in  the  business,  sometimes,  though  very  rarely, 
pays  some  money  on  the  debts  of  the  corporation,  but  quite  as 
often  adds  to  them,  and  injures  prior  creditors  by  creating  a  new 
and  superior  lien  on  the  property  pledged  to  them."^'^  In  a  recent 
case,  the  court  refused  to  appoint  a  receiver  of  a  disused  and 
independent  railroad  track  in  a  case  where  there  was  a  scramble 
for  its  possession  ;  saying,  in  reference  to  the  power  to  appoint  a 
receiver  :  "  If  we  should  carry  this  to  the  extent  to  which  you 
claim,  we  should  be  having  this  court  pushing  the  doctrine  of 
receivership  to  the  extent  of  making  us  justices  of  the  peace,  and 
issuing  peace  warrants."  ^i 

§  245.  Powers  of  Receivers  in  general.  —  The  powers  of  a  re- 
ceiver, in  the  aljsence  of  any  special  authority  given  ui  the  order 
for  his  appointment,  are  very  limited.  He  can  take  possession  of 
the  property  which  he  is  appointed  to  receive.^  If  any  of  it  is  land 
under  lease,  he  can  accept  attornment  and  payment  of  rent  and 
arrears  of  rent  from  the  tenants.^  He  can  give  notice  to  quit  to 
tenants  from  year  to  year ;  ^  and  in  States  where  the  remedy  by 

20  Barton  v.  Barbour,   104   U.  S.  126,  §  245    i  Daniell's  Cli.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.) 

137,  138,  in  the  dissentincr  opinion.  1987, 1988. 

-1  Brewer  and  Treat,  .IJ  ,  in  St  Louis,         ^  Codrington  y.Jolinstone,  1  Beav  520; 

K.  C.  &  C.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Dewees,  23  Fed.  R.  McDonnell  v.  White,  11  H.  L.  C.  570. 
510.  a  Doe  v.  Reed,  12  East,  57,  59. 

VOL.  I.  —  27 


418  RECEIVERS.  [chap.  XVII. 

distress  still  exists,  he  may  distrain  for  rents  not  more  than  one 
year  in  arrear.*  He  may  also  pay  out  small  sums  of  money  in 
customary  repairs  of  the  property  which  he  holds  in  trust,^  and  in 
some  cases  insure  it  against  fire.^  Beyond  this,  he  can  do  noth- 
ing without  the  express  authority  of  the  court.'  He  cannot  sue 
to  recover  debts  or  other  property  belonging  to  the  estate,^  nor 
even,  it  seems,  defend  suits  or  actions  brought  against  him,^  nor 
spend  any  money  whatever  which  belongs  to  the  estate,  except 
such  very  small  sums  as  are  above  referred  to,^*^  without  an  order 
authorizing  him  to  do  so.  If,  however,  he  does  any  of  these 
things  without  leave,  and  the  court  determines  that  the  money 
tlius  expended  has  been  beneficial  to  the  estate,  his  expenditures 
for  that  purpose  may  be  allowed  him  ;  ^^  otherwise,  he  must  make 
good  all  loss  thereby  occasioned. ^^  It  seems  that  an  unauthorized 
contract  made  by  him  with  a  stranger  may  be  ratified  by  an  order 
of  the  court  made  before  tlie  stranger  has  given  notice  of  his 
intention  to  abandon  it.^^  A  fire  insurance  company  which  has 
received  a  premium  from  a  receiver  cannot  in  an  action  on  the 
policy  disi)utc  his  authority  to  insure  the  property  he  holds.^^  It 
seems  that  an  order  giving  a  receiver  authority  to  sell  carries  with 
it  authority  to  execute  and  deliver  to  the  purchaser  a  deed  ;  ^^  but 
if  not,  a  subsequent  confirmation  by  the  court  of  a  sale  irreg- 
ularly made  validates  from  that  time  a  deed  previously  executed 
by  the  receiver.^^  It  has  been  said  that  "  a  purchaser  under  a 
deed  from  a  receiver  is  not  bound  to  examine  all  the  proceedings 
in  the  case  in  which  the  receiver  is  appointed.  It  is  sufficient  for 
him  to  see  that  there  is  a  suit  in  equity,  or  was  one,  in  which  the 
court  appointed  a  receiver  of  property ;  that  such  receiver  was  au- 

*  Vhtv.  Snowden.  3  Atk.  750;  Bran-  ii  Tempest  r.  Orel,  2  Meriv.  55;  Blunt 

don  V.  Brandon,  5  Madd.  473;  Davis  v.  v.   Clitherovv,  G  Ves.  799;  Thompson  v. 

Gray,  16  Wall.  203,  218.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.,  136  U.  S.  287,  294. 

^  Attorney-General  v.  Vigor,   11  Ves.  i-  Attorney-General  v.  Vigor,  11  Ves. 

503,  Dantelf's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Ani.ed.)  1090.  66.3. 

''  Thompson  v.  Phnnnix  Ins.   Co,  136  i^  Koontz  u.  Northern  Bank,  16  Wall. 

U.  S.  287,  293-294  ;  Brown  v.  Hazlehurst,  196  ;    Smith   v.  McCullough,   104    U.  S. 

54  Maryland,  20,  28.  25,29. 

'  Davi.s  V.    Gray,  16  Wall.   203,  218;  »  Thompson  r.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.,  136 

Smith  V.  McCullough,  104  U.  S.  25,  29,  U.  S.  287,  294-295. 

8  Wynne  ».  Lord  Newborough,  1  Ves.  i''  Koontz  v.  Northern   Bank,  16  Wall- 
Jr.  164  ,  s.  c.  3  Brown  Ch.   C.  88:  Green  196,  201. 

V.  .Winter,  1  J.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  60.  >''  Koontz  v.  Northern  Bank,  16  Wall. 

9  Svvaby  v.  Dickon.  5  Simons,  629.  196. 
'^  Attorney-General  v.  Vigor,  11  Ves. 

563. 


§  245.]  rowEEs  of  eeceiveks  in  general.  419 

tliorized  by  the  court  to  sell  the  property;  that  a  sale  was  made 
under  such  authority ;  that  the  sale  was  confirmed  by  the  court ; 
and  that  the  deed  accurately  recites  the  property  or  interest  thus 
sold.  If  the  title  of  the  property  was  vested  in  the  receiver  by 
an  order  of  the  court,  it  would  in  that  case  pass  to  the  purchaser. 
He  is  not  bound  to  inquire  whether  any  errors  intervened  in  the 
action  of  the  court,  or  irregularities  were  committed  by  the  re- 
ceiver in  the  sale,  any  more  than  a  purchaser  under  execution 
upon  a  judgment  is  bound  to  look  into  the  errors  and  irregu- 
larities of  a  court  on  the  trial  of  the  case,  or  of  the  officer  in 
enforcing  its  ])rocess."  ^'  An  order  authorizing  a  receiver  to  bor- 
row money  to  expend  in  building  an  unfinished  ])ortion  of  a  rail- 
road does  not  authorize  him  to  contract  for  municipal  aid  in  such 
construction.!^  An  order  authorizing  a  receiver  to  make  a  con- 
tract is  construed  strictly  in  favor  of  the  estate.^^  After  the  exe- 
cution of  a  contract  has  been  authorized  by  the  court,  the  order 
will  not  ordinarily  be  revoked  except  in  case  of  fraud.^*^  A  re- 
ceiver cannot  accomplish  by  estoppel  or  waiver  what  he  has  no 
power  to  do  directly .-^  Without  authority  from  the  court  a  re- 
ceiver cannot  by  receipt  of  rent  or  otherwise  bind  the  parties  or 
a  subsequent  purchaser  to  recognize  a  lease.^^  The  court  may, 
however,  either  in  the  original  order  of  appointment  or  subse- 
quently, give  a  receiver  very  extensive  powers.  It  is  usual  in 
the  order  appointing  a  receiver  to  give  him  power  to  bring  and 
defend  suits  or  actions  affecting  the  estate,  and  to  set  and  let 
such  of  it  {IS  consists  of  land.  Other  and  much  more  extensive 
authority,  such  as  to  borrow  money  needed  for  the  proper  admin- 
istration of  his  trust,  and  issue  as  security  therefor  certificates 
giving  their  owner  a  first  lien  upon  the  estate;-'^  to  contract  for 
the  construction  of  a  bridge ;  -^  to  pay  an  employee  his  wages 
during  the  time  that  he  is  kept  from  work  by  the  result  of  an 

^"^  Mr.    Justice    Field    in    Koontz    i-.  Central  Trust  Co.  v.  Ohio  Central  R.  R. 

Northern  Bank,  16  Wall.  100,  202.  Co.,  23  Fed.  R.  300 ;  Armstrong  v.  Arm- 
is  Smith  y.  McCulIough,  101  U.   S.  25,  stronf/,    L.    R.    12    Eq.    014;    Koontz   t-. 

29.  Nortliern  Bank,  16  Wall.  196  ;  Stanton  v. 

13  Farmers'   L.  &  Tr.  Co.   v.  Logans-  Ala.  &  C.  R.  Co.,  .31  Fed.  R.  585. 

port,  C.  &S.  W.  Ry.   Co.,  4  Fed.  R.  184.  -i^  Farmers'  L.  &  Tr.  Co.   v.  Chicago  & 

•^'  Wabash,  St.  L.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Cen-  A.  Ry.  Co.,  44  Fed.  R.  653,  059. 

tral  Trust  Co.,  22  Fed.  R.  269.     But  see  -3  Wallace   v.   Loomis,  97   U.   S.  146. 

Weeks  v.  Weeks,  106  N.  Y.  026.  See  §  247. 

•^1  Van  Dyckr.  McQuade,85N.  Y.G16;  -^  LaCrosse   Railroad   Bridge,  2  Dill. 

Farmers'  L.  &  Tr.  Co.  v.  Chicago  &  A.  465. 

Ry.  Co.,  44  Fed.  R.  653,  659.    But  see 


420  KECEITEES.  [CH.4.P.  XYII. 

injury  received  while  at  \York  for  the  receirer,  without  contrib- 
utory negligence,  but  for  which  the  receiver  is  not  responsible;^^ 
and  in  Ireland,  to  spend  money  in  relieving  and  giving  employ- 
ment to  poor  tenants,  for  the  reason  that  they  may  be  enabled  in 
the  future  to  pay  their  rent  more  regularly,-^  have  been  given  to 
receivera.  The  order  appointing  a  receiver  of  land  usually  con- 
tains a  clause  empowering  him  to  set  and  let  the  same.^'  Even 
with  this,  it  seems,  that  without  special  authority  he  cannot  let 
any  part  thereof  so  as  to  bind  the  estate  for  a  longer  period  of 
time  than  is  authorized  by  the  Statute  of  Frauds,^^  but  that  a 
lease  made  for  a  longer  time  would  bind  a  tenant  who  had  ac- 
cepted \tP  It  is  doubtful  whether  a  receiver  has  the  right  to  use 
a  patent  under  a  license  given  the  person  over  whose  estate  he 
was  appointed.^  A  receiver  of  a  dissolved  corporation  may  sus- 
tain a  bill  to  comjiel  the  assignment  to  him  of  a  patent  by  the 
legal  owner  when  the  corporation  had  the  equitable  title  to  the 
same.^^ 

§  246.  Powers  of  Receivers  of  Railroads.  —  Yery  extensive 
powers  are  often  granted  to  the  receivers  of  railroads.^  The 
Supreme  Court  has  said  of  them  :  "  In  the  progress  and  growth 
of  equity  jurisdiction  it  has  become  usual  to  clothe  such  officers 
with  much  larger  powers  than  were  formerly  conferred.  In  some 
of  the  States  they  are  by  statutes  charged  with  the  duty  of  set- 
tling the  affairs  of  certain  corporations  when  insolvent,  and  are 
authorized  expressly  to  sue  in  their  own  names.  It  is  not  un- 
usual for  courts  of  equity  to  put  them  in  charge  of  the  railroads 
of  companies  which  have  fallen  into  financial  embarrassment, 
and  to  require  them  to  operate  such  roads,  until  the  difficulties 
are  removed,  or  such  arrangements  are  made  that  the  roads  can 
be  sold  with  the  least  sacrifice  of  the  interests  of  those  concerned. 
In  all  such  cases  the  receiver  is  the  right  arm  of  the  jurisdiction 
invoked.  As  regards  the  statutes,  we  see  no  reason  why  a  court 
of  equity,  in  the  exercise  of  its  undoubted   authority,  may  not 

25  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Texas  &  P.  so  Compare  Montross  v.  Mabie,  30  Fed. 

Ry.  Co.,  33  Fed.  R.  701  ;   s.  c.  Blaener  R.  234;  with  Curran  v.  Craig,  22  Fed.  R. 

Intervenor,  41  Fed.  R.  319.  101. 

-''  Jackson  v.  Jackson,  2  Hogan,  2-38.  3'  McCulloh   v.   Association   Ilorlgerie 

27  DanicU's  Cli.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1989.  Suisse,  45  Fed.  R.  479. 

•-5  Kerr  on  Receivers  (2d  Am.  ed.),210,  §  24G.     i  Davis  v.  Gray,  16  Wall.  203, 

211.  219,  220;    Cowdrey  v.  Railroad    Co,  1 

-•*  Dancer  r.  Hastings,  4  Bingliain,  2  ;  Woods,  331,  336. 
Kerr  on  Receivers  (2d  Am.  ed.),  211. 


§  246.]  POWERS   OF   RECEIVERS  OF   RAILROADS.  421 

accomplish  all  the  best  results  intended  to  be  secured  by  such 
legislation,  without  its  aid."^  xVnd  in  a  carefully  considered  opin- 
ion, Mr.  Justice  Bradley  said  :  '*  It  may  be  laid  down  as  a  general 
proposition,  that  all  outlays  made  by  the  receiver  in  good  faith,  in 
the  ordinary  course,  with  a  view  to  advance  and  promote  the  busi- 
ness of  the  road,  and  to  render  it  prolitable  and  successful,  are 
fairly  within  the  line  of  discretion  which  is  necessarily  allowed 
to  a  receiver  entrusted  with  the  management  and  operation  of  a 
railroad  in  his  hands.  His  duties,  and  the  discretion  with  which 
he  is  invested  are  very  different  from  those  of  a  passive  receiver, 
appointed  merely  to  collect  and  hold  moneys  due  on  prior  trans- 
actions, or  rents  accruing  from  houses  and  lands.  And  to  such 
outlays  in  ordinary  course  may  properly  be  referred,  not  only  the 
keeping  of  the  road,  buildings,  and  rolling  stock  in  repair,  but 
also  the  providing  of  such  additional  accommodations,  stock,  and 
instrumentalities  as  the  necessities  of  the  business  may  require, 
always  referring  to  the  court,  or  to  the  master  appointed  in  that 
behalf,  for  advice  and  authority  in  any  matter  of  importance, 
which  may  require  a  considcrble  outlay  of  money  in  lump  ;  and 
except  in  extraordinary  cases,  the  submission  by  the  receiver  of 
bis  accounts  to  the  master  at  frequent  intervals,  whereby  the 
latter  may  ascertain  from  time  to  time  the  character  of  the  ex- 
penditures made,  and  disallow  whatever  may  not  meet  with  his 
approval,  will  be  regarded  as  a  sufficient  reference  to  the  court 
for  its  ratification  of  the  receiver's  proceedings.  In  extraor- 
dinary cases,  involving  a  large  outlay  of  money,  the  receiver 
should  always  apply  to  the  court  in  advance  and  obtain  his  au- 
thority for  the  purchase  or  improvement  proposed."^  This  lan- 
guage has  been  thus  construed  in  a  case  in  a  State  court :  "  This 
rule,  it  will  be  observed,  simply  prescribes  what  expenditures, 
out  of  the  fund  in  his  hands  as  receiver,  the  court  will  recognize 
as  legitimate  and  proper  when  the  receiver  comes  to  account  for 
the  administration  of  his  trust,  but  nothing  here  said  gives  the 
slightest  support  to  the  notion  that  the  receiver  may,  in  virtue 
of  the  power  of  his  office,  make  a  contract,  without  the  authority 
of  the  court,  which  will  bind  the  trust,  or  which  the  court  will  be 
bound  to  recognize  without  regard  to  its  necessity  or  propriety. 
A  receiver  may,  undoubtedly,  appropriate  moneys  in  his  hands 

-  Mr.  Justice  Swayne  in  Davis  y.  Gray,  ^  Cowdrey  r.  Railroad  Co.,  1  Woods, 

10  Wall   203,  219,  220.  '       331,  336. 


422  KECEIVERS.  [chap.  XVII. 

belonging  to  the  trust,  to  such  purposes,  connected  with  the  trust, 
as  he  may  think  proper,  always  taking  the  risk  that  the  court 
will  finally  approve  his  action,  but  he  has  no  authority  to  bind 
the  trust  by  contract  without  the  authority  of  the  court.  Until 
his  contracts  are  approved  or  ratified  by  the  court,  the  court  is 
at  liberty  to  deal  with  them  as  to  it  shall  appear  to  be  just,  and 
may  either  modify  them  or  disregard  them  entirely.  This,  in  my 
judgment,  is  the  only  safe  rule  which  can  be  adopted."^  A  loan 
to  a  receiver  whom  the  court  has  not  authorized  to  borrow  money 
will  be  denied  priority.^  A  receiver  cannot  make  a  permanent 
traffic  agreement  without  the  authority  of  the  court.^  It  has  been 
held  that  the  court  has  power  to  authorize  the  receiver  of  a  rail- 
road company  under  proceedings  for  a  foreclosure,  to  ratify  a 
contract  previously  made  by  the  corporation  giving  a  telegraph 
company  certain  privileges  upon  its  road,  and  that  the  contract 
thus  ratified  will  be  binding  upon  juirchascrs  of  the  railroad  at 
a  foreclosure  sale.^  A  receiver  may  be  authorized  to  complete 
the  construction  of  a  line  of  railroad,  and  to  borrow  money  for 
that  purpose.^  A  receiver  of  a  railroad  may  be  authorized  to  pur- 
chase a  lien  upon  part  of  its  property,  and  to  assume  a  lease  of  a 
connecting  railway.^  The  rules  which  should  regulate  a  receiver- 
ship of  a  consolidated  railroad  holding  leased  lines  with  sepa- 
rate mortgages  upon  the  different  branches,  as  well  as  a  general 
mortgage  upon  the  whole  system,  have  been  recently  stated  and 
aj)plied  in  an  opinion  of  Judge  Brewer,  delivered  when  denying 
an  application  by  a  receiver  of  such  a  system  of  railroads  for 
leave  to  reject  such  leased  roads  as  were  unprofitable  :  "  This 
Wabash  road  is  composed  of  many  subdivisions.  While  it  is  a 
single  corporation  to-day,  yet  into  it  have  ])asscd  many  corpo- 
rations and  many  separate  railroad  proi)erties.  In  administering 
such  a  consolidated  property,  the  court  must  look  at,  not  merely 

4  VanFleet.V.C  .Chancellor  Kunyon,  Dill.  448.  See  also  Smith  r.  McCullough, 
concurrinfr,  Lehigh  Coal  &  Navigation  Co.  104  U.S.  2-5;  AUoii  v.  The  Dallas  & 
r.  Central  R.  R.  of  N.  J.,  85  N.  .T.  Eq.  426,     Wichita  R.  R.  Co  ,  3  Woods,  316. 

42'.).  To  a  similar  effect  is  Union  Trust  "  Farmers'  Loan  &  Trust  Co.  r.  Bur- 
Co.  V.  Til.  Midland  Ry.  Co..  117  U.  S.4S4.  lington  &  S.  AV.  Ry.  Co.,  32  Fed.  R.  805. 

5  Union  Trust  Co.  v.  111.  Midland  Ry.  See  also  Central  Trust  Co.  v.  Wabash, 
Co.,  117  U.  S.  434,  477.  St.  L.   &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Oilman  Invervenor, 

«  Investment  Co.   of  Phila.  r.  Oliio  &  31    Fed.   R.   259;    Central   Trust    Co.  v. 

N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  4  Fed.  R.  378.  Wahash,  St.  L.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  23  Fed.  R. 

■  W.  U.  Tel.  Co.  r.  Atlantic  &  Pacific  868  ;  Easton   v.  Huston  &  T.  C.  Ry.  Co., 

Tel.  Co.,  7  P>iss.  3tw.  38  Fed.   K.  784. 

8  Kennedy  c.  St.  I'aul  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  2 


§  246.]        POWERS  OF  RECEIVERS  OF  RAILROADS.  423 

the  intci'est  of  the  mortgagee  in  this  general  mortgage,  or  of  the 
mortgagor  as  a  single  entity  or  corporation,  but  also  the  separate 
and  sometimes  conflicting  interests  of  the  various  subdivisions 
and  their  respective  incumbrances,  and,  back  of  all  that,  the  duty 
which  every  railroad  corporation  owes  to  the  public.  For  under- 
lying the  rule  which  the  Supreme  Court  has  laid  down  in  respect 
to  the  payment,  by  receivers  when  they  take  possession  of  the 
railroad  property,  of  prior  unsecured  debts  recently  accrued,  runs 
the  thouglit,  as  expressed  by  the  Supreme  Court,  that  a  railroad 
corporation  owes  a  duty  to  the  public,  which  has  given  it  its  fran- 
chise and  enabled  it  to  construct  its  road,  —  the  duty  of  operating 
that  road  for  the  benefit  of  the  public.  While  that  may  not  be 
what  you  call  an  absolute  duty,  enforceable  under  all  circum- 
stances, it  is  still  a  duty  to  be  regarded  and  enforced  by  the 
courts  when  they  take  possession  of  railroads  through  their  offi- 
cers. And  that  duty  is  not  limited  to  the  operation  of  merely 
that  particular  fragment  of  a  road  which  is  pecuniarily  profitable 
in  its  operations,  but  it  extends  to  the  road  as  an  entirety,  and  to 
all  its  branches,  —  all  its  parts  ;  differing  in  that  particular  from 
the  duty  which  would  rest  upon  the  court  if  it  had  simply  taken 
possession  of  property  used  for  private  purposes,  manufacturing 
or  otherwise,  where  the  single  question  might  well  be  said  to  be 
one  of  pecuniary  profit.  This  Wabash  road,  as  a  system,  was  in 
operation,  a  going  concern,  from  one  end  to  the  other ;  as  such, 
discharging  its  duties  as  best  it  could  to  its  various  creditors. 
This  court,  at  the  instance  of  the  corporation,  and  to  preserve 
the  integrity  of  the  system,  took  possession  of  it  by  its  receivers. 
It  took  possession  of  it  as  a  going  concern,  and,  so  far  as  is  rea- 
sonable and  practicable,  it  should  continue  it  as  a  going  con- 
cern, until  it  surrenders  it  to  whoever  may  be  the  purchasers  or 
future  holders  of  it.  With  that  preface,  and  calling  these  sep- 
arate branches  which  have  passed  into  this  consolidated  road, 
subdivisions,  since  some  have  passed  in  by  way  of  lease  and 
others  by  way  of  consolidation,  subject  to  separate  mortgages, 
we  pass  orders  substantially  as  follows  :  The  first  is  one  which 
lias  already  been  entered,  and  we  simply  emphasize  it  by  repeat- 
ing it,  that  subdivisional  accounts  must  be  kept  separately.  That 
was  an  order  passed  by  Brother  Treat  at  the  very  outset  of  this 
receivership,  in  order  that  the  particular  equities  of  each  one 
of  these  divisions,  as  between  themselves,  might  be  ascertained. 


424  RECEIVEES.  [chap.  XVII. 

2.  Where  any  subdivision  earns  a  surplus  over  expenses,  the 
rental  or  subdivisional  interest  will  be  paid  to  the  extent  of 
the  surplus,  and  only  to  the  extent  of  the  surplus.  Any  part 
diversion  of  such  surplus  for  general  operating  expenses  will  be 
made  good  at  once,  and,  if  need  be,  by  the  issue  of  receiver's 
certificates.  ...  3.  Where  a  subdivision  earns  no  surplus,  — 
simply  pays  operating  expenses,  —  no  rental  or  subdivisional  in- 
terest will  be  paid.  If  the  lessor  or  the  subdivisional  mortgagee 
desires  possession  or  foreclosure,  he  may  })roceed  at  once  to  as- 
sert his  rights.  W^hile  the  court  will  continue  to  operate  such  sub- 
division until  some  application  be  made,  yet  the  right  of  a  lessor 
or  mortgagee  whose  rent  or  interest  is  unpaid  to  insist  upon  pos- 
session or  foreclosure  will  be  promptly  recognized.  That,  it  is 
true,  may  work  a  disruption  of  the  system,  as  evidenced  by  the 
movement  just  made  in  respect  to  this  Cairo  division  ;  but  the 
proceeding  for  disruption  will  come  from  tlie  subdivisions.  The 
court  is  not  sloughing  off  branches,  tearing  the  system  in  two  ; 
but  the  disruption,  if  it  comes,  will  come  from  those  who  seek 
separation,  and  have  a  legal  right  so  to  do.  4.  Where  a  sub- 
division not  only  earns  no  surplus,  but  fails  to  pay  operating 
expenses,  as  in  the  St.  Joseph  &  St.  Louis  branch,  the  operation 
of  the  subdivision  will  be  continued,  but  the  extent  of  that  oper- 
ation will  be  reduced  with  an  unsparing  though  a  discriminating 
hand ;  that  is,  if  a  subdivision  does  not  earn  operating  expenses, 
and  the  receivers  are  running  two  trains  a  day,  then  lop  one  of 
them  off.  If  they  are  running  one  train  a  day,  and  still  it  does 
not  pay,  then  run  one  train  in  two  days.  Wliile  the  court  will 
endeavor  to  keep  that  subdivision  in  operation,  it  will  make  the 
burden  of  it  to  the  consolidated  corporation,  and  to  all  the  other 
interests  put  into  that  consolidated  corporation,  a  minimum."  ^^ 
In  the  same  case,  Judge  Woods  subsequently  rejected  a  claim 
to  a  preference  over  the  mortgage  for  rents  accrued  pending  a 
receivership,  in  a  suit  in  wliich  the  mortgagee  had  been  denied 
the  extension  of  the  receivership  for  his  benefit. ^^  The  court 
may,  without  notice  to  the  mortgagee,  authorize  a  receiver  to 
acquire  by  lease  another  railroad. ^^ 

1'^  Brewer,  J.,  Treat,  J.,  concurring;  in  !•  Central  Trust  Co.  v.  Wabasli,  St.  L. 

Central  Trust  Co.  v.  Wabash,  St.  L.  &  P.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Swayne  Intervenor,  40  Fed. 

Ry.  Co.,  2:;  Fed.  R.  8G3,  805-857.     But  R.  26. 

see  s.  c.  Swayne  Intervenor,  40  Fed.  R.  ^-  Mercantile  Trust  Co.  r.  Missouri,  Iv. 

26.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  41  Fed.  R.  8,  II,  12. 


§  247.]  receivers'  certificates.  425 

§  247.  Receivers'  Certificates.  —  Where  it  is  absolutely  neces- 
sary to  raise  money  for  the  presers'ation  of  the  property  in  his 
hands,  a  receiver  may  be  empowered  by  the  court  to  issue  certi- 
ficates which  give  tlieir  owners  a  lien  upon  the  property  prior 
to  that  held  by  any  persons  except  those  wliose  claims  are  para- 
mount to  the  rights  of  the  parties  to  the  suit.^  Such  certificates 
are  usually  issued  only  in  suits  for  tlie  foreclosure  of  railroad 
or  telegraph  mortgages,  in  order  to  raise  money  for  repairs,  or  to 
defray  operating  expenses,^  or  to  discharge  claims  having  an 
equitable  preference  to  tliat  of  the  party  at  whose  instance  the 
receiver  was  appointed,^  or  to  restore  to  the  rightful  owners  so 
much  of  the  income  as  the  receiver  has  improperly  applied  to  the 
foregoing  purposes.^  In  a  few  cases,  receivers  have  been  author- 
ized thus  to  borrow  money  in  order  to  complete  the  construction 
of  railroads,  and  save  from  forfeiture  land  grants  and  municipal 
subscriptions.'^  Certificates  have  been  issued  to  pay  interest  upon 
a  divisional  mortgage  prior  to  that  to  foreclose  which  the  suit 
was  brought.*^  Where  the  net  earnings  of  a  railroad  are  sufficient 
to  defray  current  expenses,  the  court  will  not  authorize  the  issue 
of  receivers'  certificates  merely  for  the  sake  of  paying  interest 
upon  the  mortgage  under  foreclosure."  It  has  been  said  to  be 
doubtful  whether  the  court  has  the  power  to  authorize  a  receiver 
to  issue  car-trust  certificates  secured  by  a  lien  upon  the  cars 
which  arc  thus  bought,  and  payable  in  ten  annual  instalments.*^ 
An  order  authorizing  the  issue  of  receivers'  certificates  to  pay 
'•  wages  and  freights  due  and  to  become  due,"  does  not  authorize 


§  247.     1  Meyer  v.  Johnston,  53  Ala.  ingB..  R.  Co.,  7  Fed.  R.  377;  SkidJy  r. 

237 ;  Jerome  v.  McCarter,  94  U.  S.  7U  ;  Atlantic,  M.  &  O.  R.  R.   Co.,  8  Hughes, 

Wallace  v.  Loomis,  97  U.  S.  146 ;  :Milten-  320. 

berger  v.   Logansport  Ry.  Co.,  106  U.  S.  *  Central  Trust  Co.  r.  Wabash,  St.  L. 

286;  Stanton  v.  Ala.  &  Chattanooga  Ry.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  2o  Fed.  R.  803. 

Co.,  2  Woods.  .500;  s.  c.  31  Fed.  R.  585  ;  s  Kennedy  r.  St.  Paul  &  P.  R.  R.  Co., 

Kennedy  u-  St.  Paul  &  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  2  2  Dill.  448 ;    Miltenberger  v.   Logansport 

Dill.  448  ;  Hoover  v.  Montclair  &  Green-  Ry.  Co.,  106  U.  S.  286,  294, 205.     See  also 

wooil   Lake   R.    R.  Co  ,  29  N.  J.  Eq.  4  ;  Smith   v.  McCullough,  104  U.  S.  25,  29. 

Coe  V.  jSf.  J.  Midland  Ry.  Co.,  27  N  J.  But  see  Investment  Co.  v.  Ohio  &  N.  W. 

Eq.  37  ;  Union  Trust  Co.  v.  Illinois  Mid-  R.  Co.,  .30  Fed.  R.  48. 

land  Ry.  Co.,  117  U.  S.  434.  c  Skiddy  i:  Atlantic,  Miss.  &  O.  R.  R. 

2  Jerome   v.  McCarter,  94  U.  S.  734;  Co.,  0  Hughes,  320,  341. 

Wallace  i:  Loomis,  97  U.  S.  140  ;  Miiten-  ^  Taylor  r.  Phila.  &  Reading  R.  R.  Co., 

berger  v.  Logansport   Ry.  Co.,  106  U.   S.  9  Fed.  R.  1. 

286.  8  Taylor  v.  Phila.  &  Reading  R.  R.  Co., 

^  Miltenberger  v.  Logansport  Rj'.  Co.,  9  Fed.  R.  1. 
106  U.  S.  280 ;  Taylor  ?•'.  Pliila.  &  Head- 


426  EECEIVERS.  [chap.  XVII. 

the  issue  of  a  certificate  to  pay  money  advanced  to  pay  wages  by 
honoring  "  store  orders."  ^  The  power  of  courts  of  equity  to  issue 
receivers'  certificates  is  of  modei-n  origin,^*^  has  been  severely  criti- 
cised,^^ and  should  be  exercised  with  great  reluctance. ^^  A  judge 
who  had  never  authorized  the  issue  of  a  receiver's  certificate, 
said :  "  AVhen  the  road  cannot  be  kept  running  without  its  exer- 
cise, except  to  a  limited  extent,  the  safe  and  sound  practice  is  to 
discharge  the  receiver,  or  stop  running  the  road  and  speed  the 
fureclosure."  ^^  Without  leave  from  the  court,  a  receiver  has  no 
power  to  pledge  the  trust  estate,  nor  to  make  a  contract  for  a  loan 
of  money  which  will  bind  the  estate  ^*  or  even  the  proposed  lender.^^ 
An  order  for  the  issue  of  receivers'  certificates  is  usually  granted 
only  upon  notice  to  all  parties  in  interest.^*^  Those  who  have 
not  received  notice  may  move  to  set  aside  the  order  and  to  can- 
cel the  certificates,  if  they  act  as  soon  as  they  learn  what  was 
done.i"  A  very  short  delay  after  knowledge  that  such  an  order 
lias  been  granted  will  estop  a  party  from  objecting  to  the  validity 
of  certificates  issued  in  pursuance  of  it.^^  Receivers'  certificates 
are  assignal)le,  Init  not  negotiable. ^^  It  has  been  said  that  the 
power  to  issue  them  is  a  personal  one  which  the  receiver  cannot 
delegate.^*^  Where  a  receiver  issued  a  certificate  to  a  person 
named  therein  as  payee,  for  negotiation  and  sale,  and  the  latter 
never  paid  over  any  money  on  account  of  it ;  a  purchaser  of  the 


9  Fi.U'lity  Ins.  &  Safe  Deposit  Co.  v.  is  Smith  v.  McCullough,  104  U.  S.  25, 

Slienaml(>:!h  Iron  Co.,  42  Fed.  R.  372,  377.  29. 

1'  Meyer  r.  Jolinson,  53  Ala.  237;  Coe  i«  Ex  parte  Mitchell,  12  S.  C.  83.     But 

r.  N.  J.  Midland  My.  Co.,  27  N.  J.  Eq.  37  ;  see  Miltenbcrgcr  v.  Logansport  Ey.  Co., 

Hoover  v.   Montclair  &  Greenwood  Lake  106  U.  S.  286,  2!.)7,  29S. 

Ey.  Co.,  20  N.  J.  Eq.  4;  Jerome  v.  Mc-  ^^  Hervey  v.  111.  Midland  Ry.  Co.,  28 

Carter,  94  U.  S.  734  ;  Wallace  v.  Loomis,  Fed.  R.  IG'.K 

97  U.  S.  146.  1^  Miltenberger  v.  Logansport  Ry.  Co., 

11  Barton  v.  Barbour,  104  U.  S.   120,  100  U.  S.  286;    Union  Trust  Co.   v.  111. 

138;  Credit  Co.  of  London  i'.  Arkansas  Midland  Ry.  Co.,  117  U.  S.  434. 

Cent.  H.  R.  Co.,  15  Fed.  R.  40.  i"  Union  Trust  Co.  of  N.  Y.  v.  Chicago 

1-2  Wallace  v.  Loomis,  97   U.   S.    140,  &  Lake  Huron  R.  R.  Co.,  7  Fed.  R.   513; 

103;    Shaw   r.  Railroad   Co.,    100  U.   S.  Stanton  ;>.  Ala.  &  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  31  Fed.  R. 

005,   012;    Taylor   v.    Pliiia.    &    Reading  585 ;  Turner  r.  Peoria  &  Springfield  R.  R. 

R.  R.  Co.,  9  Fed.   R.   1;  Credit  Co.   of  Co.,  95  III.  131 ;  Stanton  r.  Ala.  &C.  R.  R. 

London  r.  Arkansas  Cent.  R.  U.  Co.,  15  Co.,  2  Woods,  506  ;  s.  c.  31  Fed.  R.  585: 

Fed.  R.  40.  Central  Nat.  Bank  v.  Hazard,  30  Fed.  R. 

-5  Caldwell,  J.,  in  Credit  Co.  of  London  484. 

r.  Arkansas  Cent.  K.  \l.  Co.,   15  Fed.   R.  -^  Union  Trust  Co.  of  N.  Y.  r.  Chicago 

4G,  49.  &  Lake  Huron  R.  R.  Co.,  7  Fed.  R.  513. 

n  Union  Trust  Co.  v.    111.  Midland  Ry. 
Co.,  117  U.  S.  434. 


§  248.]  ADVICE   TO   RECEIVEES.  427 

certificate  at  much  less  thau  par,  who  was  unable  to  prove  that 
the  person  from  whom  he  bought  it  had  paid  anything  therefor  to 
the  person  named  as  payee,  was  not  allowed  to  receive  anything 
from  the  receiver  on  account  of  the  same.'^^  The  purchaser  at  a 
judicial  sale  made  subject  to  the  payment  of  receivers'  certificates 
cannot  contest  their  validity .^^  A  receiver  is  personally  respon- 
sible for  a  fraudulent  statement  in  a  certificate  which  he  issues.-^ 
In  at  least  one  case,  the  court  ordered  the  receiver  to  execute 
a  mortgage  to  secure  the  receivers'  certificates.^^  But,  ordinarily, 
the  order  for  the  issue  of  the  certificates  provides  that  they  shall 
constitute  a  lien  upon  the  property  superior  to  all  prior  incum- 
brances, which  is  sufficient.-^  In  one  case  the  order  simply  stated 
that  the  certificates  should  be  payable  out  of  the  income  of  the 
property,  and  "  be  provided  for  by  this  court  in  its  final  order  in 
said  cause,  unless  paid  by  the  receiver  out  of  the  income  of  said 
road  as  aforesaid."  ^^  A  receiver  appointed  in  a  suit  for  the  fore- 
closure of  a  second  railroad  mortgage  may  be  authorized  to  issue 
certificates  constituting  a  prior  lien  to  that  of  the  first  mortgage, 
])rovided  the  mortgagor  is  in  default  as  to  that,  and  the  first  mort- 
gagee is  a  party  to  the  suit.-'  An  order  authorizing  the  issue  of 
receivers'  certificates  is  appealable  to  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  Statcs.^s 

§  248.  Advice  to  Receivers.  —  Receivers  may  apply  to  the 
court  for  instructions  and  advice,  both  generally  and  in  partic- 
ular cases. 1  "  The  value  of  such  advice  depends :  If  there  are 
parties  in  interest,  and  they  have  their  day  in  court,  the  advice 
may  be  decisive.  But  if  the  matter  is  ex  parte  the  value  of  the 
advice  depends  largely  upon  the  information  and  ability  of  the 
judge,  and  is  probably  binding  only  on  the  receivei-s,  for  the  judge 
may  change  his  mind  on  hearing  full  argument."  ^     It  has  been 

-1  Union  Trust  Co.  of  N.  Y.  v.  Clncago  26  Miltenberfjer  v.  Logansport  Tiy.  Co., 

&  Lake  Huron  R.  R.  Co.,  7  Fed.  R.  513.  lOG  U.  S.  286,  298. 

See  Stanton  v.   Ala.  &  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  31  -'^  Miltenberger  i'.  Logan.<;port,  Ry.  Co., 

Fed.  R    08.3  ;  s.  c.  2  Woods,  506.  106  U.  S.  286. 

"--  Central  Nat.  Bank  i».  Hazard,  .30  Fed.  '-*<  Farmers'  Loan  &  Trust   Co.    Peti- 

R.  484  ;  Central  Trust  Co.  v.  Slieffiold  &  tioner,  120  U.  S.  206. 

B  C.  &  I    Ry.  Co.,  44  Fed.  R.  526.  §  248.    1  Frank  r.  Denver  &  R.  G.  Ry. 

-3  Bank  of  Montreal  v.   Tliayer,  7  Fed.  Co.,  2o  Fed.   R.  757  ;    Ex  parte   Koelder, 

li.  622.  23  Fed.  R.  .529  :  Missouri   Pacific  Ry.  Co. 

-■'  Jerome  v.  McCarter,  94  U.  S.  734.  i'.  Texas  &  Pacific  Ry.   Co.,  31  Fed.  R. 

2j  poj.  .J   good  form  of  an  order  and  a  862. 

certifi(;:ite,  see  Kennedy  c.   St.  Paul  &  P.  2  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Texas  &  P. 

R.  R.  Co.,  2  Dill.  448.  Ry.  Co.,  31  Fed.  R.  862. 


428  RECEIVERS.  [chap.  XVII. 

said,  that  from  the  nature  of  things  the  court  cannot  determine 
how  many  trains  a  receiver  shall  run,^  or  select  his  employees,* 
although  it  may  regulate  his  treatment  of  them.^  The  court  has, 
however,  at  a  receiver's  request,  instructed  him  what  rates  to 
charge ;  *"  and  has  directed  him  not  to  ohey  so  much  of  a  State 
statute  as  forbade  a  less  cliarge  for  transport  over  that  part  of  a 
railroad  which  competed  with  transportation  by  water,  than  over 
other  })arts  of  the  same  length,  the  trafhc  upon  which  was  not 
affected  by  such  competition,  in  a  case  where  it  was  held  that 
the  charter  of  the  corporation  gave  it  a  contract  right  to  charge 
a  reasonable  rate,  and  that  the  statute  was  unconstitutional  ; 
where  the  petition  for  instructions  was  filed  a  month  before 
the- act  went  into  operation.'  When  a  railroad  was  in  the  hands 
of  a  receiver  appointed  in  a  suit  to  foreclose  a  mortgage,  the 
court  refused  to  entertain  a  petition  by  the  mortgagor  asking 
instructions  as  to  the  propriety  of  postponing  a  meeting  of  its 
stockholders,  and  permission  to  postpone  tlie  meeting.^ 

§  249.  Litigatioxi  by  Receivers.  —  The  Causes  of  action  which 
a  receiver  can  enforce  are  of  two  kinds,  —  those  which  belonged 
to  the  estate  of  which  he  has  charge  before  it  was  entrusted 
to  him,  and  those  which  have  accrued  since  his  appointment. 
As  has  been  said  before,  he  cannot  sue  upon  either  without  the 
leave  of  the  court  which  appointed  him.^  A  suit  upon  a  cause 
of  action  which  belonged  to  the  estate  before  his  appointment  is 
brought  in  the  name  of  the  legal  owner  of  the  estate;^  unless, 
as  is  not  uncommon,  the  order  authorizes  the  receiver  to  sue  in 
his  own  name.-'^  In  the  former  case,  the  person  whose  name 
is  used  is  indemnified  out  of  the  fund  for  all  costs  to  which  he 
is  thereby  made  liable.^  Receivers  of  corporations  are  usually 
authorized  to  sue  in  the  name  of  the  corporation.^     Costs  recov- 

3  Brewer,  J.,  Treat,  J.  conciirrinor,  in  Cases,   88  ;    Green   v.   Winter,   1   J.  Cii. 

Central  Trust  Co.  i-.  Wabash,  St.  L.  &  P.  (N.  Y.)  60. 
Ry.  Co.,  23  Fed.  R.  803,  867.  -  Dick  v.  Struthers,  25  Fed.   R.  103  ; 

*  Brewer,  ,J.,  in  Frank  v.  Denver  &  R.  Dick  v.  Oil- Well  Supply  Co.,  25  Fed.  R. 
G.  Ry.  Co.,  23  Fed.  R  757,  704.  105;  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1977, 

*  Frank  r.  Denver  &  R.  G.  Ry.  Co.,  23  1991. 

Fed.  R.  757,  704.  «  Davis   v.  Gray,   10  Wall.  203.     See 

e  Ex  parte  Koehler,  23  Fed.  R.  520.  Frankle  v.  Jackson,  30  Fed.  R.  398. 

*  Ex  parte  Koeliler,  23  Fed.  R.  529.  *  Daniell's  Cii.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1991. 
8  Taylor  v.  Phila.  &  Reading  R.  R.  Co.,  &  Frankle  v.  Jackson,  30  Fed.  R.  398  ; 

7  Fed.  \\.  381.  Davis  v.  Gray,  l(i  Wall.  203  ;    Ilarland  v. 

§249.  1  Wynne  c.  Lfird  Xi'whoroufrli,  Bankers' and  Mercliants' Tel.  Co.,  33  Fed. 
1  Yes.  Jr.  1G4;  s.  c.  3  Brown  Chancery     R.  199. 


§  249.]  LITIGATIOX   BY   KECEIVERS.  429 

ered  against  a  receiver  in  an  action  brouglit  Ity  him  m  his  official 
capacity,  are  entitled  upon  the  distribution  of  the  fund  to  a 
priority  over  claims  that  existed  against  it  before  the  receiver's 
appointment,^  In  the  conduct  of  litigation,  as  in  every  other  pro- 
ceeding by  him,  a  receiver  is  under  the  constant  supervision  of 
the  court."  He  is  not  bound  by  a  stipulation  which  is  not  ad- 
vantageous to  the  estate,  made  by  himself  or  his  counsel  without 
the  sanction  of  the  court.^  He  cannot  waive  a  defense,  whether 
technical  or  substantial.^  He  cannot  allow  a  set-off  not  au- 
thorized by  law.^*^  He  may  be  allowed  to  discontinue  without 
costs  an  action  honestly  but  erroneously  begun  by  him.^i  The 
rights  of  a  receiver  are  in  general  no  greater  than  those  of  the 
person  whose  estate  he  holds.^^  Thus,  a  receiver  of  an  insolvent 
corporation  appointed  in  a  creditor's  suit  cannot  "  enforce  a 
collateral  obligation  given  to  a  creditor  or  to  a  body  of  credi- 
tors by  a  third  person  for  the  payment  of  the  debts  of  the  insol- 
vent;"^^ for  example,  a  statutory  liability  of  stockholders  to 
creditors.^*  It  has,  however,  been  said :  "  It  is  the  settled  doc- 
trine that  the  receiver  of  an  insolvent  corporation  represents  not 
only  the  corpoi-ation  but  also  creditors  and  stockholders,  and  that 
in  his  character  as  trustee  for  the  latter,  he  may  disaffirm  and 
maintain  an  action  as  receiver  to  set  aside  illegal  or  fraudulent 
transfers  of  the  property  of  the  corporation  made  by  its  agents 
or  officers,  or  to  recover  its  funds  or  securities  invested  or  mis- 
applied." ^^  The  defendant  to  an  action  by  the  receiver  of  an 
insolvent's  estate  cannot  set  off  claims  against  the  insolvent 
which  have  been  assigned  to  him  since  the  application  for  the 

•J  Camp  V.  Receivers   of   the  Niagara  548;    Arnoux  v.  Steinbrenner,   1   Paige 

Bank,  2  Paige  (N.  Y.),  283;  Columbian  (N.Y.),  82 

Ins.  Co.  V.  Stevens,  .37  N.  Y.  536  ;  Locke  12  Jacobson  v.  Allen,  12  Fed.  R.  454, 457. 

V.  Covert,  42  Ilun  (49  N.  Y.  S.  C.  R  ),  But  see  Hart  v.  Barney  &  S.  Manuf.   Co., 

484.  7  Fed.  R.  543. 

7  Van  Dyck  v.  McQuade,  85  N.  Y.  616  ;  13  Wallace,  J.,  in  Jacobson  v.  Allen,  12 

McEvers  v.  Lawrence,  Hoff.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  Fed.  R.  454. 

175.  "  Jacobson  v.  Allen,  12  Fed.  R.  454. 

^  Van  Dyck  v.  McQuade,  85  N.  Y.  610.  ^^  Andrews,  J.,  in  Attorney-General  v. 

9  McEvers  v  Lawrence,  Hoffman  Ch.  Guardian  Mutual  Life  Ins.  Co.,  77  N.  Y. 

(N.  Y.)   172  ;  Keiley  v.  Dusenbury,  10  J.  272,  275.  See  also  Gillet  v.  Moody,  3  N.  Y. 

&  S.  (N.  Y.   Superior  Ct.)  288;  8.  c.  77  479,  488;  Talmage  v.  Pell,  7  N.  Y,  328; 

N.  Y.  597 ;  "Van  Dyck  I'.  McQuade,  85  N.  Whittlesey    v.   Delaney,  73   N.    Y.  671; 

Y.  616.  National  Trust  Co.  v.  Miller,  83  N.  J.  Eq. 

I''  Van  Dyck  v.  McQuade,  85  N.Y.  610.  155,  158  ;  Jacobson  v.  Allen,  12  Fed.  R. 

'1  St.   Jolm   V.    Denison,  9   How.   Pr.  454,  456. 
{N.  Y.)  343 ;  Reeder  v.  Seeiy,  4  Cowen, 


430  RECEIVERS.  [chap.  XVIL 

receiver's  appointment.^^  A  receiver  has  no  absolute  right  to  sue 
in  the  courts  of  a  sovereignty  foreign  to  tliat  from  which  he  holds 
his  authority.i^  He  may  sue  in  a  foreign  court  upon  a  judg- 
ment which  he  has  recovered  in  the  court  which  appointed 
hini.^^  By  comity  he  is  usually  allowed  to  sue  in  a  foreign 
court,^^  unless  by  so  doing  he  would  intej^fere  with  a  preference 
given  to  domestic  creditors  by  the  laws  or  pu])lic  policy  of  the 
State  wherein  he  brings  the  action.-'^  In  this  respect,  it  seems, 
that  a  court  of  the  State  within  which  a  Federal  court  is  held 
is  considered  as  foreign  to  the  latter,  at  least  when  sitting  in 
bankruptcy .21  A  substituted  trustee  can,  however,  sue  in  a 
foreign  jurisdiction,  even  though,  when  the  court  apj^ointed  him, 
it  I'equired  him  to  give  a  bond  and  to  account  to  itself  in  the 
same  manner  as  a  receiver.-^  It  has  been  said,  that  "  where 
property,  in  the  possession  of  a  third  person,  is  claimed  by  the 
receiver,  the  com})lainant  must  make  such  person  a  party  by 
amending  the  bill,  or  the  receiver  must  proceed  against  him 
by  suit  in  the  ordinary  way."  -^  Otherwise,  a  receiver  is  especi- 
ally favored  in  the  enforcement  of  causes  of  action  arising  after 
his  appointment.  He  can,  upon  motion  or  petition  in  the  suit 
wherein  he  is  appointed,  obtain  injunctions  to  prevent  disobedi- 
ence to  conti-acts  made  with  him,^*  or  prevent  interference  with 
property  in  his  possession,--^  whether  the  person  enjoined  is  a 
party  to  the  suit  or  not.  In  nearly  every  case  interference  with 
a  receiver  in  the  discharge  of  his  duties  is  a  contempt  of  court, 
even  when  no  injunction  expressly  forbidding  it  has  been  issued.^^ 

16  7,u-fi  Van  Allen,  37  Barb.  (N.y.)  225.  ham   v.   Luddington,    12    Blatchf.    237; 

231 ;  Van  Dyck  v   Qnade,  85  N.  Y.  GIO.  Olney  v.  Tanner,  10  Fed.  R.  101. 

"  Booth  v.  Clark,  17  How.   322  ;  Brig-  -i  Olney  v.  Tanner,  10  Fed.  K.  101.  But 

ham   I'.   Luddington,    12   Blatchf.    237  ;  see  Clianibers  v.  M'Dougal,  42  Fed.  R. 

Olney  v.  Tanner^  10  Fed.  R.  101  ;  Hazard  604,  696. 

r.  Durant,  19  Fed.  R.  471,  476  ;  Holmes  r.  -Glenn   v.    Soule,  22    Fed.   R.    417; 

Sherwood,  16  Fed.   R.  725  ;  s.  c.  3  Mc-  Holmes  v.  Sherwood,  16  Fed.  R.  725  ;  s.  c. 

Crary,  405.  3  McCrary,  405. 

18  Wilkinson  ?j.  Culver,  25  Fed.  R.  030.  -^  Mr.    Justice   Swayne    in    Davis   v. 

19  Ex  parte  Norwood,  3  Biss.  504  ;  Hunt  Gray,  16  Wall.  203,  218 ;  citing  Parker  v. 
V.  Jackson,  5  Blatclif.  340  ;  Cuykendall  v.  Browning,  8  Paige  (N.  Y.),  388  ;  Noe  v. 
Miles,  10  Fed.  R.  342;    Chambers  r.  M'-  Gibson,  7  Paige  (N.  Y.),  513. 

Dougal,  42   Fed.   R.  694,   696 ;    Hurd    v.  -*  Walton  v.  Johnson,  15    Simons.  352. 

Elizabeth,  41  N  J.  Law    (12  Vroom),  1  ;  ^5  Angel  i'.  Smith,  9  Ves.  335;  Kerr  on 

Bank  v.  McLeod,  38  Ohio   St.  174.      But  Receivers,  (2d   American  edition),    177- 

see  Booth  v.  Clark,  17  How.  322  ;  Holmes  181. 

V.  Sherwood,  10  Fed.  R.  725.  -'s  Thompson   v.    Scott,    4    Dill.   508.- 

•■^1  Booth  V.  Clark,   17  How.  322 ;  Brig-  Davis  i-.  Gray,  16  Wall  203,  218. 


§  250.]  DUTIES   OF   RECEIVERS.  431 

For  example,  striking  laborers  have  been  adjudged  guilty  of 
contempt  for  attempting  to  prevent  employ(^s  of  a  receiver  of 
a  railroad  from  working  for  him.^'  In  one  of  these  cases  it  was 
said :  "  If  the  testimony-  makes  it  clear  that  when  these  parties 
went  in  such  numbers,  and  conducted  themselves  in  such  a  way, 
that  while  they  simply  said, '  Please  get  off  this  engine,'  or  '  We 
want  you  to  get  off  this  engine,'  they  intended  to  overawe, — 
intended,  by  the  demonstrations  which  they  made,  to  impress 
upon  the  minds  of  the  engineers  and  train-men  that  personal 
prudence  compelled  them  to  leave,  —  why,  then  the  government 
has  made  out  its  case.  As  my  brother  Treat  said  in  a  similar 
case,^^  that  we  had  before  us  in  St.  Louis,  a  request,  under  these 
circumstances,  is  a  threat.  Every  sensible  man  knows  what  it 
means,  and  courts  are  bound  to  look  at  things  just  as  they  are, 
to  pass  upon  facts  just  as  they  are  developed,  to  treat  the  conduct 
of  men  just  as  it  is,  and  to  impute  to  them  that  intention  which 
their  acts  and  their  conduct  disclose  was  their  intention."  -^  And 
in  another  case  the  same  judge  said :  "  Now,  if  a  party  engaged 
in  a  lawful  undertaking  unintentionally  interferes  with  some  of 
the  officers  of  this  court,  and  obstructs  them  in  the  discharge  of 
their  duties,  this  court  is  not  tenacious  of  any  mere  prerogative, 
and  would  let  such  action  pass  almost  without  notice  ;  but  where 
parties  are  engaged  in  that  which  is  of  itself  unlawful,  in  doing 
that  which  they  have  no  right  to  do,  and  in  so  doing  obstruct 
the  officers  of  the  court  although  intending  no  contempt,  that  is 
a  very  different  thing."  ^^ 

It  lias  been  held  tliat  in  an  action  by  the  receiver  of  a  national 
banking  association  against  stockholders  or  debtors  of  the  bank, 
the  defendants  cannot  contest  the  validity  of  the  appointment  of 
the  receiver. 31 

§  250.  Duties  of  Receivers.  —  A  receiver  holds  the  property  of 
which  he  is  given  the  care  in  trust  for  all  persons  interested 
therein,  whether  parties  to  the  suit  or  not,i  provided  that  they 
do  not  claim  it  by  a  title  paramount  to  his  own.^     His  duties, 

27  Secor  V.  Toledo,  P.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  so  Brewer,  J.,  In  re  Doolittle,  23  Fed.  R. 

7  Biss.  613  i  King  v.  Ohio  &  M.  Ry.  Co.,  7  544,  547. 

Hiss.  529  ;  In  re  Doolittle,  28  Fed.  R.  544  ;  8i  Young  v.  Wempe,  46  Fed.  R.  3-54. 

United   States  v.  Kane,  23  Fed.  R.  748 ;  §  250.     i  Davis  v.  Grav,  16  Wall.  208, 

In  re  Higgins,  27  F.  R.  443.  217,  218;  Central  Trust   Co.  i-.   Wabasli, 

^s  In  re  Doolittle,  23  Fed.  R.  544,  548.  St.  L.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  28  Fed.  R.  863. 

-•'  Rrewer,  J  ,  in  United  States  c.  Kane,  -  Davis  v.  The  Duke  of  Marlborough, 

23  Fed.  R  748,751.  2   Swanst.   108.  118,    i:;7,   138;   Georgia 


432  KECEIVERS.  [chap,  XVII. 

therefore,  are  substantially  those  of  a  trustee,  although  his  pow- 
ers are  usually  more  limited ;  and  the  decisions  concerning  the 
duties  and  liabilities  of  trustees,  executors,  administrators,  and 
assignees  in  bankruptcy  and  insolvency- are  often  of  sei'vice  in 
determining  those  of  a  receiver.^  A  receiver's  first  duty  after 
his  appointment  is  to  take  possession  of  the  property  entrusted 
him  by  the  order,  using  all  the  powers  therein  given  him.*  If 
any  of  it  is  under  lease  he  should  notify  the  tenants  of  his  ap- 
pointment and  demand  that  they  attorn  to  him.°  It  seems  that 
as  soon  as  he  has  obtained  possession  of  all  the  estate  tliat  con- 
sists of  personal  property  he  should  make  an  inventory  thereof.^ 
"  Under  some  circumstances  a  receiver  would  be  derelict  in  duty, 
if  he  did  not  cause  property  in  his  hands  to  be  insured  against 
fire." "  xVll  moneys  that  he  receives  he  should  either  pay  into 
court  or  deposit  in  a  bank  to  the  credit  of  himself  as  receiver,  in 
a  separate  account  from  that  for  his  private  deposits.^  In  remit- 
ting money  from  one  place  to  another,  he  may  do  so  by  using  the 
ordinary  means,  provided  that  he  uses  due  care.^  He  will  be 
personally  liable  for  all  loss  to  the  estate  caused  by  his  making 
any  other  disposition  of  the  funds  collected  by  him.^^  It  is  ad- 
visable for  a  receiver  to  take  a  receipt  for  all  sums  of  money 
exceeding  twenty  dollars  paid  out  by  him.  By  so  doing,  and 
by  using  such  receipts  as  vouchers,  he  will  have  less  dilticulty 
in  passing  liis  accounts.^^  A  receiver  should  so  keep  the  estate 
in  his  hands  that  it  can  be  easily  traced,  delivered  up,  or  ac- 
counted for.^'-^  He  should,  at  least  as  often  as  once  a  year, 
account  and  pay  into  court  all  the  money  which  he  has  received, 
together  with  the  profits  thereof,  less  all  necessary  or   author- 


V.  Atlantic  &  Gulf  R.  R.  Co.,  3  Woods,  377 ;  Hinckley  v.  Railroad  Co.,  100  U.  S. 

434.  153,  157. 

'^  See,  for  example,  Commonwealth  v.  ^  Knight  ?;,  Lord  Plimoutli,  3  Atk.  480; 

Franklin  Ins.  Co.,  115  Mass.  278;  People  s.  c.  1  Dickens,  120. 

V.  National  Trust  Co.,  82  N.  Y.  283.  ^  Salway  v.  Salway,  4  Russ.  60;  s.  c. 

*  Daniell's  Cli.  Pr.   (2d  Am.  ed.)  1987.  2  R.  &  M.  215;  Rowth  v.  Howell,  3  Ves- 

5  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)   1987.  565. 

'S  Lewin  on  Trusts  (6th  ed.,  London,  "  Remsen  v.  Remsen,  2  J.  Ch.  (N.  Y.) 

1875),  184;  England  v.   Downs,  6  Beav.  495,  501. 

260.     See   also  Williamson  v.   Wilson,  1  ^'^  Williamson  v.  Wilson,  1  Bland  (Md.), 

Bland  (Md.),  418,  430.  18;  Hinckley  v.  Railroad  Co.,  100  U.  S. 

^  Thompson  y.  Phccnix  Insurance  Co.,  153,   157;     Attorney-General     v.    North 

136  U.  S.  287,  293,  prr  Mr.  Justice  Harlan.  American  Life  Ins.  Co.,  89  N.  Y.  94,  107, 

«  Salway  r.  Salway,  4  Huss.  60;  8.  C.  108. 
2  R.  &  M.  215;  Wren  v.  Kirton,  11  Ves. 


§  250.]  DUTIES   OF   RECEIVERS.  433 

ized  expenditures,  and  such  compensation  as  the  court  allows 
him.^^  If  he  receives  a  considerable  sum  of  money  during  tlie  in- 
terval between  the  regular  times  for  his  accounting,  it  seems  that 
he  should  apply  to  the  court  for  directions  concerning  its  invest- 
ment;^* and  in  general,  he  should  apply  for  instructions  when- 
ever any  unexpected  event  occurs  of  which  advantage  may  be 
taken  for  the  benefit  of  the  estate,  or  which  necessitates  active 
measures  to  preserve  the  estate  from  loss.^^  Any  profit  which 
he  may  make  from  the  estate  belongs  to  the  finally  successful 
party,  or  to  him  to  whom  the  surplus,  after  the  payment  of  prior 
demands,  is  finally  directed  to  be  paid.^^  And  if  he  uses  the 
property  over  which  he  has  been  appointed  in  his  private  busi- 
ness, he  must  pay  to  the  estate  for  its  use.^'  It  is  usually  con- 
sidered improper  for  a  receiver  to  retain  as  his  counsel  one  who 
has  previously  acted  in  the  suit  for  one  of  the  parties.^^  But  it 
is  proper  for  a  receiver  ap])ointcd  in  a  suit  brought  by  a  creditor 
for  the  satisfaction  of  his  own  dei)t  alone,  to  retain  the  attorney 
of  the  complainant. -9  In  one  case,  the  court  refused  to  allow  the 
receiver  to  retain  a  relative  who  had  previously  |)ractised  else- 
where, and  had  come  into  the  circuit  apparently  for  the  purpose 
of  acting  as  counsel  for  the  receiver.^''  A  receiver  of  a  railroad 
is  a  common  carrier,^^  and  is  guilty  of  impropriety,  for  which  he 
may  be  removed,  when  he  discriminates  between  different  persons 
who  use  the  railway.--  A  receiver  of  a  railway  may  be  obliged 
to  repay  such  sums  of  money  as  he  has  exacted  from  shippers  of 
freight  by  unlawful  discriminations  against  them.^^  A  receiver 
cannot  resign  without  the  permission  of  the  court  which  appointed 
him.-*     A  recent  statute  provides  "  that  whenever  in  any  cause 

13  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1992  ;        20  B|,,ir  v,  St.  Louis,  H.  &K.  R.  R.  Co., 

Sliaw  V.  Rhodes,  2  Russ.  539.    See  §  256.  20  Fed.  R.  348. 

1*  Shaw  V.  Rliodes,  2  Rnss.  539 ;  Hicks         ^^  Beers  r.    Wahasli,    St.    L  &  P.   Ry. 

r.  Hicks,  3    Atk.  274  ;    Earl  of  Londsale  Co.,  34  Fed.  R.  244. 
V.  Church,  3  Brown  Ch.  C.  41.  --  Handy  v.  Cleveland  &  M.  R.  R.  Co., 

15  Shaw  V.  Rhodes,  2  Russ  539;  Hicks  31  Fed.  R.  689.     See  Missouri   Pac.  Ry. 

r.   Hicks,  3   Atk.  274  ;  Earl  of  Lonsdale  Co.  r.  Texas  &  P.  My.  Co  ,  30  Fed.  R.  2; 

V  Cliureh,  3  Brown  Ch.  C.  41.  Cutting  v.  Florida  Ry.  &  Nav.  Co.  (,Mal- 

1^  Gibbs    V.  David,   L.  R.  20  Eq.  373.  lory  et  ol.,  Intervenors),  43  Fed.  R.  747. 
But  see  Whitesides  v.  Lafferty,  3  Humph.        -•'  Cutting  v.  Florida  Ry.  &  Nav.  Co. 

(Tenn.)  150.  (Mallory  et  al.  Intervenors),  43  Fed.  R. 

1"  Battaile  v.  Fisher,  36  Miss.  321.  747. 

18  Ryckman  r.  Parkins,  5  Paige  (N.  Y.),        -*  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed)  2002. 

543;  Blair  v.  St.  Louis,  H.  &  K.  R.  R.  Co.,  See  In  tlie  Matter  of  Jones,  4  Sandford's 

20Fed.  R.  348.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  G15. 

i«  Shainwald  v.  Lewis,  8  Fed.  R.  878. 
VOL.  I.  —  28 


434  EECEIVEKS.  [chap.  XVII. 

pending  in  any  court  of  the  United  States,  there  shall  be  a  re- 
ceiver or  manager  in  possession  of  any  property,  such  receiver  or 
manager  shall  manage  and  operate  such  property  according  to 
the  requirements  of  the  valid  laws  of  the  State  in  which  such 
property  shall  be  situated,  in  the  same  manner  that  the  owner 
or  possessor  thereof  would  be  bound  to  do  if  in  possession  thereof. 
Any  receiver  or  manager  who  shall  wilfully  violate  the  provisions 
of  this  section  shall  be  deemed  guilty  of  a  misdemeanor,  and  shall 
on  conviction  thereof  be  punished  by  a  fine  not  exceeding  three 
thousand  dollars,  or  by  imprisonment  not  exceeding  one  year,  or 
by  both  said  punishments,  in  the  discretion  of  the  court."  -^ 

§  251.  Liability  of  a  Receiver.  —  The  liabilities  of  a  receiver  are, 
in  many  respects,  analogous  to  those  of  a  trustee.  He  is  liable 
to  all  persons  interested  in  the  estate  in  his  hands  for  any  dam- 
age resulting  to  them  from  any  breach  of  duty  by  him,  whether 
intentionally  ^  or  through  negligence.^  He  is,  however,  free  from 
liability  to  the  parties  to  the  suit  on  account  of  any  act  per- 
formed in  obedience  to  an  order  of  the  court  within  its  juris- 
diction, and  not  obtained  by  fraud,  until  the  same  has  been 
vacated  upon  appeal  or  otherwise.^  A  receiver's  liability  to 
strangers  is  much  more  limited  than  that  of  a  trustee.*  He  is 
not  liable  personally  upon  a  covenant  entered  into  in  his  official 
capacity  with  the  sanction  of  tlie  court.^  A  few  cases  seem, 
however,  to  imply  that  by  retaining  the  possession  for  the  use  of 
the  estate  of  property  held  under  a  lease,  he  would  become  per- 
sonally liable  for  the  rent,  where  he  had  made  no  agreement 
to  retain  possession  of  the  premises  under  the  authority  of  the 
court.*^  A  receiver,  even  when  acting  as  a  common  carrier,  is 
not  liable  personally  for  injuries  caused  by  the  negligence  of  his 

25  25  St.  at  L.  ch.  866,  §  2,  p.  4oG ;   24  «  Commonwealth  v.  Franklin  Ins  Co., 

St.  at  L.  cl).  .37:3,  §  2,  p.  554.  115  Mass.  278  ;  People  v.  National  Trust 

§251.  1  Knitrli't  r.  Lord   Plimoiith,  3  Co.,  82  N.  Y.  283;    People  ;•.  Universal 

Atk.  480,  481 ;  Kaiser  v.  Kellar,  21  Iowa,  Life  Ins.  Co.,  .30  Hun  (37  N.  Y.  S.  C.  K.), 

95,   07 ;    Koontz   v.   Nortliern   Bank,   16  142.     But  see  Central  Trust  Co.  r.  Wa- 

Wall.  100,  202,  203.  basli,  St.  L.  &  P.  lly.  Co.,  34  Fed.  K.  259, 

2  Skerrctt's  Minors,  2  Hog.  192.  269;  .s.  c.46  Fed.  R.  26;  Brown  i\  Toledo, 

8  Holcombe  v.  Jolinson,  27  Minn.  3-53.  P.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  35  Fed.  R.  444;  Easton 

4  See  Taylor  v.  Davis,  110  U.  S.  330,  v.  Houston  &  T.  C.  Ry.  Co  ,  38  Fed.  R. 

335.  784 ;  Farmers'  L.  &  Tr.  Co.  v.  Chicago 

6  Livingston  v.  Pettigrew,  7  Lansing  &  A.  Ry.  Co.,  42  Fed.  R.  6;  s.  c.  44  Fed. 

(N.  Y.),  405;  Newman  v.  Davenport,  9  R.  053;  Kneeland  i-.  American  Loan  & 

Baxter  (Tenn.),  538;  Taylor  c.  Davis,  110  Trust  Co.,  136  U.  S.  89;  supra,  §  243, 

U.  S.  330,  335,  Central  Tru.st  Co.  r.  Wa-  p.  457,  note  37. 

bash,  St.  L.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  34  Fed.  R.  259. 


§  251.]  LIABILITY   OF  A   RECEIVER.  435 

employees,  when  lie  exercised  rcasoiialjle  care  in  their  selection^ 
The  only  remedy  of  the  person  thus  aggrieved  is  by  an  action 
against  the  receiver  in  his  oflicial  capacity,  seeking  satisfaction 
out  of  the  estate.®  When  the  receiver  has  been  discharged  and 
the  estate  sold,  or  returned  to  its  owner,  he  has  no  remedy  ex- 
cept against  the  employee,  unless  one  has  been  preserved  for  him 
by  the  court  ;'-^  for  the  owner  of  the  property  is  not  liable  for  the 
negligence  of  the  receiver's  employees.^^  For  this  reason  it  is 
customary  to  insert  in  the  order  for  the  sale  in  bulk  of  prop- 
erty in  the  possession  of  a  receiver,  that  the  purchaser  shall  take 
it  subject  to  all  claims  for  injuries  caused  while  it  was  managed 
by  the  recciver.^^  Such  a  provision,  although  not  mentioned  in 
the  order  for  the  sale,  may  be  inserted  as  a  condition  in  the 
order  confirming  the  sale,  and  the  purchaser,  after  taking  posses- 
sion under  the  latter  order,  is  estoj)ped  from  disputing  the  valid- 
ity of  the  condition.^-  Such  claims  are  usually  enforced  in  the 
suit  in  which  the  receiver  was  appointed.^^  By  the  former  prac- 
tice, following  the  old  chancery  rule,  a  receiver  could  not  be  sued 
without  the  permission  of  the  court  that  appointed  him.^^  Such 
an  order  was  revocable,  and  might  have  been  conditional. ^^  '-The 
leave  to  bring  suit  in  any  form  reserves  the  right  to  the  receiver 
to  set  up  any  defense  he  may  have,  which  can  be  done  by  plea, 
answer,  or  demurrer."  ^'^  The  court  might  direct  that  service  of 
process  be  made  upon  the  resident  agent  of  a  non-resident  rc- 
ceiver.i'^  A  recent  statute  changes  the  practice  as  follows  :  "  Every 
receiver  or  manager  of  any  property  appointed  by  any  court  of 
the  United  States  may  be  sued  in  respect  of  any  act  or  transac- 

7  Kennedy  i-.  I.  C.  &  L.  R.  Co.,  3  Fed.  "  Farmers's  L    &    Tr.   Co.  v.  Central 

R.  97;   Union  Trust  Co.  v.  Chicago  &  L.  R.  R.  of  Iowa,  2  McCrary,  181;  .s.  c.  7 

H.  Ry.  Co.,  7  Fed.  R.  513,  516  ;  Davis  v.  Fed.  R.  5.S7  ;  s.  c.  subsequently  considered, 

Duncan,  19  Fed.  R.  477;  Farmers'  L   &  17  Fed.  R.  758. 

Tr.    Co.   V.    Central    Railroad    of    Iowa,  i-  Farmers'  L.   &   Tr.    Co.    r.   Central 

2  McCrary,   181;    s.   c.    7    Fed.   R.  5.37.  R.  R.  of  Iowa,  17  Fed.  R.  758. 

See,  however,  Kain  i-.   Smith,  80  N.  Y.  '3  Farmers'   L.   &   Tr.  Co.  v.  Central 

458.  R.  R.  of  Iowa,  17  Fed.  R.  758. 

s  Kennedy  r.  I.  C.  &  L.  R.  Co.,  3  Fed.  '<  Barton  i:  Barbour,  104  U.  S.  FJC. 

R.  97;  Farmers'  L.  &  Tr.  Co.  ?;.  Central  i5  Central  Trust  Co.  r.  Wabash,  St.  L. 

R.  R.  of  Iowa,  2  McCrary,  181 ;  s.  c.  7  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  20  Fed.  R.  74. 

Fed.  R.  537;  Union  Trust  Co.  ;•.  C.  cS:  L.  i«  Davis  v.  Duncan,   19   Fed.  R.  477, 

H.  Ry.  Co.,  7  Fed.  R.  518,  510.  48.!.     See  also  Jordan  v.  Wells,  3  Woods, 

^  Davis  V.  Duncan,   10  Fed.   R.  477  ;  527. 

White  V.  Keokuk  &   1).  M.   Uy.   Co.,  52  i"  Central  Trust  Co.  v.  St.  Louis  A.  & 

Iowa,  97.  T.  Ry.  Co.,  40  Fed.  R.  420. 
^^  Davis  V.  Duncan,  19  Fed.  R.  477. 


436  KECEivEES.  [chap.  xvn. 

tion  of  IjIs  in  carrying  oit  tlie  business  connected  with  such  prop- 
erty, without  the  previous  leave  of  the  court  in  which  such  receiver 
or  manager  was  appointed;  but  such  suit  shall  be  subject  to  the 
general  equity  jurisdiction  of  the  court  in  which  such  receiver  or 
manager  was  appointed,  so  far  as  the  same  shall  be  necessary  to 
the  ends  of  justice."  ^^  In  a  recent  case,  Judge  Caldwell  thus 
construed  this  statute :  "  This  court  will  not  entertain  the  sugges- 
tion that  its  receiver  will  not  obtain  justice  in  the  .State  courts. 
The  act  of  Congress  gives  the  right  to  sue  the  receiver  in  the 
State  court.  Trust  Co.  v.  Railway  Co.,  40  Fed.  R.  426.  The  State 
court  has  jurisdiction  of  the  parties  and  the  subject-matter,  and 
its  judgment  against  the  receiver  of  this  court  is  as  final  and 
conclusive  as  it  is  against  any  other  suitor.  The  right  to  sue 
the  receiver  in  the  State  court  would  be  of  little  utility,  if  its 
judgment  could  be  annulled  or  modified  at  the  discretion  of  this 
court.  It  is  open  to  the  receiver  to  correct  the  errors  of  the 
inferior  courts  of  the  State  by  an  appeal  to  the  Supreme  Court. 
But  this  court  is  not  invested  with  appellate  or  su])ervisory  juris- 
diction ovei'  the  State  courts,  and  cannot  annul,  vacate,  or  modify 
their  judgments.  Randall  v.  Howard,  2  Black,  585 ;  Nougue  v. 
Clajjp,  101  U.  S.  551.  It  is  true  the  act  of  Congress  provides 
that,  when  the  receiver  is  sued,  the  '  suit  shall  be  subject  to  the 
general  equity  jurisdiction  of  the  court  in  whicli  such  receiver  or 
manager  was  appointed,  so  far  as  the  same  shall  be  necessaiy  to 
the  ends  of  justice.'  This  clause  of  the  act  establishes  no  new 
rule,  but  is  merely  declaratory  of  the  previously  existing  law. 
The  receiver  holds  the  property  for  the  benefit  of  all  persons  hav- 
ing any  interest  in  or  lien  upon  it.  The  road  is  a  unit.  Broken 
into  parts,  or  deprived  of  its  rolling  stock,  its  value  would  be 
greatly  impaired.  Suits,  therefore,  which  seek  to  deprive  the 
receiver  of  tlie  possession  of  the  property,  and  all  process  the 
execution  of  which  would  have  that  effect,  are  subject  to  the  con- 
trol of  the  court  appointing  the  receiver,  so  far  as  may  be  neces- 
sary to  the  ends  of  justice.  The  marshalling  of  the  assets,  and  the 
orderly  distribution  of  the  fund  or  property  according  to  the  rights 
and  equities  of  the  several  parties  in  interest,  is  not  to  be  inter- 
fered with  by  the  judgment  or  process  of  the  State  court.     The 

18  25  St.  at  L.  ch.  866,  §  3,  p.  436;  24  tin,  480;  ATissnuri  Pac.  ■Ry.  Co.  r.  Texas 
St.  at  L.  ch.  373,  §  3,  p.  554.  See  Croy  V-.n-.  My.  Co  (Sullivan  intervenor),  41 
r.  Marshall,  21  Ohio  Weekly  Law  BuUe-     Fed.  K.  310,  314. 


§  25  L]  LIABILITY   OF   A    RECEIVER.  437 

judgment  of  tlie  State  court  is  conclusive  as  to  the  amount  of  the 
debt,  but  the  time  and  mode  of  its  payment  must  be  controlled 
by  the  court  appointing  the  receiver.  The  receiver  should  have 
the  right  to  appeal  from  the  judgments  of  the  State  courts.  Ap- 
peals should  not  be  taken  for  delav,  but  that  justice  may  be  done. 
When  the  receiver,  in  good  faith,  takes  an  appeal,  he  should  not 
be  required  by  this  court  to  execute  a  siqyersedeas  bond.  The 
receiver  is  an  officer  of  the  court.  His  possession  of  tlie  property 
is  the  {possession  of  the  court.  The  property  of  the  railroad 
stands  as  security  for  all  the  obligations  of  the  court  incurred  in 
its  operation.  The  receiver,  no  more  than  the  judge  of  the  court, 
should  be  required  to  become  personally  bound  as  a  condition  of 
his  appealing,  in  good  faith,  from  the  judgment  of  a  State  court 
rendered  against  him  in  his  official  capacity.  The  coui-t  will  not 
part  with  the  possession  of  the  property  until  the  obligations 
incurred  by  the  receiver  are  paid,  or  proper  provision  is  made 
to  secure  their  payment.  I>ow  v.  Railroad  Co.^  20  Fed.  R.  265, 
269.  The  objection  of  plaintiff's  counsel  to  the  clause  of  the 
order,  as  originally  drawn,  which  required  the  receiver  to  execute 
siqyersedeas  bonds  in  cases  which  he  appealed,  is  sustained,  and 
that  clause  will  be  stricken  out."  ^^  In  another  recent  case  Judge 
Hammond  said,  when  charging  a  jury  :  '•  This  is  what  we  call  an 
*  issue  out  of  chancery,'  and  comes  to  us  from  the  equity  side  of 
this  court,  in  pursuance  of  a  practice  that  submits  to  a  jury  in  a 
court  of  law  questions  of  fact  that  ordinarily,  and  but  for  the 
fact  that  the  equity  court  is  proceeding  to  exercise  its  jurisdiction 
in  the  premises,  would  be  cognizable  in  a  court  of  law.  It  has 
always  been  my  judgment  that  a  jury  should  pass  upon  such  ques- 
tions as  these,  and,  while  it  must  be  conceded  that  the  court  of 
equity  has  the  power,  without  a  violation  of  the  constitutional 
right  of  trial  by  jury,  to  try  tlicm  in  its  own  way,  by  the  chancel- 
lor, or  through  a  reference  to  a  master,  yet  it  is  the  practice  of 
those  courts  to  submit,  upon  api)lication  of  the  parties,  those 
questions  of  fact  peculiarly  cognizable  in  a  court  of  law  to  that 
court  for  trial ;  and  this  out  of  deference  to  the  sensibilities  of  our 
race  of  people  against  the  impnirment  of  their  cherished  institu- 
tion of  ti'ial  by  jury,  which  in  these  States  we  sought  to  preserve 
by  constitutional  provisions,  none  of  which  are  so  sedulous  to 
preserve  it  as  the  Federal  constitution  itself.  Courts  of  equity 
J^  Central  Trust  Co.  v.  St.  Louis,  A  &  T.  Ky.  Co.,  41  Fed.  R.  5-51,  555-5.JG. 


438  RECEIVEKS.  [chap.  XTII. 

accomplish  their  purpose  of  yielding  to  the  parties  this  preference 
for  a  trial  by  jury,  either  by  permitting  them,  in  proper  cases,  to 
proceed  against  their  receivers  by  a  regular  suit  at  law,  or  by  the 
method  adopted  in  this  case,  of  sending  to  the  court  of  law  issues 
of  fact  to  be  tried  by  the  jury ;  and,  it  having  seemed  to  this 
court,  sitting  in  equity  in  this  case,  that  recent  legislation  by 
Congress  is  a  manifestation  of  its  legislative  will  that  this  prefer- 
ence for  trial  by  jury  shall  be  acknowledged  and  favored  by  the 
courts  of  equity,  if  not  a  rebuke  to  them  for  the  practice  of  deny- 
ing it  in  the  exercise  of  their  power  to  refer  them  to  a  master  in 
equity,  these  issues  have  been  certified  to  us  for  trial."  ^^  In  a 
later  case,  Judge  Pardee  said  :  "  The  third  section  of  the  act  of 
1887,  quoted  above,  in  terms  provides  that  the  suit  so  instituted 
in  another  court  shall  be  subject  to  the  general  equity  jurisdiction 
of  the  court  in  which  the  receiver  is  appointed,  so  far  as  the  same 
shall  be  necessary  to  the  ends  of  justice.  The  better  opinion  of 
the  effect  of  said  section  is  that  it  merely  dispenses  with  leave  of 
the  court  a|)pointing  the  receiver,  as  a  ])rerequisite  to  instituting 
a  suit  against  him  in  another  court,  and  tliat  a  suit  brought  there- 
under has  the  same  status,  and  a  judgment  rendered  therein  has 
the  same  effect,  as  if  permission  to  sue  had  been  regularly  granted 
by  the  court  a])pointing  the  receiver.  However  this  may  be,  it  is 
clear  tliat  when  a  judgment  is  so  obtained,  and  is  brought  to  the 
court  of  original  jurisdiction  to  be  i-anked  as  a  lien  upon  the  trust 
funds,  such  judgment  is  sul)ject  to  the  general  equity  jurisdiction, 
and  the  duty  of  determining  the  rightfulness  of  the  judgment, 
including  whether  the  amount  is  just,  is  still  imposed  upon  this 
court,  as  it  would  be  if  it  had  ordered  an  issue  tried  at  law ;  for 
this  com"t  must  still,  in  the  language  of  the  statute,  exercise  a 
'general  equity  jurisdiction,  so  far  as  the  same  shall  be  necessary 
to  the  ends  of  justice.'  In  the  present  case,  the  proceedings  ])e- 
fore  the  master  show  tliat  intervcnor  offered  evidence,  in  addi- 
tion to  that  contained  in  the  recoi-d  from  the  State  court,  tending 
to  show  the  fact  of  injury,  and  the  extent  of  damages,  thereby 
waiving  any  right  intervener  may  have  had  to  claim  that  his 
judgment  was  conclusive  upon  the  question  of  negligence  and 
damages.  For  these  reasons,  I  am  of  the  opinion  that  in  the 
present  intervention  the  court  may  inquire  as  to  whether  or  not 
the  intervener  has  a  lien,  and,  if  so,  the  rank  and  amount  thereof, 

s''  Alkiii  V.  Wabash  Uy.  Company,  41  Fed.  R.  193,  194. 


§  251.]  LIABILITY    OF   A   EECEIVER.  439 

and  that  in  such  inquiry  the  court  is  not  concluded  in  any  way 
by  the  verdict  and  judg-nient  ])roduced  from  the  district  court  of 
IJarrison  County,  Tex."  -^  The  latest  decision  on  this  statute  was 
bv  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  as  follows  :  "  It  was 
not  intended  by  the  word  'his'  to  limit  the  right  to  sue  to  cases 
where  the  cause  of  action  arose  from  the  conduct  of  the  receiver 
himself  or  his  agents,  but  that  with  respect  to  the  question  of 
liability,  he  stands  in  place  of  the  corporation.  His  position  is 
somewhat  analogous  to  that  of  a  corporation  sole,  with  respect  to 
which  it  is  held  by  the  authorities  that  actions  will  lie,  by  and 
against  the  actual  incumbents  of  such  corporations,  for  causes 
of  action  accruing  under  their  predecessors  in  office."  ^^  Accord- 
ingly, it  was  held  that  the  act  applied  to  suits  against  a  receiver 
for  liabilities  incurred  l)y  his  predecessor  in  office.^^  A  judgment 
in  a  suit  thus  i)rnsccuted  can  only  be  collected  out  of  the  property 
in  the  hands  of  the  receiver  in  his  official  capacity. ^^  A  receiver 
is  personally  liable  to  strangers  for  trespass,^'*  .fraud,^°  or  other 
wilful  act,  although  ])erformed  under  color  of  his  office.  So,  if 
he  by  mistake,  though  honestly,  takes  j)OSsession  of  the  property 
of  another,  he  is  personally  liable.^*"  The  fact  that  he  does  so 
under  authority  of  an  order  of  the  court  will  not  justify  him  as 
against  a  person  who  was  not  a  party  to  the  suit  or  proceeding  in 
which  the  order  was  granted.^'  In  all  of  such  cases  it  seems  that 
he  can,  independently  of  the  statute,  be  sued  without  leave  of  the 
court  which  appointed  him.^^  But  when  a  receiver  of  a  State 
court  was  sued  in  a  Federal  court  for  an  infringement  of  a  pat- 
ent, in  obedience  to  an  order  of  the  State  court  the  Federal  court 
stayed  its  proceedings,  to  allow  time  for  an  application  to  the 
State  court  to  modify  its  order.-^  A  person  who,  without  having 
been  lawfully  appointed,  assumes  to  act  as  a  receiver,  has  all  the 

21  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  i:  Texas  Pac.  '^'^  Bank  of  Montreal  v.  Tliayer,  7  Fed. 

Ry.  Co.,  Sullivan  intervener,  41  Fed.  R.  R.  622. 

311,  ;n4,  per  Pardee,  J.  20  Barton  v.  Barbour,   104  U.  S.  126, 

"  McNulta  V.  Locliridge,  12  S.  C.  Rep.  134  ;  Curran  v.  Craig,  22  Fed.  R.  101. 

11 ;  142  U.  S.  1,  per  Mr.  Justice  Brown.  2"  Curran  r.  Craisr,  22  Fe.l.  R.  101. 

23  Farmers'L.&Tr.  Co.  r.  Central  R.R.  28  Barton   v.   Barl.our,   104   U.  S.  126, 

of  Iowa,  2  McCrary,  181;  s.  c.  7  Fed.  R.  134;  In  re  Young,  7  Fed.  R.  8.55;  Bank 

637  ;  Barton  v.  Barbour,  104  U.  S.  126 ;  of  Montreal   v.   Thayer,   7  Fed.  R.  622  ; 

Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Texas  Pac.  Ry.  Curran  v.  Craig,  22  Fed.  R.  101.     But  see 

Co.  (Sullivan  intervenor),  41  Fed.  R.  310.  Aston  v.  Heron,  2  Myl.  &  K.  390  ;  Chalie 

21  /;*  re  Young,  7  Fed.  R.  855 ;  Olney  v.  Pickering,  1  Keen,  749. 

V.   Tanner,   10   Fed.   R.   101  ;  Barton   v.  29  Curran  v.  Craig,  22  Fed.  R.  101. 
Barbour,  104  U.  S.  126,  134. 


440  KECEIVEKS.  [chap.  XVII. 

liabilities  of  one  duly  appointed.^^  Where  a  statute  imposed  a 
penalty  for  a  failure  to  alter  a  railroad  bridge  after  notice  by  the 
Secretary  of  War,  and  such  notice  had  been  served  upon  a  rail- 
way company  over  which  a  receiver  was  subsequently  appointed, 
but  no  notice  was  served  upon  the  receiver,  it  was  held  that 
neither  the  railway  company  nor  the  receiver  was  liable  to  the 
penalty,  —  the  proper  remedy  having  been  for  the  Secretary  of 
War  to  bring  to  the  attention  of  the  court  the  facts,  and  request 
the  court  to  order  an  alteration  of  the  bridge  out  of  the  funds  in 
the  receiver's  hands.^^  It  has  been  held  that  an  action  will  not 
lie  against  a  receiver  for  a  personal  injury  sustained  before  his 
appointment.^^  The  discharge  of  a  receiver  until  revoked  relieves 
him  from  all  liability  to  those  who  had  an  opportunity  to  be  heard 
upon  the  motion  for  his  discharge.^^ 

§  252.  Manner  of  applying  for  the  Appointment  of  a  Receiver.  — 
It  has  been  said  that  a  court  has  no  jurisdiction  to  appoint  a 
receiver,  unless  a  cause  is  pending ;  ^  and  that,  therefore,  one  will 
never  be  appointed  upon  petition  ^  when  no  suit  has  been  begun, 
except  in  the  case  of  lunatics.^  The  grounds  of  the  exception 
and  the  reasons  why  it  docs  not  extend  to  infants  *  are  not  very 
clear.  After  a  suit  has  been  begun,  however,  a  receiver  may  be 
appointed  at  any  stage  of  it  when  a  necessity  is  shown,  —  before 
appearance,'^  between  appearance  and  answer,*^  between  answer  and 
decree,'  at  the  decree,^  or  afterwards,  if  the  cause  is  still  open.^ 
But  a  case  of  pressing  necessity  must  exist  to  justify  the  appoint- 
ment of  a  receiver  before  answer.^*'  An  objection  to  the  bill  on 
account  of  multifariousness  or  a  misjoinder  of  parties  will  not 
prevent  the  a[)pointmcnt  of  a  receiver;  nor  will  the  pendency  of 

3^  Wood  V.  Wood,  4  Riiss.  558.  *  Ex  parte  Wliitfiold,  2  Atk.  315. 

31  United  States  r.  St.  Louis.  A.  &  T.  ^  Tanfield  r.  Irvine,  2  Uiiss.  149. 

R.  Co.,  4o  Fed.  R.  414.  <^  Vann  r.  Barnett,  2  Brown  Cli.  C.  158; 

"■2  Finance  Co.  of  Pa.  r.  Cliarieston  C.  Metcalfe  v.  Pulvertoft,  1  V,  &  B.  180. 

&  C.  R.  Co.,  46  Fed.  R.  508.  '^  Kershaw  v.  Matliews,  1  Russ.  361. 

35  Lehman   v.  McQuown,   .'U    Fed.    R.  ^  Osborne  v.  Harvey,  1  Y  &  C.  N.  R. 

138  ;  Davis  v.  Duncan,  19  Fed.  R.  477.  116. 

§  252.  1  Anon.,  1  Atk.  578.    See  §  200.  ^  Cooke  v.  Gwjn,  3  Atk.  689  ;  Attor- 

2  Anon.,  1  Atk.  578;  E.r  parte  Whit-  ney-General  v.  Mayor  of  (iaiway,  1  Moi- 
field,  2  Atl<.  ;;i5,  Mercliants'  &  M.  Na-  loy,  95 ;  Bowman  v.  Bell,  14  Simons,  392. 
tional  Bank  r.  Kent  Circuit  Judge,  43  i'  Latham  v.  Chafee,  7  Fed.  H.  525. 
Mich.  292.  See  Union  Mut.  Life  Ins,  Co.  ;•.  Union 

3  Ex  parte  Raddiffe,  1  J.  &  W.  039;  Mills  Blaster  Co.,  37  Fed.  R.  287. 
Anon.,  1  Atk.  578  ;  Ex  parte  Warren,  10 

Ves.  Gii2. 


§  252.]   APPLYING  FOR  THE  APPOINTMENT  OF  A  EECEIVER.     441 

a  motion  for  leave  to  amend  the  bill,^^  unless  indeed  the  proposed 
amendment  would  change  materially  the  allegations  showing 
the  necessity  for  a  receiver.  The  bill  should  lay  the  foundation 
for  the  appointment  by  stating  the  facts  which  show  its  necessity 
and  propriety ,^^  and  should  contain  a  prayer  for  a  receiver.^^  jf^ 
however,  a  state  of  facts  subsequently  arise  making  the  appoint- 
ment necessary,  it  may  probably  be  made  without  an  amendment 
of  the  original  or  the  filing  of  a  supplemental  bill.^'^  The  appli- 
cation for  a  receiver  should  be  supported  by  evidence  showing 
that  the  appointment  is  necessary .^^  If  the  application  is  made 
before  decree,  the  affidavits  should  be  founded  upon  the  allega- 
tions in  the  bill.'^  If  statements  not  founded  on  allegations  in 
the  bill  and  alleging  facts  which  existed  and  were  known  before 
the  bill  was  filed,  are  introduced  into  the  affidavits,  it  seems  that 
the  court  will  not  consider  them ;  ^'  and  even  if,  where  the  case 
made  by  the  bill  fails,  sufficient  ground  for  a  receiver  is  confessed 
in  the  answer,  it  seems  that  a  receiver  would  be  denied  the  plain- 
tiff, at  least  until  he  had  amended  his  bill.^^  After  an  application 
for  a  receiver  has  been  once  denied,  a  second  application  supported 
by  the  same  papers  will  rarely  be  granted. ^^  The  former  rule  was 
that,  after  answer,  a  plaintiff  when  moving  for  a  receiver  could 
only  rely  upon  the  admissions  in  the  answer  ;''^'^  but  now  a  sworn 
answer  is  given  upon  such  a  motion  little  more  effect  than  an 
ordinary  affidavit,  and  may  be  contradicted  by  affidavits  in  sup- 
port of  the  bill.^^  The  appointment  is  usually  only  made  upon 
notice,  and  is  very  rarely  granted  ex  parted  Less  than  one 
day's  notice  has  been  held  to  be  insufficient.-^     A  receiver  may, 

"  Barnard    v.    Darlin<,',    1     Barb.    Cli.  ^^  Cremen  v.  Ilawkes,  2  Jones  &  LaT. 

(X.  Y.)  70.  (J74  ;    Kerr  on    Keceivers    (2d  Am.  ed.), 

12  Tonilinson    i:   Ward,  2   Conn.  ?,9Q;  154. 

Verplanck  r.  Mercantile  Ins.  Co.,  2  Paige  ^^  Fenton  ?-•.  Lumberman's  Bank, Clarke 

(N.    Y.),   4:38.      But   see    Hottenstein   v.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  3fiO. 

Conra.l,  U  Kan.  4:]5.  -'»  Daniell's  Cli.   Pr.(2.]  Am.  ed.)  1D7G. 

1-^  Kule2L    Bat  see  Osborne  f.  Harvey,  See    Goodman   r.    Whitcomb,  1  J.  &  W. 

1  Y.  &  C.  N.  R.  116.  589;  Kershaw  v.  Matliews,  1  Uiiss.  301. 

"  Malcolm  v.  Montgomery,  2  Molloy,  -i  Allen  v.  Tlie  Dallas  &  Wichita  R.  R. 

500;  Hottenstein  r.  Conrad,  9  Kan.  4;).").  Co.,  :]  Woods,  316,  332. 

15  Middleton  r.  Dodsvvell,  13  Ves.  200 ;  ^-  Blondheim  i:  Moore,  11  Md.  .305; 
Kerr  on  Receivers  (2d  Am.  ed.),  154.  People   v.   Norton,  1    Paige  (N.  Y.),  17  ; 

16  Dawson  r.  Yates,  1  Beav.  301,  306  ;  Sandford  o.  Sinclair,  8  Paige  (X.  Y.),  373; 
Cremen  v.  Ilawkes,  2  .Tones  &  LaT  674;  Miltonberger  i\  Logansport  Ry.  Co.,  106 
Kerr  on  Receivers  (2d  Am.  ed.),  154.  U.  S.  280. 

"  Dawson  v.  Yates,  1  Beav.  301,  300 ;  -■'  St.  Louis,  K.  C.  &  C.  Ry.  Co.,  v. 
Kerr  on  Receivers  (2d  Am.  ed.),  154.  Dewees,  23  Fed.  R.  G91. 


442  EECEIVEKS.  [chap.  XVII. 

however,  be  appointed  ex  parte,  if  that  is  the  only  way  to  pre- 
serve the  property  from  destruction  or  serious  injury,  or  removal 
beyond  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court.-^  It  has  been  said  that  a 
receiver  of  tlie  assets  of  a  railroad  company  will  rarely  be  ap- 
pointed in  a  suit  to  wliicli  no  stockholders  or  bondholders  are 
actually  parties.^^  Where  the  officer  of  a  corporation  who  had 
been  served  with  notice  of  a  motion  for  the  appointment  of  a 
receiver  fraudulently  concealed  that  fact  from  his  associates,  and 
did  not  oppose  the  motion,  although  no  collusion  with  the  plaintiff 
was  shown,  a  motion  to  vacate  the  appointment  was  entertained.^^ 
A  delay  of  one  month  after  knowledge  of  the  appointment  of  a 
receiver,  who  had  expended  in  the  improvement  of  the  property 
money  furnished  him  by  otliers,  was  held  such  acquiescence  as  to 
estop  a  party  from  moving  to  vacate  the  order  of  appointment 
for  irregularity  because  granted  withotit  notice  to  him.^'  Except 
in  an  extraordinary  case,  a  receiver  will  not  be  appointed  over 
property  in  the  possession  of  a  stranger  to  the  suit.-^ 

§  253.  Who  may  apply  for  the  Appointment  of  a  Receiver.  — 
A  receiver  is  usually  apjiointed  uj)on  tlie  ajtplication  of  the  ])lain- 
tiff.  Before  a  decree  it  seems  that  one  defendant  cannot  move 
for  a  receiver,^  unless  he  has  filed  a  cross-bill  praying  for  one.''^ 
After  a  decree,  however,  he  may,  in  a  proper  case,  obtain  a  re- 
ceiver of  the  property  of  a  co-defendant  upon  petition,^  but  not 
usually  over  the  property  of  tlie  plaintiff  without  a  cross-bill.* 

§  254.  Manner  of  the  Appointment  of  a  Receiver.  —  By  the  Eng- 
lish practice,  which  was  followed  in  New  York  before  the  passage 
of  statutes  altering  it,  wlien  an  application  for  the  appointment 
of  a  receiver  was  granted,  the  selection  of  the  receiver  was  re- 


'^  Gibson  v.  Martin,  8  Paige  (N.  Y.),        §253.     i  Kobinson  r.  Iladley,  11  Beav. 

481 ;  Johns  t).  Johns,  '2.?>  Ga.  31  ;  Triebcrt  614  ;  Leddel's  E.x'r  v.  Starr,  19  N.  J.  Eq. 

V.  Burgess,  11  Md.  452;  Gibbons  v.  Main-  (4  C.  E.  Green)  150.     But  see  Sargant  c 

waring,   9   Simons,   77 ;  Miltenberger  v.  Keail,  L.  R.   1  Ch.  D.  GOO  ;  Henshaw  v. 

Logansport  liy.  Co.,  106  U.  S.   286.  Wells,  9  Humph.  (Tenn.)  -568. 

25  Overton  v.  Memphis  &  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  -  Grote  v.  Bury,  1  W.  R  92 ;  Robinson 

10  Fed.  R.  860.  But  see  Central  Trust  Co.  v.  Hadley,  11  Beav.  614  ;  Kerr  on  Receiv- 

V.  Texas  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  24  Fed.  R.  15:1  ers  (2d  Am.  ed.),  153,  154. 

2«  Allen  V.  Tiie  Dallas  &  Wichita  R.  R.  ^  Barlow  v.  Gains,  8  Bcav.  329  ;  Ililes 

Co.,  3  Woods,  316.  '••  Moore,  15  Beav.  175;  Kerr  on  Receiv- 

2-  Allen  V.  The  Dallas  &  Wichita  R.  R.  ers  (2d  Am.  ed.),  154. 
Co.,  3  Woods,  316.  ••  Grote  v.  Bury,  1  W.    R.  92 ;  Robin- 

2«  Scarles  v.  The  Jacksonville,  Rensa-  son  r.  Hadley,  11  Beav.  614  ;  Kerr  on  Re- 

ooln,  &  Mobile  R.   R.  Co.,  2  Woods,  621.  ceivers  (2d  Am.  ed.),  153,  154. 
See  also  Davis  v.  Gray,  10  Wall.  203,  218. 


§  255.] 


WHO   SHOULD    BE   APPOINTED   RECEIVER. 


443 


ferred  to  a  master  in  cliaucciy,  whose  action  was  subject  to  the 
confirmation  of  the  court. ^  The  same  master  usually  exercised 
supervision  over  contracts  made  by  the  receiver  and  the  adjust- 
ment of  his  compensation.^  In  the  Federal  courts,  however,  it 
is  the  customary  practice  for  the  judge  to  appoint  and  often  to 
supervise  a  receiver  himself,  without  the  aid  of  a  master,  except 
when  the  accounts  are  passed.'^ 

§  255.  Who  should  be  appointed  Receiver.  —  As  a  general  rule 
no  one  should  be  appointed  receiver  of  property  who  has  any 
interest  therein,^  or  is  in  any  way  connected  with  the  litigation 
in  the  course  of  which  the  appointment  is  made,^  or  is  nearly 
related  to,^  or  is  in  the  employ  of  any  of  the  parties  thereto,* 
or  wlio,  if  he  should  receive  the  appointment,  would  occupy  two 
inconsistent  jiositions;^  nor  a  person  who  is  not  familiar  with 
the  management  of  similar  property,^  and  able  to  give  sufficient 
attention  to  the  management  of  his  trust."  Thus  a  stockholder,^ 
officer,  or  director^  of  a  corporation  will  very  rarely  be  appointed 
a  receiver  of  its  assets ;  nor  a  party ,^'^  or  solicitor,^^  or  the  son  or 
brother  of  a  party  ^^  to  a  cause,  over  property  which  is  the  sub- 
ject of  the  litigation.  Nor  should  the  next  friend  of  an  infant, 
whose  duty  it  is  to  protect  his  interest,  be  appointed   receiver 


§  254.  ^  Creuze  )'.  Bisliop  of  London, 
Dickens,  687  ;  Tliomus  v.  DMwkin,  1  Ves. 
Jr.  4o2  ;  In  re  Eiigle  Iron  Works,  8  Paiije 
(N.  Y.),  385;  High  on  Receivers,  §  90; 
Diiniell's  Cli.  Pr.  (2(1  Am.  e(L)  1976. 

-  Tliornliill  r.  Tliornhill,  14  Simons, 
600 

3  Miltenberger  v.  Logansport  Ry.  Co., 
106  U.  S.  286  ;  Buck  v.  Piedmont  &  Ar- 
lington Life  Ins.  Co.,  4  Fed  R.  849; 
Frank  v.  Denver  &  R.  G.  Ry.  Co.,  28  Fed. 
R.  757.  But  see  Taylor  v.  Pliila.  &  Head- 
ing R.  R.  Co.,  7  Fed.  R.  379 ;  s.  c.  9  Fed. 
R.  1  ;  Cowdrey  i'.  Railroad  Co.,  1  Woods, 
331,  341. 

§  255.    1  Wiswell  v.  Starr.  48  Me.  401. 

2  Bakery.  Backus,  32  111.  79;  Garland 
V.  Garland,  2  Ves.  Jr.  137. 

3  Williamson  v.  Wilson,  1  Bland  (Md.), 
418. 

*  Baker  v.  Backus,  32  111.  79  ;  Attor- 
ney-General r.  Bank  of  Columbia,  1  Paige 
(N.  Y.),  511  ;  Buck  r.  Piedmont  &  Arling- 
ton Life  Ins.  Co.,  4  Fed.  R.  849. 

'  Stone  r.  Wisliart,  2  Madd.  61;  Ex 
parte  Fletcher,  6  Ves.  427. 


•^  Lupton  V.  Stephenson,  11  Ir.  Eq. 
484. 

"  Wynne  v.  Lord  Nevvborough,  15  Ves. 
283  ;  G'ibbs  v.  David,  L.  R.  20  Eq.  373. 

6  Wiswell  y.  Starr,  48  Me.  401  ;  Atkins 
V.  Wabash,  St.  L.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  29  Fed. 
R.  161. 

y  Attorney-Goneral  v.  Bank  of  Colum- 
bia, 1  Paige "(N.  Y.),  511  ;  Buck  v.  Pied- 
mont &  Arlington  Life  Ins.  Co.,  4  Fed.  R. 
849 ;  Atkins  v.  Wabash,  St.  L.  &  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  29  Fed.  R.  161  ;  Baker  v.  Backus,  32 
111.  79 ;  Finance  Co.  of  Pa.  v.  Charleston 
C.  &  S.  C.  R.  Co.,  45  Fed.  R.  436. 

^^  Wilson  V.  Greenwood,  1  Swanst.  471  ; 
Finance  Co.  of  Pa.  >:  Charleston  C.  &  S. 
C.  R.  Co.  45  Fed.  436. 

11  Baker  v.  Backus.. 32  111.  70;  Garland 
V.  Garland,  2  Ves.  Jr.  137  ;  Finance  Co. 
of  Pa.  V.  Charleston  C.  &  S.  C.  R.  Co., 
45  Fed.  R.  4-36. 

1-^  Williamsons.  Wilson.  1  BInnd  (Md.), 
418 :  Taylor  r.  Oldham.  Jac.  527.  But  see 
Shainwald  v.  Lewis,  8  Fed.  R.  878. 


444  RECEIVERS.  [chap.  XVII. 

over  his  estate  ;^^  nor  an  active  trustee  over  the  trust  estate,^^ 
although  a  mere  dry  trustee  may  be  thus  appoiuted.^^  Nor  should 
a  master  in  chancery,  whose  duty  it  is  to  pass  receivers'  accounts, 
be  appointed  a  receiver ;  ^^  nor  should  a  solicitor  who  docs  not 
understand  the  management  of  machinery  be  appointed  receiver 
over  a  manufacturing  establishment.^^  Nor  should  a  person  be 
appointed  receiver  who  lives  at  a  great  distance  from  the  es- 
tate over  which  a  receiver  is  desired,  and  is  actively  engaged  in 
another  employment.^*^  It  has  also  been  said  in  England,  "  that 
the  receiver-general  of  taxes  for  a  county  cannot  be  ap})ointed 
a  receiver  ;  for  having  given,  as  such,  security  to  the  crown, 
if  he  were  to  become  indebted  to  the  crown  and  to  tlie  estate, 
the  crown  might,  by  its  prerogative  process,  sweep  away  all  his 
property."  ^^  And  Lord  Eldon  held  that  a  peer  could  not  be  a 
receiver,  because,  ''  in  many  instances,  a  receiver  may  be  com- 
mitted." ^  The  court  may,  however,  under  very  special  circum- 
stances appoint  as  receiver  a  trustee,^^  or  a  person  interested  in 
the  subject  of  the  suit,^-  or  even  a  i)arty  to  the  suit,--^  or  his  near 
relation.2^  This,  however,  will  rarely  be  done  unless  by  consent, 
or  possibly  when  it  clearly  appears  to  be  for  the  interest  of  all 
concerned  ;  ~'^  and  in  such  a  case  the  receiver  is  usually  oljliged 
to  act  without  compensation  if  he  accepts  the  trust.-*^  When  a 
party  to  the  cause  is  appointed  receiver  in  it,  he  does  not  thereby 
lose  his  privilege  of  acting  as  party .2'  It  has  been  held  in  Ten- 
nessee, that  no  one,  not  even  a  clerk  of  the  court,  can  be  made 


13  Stone  V.  Wisliart,  2  Madd.  (54.  Kerr   on   Receivers   (2d  Am.  ed.),    136- 

1'  Sutton  V.  Jones,  15  Ves.  581 ; v.  10'.». 

Jolland,  8  Ves.  72.  --  Hoffman   v.    Dmiean,    18    Jur.    6!); 

^^  Sutton  V.  Jones,  15  Ves.  581.  Powys  v.  Blagrave,  18  Jur.  4U2  ;  Kerr  on 

1^  Ex  jxirtc  Fletcher,  6  Ves.  427.  Receivers  (2d  Am.  ed.),  136. 

1^  Lupton  V.  Stephenson,  11  Jr.  Eq  484.  -■^  Wilson  y.  Greenwood,  1  Swanst.  471 ; 

18  Wynne  r.  Lord  Newborough,  15  Ves.  Blakeney  v.  Dufaur,  15  Beav.  40  ;  Robin- 
283.  son  L\  Taylor,  42  Fed.  R.  803,  812. 

19  Daniell's  Ch.   Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1973.  -<  Shainwald  v.  Lewis.  8  Fed.  R.  878. 
See    Attorney  General  v.   Day,  2  JLadd  -■'  Atkins  r.  Wabasli.  St.  L.   &  R    Ry. 
246,  254.                                      "  Co.,  29  Fed.  R.  161  :  Kerr  on   Receivers 

•■^^  Attorney-General  v.  Gee,  2  V.  &  B.  (2d  Am.  ed.),  136-139. 

208.  -''  Wilson  v.  Greenwood,  1  Swanst.  471, 

■2'  Sykes  v.  Hastings,  11  Ves.  363;  Sut-  483  ;  Blakeney  r.  Dufaur,  15  Beav.  40; 

ton  V.  Jones,    15    Ves.    584;  Gardner  v.  Hoffmann  r.  l)un<!an,  18  Jnr.  69;  Powys 

Blane,  1   Hare,  381  ;  Powys  v.   Blagrave,  v.  Blagrave,  IS  Jur.  463.     I?ul  see  New- 

18  Jur.  463  ;  Ames  v.  Birketilieatl  Docks,  port  v.  Bury,  23  Beav.  30. 

20  Beav.   332;    Potts  c.  W.'irwick  &  Bir-  -^  Scott  c  Platcl,  2  Phil   229;    Cowdrey 

niingliam    Canal    Nav.    Co.,    Kiv,     1  |:1 ;  r   Unilroad  Co.,  1  Woods,  331,  300. 


§  250.]  THE  receiver's  security.  445 

a  receiver  against  his  will.-''  It  was  held  improper  to  appoint 
as  assignee  in  bankruptcy  of  a  corporation  one  who  had  been 
ai)pointed  by  a  State  court  receiver  of  its  assets  ;29  but  it  was 
subsequently  held  eminently  projjer  to  appoint  as  receiver  of  the 
assets  of  an  insolvent  corj)oration  one  who  by  the  laws  of  the 
State  that  chartered  it  was  the  othcial  custodian  of  its  assets  in 
case  of  its  insolvency,  even  though  that  State  was  in  another  cir- 
cuit from  the  one  in  which  the  suit  for  a  receiver  was  brought, 
and  the  officer  did  not  reside  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court.^*^ 
In  this  case,  it  was  made  a  condition  of  the  appointment  that  the 
receiver  should  pay  into  the  registry  of  the  court  the  proceeds  of 
all  assets  collected  within  its  jurisdiction  ;-^^  but  he  was  allowed 
to  give  sureties  who  were  residents  of  the  State  where  he  dwelt.^^ 
An  order  may  provide  for  the  appointment  of  a  receiver  in  the 
alternative  to  other  relief.^'^  Recent  statutes  provide  that  no  clerk 
or  deputy  clerk  of  a  Federal  court  shall  be  appointed  receiver 
except  for  special  reasons  which  must  be  assigned  in  the  order 
of  appointment;-"^  and  that  "no  person  related  to  any  justice 
or  judge  of  any  court  of  the  United  States  by  affinity  or  con- 
sanguinity, within  the  degree  of  first  cousin,  shall  hereafter  be 
appointed  by  such  court  or  judge  to  or  employed  by  such  court 
or  judge  in  any  office  or  duty  in  any  court  of  which  such  justice 
or  judge  may  be  a  member."  ^ 

§  256.  The  Receiver's  Security.  —  As  a  general  rule,  the  order 
for  the  appointment  of  a  receiver  provides  that  he  shall  give  good 
and  sufficient  security  for  the  faithful  performance  of  his  duties.^ 
This,  by  the  English  practice,  was  usually  a  recognizance  entered 
into  by  the  receiver  and  two  or  more  sureties,  wherelw  they,  the 
cognizors,  acknowledged  "  themselves  to  be  indebted  to  the  cog- 
nizees  (usually  the  Master  of  the  Rolls  and  the  senior  Master  of 
the  Court)  in  certain  sums  of  money  to  be  paid  on  certain  days 
therein  mentioned  ;  in  default  of  which  they  will  and  agree  that 
the  said  sums  shall  be  levied  and  recovered  of  them,  their  heirs, 

-^  Waters  ;-.   Carroll,  9   Yerjr.   (Tenii.)  '^^  Taylor  r.  Life  Association  of  Amer- 

102.  ica,  ?,  Fed.  R.  4(55. 

-'J  In  re  Stiiyvesant  Bank,  5   Benedict,  ■"'■^  Curling  v.  Townsliend,   10  Yes.  628. 

560;  s.  c.  6  N.'b   R.  272.  3i  20  St.  at  L.  ch.  IS-'],  p.  415. 

2"  Taylor  v.  Life  Association  of  Amer-  S".  25  St.  at  L.  ch.  373,  §  7,  p.  5.")4. 

ica,  3  Fed.  R.  465.  §  256.    i  Daniell's  Ch.'p.  (2d  Am.  od.) 

5'  Taylor  r.  Life  Association  of  Amer-  1077;  Mead  v.  Lord  Orrery,  3  Atk.  235; 

ica,  3  Fed.  R.  465.  Tomlinson  v.  Ward,  2  Conn.  396. 


446  RECEIVERS.  [chap.  XVII. 

executors,  and  administrators,  and  of  all  and  singular  their  lands 
and  hereditaments,  goods  and  chattels."  ^  The  recognizance,  how- 
ever, was  subject  to  a  condition  making  it  void  if  the  receiver 
should  duly  account  for  the  rents  and  profits  of  the  estate  over 
which  he  was  appointed.^  In  the  Federal  courts  no  fixed  rule 
prevails,  the  security  required  from  a  receiver  being  whatever  the 
judge  who  orders  his  appointment  thinks  proper.^  When  a  re- 
ceiver is  appointed  by  consent,  the  court  may  appoint  him  with- 
out requiring  security,  or  upon  his  own  recognizance  only.^  The 
sureties  must  usually  dwell  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court ; 
but  under  peculiar  circumstances  sureties  residing  elsewhere  have 
been  accepted.^  The  sui-eties  of  a  receiver  cannot  be  discharged 
at  their  own  request,"  except  under  special  circumstances,  "  as 
where  underhand  practice  is  proved,  and  the  person  secured 
shown  to  be  connected  witli  such  practice."  ^  "  For  if  people  vol- 
mitarily  make  themselves  bail  or  sureties  for  another,  they  know 
the  terms,  and  will  be  held  very  hard  to  their  recognizance,  and 
not  discharged  at  their  request  to  have  new  sureties  appointed, 
for  then  there  would  be  no  end  of  it."'^  If  a  surety  should  pro- 
cure his  discharge  during  the  continuance  of  the  receivership,  the 
receiver  must  enter  into  a  fresh  recognizance.^"^  In  law,  a  surety 
is  lial)le  to  the  full  amount  of  the  penalty  of  the  recognizance, 
bond,  or  undertaking  by  which  he  is  bound. ^^  In  equity,  how- 
ever, he  is  only  liable  to  the  full  amount,  including  interest  as 
well  as  principal,  which  the  receiver  is  liable  in  equity  to  pay,^^ 
unless  that  exceeds  the  amount  of  the  peualty,  which  fixes  the 
extreme  limit  of  his  liability. ^^  It  has  been  held  in  England  that 
a  surety  who  has  undertaken  to  be  responsible  for  whatever  a  re- 
ceiver "  should  receive  or  become  liable  to  pay  "  as  such  receiver, 
is  liable  for  funds  received  by  the  receiver  before  the  security 
was  given. ^*    Where  the  parties  interested  have  been  guilty  of 

2  Daniell's  Ch.  P.  (2 J  Am.  erl.)  1977;        "  Griffith   v.  Griffith,  2  Yes.  Sen.  400; 
Mead  v.  Lord  Orrery,  3  Atk.  235;  Tom-     Gordon  r.  Calvert,  2  Simons,  253. 
linson  v.  Ward,  2  Conn.  306.  »  Hamilton  v.  Brewster,  2  JNIoUoy,  407. 

3  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1909.         ^  Lord  Hard  wicke  in  Griffitii  r.  Griffith, 
■*  Taylor  u.  Life  Association  of  Amer-     2  Ves.  Sen.  400. 

ica,  3  Fed.  R.  465.  i'  Vaugiian  v.  Vauglian,  1  Dickens,  90; 

"  Hihbert   v.  Hibbert,   3    Meriv.    681 ;  Blois  v.  Betts,  1  Dickens,  33G. 

Countess   of  Carlisle   v.    Lord   Berkley,  "  Dawson  v.  Raynes,  2  Unss.  4^16,  468, 

Amh.  509;  Ridout  v.  Earl  of  Plymouth,  i-  Dawson  v.  Raynes,  2  Russ.  466. 

1  Dickens,  68.  ^^  Walker  i:  Wild,  1  Madd   528. 

«  Taylor  ;•.  Life  Association  of  zVmer-  "  Smart  v.  Flood,  49  L.  T.  467. 
ica,  3  Fed.  K.  465. 


§  257.]  receivers'  accounts.  447 

gross  delay  in  compelling  the  receiver  to  pass  his  accounts,  the 
court  may  excuse  the  surety  from  the  payment  of  the  whole  or 
a  part  of  the  interest. ^^  According  to  Daniell,  "  When  an  action 
is  brought  against  a  receiver's  surety  upon  the  recognizance,  the 
proper  course  for  him  to  pursue  a[)pears  to  be  to  ajjply  to  the 
court  by  motion  to  stay  the  proceedings  on  the  recognizance, 
offering  at  the  same  time  to  pay  the  amount  due  from  the  re- 
ceiver, so  as  tlie  same  does  not  exceed  the  amount  of  the  recog- 
nizance, into  court ;  and  upon  such  motion,  the  order  will  be 
made,  upon  the  surety's  paying  the  cost  of  the  application,  and  of 
the  proceedings  consequent  upon  it.  When  the  receiver's  account 
has  not  been  taken,  the  motion  should  also  pray  a  reference  to  the 
master  to  see  what  is  due  from  the  receiver ;  and  it  seems  that 
upon  such  application  the  court  will  indulge  the  surety  by  allow- 
ing him  to  pay  the  balance  by  instalments."  ^^  When  a  surety 
has  been  obliged  to  pay  anything  on  account  of  the  receiver, 
he  will  be  entitled  to  a  lien  for  his  reimbursement  upon  any- 
thing which  may  subsequently  be  due  to  the  receiver  from  the 
suit.17 

§  257.  Receivers'  Accounts.  —  A  receiver  should  account  annu- 
ally to  the  court  unless  accounts  at  sliorter  intervals  are  required 
of  him.i  His  accounts  are  filed  and  passed  in  the  office  of  the 
master  to  whom  matters  pertaining  to  the  receivership  are 
referred.^  A  receiver's  account  should  describe  the  situation 
of  the  estate  at  the  time  when  he  received  it,  and  any  changes 
that  have  since  taken  place.  He  should  then  state  his  receipts 
and  disbursements,  which  should  be  set  forth  in  schedules  as 
specifically  as  possible.^  He  should  also  state  such  indebtedness 
as  he  has  incurred  ;  and,  in  general,  give  as  full  a  description 
of  the  estate  in  his  hands,  and  of  his  actions  concerning  the  same 
as  is  practicable.^  If  a  person  has  not  been  ])aid  for  services 
rendered  to  the  estate,  but  has  agreed  with  the  receiver  to  be 

15  Dawson  v.  Raynes,  2  Riiss.  466.  ^  Daniell's  Clir.  Pr.  (2(1  Am.  cd)  1096, 

16  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2(1  Am.  cd.)   200.5,     1907.     But   see  Lafayette  Co.   v.   Xeely, 
2006,  citing  Walker  y.  Wild,  1  Madd.  528.     21  Fed.  R.  7.S8. 

1"  Glossop   V.    Harrison,    Cooper,    61 ;  *  Daniell's  Cli.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1996, 

S.  c.  3  V.  &  B.  134.  1997;    Hooper  v.  Winston,  24    111.  353; 

§2-37.     1  Potts   V.   Leighton,    15   Ves.  Hinckley  r.  Railroad  Co.,  100  U.  S.   15.3; 

273 ;  General  Order,  15  Ves.  278  ;  Lowe  Attorney-General  v.  North  America  Life 

r.  Lowe,  1  Tenn.  Ch.  515.  Ins.    Co.,   89   N.  Y.  94,   107;    Bourne  v. 

2  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1996,  Maybin,    3    Woods,    724,    741;    Equity 

1997.  Rule  79. 


448  RECEIVERS.  [chap.  XVII. 

content  with  what  the  court  allows  him,  that  fact  should  be 
stated  in  the  account  together  with  a  description  of  the  services 
tlius  performed.'^  Allowances  for  counsel  fees  will  usually  be 
small,  until  the  final  accounting  of  the  receiver,  when  the  full 
amount  earned  will  be  ordered  paid.^  Such  allowances  are  the 
property  of  the  receiver,  not  of  his  counsel."  In  a  recent  case, 
upon  an  ai)plication  for  the  paymeut  of  counsel  fees  pending  a 
receivership,  Judge  Brewer  said  :  "  It  is  not  because  we  think  the 
counsel  have  not  earned  the  amount  reported  by  the  master  in 
their  favor  that  we  do  not  sustain  this  report  in  full ;  but  wc  do 
not  believe  in  the  policy  or  propriety,  pending  a  receivership,  of 
making  a  large  allowance  to  parties  who  are  employed  as  officers 
of  the  court,  or  in  lookiug  after  the  interests  of  their  clients  in 
that  connection.  They  should  wait  until  the  matter  comes  to  a 
close,  and  then  their  bills,  as  a  whole,  should  be  presented.  The 
court  can  then  look  at  them,  and  pass  upon  the  question  as  to 
whether  they  arc  correct  or  not.  It  makes  a  great  difference, 
practically,  in  the  administration  of  affairs,  whether  parties  pre- 
sent bills  for  two  or  three  thousand  dollars  every  three  or  four 
months,  or  at  the  end  of  the  litigation  for  eight  or  ten  thousand 
dollars.  We  do  not  mean  that  counsel  shall  go  without  compen- 
sation as  the  case  progresses,  because  they  cannot  afford  to,  but 
still  these  intermediate  allowances  will  always  be  small,  and  will 
not  be  in  the  way  of  a  determination  of  what  the  services  up  to 
that  time  are  really  worth,  or  what  they  should  be  at  the  final 
disposition  of  the  case.  They  will  be  simply  in  view  of  the  neces- 
sities, so  to  speak,  of  counsel  pending  litigation  ;  and  while  the 
master  in  this  case  recommends  an  allowance  of  86,000,  the  order 
will  be  that  these  gentlemen  be  paid  82,000  on  account.  The 
matter  will  then  stand  over  until  we  come  to  the  final  disposition 
of  the  Wabash  case,  and  then  all  fees  and  claims  will  be  ])resented, 
and  it  will  be  seen  whether  there  are  funds  enough  in  the  Wabash 
road  to  pay  expenses."^  Where  before  his  ai)pointment  a  re- 
ceiver had  received  rent  paid  to  him  in  his  individual  capacity 
in  advance,  he  was  obliged  to  apportion  the  rent,  and  to  accomit 
for  so  much  of  it  as  was  paid  for  the  time  during  which  be  acted 

6  Adams  v.  Woods,  8  Cal.  306.  7  Stuart  y.  Boul-.vare,  U?,  U   S  78. 

«  Central  Trust  Co.  v.   Wabash,  St.  L.  8  Central  Trust  Co    r.    Wabasli,  St.  L. 

&  P.  Ry.  Co  ,  23  Fed.  R.  (575  ;  Bound  v.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  23  Fed.  R.  675. 
South  Carolina  Ry.  Co.,  43  Fed.  R.  404. 


§  258.]  COMPENSATION   OF   RECEIVERS.  449 

as  receiver  of  the  })roi)crty,  for  the  use  of  which  the  rent  was 
paid.^  Exceptions  should  not  be  taken  after  a  master's  report 
upon  a  receiver's  accounting  has  been  filed,  the  master  acting  in  the 
place  of  the  court  in  a  judicial  and  not  in  a  ministerial  capacity .^^ 
Should  the  receiver  or  any  other  party  to  the  accounting  feel 
aggrieved  at  a  ruling  of  the  master,  he  should  take  an  exception 
at  the  time,'^  and  subse(piently  j)etition  the  court  to  refer  the 
matter  back  to  the  master  for  correction. ^-  The  court's  duty 
upon  such  a  petition  consists  in  reviewing  the  principles  and 
rules  adopted  and  followed  by  the  master  in  allowing  the  re- 
ceiver's accounts,  rather  than  in  examining  the  items  of  the  account 
in  detail,  or  the  evidence  upon  which  those  items  are  severally 
founded ;  the  latter  duty  belonging  more  especially  to  the  prov- 
ince of  the  master  acting  in  his  judicial  capacity,  analogous  to 
the  province  and  duty  of  a  jury  on  questions  of  fact.^^  In  a  proper 
case,  the  receiver,  as  well  as  any  other  party  interested,  may 
appeal  to  the  Supreme  Court  from  the  final  decree  entered  after 
his  accounting.!* 

§  258.  Compensation  of  Receivers.  —  The  compensation  of  a 
receiver  is  usually  fixed  in  the  first  instance  by  the  master.^ 
with  whose  determination  the  court  will  not  ordinarily  interfere.^ 
The  compensation  will  rarely,  if  ever,  be  increased  upon  appeal.^ 
Where  the  court  has  fixed  a  receiver's  compensation  in  advance, 
it  has  the  power  to  award  him  an  additional  sum  for  extraordi- 
nary labors.*  Concerning  the  rules  regulating  the  amount  of  a 
receiver's  compensation,  Mr.  Justice  Bradley  said :  "  It  would 
hardly  be  a  proper  rule  for  governing  the  case,  to  inquire  what 
another  even  competent  person  would  have  been  willing  to  do 
the  work  for.  The  receiver's  office  is  not  put  up  at  auction. 
His  compensation  is  not  fixed  on  that  principle  at  all.      The 

9  In  re.  Allin,  8  Fed.  K.  753.  §  258.     i  Cowdrey    v.  Kailroad  Co.,  1 

w  Cowdrey  v.   Railroad  Co.,  1  Woods,     Woods,  331,  341  ;  Central  Trust   Co.  v. 

331,  334.  Wabash,  St.  L.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  32  Fed.   R. 

11  Cowdrey  v.  Railroad  Co.,  1  Woods,     187. 

331,  333.  2  Cowdrey  v.  Railroad  Co.,  1  Woods, 

12  Cowdrey  i-.  Railroad  Co.,  1  Woods,  331,  341  ;  Central  Trust  Co.  v.   Wabash, 
331.  St.  L.  &  r.  Ry.  Co.,  32  Fed.  R.  187. 

13  Cowdrey  v.  Railroad  Co.,  1  Woods,        3  Hinckley  v.  Railroad  Co.,  100  U.   S. 
331,  834.  153  ;  Stuart  v.  Boulware,  133  U.  S.  78. 

14  Hinekley  v.  Oilman  C.  &  S.  R.  R.  Co.,        *  Farmers'  L.&Tr.  Co.  v.  Central  R.  R. 
94  U.  S.  467  ;    Hinckley  v.  Railroad  Co.,  of  Iowa,  8  Fed.  R.  60. 

100  U.  S.  153  ;  Horey  v.  McDonald.  109 
U.  S.  150. 

VOL.  I 29 


450  RECEIVERS.  [CIIAP.  XVII. 

chancellor  selects  a  person  whom  he  regards  as  competent  and 
trustworthy,  and  the  amount  of  compensation  is  graduated  some- 
what by  the  duties  and  somewhat  by  the  responsibilities  of  the 
situation."^  In  cases  of  moderate  amount,  a  commission  of  five 
per  cent  upon  the  receipts  and  disbursements  is  not  unusual.^ 
Where  the  amounts  received  and  disbursed  are  large,  it  is  cus- 
tomary to  pay  the  receiver  a  salary  or  a  lump  sum  graduated 
according  to  the  amount  of  his  time  employed,  the  value  of  the 
property,  the  difficulty  of  his  task,  and  the  success  of  his  admin- 
istration.' It  has  been  said  that  the  peculiar  duties  and  respon- 
sibilities and  accountability  of  a  receiver  of  a  railroad  entitle  him 
to  a  larger  amount  than  would  be  demanded  by  the  head  officer 
of  a  railroad  of  the  same  size  and  business.^  Accordingly,  re- 
ceivers of  railroads  have  been  frequently  allowed  as  mucli  as 
810,000  a  year ;  ^  and  in  one  case  two  receivers  were  each  al- 
lowed $70,000  for  three  and  a  half  years'  work.^"^  In  a  late  case 
$4,500  a  year  to  each  of  two  receivers  was  considered  adequate 
compensation. 1^  In  one  case  the  same  man  had  twice  been 
appointed  receiver  of  the  same  railroad.  Firstly,  in  a  stock- 
holder's suit  which  remained  in  a  State  court,  and  secondly,  in 
a  bondholder's  suit  which  was  removed  into  a  Federal  court. 
The  stockholder's  suit  was  stricken  from  the  docket ;  and  the 
bondholder's  suit  pushed  toward  a  determination.  A  dispute 
arose  as  to  the  compensation  of  the  receiver.  This  was  deter- 
mined against  him  by  the  Circuit  Court,  and  affirmed  upon 
appeal  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  he  being 
thus  obliged  to  pay  into  court  the  amount  thus  decreed  as  due 
from  him.^2  He  then  had  the  stockholder's  suit  reinstated  in  the 
State  court  and  obtained  a  reference  to  a  master  who  reported 

5  Cowrlrey  v.  Railroad  Co.,  1  Woorls,  Brewer,  J.,  in  Central  Trust  Co.  i'.  Wa- 
.331.  345,  340.  Approved  l.y  Brewer.  J.,  basli,  St.  L.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  32  Fed.  R.  187, 
in  Central  Trust  Co.  v.  Wabash,  St.  L.  &     188. 

P.  Ry.  Co.,  32  Fed.  R.  187.  188.     See  also  9  Hinokley   v.  Railroad  Co.,  100  U.  S. 

Williams  r.  Morgan,  111  U   S.  684.  153;  Cowdrey  v.  Railroad  Co.,  1  Woods, 

6  Cowdrey  v.  Railroad  Co.,  1  Woods,  331,  347.  But  see  Farmers'  L.  &  Tr.  Co. 
331,  340 ;  Day  v.  Croft,  2  Beav.  488.  v.  Central  R.  R.  of  Iowa,  8  Fed.  R.  60. 

"  Cowdrey' I!.  Railroad  Co.,  1  Woods,  i»  Central  Trust  Co.  v.  Wabash,  St.  L. 

.331,  346 ;  Farmers'  L.  &  Tr.  Co.  i-.  Central  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  32  Fed.  R.  187. 

R.  R.  of  Iowa,  8  Fed.  R.GO;  Central  Trust  i'  Easton  &  Houston  &   T.  C.  Ry.  Co., 

Co.  V.  Wabash,  St.  L.  &  P.   Hy.  Co.,   32  40  Fed.  R.  189. 

Fed.  R.  187.  i-  Hinckley  i-.  Railroad  Conipan.y,   100 

«  Bradley,  .1.,  in  Cowdrey  r.  Railroad  U.  S.  153  ;  In  re  Hinckley,  3  Fed.  R.  556. 
Co.,  1   Woods,   331,   347.     Approved  by 


§  259]  REMOVAL  OF  keceivp:rs.  451 

a  large  sum  as  due  to  him  for  compensation  and  disbursements. 
Neither  the  bondholders  nor  their  trustees  took  any  part  in 
these  proceedings  in  the  State  court.  An  application  by  the 
receiver  to  have  the  sum  which  he  had  been  previously  obliged 
to  pay  into  the  Federal  court  appropriated  in  part  payment 
of  the  amount  which  the  State  court  had  allowed  him  was 
denied. ^^ 

§  259.  Removal  of  Receivers.  —  A  receiver  may  be  removed 
for  misconduct  in  office,^  or  because  his  original  appointment 
was  obtained  by  collusion  or  fraud, ^  or  was  improper  on  account 
of  his  interest  in  the  subject  of  the  receivership  or  connection 
with  the  parties  in  interest.^  Instances  of  such  misconduct 
as  will  be  a  cause  for  the  removal  of  a  receiver  are  unlawful 
discrimination  in  charges  between  different  shippers  upon  a 
railroad;*  the  purchase  of  supplies  for  tlie  purpose  of  the  re- 
ceivership from  a  firm  or  corporation  in  which  he  is  largely 
interested  ;^  and  in  the  case  of  two  receivers,  where  they  are  un- 
able to  act  in  harmony,  and  the  interests  of  the  estate  suffer  from 
their  discord.^  A  receiver  will  not  be  removed  or  discharged 
at  his  own  request  except  for  good  cause  shown,  nor  ordinarily 
for  a  reason  which  he  knew  or  had  ground  to  anticipate  when  he 
accepted  the  receivership."  Thus  the  court  refused  to  remove,  at 
his  own  request,  a  receiver  upon  the  sole  ground  that  the  duties 
of  his  office  interfere  with  his  private  business.^  A  receiver  may 
be  removed  at  his  own  request  when  by  reason  of  blindness  he 
has  become  physically  incapable  of  performing  the  duties  of  his 
receivership.^  Ordinarily,  a  receiver  can  only  be  removed  by  the 
court  which  appointed  him,^*^  upon  an  application  made  in  the 

"  In  re  Hinckley,  3  Fed.  R.  556.  «  Meier  v.  Kansas  Pacific  R.  R.    Co. 

§  259.     1  Handy  v.  Cleveland  &  Mari-  5  Dill.  47G.     But  see  Conner  v.  Belden 

etta  R.  R.  Co.,  31  Fed.  R.  680  ;  Atkins  r.  8  Didy  (N.  Y.  C.  P  ),  257. 

Wabash,  St.  L.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  29  Fed.  R.  "  Richardson  r.  Ward,  G  Madd.  266 

161.  Beers  r.  Chelsea  Bank,  4  Edw  Ch.  (N.Y.; 

^  O'Mahoney  v.  Belmant,  62  N.  Y  133 ;  277  ;  In  re  Lytle,  3  Paige  Cli.  (N.  Y.)  251 

s.  c.  37  N.  Y.  Superior  Court,  223.  Smith  v.   Vaughan,   Ridg.  temp.  Hardw. 

3  Atkins  V.  Wabash,   St.  L.  &  P.  Ry.  261  ;  Beach  on  Receivers,  §  782. 

Co.,  29  Fed.  R.  161,  «  Beers  v.  Chelsea  Bank,  4  Edw.  Ch. 

*  Handy  u.  Cleveland  &  Marietta  R.  R.  (X.Y.)  277.     But  see  Purdy  v.  Rapalye 

Co.,  31  Fed.   R.  689;  Atknis  v.   Wabash,  (N.    Y.    Chancery,    1835);    Edwards   on 

St.  L.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  29  Fed.  R.  161.     But  Receivers,   661 ,     Beach    on     Receivers, 

see  Central  Trust  Co.  v.  Ohio  Cent  R.  R.  §  782. 

Co.,  23  Fed.  R.  306  •'  Richardson  v.  Ward,  6  Madd  266. 

5  Atkins  V.   Wabash,  St.  L.   &  P.  Ry.  i'  Young  r.  Montgomery  &  E.  R.  R.  Co., 

Co.,  29  Fed.  R.  161.  2  Woods,  606,  618  ;  Alabama  &  C.  R.  R. 


452  EECEIVEKSv  [chap.  XVTL 

suit  in  which  his  appointment  was  made."  A  Federal  court  may, 
however,  after  the  removal  of  a  suit,  remove  a  receiver  therein 
appointed  by  a  State  court.^''^  And  it  has  been  held  that  when 
a  Circuit  Court  of  the  United  States  has  appointed  a  receiver  of  a 
line  of  railroads  running  through  another  circuit,  as  well  as 
through  that  wherein  the  appointment  is  made,  his  authority 
in  the  other  circuit  is  recognized  merely  by  judicial  comity, 
and  he  may  be  removed  fi'om  all  control  over  property  there- 
in by  the  Federal  court  there  held,  upon  a  bill  there  filed. ^ 
When  a  receiver  is  removed,  the  court  may  appoint  anotlver 
in  his  place.  A  delay  of  ten  months  after  knowledge  of  the 
facts  upon  which  the  motion  is  founded,  in  moving  for  the 
discharge  of  a  receivership  and  the  removal  of  a  receiver,  has 
been  held  a  sufficient  reason  for  denying  the  application.^* 
The  successor  to  a  receiver  can  usually  enforce,  at  least  in 
equity,  contracts  made  with  his  predecessor  in  his  official  ca- 
pacity ,^^  and  is  usually  responsible  in  his  official  capacity  for 
liabilities  incurred  ])y  his  predecessor  in  the  same  manner  as 
if  he  were  a  corporation  sole.^^  Whether  a  receiver  who  is  not 
a  party  to  a  suit  can  appeal  from  an  order  for  his  removal  is 
doubtful.i' 

§  260.  Discharge  of  a  Receiver,  —  The  discharge  of  a  receiver  is 
a  termination  of  the  receivership,  and  no  successor  to  him  is  then 
appointed.^  It  will  be  ordered  when  the  court  is  satisfied  either 
that  no  occasion  for  a  receivership  existed  when  the  appointment 
was  made,'^  or  that  in  the  course  of  subsequent  events  the  neces- 
sity for  the  receivership  has  ceased.^   Ordinarily,  a  receiver  can  be 

Co.  V.  Jones,  7  N    B.  R.  145,  109;  Beach  i^  Thompson  v.  Phenix  Insurance  Co., 

on  Receivers,  §§  777,  778.  136  U.  S.  2«7. 

11  Davis  r.  Michelbacher  (S.  C.  Wis  ),  i«  McNulta    v.    Lochridge,   141    U.   S. 

.31  N.   W.   R.   108;  Beach   on  Receivers,  327. 

§§  777,  778.  1^  See  Conner  v.  Belden,  8  Daly  (N.  Y. 

1-  Texas  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  r.   Rust,  17  C.  P  ),  257  ;  Wilson   v.  Barney,  5   Hun 

Fed.  R.  275.     See  Infn,,  §§  200,  391.  (N.Y.),  257  ;  Connolly  v.  Kretz,  78  N.  Y. 

13  Atkins  V.  Wabash,  St.   L.  &  P.  Ry.  620. 

Co,  29  Fed.  R.    101.     But   see   Central  §  200.     i  Beach  on  Receivers,  §  791. 

Trust  Co.  V.  Wabash,  St.  L.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  -  Lavender  v.  Lavender,  Irisn   Rep.  9 

29  Fed.  R.  018  ,  MuUer  r.  Dovvs,  94  U  S.  Eq.  593 ;  Furlong  r.  Edwards,  3  Md.  99 ; 

444;  Youni:  ?•.  Montgomery  &  E.  R.  R.  Sage  r.  Memphis  &  L.  R.  R.   R.   Co.,  18 

Co.,  2  Woods,  600, 018  ;  Alabama  &  C.  R.  Fed.  R.  571  :  s.  c.  125  U.  S.  361. 

R.  Co.  V.  Jones,  7  National  Bankruptcy  '■^  Davis   v.    Duke   of  Marlborough,  2 

Register,  145,  109.  Swanst.  108,   108 ;  Bainbrigge  v.  Blair,  3 

n  Brown  ?•.  Lake  Superior    Iron  Co.,  Beav.  421. 
134  U.  S.  530. 


§  260.]  DISCHARGE  OF  A  RECEIVER.  453 

discharged  only  by  the  court  that  appointed  him.*  After  the  re- 
moval of  a  case  from  a  State  to  a  Federal  court,  the  Federal  court 
may  discharge  a  receiver  therein  appointed.^  Any  person  injured 
by  the  appointment  of  a  receiver  can  move  for  his  discharge  al- 
though not  a  party  to  the  suit  in  which  he  was  appointed.^  The 
motion  should  be  made  on  notice  to  all  parties  interested.''  A  mo- 
tion for  the  discharge  of  a  receiver  may  be  denied  on  account  of 
the  laches  of  the  moving  party .^  A  receiver  of  the  estate  of  an 
infant  will  not  be  discharged  until  a  year  after  the  infant's  ma- 
jority, unless  the  ward  after  majority  consents  to  his  discharge.^ 
The  receiver  will  not  be  discharged,  as  of  course,  at  the  motion 
of  the  party  who  procured  his  appointment,  if  other  parties  who 
have  acquired  an  interest  in  the  receivership  object.^'*  The  entry 
of  a  final  decree  which  does  not  provide  for  tlie  continuance  of 
a  receivership  supersedes  the  appointment  of  a  receiver."  A 
receiver  may  be  discharged  from  the  control  of  real  estate,  and 
the  rents  and  profits  wdiicli  he  has  collected  be  continued  in 
his  control  until  the  termination  of  the  litigation. ^2  Jt  jj^s  been 
held  that  the  discharge  of  a  receiver  by  a  decree  cannot  be  set 
aside  upon  a  motion  entered  after  the  terra  at  which  it  was 
made.^^  The  discharge  of  a  receiver  terminates  his  liability  for 
acts  done  in  his  official  capacity.^*  After  a  receiver's  discharge 
damages  to  the  estate  resulting  from  his  mismanagement  cannot 
be  recovered  from  the  sureties  upon  an  injunction  bond  con- 
current with  his   appointment.^^     Where  a  decree  discharged  a 

*  Young  V.  Montoromery  &  E.  R.   R.  America,  38  Fed.  R.  195 ;  Brown  v.  Lake 

Co.,  2  Woods,  60G ;  Beach  on  Receivers,  Superior  Iron  Co.,  134  U.  S.  530. 

§  791.  9  Matter  of  Van  Home,  7  Paige  Ch. 

5  Texas  &  St.   L.   Ry.  Co.  y.  Rust,  17  (N.   Y.)    346;  Wildridge    v.  McKane,   2 

Fed.   R.    275;  Mahoney   Mining   Co.    v.  Molloy,    545.      See    also    Bainbrigge  v. 

Bennett,  4  Saw.  287.      As  to  the  disposi-  Blair,  3  Beav.  421. 

tion  of  the  money  in  the  hands  of  a  re-  i*^  Bainbrigge   v.  Blair,  3  Beav.   421  ; 

ceiver  thus  discharged,  see  Mack  y.  Jones,  People  v.  Globe  Mutual  Life  Ins.  Co.,  57 

31  Fed.  R.  189,  19G.  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  481  ;  Fay  v.  Erie  &  K. 

«  Thomas   v.  Brigstocke,  4   Russ.  64 ;  R.  R.  Bank,  Harring.  (Mich.)  194.     See, 

Grenfell  v.  Dean  of  Windsor,  2  Beav.  544  ;  however,  Davis  v.  Duke  of  Marlborougli, 

Milwaukie  &  Minnesota  R.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  2  Swanst.  108,  168  ;  Whiteside  v.  Prender- 

Soutter,  2  Wall.  510.  gast,  2  Barb.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  471. 

T  Davis   V.  Duke  of  Marlborough,    2  "  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (5th  Am.  ed.)  1765. 

Swanst.  108,  118  ;  Bainbrigge  v.  Blair,   3  i-  Jones  v.  Smith,  40  Fed.  R.  814. 

Beav.  421,  423.  i3  Davis  v.  Duncan,  19  Fed.  R.  477. 

8  Allen   V.  Dallas  &  W    R.  R.  Co.,  3  »  Davis  v.  Duncan,    19  Fed.  R.  477 ; 

Woods,   316,   331  ;    National   Mechanics'  White  v.  Keokuk  &  D.  M.  Ry.  Co.,  52 

Banking  Assn.  v  Mariposa  Co.,  60  Barb.  Iowa,  97. 

(\.  Y.)  423;  Hazard  v.  Credit  Mobilierof  1^  Lehman  v.  M'Quown,  31  Fed.  R.  138. 


454  RECEIVERS.  [chap.  XVII. 

receiver  upon  condition  that  he  should  file  a  release  from  the 
person  to  whom  the  property  was  given  by  the  decree,  it  was 
held  that  his  omission  to  file  the  release  did  not  make  him  liable 
to  strangers  for  former  injuries  by  his  employees.i^ 

IS  Davis  V.  Duncan,  18  Fed.  B.  477. 


261.]  THE   WRIT   OF  NE   EXEAT   REPUBLIC  A.  455 


CHAPTER  XVIII. 

THE   WRIT   OF   NE   EXEAT   REPUBLICA. 

§  261,  Definition  of  the  Writ  of  Ne  Exeat  Republica,  and  when  it 
will  Issue.  —  The  writ  of  7ie  exeat  republica  is  a  writ  which  issues 
from  a  Federal  court  of  equity  to  restrain  a  defendant  to  a  suit 
therein  from  dcpartiug-from  the  United  States  without  the  leave  of 
the  court.^  In  England  it  was  called  ne  exeat  regno^  and  was  con- 
sidered a  writ  of  high  prerogative.  It  was  originally  applicable  to 
])urposes  of  state  only,  but  afterwards  extended  to  })rivate  transac- 
tions.2  In  the  United  States  the  writ  has  hitherto  been  issued  only 
at  the  request  of  a  private  party.  The  Revised  Statutes  provide 
that  "  writs  of  ne  exeat  may  be  granted  by  any  justice  of  the  Su- 
preme Court,  in  cases  where  they  might  be  granted  by  the  Supreme 
Court ;  and  by  any  circuit  justice  or  circuit  judge,  in  cases  where 
they  might  be  granted  by  the  circuit  court  of  which  he  is  a  judge. 
But  no  writ  of  ne  exeat  shall  be  granted  unless  a  suit  in  equity  is 
commenced,  and  satisfactory  proof  is  made  to  the  court  or  judge 
granting  the  same  that  the  defendant  designs  quickly  to  depart  from 
the  United  States."  ^  It  is  unsettled  whether  the  writ  can  now  issue 
from  a  Federal  court  held  in  a  State  which  has  abolished  imprison- 
ment for  debt.*  It  has  been  held  that  the  writ  cannot  be  granted 
by  a  judge  of  the  District  Court,^  except  when  holding  a  court  of 
equity.^  The  intention  of  the  defcndaut  to  depart  from  the  judi- 
cial district  is  not  enough  to  authorize  the  issue  of  the  writ.'^  The 
claim  of  the  party  applying  for  the  writ  must  be  one  enforceable 
by  a  suit  in  a  court  of  equity  ;  ^  except  where  a  decree  for  perma- 
nent alimony  has  been  entered  and  no  appeal  therefrom  is  pend- 
ing, in  which  case  the  English  rule  was  that  the  writ  might  issue 

§  261.    1  Dan.Ch.rr.(2fl  Ani.ed.)  1025.  ^  Qernon  r.  Boeeiiline,  2  Wash.  130. 

'-  Jju'kson  V.  Petrie,  10  Ves.  164  ;  Dan.  «  Lewis  v.  Shaiiiwald,  7  Saw.  403,  417, 

Cli.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  r.t25;  Beames  on  Ne  418. 
Exeat,  1-21.  "  Loewensteini'.  Biernbaum,  8  Weekly 

3  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  717.  Notes  of  Cas.  (Pa.)  163. 

*  Cf.  U.  S.  R  S.  §990;  Mallory  Manuf.  s  Pe;,rne  v.  Lisle,  Ambler,  75;   Sey- 

Co.  V.  Fox,  20  Fed.  R.  409  ;  and  intra,  §  370.  mour  v.  Hazard,  1  J.  Cli.  (N.  Y. )  1. 
See  also,  24  Am.  Law  Review,  535. 


456  THE   "WPJT    OF   NE   EXEAT   KEPUBLICA.         [CHAP.  XVIII. 

to  compel  obedience  to  the  same.^  The  claim  must  be  for  the 
payment  of  a  certain  fixed  sum  of  money. ^^  A  claim  for  unliqui- 
dated damages  is  insufficient.^^  Thus,  the  writ  cannot  issue  under 
a  bill  to  set  aside  a  bill  of  sale  of  a  vessel,  for  a  return  of  the  vessel 
or  her  value,  and  for  an  account  of  her  earnings. ^^  The  debt  must 
be  already  due.'^^  A  debt  which  is  contingent,^^  or  certain  but 
future,^-^  is  iusufficient.  The  motives  for  the  defendant's  depart- 
ure, no  matter  how  innocent  they  may  be,  —  as,  for  example, 
that  he  is  about  to  sail  upon  a  ship  of  wliich  he  is  captain,^^  — 
will  not  prevent  the  issue  of  the  writ.^^ 

§  262.  Against  whom  the  "Writ  will  Issue. —  The  writ  waS  origi- 
nally confined  to  subjects  of  the  King  of  England. ^  It  has  been 
extended,  however,  so  as  to  apply  to  foreigners  as  well  as  sub- 
jects of  the  country  from  the  coui-ts  of  which  the  writ  issues,^ 
and  where  the  court  has  jurisdiction,  the  writ  may  be  issued  at 
the  suit  of  one  foreigner  against  another.^  It  seems  that  the 
writ  may  be  issued  against  a  married  woman  in  a  suit  affectiug 
her  separate  estate.^  The  writ  will  not  issue  against  a  defendant 
who  is  under  arrest  or  held  to  bail  in  an  action  at  law.°  The 
Constitution  provides  that  Senators  and  Representatives  shall,  in 
all  cases,  except  treason,  felony,  and  breach  of  the  peace,  be 
privileged  from  arrest  during  tlieir  attendance  at  the  session  of 
their  respective  Houses,  and  in  going  to  and  returning  from  the 
same.*"  And  the  Revised  Statutes,  that  whenever  any  writ  or 
process  is  sued  out  or  prosecuted  by  any  person  in  any  court  of 
the  United  States,  or  of  a  State,  or  by  any  judge  or  justice, 
whereby  the  person  of  any  public  minister  of  any  foreign  prince 
or  state,  authorized  and  received   as   such  by  the  President,  or 

"  Tearne  v.  Lisle,  Ambler,  75 ;  Read  v.  ^^  Dick  v.  Svvinton,  1  V.  &  B.  .171. 

Read,!  Cli.Cas.  115;  £'.r/)«rte  Whitmore,  i"  Stewart   v.    Graliain,    19   Ves.   31.3; 

1  Dickens,  143 ;  Shaftoe  >:  Shaftoe,  7  Ves.  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2(1  Am.  ed.)  1934,  1935. 

171 ;  Street  v.  Street,  1  T.  &  R.  822 ;  Dan-  §  262.    i  Daniell's  Cli.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.) 

iell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  192G,  1927.  1933;  Beames  on  Ne  E.xeat,  1-20. 

1"  Graham  v.  Stucken,  4  Blatchf.  50;  -  Flnck    v     Holm,    1    J.    &   W.   405; 

Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1931.  Daniell's    Cii.    Pr.    (2d    Am.    cd.)    1933, 

11  Graham  v.  Stucken,  4  Blatchf.  50.  1934. 

1-  Graliam  r.  Stucken,  4  Blatchf.  50.  ^  DeCarriere  ;•.  DeCalonne,  4  Ves.  577 ; 

13  Wiiitehoiise  v.  Partrid^re,  3  Swanst.  Mitchell  r.  Bunch,  2  PaitiO,  (N.  Y.),  OOG. 

365,  377;   Seymour  v.  Hazard,  1  J.  Ch.  *  Moore  v.  Hudson,  Mad.  &  Geld.  218; 

(N.  Y.)  1.  Moore  v.  Mcynell,  1  Dickens,  30 ,  Daniell's 

»  Anon  ,  1  Atk.  .521.  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  101. 

i''  Wiiitehousc  v.  Partridfre,  3  Swanst.  ^  Raynes  r.  Wyse,  2  Meriv.  472 ;  Dan- 

S.,i5,  377;  Seymour  v.  Hazard,  1  J.  Ch.  iell's  Cli.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1930,  1931. 

^N.  Y.)  1.  '^  Constitution,  Article  I,  §  G. 


§  263.]      PRACTICE   IN   OBTAINING   THE   WRIT   OF    NE   EXEAT.  457 

any  domestic  or  domestic  servant  of  any  such  minister,  is  arrested 
or  imprisoned,  or  his  goods  or  chattels  are  distrained,  seized,  or 
attached,  sucli  writ  or  process  shall  be  deemed  void."  When- 
ever any  writ  or  process  is  sued  out  in  violation  of  this  statute, 
eveiy  person  by  whom  the  same  is  obtained  or  prosecuted, 
whether  as  party  or  as  attorney  or  solicitor,  and  every  officer 
concerned  in  executing  it,  is  deemed  a  violator  of  the  laws  of  na- 
tions and  a  disturber  of  the  public  repose,  and  is  liable  to  impris- 
onment for  not  more  than  three  years,  and  a  tine  at  the  d<iscretion 
of  the  court.^  These  regulations  do  not  apply  to  any  case  where 
the  person  against  whom  the  process  is  issued  is  a  citizen  or  in- 
habitant of  the  United  States  in  the  service  of  a  public  minister, 
and  the  process  is  founded  upon  a  debt  contracted  before  he 
entered  upon  such  service  ;  nor  to  any  case  where  the  person 
against  whom  the  process  issued  is  a  domestic  servant  of  a  pub- 
lic minister,  unless  the  name  of  the  servant  has,  before  the 
issuing  thereof,  been  registered  in  the  Department  of  State,  and 
transmitted  by  the  Secretary  of  State  to  the  marshal  of  the  Dis- 
trict of  Columbia,  who  is  required,  upon  the  receipt  thereof,  to 
post  the  same  in  some  public  place  in  his  office.^  All  persons 
may  have  access  to  the  list  of  names  so  posted  in  the  marshal's 
office,  and  may  take  copies  without  a  fee.^*' 

§  263.  Practice  in  obtaining  the  Writ  of  Ne  Exeat.  —  The  ap- 
plication for  a  writ  of  we  exeat  repuhlica  may  be  made  ex  parte, 
even  after  the  defendant  has  appeared.^  The  reason  for  allow- 
ing this  is,  that  notice  might  frustrate  the  object  of  the  motion 
by  giving  the  party  an  opportunity  of  removing  himself  out  of 
the  jurisdiction.-  It  has  been  held  in  England  that  the  writ  can- 
not be  obtained  until  a  bill  has  been  filed.''^  The  equity  rules 
provide  that  the  writ  shall  be  asked  for  in  the  bill,  when  it  is 
required  "  pending  the  suit."  ^  But  it  has  been  held  that  the 
writ  may  be  granted  at  or  after  the  decree,  although  the  bill 
contains   no   such   prayer.^     And   by   the   English  practice,  no 

T  U.  S.   R.  S.  §  40G3.     See   Ex  parte  2  ;Elliot  v.  Sinclair,  Jacob,  545. 

Ca])rera,    1    Wash.    C.    C.   232  ;    Uiiitod  3  jr^-  parte  Brunker,  3  P.  Wnis.  312  ; 

States  V.  Benner,  Baldwin,  234;  United  Mattocks   v.   Treniain,  3  J.  Ch.    (N.  Y.) 

States  V.  Lafontaine,  4  Cranch  C.  C.  173.  75.     But  see  Loyd  v.  Cardy,  Prec.  in  Ch. 

8  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  4064.  171. 

9  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  40G.5.  <  Rule  21.     But  see  the  languase  of 
W  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  4066.                                     Lord  Eldon  in  Collinson  v. ,  18  Vts. 

§  263.   1  Collinson  v. .  18  Ves.  353  ;     353. 

Elliot  V.  Sinclair,  Jacob,  545.  ^  Lewis  v.  Shainwald,  7  Saw.  403,  417 


458  THE    WRIT   OF   NE    EXEAT   REPUBLICA.         [CHAP.  XVIII. 

prayer  in  the  bill  was  required.^  The  writ  must  be  supported 
by  au  affidavit  made  by  the  complainant  hhnself,  or  some  person 
acquainted  with  the  facts.^  The  affidavit  must  be  positive  as  to 
the  facts,  not  merely  upon  information  and  belief,^  except  in  the 
case  of  an  account,  when  the  plaintiff  may  swear  that,  to  the 
best  of  his  belief,  the  sum  named  will  be  due  to  him  on  the  bal- 
ance of  the  account.^  A  writ  was  discharged  when  it  appeared 
from  the  affidavit  that  the  affiant  could  not  have  had  personal 
knowledge  of  the  transaction  to  which  he  swore  positively.^'' 
The  affidavit  must  be  positive  as  to  the  intention  of  the  defendant 
to  go  abroad,  or  to  his  threats  or  declarations,  or  those  of  members 
of  his  family  or  his  agents,  showing  such  an  intention  on  Ids  part.^^ 
An  affidavit  stating  information  from  a  stranger  will  ordinarily 
be  insufficient.^^  It  is  prudent  to  state  in  the  affidavit  that  the 
debt  will  be  endangered  by  the  defendant's  quitting  the  coun- 
try.13  Deficiencies  in  the  affidavit  may  be  supplied  by  admis- 
sions in  the  answer.^*  The  court  may  require  as  a  condition  for 
the  issue  of  the  writ  that  the  complainant  give  an  undertaking 
to  respond  in  damages  should  the  writ  be  afterwards  discharged.!^ 
The  writ  is  directed  to  the  marshal,  and  is  in  substantially  the 
following  form  :  — 

The  President  of  the  United  States  of  America  to  the  Mar- 
shal OF  THE  Southern  District  of  New  York  : 
Greeting,  —  Whereas  it  is  represented  to  us  in  our  Circuit  Court 
of  the  United  States  for  the  Southern  District  of  New  York  in  equity, 
on  the  part  of  John  Aber,  complainant,  against  Charles  Dutton, 
defendant,  (among  other  things)  that  he,  the  said  defendant,  is  greatly 
indebted  to  the  said  complainant  and  designs  quickl}^  to  go  into 
parts  without  the  United  States  (as  by  oath  made  on  that  behalf 
appears),  which  tends  to  the  great  prejudice  and  damage  of  the  said 
complainant.     Therefore,  in  order   to    prevent   this   injustice,   we   do 

^  CoUinson  !•. ,  18  Vcs.  353  ;  Lewis  Watts,  2  C.  P.  Cooper  temp.  Cottenham, 

V.  Sliainwald,  7  Saw.  403,  416,  417.  257. 

■  Collinson  v. ,  18  Ves.  353  ;  Mat-         i-     Olclliam  v.  Oldham,  7  Yes.  410. 

tocks  V.  Tremain,  3  J.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  75.  13  Mattocks  r.  Treniain,  3  J.  Ch.  (N.  Y  ) 

8  Rico  V.  Gualtier,  3  Atk.  501  ;  -Tack-  75,  76  ;  Baker  v.   Haily,  2  Dickens,  G32  ; 

son  V.  Petrie,  10  Ves.  164;    Mattocks  v.  Daiiiell's  Ch.  Pr.  (5th  Am.  ed.)  1708,  and 

Tremain,  3  J.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  75.  cases  cited.     But  see  McGehee  v.  Polk, 

0  Rico  ".  Gualtier,  3  Atk.  501  ;  Jack-  24  Ga.  40G,  412. 
0  son  V.  Petrie,  10  Ves.  164.  "  Roddam  v.  Iletherington,  5  Vcs.  91, 

'»  Roddam  i\  Iletherington,  5  Vcs.  91.  95. 

11  ()],lham    V.    Oldliani,    7   Vcs.   410  ;         !&  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (5th  Am.  ed.)  1708. 
Collin.son  r.  ,  IS  Vcs.  353;  Knights. 


§  263]      PRACTICE   IN   OBTAINING   THE   WRIT   OF  NE   EXEAT.  4o9 

hereby  command  you,  that  3-ou  do,  without  delay,  cause  the  said 
Charles  DurroN  personally  to  appear  before  you,  and  give  sufficient 

bail  or  security  in  the  sum  of  $ that  the  said  Charles  Dlttox  will 

not  ''"o,  or  attempt  to  go,  into  parts  without  the  United  States,  without 
leave  of  our  said  Court ;  and  in  case  the  said  Charles  Dutton  shall 
refuse  to  give  such  Bail  or  Securit}',  then  you  are  to  commit  the  said 
Charles  Dltton  to  our  next  prison,  there  to  be  kept  in  safe  custody, 
until  he  shall  do  it  of  his  own  accord  ;  and,  when  you  shall  have  taken 
such  security,  you  are  forthwith  to  make  and  return  a  certificate  thereof 
to  us  in  our  said  Circuit  Court  of  the  United  States  for  the  Southern 
District  of  New  York  distinctly  and  plainly  under  your  hand,  together 
with  this  "Writ. 

Witness,  the  Honorable  MELVILLE  W.  FULLER,  Chief  Justice  of 
the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  at  the  City  of  New  York,  in 
the  County  and  State  of  New  York,  the  thirteenth  day  of  November, 
one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  eighty-nine.^" 

The  writ  should  be  endorsed  with  the  amount  of  the  sum  de- 
manded written  out  in  words  at  length.^^  AVhen  it  is  issued  against 
a  personal  representative  by  a  person  claiming  a  share  of  the  re- 
siduary estate,  it  should  be  endorsed  with  the  whole  amount  due 
from  the  defendant,  not  only  to  the  plaintiiT,  but  to  all  persons  in- 
terested in  the  estate.^^  When  the  writ  is  endorsed  for  a  larger 
sum  than  is  due,  the  court  will  ordinarily  refuse  to  quash  it,  but 
will  require  the  defendant  to  give  security  only  for  so  much  as  is 
reall}''  due.^^  The  writ,  upon  its  issue,  must  be  delivered  to  the 
marshal.  It  is  his  duty  thereupon  to  execute  it  by  arresting  the 
defendant  named  in  it,  and  bringing  him  before  the  court. -*^  He 
has  no  power  to  break  open  doors  under  the  writ.-^  The  de- 
fendant may  be  released  upon  giving  sufficient  security  to  sat- 
isfy the  marshal.2^  After  executing  the  writ,  the  marshal  should 
make  a  return  of  what  he  has  done.-^  The  defendant  may  move 
at  any  time  to  discharge  the  writ,  either  for  irregularity  or  upon 
the  merits,  by  disproving  the  charges  in  the  complainant's  affi- 
davits.2^  j>^^  [^  liay  been  said  by  Lord  Eldon,  that  where  the 
plaintiff  has  sworn  positively  to  the  debt  and  to  the  defendant's 

16  Beanies  on  Ne  Exeat,  2.3,  24.  Wootl,  T.  &  R.  3-12,  340;  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr. 

1"  Beames  on  Ne  Exeat,  9.'3.  (2d  Am.  cd.)  1943. 

18  Pannell  v.  Tayler,  T.  &  R.  06,  100.  ^3  Daniell's  Oh.  Pr.  (2d  Am   ed.)  1945 ; 

19  Pannell  i:  Tayler,  T.  &  R.  90,  100.  Impey  on  Sheriffs  (2d  ed.),  5.']2. 

2'5  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1943.         -*  Gcrnon  v.  Bopcaline,  2  Wash.   1.30; 
'^i  Beames  on  Ne  Exeat,  9.5.  Grant  v.  Grant,  3  liuss.  598,  GU2. 

22  Beames  on  Ne  Exeat,  90  ;   Boehm  v. 


460  THE    WRIT    OF   NE    EXEAT   REPUBLICA.         [CHAP.  XVIII. 

declarations  of  his  intention  to  go  abroad,  the  defendant's  unsup- 
ported affidavit  will  be  insufficient  to  contradict  tliis.^^  If  the 
writ  is  discharged,  another  writ  may  issue  upon  a  new  affidavit.'^^ 
Upon  payment  into  court  of  enough  to  satisfy  the  plaintiff's 
claim,  the  writ  will  always  be  discharged.^^  The  writ  may  be 
discharged  if  the  defendant  gives  sufficient  security  to  satisfy  the 
court/2^  The  security  usually  required  is  conditioned  that  the 
defendant  abide  by  the  process  and  decree  of  the  court ;  ^^  but 
security  that  the  defendant  abide  by  and  perform  the  process  and 
decree  of  the  court  may  be  required.^*^  The  discharging  order 
usually  enjoins  the  defendant  from  bringing  an  action  of  false 
imprisonment ;  ^^  and  the  prosecution  of  such  an  action  may  be 
restrained  by  a  subsequent  order.^s  If  the  court  considers  the 
writ  improperly  issued,  it  may  direct  a  reference  to  a  master  to 
ascertain  the  damages  sustained  by  the  defendant,  and  direct  the 
payment  to  him  of  the  amount  found  due  by  the  sureties  upon 
the  plaintiff's  undertaking.'^'^  An  amendment  of  the  bill  which 
does  not  materially  alter  the  case  does  not  discharge  the  writ.^^ 

25  Amsinck  v.  Barklay,  8  Vcsey,  594,  29  Qriswold  v.  Hazard,  141  U.  S.  260, 

597;   Jones  i-.  Aleplisin,  16  Vesey,  470,  281. 

471.  ao  Griswold  v.  Hazard,  141  U.   S.  260, 

^6  Gernon  v  Boecaline,  2  Wash.  130.  281. 

2"  Evans  v.  Evans,  1  Ves.  Jr  96.  3^  Darley  v.  Nlcliolson,  2  Dr.  &  War.  86. 

28  Roddam  v.  Hetlierington,  5  Ves.  91,  ^2  Darley  v.  Nicholson,  2  Dr.  &  War.  86. 

95  ;  Boon  v.  Collingwood,  I  Dickens,  115;  ^^  Sichel  v  Raphael,  4  L.  T.  n.  s.  114. 

Beanies  on  Ne  Exeat,  98,  99.  3*  Grant  i'.  Grant,  5  Russ.  189. 


§  265.]  ADMISSIONS.  461 


CHAPTER  XIX. 

EVIDENCE    AT   LAW  AND   IN    EQUITY. 

§  264.  Evidence  in  General.  —  The  Revised  Statutes  provide  that 
"  the  mode  of  proof  in  the  trial  of  actions  at  common  law  shall 
be  by  oral  testimony  and  examination  of  witnesses  in  open  court, 
except  as  hereinafter  provided  ; "  ^  and  "  the  mode  of  proof  in 
causes  of  equity  and  of  admiralty  and  maritime  jurisdiction  shall 
be  according  to  rules  now  or  hereafter  prescribed  by  tlie  Supreme 
Court,  except  as  herein  specially  provided  for."  ^  Evidence  con- 
sists of  admissions  upon  the  record,  documents,  and  the  testi- 
mony of  witnesses.  No  objection  can  be  taken,  on  an  appeal  to 
the  Supreme  Court,  to  the  admissibility  in  evidence  of  any  depo- 
sition, deed,  grant,  or  other  exhibit  found  in  the  record,  unless 
the  record  shows  that  objection  was  taken  thereto  in  the  court 
below.3  The  Federal  courts  take  judicial  notice  of  all  public 
statutes,  whether  State  or  Federal,*  of  public  statutes  of  a  former 
government  exercising  jurisdiction  over  the  same  territory,^  and 
of  executive  regulations  authorized  by  acts  of  Congress  which 
have  the  force  of  statutes.^  They  will  not  take  judicial  notice 
of  the  filing  by  a  railway  company  of  the  map  of  its  route  with 
the  Secretary  of  the  Interior." 

§  265.  Admissions.  —  Admissions  upon  the  record  are  either 
actual  or  constructive.  Actual  admissions  are  made  either  in 
the  pleadings  or  by  agreement.  Every  statement  of  a  fact  ma- 
terial to  the  issues  made  in  the  pleadings  or  other  documents 
used  in  support  of  the  claim  of  any  party  to  a  suit,  who  is  of  full 
age,  whether  sworn  to  or  not,^  may  be  used  as  evidence  against 
him  upon  the  hearing.     The  filing  of  the  general  replication  does 

§■264.  1  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  861.  See  Benrrls-  «  United  States  i-.Willuims, 6  Mont  379. 

ley  f.  Littell,  14  Blatchf.  102;  Ex  parte  "^  McKeoin  r.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  45 

Fisk,  113  U.  S.  713.  Fed.  R.  464,  467. 

•^  U.   S.  R.   S.  §  862.     See  Blease  v.  §  265.     i  Smith  v.  Potter,  3  Wis.  432. 

Garlington,  5)2  U.  S.  1.  An  admission  in  an  unverified  pleading 

8  Supreme  Court  Rule  13.  in  another  suit  which  was  signed  only  by 

*  Owings  V.  Hull,  9  Pet.  607  ;   Gorm-  an  attorney,  cannot  be  admitted   in   evi- 

ley  V.  Bunyan,  138  U.  S.  623,  635.  dence.     Delaware  County  Com'rs  r.  Die- 

5  U.  S.  V.  Perot,  98  U.  S.  438.  bold  S.  &  L.  Co.,  133  U.  S.  399. 


462  EVIDENCE   AT   LAW   AND   IN   EQUITY.  [CHAP.  XIX. 

not  waive  the  right  to  rely  on  admissions  in  an  answer  or  plea.^ 
The  statement  by  a  defendant  that  he  believes,  or  is  informed 
and  believes,  that  a  certain  fact  occurred,  is  treated  as  an  ad- 
mission, unless  coupled  with  some  clause  to  prevent  its  being  so 
considered.^  For  it  is  a  rule  in  equity  that  what  the  defendant 
believes,  the  court  will  believe.'^  This  rule,  however,  does  not 
apply  to  the  statement  of  a  defendant  that  he  believes  that  a 
will  was  executed  as  charged  in  the  bill.^  Admissions  in  an 
answer  made  on  behalf  of  an  infant  cannot  be  used  against  him,^ 
unless  he  adopts  the  answer  after  he  has  reached  his  majority.'^ 
An  admission  of  one  defendant,  whether  in  his  answer  or  other- 
wise, is  not  evidence  against  any  of  his  co-defendants,^  who  is 
not  his  partner 9  or  who  docs  not  derive  his  title  from  him.^*^ 
The  parties  to  a  suit  may,  by  an  agreement  signed  by  themselves 
or  their  solicitors  or  made  in  open  court  by  their  counsel,  admit 
any  fact  as  proven,  or  allow  testimony  to  be  taken  in  any  man- 
ner, unless  they  thus  commit  an  act  repugnant  to  public  policy. ^^ 
Xo  agreement  between  counsel  will  be  enforced  unless  reduced  to 
writing  or  made  in  open  court.^^ 

§  266.  Constructive  Admissions.  —  Constructive  admissions  are 
those  which  are  implied  by  law  from  a  party's  act.  A  construc- 
tive admission  is  made  by  the  plaintiff  when  he  files  no  general 
replication,  but  sets  the  cause  down  for  a  hearing  upon  bill  and 
answer  only ;  or  when,  in  his  bill,  he  does  not  expressly  waive 
an  answer  under  oath.  In  the  former  case,  he  admits  for  the 
purposes  of  the  suit  that  all  the  allegations  in  the  answer  are 

2  Cavender  !'.  Cavender,  8  Fed  R.  G41.  "  Field  v.  Holland,  6  Cranch,  8;  Os- 

«  Potter  y.  Potter,  I  Ves.  Sen.  274  ;  Hill  born  v.  Bank  of  United   States,  9  Wheat. 

V.  Binney,  6  Ves.  738.  738. 

4  Potter  V.  Potter,  1  Ves.  Sen.  274  ;  Hill  ^^  Barker  v.  Dixie,  Reports  temp.  Hard- 
V.  Binney,  6  Ves.  738.  wicke,  252;  Owen  v.  Thomas,  3  M.  &  K. 

5  Potter  V.  Potter,  1  Ves.  Sen.  274;  353,357;  Nixon  f.  Albion  Marine  Ins.  Co., 
Davies  v.  Davies,  3  DeG.  &  Sm.  698.  L.  R.  2   Ex.  338.     For  a  case  where  the 

•>  Leigh  V.  Ward,  2  Ventris,  72  ;  Ec-  court  refused    to  relieve  a    party   from 

cleston  V.  Petty,  Carthew,  79 ;  Savage  v.  a  stipulation,    see  McNeill  v.  Town    of 

Carroll,  1  Ball  &  Beatty,  548,  553;  Wrot-  Andes,  40  Fed.  R.  45.     As  to  the  power  of 

tesley  f.  Bendish,  3  P.    Wms.  235.     See  the  next  friend  of  an  infant  to  stipulate, 

Kingsbury  v.  Buckner,  134  U.  S.  650,080.  see  Kingsbury  v.  Buckner,  134  U.  S.  650, 

'   Hinde's  Ch.  Pr.  422.  080.     As  to  the  power  of  a  receiver  to 

8  Leeds  v.  Marine  Ins.  Co.,  2  Wheat,  bind  the  estate  by  a  stipulation,  see  su- 
380;  Clark's  Executors  v.  Van  Riemsdyk,  pra,  §  249. 

9  Crancii,  163.  ^'  Evans  v.  State    National   Bank,  19 

9  Crosse  v.  Bedingfield,  12  Simons,  35  ;  Fed.  R.  676  ;  Lee  v.  Simpson,  42  Fed.  R. 
Clark's    Executors   v.  Van  Riemsdyk,  9    434. 

Cranch,  153,  lot). 


§  267.]  DOCUMENTARY   EVIDENCE   IN   GENERAL.  463 

true ;  ^  in  the  latter,  that  all  arc  true  which  he  cannot  contradict 
by  the  testimony  of  two  witnesses,  or  of  a  single  witness  with 
corroborating  circumstances.^  This  rule  does  not  apply, however, 
unless  tlie  allegations  in  the  answer  are  made  positively.-^  Thus, 
a  denial  according  to  the  defendant's  recollection  and  belief  is 
insufficient  for  this  purpose.*  So  is  an  allegation  upon  infor- 
mation and  belief.'^  By  setting  down  a  plea  for  argument  the 
plaintiff  admits  the  truth  of  the  allegations  of  fact  therein  con- 
tained,*^ Constructive  admissions  are  also  made  by  a  demurrer, 
a  plea,  or  a  default  in  pleading.  A  demurrer  admits  the  truth  of 
the  allegations  in  the  bill,'  but  not  of  conclusions  of  law  tlicrein 
set  fortli.^  A  plea  admits  the  truth  of  so  much  of  the  bill  as  it 
does  not  deny%^  A  default  by  the  defendant's  failing  to  file  a 
demurrer,  plea,  or  answer  to  the  bill  within  the  time  allowed  for 
that  purpose  entitles  the  plaintiff  to  enter  an  order  taking  the 
bill  as  confessed  by  him ;  whereupon  the  defendant  is  deemed  to 
admit  the  truth  of  the  allegations  in  the  bill.^^  Formerly  in 
England  no  extra-judicial  admissions  of  a  defendant  could  be 
given  in  evidence  unless  they  had  been  charged  in  the  bill ;  but 
that  rule  probably  would  not  now  be  followed  here.^^  Other 
testimony  also,  which  was  of  a  kind  likely  to  take  a  party  by 
surprise,  was  formerly  often  excluded  unless  the  pleadings  called 
attention  to  it.^^ 

§  267.  Documentary  Evidence  in  General.  —  Documentary  evi- 
dence consists  of  all  those  matters  not  contained  in  depositions 
or  affidavits,  which  are  submitted  to  the  court  in  the  shape  of 
written  documents.  The  rules  regulating  its  admission  are  sub- 
stantially the  same  in  equity  as  at  common  law}      In  equity, 

§  2m.    1  United    States   v.    Scott,    3  Illinois  M.  &  T.   R.  R.   Co.,    133   U.   S. 

Woods,  334  ;  Kennedy  v.  Baylor,  1  Wash.  200. 

(Va.)  1(!2.  ''  Pacific  Railroad  of  Missouri  v.  Mis- 

2  Clark's  Executors  r.  Van  Rienisdyk,  sonri  Pacific  Ry.  Co.,  Ill  U.  S.  505,  522. 

9    Crancli,   153,    160;    Union    Bank' of  See  §  106. 

Georgetown  v.  Geary,  5    Pet.   99,    110;  ^^  Dillon  i-.  Barnard,  21  Wall.  430.  See 

Seitz  V.  Mitchell,  94  U.  S.  580,  582  ;  Vigel  §  106. 

V.  Hopp,  104  U.  S.  441.  3  Farley  r.  Kittson,  120  U.  S.  303. 

8  Carpenter  !'.  Providence  Washington  ^'>  Rules  18,  10.     See  §§  103-104,  ch.  vii. 

Ins.  Co,  4  How.  185;  Taylor  v.  Lutiier,  ii  See  §  50,  and  Smith   v.   Burnham,  2 

2  Sumner,  228;  Berry  y.  Sawyer,  19  Fed.  Sumner,    612.;    Jenkins     v.    Eldredge,    3 

R.  280.  Story,  181 ;  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §§  265  a. 

4  Taylor  v.  Luther,  2  Sumner,  228.  12  See  §  69,  and  Lang.lell's  Eq.  PI.  §  60. 

6  Berry  i\  Sawyer,  19  Fed.  R.  286.  §  267.     1  Lake  v.  Philips,  1  Ch.   Rep. 

6  Burrell  v.  Hackley,  .35  Fed.  R.  833;  110;  Stevens  r.  Cooper,  1  J.  Cli.  (N.  Y.) 

Burrell  v.  Pratt,  35  Fed.  R.  834 ;  Beals  v.  425,  429,  and  cases  cited. 


464  EVIDENCE    AT   LAW   AND    IN    EQUITY.  [cHAP.  XIX. 

however,  such  documents  as  merely  require  proof  of  their  execu- 
tion or  of  the  handwriting  contained  in  them  may  be  admitted 
in  evidence  at  the  hearing  of  the  cause  if  accompanied  by  an 
affidavit  of  these  facts,  provided  that  an  order,  which  is  granted 
as  of  course,  has  been  obtained  and  served  upon  the  opposite 
side  at  least  two  days  before.'-^  In  some  cases,  the  courts  have 
permitted  the  proof  of  such  documents  by  word  of  mouth  under 
oath  at  the  hearing,  when  their  existence  and  execution  was  not 
denied  by  the  answer.^  According  to  the  old  English  practice, 
the  adverse  party  had  no  right,  in  tbe  absence  of  special  circum- 
stances, to  compel  before  the  hearing  the  production  of  any 
exhibit,  however  it  had  been  proved, — except,  perhaps,  when  the 
deposition  proving  it  had  set  it  out  verbatim  ;  nor  even  to  inspect 
it,  it  being  considered  that  a  party  should  not  before  the  hearing 
see  the  strength  of  the  cause,  or  any  deed,  to  |)ick  holes  in  it.^ 
The  practice  in  the  Federal  courts  seems  to  be  otherwise.  It 
has  been  held  there  that,  in  equity  and  at  common  law,  either 
party  may  upon  motion  supported  by  affidavit,  which  affidavit 
may  be  controverted,  compel  the  other  party  to  produce  for  his 
inspection  on  the  trial  or  hearing  any  books  or  other  documents 
material  to  the  issues,  which  are  in  his  opponent's  possession  or 
under  his  opponent's  control.^  It  has  been  held  that  such  an 
order  will  not  be  granted  when  the  production  of  the  papers  can 
be  compelled  by  a  subpoena  duces  tecum  which  has  been  served.^ 
When  a  party  inspects  a  document  which  he  has  compelled  his 
adversary  to  produce  under  a  subpoena  duces  tecum,  and  then 
fails  to  offer  it  in  evidence,  his  adversary  may  put  it  in  evidenceJ 
The  production  of  applications  for  patents  which  do  not  interfere 
with  caveats  may  thus  be  compelled.^  When  a  party  had  filed 
an  exhibit  drawn  in  pencil,  a  motion  requiring  him  to  refile  it 
drawn  in  ink  was  denied.^  A  party  is  not  entitled  to  a  general  in- 
spection of  books  and  papers  in  his  adversary's  possession.     In 

2  Clare  v.  Wood,  1  Hare,  314.  ^  Edi.son  Electric  Lifrlit  Co.   v.   U.  S. 

3  Wood  I'.  Mann,  2  Sumner,  310  ;  Nes-  Electric  Lifjlitinsj  Co.,  44  Fed.  R  294,  300. 
mith  V.  Calvert,  1  W.  &  M.  .34  ;  Attorney-  "  Edison  Electric  Li<.Hit  Co.  ;•.  U.  S. 
General  c.  Pearson,  7  Simons,  290,  .303  Electric  Lifjlitin^'  Co.,  45  Fed.  R.  55. 

^  Pavers  v.  Davers,  2  P.  Wms.  410.  8  Edison   Electric   Lisrlit   Co.  v.   U.  S. 

6  Coit  V.  North  Carolina  Gold  Amalga-  Electric  Lifjlitins  Co.,  44  Fed.  R.  204 ;  s.  C. 

mating  Co.,  9  Fed.  R.  577.      Cf.  U  S.  R.  45  Fed.  R  55.     But  see  Rule  15  of  Patent 

S.  §  724.  ;   and   mfra,  §  372.      But  see  Office;   U.  S,  R.  S.  §4902. 
Guyot  V.  Hilton,  32  Fed.  R.  743 ;  Colgate         9  Tubman  v.  Wason   Manuf.    Co.,  44 

&  Comjjagnie  Francaise,  23  Fed.  R.  82.  Fed.  R.  429. 


§  268.]  DOCUMENTARY   EVIDENCE.  465 

the  case  of  an  inspection  of  books,  the  usual  practice  is  to  have 
all  except  the  pages  containing  the  material  matter  sealed  up, 
and  to  have  the  inspection  take  place  under  the  supervision  of  a 
master  or  commissioner. ^'^  In  an  action  to  recover  a  penalty, 
whether  brought  by  a  private  individual  or  by  the  United  States, 
and  in  a  proceeding  to  enforce  a  forfeiture  of  property,  the  defend- 
ant or  owner  of  the  property  seized  cannot  be  compelled  to  pro- 
duce his  books  or  papers  or  other  articles  of  personal  property  for 
the  inspection  of  the  opposite  party,  and  should  such  an  inspec- 
tion be  compelled,  the  judgment  may  be  reversed  upon  that 
ground  alone. ^^  It  has  been  held  that  under  a  subpcKna  duces 
tecum,  a  witness  cannot  be  compelled  to  produce  patterus  of  the 
casting  of  a  stove,  or  anything  except  books  and  papers. '^  A  de- 
fendant may  be  compelled  to  state,  when  called  as  a  witness  by 
the  plaintiff,  whether  he  has  in  his  possession  a  machine  claimed 
to  be  an  infringement  of  the  plaintiff's  patent,  although  the  plain- 
tiff has  not  previously  made  out  a  pt'ima  facie  case  of  infriuge- 
ment.^3  j^  ^  suit  against  the  heir-at-law  to  establish  the  validity 
of  a  will,  all  the  witnesses  to  the  will  who  are  alive,  sane,  and 
within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court,  must  be  examined ;  ^*  aud  the 
testator's  sanity  must  be  proved  affirmatively.^^  This  rule  does 
not,  however,  apply  to  suits  to  establish  the  trusts  of  a  will,  or  to 
appoint  a  new  trustee,  or  in  any  other  case  when  the  validity  of 
the  will  is  not  directly  in  issue. ^^ 

§  268.  Federal  Statutes  regulating  Admission  of  Documentary 
Evidence.  —  The  Revised  Statutes  of  the  United  States  provide 
as  follows  concerning  the  admission  of  documentary  evidence : 
"  Copies  of  any  books,  records,  papers,  or  documents  in  any  of 
the  executive  departments,  authenticated  under  the  seals  of  such 
departments,  respectively,  shall  be  admitted  in  evidence  equally 
witli  the  originals  thereof."  ^     The  mode  of  authentication  pre- 

i»  Bobbins  v.  Denis,  1  Blatchf  2-38,  243.  i^  Bootie  c.   Blundell,   19   Ves.  494  b, 

^1  Johnson   v.    Donalds^on,    18  Blatchf.  505;  Concannon  r.  Cruise,  2  Molloy,  332. 

287;  Boyd  i-   United   States,   116   U.  S.  §268.  i  U.  S.  R.  S  §  8^2.     See  13arney 

616.     See  United  States   v.  Denicke,  35  r.  Sclmieider,  9   Wall.  248;  Chadwick  v. 

Fed.  R.  407,  410.  United  States,  3  Fed.  R.  750;  Block  v. 

12  In  re  Sheppard,  3  Fed.  R.  12.  United  States,  7  Ct.  CI.  40(5 ;  United  States 

13  Delamater  r.  Rcinhardt,  43  Fed.  R.  i-.  Liddle,  2  Wash.  205,  United  States  v. 
76;  per  Lacombe,  J.  Contra,  Celluloid  Benner,  Baldwin,  234;  White  r.  St. 
Co.  V.  Crowe  Co.,  U.  S.  C.  C.  3d  Circuit.  Guirons,  Minor    (Ala.),    331  ;  Cartlett  v. 

"  Bootler.  Blundell,  19  Ves.  494  b,  505.  Pacific  Ins.  Co..  1   Paine,  594;  Bleecker 

15  Harris   v.   Ingledew,  3  P   Wms.   91  ;  v.  Bond,  3  Wash.  529  ;  Thompson  v.  Smith, 

Wallis  I'.  Hodgeson,  2  Atk.  56.  2  Bond,  320 ;  Wetmore  v.  United  States, 
VOL.   1,-30 


466  EVIDENCE   AT   LAW   AND    IN    EQUITY.  [CIIAP.  XIX. 

scribed  by  the  statute  must  be  strictly  followed.^  The  words, 
"  papers  or  documents,"  mean  only  such  as  are  made  by  an  officer 
and  an  agent  of  the  government  in  the  discharge  of  his  official 
duty ;  and  copies  of  such  are  not  competent  evidence  unless  it 
was  the  duty  of  the  officer  to  file  the^  originals.^  In  the  case  of 
documents  filed  in  the  Treasury  Department,  an  authentication 
under  the  seal  of  that  department  and  the  signature  of  the  Secre- 
tary and  the  Assistant  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  will  be  suffi- 
cient.'^ If  the  officer  having  charge  of  tlie  paper  certifies  that 
the  copy  is  correct  and  the  head  of  a  department  certifies  to 
the  officer's  character,  the  paper  is  sufficiently  authenticated, 
provided  that  the  seal  from  the  department  is  attached  thereto.^ 
The  original  cancelled  register  of  a  lost  vessel  has  been  held  to 
come  within  the  statute.^  Accounts  and  papers  filed  in  the  office 
of  the  Quartermaster-General,  may  thus  be  proved.'  In  cases 
described  in  §  886  of  tlie  Revised  Statutes,  proof  must  be  given 
in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  that  section.'^  The  original 
papers  may  also  be  put  in  evidence.''  In  cases  where  the  govern- 
ment is  a  party,  duly  authenticated  copies  should  be  procured  and 
the  fees  therefor  paid,  and  a  mere  notice  to  produce  the  original 
is  not  sufficient.^*^  Papers  which  were  a  part  of  the  archives  of 
the  late  so-called  "Confederate  Government"  must  be  proved  by 
proper  testimony .^^  The  certificate  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Span- 
ish Governor  of  Florida  is  prima  facie  evidence  of  the  existence 
of  a  grant  of  land.^^  "The  volume  of  public  documents,  printed 
by  authority  of  the  Senate  of  the  United  States,  coii^taining  let- 

10   Pet.   647;    Wickliffe  v.  Hill,  3    Litt.         ^  Thompson    v.    Smith,   2  Bond,  320. 

(Ky.)  3:30.  See  Crowell  »•.  Hopkinson,  45  N.  H.  9. 

2  Smiths.  Uniteil  States,  5  Pet.  291,  8  United  State?  v.  Humasnn,  8  Fed.  R. 
300;   Elock  ;;.   United   States,  7   Ct.   CI.,  71. 

406;    Bleecker  v.   Boml,  3    Wash.    531,  "  Bruce  r.  Manchester  &  K.  R.  R.Co., 

United  States  v.  HarriU,    Mc,  All.    243;  19  Fed.  R.  342. 

Wickliffe  v.  Hill,  3  Litt.  (Ky.)  330.  'f»  Barney   r.  Sclineider,  9  Wall.   248  ; 

3  Block  I'.  United  States,  7  Ct.  CI.  406.  Chadwick  r.  United  States,  3  Fed.  R.  750 ; 
*  Chadwicke  y.  United   States,  3   Fed.  United   States  v.   Scott,  25  Fed.  R.  470 ; 

R.   750;     White    i'.    St.    Guirons,   Minor  United   States  v.   Beniier,  Baldwin,  234; 

(Ala.),  3:;i.  United  States  f.   Perclmian,   7    Pet.  51; 

'^  Tiiompson   v.    Smith,  2  Bond,  320;  Winn  v.  Patterson,  9  Pet.  663 ;  James  v. 

Stevens   v.    Westwood,    25    (Ala.)    716;  Gordon,  1  Wash.  333. 

Crowell  V.  Hopkinton,  45  N.  H.  9;  Wet-  "  Chorbin  v.  United  States,  6  Ct.  CI. 

more  v.  United  States,  10  Pet.  647.       See  430. 

Wickliffe  r.  Hill,  3  Litt.  (Ky.)  330.  12  United   States   v.  Wiggins,  14   Pet. 

*'  Cattlett  I'.  Specific  Ins.  Co.,  1  Paine,  334  ;    United  States   v.  Acosta,   1  How. 

612  ;    See  Bleecker  v.   Bond.  3  Wash.  29.  24. 


§  268.]  PUBLIC   RECORDS.  467 

ters  to  and  from  various  officers  of  state,  communicated  l)y  the 
President  of  the  United  States  to  tlie  Senate,  is  as  competent  evi- 
dence as  the  original  documents  themselves."  ^^ 

"  The  design  and  meaning  of  this  rule  is  not  to  convert  in- 
competent and  irrelevant  evidence  into  competent  and  relevant 
evidence  simply  because  it  is  contained  in  an  official  communi- 
cation. Had  the  officer  been  testifying  under  oath,  such  an  as- 
sertion would  have  been  excluded  as  inadmissible,  upon  the 
ground  that  the  statement  itself  implied  the  existence  of  pri- 
mary and  more  original  and  explicit  sources  of  information. 
The  courts  hold  this  rule  which  has  been  invoked  to  be  limited 
to  only  such  a  statement  in  official  documents  as  the  officers 
are  bound  to  make  in  the  regular  course  of  official  duty.  The 
statement  of  extraneous  or  indejiendent  circumstances,  however 
naturally  they  may  be  deemed  to  have  a  })lace  in  tlie  narrative, 
is  no  proof  of  such  circumstances,  and  is,  therefore,  rejected."^* 
"  Copies  of  any  documents,  records,  books,  or  papers  in  the  office 
of  the  solicitor  of  the  treasury,  certified  by  him  under  the  seal 
of  his  office,  or,  when  his  office  is  vacant,  by  the  officer  acting 
as  solicitor  for  the  time,  shall  be  evidence  equally  with  tlie  origi- 
nals." i''^  "Every  certificate,  assignment,  and  conveyance  executed 
by  the  Comptroller  of  the  Currency,  in  pursuance  of  law,  and 
sealed  with  his  seal  of  oflfice,  sliall  bo  received  in  evidence  in  all 
places  and  courts  ;  and  all  copies  of  papers  in  his  office  certi- 
fied by  him  and  authenticated  by  the  said  seal,  shall  in  all  cases 
be  evidence  equally  with  the  originals.  An  impression  of  such 
seal  directly  on  the  j)aper  shall  be  as  valid  as  if  made  on  wax  or 
wafer."  '^ 

"  Copies  of  the  organization  certificate  of  any  national  banking 
association,  duly  certified  by  the  Comptroller  of  the  Currency,  and 
authenticated  by  his  seal  of  ollicc,  shall  be  evidence  in  all  (iourts 
,  and  j)laces  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States  of  tlie 
existence  of  the  association,  and  of  every  matter  which  could 
be  proved  by  the  production  of  the  original  certificate."  ^"  A 
certificate    is    sufficient   in   the   absence    of    any   evidence   that 

13  Whiton  r.  Albany  Ins.  Co.,  109  Mass.  i"  U.  S.  R.   S.  §  885;    First    National 

30.  Bank  v.  Kidd,  20  Minn.  234;  Wasliington 

»  United  States  v.  Corwin,  129  U.  S.  County  Nat.  Bank  v.  Lee,  112  Mass.  521  ; 

381,  386.  Mercliants'  Nat.  Bank  v.  Glendon  Co.,  120 

IS  U.  S.  R.  R.  §  883.  Mass.  97. 

i«  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  884. 


468  EVIDENCE   AT  LAW   AND   IN   EQUITY.  [CHAP.  XIX. 

there  is  any  other  national  bank  of  the  same  name  at  the  same 
place.^^ 

"  When  suit  is  brought  in  any  case  of  delinquency  of  a  revenue 
officer,  or  other  person  accountable  for  public  money,  a  transcript 
from  the  books  and  proceedings  of  the  Treasury  Department  cer- 
tified by  the  Register  and  authenticated  under  the  seal  of  the  De- 
partment, or,  when  the  suit  involves  the  accounts  of  the  "War  or 
Navy  Departments,  certified  by  the  Auditors  respectively  charged 
with  the  examination  of  those  accounts,  and  authenticated  imder 
the  seal  of  the  Treasury  Department,  shall  be  admitted  as  evi- 
dence, and  the  court  trying  the  cause  shall  be  authorized  to  grant 
judgment  and  award  execution  accordingly.  And  all  copies  of 
bonds,  contracts,  or  other  papers  relating  to,  or  connected  with, 
the  settlement  of  any  account  between  the  United  States  and  an 
individual,  when  certified  by  the  Register,  or  by  such  Auditor,  as 
the  case  may  be,  to  be  true  copies  of  the  originals  on  file,  and 
authenticated  under  the  seal  of  the  Department,  may  be  an- 
nexed to  such  transcripts,  and  shall  have  equal  validity,  and 
be  entitled  to  the  same  degree  of  credit  which  would  be  due  to 
the  original  papers  if  produced  and  authenticated  in  court :  pro- 
vided, that  Avhere  suit  is  brought  upon  a  bond  or  other  sealed  in- 
strument, and  the  defendant  pleads  ^non  est  factum^  or  makes  his 
motion  to  the  court,  verifying  such  plea  or  motion  by  his  oath, 
the  court  may  take  the  same  into  consideration,  and,  if  it  appears 
to  be  necessary  for  the  attainment  of  justice,  may  require  the 
production  of  the  original  bond,  contract,  or  other  paper  specified 
in  such  affidavit."  ^^  This  section  applies  to  sureties  as  well  as  to 
principals.2^  It  applies  only  to  suits  against  persons  accountable 
for  public  moneys  as  such.^^  "  There  are  two  kinds  of  transcripts 
which  the  statute  authorizes  the  proper  officer  to  certify.  First, 
a  transcript  from  the  'books  and  proceedings  of  the  treasury'; 
and  second,  '  copies  of  bonds,  contracts,  and  other  papers,  &c., 
which  remain  on  file,  and  relate  to  the  settlement.'  Under  the 
first  head  are  included  charges  of  moneys  advanced  or  paid  by  the 
department  to  the  agent,  and  an  entry  of  items  suspended,  re- 
jected, or  placed  to  his  credit.     Tlicsc  all  appear  upon  the  books 

'"  Wasliirifrton   Co.  Nat.   Bank  v.  Lee,  '■^"'  United   States  v.  Ganner,  19  Wall. 

112  Mass.  621.  198. 

1^  U   S.  R.  S.  §  880;  Bechtel  v.  United  21  United   States   v.  "Radowitz.  8  Rep. 

States,  101  U.  S  597;  U.S.  r.  Bell.  Ill  2G3.       See  United    States  r.   Griffith,   2 

U.  S.  477 ;  U.  S.  v.  Stone,  100  U.  S.  525.  Crancli,  C.  C.  GG6. 


§  268.]  OFFICIAL   ACCOUNTS-  469 

of  the  department.  The  decision  made  on  the  vouchers  exhib- 
ited, and  the  statement  of  the  amount,  constitute,  in  part,  the 
proceedings  of  the  treasury.  Under  the  second  head,  copies  of 
papers,  whicli  remain  on  file,  and  which  have  a  relation  to  the 
settlement,  may  be  certified.  In  this  case  it  is  essential  that  the 
officer  certify  that  the  transcripts  '  are  true  co{)ies  of  the  originals 
which  remain  on  file.' "  -^  "  An  account  stated  at  the  Treasury 
Department  which  does  not  arise  in  the  ordinary  mode  of  doing 
business  in  that  department,  can  derive  no  additional  validity 
from  being  certified  under  the  Act  of  Congress.  Such  a  state- 
ment can  only  be  regarded  as  establishing  items  for  moneys  dis- 
bursed through  the  ordinary  channels  of  the  department,  where 
the  transactions  are  shown  by  its  books.  In  these  cases,  the 
officers  may  well  certify,  for  they  must  have  otBcial  knowledge 
of  the  facts  stated.  But  where  moneys  come  into  the  hands  of 
an  individual,  as  in  the  case  under  consideration,  the  books  of 
the  treasury  do  not  exhibit  the  facts,  nor  can  they  be  officially 
known  to  the  officers  of  the  department.  In  this  case,  there- 
fore, the  claim  must  be  established  not  by  the  treasury  state- 
ment, but  by  the  evidence  on  which  that  statement  was  made."  ^^ 
A  copy  of  a  bond  certified  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  with- 
out the  certificate  of  the  register  and  auditor  is  insuificient.^* 
The  certificate  should  show  that  the  transcript  exhibits  the  final 
adjustment  of  the  debits,  as  shown  not  by  mere  copies  of  origi- 
nal papers  on  the  files,  but  upon  the  books  and  records  of  the 
department.'-^ 

It  seems  that  the  balances  struck  by  the  treasury  and  charged 
as  such  are  not  evidence,  but  that  the  items  should  be  stated.'^** 
A  transcript  from  the  books  may  be  evidence  of  charges  for 
moneys  advanced  or  paid  by  the  department  to  the  agent,  and 
claims,  suspended,  rejected,  or  placed  to  his  credit ;  but  not  of 

22  Smith  V.  United  States,  5  Pet.  201,  States,    10   How.    109;  Bruce  v.  United 
.300,  .301 ;  per  Mr.  Justice  M'Lean.  States,  17  How.  437. 

23  United    States  v.  Buford,  3    Pet.  12,  ->'  United  States  r.  Edwards,  1  McLean, 
20;  ppr  Mr.  .Justice  M'Lcan.  347  ;  United   States  r.  Jones,  8   Pet.  375; 

2<  United  States  v.  Huniason,  8  Fed.  R.  Gratiot   v.    United    States,   15   Pet.  336 ; 

71.  Hoyt   V.    United    States    10    How.    109; 

25  United  States   v.   Pinson,  102  U.  S.  United    States   v.   Martin,   2  Paine,  68; 

.'i48;Tiernan    ;;.    Jackson.  5    Pet.    592;  United  States  y.  Gaussen,   19  Wall.   1^8; 

United   States   c.  Buford,  3  Pet.  12 .  Cox  United  States  i'.  Smitli,  .35  Fed.  R.    490; 

IK    United    States,    6    Pet.    172  ;    United  United  States  >:  Van  Zamlt,  2  Cranch  0. 

States    r.   Jones,  8  Pet.  375 ;  Gratton    r.  C.  338  ,  United  States  v.  Kulin,  4  Cranch 

United  States,  15  Pet.  3.30  ;  Iloyt  v.  United  C  C.  401. 


470  EVIDENCE   AT   LAW   AND   IN    EQUITY.  [CHAP.  XIX. 

moneys  received  by  him  for  the  benefit  of  the  United  States  from 
other  sources  than  tlie  department.-'  A  transcript  showing  the 
money  expended  by  the  officers  in  supplying  the  default  of  the 
contractor  to  carry  out  his  contract  is  competent  evidence.-^  The 
government  need  not  show  that  the  party  had  notice  of  the  adjust- 
ment or  of  the  balance  against  him  in  the  transcript.^ 

"  The  statute  says  that  a  transcript  from  the  books,  shall  be 
admitted  as  evidence.  A  transcript  or  a  transcribing  is  substan- 
tially a  copy.  A  copy  from  the  books,  and  not  of  the  books,  shall 
be  admissible  in  evidence.  An  extract  from  the  books,  a  por- 
tion of  the  books,  wdien  authenticated  to  be^a  copy,  may  be  given 
in  evidence.  While  a  garbled  statement  is  not  evidence,  or  a 
mutilated  statement,  wherein  the  debits  shall  be  presented  and 
the  credits  suppressed,  or  perhaps  a  statement  of  results  only,  it 
still  seems  to  be  clear  that  it  is  not  necessary  that  every  account 
with  an  individual,  and  all  of  every  account  shall  be  transcribed 
as  a  condition  of  the  admissibility  of  any  one  account.  The  state- 
ment presented  should  be  complete  in  itself,  perfect  for  what  it 
purports  to  represent,  and  give  both  sides  of  the  account  as  the 
same  stands  upon  the  books."  '^^  Treasury  statements  are  only 
prima  facie  evidence  of  the  correctness  of  the  balance.  The 
accounting  ofhcer  may  correct  mistakes  and  restate  balances.^^ 
The  errors  made  in  striking  the  balance  may  be  proved  by  the 
defendant  by  the  procuring  of  the  original  vouchers,  or  other- 
wise.^^ The  defendant  by  accepting  the  credits  given  him  does 
not  waive  the  objection  to  the  items  on  the  debit  side.^^ 

"  U[)on  the  trial  of  any  indictment  against  any  person  for  em- 
bezzling public  moneys,  it  shall  be  sufficient  evidence,  for  the 
purpose  of  showing  a  balance  against  such  person,  to  produce 
a  transcript  from  the  books  and  proceedings  of  the  Treasury 
Department,  as  provided  by  the  preceding  section." ^  "A  copy 
of  any  return  of  a  contract  returned  and  filed  in  the  returns- 

■-'   United  States  v.    Bufonl,  .3  Pet.  12;  201;  United    States  v.  Hunt,   105  U.   S- 

Uiiited  States  v.  Jones,  8  Pet   o75.  18.3,  187.     But  see  United  States  v.  Col- 

2^  United  States  v.  Griffith,  2   Cranch  lier,  .3  Blatclif.  325 ;  Ex  parte   Randolph, 

C.  C.  G66.  2  Brock.  44. 

2'-'  Watkinsr.  United  States,  9  Wall. 759.  -i-^  Soule  r.  United  States,  100  U.  S.  8  ; 

2'^  United  States  v.  (iaussen,  li)    Wall.  Bruce   v.  United  States,    17    How.   437  ; 

212,  214  ;  pel-  Mr.  Justice  Hunt.  United  States  v.  Stone,  106  U.  S.  525. 

='1  Soule  V.  United  States,  100  U.  S.  8,  3;)  United  States  v.  Jones,  8  Pet.  375. 

11 :  United  States  v.  Ecksford,  1  Mow.  250,  3t  u.  S.  R.  S.  §  887.     See  United  States 

263  ;  United  States  v.   Eggle.son,  4  Saw.  v.  Gaussen,  19  Wall.  198. 


§  268.]  OFFICIAL   ACCOUNTS.  471 

office  of  the  Department  of  the  Interior,  as  provided  by  law, 
when  certified  by  the  clerk  of  the  said  office  to  be  full  and  com- 
plete, and  when  authenticated  by  the  seal  of  the  Department, 
shall  be  evidence  in  any  prosecution  against  any  officer  for  falsely 
and  corruptly  swearing  to  the  affidavit  required  by  law  to  be 
made  by  such  officer  in  making  his  return  of  any  contract  as 
required  by  law,  to  said  returns-office."  '-^ 

"  Copies  of  the  quarterly  returns  of  postmasters  and  of  any 
papers  pertaining  to  tlie  accounts  in  the  office  of  the  sixth  auditor, 
and  transcripts  from  the  money-order  account-books  of  the  post- 
office  department,  when  certified  by  the  sixth  auditor  under  the 
seal  of  his  office,  shall  be  admitted  as  evidence  in  the  courts  of 
the  United  States,  in  civil  suits  and  criminal  prosecutions ;  and  in 
any  civil  suit,  in  case  of  delinquency  of  any  postmaster  or  con- 
tractor, a  statement  of  the  account,  certified  as  aforesaid,  shall  be 
admitted  in  evidence,  and  the  court  shall  be  authorized  thereupon 
to  give  judgment  and  award  execution,  subject  to  the  provisions 
of  law  as  to  proceedings  in  such  civil  suits."  ^^ 

"  In  all  suits  for  the  recovery  of  balances  due  from  postmasters, 
a  copy,  duly  certified  under  the  seal  of  the  sixth  auditor,  of  the 
statement  of  any  postmaster,  special  agent,  or  other  person,  em- 
ployed by  the  Postmaster-General,  or  the  auditor  for  that  pur- 
pose, that  he  has  mailed  a  letter  to  such  delinquent  postmaster, 
at  the  post-office  where  the  indebtedness  accrued,  or  at  his  last 
usual  place  of  abode ;  that  a  sufficient  time  has  elapsed  for  said 
letter  to  have  reached  its  destination  in  the  ordinary  course  of  the 
mail,  and  the  payment  of  such  balance  has  not  been  received, 
within  the  time  designated  in  his  instructions,  shall  be  received 
as  sufficient  evidence  in  the  courts  of  the  United  States  or  other 
courts,  that  a  demand  has  been  made  upon  the  delinquent  post- 
master ;  but  when  the  account  of  a  late  postmaster  has  been  once 
adjusted  and  settled,  and  a  demand  has  been  made  for  the  balance 
appearing  to  be  duo,  and  afterward  allowances  are  made  or  credits 
entered,  it  shall  not  be  necessary  to  make  a  further  demand  for 
the  new  balance  found  to  l)e  due."'^' 

35  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  888.      See  U.   S.  R.  S.  United  States  v.  Wikinson,  12  How.  246 ; 

§  8744.  Postmaster-General    v.   Rice,  Gilp.  554 ; 

3'J  United  States  Revised  Statutes  §889;  Lawrence  v.  United   States,  2   McLean, 

United  States  v.  Harrill,  McAllister,  24?, ;  581 ;  United  States  v.  Snyder,  14  Fed.  R. 

United   States   r.  IIod>ie,  13  How.   478;  554. 

United  States  v.  Uilliard,  3  McLean,  324 ;  87  u.  S.  R.  S.  §  890. 


472  EVIDENCE   AT   LAW   AND   IN   EQUITY.  [CHAP.  XIX. 

"  Copies  of  any  records,  books,  or  papers  in  the  general  land 
office,  authenticated  by  the  seal  and  certified  by  the  commissioner 
thereof,  or,  when  his  office  is  vacant,  by  the  principal  clerk,  shall 
be  evidence  equally  with  the  originals  thereof.  And  literal  ex- 
emplifications of  any  such  records  shall  be  held,  when  so  intro- 
duced in  evidence,  to  be  of  the  same  validity  as  if  the  names  of 
the  officers  signing  and  countersigning  the  same  had  been  fully 
inserted  in  such  record."  ^^  This  section  only  applies  to  official 
documents.'^^  The  words,  "  evidence  equally  with  the  originals," 
do  not  mean  that  in  all  cases  the  copy  shall  have  the  ^ame  proba- 
tive force  as  the  original,  and  that  on  a  question  as  to  some  par- 
ticular word  or  figure,  the  copy  shall  be  as  convincing  as  the 
original ;  it  merely  requires  the  copy  to  be  regarded  as  of  the 
same  class  in  the  grades  of  evidence,  as  to  written  and  parol,  and 
primary  and  secondary.'^^  A  party  is  not  deprived  of  his  title 
because  of  a  defective  record,  if  he  has  a  perfect  patent.  A  per- 
fect record  of  a  perfect  patent  proves  the  grant ;  but  a  perfect 
record  of  an  imperfect  patent,  or  an  imperfect  record  of  a  perfect 
patent,  has  no  such  effect.  In  such  a  case,  if  a  perfect  patent 
has  in  fact  issued,  it  must  be  proved  in  some  other  way  than  by 
the  record.^i  The  defective  record  in  the  general  land  office, 
does  not  deprive  a  party  of  his  rights,  and  the  contents  of  the 
original  may  be  shown  if  the  record  or  transcript  is  not  a  true 
copy.'^^  "  The  names  need  not  be  fully  inserted  in  the  record,  but 
it  must  appear  in  some  form  that  the  names  were  actually  signed 
to  the  patent  when  it  issued."  "^^  A  perfect  record  of  a  perfect 
patent  is  presumptive  evidence  of  its  delivery  to  and  acceptance 
by  the  grantee.**  An  entry  in  the  books  of  the  land-office,  that  the 
balance  of  the  purchase-money  was  paid  by  the  person  "  to  whom 
the  patent  had  issued,"  is  some  evidence  that  a  patent  issued, 
although  no  ])atent  is  produced.'*^  A  certificate  by  a  receiver  that 
a  party  has  made  full  payment  is  evidence  that  such  party  has 
taken  the  steps  necessary  for  a  pre-emption.^^     A  copy  of  a  plat 

38  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  891.  316,  823  ;  Campbell  ;;.  Laclede  Gas  Co., 

39  Block  V.  United  States,  7  Ct.  CI  406.    119  U.  S.  445. 

4^  Campbell  u.  Laclede  Gas   Co.,  119  U.  «  McGurrahan  v.  Mining  Co.,  96   U.  S. 

S.  445,  449.     See  Gait  v.  Galloway,  4  Pet.  316,  323. 

331.  <'  McGarralian  v.  Mining  Co.,  96  U.  S. 

■»'  McGarralian  v.  Mining  Co.,  90  U.  S.  316,  323. 

316,  323  ;  Campbell  v.   Laclede  Gas  Co  ,  *!>  Willis  v.  Bucher,  3  Wash.  C.  C.  369. 

119  U.  S.  445,  449.  <«  McDonald  v.  Edmonds,  44  Cal.  328. 

«  McGarralian  v.  Mining  Co.,  90  U.  S. 


§  268.]  PUBLIC  RECORDS.  473 

and  description  duly  authenticated  is  admissible.*^  A  connected 
plat  of  sundry  tracts  of  land  made  and  put  together  by  an  officer 
of  the  land  office,  which  is  not  the  copy  of  any  record  in  such 
office,  is  not  competent  evidencc^^  Under  this  statute  a  certified 
copy  of  the  records  of  the  land  office  at  Washington,  concerning 
the  location  of  a  land  warrant  containing  a  description  of  the 
various  acts  of  the  register  and  receiver  at  the  land  office  at 
Chicago,  and  of  the  locator  in  regard  to  the  location,  showing 
that  the  land  was  subject  to  location  at  the  time,  and  that  the 
land  warrant  was  properly  delivered  np  and  deposited  with  the 
commissioner  of  the  land  office,  is  admissible  in  evidence.*^ 

"  Written  or  printed  copies  of  any  records,  books,  papers,  or 
drawings  belonging  to  the  patent  office,  and  of  letters-patent 
authenticated  by  the  seal  and  certified  by  the  commissioner  or 
acting  commissioner  thereof,  shall  be  evidence  in  all  cases  where- 
in the  originals  could  be  evidence  ;  and  any  person  making  appli- 
cation therefor,  and  paying  the  fee  required  by  law,  shall  have 
certified  copies  thereof."  ^^  A  transcript  of  certain  documents  on 
file  is  competent,  although  not  a  transcript  of  the  whole  proceed- 
ings.'^^ Proof  that  there  is  no  record  must  be  made  by  deposition 
or  attendance  in  court  of  the  proper  officer  ;  and  a  mere  certificate 
that  diligent  search  has  been  made  is  not  sufficient.^"^  It  seems 
that  the  court  will  presume  that  a  person  who  signs  as  "  Acting 
Commissioner  "  holds  such  office  in  the  absence  of  evidence  to 
the  contrary .^3  Letters  written  by  an  applicant  for  a  patent,  when 
properly  certified  as  papers  remaining  in  the  department,  are 
admissible  in  evidence.^  The  documents  which  make  up  the 
original  papers  belong  to  the  public  archives,  and  a  duly  certi- 
fied copy  thereof  is  competent  evidence,  although  some  of  these 
documents  may  contain  private  stipulations  between  the  parties 
concerncd.^^ 

A  certified  copy  of  a  patent  surrendered  and  cancelled  is  ad- 
missible to  show  that  an  improvement  subsequently  patented  is 
not  original,  although  the  certificate  does  not  show  when  it  was 

«  Harris  iJ.  Barnett,  4  Blatchf.  .069.  Depot    Co.    v     Shclilon,  17  Blatcli.    210, 

48  Griffith  v.Tnickliomer,  Pet.  C.  C.  IGC).  Stone  r.  Palmer,  28  Mo.  530. 

49  Culver  V.  Utlie,  133  U.  S.  655.  sii  Woodwortli  v.  Hall,   1  Wood.  &  M. 
60  U.  S.  R.  S.  S  892.  248. 

"  Toohey  v.  Hardintr,  1  Fed.  R.  174.  S4  Pettibone  u.  Derringer,  4  Wash.  C.  C 

62  Stoner  v.  Ellis,  6  Ind.   152  ;  Bullock    215,  219. 
i;.  Wallingford,  55  N.  H.  619 ;  American        "^  Ilanrick  l:  Barton,  16  Wall.  166. 


474  EVIDENCE   AT    LAW    AND    IN    EQUITY.  [CHAP.  XIX. 

cancelled,  or  how,  or  for  what  defect.^^  A  certified  copy  of  an 
assignment  is  prima  facie  evidence  of  the  genuineness  of  the 
original  and  of  the  correctness  of  the  copy  of  the  record.^"  A 
certified  copy  of  a  transfer  not  required  by  law  to  be  recorded  is 
not  proof  of  the  transfer.^^  He  who  desires  a  copy  of  papers 
filed  in  the  patent  office  must  make  demand  therefor  in  a  proper 
manner,  without  insulting  or  abusing  the  officers  ;  but  if  a  sec- 
ond demand  is  properly  made,  the  commissioner  cannot  refuse  to 
comply  because  of  the  applicant's  previous  improper  conduct.°^ 
"  Copies  of  the  specifications  and  drawings  of  foreign  letters- 
patent,  certified  as  provided  in  the  preceding  section,  shall  be 
prima  facie  evidence  of  the  fact  of  the  granting  of  such  letters- 
patent,  and  of  the  date  and  contents  thereof."  ^^  Courts  of  the 
United  States  take  judicial  notice  of  foreign  nations  and  their 
seals  of  state,  but  not  of  their  inferior  officers  or  departments  and 
the  seals  of  such  inferior  officers  or  departments. *^i  A  copy  of 
a  French  patent  certified  l)y  the  director  of  the  Conservatoire 
National  des  Arts  et  Metiers  of  France,  under  the  seal  of  that  de- 
partment, verified  by  the  minister  of  agriculture  and  commerce, 
and  the  minister  of  foreign  affairs,  under  their  seals,  but  not  by 
the  great  seal  of  France,  may  be  admitted  in  evidence.*^^  "  The 
printed  copies  of  specifications  and  drawings  of  patents,  which 
the  Commissioner  of  Patents  is  authorized  to  print  for  gratu- 
itous distribution,  and  to  deposit  in  the  capitols  of  the  States 
and  Territories,  and  in  the  clerk's  offices  of  the  district  courts, 
shall,  when  certified  by  him  and  autbenticated  by  the  seal  of  his 
office,  be  received  in  all  courts  as  evidence  of  all  matters  tlierein 
contained." '^•^ 

"  Extracts  from  the  journals  of  the  senate,  or  of  the  house  of 
representatives,  and  of  the  executive  journal  of  the  senate  when 
the  injunction  of  secrecy  is  removed,  certified  by  the  secretary  of 
the  senate  or  by  the  clerk  of  tlie  house  of  representatives,  shall 
be  admitted  as  evidence  in  the  courts  of  tlie  United  States,  and 


5«  Delano  v.  Scott,  Oilp.  480.  si  Schoerken  ?•.  Swift  &  C.  &  B.  Co.,  7 

5'  Lee  V.  BliU!<ly,  1  Boiul,  .^01  ;  Brooks  Fed.  R.  469,  471  ;  Church   v.   Ilubbart,  2 

I'.   Jenkins,  :i    M'Lean,    4;]2 ;    I'arker  v.  Crancli,  1^7. 

Haworth,  4  McLean,  370.  ^2  Schoerken  v.   Swift  C.  &  B.   Co.,  7 

^  Sherman  r.  Ciianiplain  Trans.  Co.,  31  Fed.  R.  469,  471.  See  Deflorz  i.  Reynolds, 

Vt.  162.  17  Blatclif.  43G. 

»3  Bovden  v   Burke,  14  How.  575.  «»  u.  S.  R.  S.  §  894. 

«^  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  893. 


§  268.]  CONSULAR   CERTIFICATES.  475 

shall  have  the  same  force  and  effect  as  the  originals  would  have 
if  produced  and  authenticated  in  court."  ^* 

"  Copies  of  all  official  documents  and  papers  in  the  office  of 
any  consul,  vice-consul,  or  commercial  agent  of  the  United  States, 
and  of  all  official  entries  in  the  books  or  records  of  any  such 
office,  certified  under  the  hand  and  seal  of  such  officer,  shall  be 
admitted  in  evidence  in  the  courts  of  the  United  States." '^^  The 
certificate  of  a  consul  is  competent  evidence  to  ])rove  his  official 
acts,  but  not  acts  which  are  not  official  or  not  within  his  per- 
sonal knowledge.'''^  The  consul's  certificate  is  competent  to  prove 
that  the  ship's  papers  were  lodged  with  liim;*^^  that  a  seaman 
was  discharged  in  a  foreign  court  with  his  own  consent  ;^^  and 
when  it  sets  out  all  the  essential  facts  it  is  prima  facie  evidence 
that  a  master  violated  the  law  in  refusing  to  receive  a  discharged 
seaman  in  a  foreign  port.^^  A  consular  certificate  is  not  com- 
petent to  prove  facts  to  justify  imprisonment  of  a  seaman  by  the 
master  in  a  foreign  port ;  "'^  nor  to  authenticate  the  record  of  the 
condemnation  of  a  vessel  in  a  court  of  vice  admiralty ;  '^  nor  to 
prove  a  foreign  law  or  the  correctness  of  a  translation ;  '^  nor  to 
prove  any  fact  between  third  persons,  imlcss  made  so  by  stat- 
ute ;''2  nor  to  prove  a  copy  of  a  bill  of  lading  in  another's  posses- 
sion.'* A  certificate  with  an  undecipherable  seal  and  signature, 
is  not  admissible  in  evidence.'^ 

"  The  transcripts  into  new  books,  made  by  the  clerks  of  the 
District  Courts  in  the  several  districts  of  Texas,  Florida,  Wis- 
consin, Minnesota,  Iowa,  and  Kansas,  in  pursuance  of  the  act  of 
June  twenty-seven,  eighteen  hundred  and  sixty -four,  chapter  one 
hundred  and  sixty-five,  from  the  records  and  journals  transferred 
by  them  respectively,  under  the  said  act,  to  the  clerks  of  the  Cir- 

«  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  895.  ««  Lamb  v.  Briard,  Abb.  Adm.  367. 

65  U.  S.  K.  S.  §  8',tG;  Levy   v.  Biirley,        69  Mathews  v.  Offley,  3  Siimii.  115. 
2    Sumner,    355 ;    Matthews  v.   Offley,  3        "'  Johnson  v.  The  Cariolanus,   Crabbe> 

Sumner,    115;  Brown   v.    Tlie    Indepen-  239. 

dence,  Crabbe,  54;    Church  v.   IIiil)bart,        '^  Catlett  r.  Pacific  Ins.  Co.,  1   Paine, 

2  Cranch,  186;  Lamb  v.  Briard,  Abbott's  594. 

Adm.  367  ;  The  Atlantic,  Abbott's  A(hn.        "-  Church  v.  Ilnbbart,  2  Cranch,  187. 
451  ;  United  States  v.  Mitchell,  2  Wash.        '■'  United  States  r.   Mitciiell,  2   Wash. 

478;  Johnson  i-.  The  Cariolanus,  Crabbe,  478;  The  Alice,  12  Fed.  R.  923;  Stein  v. 

239.  Bowman,  13  Pet.  209;  Levy  v.  Burley,  2 

"G  Brown  i'.  The  Independence,  Crabbe,  Sumn.  355. 
54.  'i  The  Alice,  12  Fed.  H.  923. 

•'"  United  States    v.   Mitchell,  2  Wash.        "^  The  Atlantic,  Abb.  Adm.  451. 
478. 


476  EVIDENCE    AT   LAW   AND   IN    EQUITY.  [CHAP.  XIX. 

cuit  Courts  in  the  said  districts,  when  certified  by  the  clerks  re- 
spectively, making  the  same  to  be  full  and  true  copies  from  the 
original  books,  shall  have  the  same  force  and  effect  as  records 
as  the  originals.  And  the  certificates  of  the  clerks  of  said  Cir- 
cuit Courts,  respectively,  of  transcripts  of  any  of  the  books  or 
papers  so  transferred  to  them,  shall  be  received  in  evidence  with 
the  like  effect  as  if  made  by  the  clerk  of  the  court  in  which 
the  proceedings  were  had."  ''^  "  The  transcripts  into  new  books 
made  by  the  clerks  of  the  Circuit  and  District  Courts  for  the 
western  district  of  North  Carolina,  in  pursuance  of  the  act  of 
Jane  four,  eighteen  hundred  and  seventy -two,  chapter  two  hun- 
dred and  eighty-two,  when  certified  by  the  clerks  respectively, 
making  the  same  to  be  full  and  true  copies  from  the  original 
books,  shall  have  the  same  force  and  effect  as  records  as  the 
originals.  And  the  certificates  of  the  clerks  of  said  Circuit  and 
District  Courts  respectively,  of  transcripts  of  any  of  the  said 
transcribed  records,  shall  also  be  received  in  evidence  with  the 
like  effect  as  if  made  by  the  proper  clerk  from  the  originals  from 
which  such  records  were  transcribed.'" '"  "  When  the  record  of 
any  judgment,  decree,  or  other  proceeding  of  any  court  of  the 
United  States  is  lost  or  destroyed,  any  party  or  person  interested 
therein  may,  on  application  to  such  court,  and  on  showing  to  its 
satisfaction  tliat  the  same  was  lost  or  destroyed  without  his  fault, 
obtain  from  it  an  order  autliorizing  such  defect  to  be  sui)plied  by 
a  duly  certified  copy  of  the  original  record,  where  the  same  can 
be  obtained ;  and  such  certified  copy  shall  thereafter  have,  in  all 
respects,  the  same  effect  as  the  original  record  would  have  had."  ''^ 
"  When  any  such  record  is  lost  or  destroyed,  and  the  defect  can- 
not be  supplied  as  provided  in  the  preceding  section,  any  party  or 
person  interested  therein  may  make  a  written  application  to  the 
court  to  which  the  record  belonged,  verified  by  affidavit,  showing 
such  loss  or  destruction ;  that  the  same  occurred  without  his  fault 
or  neglect ;  that  certified  copies  of  such  record  cannot  be  obtained 
by  him ;  and  showing  also  the  substance  of  the  record  so  lost  or 
destroyed,  and  that  the  loss  or  destruction  thereof,  unless  sup- 
plied, will  or  may  result  in  damage  to  him.  The  court  shall 
cause  said  application  to  be  entered  of  record,  and  a  copy  of  it 
shall  be  served  personally  upon  every  person  interested  therein, 

■6  U.  S  R.  S  §  897.  78  u   S    R.  S.  §  899;  Cornett  i'.  Wil- 

T!  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  898.  liaras,  20  Wall.  220. 


§  268.]  PROOF  OF  RECORDS.  477 

together  with  a  written  notice  that  on  a  day  therein  stated,  Avhicli 
sliall  not  be  less  than  sixty  days  after  such  service,  said  api)lica- 
tion  will  be  heard  ;  and  if,  upon  such  hearing,  the  court  is  satis- 
fied that  the  statements  contained  in  the  application  are  true,  it 
shall  make  and  cause  to  be  entered  of  record  an  order  reciting 
the  substance  and  effect  of  said  lost  or  destroyed  record.  Said 
order  shall  have  the  same  effect,  so  far  as  concerns  the  party  or 
person  making  such  application  and  the  persons  served  as  above 
provided,  but  subject  to  intervening  rights,  which  the  original 
record  would  have  had,  if  the  same  had  not  been  lost  or  de- 
stroyed." '^  "  When  any  cause  has  been  removed  to  the  supreme 
court,  and  the  original  record  thereof  is  afterward  lost,  a  duly 
certified  copy  of  the  record  remaining  in  said  court  may  be  filed 
in  the  court  from  which  the  cause  was  removed,  on  motion  of  any 
party  or  person  claiming  to  be  interested  therein  ;  and  the  copy 
so  filed  shall  have  the  same  effect  as  the  original  record  would 
have  had  if  the  same  had  not  been  lost  or  destroyed."  ^^  "  In  any 
proceedings  in  conformity  with  law  to  restore  the  records  of  any 
court  of  the  United  States  which  have  been  or  may  be  hereafter 
lost  or  destroyed,  the  notice  required  may  be  served  on  any  non- 
resident of  the  district  in  which  such  court  is  held  anywhere 
within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States,  or  in  any  foreign 
country ;  tlie  proof  of  service  of  such  notice,  if  made  in  a  foreign 
country,  to  be  certified  by  a  minister  or  consul  of  the  United 
States  in  sucli  country,  under  his  ofificial  seal."  ^^  "  A  certified 
copy  of  the  official  return,  or  any  other  official  paper  of  the  United 
States  attorney,  marshal,  or  clerk,  or  other  certifying  or  recording 
officer  of  any  court  of  the  United  States,  made  in  pursuance  of 
law,  and  on  file  in  any  department  of  the  government,  relating  to 
any  cause  or  matter  to  which  the  United  States  was  a  party  in 
any  such  court,  the  record  of  which  has  been  or  may  be  lost  or 
destroyed,  may  be  filed  in  the  court  to  which  it  appertains,  and 
shall  have  the  same  force  and  effect  as  if  it  were  an  original  re- 
port, return  paper,  or  other  document  made  to  or  filed  in  such 
court ;  and  in  any  case  in  which  the  names  of  the  parties  and  the 
date  and  amount  of  judgment  or  decree  shall  appear  from  such 
return   paper,  or  document,  it  shall  be  lawful  for  the  court  in 

'9  U.  S.  R.  S  §  000.  of  Jan  31,  1879,  ch.  xxxix,  §  1  (20  St.  at 

81  US    R.  S   §  901  L.  277). 

81  U.  S  R.  S  §  902,  as  amended  by  Act 


478  EVIDENCE    AT   LAW    AND    IN    EQUITY.  [cHAP.  XIX. 

which  the}'  are  filed  to  issue  the  proper  process  to  enforce  such 
decree  or  judgment,  in  the  same  manner  as  if  the  original  record 
remained  in  said  court.  And  in  all  cases  where  any  of  the  files, 
papers,  or  records  of  any  court  of  the  United  States  have  heen  or 
shall  'be  lost  or  destroyed,  the  files,  records,  and  papers  which, 
pursuant  to  law,  may  have  been  or  may  be  restored  or  supplied  in 
place  of  such  records,  files,  and  papers,  shall  have  the  same  force 
and  effect  to  all  intents  and  purposes,  as  the  originals  thereof 
would  have  been  entitled  to."  ^^  "  Whenever  any  of  the  records 
or  files  in  which  the  United  States  are  interested  of  any  court  of 
the  United  States  have  been  or  may  be  lost  or  destroyed,  it  shall 
be  the  duty  of  the  attorney  of  the  United  States  for  the  district  or 
court  to  which  such  files  and  records  belong,  so  far  as  the  judges 
of  such  courts  respectively  shall  deem  it  essential  to  the  interests 
of  the  United  States  that  such  records  and  files  be  restored  or 
supplied,  to  take  such  steps,  under  the  direction  of  said  judges,  as 
may  be  necessary  to  effect  such  restoration  or  substitution,  in- 
cluding such  dockets,  indices,  and  other  books  and  papers  as  said 
judges  shall  think  proper.  Said  judges  may  direct  the  perform- 
ance, by  clerks  of  said  courts  respectively  and  by  the  United 
States  attorneys,  of  any  duties  incident  thereto ;  a)id  said  clerks 
and  attorneys  shall  be  allowed  such  compensation,  for  services  in 
the  matter  and  for  lawful  disbursements,  as  may  be  approved  by 
the  attorney-general  of  the  United  States,  upon  a  certificate  by 
the  judges  of  said  courts  stating  that  such  claim  for  services  and 
disbursements  is  just  arid  reasonable ;  and  the  sum  so  allowed 
shall  be  paid  out  of  the  judiciary  fund."  ^^ 

"  The  acts  of  the  legislature  of  any  State  or  Territory,  or  of 
any  country  subject  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States,  shall 
be  authenticated  by  having  the  seals  of  such  State,  Territory,  or 
country  affixed  thereto.  The  records  and  judicial  proceedings  of 
the  courts  of  any  State  or  Territory,  or  of  any  such  country,  shall 
be  proved  or  admitted  in  any  other  court  within  the  United  States, 
by  the  attestation  of  the  clerk,  and  the  seal  of  the  court  annexed, 
if  there  be  a  seal,  together  with  a  certificate  of  the  judge,  chief- 
justice,  or  presiding  magistrate,  that  the  said  attestation  is  in  due 
form.    And  the  said  records  and  judicial  proceedings,  so  autlienti- 

B'!  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  903,  as  amcntled  by  Act  s"  u.  S.  R.  S.  §  904,  as  amended  by  Act 
of  Jan.  ol,  1879,  ch.  xx.\ix,  §  2  (20  St.  at  of  Jan.  31,  1879,  ch.  xxxix,  §  o  (20  St.  at 
L.  277).  L.  278). 


§  268.]  PROOF  OF  RECORDS.  479 

cated,  shall  have  such  faitli  and  credit  given  to  them  in  every 
court  within  the  United  States  as  tliey  have  by  law  or  usage  in 
the  courts  of  the  State  from  which  they  are  taken."  ^*  This  stat- 
ute applies  to  the  Federal  courts  as  well  as  to  the  State  courts. ^^ 
The  courts  of  the  United  States  take  judicial  notice  of  the  public 
acts  of  the  legislatures  of  the  different  States.^^  It  will  be  pre- 
sumed that  the  seal  of  a  State  was  annexed  to  a  paper  by  the 
proper  officer  under  due  authority.^"  The  certificate  must  show 
that  the  person  who  signed  it  as  judge  was,  when  he  signed  it, 
the  judge,  chief  justice,  or  presiding  magistrate  of  the  court  in 
wliich  the  judgment  is  of  record.^^  If  the  laws  of  a  State  show 
that  the  court  in  which  the  judgment  was  rendered  consisted  of 
but  a  single  judge,  it  is  not  material  in  a  Federal  court  that  the 
certificate  to  tlie  attestation  of  the  clerk  did  not  show  that  the 
certifying  officer  was  the  sole  judge,  chief  justice,  or  presiding 
magistrate.^^  The  certificate  of  the  judge  that  he  is  "  one  of  the 
judges"  of  the  court,  is  insufficient.^'^  The  judge  should  certify 
that  the  attestation  is  in  due  form  according  to  the  laws  of  the 
State.^i  If  a  clerk  of  a  court  certifies  at  the  foot  of  a  paper  which 
purports  to  be  a  record,  that  the  foregoing  is  truly  taken  from 
the  record  of  proceedings  of  his  court,  and  if  the  judge,  chief  jus- 
tice, or  presiding  magistrate  certifies  that  such  attestation  of  the 
clerk  is  in  due  form  of  law,  it  is  to  be  presumed  that  the  paper  so 
certified  is  in  due  form,  and  is  a  full  copy  of  the  proceedings  in 
the  case,  and  is  admissible  in  evidence ;  but  if  it  proves  to  be  a 
mere  transcript  of  minutes  taken  from  the  docket  of  the  court, 
it  is  not  admissible.^^  If  a  judgment  has  been  recovered  against 
a  corporation  by  a  wrong  name,  there  may  be  a  recovery  in  a 
suit  on  such  judgment  in  another  State  brought  against  it  by 
the  proper  name.^^ 

"  All  records  and  exemplifications  of  books,  which  may  be  kept 

8>  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  905.     The  cases  con-  s.  c.  1  Wash.  C.  C.  363;  United  States  y. 

struinp;  tliis  section  of  tlie  Revised  Stat-  Amedy,  11  Wheat.  392. 

utes  are    very   numerous,  and    nia}'    be  ^°  Stewart  i".  Gray,  Hemps.  94 ;  United 

found  collected  in  Greenieaf  on  Evidence,  States  v.  Biebuscli,  1  McCrary,  42;  1  Fed. 

§§504-500;  Bump's  Federal   Procedure,  R.  213. 

505-617.  89  Bennett  v.  Bennett,  Deady,  299. 

«5  Gormley  f.  Bunyan,  138  U.   S.   023,  ^o  Stewart  i'.  Gray,   Hemps.  94;  Gard- 

6.35;  Mills   i-.    Duryee,   7  Cranch,   481;  nerr.  Lindo,  1  Cranch  C.  C.  78. 

Galpin  r.  Sage,  3  Saw.  93.  '•!  Craig  v.  Brown,  Pet.  C.  C.  352. 

^•'  Owings  f.  Hull,  9  Pet.  607.  »-  Ferguson  r.  Harwood,  7  Cranch,  408. 

8"  United  States  f.  Johns,  4   Dall.  412  ;  "^  l^    Fayette  Ins.  Co.   v.  French,  18 

How.  404. 


480  EVIDENCE   AT   LAW   AND   TN    EQUITY.  [CHAP.  XIX. 

in  any  public  office  of  any  State  or  Territory,  or  of  any  country 
subject  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States,  not  appertaining 
to  a  court,  shall  be  proved  or  admitted  in  any  court  or  office  in 
any  other  State  or  Territory,  or  in  any  such  country,  by  the 
attestation  of  the  keeper  of  the  said  records  or  books,  and  the 
seal  of  his  office  annexed,  if  there  be  a  seal,  together  with  a 
certificate  of  the  presiding  justice  of  the  court  of  the  county, 
parish,  or  district  in  which  such  office  may  be  kept,  or  of  the  gov- 
ernor, or  secretary  of  state,  the  chancellor  or  keeper  of  the  great 
seal,  of  the  State  or  Territory,  or  country,  that  the  said  attesta- 
tion is  in  due  form,  and  by  the  proper  officers.  If  the  said  cer- 
tificate is  given  by  the  presiding  justice  of  a  court,  it  shall  be 
further  authenticated  by  the  clerk  or  prothonotary  of  the  said 
court,  who  shall  certify,  under  his  hand  and  the  seal  of  his  office, 
that  the  said  presiding  justice  is  duly  commissioned  and  quali- 
fied ;  or,  if  given  by  such  governor,  secretary,  chancellor,  or  keeper 
of  the  great  seal,  it  shall  be  under  the  great  seal  of  the  State, 
Territory,  or  country  aforesaid  in  which  it  is  made.  And  the  said 
records  and  exemplifications,  so  authenticated,  shall  have  such 
faith  and  credit  given  to  them  in  every  court  and  office  within  the 
United  States  as  they  have  by  law  or  usage  in  the  courts  or  offices 
of  the  State,  Territory,  or  country,  as  aforesaid,  from  which  they 
are  taken."  ^*  This  section  does  not  impart  to  the  authenticated 
State  record  anything  more  than  "  faith  and  credit,"  and  does 
not  extend  the  effect  of  a  decision  against  a  State  to  the  United 
States,  nor  make  an  award  or  judgment  which  might  be  final 
against  a  State  cither  obligatory  in  law  or  conclusive  against  the 
United  States.^^  Where  a  deed  of  land  in  Texas  had  been  exe- 
cuted in  accordance  with  the  civil  laws  in  Louisiana,  and  a  copy 
furnished  to  the  grantee  as  a  second  original,  this  copy  was  ad- 
mitted in  evidence,  upon  proof  by  the  witness  that  he  had  exam- 
ined the  original  on  file  in  tlie  notary's  book ;  that  the  copy  was 
a  true  one ;  that  the  notary  before  whom  the  conveyance  was  exe- 
cuted was  dead  ;  that  the  witness  knew  the  handwriting,  which 
was  genuine ;  that  the  witness  knew  the  handwriting  of  one  of 

9^  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  90G.     See  also  Snyder  son,  28  Mo    316  ;    Grant  v.  Henry  Clay 

V.  Wise,  lOPa.St.  157  ;  Lawrence  v.  Gault-  Coal  Co  ,  80  Pa.  St.  208;  and  authorities 

ney,  Cheves  Law  (S  C),  7;  King  v.  Dale,  cited  in  Bump's  Federal  Procedure,  617- 

2  111.  513  ;  Hentliorn  i-.  Doe,  1  Blackford  019. 

(Ind.),  157;  Russell  >:  Kearney,  27  Ga.  90;  o^  ^Vi^iams  v.  United  States,  137  U.  S. 

Paca  V.  Dutton,  4  Mo.  371 ;  Karr  i-.  Jack-  113,  180. 


§  268.]  PROOF  OF  RECORDS.  481 

the  subscribing  witnesses  ;  that  such  witness  was  dead ;  and  that 
the  signature  of  such  subscribing  Avitncss  was  genuine.^  A  par- 
don certified  under  the  great  seal  of  the  State  was  admitted  in 
evidence.^'^  A  copy  of  a  survey  certified  by  the  register,  by  the 
judge,  and  by  the  secretary  of  state  under  the  great  seal,  was  ad' 
mitted  in  evidencc.^^''  The  clerk's  certificate  should  show  that  the 
judge  is  the  presiding  judge,  or  that  he  is  the  presiding  judge  for 
the  district.^^     This  statute  does  not  apply  to  court  records.^'^'' 

"  It  shall  be  lawful  for  any  keeper  or  person  having  the  cus- 
tody of  laws,  judgments,  orders,  decrees,  journals,  correspond- 
ence, or  other  public  documents  of  any  foreign  government  or 
its  agents,  relating  to  the  title  to  lands  claimed  by  or  under  the 
United  States,  on  the  application  of  the  head  of  one  of  the  Depart- 
ments, the  Solicitor  of  the  Treasury,  or  the  Commissioner  of  the 
General  Land  Office,  to  authenticate  copies  thereof  under  his  hand 
and  seal,  and  to  certify  them  to  be  correct  and  true  copies  of 
such  laws,  judgments,  orders,  decrees,  journals,  correspondence, 
or  other  public  documents,  respectively  ;  and  when  such  copies 
are  certified  by  an  American  minister  or  consul,  under  his  hand 
and  seal  of  office,  to  be  true  copies  of  the  originals,  they  shall  be 
sealed  up  by  him  and  returned  to  the  Solicitor  of  the  Treasury, 
who  shall  file  them  in  his  office,  and  cause  them  to  be  recorded  in 
a  book  kept  for  that  purpose.  A  copy  of  any  such  law,  judgment, 
order,  decree,  journal,  correspondence,  or  other  public  document, 
so  filed,  or  of  the  same  so  recorded  in  said  book,  may  be  read  in 
evidence  in  any  court,  where  the  title  to  land  claimed  under  or 
by  the  United  States  may  come  into  question,  equally  with  the 
originals."  ^^^ 

"  The  edition  of  the  laws  and  treaties  of  the  United  States, 
published  by  Little  &  Brown,  shall  be  competent  evidence  of  the 
several  public  and  private  acts  of  Congress,  and  of  the  several 
treaties  therein  contained,  in  all  the  courts  of  law  and  equity 
and  of  maritime  jurisdiction,  and  in  all  the  tribunals  and  public 
offices  of  the  United  States,  and  of  the  several  States,  without 
any  further  proof  or  authentication  thereof."  '^'^ 

96  White  ('.  Bromley,  20  How.  235,  250.  v.  Wise,  10  Pa.  157;   Law  v.  Gaultney, 

9^  United  States  ik  Wilson,  Baldwin,  78.  Cheves  (S.  C.)  Law,  7. 

98  Smith  V.  Redden,  5  Harr  (Del.)  321.        wi  U.   S.   R.  S    §907;   Ten  Cases  v. 

99  Paca  r.  DuUon,  4  Mo.  .370.  United  States,  34  Fed.  R.  101  ;  Chadwick  v. 
i"0  Tarlton  v.  Briscoe,  1  A.  K.  Marsh.  United  States,  3  Fed.  R.  753. 

(Ky.)  67;    U.  S.  R.  S.,  §   905;   Snyder       i"^  U.  S.  R.  S  §  908.     See  also  act  of 

VOL.    I. —  ol 


482  EVIDENCE    AT   LAW   AND   IN    EQUITY.  [CHAF.  XIX. 

"  In  suits  or  informations  brought,  where  any  seizure  is  made 
pursuant  to  an  act  providing  for  or  regulating  the  collection  of 
duties  on  imports  or  tonnage,  if  the  property  is  claimed  by  any 
person,  the  burden  of  proof  shall  lie  upon  such  claimant:  pro- 
vided that  probable  cause  is  shown  for  such  prosecution,  to  be 
judged  of  by  the  court."  ^^^ 

§  269.  Definition  and  Use  of  an  Affidavit.  —  An  affidavit  is  a 
declaration  upon  oath  or  affirmation  before  some  persons  having 
competent  and  lawful  power  and  authority  to  administer  the 
same.  Affidavits  are  used  in  a  suit  in  equity  in  three  ways. 
In  certain  cases  they  must  be  annexed  to  a  bill  before  it  can  be 
properly  filed ;  ^  certain  documents  may  be  proved  by  them  at 
the  hearing  ;  ^  and  they  are  used  in  support  of  interlocutory  ap- 
plications.^ The  manner  of  their  use  has  been  already  described. 
It  is  unsettled  whether  the  court  has  power  to  compel  any  one 
to  have  liis  affidavit  taken,'^  or  to  cross-examine  an  affiant,^  ex- 
cept, possibly,  by  means  of  a  feigned  issue. 

§  270.  Manner  of  Verifying  an  Affidavit.  —  An  affidavit  must 
be  sworn  to ;  unless  the  affiant  is  conscientiously  scrupulous  of 
taking  an  oath,  when  he  may,  in  lieu  thereof,  make  solemn  affir- 
mation of  the  truth  of  the  facts  stated  by  him.^  If  the  deponent 
be  blind  or  unable  to  read,  the  affidavit  must  be  read  over  to  him 
by  the  officer  before  whom  he  swears  to  its  truth.^  An  affidavit, 
if  made  within  the  United  States,  must  be  verified  before  a 
judge  of  the  court  in  which  it  is  to  be  used,  or  a  United  States 
commissioner,  or  a  notary  public.^  If  made  without  the  United 
States,  it  may  be  verified  before  any  secretary  of  legation,  or  con- 
sular officer  within  the  limits  of  his  legation,  consulate,  or  com- 


June  20,  1874,  ch.  333,  §  8  (18  St.  at  L.  *  See  Hammerschlag  Manufacturing 

114);    Act  of  June  7,  1880,  Res.  44   (21  Co.  v.  Judd,  26  Fed.   R.  292;  Bacon  v. 

St.  at  L.  308).  Magee,  7  Cowen  (N.  Y.),  515;    Day  v. 

i'J3  U.S.  R.  S.  §909.     See  also  Locke  y.  Boston  Belting  Co.,  6  Law  Rep.   (n.  s.) 

United   States,  7  Crancli,  339,  The  Lu-  329. 

minary,  8  Wheat.  407;  Wood  v.  United  ^  See  Day  r.  Boston  Belting  Co.,  6  Law 

States,  16  Pet.  342;  The  John  Griffin,  15  Rep.  (n.  s.)  329;  Hammerschlag  Manuf. 

Wall.   29  ;    Clifton   v.   United   States,   4  Co.  v.  Judd,  26  Fed.  R.  292. 

How.  242;    Taylor  v.   United  States,  3  §270.  i  Rule  91 ;  U.  S.  R.  S.  §§  1,5013. 

How.  197;  Buckley  v.  United  States,  4  ^  Matter  of  Christie,  5  Paige  (N.  Y.), 

How.  251 ;  Cliquot's  Champagne,  3  Wall.  242. 

114.  8  u.  S.  R.  S.  §§  725,  945 ;  L.  1876.  Hi. 

§  269.     1  See  §  87.  304  ;  U.  S.  R.  S.  1st  Supp.  251  (19  U.  S. 

2  See  §  269.  St.  at  L.  206)  ;  Haight  v.  Morris  Aque- 

8  See  Chapter  XV.  duct,  4  Wash.  C.  C.  601. 


§  272.]  FORM   OF   AN   AFFIDAVIT.  483 

mercial  agency  ;  *  or,  perhaps,  before  any  person  who,  by  the  laws 
of  the  country  in  which  the  affidavit  is  made,  is  authorized  to 
administer  an  oath  or  affirmation.^ 

§271.  Title  of  au  Affidavit.  —  An  affidavit  should  be  corrcctly 
entitled  in  the  cause  or  matter  in  which  it  is  made.^  For,  other- 
wise, it  is  said  that  the  affiant  cannot  be  convicted  of  perjury 
if  his  statements  are  false.-  But,  it  seems  that,  if  there  are  sev- 
eral parties  on  either  side,  or  both  sides,  it  will  be  sufficient  to 
entitle  it  in  the  name  of  a  single  )»laintiff  and  defendant,  and 
after  each  to  insert  the  word  "  others  "  or  "  another,"  according 
to  the  circumstances  of  the  case.'^  The  omission  of  a  party's 
christian  name  will  not  be  a  fatal  defect."*  If  the  affidavit  is 
correctly  entitled  when  made,  it  can  still  be  used  after  the  title 
of  the  cause  has  been  subsequently  changed.^  If  an  affidavit  of 
service  be  attached  to  papers  which  are  themselves  correctly 
entitled,  it  needs  no  separate  title.^  An  affidavit  made  or  entitled 
in  one  cause  cannot,  it  has  been  held,  be  used  in  another;"  un- 
less, perhaps,  when  the  affiant  is  dead,  insane,  imbecile,  or  beyond 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  court. 

§  272.  Form  of  an  Affidavit.  —  Every  affidavit  should  begin  with 
the  venire,  —  that  is,  the  name  of  the  county  ;  ^  and  if  sworn  to 
elsewhere  than  in  that  where  the  court  is  held,  with  the  name  of 
the  State  where  it  is  taken ;  which  is  usually  followed  by  the  ab- 
breviation Ss.  for  scilicet,  or  the  English  words  to  wit.  Otherwise, 
it  has  been  held,  though  not  by  a  Federal  court,  that  it  may  be 
disregarded  as  a  nullity,  even  though  the  residence  of  an  officer 
before  whom  it  is  sworn  appear  in  the  jurat.^  The  English  rule 
was  that  in  all  affidavits  the  true  place  of  residence,  description, 
and  addition  of  every  person  swearing  to  the  same,  must  be  in- 

4  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  1750.  "  Liiinbrozo  v.  Wliite,  1  Dickens,  150; 

5  Pinkerton  v.  The  Barnsley  Canal  Daniell's  Cli.  Pr.  1774 ;  Milliken  r  Selye, 
Co.,  3  Y.  &  J.  277  n.  3  Denio  (N.  Y  ),  54  ;    Stacy  v.  Farnham, 

§  271.  1  Hawley  r.  Donnelly,  8  Paige  2  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  26.     But  see  Barnard 

(N.  Y.),415,  Stafford  v.  Brown,  4  Paige  v.  Heydrick,  49   Barb.   (N.  Y.)   62,   72; 

(N.Y.),  3G0.  But  see  Bowman  f.  Slieldon,  s.  c.   2   Abbott's  Pr.  n.   s.    (N.  Y.)  47; 

6  Sand.  (N.  Y.)  657.  Langston  v.  Wetherell,   14  Mees.  &  W. 

2  Hawley  v.  Donnelly,  8  Paige  (N.Y.),  104. 

415.  g  272.  1  Belden  v.  Devoe,  12  Wendell 

3  White  V.  Hess,  8  Paige  (N.  Y.),  544.    (N.  Y),  223. 

*  Maury  v.  Van  Arnum,  1  Hill  (N.  Y.),  ^  Cook  v.  Staats,  18  Barb.  (N.Y.)  407  ; 
370.  Lane  v.  Morse,  6  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  894. 

*  Hawes   v.  Bamford,   9  Simons,  G53.  But   see  Moslier   v.  Heydrick,  45  Barb. 

6  Anon.,  4  Hill  (N.  Y.),  597.  (N.Y.)  549 ;  s.  c  30  How.  Pr.  (N.Y.)  161. 


484-  EVIDENCE   AT   LAW   AND    IN   EQUITY.  [CHAP.  XIX. 

gerted ;  unless  the  affidavits  were  made  by  parties  in  the  cause, 
wlio  might  describe  themselves,  in  the  affidavit,  as  the  above-named 
plaintiff,  or  defendant,  without  specifying  any  residence,  or  ad- 
dition, or  other  description.-^  This  rule,  however,  is  not  always 
adhered  to  or  insisted  upon  by  practitioners  in  the  courts  of  the 
United  States.  The  English  rule  was  that  the  stating  part  of 
the  affidavit  must  be  preceded  by  the  statement  that  the  deponent 
was  duly  sworn.*  The  affidavit  should  state  "  sufficient  to  sus- 
tain the  case  made  by  the  motion  or  petition  of  which  it  is  the 
ground  work."  ^  Its  statements  must  be  made  with  sufficient  cer- 
tainty, and  with  all  necessary  circumstances  of  time,  place,  manner, 
and  other  material  incidents.^  When,  however,  the  affiant  de- 
poses to  words  spoken,  the  addition  "or  to  that  effect"  is  not 
improper^  Special  fulness  is  required  of  affidavits  of  service.^ 
An  affidavit  should  state  facts  and  not  conclusions  of  law  ;  ^  and 
must  be  pertinent,  material,  and  not  scandalous.^'^  The  court 
may,  upon  examination  of  the  paper,  order  such  matter  expunged 
with  costs,  to  be  paid  by  the  party  or  solicitor  seeking  to  use  the 
same ;  ^^  or  a  reference  may  be  ordered  to  determine  whether 
the  statements  in  it  are  proper.^^  A  reference  can  only  be  de- 
manded upon  exceptions  in  writing  similar  to  those  to  a  plead- 
ing ;  13  and  the  filing  or  reading  of  affidavits  in  opposition  to 
such  parts  of  his  opponent's  affidavits  as  are  excepted  to  may 
be  construed  as  a  waiver  of  the  exceptions.^*  Pending  a  refer- 
ence concerning  it,  an  affidavit  cannot  be  used  except  by  leave 
of  the  court,  which  is  usually  granted  only  upon  terms. ^^ 

§  273.  Execution  of  an  Affidavit.  —  It  is  usual,  though  it  seems 
not  indispensable,  for  the  affiant  to  subscribe  his  christian  name 
and  surname  at  the  foot  of  the  affidavit.^   In  England  the  signature 


8  DanicII's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1775.  i""  Powell  v.  Kane,  5  Paisje  (N.  Y),  265. 

See   also   Hinde's  Pr.   451;    Crockett  v.  "  Powell  c.  Kane,  5  Paige  (N.  Y.),2G5; 

Bisiiton,  2  Madd.  446.  Ex  parte  Smith,  I  Atk.  139. 

^  Phillips   V.   Prentice,   2   Hare,   542;  12  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1777. 

Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1776.  See  §  68. 

5  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  177G  ;  i^  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1777. 

Ilinde's  Pr.  451 ;  Van  Wyck  v.  Reid,  10  See  §  68. 

How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.),  366.  "  Bickford  v.  Skewes,  8  Simons,  206; 

•^  Sea   Insurance   Co.  v.    Stebbins,    8  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  1777. 

Paige  (N.  Y.),  565;   Mcach  v.  Chappell,  is  Pearse  i'.  Brook,  3  Beav.  337;  Dan- 

8  Paige  (N.  Y.),  135.  iell's  Ch.  Pr.  1777. 

7  Ayliffe  v.  Murray,  2  Atk.  58,  60.  §  273.      1    Haff  v.    Spicer,  3   Caines 

8  Hinde's  Pr.  453.  (X.  Y.),  190  ;  Jackson  rx  don.  Kenyon  v. 

9  Powell  V.  Kane,  6  Paige  (N.  Y.),  265.  Virgil,  3  J.R.  (N.  Y.)  640 ;  Soule  ij.  Chase, 


§  274.]  OOMPETEKCY   OF   WITNESSES.  485 

had  to  be  on  the  left  side  of  tlie  page  ;  ^  but  in  this  country  it  is 
usually  at  the  right.  In  one  case  where  a  marksman  had  signed 
with  his  name  at  length,  his  hand  having  been  guided  for  that 
purpose,  the  affidavit  was  ordered  taken  off  the  file.^  The  jurat, 
which  is  indispensable,  is  placed  upon  the  opposite  side  from  the 
signature.  It  is  usually  in  substantially  the  following  form : 
"  Sworn  to  beforo  me  this  day  of  ,  18     ."     If  the 

affiant  be  blind  or  a  marksman,  the  jurat  should  be  in  substance 
thus  :  "  Sworn,  <fec.,  the  whole  of  the  above  affidavit  having  been 
first  read  over  and  explained  to  the  said  A.  B.,  who  appeared 
perfectly  to  understand  the  same,  he  made  his  mark  in  my  pres- 
ence." ^  If  the  affiant  have  been  previously  found  by  the  inquisi- 
tion of  a  jury  to  be  an  idiot,  a  lunatic,  or  imbecile,  the  officer 
before  whom  tho  affidavit  is  sworn  should  state  in  the  jurat  that 
he  has  examined  the  deponent  for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining  the 
state  of  his  mind,  and  that  the  latter  was  apparently  of  sound 
mind  and  capable  of  understanding  the  nature  and  contents  of 
the  affidavit.^  The  omission  of  the  addition  to  the  officer's  signa- 
ture of  his  titlc,^  and  even  the  omission  of  his  signature,  will  not, 
it  seems,  be  a  fatal  defect."  It  is  usual  and  more  prudent,  oven 
if  not  absolutely  essential,  for  the  officer  to  mark  with  his  initials 
all  interlineations  and  erasures  in  the  body  of  the  affidavit.^ 

§  274.  Competency  of  Witnesses.  — The  testimony  of  witnesses 
may  be  taken  either  solely  for  use  in  the  court  taking  the  same, 
or  for  use  in  other  courts  as  well.  The  same  rules  as  to  compe- 
tency prevail  at  law  and  in  equity.^  The  Revised  Statutes  pro- 
vide that,  "  in  the  courts  of  the  United  States,  no  witness  shall 
be  excluded  in  any  action  on  account  of  color,  or  in  any  civil 
action  because  he  is  a  party  or  interested  in  the  issue  tried : 
provided,  that  in  actions  by  or  against  executors,  administra- 
tors, or  guardians,  in  which  judgment  may  be  rendered  for  or 
against  them,  neither  party  shall  be  allowed  to  testify  against  the 
other,  as  to  any  transaction  with,  or  statement  by,  the  testator, 

1  Robertson  (N.  Y.),  222.     But  see  Laim-  728  ;  People  v.  Rensselaer  Common  Pleas, 

beer  v.  Allen,  2  Sand.  (N.  Y.)  648.  G  Wentl.  (N.  Y.)  543. 

'^  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1778.         ^  Chase  v.  Edwards,  2  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 

3 V.  Cliristoplier,  11   Simons,  409.  283. 

*  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)   1776;         »  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  1777  ; 

Matter  of  Christie,  5  Paige   (N.  Y.),  242.  Didier  v.  Warner,  1  Code  R.  (N.  Y.)  42. 

5  Matter  of  Christie,  5  Paige  (N.  Y.),  §  274.  i  Nash,  tenant   of   Connett   v. 

242.  Williams,  20  Wall.  226. 

*^  Hunter  v.  Le  Conte,  6  Cowen  (N.  Y. ), 


486  EVIDENCE   AT   LAW   AND   IN   EQUITY.  [CHAP,  XIX. 

intestate,  or  ward,  unless  called  to  testify  thereto  by  the  oppo- 
site party,  or  required  to  testify  thereto  by  the  court.  In  all 
other  respects,  the  laws  of  the  state  in  which  the  court  is  held 
shall  be  the  rules  of  decision  as  to  the  competency  of  witnesses 
in  the  courts  of  the  United  States  in  trials  at  common  law,  and 
in  equity  and  admiralty."  ^  This  statute  has  been  said  to  be 
remedial,  and  to  deserve,  therefore,  a  liberal  construction.-^  It 
applies  as  well  to  causes  to  which  the  United  States  is  a  party, 
as  to  those  between  private  persons.*  It  allows  a  party  to  testify 
in  his  own  behalf,  as  well  as  when  called  upon  by  the  other .^ 
It  does  not  prevent  a  person,  not  a  party  but  interested  in  the 
result  of  a  suit,  from  testifying  against  an  executor  in  a  case 
when,  if  a  party,  he  could  not  do  so  although  the  State  law 
would  exclude  such  testimony.^  Where  an  administratrix  had 
commenced  a  suit  and  subsequently  resigned,  and  the  suit  was 
continued  by  her  successor,  it  was  held  that  she  who  began  the 
suit  was  a  competent  witness  as  to  transactions  with  the  testator.''' 
This  statute  does  not  allow  a  wife  to  testify  in  behalf  of,  or 
against,  her  husband,  unless  the  laws  of  the  State  permit  her  so 
to  do.^  For  her  incompetency  by  the  common  law  was  due  not 
to  interest,  but  to  grounds  of  public  policy.^  The  cases  where  the 
court  will  require  a  party  to  testify,  when  otherwise  he  would  not 
be  obliged  or  allowed  so  to  do,  are  rare.  The  court  will  usually 
only  do  so  upon  its  own  motion,  and,  if  upon  his  suggestion, 
only  after  hearing  the  other  party,  if  the  latter  object.^*^  The 
court  will  do  so,  however,  when  a  party  has  died  after  his  testi- 
mony has  been  taken  and  before  trial,  and  his  administrator 
insists  upon  reading  or  submitting  his  testimony  at  the  hearing.^^ 
The  court,  will,  it  seems,  not  require  such  testimony  to  be  taken, 
if  by  so  doing  it  would  adopt  a  rule  of  decision  for  a  Federal 
court  different  from  that  prescribed  by  the  legislature  for  courts 
of  the  State  wherein  it  is  hcld.^^  If  there  are  several  defendants, 
one  of  whom  has  a  similar  interest  in  the  result  to  that  of  the 

2  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  858  ;  James  v.  Atlan-  ^  Stevens  v.  Bernays,  42  Fofl.  R.  488  ; 
tic  Delaine  Co.,  3  Cliff.  614.  See  infra,  Potter  v.  Third  National  Bank  of  Chic, 
§  372.  ■  102  U,  S.  163. 

3  Texas  ?;.  Cliiles,  21  Wall.  488.  '  Snyder  v.  Fiedler,  1.39  U.  S.  478. 
*  Green  v.  United  States,  9  Wall.  055.  «  Lucas  v.  Brooks,  18  Wall  480. 

Contra,  Jones  v.   United  States,  1  Ct.   CI.  9  Lucas  v.  Brooks,  18  Wall.  430. 

383.  10  Fvslava  v.  Mazan^re,  1  Woods,  023. 

5  Texas  v.  Cliiles,  21  Wall.  488;   Rail-  "  Miinim  v.  Owens,  2  Dill  475. 

road  Co.  i;.  Pollard,  22  Wall.  311.  i-  Robinson  v.  Mandell,  3  Cliff.  169. 


§  274]  COMPETENCY   OF   WITNESSES.  487 

complainant,  such  defendant  cannot,  by  requiring  tlic  complain- 
ant to  testify,  obviate  the  effect  of  the  proviso  in  this  statute.^^ 
It  seems  that  the  admissions  of  a  party  are  competent  evidence 
against  him,  even  though,  upon  his  cross-examination,  when 
testifying  in  his  own  behalf,  he  was  not  asked  if  he  made  them.^* 
In  the  Federal  courts,  no  matter  what  the  decisions  of  the  State 
courts  may  be,  a  verbal  collateral  agreement  cannot  be  proven 
to  vary,  qualify,  contradict,  add  to,  or  subtract  from  the  absolute 
terms  of  a  written  instrument,  in  the  absence  of  fraud,  accident, 
or  mistake,  ^^  nor  to  show  by  parol  that  payment  was  to  be  made 
in  some  other  way  than  that  specified  in  the  written  instrument.^^ 
It  has  been  held,  in  actions  at  common  law,  that  the  testimony 
of  a  physician  as  to  information  acquired  while  attending  a 
patient  in  a  professional  capacity,  when  forbidden  by  the  statutes 
of  the  State,  should  not  be  admitted  in  the  Federal  court  there 
held  ;  ^'^  that  when  a  State  statute  authorized  the  admissibility 
in  evidence  of  a  notarial  certificate  of  a  form  inadmissible  at 
common  law,i^  or  of  the  endorsement  of  negotiable  paper  without 
proof  of  handwriting,!^  the  Federal  court  there  held  should  follow 
such  statutes ;  but  that  a  State  statute  excluding  the  testimony 
of  a  witness  on  account  of  his  interest  in  the  controversy  should 
be  disregarded.^''  An  application  to  the  patent  office  and  corre- 
spondence with  the  patent  office,  although  the  rules  of  the  patent 
office  provide  that  they  shall  be  kept  secret,  must  be  produced  by 
a  party  who  has  been  served  with  a  subpcena  duces  tecum  calling 
for  them,  although  a  privilege  is  claimed  upon  the  ground  that 
they  are  the  result  of  consultations  between  the  applicant  and 
his  counsel,  that  their  phraseology  must  necessarily  reflect  both 
the  information  given  by  the  client  to  the  counsel  and  the  advice 
given  by  the  counsel  to  the  client,  and  that  they  have  been  placed 
in  the  hands  of  counsel  under  the  protection  of  a  confidential 
relation.^!     By  statute,  on  the  trial  of  all  indictments,  informa- 

18  Eslava  i:  Mazange,  1  Woods,  62.3.  ^^  Sims  v.  Hundley,  6  How.  1. 

1*  The  Stranger,  1  Brown's  Adm.  281.  i'-*  M'Niel  v.  Holbrook,  12  Pet.  84 

15  Brown  ;-.  Spofford,  95  U.  S.  474  ;  ^o  Potter  v.  National  Bank,  102  U.  S. 
American  Electric  Const.  Co.  v.  Con-  163 ;  Goodwin  v.  Fox,  129  U.  S.  601, 
sumcrs'  Gas  Co.,  47  Fed.  R.  43,  46.  631. 

16  Richardson  v.  Hardwick,  106  U.  S.  ^i  Edison  Electric  Liglit  Co,  v.  V.  S. 
252 ;  Bast  i-.  First  National  Bank  of  Ash-  Electric  Lighting  Co.,  44  Fed.  R,  2U4, 297, 
land,  101  U.  S.  93.  299. 

1'^  Conn.  Mutual  Life  Ins.  Co.  i'.  Union 
Trust  Co.,  112  U.  S.  250. 


488  EVIDENCE   AT   LAW   AND   IN   EQUITY.  [CHAP.  XIX. 

tions,  complaints,  and  other  proceedings  against  persons  charged 
with  the  commission  of  crimes,  offenses,  and  misdemeanors  in  the 
United  States  courts.  Territorial  courts,  and  courts-martial,  and 
courts  of  inquiry,  in  any  State  or  territory,  including  tlic  District 
of  Columbia,  the  person  so  charged  shall,  at  his  own  request, 
but  not  otherwise,  be  a  competent  witness.^^  It  has  been  held 
that  this  docs  not  render  competent  a  defendant  who  by  a 
previous  conviction  of  an  infamous  crime  had  lost  the  privilege 
of  testifying.'-^'^  The  Revised  Statutes  provide  that  "  no  pleading 
of  a  party,  nor  any  discovery  or  evidence  obtained  from  a  party 
or  witness  by  means  of  a  judicial  proceeding  in  this  or  any  foreign 
country,  shall  be  given  in  evidence,  or  in  any  manner  used 
against  him  or  his  property  or  estate,  in  any  court  of  the  United 
States,  in  any  criminal  proceeding,  or  for  the  enforcement  of  any 
penalty  or  forfeiture  ;  provided  that  this  section  shall  not  exempt 
any  party  or  witness  from  prosecution  and  punishment  for  per- 
jury committed  in  discovering  or  testifying  as  aforesaid."  ^^  Some 
authorities  hold  that  since  this  statute  a  witness  cannot  object  to 
testifying  on  the  ground  that  an  answer  would  tend  to  crimi- 
nate him.-^  Such  cases  seem  to  give  a  very  narrow  construction 
to  the  Fourth  Amendment  to  the  Constitution.  "  The  only  pro- 
tection to  the  party  being  that  his  answer  shall  not  be  used 
against  him  in  a  criminal  prosecution,  —  a  i)rotection  of  little 
avail  to  any  party  who  should  disclose  criminal  acts  upon  which 
an  indictment  could  be  found,  and  should  upon  compulsion  in- 
dicate other  sources  of  evidence  by  means  of  which  the  acts 
disclosed  can  be  proved ;  and  such  acts  may  also  constitute 
offences  under  the  law  of  the  State,  against  which  Congress  can 
afford  no  immunity."  ^6  The  Revised  Statutes  further  provide 
that :  "  No  testimony  given  by  a  witness  before  either  House, 
or  before  any  committee  of  either  House  of  Congress,  shall  be 

22  20  St.  at  L.  30  (1  U.  S.  Supp.  312).  26  /„   re  Pacific  Railway  Commission, 

23  United  States  v.  Mollis,  43  Fed.  K.  32  Fed.  K.  241,  267  ;  per  Sawyer,  J.  In 
248.  Matter  of  Palliser,  U.  S.  D.  C,  D.  Conn. 

24  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  860.  Nov.    1889,   argued   by   George   C.    Sill, 

25  United  States  r.  M'Cartliy,  18  Fed.  U.  S.  attorney,  for  the  government,  and 
R.  87;  People  v.  Kelly,  24  N.  Y.  74;  Roger  Foster  for  the  witness;  Judge 
United  States  v.  Brown,  1  Saw.  531,  536  ;  Shipman  refused  to  follow  the  cases  cited 
United  States  v  Williams,  15  Int.  Rev.  in  note  25,  and  allowed  the  witness  to  re- 
Rec.  199;  In  ra  Phillips,  2  American  Law  fuse  toansweraquestioii  wiiich  heclaimed 
Times,  154;  In  re  Counseiman,  44  Fed.  would  tend  to  criminate  him.  No  opinion 
R.  2G8.  was  written. 


§  275.]  SUBPCENAS   AD  TESTIFICANDUM.  489 

used  as  evidence  in  any  criminal  proceeding  against  him  in 
any  court,  except  in  a  prosecution  for  perjury  committed  in  giving 
such  testimony.  But  an  official  paper  or  record  produced  by 
him  is  not  within  the  said  privilege."  ^''  "  No  witness  is  privi- 
leged to  refuse  to  testify  to  any  fact,  or  to  produce  any  paper, 
respecting  which  he  shall  be  examined  by  either  House  of  Con- 
gress, or  by  any  committee  of  cither  House,  upon  the  ground  that 
his  testimony  to  such  fact  or  his  production  of  such  paper  may 
tend  to  disgrace  him  or  otherwise  render  him  infamous.''^^  A 
defendant  when  called  by  the  complainant  as  a  witness  may  be 
compelled  to  state  whether  he  has  in  his  possession  a  machine 
claimed  to  be  an  infringement  of  the  plaintiff's  patent,  although 
the  plaintiff  has  not  previously  made  out  a  prima  facie  case  of 
infringement.^^  The  rules  regulating  the  production  of  docu- 
ments by  a  subpoena  duces  tecum  or  otherwise  have  been  pre- 
viously explained. 2*^ 

§  275.  Subpoenas  ad  Testificandum.  —  The  attendance  of  a  wit- 
ness is  usually  compelled  in  equity  as  in  law  by  the  service  of  a 
subpoena  ad  testificandum,  and  the  payment  of  his  fees  and  mile- 
age.i  A  subpoena  ad  testificandum  is  substantially  in  the  samo 
form  in  equity  as  in  law.  When  issued  from  a  court  of  the 
United  States,  it  must  be  under  the  seal  of  the  court,  and  signed 
by  the  clerk  ;  and  is  usually  also  signed  by  the  solicitors  of  the 
party  at  whose  request  it  issues.  Those  issued  from  the  Supreme 
Court  or  a  Circuit  Court  must  bear  teste  from  the  day  of  such 
issue  of  the  Chief  Justice  of  the  United  States,  or,  when  that 
office  is  vacant,  of  the  associate  justice  next  in  precedence.'^ 
Those  issuing  from  a  District  Court  must  bear  teste  of  the  judge, 
or  when  that  office  is  vacant,  of  the  clerk  thereof.^  By  the  com- 
mon law,  the  names  of  but  four  witnesses  could  be  included  in 
one  subpoena.*  The  Revised  Statutes,  however,  provide  that,  "  to 
save  unnecessary  expense,  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  clerk  to 
insert  the  names  of  as  many  witnesses  in  a  cause  in  such  sub- 
poena as  convenience   in    serving   the   same  will    permit."  ^     If 

27  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  859.  §  275     i  For  tlie  amount  of  his  fees 

28  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  103.  and  mileage,  see  §  3.']3. 

29  Delamater  v.  Reinhardt,  43  Fed.  R.         '^  U.  S.  R.  S.  §§  911,  912. 
76;  U.  S.  C.  C,  S.  D.N.  Y.  />«•  Lacombe,         3  u.  S.  R.  S.  §§  911,  912. 

J.  Contra,  Celluloid  Co.  v.  Crane  Co.,  3d  *  Erwin  v.  United  States,  37  Fed.  R. 
Circuit.  470,  490. 

80  Supra,  §  267.  ^  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  829.     Erwin  i-.  United 

States,  37  Fed.  R.  470,  490. 


490  EVIDENCE   AT   LAW   AND    IN    EQUITY.  [CHAP.  XIX. 

the  witness  can  be  served  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court 
where  the  suit  is  pending,  or  within  a  Imndred  miles  of  the  place 
of  holding  that  court,  the  subpoena  may  be  issued  from  its  clerk's 
office.^  If  he  cannot,  and  it  is  desired  to  take  his  testimony  de 
bene  esse  under  the  acts  of  Congress,'^  application  for  the  issue 
of  the  subpoena  must  be  made  to  the  court  of  the  district  in 
which  the  examination  is  to  be  made.^  It  has  been  held  that 
Congress  has  no  power  to  authorize  or  compel  the  courts  of  the 
United  States  to  issue  subpoenas  or  punish  for  contempt  witnesses 
before  a  Congressional  Commission,^  or  an  executive  officer.^*^ 
"  Witnesses  who  are  required  to  attend  any  term  of  a  circuit  or 
district  court  on  the  part  of  the  United  States,  shall  be  sub- 
poenaed to  attend  to  testify  generally  on  their  behalf,  and  not  to 
depart  the  court  without  leave  thereof,  or  of  the  district  attorney ; 
and  under  such  process  they  shall  appear  before  the  grand  or 
petit  jury,  or  both,  as  they  may  be  required  by  the  court  or 
district  attorney."  ^^  It  has  been  held  that  a  witness  cannot  be 
compelled  by  subpoena  to  produce  the  patterns  of  the  castings 
of  a  stove,  which  are  in  his  possession.^^ 

§  276.  Service  of  a  Subpoena  ad  testificandum.  —  A  subpoena  to 
appear  and  testify  may  be  served  by  the  marshal  of  the  court,  or 
by  any  other  person  acting  as  the  agent  of  the  party  calling  the 
witness.^  The  Revised  Statutes  provide  that  "  subpoenas  for  wit- 
nesses who  are  required  to  attend  a  court  of  the  United  States, 
in  any  district,  may  run  into  any  other  district ;  ^;rov/(f?c?,  that  in 
civil  causes  the  witnesses  living  out  of  the  district  in  which  the 
court  is  held  do  not  live  at  a  greater  distance  than  one  hundred 
miles  from  the  place  of  holding  the  same."  ^  A  witness'  attend- 
ance at  a  court  more  than  one  hundred  miles  from  the  place 
where  he  lives  cannot  be  compelled  by  the  service  of  a  subpoena 
upon  him  within  the  district,  when  he  has  been  enticed  there  by 

e  U.  S.  K.  S.  §  876.  »  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  877. 

"  See  Infra,  §§  286-287  12  /„  re  Shephard,  3  Fed.  R.  12. 

8  U.  S  R  S.  §  863  ,  United  States  v.  §  276.  1  Schwabacker  v.  Reilly,  2  Dill. 
Tililen,  25  Internal  Rev.  R.  352  ;  Ex  parte  127  ;  Cumniings  v.  The  Akron  Cement  & 
Ilumplirey,  2  Blatchf.  228;  Henry  0.  Plaster  Co.,  G  Blatchf.  509;  Millers. 
Ricketts,  1  Crunch  C.  C.  580 ;  Er  jnrte  Scott,  6  Phila.  (Pa.)  484;  Power  v. 
Elisha  Peck,  3  Blatchf.   113.     See /«/m,  Senimes,  1  Cranch  C.  C.  247. 

§  276.  "  --J  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  876 ;  Ex  parte  Beehees, 

9  In  re  Pacific  Railway  Comm'n,  32  2  Wall.  Jr.  127;  Henry  v.  Ricketts,  1 
Fed.  R.  241.  But  see  In  re  Counselman,  Cranch  C.  C.  580;  United  States  v.  Wil- 
44  Fed.  R.  2(58.  Hams,  4  Cranch  C.  C.  372. 

1"  In  re  McLean,  37  Fed.  R.  048. 


§  276.]  SERVICE   OF   A   SLBPCENA   AD    TESTIFICANDUM.  -iQl 

false  pretences  ;  ^  or  while  there  to  attend  either  as  a  party,  a 
witness,  an  attorney,  or  a  counsel  during  a  suit  or  other  judicial 
proceeding  in  a  State  *  or  Federal  court ;  ^  or,  while  travelling 
upon  his  way  to  or  from  Congress,  if  he  be  a  nienihcr  thereof;^ 
or  if  there  in  the  course  of  the  performance  of  any  public  duty." 

"  AVhen  a  commission  has  been  issued  by  any  court  of  the 
United  States  for  taking  the  testimony  of  a  witness  named  therein 
at  any  place  within  any  district  or  Territory,  the  clerk  of  any  court 
of  the  United  States  for  such  district  or  Territoiy  shall,  on  the 
application  of  either  party  to  the  suit,  or  of  his  agent,  issue  a 
subpoena  for  such  witness,  commanding  him  to  appear  and  tes- 
tify before  the  commissioner  named  in  the  commission,  at  any 
time  and  place  stated  in  the  subpoena ;  and  if  any  witness,  after 
being  duly  served  with  such  subpoena,  refuses  or  neglects  to  ap- 
pear, or,  after  appearing,  refuses  to  testify,  not  being  privileged 
from  giving  testimony,  and  such  refusal  or  neglect  is  proven  to 
the  satisfaction  of  any  judge  of  the  court  whose  clerk  issues  such 
subpoena,  such  judge  may  proceed  to  enforce  obedience  to  the 
process,  or  punish  the  disobedience,  as  any  coui't  of  the  United 
States  may  j)rocced  in  case  of  disobedience  to  process  of  subpoena 
to  testify  issued  by  such  court."  ^ 

"When  either  party  in  such  suit  applies  to  any  judge  of  a 
United  States  court  in  such  district  or  Territory  for  a  subpoena 
commanding  the  witness,  therein  to  be  named,  to  appear  and 
testify  before  said  commissioner,  at  the  time  and  place  to  be 
stated  in  the  subpoena,  and  to  bring  with  him  and  produce  to 
such  commissioner  any  paper  or  writing  or  wi-ittcn  instrument 
or  book  or  other  document  supposed  to  be  in  the  possession  or 
power  of  such  witness,  and  to  be  described  in  the  subpoena,  such 
judge,  on  being  satisfied,  by  the  affidavit  of  the  person  apply- 
ing, or  otherwise,  that  there  is  reason  to  believe  that  such  paper, 
writing,  written  instrument,  book,  or  other  document  is  in  the 
possession  or  power  of  the  witness,  and  that  the  same,  if  pro- 
duced, would  be  competent  and  material  evidence  for  the  party 

8  Union  Sugar  Refinery  Co.  v.  Mathics-  Matthews  v.  Tufts,  87  N.  Y.  568.    Contra, 

son,  2  Cliff.  304 ;  Steiger  v.  Bonn,  4  Fed.  Bliglit   v.   Fislier,  Peters'  Circuit  Court 

U.  17.  Reports,  41. 

4  Juneau   Bank  v.   M'Speda,   5   Biss.  *'  Constitution    Art.  I.   §  6 ;  Miner  v. 

64,  Mattliews  v.  Tufts,  87  N.  Y  568.    But  Markham,  28  Fed.  R.  387. 

see  Blight  v.  Fisher,  Pet.  C.  C.  41.  '  See  §  98. 

6  Parker  c.  Hotchkiss,  1  Wall.  Jr.  209  ;  »  u.  S.  R.  S.  §  868. 


492  EVIDENCE    AT   LAW    AND   IN    EQUITY.  [CHAP.  XIX. 

applying  therefor,  may  order  the  clerk  of  said  court  to  issue  such 
subpoena  accordingly.  And  if  the  witness,  after  being  served 
with  such  subpoena,  fails  to  produce  to  the  commissioner,  at  the 
time  and  place  stated  in  the  subpoena,  any  such  paper,  writing, 
written  instrument,  book,  or  other  document,  being  in  his  pos- 
session or  power,  and  described  in  the  subpoena,  and  such  fail- 
ure is  proved  to  the  satisfaction  of  said  judge,  he  may  proceed 
to  enforce  obedience  to  said  process  of  subpoena,  or  punish  the 
disobedience,  in  like  manner  as  any  court  of  the  United  States 
may  proceed  in  case  of  disobedience  to  like  process  issued  by 
such  court.  When  any  such  paper,  writing,  written  instrument, 
book,  or  other  document  is  produced  to  such  commissioner,  he 
shall,  at  the  cost  of  the  party  requiring  the  same,  cause  to  be 
made  a  correct  copy  thereof,  or  of  so  much  thereof  as  shall  be 
required  by  either  of  the  parties."  ^ 

"  No  witness  shall  be  required,  under  the  provisions  of  either 
of  the  two  preceding  sections,  to  attend  at  any  place  out  of  the 
county  where  he  resides,  nor  more  than  forty  miles  from  the 
place  of  his  residence,  to  give  his  deposition  ;  nor  shall  any  wit- 
ness be  deemed  guilty  of  contempt  for  disobeying  any  subpoena 
directed  to  him  by  virtue  of  either  of  the  said  sections,  unless  his 
fee  for  going  to,  returning  from,  and  one  day's  attendance  at  the 
place  of  examination  are  paid  or  tendered  to  him  at  the  time  of 
the  service  of  the  subpoena."  ^^ 

§  276  a.  Depositions  in  the  District  of  Columbia  for  use  in  Suits 
pending  elsewhere.  Tlie  Revised  Statutes  provide  that,  "  When  a 
commission  to  take  the  testimony  of  any  witness  found  within  the 
District  of  Columbia,  to  be  used  in  a  suit  depending  in  any  State 
or  Territorial  or  foreign  court,  is  issued  from  such  court,  or  a 
notice  to  the  same  effect  is  given  according  to  its  rules  of 
practice,  and  such  commission  or  notice  is  produced  to  a  justice 
of  the  Supreme  Court  of  said  District,  and  due  proof  is  made  to 
him  that  the  testimony  of  such  witness  is  material  to  the  party 
desiring  the  same,  the  said  justice  shall  issue  a  summons  to  the 
witness,  requiring  him  to  appear  before  the  commissioners  named 
in  the  commission  or  notice,  to  testify  in  such  suit,  at  a  time  and 
at  a  place  within  said  District  therein  specified."  ^ 

"  When  it  satisfactorily  appears  by  affidavit  to  any  justice  of 

9  U.  S.  R.  S  §  809.  §  276  a.     i  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  871. 

i>  U.  S  R.  S.  §  870. 


I  277.]  COMPELLING   A  WITNESS   TO   TESTIFY.  493 

the  Supreme  Court  of  the  District  of  CoUirabia,  or  to  any  com- 
missioner for  taking  depositions  appointed  by  said  court :  first, 
that  any  person  within  said  District  is  a  material  witness  for 
either  party  in  a  suit  pending  in  any  State  or  Territorial  or  for- 
eign court ;  second,  that  no  commission  nor  notice  to  take  the 
testimony  of  such  witness  has  been  issued  or  given  ;  and,  third, 
that,  according  to  the  practice  of  the  court  in  which  the  suit  is 
pending,  the  deposition  of  a  witness  taken  without  the  pres- 
ence and  consent  of  both  parties  will  be  received  on  the  trial  or 
hearing  thereof,  —  such  officer  shall  issue  his  summons,  requiring 
the  witness  to  appear  before  him  at  a  place  within  the  Dis- 
trict, at  some  reasonable  time,  to  be  stated  therein,  to  testify  in 
such  suit."  2 

"  Testimony  obtained  under  the  two  preceding  sections  shall 
be  taken  down  in  writing  by  the  officer  before  whom  the  wit- 
ness appears,  and  shall  be  certified  and  transmitted  by  him  to 
the  court  in  which  the  suit  is  pending,  in  such  manner  as  the 
practice  of  that  court  may  require.  If  any  person  refuses  or 
neglects  to  appear  at  the  time  and  place  mentioned  in  the  sum- 
mons, or,  on  his  appearance,  refuses  to  testify,  he  shall  be  liable 
to  the  same  penalties  as  would  be  incurred  for  a  like  offense  on 
the  trial  of  a  suit."  ^ 

"  Every  witness  appearing  and  testifying  under  the  said  pro- 
visions relating  to  the  District  of  Columbia  shall  be  entitled  to 
receive  for  each  day's  attendance,  from  the  party  at  whose  in- 
stance he  is  summoned,  the  fees  now  provided  by  law  for  each 
day  he  shall  give  attendance."  ^ 

The  courts  of  the  United  States  have  no  power  to  compel  the 
attendance  of  persons  to  an  examination  in  a  foreign  country. 
Such  testimony,  therefore,  can  only  be  taken  against  the  will  of 
a  witness  by  the  aid  of,  and  by  means  of,  the  remedies  adminis- 
tered by  a  foreign  court.^ 

§  277.  Compelling  a  Witness  to  testify.  —  When  a  witness,  who 
lias  been  properly  served  with  a  subpoena,  refuses  to  attend,  or 
when  upon  his  examination  he  refuses  to  answer  a  relevant  and 
proper  question,  against  answering  which  he  is  not  protected  by 
his  privilege,  by  the  old  rules  he  was  liable  "  to  be  proceeded 
against  in  three  ways  :  first,  by  attachment  for  a  contempt  of 

■^  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  872.  ■»  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  874. 

8  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  873.  6  §  290. 


494  EVIDENCE   AT   LAW   AND    IN   EQUITY.  [CHAP.  XIX. 

the  process  of  the  court ;  secondly,  by  a  special  action  on  the 
case  for  damages  at  common  law ;  and  thirdly,  by  action  on  the 
statute  5  Eliz.  c.  9,  §  12,  for  the  further  recompense  given  by  that 
statute,  if  it  has  been  previously  assessed  by  the  court  out  of 
which  the  process  issued."  ^  In  the  Federal  courts,  a  witness,  if 
contumacious,  may  be  punished  for  coutempt,^  and  is  also  prob- 
ably liable  to  an  action  for  the  damages  sustained  by  his  refusal. 
Upon  an  application  to  punish  a  witness  for  refusing  to  answer 
a  question,  the  power  of  the  officer  before  whom  he  is  exam- 
ined and  the  materiality  of  the  question  may  both  be  consid- 
ered.^ Such  an  application  must  be  made  to  the  court  which 
issued  the  subpoena.'*  When  an  application  to  punish  a  witness 
for  contempt  for  failure  to  produce  a  paper  in  obedience  to  a 
subpoena  duces  tecum,  it  has  been  said  that  the  materiality  of  the 
paper  required  will  not  be  determined  unless  it  is  produced  ;5 
and  if  there  is  color  for  the  claim  that  the  paper  is  material, 
its  production  will  be  compelled,  and  the  decision  as  to  the  ad- 
mission of  the  paper  in  evidence  postponed  to  the  final  hearing.^ 
The  rules  concerning  the  privileges  of  witnesses  and  the  mate- 
riality and  relevancy  of  evidence  are  substantially  the  same  in 
equity  as  at  law."  Care  will  be  taken  not  to  compel  a  witness 
to  needlessly  disclose  his  business  secrets  ^  and  private  papers.^ 

§  278.  Testimony  taken  in  Equity  which  may  be  used  in  other 
Courts.  —  Testimony  may  be  taken  in  a  court  of  equity  for  use  in 
other  courts,  as  well  as  for  its  own  use,  by  bills  to  perpetuate 
testimony  *  and  bills  to  take  testimony  de  bene  esse ;  ^  and  for- 
merly, at  least,  testimony  could  be  taken  in  a  court  of  equity  for 
use  in  another  court  by  a  bill  of  discovery .^ 

§  279.  Bills  to  perpetuate  Testimony.  —  "  In  any  case  where  it 
is  necessary  in  order  to  prevent  a  failure  or  delay  of  justice,  any 
of  the  courts  of  the  United  States  may  grant  a  dedimus  liotestateyn 
to  take  depositions  according  to  common  usage ;  and  any  circuit 
court,  upon  application  to  it  as  a  court  of  equity,  may,  according 

§  277.     1  Titld's  Pr.  738.  "^  Stevens  v.  Cooper,  1  J.   Ch.  (N.  Y.) 

i  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  725.  425. 

8  Ex  parte  Peck,  3   Blatehf.   113  ;  Ex  ^  Robinson  v.  Phila.,  &c.  R.  R.  Co  ,  28 

parte  Judson,  3  Blatehf.  80.  Fed.  R.  340,  342. 

4  In  re  Allis,  44  Fed.  R.  216.  '  Henry  v.  Travelers'  Ins.  Co.,  35  Fed. 

5  Edison  El.  L.  Co.  v.  United  States  R.  15. 

El.  L.  Co.,  44  Fed.  R.  294.  §  278.     i  §  279. 

G  Edison  El.  L.  Co.  v.  United  States  -  §  280. 

El.  L.  Co.,  46  Fed.  R.  55,  59.  »  §  281. 


§  279.]  BILLS   TO   PEEPETUATE   TESTIMONY.  495 

to  the  usages  of  chancery,  direct  depositions  to  be  taken  in  pei-- 
petuam  rei  memoriam,  if  they  relate  to  any  matters  that  may  be 
cognizable  in  any  court  of  the  United  States."  ^  In  order  to  obtain 
such  a  direction,  the  party  wishing  the  testimony  taken  should  file 
a  bill  to  perpetuate  testimony .2  A  bill  to  perpetuate  testimony 
must  contain  all  the  facts  necessary  to  give  the  court  jurisdiction. 
It  must  state  with  reasonable  certainty  the  subject-matter  touch- 
ing which  the  plaintiff  is  desirous  of  taking  testimony,  ^  and  show 
that  it  is  a  matter  which  may  be  cognizable  in  a  court  of  the 
United  States.'*  It  should  also  show  that  the  plaintiff  has  some 
interest  in  the  subject-matter,  which  may  be  endangered  if  the 
testimony  in  support  of  it  is  lost.  A  mere  expectancy,  however 
strong  and  well-founded,  is  not  sufficient.  It  has  been  said,  "Put 
the  case  as  high  as  possible  ;  that  the  party  seeking  to  perpetuate 
the  testimony  is  the  next  of  kin  of  a  lunatic  ;  that  the  lunatic  is 
intestate ;  that  he  is  in  the  most  helpless  state,  a  moral  and  physi- 
cal impossibility  (though  the  law  would  not  so  regard  it)  that  he 
should  ever  recover  ;  even  if  he  were  in  articido  mortis,  and  the 
bill  was  filed  at  that  instant;  still,  the  plaintiff  could  not  qualify 
himself  to  maintain  it,  as  having  any  interest  in  the  subject  of 
the  suit."  ^  If,  however,  the  interest  be  such  a  one  as  may  be 
immediately  barred  by  the  party  against  whom  the  bill  is  brought, 
it  has  been  said  that  the  court  will  withhold  its  assistance,  for  it 
would  be  a  fruitless  exercise  of  power.^  Such  a  bill  must  also 
show  that  the  defendant  has,  or  claims  to  have,  a  title  or  interest 
in  opposition  to  that  of  the  plaintiff  in  the  subject-matter  of  the 
proposed  testimony,'^  as,  for  example,  that  the  defendant  claims 
an  exclusive  right  to  the  use  of  a  process  which  the  plaintiff  is 
using,  and  rests  his  claim  upon  letters-patent  which  the  proposed 
testimony  will  show  to  be  invalid ;  ^  and  some  ground  of  necessity 
for  perpetuating  the  evidence,  as  that  the  facts  to  which  the  testi- 


§  279.     1  U  S.  R.  S.  §  8G6.   Testimony  timore  Coffee  Polishing  Co.  v.  New  York 

may  tluis  be  taken  before  a  Circuit  Court  Coffee  Polisliing  Co.,  9  Feil.  K.  578.     But 

"while  a  case  is  pending  in  the  Supreme  see  Morris  v.  Morris,  2  Phill.  205,  208. 
Court  or  Circuit  Court  of  Appeals  on  ap-         ^  Dursley  v.  Fitzhardinge,  6  Ves.  260. 
peni  from  a  decree  sustainintr  a  demurrer.         ^  Dursley  v.  Fitzhardinge,  G  Ves.  261- 

Richter  v.  Union  Trust  Co.,  116  U.  S.  55.  263. 

2  New  York  &  Baltimore  Coffee  Pol-         '^  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  302. 

ishing  Co.  v.  New  York  CofTee  Polishing         ^  New  York  &  Baltimore   Coffee  Pol- 
Co.,  0  Fed.  R.  678.  ishing  Co.  v.  New  York  Coffee   Polishing 

3  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §§  300,  305.  Co.  9  Fed.  R.  678. 
«  U.  s".  R.  S.  §  868 ;  New  York  &  Bal- 


49 G  EVIDENCE   AT   LAW   AND    IN    EQUITY.  [CHAP.  XIX. 

mony  of  the  witnesses  proposed  to  be  examined  relate,  cannot  be 
immediately  investigated  in  a  court  of  law  or  equity,  —  or,  if  they 
can  be  immediately  investigated,  that  the  right  to  commence  such 
a  suit  or  action  belongs  exclusively  to  the  defendant ;  or  that  the 
defendant  has  interposed  some  impediment,  such  as  an  injunction, 
to  an  immediate  trial  of  the  matter  in  a  court  of  law ;  or  that, 
before  the  investigation  can  take  place,  the  evidence  of  a  material 
witness  is  likely  to  be  lost  by  his  threatened  death,  illness,  or 
departure  from  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court :  ^  but  the  fact  that,  in 
the  case  recently  cited,  the  attorney-general  might  institute  a 
proceeding  to  annul  a  patent,  will  not  prevent  the  granting  of  the 
prayer  of  the  bill.^*^  The  prayer  should  be  for  leave  to  examine 
the  witnesses  touching  the  matter  stated,  to  the  end  that  their 
testimony  may  be  preserved  and  perpetuated,  and  for  the  proper 
process  of  subpcena.^i  i^  seems  that  if  it  adds  thereto  a  prayer 
for  other,  or  for  general  relief,  it  will  be  demurrable  for  that 
reason,^^  although  the  court  may  allow  an  amendment  omitting 
that  part  of  the  prayer.^^  An  affidavit  of  the  circumstances  by 
which  the  evidence  intended  to  be  perpetuated  is  in  danger  of 
being  lost,  must  be  filed  with  the  bill.^*  Otherwise,  the  bill 
should  conform  substantially  to  the  requirements  of  original 
bills  praying  relief.  Such  a  bill,  it  has  been  held,  cannot  by 
amendment  be  converted  into  a  bill  of  discovery.^^  y^  jg  gf  jfggif 
a  bill  of  discovery  only  to  the  extent  of  enabling  the  plaintiff  to 
obtain  the  relief  prayed  for  in  it,  and  he  can,  therefore,  only 
require  an  answer  from  the  defendant  as  to  the  facts  alleged  in 
the  bill  as  entitling  him  to  examine  the  witnesses. ^^  An  omission 
of  any  of  the  foregoing  statements  in,  or  requirements  of,  the  bill 
will  make  it  demurrable ;  and  if  any  of  the  necessary  allegations 
are  false,  or  there  is  another  objection  not  apparent  upon  the 
face  of  the  bill,  that  may  be  taken  by  plea  or  answer.^"     If  the 


9  Angell  t'.   Angell,  1  Sim.  &  S.  83;  Eq.    PI.  §  306;    Dalton  v.  Thomson,    1 

New  York  &  Baltimore  Coffee  Polishing  Dickens,  07.     But  see  Rule  21. 

Co.  V.  New  York  Coffee  Polishing  Co.,  9  i^  Vaughan  v.  Fitzgerald,  1  S.  &  L.  316. 

Fed.  R.  578  ;  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  303  ;  Dan-  »  Earl  of  Suffolk  v.  Green,  1  Atk.  450 ; 

iell's  Ch.  Pr.  1572,  157:1  Philips  >:  Carew,  1  P.  Wms.  117  ;  Shirley 

w  New  York  &  Baltimore   Coffee  Pol-  v.  Earl  Ferrers,  3  P.  Wms.  77. 

ishing  Co.  v.  New  York  Coffee  Polishing  i^  Enjce  ,'.  Roupell,  32  Beav.  299  ;  s.  c. 

Co.,  9  Fed.  R.  578.  9  Jur.  n.  8.  530. 

11  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  306.  i^  EUice  v.  Roupell,  32  Beav.  308  ;  8.  0. 

12  Rose  V.  Gannel,  3  Atk.  439 ;  Vaughan  9  Jur.  n.  s.  533. 

V.  Fitzgerald,  1  Sch.  &  Lef.'316;  Story's  i'  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  306  a. 


§  280.]  BILLS   TO   TAKE  TESTIMONY   DE   BENE    ESSE.  497 

defendant  answer  denying  the  plaintiffs  case,  witnesses  may  be 
examined  as  to  the  point  in  issue  by  cither  party. ^^  Otherwise, 
sucli  a  bill  should  not  be  brought  to  a  hearing,  and  if  the  plain- 
tiff do  so  it  will  be  dismissed  with  costs,  but  without  prejudice  to 
the  use  of  the  testimony  taken  in  pui-suance  of  its  prayer.^  It  is 
said  that  "  If  the  plaintiff  neglects  to  proceed  with  the  suit,  the 
defendant  cannot  move  to  dismiss  for  want  of  prosecution ;  but 
may  move  that  the  plaintiff"  be  ordered  to  take  the  next  stej>, 
within  a  limited  time,  or  to  pay  him  the  costs  of  the  suit.  If  the 
defendant  neglects  to  take  the  steps  proper  to  be  taken  by  him 
within  the  prescribed  time,  the  court  will,  it  seems,  order  the 
examination  of  the  witnesses  to  proceed."  ^'^  If  no  valid  objection 
is  made,  the  court  will  order  the  testimony  to  be  taken.  Both 
parties  may  examine  witnesses  under  the  order,^*  and  either  party 
must  be  allowed  to  cross-examine  those  whom  his  opponent  ex- 
amines in  chief.'-^^  After  the  witnesses  have  been  examined,  the 
cause  is  at  an  cnd,^  and  if  the  defendant  have  examined  no  wit- 
nesses in  chief  he  will  be  entitled  to  his  costs  ;  but  by  receiving 
costs  he  waives  any  objection  he  might  otherwise  be  entitled  to 
make  on  the  ground  that  he  has  had  no  sufficient  opportunity 
of  cross-examination.^*  The  testimony  thus  taken  is  filed  in  the 
clerk's  office,  and  can  be  used  in  a  subsequent  case  at  law  or 
in  equity  in  the  same  court,  under  an  order,  which  must  be 
obtained  by  motion  upon  notice,  and  supported  by  proof  of  the 
witness's  death,  or  that  he  cannot  be  then  compelled  to  attend 
and  testify.-^ 

§  280.  Bills  to  take  Testimony  de  bene  esse.  —  Bills  to  take  tes- 
timony de  bene  esse  were  formerly  filed  after  a  suit  or  action  had 
been  begun,  in  order  to  take  the  testimony  of  such  witnesses  as, 
on  account  of  their  age,  infirmity,  or  intention  to  depart  from  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  court,  it  was  feared   could  not  be  taken  in  its 

18  Briiistocke  '•.  Rocli,  7  Jar.  n.  s.  03.        Karl  of  Abergavenny  r.  Powell,  1  Meriv. 

19  Hail  r.  Hoddesdon,  2  T'.   Wins    162;    4.34,    Skrinc   r.  Powell,  15  Simons,  81 ; 
Anon.,  Ambler,  237  ;  s.  c.  2  Ves.  Sen.  497  ;    s.  c.  9  Jar    1054. 

Vaugliaa  r  Fitzgerald,  1  Sch.  &  Lef.  316  ;  '^^  Daniell's  Cli.  Pr.  (5tli  Am.  ed.)  1573, 

Morrison  L'.  Arnold,  19   Ves.  670;  Ellice  1674. 

V.  Roupell,  32  Beav.  308.  "■"  Morrison  v.    Arnold,  19  Ves.   670 ; 

■-»  Daniell's  Cli.  Pr.  (5th  Am.  ed.)  1573  ;  Vaughan  v.  Fitzgerald,  1  Scli.  &  Lef.  316. 

"Wright  c.  Tatliam,  2  Simons,  459;  Bea-  '^*  Watkins  i'.  Atchison,  10  Hare,  Ap. 

van  V.  Carpenter,  11  Simons,  22  ;  Coveny  xlvi. 

V.  Athill,   1  Dickens,  355  ;  Lancaster  v.  25  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (6th  Am.  ed.)  1574, 

Lancaster,  6  Simons,  439.  1675. 

21  Sheward  r.  Sheward,  2  V.  &  B.  116  ; 
VOL.  I,  —  32 


498  EVIDENCE   AT   LAW   AND   IN   EQUITY.  [CHAP.  XIX. 

regular  method  of  proceeding.^  Such  bills  must  substantially 
comply  with  the  rules  regulating  bills  to  perpetuate  testimony, 
with  which,  indeed,  they  have  been  often  confounded.^  Now 
that  the  same  relief  can  be  afforded  under  the  statutes  both  of 
most  of  the  individual  States  and  of  the  United  States,^  it  is 
rarely,  if  ever,  that  an  occasion  for  their  use  arises. 

§  281.  Bills  of  Discovery.  —  Every  bill  may  seek  discovery,  but 
the  kind  of  bill  called  a  bill  of  discovery  is  a  bill  filed  for  the 
sole  purpose  of  obtaining  a  discovery  of  facts  resting  in  the  de- 
fendant's knowledge,  or  of  deeds,  writings,  or  other  things  in  his 
custody  or  power ;  and  seeking  no  relief  in  consequence  of  the 
discovery,  except  possibly  a  stay  of  proceedings  till  the  dis- 
covery is  made.^  A  bill  of  discovery  is  usually,  if  not  always, 
used  in  aid  of  the  jurisdiction  of  another  court.^  It  will  not  be 
allowed,  if  it  seek  a  discovery  of  matters  concerning  which  a 
party,  if  called  as  a  witness,  would  be  excused  from  testifying  ;  ^ 
nor,  it  has  been  said,  if  the  discovery  is  sought  in  aid  of  an  action 
for  a  mere  personal  tort.*  A  bill  of  discovery  can  only  be  filed  in 
aid  of  a  judicial  proceeding  already  commenced  or  immediately 
contemplated.^  If  filed  in  aid  of  proceedings  already  begun,  no 
person  may  be  made  a  party  to  it  who  is  not  a  party  to  such  pro- 
ceedings,^ except  possibly  the  officer  of  a  corporation."  A  bill  of 
discovery  must  state  the  matter  touching  which  discovery  is 
sought,  show  that  both  the  plaintiff  and  the  defendant  have  or 
claim  an  interest  therein,  state  the  facts  and  circumstances  upon 
which  the  plaintiff's  right  to  compel  discovery  from  the  defendant 
is  founded,  and  pray  that  the  defendant  may  make  a  full  dis- 
covery of  the  matters  therein  stated.^  A  bill  of  discovery  may 
also  pray  any  equitable  assistance  of  the  court  which  is  merely 
consequential  upon  the  prayer  for  discovery  ;  ^  but  if  it  should 
pray  any  other  or  general  relief,  it  will  thereby  become  a  bill  for 

§  280.    1  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  307.  *  Mayor  of  London  v.  Levy,  8  Vos. 

2  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  307.  398 ;  United  N.  J.  IJailroad  &  C.Conipany 

8  U.  S.  H.  S.  §§  803-865,  and  Rule  70.  v.  Hoppock,  1  Stewart's  Eq.  (N.  J.)  261 ; 

§  281.     '  Daniell's  Cli.  Pr.  (5th  Am.  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  1558. 

ed.)  1650.  e  Queen  of  Portugal  v.  Glyn,  7  CI.  & 

2  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (5th  Am.  ed  )  1556.  F.  466;  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (5th  Am.   ed.) 

8  Glynn    v.    Houston,    1    Keen,    329;  1568. 

Langdell's   Eq.   PI.    §    fiO;     Wigram  on  ^  See  §  43. 

Discovery,  §§  130-138  ;    Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  »  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (5th  Am.  ed.)  1557. 

(2d  Am.  ed.y  563-509.  ^  Mitford's  Eq.  PI.  ch.  i.  §  3  ;  Loker  v. 

*  Glynn  r.  Houston,  1  Keen,  329.  Roll,  3  Ves.  4. 


§  281.]  BILLS   OF   DISCOVERY.  499 

relief.'*'  It  seems  that  a  bill  of  discovery  need  not  allege  that 
the  facts  of  Avliich  a  discovery  is  sought  are  within  the  exclusive 
knowledge  of  the  defendant ;  '^  but  they  must  be  matters  essen- 
tial to  a  plaintiff's  cause  of  action,  or  if  he  be  defendant  in 
another  suit  or  action,  to  his  afltirmative  defense,  and  the  bill 
must  not  seek  discovery  of  the  evidence  of  a  part  of  what  belongs 
solely  to  the  defendant's  case.'^  The  defendant  may  oppose  a 
bill  of  discovery  by  a  demurrer,  or  plea,  or  in  his  answer,  in  the 
same  manner  as  he  might  oppose  a  bill  for  relief.  The  English 
rule,  as  finally  established,  was  that,  if  a  demurrer  were  inter- 
posed to  a  bill  praying  both  discovery  and  relief,  and  the  bill 
were  held  not  to  show  a  proper  case  for  relief,  it  could  not 
be  maintained  for  discovery  merely. ^^  The  rule  in  the  Federal 
courts  is  uncertain. ^^  A  defense  founded  upon  the  statute  of 
limitations  or  laches  may  be  interposed  to  a  bill  of  discovery  by 
plea,'^  or,  if  it  appear  upon  the  face  of  the  bill,  by  demurrer.^^ 
A  material  amendment  of  a  bill  of  discovery  will  very  rarely  be 
allowed.^''  A  bill  of  discovery  is  never  brought  to  a  hearing ;  but, 
after  the  defendant  has  put  in  a  full  answer  thereto,  he  is  enti- 
tled to  costs  of  the  suit,'^  less  any  costs  allowed  the  plaintiff  upon 
exceptions  to  a  previous  answer  as  insufficient.^^  It  has  been 
held  in  tlie  district  of  Wisconsin  that  a  bill  of  discovery  cannot  be 
maintained  in  a  Circuit  Court  of  the  United  States  held  within  a 
State  under  whose  statutes  a  party  can  be  compelled  to  testify.^^ 

1''  Angell  V.  Westcombe,  6  Simons,  80.  i^  Attorney-General  v.  Burcli,  4  !Madc1. 

"  Metier  i-.  Metier,  4  C.  E.  Green  (19  178. 

N.  J.  Eq.),  4.57.  I''  Hughes  v.  Clerk,  6  Hare,  195.     See 

1-  Wigram  on  Discover}-,  §  .'>72  ;  Lang-  also  Bryant  i'.  Leland,  6  Fed.  R.  125  U. 

dell's  Eq.  PI.   §   172;  Ingilby  v.   Sliafto,  S.  C.  C,  D.  Mass.;  Easton  v.   Hodges,  7 

33  Beav.  .31.  Bissell   .324;    U.    S.   C.    C,    D.    Illinois; 

15  Fry  V.  Penn,  2  Bro.  C.  C.  280 ;  Loker  Paton  v.  M.ijors,  46  Fed.  H.  210,  U.  S.  C. 

V.   Rolle,   3    Ves.  4;    Langdell's    Eq.    PI.  C  ,  E.  D.  La",  Billings  J. ;  Washburn  &  M. 

§  152.  Manuf.   Co.    r.     Freeman    Wire  Co.,  41 

■      1*  Compare  Livingston  r.  Story,  9  Pet.  Fed.   R.   410;    U.  S.   C.  C,    E.   D.   Mo, 

6.32;  Wright  i-.  Dame,  1  Met.  (Mass.)  2:]7;  Thayer,    J.;     Washburn    &   M.    Manuf. 

Hinginbotliam  v.  Burnet,  5  .1.  Ch.  (N.Y. )  Co.    i".    Cincinnati     Barb     Wire     Fence 

184;  Story's  Eq.  PI  §  412,  with  Markoy  Co.,  42  Fed.  R.  675,   U.  S.  C.  C,  S.  D. 

V.  MutualBenefit  Life  Ins.Co.,  6  Ins.  L  J.  Ohio. 

5.37.  •-"  Rindskopf  r.  Piatto,  29  Fed.  R.  130. 

15  Beames  on  Pleas,  275;  Gait  v.  Os-  Soe  also  Heath  r.  Erie  R.R.  Co.,  9  Blatchf. 
baldeston,  1  Russ.  1.58.  316  ;  Brown  r.  Swann,  10  Pet  497  ;  Man- 

16  Wooster  c.  Sidenhergh,  U.  S.  C.  C,  Chester  Fire  Assur.  Co.  v  Stockton,  C.  H. 
S.  D.  N.  Y.  Nov.  6,  1889.  '  &  A.  Works,  38  Fed.  R.  378. 

1"  Marquis  Cholmondeley  i".  Lord  Clin- 
ton, 2  Meriv.  71. 


500  EVIDENCE   AT   LAW   AND   IN   EQUITY.  [CHAP.  XIX. 

In  the  Southern  District  of  New  York  a  contrary  ruling  sustain^ 
ing  such  a  bill  was  made.^^ 

§  282.  Testimony  taken  before  a  Cause  is  at  Issue.  ■ —  Testimony 
for  use  in  a  court  of  law  or  equity  of  the  United  States  may  be 
taken  either  before  or  after  it  is  at  issue.  Testimony  taken 
before  a  cause  is  at  issue  may  be  taken  either  before  or  after  it 
has  been  begun.  "Any  court  of  the  United  States  may,  in  its 
discretion,  admit  in  evidence  in  any  cause  before  it  any  deposi- 
tion taken  in  perpefuam  ret  memoriam,  which  would  be  so  ad- 
missible in  a  court  of  the  State  wherein  such  cause  is  pending, 
according  to  the  laws  thereof."  ^  Evidence  taken  by  means  of  a 
bill  to  perpetuate  testimony  may  also  be  admitted  in  a  subse- 
quent suit  in  equity .2  "  After  any  bill  filed  and  before  the  de- 
fendant hath  answered  the  same,  upon  affidavit  made,  that  any 
of  the  plaintiff's  witnesses  are  aged  and  infirm,  or  going  out  of 
the  country,  or  that  any  one  of  them  is  a  single  witness  to  a 
material  fact,  the  clerk  of  the  court  shall,  as  of  course,  upon 
the  application  of  the  plaintiff,  issue  a  commission  to  such  com- 
missioner or  commissioners  as  a  judge  of  the  court  may  direct,  to 
take  the  examination  of  such  witness  or  witnesses  de  bene  esse, 
upon  giving  due  notice  to  the  adverse  party  of  the  time  and  place 
of  taking  his  testimony."  ^  Such  testimony  is  then  taken  in  the 
same  manner  as  testimony  taken  after  issue  has  been  joined. 

§  283.  Testimony  taken  after  a  Cause  is  at  Issue  -v^ithin  the  Juris- 
diction of  the  Court.  — Testimony  taken  after  a  cause  is  at  issue 
is  taken  differently  when  taken  within  than  when  taken  without 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  court.  Originally,  the  only  manner  of 
examining  witnesses  within  the  jurisdiction  of  a  court  of  chan- 
cery was  by  means  of  written  interrogatories  and  cross-interroga- 
tories, which  were  prepared  by  the  solicitors  and  counsel  of  the 
respective  parties,  or  by  the  court,  and  then  submitted  to  an 
examiner  or  one  or  more  commissioners  appointed  by  the  court, 
who  examined  the  witnesses  privately  by  means  of  them.  The 
testimony  thus  obtained  was  kept  secret  until  all  the  testimony 
in  the  cause  had  Ijcen  taken.  The  time  when  it  would  first  be 
inspected  was  called  the  time  of  publication.^     In  the  courts  of 

21  Colgate  V.  Compagnie  Franoaise,  23  ing  Co.  v.  New  York  Coffee  Polisliing  Co., 

Fed.  II.  82.     See  also  Paine  v.   Warren,  9  Fed.  R.  578. 
33  Fed.  R.  357.  ^  Rule  70.     See   Eslava   v.  Mazange, 

§  282.     1  U.  R.  R.  S.  §  80)7.  1  Woods,  023. 

2  New  York  &  Baltimore  Coffee  Polish-         §  28-3.     i  LangdtU's  Equity  Pleading, 


§  283.]     TESTIMONY  WITHIN  THE  JURISDICTION  AND  AFTER  ISSUE.     501 

the  United  States  it  seems  that  originally  the  only  method  of 
examination  in  equity  was  by  commissioners.  It  was  regulated 
by  the  following  rules  :  — 

"  After  the  cause  is  at  issue,  commissions  to  take  testimony 
may  be  taken  out  in  vacation  as  well  as  in  term,  jointly  by  both 
parties,  or  severally  by  either  party,  upon  interrogatories  filed  by 
the  party  taking  out  the  same  in  the  clerk's  office,  ten  days' 
notice  thereof  being  given  to  the  adverse  party  to  file  cross-in- 
terrogatories before  the  issuing  of  the  commission;  and  if  no 
cross-interrogatories  are  filed  at  the  expiration  of  the  time,  the 
commission  may  issue  ex  j^cirte.  In  all  cases,  the  commissioner  or 
commissioners  shall  be  named  by  the  court,  or  by  a  judge  thereof. 
If  the  parties  shall  so  agree,  the  testimony  may  be  taken  upon 
Oral  interrogatories  by  the  parties  or  their  agents,  without  filing 
any  written  interrogatories."  ^  In  1854  it  was  "  ordered,  that  the 
sixty-seventh  rule  governing  equity  practice  be  so  amended  as  to 
allow  the  presiding  judge  of  any  court  exercising  jurisdiction, 
either  in  term  time  or  in  vacation,  to  vest  in  the  clerk  of  said  court 
general  power  to  name  commissioners  to  take  testimony  in  like 
manner  that  the  court  or  judge  thereof  can  now  do  by  the  said 
sixty-seventh  rule."  ^  "  Three  months,  and  no  more,  shall  be 
allowed  for  the  taking  of  testimony  after  the  cause  is  at  issue, 
unless  the  court,  or  a  judge  thereof,  shall,  upon  special  cause 
shown  by  either  party,  enlarge  the  time  ;  and  no  testimony  taken 
after  such  period  shall  be  allowed  to  be  read  in  evidence  at  the 
hearing.  Immediately  upon  the  return  of  the  commissions  and 
depositions  containing  the  testimony  into  the  clerk's  office,  pub- 
lication thereof  may  be  ordered  in  the  clerk's  office,  by  any  judge 
of  the  court,  upon  due  notice  to  the  parties,  or  it  may  be  enlarged 
as  he  may  deem  reasonable  under  the  circumstances  ;  but,  by 
consent  of  the  parties,  publication  of  the  testimony  may  at  any 
time  pass  into  the  clerk's  office,  such  consent  being  in  writing, 
and  a  copy  thereof  entered  in  the  order-books,  or  endorsed  upon, 
the  deposition  or  testimony."  *  Where  there  is  a  dispute  as  to 
the  relevancy  of  an  interrogatory  or  cross-interrogatory,  the  usual 
practice  is  to  allow  it  to  be  answered  in  a  doubtful  case,  and 

§§  56-58.     See  Eillert  r.  Craps,  44  Fed.  R.  ^  Amendment  of  1854  to  Rule  67. 

702;  Wood  r.  Mann,  2  Sumner,  316.  *  Rule  69;  Eillert  v.  Craps,  44  Fed.  R. 

2  Rule  (17.     In  1861  the  last  paragraph  792. 
of  tills  rule  was  repealed. 


502  EVIDENCE   AT   LAW   AND    IN    EQUITY.  [CHAP.  XIX. 

to  determine  the  objections  to  it  at  the  hearing  or  by  a  motion 
to  suppress  the  deposition.^  The  court  may  refer  the  interrog- 
atories to  a  master  to  inquire  into  their  relevancy.^  It  has  been 
said,  that,  as  a  general  rule,  after  the  publication  of  testimony, 
no  more  can  be  taken  unless  the  judge  himself,  upon  or  after 
the  hearing,  entertains  a  doubt,  or  the  proof  of  some  additional 
fact  is  indispensable  to  enable  him  to  make  a  satisfactory  decree ; 
but  that  exhibits  in  a  cause  may  be  proved  after  publication,  and 
even  viva  voce  at  the  hearing,  when  they  have  not  been  proved  in 
due  season  ;  and  that  a  witness  may  be  examined  after  publica- 
tion as  to  the  credit  of  other  witnesses  ;  and  that  the  time  may  be 
enlarged  after  publication  is  passed,  but  not  in  fact  made  accord- 
ing to  rules  of  court,  upon  good  cause,  as  surprise,  accident,  or 
some  other  circumstances  repelling  imputations  of  laches,  proved 
by  affidavit,  which,  unless  the  other  party  has  practised  fraud,  is 
indispensable."  This  method  of  taking  testimony  was,  like  many 
other  parts  of  equity  practice,  borrowed  from  the  canon  law  ;  with 
this  difference,  however,  that  whereas  by  the  canon  law  each 
party  before  the  examination  of  witnesses  was  obliged  to  furnish 
his  adversary  and  the  co'urt  with  articles  containing  a  specific 
statement  of  the  facts  which  he  expected  to  prove  by  them ;  in 
equity,  on  the  other  hand,  except  in  a  few  rare  instances,  facts, 
not  evidence,  are  required  to  be  pleaded.  So,  originally,  each 
party  was  before  i)ublication  very  much  in  the  dark  as  to  the 
facts  which  his  antagonist  intended  to  attempt  to  establish.  "  It 
is  not  surprising,  therefore,  that  the  mode  of  taking  testimony  in 
equity  fell  into  disrepute,  and  finally  bi'oke  down."  ^ 

§  284.  Present  Method  of  taking  Testimony  within  the  Jurisdic- 
tion. —  Testimony  in  equity  is  now,  therefore,  almost  universally 
allowed  to  be  taken  orally  in  the  presence  of  counsel.  The  rules 
regulating  the  practice  of  the  courts  of  the  United  States  upon 
the  subject  are  as  follows  :  "  Either  party  may  give  notice  to  the 
other  that  he  desires  the  evidence  to  be  adduced  in  the  cause  to 
be  taken  orally,  and  thereupon  all  the  witnesses  to  be  examined 
shall  be  examined  before  one  of  the  examiners  of  the  court,  or 

5  Ziiiikcl  V.  Litclifield,  21  Fed.  R.  196,  e  Zunkel  v    Litchfield,  21  Fed.  R.  196. 

197;  Giles    v.    Paxson,  36  Fed.   R.  882;  "  Wood  ?•.  Mann,  2  Sumner,  316. 

Appleton   V.   Ecaubert,  45  Fed.  R.  281  ;  «  Langdell's   Eq    PI.   §  56.     See  also 

Edison  El  L.  Co.  v  U.  S  El.  L.  Co.  44  Fed.  Langdell's  Eq.  PI.  §§  14-19. 
R  294;  s.  c.  45Fed.  R.  55,  Blease  ?•  Gar 
lington,  92  U.  S   1 ,  infra,  §  284,  note  17. 


§  284]      TESTIMONY  TAKEN  ORALLY  WITHIN  THE  JURISDICTION.       503 

before  an  examiner  to  be  specially  appointed  by  tbc  court,  the 
examiner  to  be  furnished  with  a  copy  of  the  bill  and  answer,  if 
liny  ;  and  such  examination  shall  take  place  in  the  presence  of 
the  parties  or  their  agents,  by  their  counsel  or  solicitors,  and  the 
witnesses  shall  be  subject  to  cross-examination  and  re-examina- 
tion, and  which  shall  be  conducted  as  near  as  may  be  in  the 
mode  now  used  in  the  common-law  courts.  The  depositions 
taken  upon  such  oral  examinations  shall  be  taken  down  iii  M'rit- 
ing  by  the  examiner  in  the  form  of  a  narrative,  unless  he  deter- 
mines the  examination  shall  be  by  question  and  answer  in  special 
instances ;  in  which  instances  it  shall  be  taken  down  by  a  steno- 
grapher and  be  put  into  typewriting  or  other  writing,  and, 
when  completed,  shall  be  read  over  to  the  witness  and  signed  by 
him  in  the  presence  of  the  parties  or  counsel,  or  such  of  them  as 
may  attend ;  provided,  if  the  witness  shall  refuse  to  sign  the  said 
deposition,  then  the  examiner  shall  sign  the  same  ;  and  the  exam- 
iner may,  upon  all  examinations,  state  any  special  matter  to  tlie 
court  as  he  shall  see  fit ;  and  any  question  or  questions  which 
may  be  objected  to  shall  be  noted  by  the  examiner  upon  the 
deposition,  but  he  shall  not  have  power  to  decide  on  the  compe- 
tency, materiality,  or  relevancy  of  the  questions  ;  and  the  court 
shall  have  power  to  deal  with  the  costs  of  incompetent,  imma- 
terial, or  irrelevant  depositions,  or  parts  of  them,  as  may  be  just."  ^ 
"  The  expense  of  the  taking  down  of  depositions  by  a  stenographer 
and  of  putting  them  into  typewriting  or  other  writing,  shall  be 
paid  in  the  first  instance  by  the  party  who  makes  the  examination 
or  the  cross-examination,  as  the  case  may  be,  and  shall  be  im- 
posed by  tlie  court,  as  part  of  the  costs,  upon  such  party  as  the 
court  shall  adjudge  shall  ultimately  bear  them."  ^ 

"  In  case  of  refusal  of  witnesses  to  attend,  to  be  sworn,  or  to 
answer  any  question  put  by  the  examiner,  or  by  counsel  or  solicitor, 
the  same  practice  shall  be  adopted  as  is  now  practised  with  respect 
to  Avitnesses  to  be  produced  on  examination  before  an  examiner  of 
said  court  on  written  interrogatories.  Notice  shall  be  given  b}'  the 
respective  counsel  or  solicitors,  to  the  opposite  counsel  or  solici- 
tors, or  parties,  of  the  time  and  place  of  the  examination,  for 

§  284.     ^  Amendments    of   1801   and  Fed.  R.  86.     Interrogatories  may  be  re- 

1891  to  Rule  67.     For  an  instructive  case  fcrred  to  a  master  for  an    inquiry   into 

as  to  tlic  regularity  of  proceedings  before  their  relevancy.     Zunkel  v.  Litchfield,  21 

an    examiner,   see   Fisher    v.    Hayes,   6  Fed.  K.  190. 


504  EVIDENCE   AT  LAW   AND   IN   EQUITY.  [CHAP.  XIX. 

such  reasonable  time  as  the  examiner  may  fix  by  order  in  each 
cause.  When  the  examination  of  witnesses  before  the  examiner 
is  conchided,  the  original  deposition,  authenticated  by  the  signa- 
ture of  the  examiner,  shall  be  transmitted  by  him  to  the  clerk 
of  the  court,  to  be  there  filed  of  record,  in  the  same  mode  as 
prescribed  in  the  thirtieth  section  of  Act  of  Congress,  September 
24,  1789.2  Testimony  may  be  taken  on  commission  in  the  usual 
way,  by  written  interrogatories  and  cross-interrogatories,  on  mo- 
tion to  the  court  in  term  time,  or  to  a  judge  in  vacation,  for 
special  reasons  satisfactory  to  the  court  or  judge."  ^  "  Where 
the  evidence  to  be  adduced  in  a  cause  is  to  be  taken  orally,  as 
provided  in  the  order  passed  at  the  December  term,  1861,  amend- 
ing the  67th  General  Rule,  the  court  may,  on  motion  of  either 
party,  assign  a  time  within  which  the  complainant  shall  take  his 
evidence  in  support  of  the  bill,  and  a  time  thereafter  within 
which  the  defendant  shall  take  his  evidence  in  defense,  and  a 
time  thereafter  within  which  the  complainant  shall  take  his  evi- 
dence in  reply  ;  and  no  further  evidence  shall  be  taken  in  the 
cause,  unless  by  agreement  of  the  parties,  or  by  leave  of  the 
court  first  obtained,  on  motion,  for  cause  shown." ^  "Three 
months,  and  no  more,  shall  be  allowed  for  the  taking  of  testi- 
mony after  the  cause  is  at  issue,  unless  the  court,  or  a  judge 
thereof,  shall,  upon  special  cause  shown  by  either  party,  enlarge 
the  time ;  and  no  testimony  taken  after  such  period  shall  be 
allowed  to  be  read  in  evidence  upon  the  hearing."  ^  Except  in 
a  very  flagrant  case,  the  appellate  court  will  not,  upon  appeal, 
review  the  action  of  the  lower  court  in  giving  or  refusing  fur- 
ther time  in  which  to  take  testimony.^ 

In  the  Circuit  Court  of  the  United  States  for  the  Southern 
District  of  New  York,  the  following  rules  regulate  the  subject : 
"  If  a  general  commission  is  not  issued,  pursuant  to  the  25th 
Rule  of  the  Supreme  Court,  within  ten  days  after  rei)lication  filed, 
either  party  may  give  notice  of  the  examination  of  witiicsscs  be- 
fore the  standing  examiner  of  this  court;  and  three  months  from 
the  time  of  the  replication  shall  be  allowed  the  parties  for  taking 

2  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  8G5.     See  »iAr»,  §§  280,  548;   Wooster  r.  Clark,  0  Fed   R.  851. 

287.  After  the  time  lias  expired,  the  court  may 

8  Amendment  of  1861  to  Rule  67.  permit  the  testimony  to  he  taken  yiunc  pro 

■»  Amendment  of  1809  to  Rule  67.  tunc.     Coon  v.  Abbott,  37  Fed.  R.  U8. 

5  Rule  09.     See   Coon   v.   Abbott,    37  ^  jngle  v.  Jones,  9  Wall.  480 ;  Grant  v. 

I'ed.R.  98  ;  Streat  v.  Steinam,  38  Fed.  R.  Phoeni-x  Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co.  121  U.  S.  105. 


§  284]      TESTIMONY  TAKEN  ORALLY  WITHIN  THE  JURISDICTION.        505 

their  depositions  before  the  examiner."'  "  In  taking  testimony, 
all  Masters,  Examiners,  Referees,  and  Commissioners  shall,  where 
testimony  is  written  down  by  question  and  answer,  number  the 
questions  put  to  each  witness  continuously,  from  the  commence- 
ment of  his  direct  examination  to  the  final  close  of  his  examina- 
tion, direct  and  cross."  ^  "  Whenever  it  is  intended  to  offer  oral 
proof  in  open  court,  the  party  proposing  it  shall  give  due  notice 
to  the  opposite  party  of  the  names  of  the  witnesses,  the  matters 
to  which  they  are  to  be  examined,  and  of  the  reasons  upon  which 
he  will  move  for  an  examination."^  "A  master  or  examiner,  in 
taking  proofs,  or  in  matters  of  reference,  shall  not,  without  the 
written  consent  of  all  parties,  or  the  authorization  of  one  of  the 
judges,  adjourn  proceedings  pending  before  him,  for  a  longer  time 
than  ten  days."  '^^  "  No  rule  or  order  need  be  entered  for  the 
publication  of  testimony  ;  but  so  soon  as  the  commissioner  or 
examiner  shall  have  completed  the  testimony  offered,  the  party 
taking  it  shall  cause  the  deposition  to  be  filed  in  the  clerk's  office, 
and  forthwith  give  notice  thereof  to  the  adverse  party.  Either 
party  may  thereupon  enter  a  rule  of  course,  that  the  clerk  open 
the  commission,  or  deposition,  and  file  the  same."  ^^  "Within 
four  days  after  the  clerk  shall  have  prepared  copies  of  the  depo- 
sitions (provided  the  same  were  applied  for  in  two  days  after  the 
notice  of  the  filing  thereof),  the  adverse  party  may  give  notice 
of  exception,  before  a  judge  at  chambers,  to  the  proofs  or  any 
part  of  them,  on  account  of  any  irregularity  in  taking  the  depo- 
sitions, or  executing  the  commissions  ;  and,  if  no  such  notice  of 
exception  is  given,  all  objections  to  the  form  or  manner  in  which 
the  proofs  were  taken,  shall  be  deemed  waived."  ^^  Testimony 
cannot  thus  be  taken  outside  the  district  where  the  suit  is  pcnd- 
ing,i3  except  possibly  when  a  special  examiner  is  appointed  for 
that  purpose.^* 

"  Whenever  it  is  intended  to  offer  oral  proof  in  open  court,  the 
party  pro|)osing  it  shall  give  due  notice  to  the  opposite  party  of 
the  names  of  the  witnesses,  the  matters  to  which  they  are  to  be 
examined,  and  of  the  reasons  upon  which  he  will  move  for  an 

7  U.  S.  C.  C.  S.  D.  N.  Y.     Rule  108.  i-  U.  S.  C.  C,  S.  D   N.  Y.     Rule  11.3. 

8  U.  S.  r.  C,  S.  D.  N.  Y.  Rule  of  i'^  Celluloid  Mnnuf.  Co.  v.  Russell,  35 
Nov.  10,  1868.  Fed.  R.  17. 

9  U.  S.  C.  C,  S.  I).  N.  Y.  Rule  110.  n  Railroad  Co.  ?-.  Drew,  .3  Woods,  G97. 
10  U.  R.  C.  C,  S.  D.  N.  Y.  Rule  115.  Contra,  Arnold  v.  Clieseborough,  35  Fed. 
"  U.  S.  C.  C,  S.  D.  N.  Y.     Rule  112.       R.  16. 


506 


EVIDENCE    AT    LAW    AND    IN    EQUITY.  [CHAP.  XIX. 


exainlnation."  ^^  The  examiner  must  note  all  objections  and 
exceptions  to  questions  and  answers,  and  take  the  testimony 
sul)jcct  to  them,  but  cannot  decide  on  their  validity.!^  It  has 
been  held  that  the  court  will  not  interfere  to  prevent  irrelevant 
questions.^'      Wliether  the   judge    can  in  his  discretion   permit 


15  U.  S.  C.  C,  S.D.N.  Y.     Rule  no. 

16  Appleton  V.  Ecaubert,  45  Fed.  11. 
281. 

1"  Blease  v.  Garlington,  92  U.  S.  1,  4-8; 
]icr  Waite,  C.  J. :  — 

"  The  Juiliciary  Act  of  1789  (I  Stat,  at  L. 
88,  sect.  30)  provided  that  tlie  mode  of 
proof  by  oral  testimony  and  e.xamination 
of  witnesses  in  open  court  should  be  tiie 
same  in  all  the  courts  of  the  United 
States,  as  well  in  the  trial  of  causes 
in  equity  as  of  actions  at  common  law. 
By  sect.  19  of  the  same  act,  it  was  made 
the  duty  of  the  Circuit  Court,  in  equity 
cases,  to  cause  the  facts  on  wiiich  tbey 
founded  their  decree  fully  to  appear  upon 
the  record,  either  from  the  pleadings  and 
decree,  or  a  statement  of  the  case  agreed 
upon  by  the  parties  or  their  counsel,  or,  if 
they  disagreed,  by  a  stating  of  the  case  by 
the  court.  Subsequently,  in  1802  (2 
Stat,  at  L.  1G6,  sect.  25),  it  was  enacted 
that  in  all  suits  in  equity  the  court  miglit 
in  its  discretion,  upon  the  request  of  either 
party,  order  the  testimony  of  witnesses 
therein  to  be  taken  by  depositions  In 
1803  (2  Stat,  at  L.  244,  sect.  2)  an  appeal 
was  given  to  this  court  in  equity  cases,  and 
it  was  provided,  that,  upon  the  appeal,  a 
transcript  of  the  bill,  answer,  depositions, 
and  all  other  pioceeilings  in  the  cause, 
should  be  transmitted  here.  The  case 
was  to  be  beard  in  this  court  upon  the 
proofs  submitted  below.  In  Coini.  *•. 
Penn..  5  Wheat.  424,  decided  in  1820, 
this  court  held  that  a  decree  founded  in 
])art  upon  parol  testimony  must  be  re- 
versed, because  that  portion  of  the  testi- 
mony which  was  oral  had  not  been  sent 
up  For  this  reason,  among  others,  the 
cause  was  sent  back  for  further  proi'ced- 
ings  according  to  equity  Chief-Justice 
Marshall,  in  delivering  the  opinion  of  the 
court,  said  (]).  420)    — 

" '  Previous  to  this  act  (tliat  of  1803),  tlie 
facts  were  brought  before  this  court  by 
the  statement  of  the  judge.  The  deposi- 
tions are  substituted  for  that  statement ; 


and  it  would  seem,  since  this  court  must 
judge  of  the  fact  as  well  as  the  law,  that 
all  the  testimony  which  was  before  the 
Circuit  Court  ought  to  be  laid  before  this 
court.  Yet  the  section  (of  the  act  of  1789) 
wiiich  directs  that  witnesses  shall  be  e.x- 
amined  in  open  court  is  not,  in  terms,  re- 
pealed. Tlie  court  has  felt  considerable 
doubt  on  this  subject,  but  thinks  it  the 
safe  course  to  require  that  all  the  testi- 
mony on  which  the  judge  founds  his 
opinion  should,  in  cases  within  the  juris- 
diction of  this  court,  appear  in  the  rec- 
ord.' Under  the  authority  of  the  act  of 
May  8,  1792  (1  Stat,  at  L.  27G,  sect.  2),  this 
court  at  its  February  Term,  1822,  adopted 
certain  rules  of  practice  for  the  courts  of 
equity  of  the  United  States.  7  Wheat. 
Rules  25,  26,  and  28  related  to  the  tak- 
ing of  testimon_v  by  depositions,  ami  the 
examination  of  witnesses  before  a  master 
or  examiner;  but  by  Rule  28  it  was  e.x- 
pressl}'  provided  that  nothing  therein  con- 
tained should  '  prevent  the  examination 
of  witnesses  viva  voce  when  produced  in 
open  court.'  These  rules  cimtinued  in 
force  until  the  January  Term,  1842,  when 
they  were  superseded  by  others  then  pro- 
mulgated, of  which  67,  68,  69,  and  78  re- 
lated to  the  mode  of  taking  testimony, 
but  made  no  reference  to  the  examina- 
tion of  witnesses  in  open  court,  further 
than  to  provide,  at  the  end  of  Rule  78, 
that  nothing  therein  contained  should 
'prevent  the  examination  of  witnesses 
viva  voce  when  produced  in  open  court, 
if  tlie  court  shall,  in  its  discretion,  deem 
it  advisable.' 

"Afterwards  (in  August,  1842)  Con- 
gress authorized  this  court  to  prescribe 
and  regulate  the  mode  of  taking  ami  ob- 
taining evidence  in  equity  cases.  5  Stat 
at  L  518,  §G.  While  these  rules  remained 
in  force  substantially  as  originally  adopted, 
and  before  any  direct  action  of  the  court 
under  the  special  authority  of  this  act  of 
Congress,  the  case  of  Sickles  v.  Glouces- 
ter Co.,  3  Wall.  Jr.  186,  came  before  Mr. 


§  234]      TESTIMONY  TAKEN  OKALLY  WITHIN  THE  JUKISDICTION.        507 

oral  testimony  to  be  taken  before  him  at  the  hearing  of  a  suit 
in  equity,  has   not  yet  been  deeided    by   the   Supreme   Court. ^^ 

Justice  Grier  oi)  tlie  circuit ;  ami  lie  tlicie  may  upon  all  examinations  state  any  spe- 

held  tliat,  notwitiistanding  tlie  rules,  wit-  cial  matters  to  tlie  court  as  lie  shall  tiiink 

iiesses  migjit   still  be  examined  in  ojjen  fit ;  and  any  question  or  questions  which 

court.     It  was    his  opinion  that   the   act  may  be  objected  to  shall  be  noted  by  the 

of  17tS!)  guaranteed  to  suitors  the   right  examiner   upon    the   deposition,   but   he 

to  have   their  witnesses   so  examined    if  shall   not  iiave  power  to  decide  on    the 

they  desired  it,  that  Rule  07  did  not  af-  competency,  materiality,  or  relevancy  of 

feet  or  annul  the  act  of  Congress  or  the  the  questions,  and  the  court  shall  have 

policy  established  by  it,  and  that  a  party  power  to  deal  with  the  costs  of  iiicompe- 

liad  therefore  the  right  to  demand  an  ex-  tent,  imniaterial,  or  irrelevant  depositions, 

amination  of  witnesses  within  the  juris-  or  parts  of  them,  as  may  be  just.' 

diction  of  the  court  oce  tentts,  according  to  "  The  act  of  1789,  in  relation  to  the  oral 

the  principles  of  the  common  law,  either  examination  of  witnesses  in  open  court, 

by  having  them  produced  in  court  or  by  was    not    expressly    repealed    until    the 

having  leave  to  cross-examine  tliem  face  adoption  of  the  Revised   Statutes,  §  b62 

to  face  before  the  examiner.  of  whicii  is  as  follows  •  — 

"This  case  was  decided  in   1856;  and  "' Tiie  mode  of  proof  in  causes  ofequity 

at  the  December  term,  1861,  of  this  court,  and  of  admiralty  and  maritime  jurisdic- 

Kule  67  was  amended  so  as  to  provide  for  tion    shall    be    according    to    the    rules 

the  oral  examination  of  witnesses  before  now  or  hereafter  prescribed   by  the  Su- 

an   examiner.     The   part  of  the  rule  as  preme  Court,  except  as  lierein  specially 

amended  pertinent  to  tlie  present  inquiry  provided.' 

is  as  follows    —  "  Since  the  amendment  of   Rule  67,  in 

"'Either  party  may  give  notice  to  the  1861,  there  could  never  have  been  any 
other  that  he  desires  the  evidence  to  be  difficulty  in  bringing  a  case  here  upon  ap- 
adduced  in  the  cause  to  be  taken  orally  ;  peal,  so  as  to  save  all  excei)tions  as  to  the 
and  thereupon  all  tiie  witnesses  to  he  ex-  form  or  substance  of  the  testimony,  and 
amined  shall  be  examined  before  one  of  still  leave  us  in  a  condition  to  proceed  to 
the  examiners  of  the  court,  or  before  an  a  final  determination  of  the  cause,  what- 
examiner  to  be  specially  api)()inted  by  the  ever  might  be  our  rulings  upon  tiie  ex- 
court,  the  examiner  to  be  furnished  with  ceptions.  The  examiner  before  whom 
a  copy  of  the  bill,  and  answer,  if  any,  and  the  witnesses  are  orally  examined  is 
such  examination  shall  take  place  in  the  required  to  note  exceptions;  but  he 
presence  of  the  parties  or  their  agents  by  cannot  decide  upon  their  validity.  He 
their  counsel  or  solicitors  ;  and  the  wit-  must  take  down  all  the  examination  in 
nesses  shall  be  subject  to  cross-examina-  writing,  and  send  it  to  the  court  with  the 
tion  and  re-examination,  and  which  shall  be  objections  noted.  So,  too,  when  dejiosi- 
conducted  as  near  as  may  be  in  the  mode  tiuns  are  taken  according  to  the  acts  of 
now  used  in  common-law  courts.  The  Congress,  or  otherwise  under  the  rules, 
depositions  taken  tipon  such  oral  exam-  exceptions  to  the  testimony  may  be  noted 
inations  shall  be  taken  down  in  writing  by  the  officer  taking  the  dei)osition,  but 
by  the  examiner  in  the  form  of  narrative,  he  is  not  permitted  to  decide  upon  them  ; 
unless  he  determines  the  examination  and  when  the  testimony  as  reduced  to 
shall  be  by  question  and  answer  in  special  writing  by  the  examiner,  or  the  deposi- 
instances,  and  when  completed  shall  be  tion,  is  filed  in  court,  further  exceptions 
read  over  to  the  witness  and  signed  by  may  be  there  taken.  Thus  both  the  ex- 
liim  in  the  presence  of  the  parties  or  cei)tioi)s  and  the  testimony  objected  to 
counsel,  or  such  of  them  as  may  attend  ;  are  all  before  the  court  below,  and  come 
provided,  if  the  witnesses  shall  refuse  to  here  upon  the  apj)eal  as  part  of  the  record 
sign  the  said  deposition,  then  the  exam-  and  proceedings  there.  If  we  reverse  the 
iner  shall  sign  the  same;  and  the  examiner  ruling  of  that  court  upon  the  exceptions, 

18  Blease  r  Garlington,  92  U.  S.  1,  7 


.08 


EVIDENCE    AT    LAW    AND    IN    EQUITY.  [CHAP.  XIX. 


If  it  is  desired  to  review  upon   appeal  a  judge's   refusal  so  to 
do,  the  testimony  thus  rejected   by  him,  or  at   least   its    sub- 


ue  may  still  proceed  to  tlie  liearin*,  be- 
cause we  have  in  our  possession  and  can 
consider  tiie  rejected  testimony.  But  an- 
gler the  practice  adopted  in  tliis  case,  if 
the  exceptions  sustained  below  are  over- 
ruled here,  we  must  remand  the  cause  in 
order  that  tlie  proof  may  be  taken.  That 
was  dotie  in  Conn  i:  Pcnn.  shjh-u,  which 
was  decided  before  the  promulgation  of 
the  rules.  One  of  the  objects  of  the  rule, 
ill  its  present  foriw,  was  to  prevent  the 
necessity  for  any  such  practice. 

"  While,  tlierefore,  we  do  not  say  that, 
even  since  the  Revised  Statutes,  the  cir- 
cuit courts  may  not  in  their  discretion, 
under  the  o[ieratioii  of  tlie  rules,  permit 
the  examination  of  witnesses  orally  in 
open  court  upon  tlie  hearing  of  cases  iu 
equity,  we  do  say  that  now  they  are  not 
by  law  required  to  do  so  ;  and  that,  if 
such  practice  is  adopted  in  any  case,  the 
testimony  presented  in  that  form  must  be 
taken  down  or  its  substance  stated  in 
writLKg,  and  made  part  of  the  record,  or 
it  will  be  entirely  disregarded  here  on  an 
appeal.  So,  too,  if  testimony  is  objected 
to  and  ruled  out,  it  must  still  be  sent  here 
with  the  record,  subject  to  the  objection, 
if)r  tlie  ruling  will  not  be  considered  by  us. 
A  case  will  not  be  sent  back  to  have  the 
rejected  testimony  taken,  even  tliough  we 
might  on  examination  lie  of  the  opinion 
that  the  objection  to  it  ought  not  to  have 
been  sustained.  Ample  provision  having 
been  made  by  the  rules  for  taking  the 
testimony  and  saving  exceptions,  parties, 
jf  they  prefer  to  adopt  s<tme  other  mode 
of  presenting  their  case,  must  be  careful 
to  see  that  it  conforms  in  other  respects 
to  the  established  practice  of  the  cnurt. 

"The  act  of  1872  (17  Stat,  at  L.  197; 
R.  S.  §  914)  providing  that  the  practice, 
pleadings,  and  forms  and  modes  of  pro- 
ceeding, in  civil  causes  in  the  circuit  and 
district  courts,  shall  conform,  as  near  as 
may  lie,  to  the  practice,  ifec,  in  the  courts 
of  the  States,  has  no  application  to  this 
case,  because  it  is  in  equity,  and  cquit}' 
and  admiralty  causes  are  in  express  terms 
excepted  from  the  operation  of  that  act." 
Appleton  el  al.  v.  Ecaubcrt,  4.3  Fed.  IJ. 
282,  j)er  Lacombe,  J. :  — 


"  Undoubtedly  the  method  of  taking 
testimony  in  equity  cases  in  the  Federal 
court  is  expensive,  and  frequently  pro- 
duces voluminous  records,  filled  with  a 
great  deal  of  testimony  which  any  court 
to  wliicii  it  may  be  presented  will  disre- 
gard ;  but  that  system,  cumbrous  though 
it  be,  seems  to  have  been  expressly  de- 
vised for  a  specific  end  ;  namely,  that  the 
record  should  be  made  so  full  that  the 
court  of  last  resort  may  not  be  compelled 
to  send  an  equity  case  back  for  a  new 
hearing.  A  histoi-ical  review  of  this  prac- 
tice will  be  found  in, the  case  cited  suj/ra, 
and  need  not  be  repeated  here.  It  is  suf- 
ficient to  say  that  under  it  the  examiner 
is  required  to  note  the  exceptions,  but 
cannot  decide  upon  their  validit}*,  and 
must  take  down  all  the  examination  in 
writing,  and  send  it  to  the  court,  with  the 
objections  noted  ;  and  when  depositions 
in  equity  are  taken  according  to  tlie  acts 
of  Congress,  or  otherwise  under  the  rules, 
the  same  method  applies.  When  the  tes- 
timony is  reduced  to  writing  by  the  ex- 
aminer, or  the  deposition  is  filed  in  court, 
further  excepti(»ns  may  be  there  taken. 
'  Thus,'  say  the  Supreme  Court, '  both  the 
exceptions  and  the  testimony  objected  to 
are  all  before  the  court  below,  and  come 
here  upon  the  appeal  as  part  of  tiie  record 
and  proceedings  there.  If  we  reverse  the 
ruling  of  that  court  upon  the  exceptions, 
we  may  still  proceed  with  the  hearing, 
because  we  have  in  our  possession  the  re- 
jected testimony.'  If  the  defendant's  ob. 
jections  in  this  case  were  sustained,  and 
his  motion  granted,  and  the  Supreme 
Court  should  reach  the  conclusion  tliat 
this  court  erred  in  sucli  determination,  it 
would  have  to  remand  the  cause,  in  order 
that  the  suppressed  deposition  and  the 
additional  prfiof  which  the  complainant 
desires  to  offer  might  be  taken.  That  is 
what  was  done  in  Connecticut  v.  Penn- 
sylvania, 5  Wheat.  4'24,  which  case  was 
decided  before  the  promulgation  of  the 
rules;  but,  as  it  is  one  of  the  objects  of 
the  sixty-seventh  Rule,  in  its  present 
form,  to  prevent  the  necessity  for  any 
such  practice,  defendant's  motion  must 
be  denied." 


§  285.]  DEPOSITIONS   DE   BENE   ESSE.  509 

stance,  must  be  taken  down  so  that  it  may  appear  upon  the 
record. ^^ 

§  285.  Testimony  taken  after  a  Cause  is  at  Issue  and  beyond  the 
Jurisdiction  of  the  Court. —  It  often  happens  that  a  witness,  whose 
testimony  is  needed  by  either  party  to  a  suit  in  equity,  is  beyond 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  court.  In  such  a  case,  his  testimony  can  be 
taken  in  three  ways,  —  by  deposition,  according  to  the  acts  of  Con- 
gress ;  ^  by  a  commission  under  a  dedimus  potestatem  ;^  and  by 
letters  rogatory .^  Whether  a  Circuit  Court  can  appoint  a  special 
examiner  to  take  testimony  beyond  its  territorial  jurisdiction,  is 
doubtful.4 

§  286.  Depositions  de  bene  esse  under  the  Acts  of  Congress.  — 
The  equity  rules  say  that  "  testimony  may  also  be  taken  in  the 
cause,  after  it  is  at  issue,  by  deposition,  according  to  the  acts  of 
Congress.  But  in  such  case,  if  no  notice  is  given  to  the  adverse 
party  of  the  time  and  place  of  taking  the  deposition,  he  shall, 
upon  motion  and  afiidavit  of  the  fact,  be  entitled  to  a  cross- 
examination  of  the  witness  either  under  a  commission  or  by  a 
new  deposition  taken  under  the  act  of  Congress,  if  a  court  or 
a  judge  thereof  shall,  under  all  the  circumstances,  deem  it  reason- 
able." ^  The  acts  of  Congress  on  the  subject  ajjply  to  cases  at 
common  law  and  in  equity .^  They  are  as  follows  :  "  The  tes- 
timony of  any  witness  may  be  taken  in  any  civil  cause  depending 
in  a  District  or  Circuit  Court  by  deposition  de  bene  esse,  when 
the  witness  lives  at  a  greater  distance  from  the  place  of  trial  than 
one  hundred  miles,  or  is  bound  on  a  voyage  to  sea,  or  is  about  to 
go  out  of  the  United  States,  or  out  of  the  district  in  Avhich  the 
case  is  to  be  tried,  and  to  a  greater  distance  than  one  hundred 
miles  from  the  place  of  trial,  before  the  time  of  trial,  or  when  he 
is  ancient  and  infirm.  The  deposition  may  be  taken  ))efore  any 
judge  of  any  court  of  the  United  States,  or  any  commissioner  of 
a  Circuit  Court,  or  any  clerk  of  a  District  or  Circuit  Court,  or 
any  chancellor,  justice,  or  judge  of  a  Supreme  or  Superior  Court, 

19  Blease  v.  Garlington,  92  U.  S.  1,  8.  *  In  North  Carolina  Railroad  Co.  v. 

For  the  practice  when  testimony  is  taken  Drew,  3  Woods,  691,  tiiis  was  done.     In 

in  a  foreign  language,  see  Euberwcg  v.  Arnold  v.  Chesebrougli,  35  Fed.  R    Ui, 

LaCompagnie  Generale  Transatlantique,  and  Celluloid  Manuf.  Co.  r.  Russell,  8.5 

35  Fed.  R.  530  ;  The  Jacob  Brandon,  33  Fed.  K.  17,  such  a  request  was  refused. 

Fed.  R.  160.  §  286.     i  Rule  68.     See   Stegtier    r. 

§  285.     1  See  §§  286,  287.  Blake,  36  Fed.  R.  183. 

2  See  §§  288,  289.  2  Stegner  v.   Blake,  36  Fed.  R.  183; 

»  See  §  290.  D.  S.  R.  S.  §  803. 


510  EVIDENCE   AT   LAW   AXD   IN   EQUITY,  [CHAP.  XIX. 

mayor  or  chief  magistrate  of  a  city,  judge  of  a  county  court  or 
Court  of  Common  Pleas  of  any  of  the  United  States,  or  any  notary 
public,  not  being  of  counsel  or  attorney  to  either  of  the  parties, 
nor  interested  in  the  event  of  the  cause.  Reasonable  notice  must 
first  be  given  in  writing  by  the  party  or  his  attorney  proposing 
to  take  such  deposition,  to  the  opposite  party  or  his  attorney  of 
record,  as  either  may  be  nearest,  which  notice  shall  state  the  name 
of  the  witness,  and  the  time  and  place  of  the  taking  of  his  deposi- 
tion ;  and  in  all  cases  in  rem,  the  person  having  the  agency  or 
possession  of  the  property  at  the  time  of  seizure  shall  be  deemed 
the  adverse  party,  until  a  claim  shall  have  been  put  in  ;  and 
whenever,  by  reason  of  the  absence  from  the  district  and  want 
of  an  attorney  of  record  or  other  reason,  the  giving  of  the  notice 
therein  required  shall  be  impracticable,  it  shall  be  lawful  to  take 
such  depositions  as  there  shall  be  urgent  necessity  for  taking, 
upon  such  notice  as  any  judge  authorized  to  hold  courts  in  such 
circuit  or  district  shall  think  reasonable  and  direct.  Any  person 
may  be  compelled  to  appear  and  depose  as  provided  by  this  sec- 
tion, in  the  same  manner  as  witnesses  may  be  compelled  to  appear 
and  testify  in  court."  ^  "  Every  person  deposing  as  provided  in 
the  preceding  section,  shall  be  cautioned  and  sworn  to  tell  the 
whole  truth,  and  carefully  examined.  His  testimony  shall  be 
reduced  to  writing  by  the  magistrate  taking  the  deposition,  or  by 
himself  in  the  magistrate's  presence,  and  by  no  other  person,  and 
shall,  after  it  has  been  reduced  to  writing,  be  subscribed  by  the 
deponent.""*  "  Every  deposition  taken  under  the  two  prccediug 
sections  shall  be  retained  by  the  magistrate  taking  it,  until  he 
delivers  it  with  his  own  hand  into  the  court  for  which  it  is  taken  ; 
or  it  shall,  together  with  a  certificate  of  the  reasons  as  aforesaid  of 
taking  it,  and  of  the  notice,  if  any,  given  to  the  adverse  party,  be 
by  him  sealed  up  and  directed  to  sucli  court,  and  remain  under 
his  seal  until  opened  in  court.  But  unless  it  appears  to  the  satis- 
faction of  the  court  that  the  witness  is  then  dead,  or  gone  out 
of  the  United  States,  or  to  a  greater  distance  than  one  liundred 
miles  from  the  place  where  the  court  is  sitting,  or  that  by  reason 
of  age,  sickness,  bodily  infirmity,  or  imprisonment,  he  is  unable 
to  travel  and  appear  at  court,  such  deposition  shall  not  be  used 
in  the  cause."  ^ 

These  sections  do  not  apply  to  the  taking  of  depositions  in 
8  U  S.  R.  S  §  863.  *  U  S  R.  S.  §  804.  ^  u.  S.  R.  S.  §  805. 


§  286.]  DEPOSITIONS   DE   BENE   ESSE.  511 

foreign  countries.^  A  deposition  cannot  be  taken  under  these 
statutory  provisions  after  an  appeal  to  the  Supreme  Court  or  the 
Circuit  Court  of  Appeals  has  been  perfected  ;  for  the  case  is  then 
no  longer  "  depending  "  in  a  Circuit  Court."  This  practice  has 
no  api)lication  to  cases  pending  in  the  Supreme  Court,^  It  has 
been  held  that  the  deposition  may  be  taken  before  a  judge  of 
probate  if  his  court  is  a  court  of  record,^  or  any  county  judge.^*^ 
It  has  been  held  that  the  deposition  cannot  be  taken  before  a 
township  justice,'^  or  a  judge  of  a  county  commissioner's  court,^'^ 
or  a  judge  of  a  city  court.^^  The  magistrate  should  write  down 
and  return  to  the  court  any  species  of  evidence  offered  before 
him,  and  cannot  exclude  evidence  on  the  ground  that  it  is  not 
pertinent.  It  belongs  to  the  court,  on  the  retui-n  of  the  deposi- 
tion, to  determine  whether  the  evidence  is  pertinent  or  uot.^* 
The  relevancy  of  a  question  and  the  right  to  have  the  deposition 
taken  will  be  tested,  if  the  witness  refuses  to  answer,  and  an 
application  is  made  to  punish  him  for  contempt. ^^  These  stat- 
utory provisions,  being  in  derogation  of  the  common  law,  are 
strictly  construed.^^  Consequently,  before  depositions  thus  taken 
can  be  read  in  evidence,  the  party  that  offers  them  must  prove 
that  compliance  was  made  with  all  the  requirements  of  the  stat- 
utes, or  else  that  these  requirements  were  waived  by  the  opposite 
party. ^^  There  is  no  presumption  that  a  deposition  was  properly 
taken. ^^  The  certificate  of  the  magistrate  is  prima  facie  evi- 
dence of  such  a  compliance.^^  His  certificate  that  tlie  witness 
lives  more  than  one  hundred  miles  from  the  place  of  trial  is 
jjrima  facie  evidence  of  that  fact.^*'    If  the  witness  does  not  live 

6  Cortes  Co.  f.Tannhauser,  18  Fed.  R.  89;  Adee  r.  J.  L.  Mott  Iron   "Works,  46 

667  ;  Stein  v.  Bowman.  13  Pet.  209.     But  Fed.  K.  39. 

see  Bisclioffscheim  v.  Baltzer,  10  Fed.  R.  1.  ^^  Ex  parte  Elisha  Peck,  8  Blatclif.  113  ; 

■^  Ricliter  i\  Jerome,  25  Fed.  R.  679,  Ex  parte  William  Judson,  .']  Blatclif.  89. 

681 ;    The   Slaughter    House    Cases,   10  See  supra,  §  284,  note  17. 

Wall.  273.  i«  Bell  v.  Morrison,  1  Pet.  351. 

»  Tiie  Argo,  2  Wheaton,  287;  Ricliter  ''  Bell  r  Morrison,  1  Pet.  351  ;  Harris 

V.  Jerome,  25  Fed.  K.  679,  681.  v.  Wall.  7  How.  693. 

9  .Merrill  c.  Davv.«on,  Hempst.  563;  s.  c.  '^  Bell  o.  Morrison,  1  Pet.  351 ;  Banks 

sub  num.  Fowler  v.  Merrill,  11  How.  375.  i;.  Miller,  1  Crancli  C.  C.  543. 

1"  .Voce  V.  Lawrence,  4  M('I>enn,  203.  i^  Harris  v.  Wall,  7  How.  693;  Thorpe 

li  Shutte  ('.  Thompson,  15  Wall.  152.  v.  Simmons,  2  Cranch  C.  C  195. 

12  Garey  r.  Union  Bank,  3  Cranch  C.  -'  Patapsco  Ins.  Co  r.  Southgate,  6  Pet. 
C.  91.  604;  Merrill  (•  Dawson,  Hempst  563;  s.c. 

13  Freeman  ?•  Holmead,  5  Cranch  C.  C.  sub  non}.  Fowler  i-.  Merrill,  11  How.  375; 
162.  Tooker  i-  Thompson,  3  McLean,  92. 

1*  Ex  parte  William  Judson,  3  Blatchf. 


512  EVIDENCE    AT   LAW   AND   IN    EQUITY.  [CHAP.  XIX. 

more  than  one  hundred  miles  from  the  place  of  trial,  the  party 
who  has  taken  his  deposition  must  prove  that  his  disability  to 
attend  still  continues,  and  that  due  diligence  was  used  in  seek- 
ing to  procure  his  attendance,  before  the  deposition  can  be  read 
in  evidence.^^  The  previous  issue  of  a  subpcEna  is  not  essential 
if  proof  of  the  inability  of  the  witness  is  otherwise  given.^^  If 
it  appears  that  at  the  time  when  the  deposition  was  taken  tlie  wit- 
ness lived  more  than  one  hundred  miles  from  the  place  of  trial, 
the  opposite  party,  upon  whom  the  burden  then  rests,  may  prove 
that  at  the  time  of  trial  he  lives  within  one  hundred  miles.^^ 
Whether  a  witness  resides  more  than  one  hundred  miles  from  the 
place  of  trial  is  to  be  determined  by  the  actual  distance  by  usual 
routes. 2* 

It  has  been  held  that  parol  evidence  is  inadmissible  to  show 
a  sufficient  reason,  where  the  magistrate's  certificate  gives  an  in- 
sufficient reason.25  It  is  the  proper  practice  for  the  magistrate 
to  state  in  his  certificate  that  he  was  not  of  counsel  for  either 
party  nor  interested  in  the  event  of  the  cause.^^  It  has  been  held 
that  the  magistrate's  certificate  need  not  state  the  witness  was 
"  sworn  to  testify  the  whole  truth,"  if  it  states  that  the  witness 
was  sworn  ;  ^'  nor,  perhaps,  that  the  witness  is  not  a  resident  of 
the  district  where  the  case  is  pending.^s  The  fact  that  a  witness 
is  a  seaman  on  a  gunboat  stationed  in  a  harbor,  but  liable  to  be 
ordered  to  some  other  place,  is,  it  seems,  not  sufficient  to  author- 
ize the  taking  of  his  testimony  de  bene  esse  in  this  manner.^^  No 
order  or  rule  of  the  court  is  necessary  in  order  to  take  deposi- 

21  Patapsco  Ins.   Co.   v.    Southgate,  5  tapsco  Insurance  Co.  v.  Soutligate,  5  Pet. 

Pet.  604,  612.     The  Samuel,  1  Wheat.  9  ;  604. 

Weed  V   Kellogg,  6  McLean,  44  ;  Jones  v.  ^*  Ex  parte  Beebees,  2  Wall.  Jr.  127. 

Greenolds,  1  Cranch  C.  C.  oo9 ;  Penn  v.  -5  Wheaton  v.  Love,   1   Cranch  C.  C. 

Ingraham,  2  Wash.    C.  C.  487 ;  Bannert  451.     But  see   Dunkle   v.    Worcester,   6 

r.  Day,  3  Wash.  C.  C.  343;  Pettibone  v.  Biss.  102. 

Derringer,  4   Wash.  C.   C  215;  Read  v.  2fi  Qartside  Coal   Co.   v.  Maxwell,   20 

Bertrand,  4  Wash.   C.  C.  558;  Brown  y.  Fed.    R.    187;  Donohue    v.    Roberts,  19 

Galloway,  Pet.  C.  C.  291.  Fed.  R.  863.   But  see  Miller  v.  Yoting,  2 

2i  Park  V.  Willis,  1  Cranch   C.  C,  357 ;  Cranch   C.   C.  53  ;    Peyton  v.  Veitch,  2 

Leatherberry  v.  Radcliffe,  5  Crancii  C.  C.  Cranch  C.  C.  128 ;  Stewart  v.  Townsend, 

650.  41  Fed.  R.  121. 

21  Penn  v.  Ingraham,  2   Wash.   C   C.  -"  Bussard  v.  Catalino,  2  Cranch  C.  C. 

487  ;  Brown  v.  Galloway,  Pet.  C.  C.  201  ;  421.     But  see  Rainer  r.  Haynes,  Hempst. 

Pettibone  i'.   Derringer,   4    Wash.    215;  689;    Garrett   i-.    Woodward,  2  Cranch, 

Russell    V.    Ashley,    Hempst.   640,   549;  C.  C.  190. 

Weed  r.  Kellogg,  6  McLean,  44;  Whitford  -8  Sage  v.  Tauszky.  6  Cent.  L.  J.  7. 

V.  Clark  Co ,  119  United  States,  622 ;  Pa-  29  The  Samuel,  1  Wheat.  9. 


§  286.]  DErosiTioNS  de  bene  esse.  513 

tioiis  ill  this  manner.^  Although  one  deposition  has  been  already 
taken,  yet  a  second  deposition  of  the  same  witness  may  be  taken 
without  an  order  of  the  court.^^  It  is  customary  to  file  the  no- 
tice or  a  copy  thereof"  in  the  clerk's  office  before  the  issue  of  the 
subpoenas. 

Any  one,  even  a  party  to  the  suit,  may  serve  the  notice.^^  If 
the  United  States  be  a  party,  it  seems  that  service  should  be  made 
upon  the  nearest  district  attorney .^'^  It  has  been  held  that  if  an 
attorney  has  been  employed  in  a  case  and  is  still  employed  therein, 
notice  should  ha  given  to  him,  although  he  has  never  formally 
appeared  on  the  record.^*  The  service  must  be  personal,  unless 
otherwise  expressly  authorized  as  provided  for  in  the  statute.^ 
The  notice  must  be  served  a  reasonable  time  before  the  taking  of 
the  deposition.^^  An  hour's  notice  has  been  held  to  be  reason- 
able.^*^ Where  the  parties  and  their  attorneys  lived  in  the  place 
where  the  deposition  was  taken,  a  notice  tliat  the  deposition  would 
be  taken  "  before  William  G.  Peckham,  Esq.,  Notary  Public,  or 
some  other  officer  authorized  by  law  to  take  depositions,"  &c.,  was 
held  sufficient  when  the  deposition  was  taken  before  another  no- 
tar}'.^"^  It  seems  that  it  is  not  proper  to  serve  a  notice  for  the 
taking  of  a  deposition  during  a  term  at  which  the  cause  could  be 
tried  ;  ^  or  so  short  a  time  before  as  not  to  allow  an  attorney,  if 
he  attend,  to  reach  the  court  before  the  commencement  of  that 
term.*''  The  notice  must  show  on  its  face  that  the  contingency 
has  happened  which  confers  jurisdiction  on  the  magistrate,  and 
gives  the  party  serving  it  a  right  to  have  the  deposition  taken;  so 
that  the  party  upon  whom  it  is  served  may  be  able  to  judge 
whether  it  is  necessary  for  him  to  attend.*^       If  the  witnesses' 

3''  Pettibone  v.  Derringer,  4  Wash.  215  ;  5G6;  Renner  v.  Ilowland,  2  Crancli  C.  C. 

Biickinf^jbam  r.  Burgess,  3  McLean,  368.  441  ;  Barreli  /•.  Simonton,  3  Crancli  C.  C. 

But  see  Walker  v.  Parker,  5  Crancli  C.  C.  681. 

(•,3'J.  37  Leiper  v.  Bickley,  1   Crancli  C.  C. 

^'  Nash,  tenant  of  Coniiett  v.  Williams,  20  ;  Bowie  c  Talbot,  1  Crancli  C.  C.247  ; 

•20  Wall.  220.  Atkinson  v.  Glenn,  4   Cranch  C.  C.  134. 

'-  Young  V.  Davidson,  5  Cranch   C.  C.  But  see  Renner  r.  Howland,  2  Cranch  C. 

515.  C.  441 ;  Irving  v.  Sutton,  1   Cranch   C.  C. 

33  The  Argo.  2  Gall.  314.  567. 

3<  Allen  V.  Blunt,  2  W.  &  M.  121.  ^s  Qormley  v.  Bunyan,  138  U.  S.  623, 

35  Carrington  v.  Stimson,  1  Curtis,  437.  632. 

Contra,  Merrill  v.  Dawson,   Hempst.  563.  3!)  Allen  r.  Blunt,  2  W.  &  M.  121 ;  Bell 

s.  c.  sub  nom.  Fowler  v-  Merrill,  11  How.  r.  Nimnion,  4  McLean,  53'J. 

375.  ■»!  Bell  r.  Niinmon,  4  McLean,  539. 

35  Jamieson   v.  Willis,  1  Cranch  C.  C.  "'^  Harris  v.  Wall,  7  How.  G!)3.     Contra, 
VOL.  I.  — 33 


514  EVIDENCE   AT   LAW   AND   IN    EQUITY.  [CIIAP.  XIX. 

Christian  names  are  unknown,  the  inclusion  of  their  surnames 
in  the  notice  will  be  sufficient.'*'-^  If  the  notice  state  that  the  tak- 
ing of  depositions  will  be  adjourned  from  day  to  day,  it  seems 
that  depositions  taken  upon  an  adjourned  day  will  be  received.*^ 
It  seems  insufficient  to  swear  the  witness  to  tell  the  whole  truth 
concerning  such  interrogatories  as  may  be  put  to  him.  He  should 
be  sworn  or  should  affirm  to  tell  tlie  whole  truth  as  far  as  he 
knows  concerning  the  matter  in  controversy  between  the  parties,*'* 
A  notice  that  a  party  will  on  the  same  day  take  depositions  of 
witnesses  in  difterent  cities  is  unreasonable,  and  such  depositions 
will  be  suppressed  ;  even,  it  has  been  held,  if  the  opposite  party 
appeared  at  each  by  counsel  and  cross-examined,  provided  that 
before  the  direct  examination  the  objection  was  specifically  stated, 
and  although  such  party  had  served  similar  notices  of  the  taking 
of  depositions  at  other  times  and  {daces  on  his  own  behalf.*^ 
It  seems  tliat  if  the  witness  is  properly  sworn,  it  is  not  neces- 
sary that  he  be  also  cautioned  to  testify  the  whole  truth  ;'**^  and 
tliat  tlie  oath  may  be  administered  after  the  deposition  has  been 
reduced  to  vrriting,  as  well  as  before.*"  If  the  witness  has  con- 
scientious scruples  about  taking  an  oath,  he  may  affirm.*^  Tlie 
certificate  of  the  magistrate  that  the  witness  has  such  conscien- 
tious scruples  is  sufficient  evidence  thereof.*^  It  has  been  held 
that  a  witness  may  be  compelled  to  attend  for  the  purpose  of  hav- 
ing his  deposition  taken  de  bene  esse,  either  by  a  subpoena,  a  sub- 
pcena  duces  tecum,  or  the  writ  of  haheas  corpus  ad  testificandum, 
but  that  a  commissioner  cannot  issue  a  writ  of  haheas  corpus  to 
take  a  person  from  jail  for  the  purpose  of  giving  his  deposition 
bjfore  such  a  commissioner.-^'^  A  party  cannot  be  compelled  by 
a  subpoena  to  produce  papers,  books,  etc.,  which  would  not  be 
material  or  competent  as  evidence,  merely  for  the  purpose  of  re- 

Debutts  r.  MeCiillocli,  1  Cranch  C.  C.  286  ;  son  S.  M.   A.  r.  Jnckson,  1    HuErhes,  205  ; 

Sa-ie  r.  Taiiszky,  6  Cent.  L.  J.  7.  United  States  r.  Smith,  4  Day,  121. 

■i-  Claxton    V.    Adams,    1     MacArtlmr  ^'^  Uiile  v.   Biirnhain,  44  Fed.   R.  729 ; 

(D.  C  ),  490.     See  Carrington  r.  Stinison,  U.  S.  C.  C,  S.  D  N.  Y.,  Lacombe,  J. 

1  Curt.  437.  ■*"  Doe  d.  Moore,  v.  Nelson,  3  McLean, 

*5  Knode  v.  Williamson,  17  Wall.  580  ;  383;  Brown  v.  Piatt,  2  Cranch  C.  C.  253. 

Sage  »'.  Tauszky,  0  Cent.  ly.  J.  7.    But  see  Contra,  Luther  v.  The  Mcrritt   Hunt,    1 

Kirkpatrick   v.   Baltimore  &  Ohio   R.   R.  Newb.  Adm.  4. 

Co.,  24  Pittsb.  L.  J.  51.  *'  Tooker  v.  Thompson,  3  McLean.  92. 

*^  Shutte  r.  Thompson,  15  Wall.  152;  ^8  u.  S   R.  S.  §  1. 

Pendleton  v.  Forl)es,  I  Cran(-ii  C.  C.  507  ;  ^^  Elliot  r.  Hayman,  2  Cranch  C.  C.  078. 

Garrett   i.    Woodward,  2  Cranch  C.  C.  ^  /sx /wWr  Peck,  3  Blatchf.  113;  United 

190 ;  Raincr  r.  Haynes,  Hempst.  089 ;  Wil-  States  v.  Tiiden,  10  Bon.  56G  ;  infra,  §  300. 


§  287.]       FORM   OF   DEPOSITION   UNDER   ACTS   OF   CONGRESS.  515 

freshing  his  memory .^^  It  has  been  held  that  after  a  party  has 
examined  a  witness  in  chief  under  the  statutory  provisions  and 
demanded  an  adjournment,  he  has  no  right  to  withdraw  the  pro- 
ceedings, and  that  any  party  in  interest  may  compel  such  witness 
to  appear  and  submit  to  cross-examination. ^^  Either  party  may 
obtain  an  order  compelling  the  return  of  a  deposition  thus  taken.^ 
After  the  de])osition  is  complete,  the  court  may  allow  a  further 
cross-examination  on  newly  discovered  facts.^'^  The  court  has 
the  power  to  conip<'l  the  opening  of  such  a  deposition  before  the 
trial  upon  the  motion  of  either  party  against  the  objection  of  the 
other.''^  It  is  the  safer  practice  to  have  the  witness  sign  his  depo- 
sition.^*"  No  notice  of  filing  a  deposition  need  be  given  to  a  party 
who  knows  it  has  been.taken.^' 

§  287.  Form  of  Deposition  under  Acts  of  Congress.  —  The  depo- 
sition should  state,  either  in  its  body  or  in  its  caption,  the  name 
of  the  court  where  the  cause  is  pending,'^  the  title  of  the  cause,^ 
and  the  place  where  the  deposition  is  taken.^  A  slight  error  in 
the  caption,  such  as  a  mistake  in  spelling  the  name  of  a  party,* 
or  the  omission  from  the  title  of  the  cause  of  the  name  of  one  of 
several  plaintiffs  or  defendants  is  not  a  ground  of  suppressing 
the  deposition.^  The  heading  of  the  notice  :  "  United  States  of 
America,  State  of  Illinois,  County  of  Cook,  ss.  In  the  Circuit 
Court  of  the  United  States,"  was  held  not  sufficiently  irregular  to 
avoid  the  deposition.^  The  omission  of  the  name  of  the  county 
from  the  caption   is  not  a  fatal  defect,"     The  certificate   should 

5'  /I'.r/ia;^  Peck,  •".  RIatclif.  113;  United  Waskern  r.  Dinninnd,  Heinpst.  701;  Al- 

Stiites  r.  Tilden,  10  Ren.  .570.  len  r.  Blunt,  2   W.  &   M.   121.     But   see 

■'•  F.:r  jxirU'  Bnrno.«,  1  Spra<iue,  Irl.S;  Re  Voce  r.  Lawrence,  4  McLean,  203;  Buck- 

Kintlsknpf,  21  Fed.  1{    AI'J.  inulinin  r   Burgess,  3  McLean,  368  ;  Pan- 

■"^•^  First  Nat.  Bank  of  (irand   Haven   v.  niil  r.  Klia'ion,  o  Crancli   C.  V.  3.58;  Mer- 

Forest.  44  Fed.   K.  24t).  rill   r.   Dawsot),    Hernpst.   563;    s.   c.   sub 

^*  The  Xorniandie,  40  Fed.  K.  .5flO.  uoin.  Fowler  r.  Merrill,  11  How.  375. 

S5  United  States  r.  Tilden,  10  Ben.  170.  3  Pendleton  r.  Forbes,  1  CrancJi   C.  C. 

^''  Thorpe  c.  Simmons,  2  Cranch  C.   C  507  ;  Tooker  v.  Thompson,  3  McLean,  92. 

195.  i  Van  Ness  v.  Ileineke,  2  Cranch  C.  C. 

^"Nelson?'.   Woodruff,   1    Black,  150;  259. 

Leatherberrj- r.  Kadcliffe,  5  Cranch  C.  C.  ^  Pamill  v.   Eliason,   3  Crancli   C.  C. 

550.   For  practice  wlien   a   deposition   is  358;  Eiibert  r.  Citizens' Ins.  Co.,  7  Fed. 

destroyed,  see  Stehhins  r.  Duncan,  108  1?.  47  ;  Merrill  v.   Dawson,   Hcnipst.  56.3. 

U.  S.  32.  s  c.  snh  nom.  Fowler  «.  Merrill,  11  How. 

§287.  ^  Van  Xess  r.  Heinekc,  2  Crancli  375.      See    also    Voce    i'.    Lawrence,    4 

C.  C.  259.  McLean,  203. 

2  Peyton  v.  Veitch,  2  Crancli  C.  C.  123  ;  «  Gormley  r  Bnnyan,  138 U.S. 623,0.34. 

Smith  V.  Coleman,  2   Cranch   C.  C.  237  ;  '  Van  Ness  v.  Heineke,  2  Cranch  C.  C. 

Centre  i'.    Keene,  2  Cranch   C.   C.  198 ;  259. 


516  EVIDENCE    AT   LAW    AND   IN   EQUITY.  [CHAP.  XIX. 

show  that  tho  magistrate  reduced  the  testimony  to  writing  him- 
self, or  that  it  was  done  by  the  witness  in  his  presence.^  It  is  the 
better  practice  for  the  magistrate  to  certify  that  he  reduced  the 
deposition  to  writing  in  the  presence  of  the  witness.^  No  other 
person  can  reduce  the  deposition  to  writing  except  the  magistrate 
or  the  deponent  in  his  prescnce,^'^  except  by  consent.^^  A  certifi- 
cate by  the  magistrate  that  the  deposition  was  reduced  to  writing 
in  his  presence,  without  saying  by  whom,  is  bad.^^  The  objection 
that  the  mngistrate  does  not  certify  that  the  deposition  was  signed 
by  the  witness  in  his  presence,  is  not  fatal. ^^  If  the  deponent  re- 
duces the  deposition  to  writing,  the  magistrate  must  certify  that 
it  was  reduced  to  writing  by  the  deponent  in  his  presence. ^^  A 
certificate  by  the  magistrate  that  the  deposition  was  reduced  to 
writing  by  the  witness  and  himself  was  held  sufficient. ^-^  If  the 
deposition  bears  the  witness'  signature  and  ajipears  to  have  been 
reduced  to  writing  l)y  the  magistrate,  it  is  sufficient,  although  the 
certificate  does  not  say  that  it  was  signed  by  the  witncss.^*^  In 
one  case,  a  deposition  was  rejected  because  the  magistrate  certi- 
fied that  "  the  form,"  an  evident  slip  of  the  pen  for  "  the  same," 
which  were  the  words  of  the  statute  then  in  force,  "  was  reduced 
to  writing."^'  The  certificate  should  state  whether  the  parties 
were  or  were  not  present  or  represented.^^  Tlie  certificate  should 
contain  the  reasons  for  which  the  deposition  was  taken. ^^  It 
has  been  held  that  a  certificate  sufficiently  shows  the  reason  for 
making  de|»ositions,  if  the  caption  of  the  deposition  states  where 
the  depositions  were  taken,  without  giving  the  distance  from  the 

8  Cook    V.  Burnley,    11    "Wall.    (559;  228;    Kainer   v.   Ilaynes,   TTempst.    689; 
United    States  ;'.  Sniitli,  4  Day  (Conn.),  Pettibone  r.  Derrinj^er,  4  ^Yasll.  215. 
121;    Bell   c.  Morrison,  1  Pet.  3ol,  355.  i-^  Elliott  r.  Pier.sol,   1  Pet.  328,   .335; 
But  see    Bussard   v.  Catalino,  2    Craneli  Cook  r.  Rurnle}",  11  Wall.  659.      But  see 
C.  C.  421.  V.isse  V.  Smith,  2  Craneh  C:.  C.  31. 

9  Donahue  r.  Roberts,  19  Fed.  B.  803.  !■  Bussard  r.  Catalino,  2  Cranch  C.  C. 
Contra,  Yiisse  r.  Smith,  2  Cranch  C.  C.  421.  But  see  Cook  r.  Burnley,  11  Wall. 
31 ;  Van  Ness  v  Heineke,  2  Cranch  C.  C.  G5'.t ;  Donahue  v.  Roberts,  19  Fed.  R.  ^63. 
259  ;  Centre  v.  Keen,  2  Cranch  C.  C.  108.  n  Voce  v.  Lawrence,  4  McLean,  203; 

1'^  Marstin   v.    McRae,    Hempst.    6S8 ;  Burton  r.  Simmons,  2  Cranch  C.  C.  195. 

Rainer  i.  Ilaynes,  Henipst.  OSO.  i^  Curtis  ;•.   Railway'    Co,  6  McLean, 

11  Stewart  v.  Townsend,  41  Fed.  R.  121.  401. 

1'  United    States    v.     Smith,    4     Day  "  Shutte  r.  Thompson,  15  Wall.   152; 

(Conn.),  121.  Saiie  r.  Tauszky,  C  Cent.  L.  J.  7  ;  Harris 

"  Van  Ness  v.  Heineke,  2  Cranch  C.  v.  Wall,  7  How.' 693 ;  Woodward  v.  Hall, 

C.  2.59;  Centre  v.  Keen,  2  Cranch  C.  C.  2  Cranch    C.  C.  2S5  ;  Wheaton  v.  L  )\v,  1 

198.  Cranch  C.   C.  451  ;  Jones  r.   Knowles,  1 

"  Edmonson  i-.  Barrel,  2  Cranch  C.  C.  Cranch  C.  C.  523.     See  snjira,  §  23G. 


§  287.]        FORM   OF   DEPOSITION    UNDER   ACTS    OF   CONGRESS.  517 

place  of  taking  to  the  place  of  trial  ;  if  the  distance  is  in  fact, 
and  is  well  known  by  all  parties  to  be,  more  than  one  hundred 
miles  from  the  place  of  trial.^o  The  notice  need  not  be  attached 
to  the  deposition. -1  If  the  deposition  is  sent  by  mail,  the  magis- 
trate should  certify  that  it  was  retained  by  him  until  sealed  up 
and  directed  to  the  court,^^  The  deposition  need  not  state  that 
the  deposition  has  been  sealed,  provided  that  it  appears  by  the 
envelope  that  the  deposition  was  scaled.-^  If  the  deposition  is 
sealed  up  with  the  seal  of  a  corporation,  across  which  are  written 
the  name  or  the  names  of  the  person  or  persons  who  took  the  de- 
position, it  is  sufficient.-'^  The  accidental  oi)cning  in  the  mail  of 
an  envelope  containing  a  deposition  taken  l^y  a  commission  under 
Rule  67  does  not  authorize  the  suppression  of  the  deposition.^^ 
If  the  magistrate  have  an  official  seal  under  which  he  usually  cer- 
tifies his  acts,  it  seems  that  this  certificate  should  be  under  that 
scaL^*^  It  seems  that  it  will  be  presumed  that  he  occupies  the 
official  position  which  he  assumes  in  his  certificate  ; 2''  certainly 
so  if  he  be  a  notary  public  and  certifies  under  his  notarial  seal  ;'^^ 
and  this  may  always  be  proved  by  oral  testimony  like  any  other 
material  fact.-^  The  deposition  may  be  directed  to  either  the 
judge  or  the  clerk  of  the  court.^*^  It  cannot  be  read  in  evidence 
if  opened  anywhere  but  in  court,-'^^  except  by  consent,  which  it 
will  be  well  to  have  appear  by  writing  duly  signed  and  filed  with 
or  indorsed  on  the  deposition.^^  Where  the  certificate  fails  to 
state  certain  material  facts,  by  leave  of  the  court  the  deposition 
may  be  withdrawn  from  the  clerk's  office,  the  certificate  amended, 
and  the  deposition  then  refiled.-^^  If  an  attorney  appear  and  cross- 
examine  a  witness  without  objection,  he  thereby  waives  any  no- 

20  Egbert  V.  Citizens'  Ins.  Co.  of  Mo.,  7  Iluntt,  -5    Cranch    C.    C.    120.     But    see 

Fed.  R.  47.  Tooker  v.  Thompson,  8  McLean,  92. 

-1  Stewart  v.  Townsend,  41  Fed.  R.  121.  -«  Dinsmorec.  Maronej',  4  Blatohf.  416. 

"^  Sliankwiker  v.  Reading,  4  McLean,  -9  Paul  v.  Lovvry,  2  Cranch   C.  C.  628; 

240 ;  Jones  v.  Neale,  1  Hughes,  268.    But  Dunlop  v.  Munroe,  1  Cranch  C.  C.  536. 

see  Stewart  v.  Townsend,  41  Fed.  R.  121.  ■^"  Thorp  v.  Orr,  2   Cranch   C.  C.  3.35; 

23  Egbert  V.  Citizens'   Ins.  Co.  of  Mo.,  Whitney  c.  Huntt,  5  Cranch  C.  C.  120. 

7  Fed.  R.  47,  50.  si  Beale  o.  Thompson,.  8  Cranch,  70; 

•24  Re  Thomas,  So  Fed.  R.  .337.  The  Roscius,  1  Brown  Adm.  442.     In  re 

25  Eiffert  y.  Craps,  44  Fed.  R.  164.  Thomas,  35  Fed.  R.  337. 

28  Paul  V.  Lowry,  2  Crancii  C.  C.  628.  32  xiie  Roscius,  1  Brown  Adm.  442. 

But  see  Price  v.  Morris,  5  McLean,  4  3.3  Qartside  Coal    Co.    v.    Ma.xwell,    20 

2'  Ruggles  V.  Bucknor,   1  Paine,  358;  Fed   R.  187;  Donahue  r.  Roberts,  10  Fed. 

Pricey.  Morris,  5  McLean,  4;  Vasse  i'.  R.    868;    Leatherberry    v.    Radcliffe,    5 

Smitli,  2   Cranch   C.  C.  31  ;  Whitney  v.  Cranch  C.  C.  550. 


518  EVIDENCE    AT   LAW   AND    IN    EQUITY.  [CHAP.  XIX. 

tice  or  irregularity  in  the  notice,^*  or  in  the  form  and  manner 
of  the  proceedings,^^  or,  it  seems,  an  incompetency  in  the  witness 
then  known  to  "him,^^  or  any  other  formal  defect.  His  presence, 
however,  if  he  declines  to  take  any  part  in  the  proceedings,  does 
not.^'''  It  is  the  safer  and  the  usual  practice  for  the  counsel  pres- 
ent to  note  on  the  record  all  objections  to  the  form  of  questions  ; 
and  a  failure  to  note  such  an  objection  might  be  held  a  waiver 
by  a  party  who  was  present  or  represented  at  the  examination. 
Irregularities  are  waived  l)y  consent  to  open  depositions  "  without 
prejudice  to  any  objections  to  the  inclosed  deposition  other  than 
relating  to  [)ublication  and  opening,  which  is  hereby  waived."  2*^ 
An  objection  to  the  failure  of  a  witness  to  produce  a  paper  to 
which  he  referred,  or  which  was  called  foi',  can  only  be  made  by 
a  motion  to  suppress  the  deposition.^  In  general,  all  defects  in 
form  can  only  be  raised  by  a  motion  to  suppress  the  deposition,*'^ 
and  the  court  may,  when  such  a  motion  is  granted,  usually  allow 
an  adjournment  of  the  hearing  in  order  that  the  testimony  may 
again  be  taken. '^^ 

§  288.  Commissions  issued  under  a  Dedimus  Potestatem.  —  J.  he 
Revised  t^tatutes  i)rovide  that  *■'  in  any  case  where  it  is  necessary, 
in  order  to  jirevent  a  failure  or  delay  of  justice,  any  of  the  courts 
of  the  United  States  may  grant  a  dedimus.  potestatein  to  take  depo- 
sitions according  to  common  usage.'"  "•  And  the  provisions  of 
Sections  eight  hundred  and  sixty-three,  eight  hundred  and  sixty- 
four,  and  eight  hundred  and  sixty-five  shall  not  apply  to  any  depo- 
sitions to  Ijc  taken  under  the  authority  of  this  section."^  This 
statute  a])plies  in  criminal  prosecutions,-  actions  at  law,'^  and  cases 
in  equity.'*  The  words  ''  common  usage  "  when  apjiHed  to  a  suit 
in  eipiity,  signify  the  ordinary  })ractice  of  courts  of  equity.^     In 

S'*  Dinsmore  '•.  Maroney,  4  Blatclif.  416.  McLean,  4?.2;  Ulile  r.  Burnliam,  44  Fed. 

3-5  Shinte  r.  Tlinmpson,  15  Wall.  152;  R.  720,  730;  Howard  v.  Stillwell  B.  M. 

hire  Thomas,  35  Ke.l.  W.  822.  Co.  139  U.  S.  199. 

3'^  UiiUcmI  States  '■.  One  Case,  1   Taiiie,  *i  Luther  v.  Tiie  Merritt  Hunt,  1  Newb. 

400.  4  ;  Doe  d.  Moore  r.  Nebon,  3  McLean,  383. 

3'   Harris  r.  Wall,  7  How.  693.  §  288.    '  U.  S.  R.   S.  §  866  ;  Jones  v. 

3S  Stewart  (-..Townscnd,    41    Fed.    R.  Oregon  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  3  Sawyer, -523. 

121.  -  United  States  v.  Canieron,  15  P>d.  R. 

3^  Blackburn  r.  Crawford,  3  Wall  175 ;  794  ;  United  States  v.  Wilder,  14  Fed.  R. 

Winans  v.  New  Y.jrk  &  E.   R.  R.  Co.,  21  393. 

How.  88.  3  Peters  r.  Prevost,  1  Paine,  G4. 

'f'  Cla.xton    r.    Adam.s    1    MacArthur  <  Bi.schoffheim  c  Baltzer.  10  Fed.  R.  1. 

(1).  C.),490;  Bank  of  Danville  c  Trav-  ^  United    States  v.  Parrott,  1  iMcAU. 

ers,  4   Biss.    507 ;  Brooks    v.   Jenkins,   3  447. 


§288]      COMMISSIONS  ISSUED  UNDER  A  DEDIMUS  POTESTATEM.         519 

a  case  of  doubtful  authority,  the  condition  that  a  safe  conduct 
be  furnished  to  the  pkiintiff  was  inserted  in  an  order  for  a  com- 
mission to  examine  witnesses  on  the  part  of  the  defendant  in 
a  foreign  country,*^  but  a  commission  to  prove  documents  was 
allowed  without  such  a  condition  J  Depositions  may  be  taken 
under  this  section  of  the  Revised  Statutes,  even  though  the  wit- 
ness live  within  one  hundred  miles  of  the  court  where  the  cause 
is  pending;^  or  in  a  country  with  which  the  United  States  are 
at  war.9  Such  a  commission  is  not  gi-anted  as  of  course,  but 
only  u[)un  good  cause  shown. ^'^  The  application  must  be  made 
in  open  court,  and  not  to  a  judge  at  chambers  ;  ^^  and  must  be 
accompanied  by  an  affidavit  showing  that  the  testimony  which 
the  party  desires  to  take  is  material. ^^  It  seems  that  the  commis- 
tiou  need  not  specify  the  exact  place  where  the  depositions  are  to 
be  taken  ;  but  if  it  do,  the  commissioners  should  conform  to  it  in 
that  respect. ^'^  Whetlier  a  party  will  or  will  not  be  required  before 
the  commission  is  issued  to  name  the  witnesses  to  be  examined 
under  it,  depends  upon  the  discretion  of  the  court,  to  be  exercised 
under  the  circumstances  of  each  case.^*  Before  the  issue  of  the 
commission,  the  i)roi)Osed  interrogatories  should  be  filed  ^^  and 
served  upon  the  oi)posite  party  or  his  attorney ;  ^^  and  the  latter 
given  a  reasonable  time,  usually  fixed  by  the  court,  within  which 
to  object  to  them  and  to  file  cross-interrogatories.^''  If  he  omit 
to  do  so,  the  commission  may  be  issued  without  further  notice. ^^ 
The  interrogatories  are  drawn  up  substantially  as  those  for  the 
examination  of  witnesses  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court. ^^ 
Objections  to  interrogatories  or  cross-interrogatories  should  be  in 
the  form  of  exceptions  to  them,  and  must  be  filed  before  the  com- 
mission issues  ;  or  otherwise  will  be  held  waived.^^    If  the  parties 

6  Hollander  i\   Eaiz,  40  Fed.   K.  059.  i«  Rhoades  v.  Selin,  4  Wasli.  715 ;  Mer- 

"  Ilollatidcr  y   Baiz,  43  Fed.  R.  35.  rill  v.   Dawson,   Hempst.  5(3 o  ;    s.    c.  sub 

8  Wellford  V.  Miller,  1  Crancli  C.   C  iiom.  Fowler  c.  Merrill,  11   How.  375. 

485  ;  Russell  r.  M'Lellan,  3  W.  &  M.  157.  ''  Frevall   v.    Baclie,  5   Cranch  C.  C. 

^  Peters  ('.  Prevost,  1  Paine,  G4.  403;  Tlie  Norway,  1  Ren.  493.     Leave  to 

1"  United  States  r.   Parrott,   1  McAU.  cross-examine  orally  will  rarely  be  given. 

447.  Coates  v.  Merrick  Thread  Co.,  41  Fed.  R. 

^^  Peters  r.  Prevost,  1  Paine,  04.  73. 

1-  Stitton  r.  Mandeville,  1  Oranch  C.  C.  i*^  Cocker  v.  F.  H.  &   B.  Co  ,  1   Story, 

n-".;  United  States  i-.  Parrott,  1  McAll.  169. 

447.  ^'•>  Rhoades  v.  Selin,  4  Wash.  715. 

13  Rhoades  >\  Selin,  4  Wash.  715.  '-"  Cocker  r.  Franklin   II.  &  B.  Co.,  1 

1^  Parker  r.  Nixon,  Baldw.  291.  Story,  169. 
^^  Cunningham  v.  Otis,  I  Gall.  106. 


520  EVIDENCE   AT  LAW   AND   IN   EQUITY.  [CHAP.  XIX. 

cannot  agree  as  to  their  form  or  substance,  a  reference  may  be 
ordered  to  a  master,  whose  report  will  be  reviewed  by  the  court.^^ 
If  there  be  any  doubt  as  to  the  relevancy  or  propriety  of  an  in- 
terrogatory, tlie  idtiraate  decision  thereon  will  be  reserved  until 
the  hearing,  and  it  will  be  allowed  to  stand  and  be  answered. 
If  there  be  no  doubt  as  to  its  irrelevancy  or  impropriety,  it  will 
be  stricken  out  before  the  commission  issues.^'-^  A  commission 
must  always  name  or  designate  the  commissioner  or  commission- 
ers.2'^  A  woman  may  be  a  commissioner,  even  though  she  be  the 
wife  of  the  witness  to  be  examined .^-^  The  court  may  grant  an 
order  that  exhibits  annexed  to  a  deposition  ali-eady  taken  may 
be  removed  from  the  file  and  attached  to  a  commission,  provided 
that  copies  of  them  are  left  in  their  place.^^ 

§  289.  Proceedings  under  a  Dedimus  Potestatem. — If  the  ap- 
plication does  not  state  when  and  where  the  commission  is  to  be 
executed,  the  party  at  whose  instance,  or  the  commissioner  to 
whom  it  is  issued,  should  notify  the  adverse  party  or  his  solicitor 
before  the  depositions  are  taken. ^  The  notice  should  name  the 
year  as  well  as  the  day.^  When,  however,  a  party,  after  notice 
of  an  opportunity  to  do  so,  has  neglected  to  file  cross-interroga- 
tories, no  further  notice  to  him  is  necessary.'^  The  notice  shoul4 
be  served  personally,  or  else  left  at  the  liouse  of  the  person  upon 
wliom  it  is  made  with  a  member  of  his  family  of  sufhcient  in- 
telligence.* The  person  upon  whom  it  is  left,  hov.-ever,  need 
not  be  informed  of  its  purport.^  Service  by  mail,  unless  actually 
received  in  time,  is  insufficient.'^  An  hour's  notice  of  the  time  of 
taking  a  deposition  in  the  place  where  the  attorney  to  whom  it  is 
given  dwells,  has  been  held  sufficient.'  Tlie  regulation  of  the 
proceedings  under  a  commission  is  a  matter  in  the  discretion  of 
the  court  issuing  it.^     A  commissioner  is  appointed  by  and  repre- 

21  Cocker  v.  F    H    &  B.  Co.,  1  Story,  2  Knorle  v.  Williamson,  17  Wall.  586. 
169;  BouJereau  c.  Montgomery,  4    Wash.  3  Merrill    v.    Dawson,    Heinpst.    563; 
18G.  s.  c.  sub  nom.  Fowler  v.  Merrill,  11  How. 

22  Cooker  v.  V.  IL  &  B.  Co.,  1  Story,  169.  375. 

23  Vanstopliorst  v.   Maryland,  2  Dall.  ^  ^Merrill    ?•.    Dawson,    Ilempst.    563; 
401.  s.  c.  sub  nom.  Fowler  r.  Merrill,  11   How. 

21  The  Norway,  2  Ben.  121.  375. 

25  Daly  V.  Matruire,  6  Blatchf.  137.  ^  M'Call  v.  Towers,  1  Craneh  C   C.41. 

§  289^  '  Uhoailesr.  Selin,4  Wash.715;  ^  Walker   v.    Parker,  5  Craneli  C.  C 

Knoile  /•.  Williamson,  17  Wall.  586 ;  Mer-  639. 

rill  r.  Dawson,  Ilempst.  563;    s.    c.  sub  "  Nicholls  ?>.  White.  1  Cranch  C.  C.  59 

nom.    Fowler  /-'.    Aferrill,   11    How     .■')75;  ^  Cunningham  v.  Otis,  1  Gall.  166. 

Dunlop  0.  Munroe,  1  Cranch  C.  C.  53ij. 


§  289.]  PROCEEDINGS   UNDER   A   DEDIMUS   POTESTATEM.  521 

sents  the  court ;  and  is  no  more  than  is  an  arbitrator  the  repre- 
sentative of  the  party  nominating  him.^  The  authority  given  to 
a  commissioner  is  special,  and  must  be  strictly  construed. ^'^  A 
commission  issued  to  more  than  one  commissioner  must  be  exe- 
cuted and  returned  by  all  of  them,^^  milcss  it  is  otherwise  so  pro- 
vided in  it ;  ^'^  and  if  any  one  else,  except  a  judge  in  a  foreign 
country  whose  laws  do  not  ])crmit  a  private  individual  to  take 
testimony  alone,^^  join  in  its  execution  on  return,  the  testimony 
taken  under  it  will  also  be  suppressed.^'*  A  commission  must  be 
executed  at  the  time  and  place  named  in  it,  or  in  the  notice.^^ 
It  has  been  held  that  the  witnesses  under  such  a  commission 
should  be  examined  alone  ;  and  the  parties  are  not  allowed  to  be 
present  either  in  person  or  by  attorney,  unless  the  court  other- 
wise dirccts.^'^  The  interrogatories  may  be  shown  the  witness 
before  he  is  called  upon  to  give  his  testimony.^''  He  must  be 
examined  as  to  each  interrogatory  and  cross-interrogatory  ;  and 
if  he  imin-oj)erly  omits  to  answer  any  one  of  them,  or  if  any  one 
of  them,  an  answer  to  which  would  be  legal  evidence,  is  not  put 
to  him,  his  whole  deposition  may  be  suppressed  at  the  instance 
of  the  party  who  might  be  thereby  injured.^'*  If,  however,  the 
deposition  have  been  issued  ex  parte,  the  adverse  party  having 
omitted  to  file  cross  interrogatories  after  an  opportunity  to  do 
so  has  been  given  him,  it  has  been  said  that  as  many,  or  as 
few,  of  these  interrogatories  as  the  ])arty  who  filed  them  thinks 
proper  may  be  put,  provided  that  the  general  interrogatory  is 
not  omitted. 1^     If  the  cross-interrogatories  are  put,  it  makes  no 

3  Jones  r.  Oreiion  Central  IJ.  U.  Co.,  3         '6  Cunniiii;1iam    v.    Otis,    1  Gall.    106. 

Sawyer,  623;  Gilpins   v.   Consequa,  Pet.  But  see   Knode  v.  Williamson,  17  Wall. 

C.  C.  85;  Giippy  c.  Brown,  4  Dal!   410.  580;  Merrill   r.   Dawson,    Henipst.  503; 

1'  Guppy  r.  Brown,  4  Dall.  410;  Arm-  s.  c.  sub  nom.   Fowler  v.  Merrill,   11  llow. 

strong  !\  Brown,  1  Wasli.  43  ,  Bouilereau  375. 
V.  Montgomery,  4  Wash.  186.  '"  North  Carolina   R.    R.    v    Drew,   3 

11  Guppy  r.  Brown,  4  Dall.  410;  Arm-  Woods,  691. 
strong  I'.  Brown,  1    Wasii.  43;  Munns  v.         is  Ketland   v.   Bissett,  1    Wash.    144; 

Dupont,  3  Wash.  C.  C  31.  Nelson  v.  United   States,  Pet.    C.   C.  235; 

1-  The  Griffin,   4  Biatehf.  203-  Lons-  Winthrop  ?'.  Union  Ins,    Co.,  2  Wash.  7, 

dale  V.  Brown,  3  Wash.  40-1.  Bell  v.  Davidson,  3  V/ash.  C.  C.  328  ,  Bix;li- 

1^  Wintlirop  V.  Union  Insurance  Co  ,  2  ardson    v.    Golden,  3  Wash.  C.   C.    109 ; 

Wash.  7.  Dodge  v  Israel,  4  Wash.  323;  Gilpins  v. 

"  Willings  V  Conscqua,  Pet.  C.  C.  .301.  Consequa,  Pet.  C.  C.  85;  s.  c  3  Wash  184. 

Barnet  c.  Day,  3  Wasli.  243.  But  see  Gass  ik  Stmson,  3  Sumner,  08. 

1^  llhoades  (•.  Selin,4Wasli  715;  Bou-         i'^  Merrill  r.  Dawson,  Hempst. -503  ,  s.  c. 

dereau   v.    Montgomery,    4  Wasli.  186;  s»i  ?(07?<.  Fowler  r.  Merrill,  11  How.  375. 
Knodc  r    Williamson,  17  Wall.  586;   Bud- 
c'icum  '■   Kirk,  3  Crancii,  2'J3. 


522  EVIDENCE   AT   LAW   AND   IN   EQUITY.  [CHAP.  XIX. 

difference  how  soon  after  the  direct  interrogatories  have  been 
answered  the  witness  is  called  upon  to  answer  them.^*^  No  addi- 
tional interrogatories,  however,  can  be  filed  with  or  put  by  or  be- 
fore the  commissioner.^^  Under  extraordinary  circumstances  the 
examination  of  a  witness  not  named  in  the  commission  might 
be  permitted.^^  The  deposition  may  be  taken  down  in  writing 
either  by  the  magistrate  or  by  the  deponent  in  the  })rescncc  of 
the  magistrate;-^  but  not  by  the  counsel  for  either  of  tl»e  par- 
ties.-"^ If  exhibits  are  referred  to  by  the  witness,  they  should 
be  annexed  to  the  deposition  or  identified  by  marks  or  refer- 
ence.2^  A  paper  referred  to  by  a  witness,  but  which  is  neither 
in  his  own  power  nor  in  that  of  the  party  making  the  objection, 
need  not,  however,  be  included  in  the  deposition  or  thus  identi- 
fied.^*^  It  has  been  held  that  the  deposition  need  not  be  signed 
by  the  witncss.^'^  A  deposition  prepared  and  signed  some  time 
before  the  oath  is  administered  is  improper  and  will  l^e  sup- 
pressed.^^ The  depositions  should  be  attached  to  the  commission, 
and,  with  them,  a  certificate  by  all  the  commissioners  that  they 
have  complied  with  tlie  requirements  above  described.  The 
commission  should  then  be  sent  or  delivered  to  the  clerk's  office 
of  the  court  unopened,  and  must  there  remain  so  till  publication 
is  allowed  by  order  or  consent.^^  The  return,  or  certificate,  of 
the  commissioners  should  state  that  they  were  sworn,  unless  that 
ceremony  has  been  waived,  or  they  are  officers  qualified  to  ad- 
minister an  oath.2°  The  return  should  also  state  the  time  and 
place  of  taking  the  depositions  ;  ^'  tliat  each  witness  was  sworn 
or  affirmed,  but  not  that  he  was  cautioned  ;  nor  need  it  state 
the  form  of  the   oath.^^     The   return   need   not   state   in  whose 

"0  Gilpins  V.  Consequa,   Pet.   C.  C.  85;  27  Ketland  r.  Bissett,  1  Wasli.  144. 

s.  c  3  Wasli.  184.  28  i^oflge  v.  Israel,  4  Wash.  323  ;  North 

21  Cumiiiiitliam   v.   Otis,    1   Gall.  166;  Carolina    K.   R.  Co.  r.  Drew,  3   Woods, 

Merrill   v    Dawson,  Hempst.    563;  s,    c  601. 

.s7//)  noiii.  Fowler  i\  Merrill,  11  How.  375.  '-■'  Roudereau  i'.  Montgomer_y,  4  Wash. 

■--  The  Infanta,  Abbott's  Ad.  263.  18();    Frevall  v.  Bache,"5  Cranch  C.  C. 

2t  Stockwell  r.  United   States,  3  Cliff.  463;    United    States    v.    Price,   2    Wash. 

284  ;  Keene  v.  Meade,  3  Pet.   1 ;  s.  c.  sub  356. 

nom.  Meade  v.  Keane,  3  Craneh  C.  C.  51.  so  Prevail    v.    Baehe,   5    Cranch  C.  C. 

24  United  States  !'.  Pings,  4  Fed.  R.  714.  463;    Hoyt  v.  Hanimekin,  14   How.  346. 

But  see  NichoUs  v.  White,  1  Cranch  C.  C.  But  see  Gilpins  r.  Consequa,  Pet.  C.  C  85; 

50;  Atkinson  r.   Glenn,  4  Cranch  C.  C.  s,  c  3  Wash.  184. 

134.  ^1  Rhodes  v   Selin,  4  Wash.  715;   Bou- 

2'  DiMli^e  >:.  Israel,  4  Wash.  323.  dereaii  /•.  Montjroniery,  4  Wash.  186. 

2''  Winans   r.  New  York  &  Erie  R.  R.  ^'-  Jones  v.  Oregon  Central    H.  R.  Co., 

Co  ,  21  How.  88.  3  Sawyer,  523 ;  Keene  r.  Meade,  3  Pet.  1 ; 


§  290.]  LETTERS   EOGATOKY.  523 

handwriting  the  depositions  were  taken  down  ;33  ^or,  if  the  wit- 
ness was  an  alien,  whether  or  not  he  was  examined  by  means  of 
an  interpreter.^^  This  certificate  will  be  presumptive  evidence 
of  the  facts  therein  stated  in  relation  to  the  execution  of  the 
commission.^^  Otherwise,  proceedings  under  these  commissions 
should  conform  substantially  to  those  under  commissions  to  ex- 
amine witnesses  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court.'^'^  Any  ob- 
jecti(m  to  the  form  or  manner  of  the  proceedings  can  only  be 
raised  l)y  a  motion  to  suppress  the  deposition,-"^"  jirovided  that  suf- 
ficient time  within  which  to  make  such  a  motion  remains  between 
the  return  of  the  commission  and  the  hearing.'^*  Should  a  foreign 
plaintiff  refuse  to  testify  before  a  commission  when  required  so  to 
do,  the  court  may  deny  him  relief  in  the  suit.-^'-^ 

§  290.  Letters  Rogatory.  —  When  the  witnesses  whose  testi- 
mony is  desired  are  in  a  country  whose  laws  do  not  permit 
of  the  execution  of  a  commission  issued  from  a  foreign  court, 
their  testimony  can  only  be  taken  by  means  of  letters  roga- 
tory. "  This  method  of  obtaining  testimony  from  witnesses  in 
a  foreign  country  has  always  been  familiar  in  the  Courts  of  Ad- 
miralty ;  but  it  is  also  deemed  to  be  within  the  inherent  powers 
of  all  courts  of  justice.  For,  by  the  law  of  Nations,  courts  of 
Justice,  of  different  countries,  are  bound  mutually  to  aid  and 
assist  each  other,  for  the  furtherance  of  justice;  and  hence,  when 
the  testimony  of  a  foreign  witness  is  necessary,  the  Court  before 
which  the  action  is  pending,  ma}-  send  to  the  Court  within  whose 
jurisdiction  the  witness  resides,  a  writ,  either  patent  or  close, 
usually  called  a  letter  rogatory,  or  a  commission  sitb  mutuae  vicis- 
situdlnis  obtentu,  ac  in  juris  subsidiu)n,hom  those  words  contained 
in  it.     By  this  instrument  the  court  abroad  is  informed  of  the 

s.  c.  sub  noin.  Meaile  v.  Keane,  3  Cranch  3  Sawyer,  523;  Uniteil  States  v.  Parrott, 

C.  C.  51.  1  McAll.  447.     See  §  284. 

^  Keene  v.  >rea(le,  3  Pet.  1;   s.  c.  sub  '^'  Blaekburn  c.  Crawt'ords,  o  Wall.  175; 

nom.  Menile  v.  Keane,  3  Cranch  C.  C.  51 ;  .  Winans  v.  New  York  &  Erie  11.  R.  Co., 

Jones  r.  Oregon  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  3  Saw-  21   How.  88  ;    Doane  r.  Glenn,  21  Wall, 

yer,  523.       "  33;  York  Co.  v.  Central   R.  R.,  3  Wall. 

34  Gilpins  V.  Consequa,  Pet.  C.  C.  85;  107;   Walker  v.  Parker,  5  Cranch   C.  C. 
s.  c.  3  Wash.  184.  639. 

35  Mt-rrill    v.   Dawson,     Ilempst.    563;  3s  Sergeant   v.  Biddle,  4   Wi)eat.  508; 
s,,  c.  sub  »07«.  Fowler  I'.  Merrill,  n  How.  Mechanics'   Bank   v.   Seton,  1   Pet.  290; 
375  ;  Bondereau  v.  Montgomery,  4  Wash.  Buddicum  r.  Kirk,  3  Cranch,  293  ;  Alsop 
180 ;  Winter  v.  Simonton,  3  Cranch  C.  C.  i'.  Commercial  Ins.  Co.,  1  Sunmor,  451. 
104.  39  Heath  v.  Erie  R.  R.  Co.,  9  Blatciif 

3«  Jones  V.  Oregon  Central  R.  R.  Co.,     31G.     Cf.  infra,  §  290,  note  2. 


52-4  EVIDE.XCE    AT    LAW   AND    IN    EQUITY.  [CHAP.  XIX. 

pendency  of  the  cause,  and  the  names  of  the  foreign ,  witnesses, 
and  is  requested  to  cause  the  depositions  to  be  talven,  in  due 
course  of  law,  for  the  furtherance  of  justice ;  with  an  offer,  on 
the  part  of  the  tribunal  making  the  request,  to  do  tlie  like  for 
the  other  in  a  similar  case.  The  writ  or  commission  is  usually 
accompanied  by  interrogatories,  filed  by  the  parties,  on  each  side, 
to  whiidi  tlie  answers  of  the  witnesses  are  desired.  Tiie  commis- 
sion is  executed  by  the  judge  who  receives  it,  either  by  calling 
tiie  witness  before  himself,  or  by  the  intervention  of  a  commis- 
sioner for  that  purpose  ;  and  the  original  answers,  duly  signed 
and  sworn  to  by  the  deponent,  and  jjroperly  authenticated,"  or 
duly  authenticated  copies  of  the  same  '•  are  returned  with  the  com- 
mission to  the  Court  from  which  it  issued.  The  Court  of  Chan- 
cery has  always  freely  exercised  this  power,  by  a  commission, 
either  directed  to  foreign  magistrates,  by  their  official  designa- 
tion, or  more  usually,  to  individuals  by  name ;  which  latter 
course,  the  peculiar  nature  of  its  jurisdiction  and  proceedings 
enables  it  to  induce  the  parties  to  adopt  by  consent,  where  any 
doubt  exists  as  to  its  inherent  authority."  ^  A  special  application 
for  an  order  for  letters  rogatory  may  be  made  to  the  court,  and 
will  be  granted  in  the  first  instance  without  issuing  a  commission, 
upon  satisfactory  proof  that  the  authorities  abroad  will  not  allow 
the  testimony  to  be  taken  in  any  other  manner.-     "  When  any 

§  290.     1  Greenleafs  Evidence,  §  320.  the  German  government  has  labored  un- 

See  for  a  good  form.  Nelson   v.  Uniied  der   a   serious    misappreliension    in    tlie 

State.s,  1  Pet.  C.  C.  236,  note  a.     See  also  matter.     Tiie  minister  of  foreign  affairs 

Ciinningiiam  v.  Otis,  1   Gall.  166;   Hall's  objects  to  the  taking  of  the  desired  testi- 

Adin.  Pr.  Part  2,  tit.  19,  Vol.  I.  cum  adil ,  niony  by  the  consuls,  under  tlie  commis- 

aiid  tit.  27,  cum  add.,  pp.  37,  38,  55-GO  ;  sion  in  question,  on  the  ground  that  it  is 

Clarke's  Praxis,  tit.  27  ;  1  Roll.  Abr.  530,  an  exercise  of  functions  by  consular  offi- 

pl.    15;     Ougliton's     Urdo     Judiciorum,  cers  in  tlie  German  Empire  not  warranted 

Vol.   I.  pp.  150-152,   tit.   '.'5,  90  ;    Wliar-  by  Article  IX.  of  the  German-American 

ton's  International  Law  Digest,  Vol.  III.  cr)nvention  of  December  11,  1871.  Under 

§  413.  our  system  of  jurisprudence,  where  tlie 

-  1  Hoffman's  Ch.  Pr.  482  ;   Daniell's  testimony  of  persons  beyond  the  limits 

Ch.  Pr.  (3d  Am.  ed    by  Judge   Perkins),  of  the  United  States  is  desired  b}-  eitlier 

Vol.  IL  p.  053;  Gason  ;?.  Wordswortli,  2  party  to  an  action  pending  in  the  courts, 

Ves.    Sen.  33t) ;     Lincoln    c.    Battelle,    6  the  same  is  taken  on  commission.     For 

Wend.  (N.  Y.)  475.  tiiis  purpose  application  is  made  to  the 

Secretary  Fish  wrote  as  follows  con-  court  in  whicii  the  action  is  pending,  and 
cerning  tlie  refusal  of  the  German  gov-  when  granted  a  person  is  agreed  on  by 
ernment  to  allow  American  consuls  to  tiie  parties,  or  named  by  the  court,  to 
examine  witnesses  in  Germany  under  take  the  evidence,  and  an  order  is  en- 
commissions  from  the  courts  of  the  tered  in  the  court  to  that  effect.  Ques- 
United    States; —  tioiis  are  prepared  by  each  part}',  which 

"It  ajipears  to  this  department  tliat  are  propounded  to  the  witnesses  by  the 


290.] 


LETTEKS    ROGATORY. 


525 


commission  or  letter  rogatory,  issued  to  take  the  testimony  of 
any  witness  in  a  foreign  country,  in  any  suit  in  which  the  United 
States  are  parties  or  have  any  interest,  is  executed  by  the  court 


person  so  named,  or  an  oral  examination 
is  sometimes  jjrovided  for,  at  wliiuli  botii 
l)arties  are  represented  b3'  counsel.  Tiie 
answers  to  the  questions  are  taken,  and 
the  evidence  tiius  taken  is  certified  liy 
tiie  commission  named,  and  returned  to 
tiie  court  to  be  read  at  tlie  trial.  No 
claim  is  made  that  a  consul  of  the  United 
States,  as  sucli,  has,  by  treaty  or  by  con- 
vention, the  rigiit  to  take  such  testimony. 
It  is  no  part  of  his  official  duty,  nor  docs 
he  act  as  consul  in  so  doing.  He  acts  in 
tlie  matter  as  a  private  nidividual,  at  the 
request  of  the  parties  or  the  a[)poiiitmcnt 
of  tiie  court.  The  government  in  no 
case  takes  any  part  in  these  appoint- 
ments ;  they  are  made  by  the  courts  in 
tlie  independent  discharge  of  their  func- 
tions as  a  matter  of  practice,  and  with 
tlie  sole  view  of  the  administration  of 
justice  and  the  ascertainment  of  the  facts 
of  the  case  at  issue  between  the  parties 
litigant.  The  person  named  may  be  a 
subject  of  the  German  empire,  an  iVmeri- 
can  citizen,  or  may  belong  to  any  other 
nationality.  He  is  selected  in  each  par- 
ticular case  as  an  individual,  who,  from 
character,  residence,  or  other  qualifica- 
tion, will  fairlN^  propound  the  questions 
and  certify  the  answers.  His  services 
are  purely  ministerial,  and  entirely  vol- 
untary. He  has  no  power  to  compel  the 
attendance  of  witnesses  or  to  punish  them 
for  contempt.  No  authority  is  given  e.x- 
cept  to  put  questions  and  certify  an- 
swers, and  no  other  is  claimed  for  him. 
The  same  proceedings  are  taken  and  the 
same  rule  applies  in  every  (;ase,  whoever 
the  parties  to  the  action  may  be.  The 
fict  that  the  government  is  a  party  or 
Iris  an  interest  in  the  action  in  no  respect 
alters  the  rule.  It  is  a  proceeding  in  the 
interest  of  justice  to  arrive  at  the  truth 
1  etween  disputed  facts  in  an  action  pend- 
ing in  the  court.  The  testimony  in  any 
pr.rticular  case  may  be  necessary  to  save 
a  private  person,  whether  German  or 
American,  from  penalties  to  which  he 
would  otherwise  l)e  liable.  On  the  other 
hand,  it  may  be  required  in  tlie  interest 
of  good  government  here  or  elsewhere  to 


punish  attempted  frauds  upon  the  public 
revenue.  These  are  objects  of  common 
interest  to  all  commercial  powers,  which 
the  government  of  Germany  from  its 
well-known  character  will  be  the  first 
to  appreciate  and  to  vindicate.  Upon 
an  examination  of  the  particular  order 
in  question,  it  will  be  seen  that  it 
provides  for  the  taking  of  testimony 
for  the  benefit  of  either  party ;  and 
from  this  fact  and  from  the  letter  of  the 
district  attorney  it  will  be  found  to  be  an 
order  made  for  the  benefit  of  both  par- 
ties, and  obtained  by  consent  or  upon 
their  joint  application.  So  far  as  any 
objection  (nay  be  made  to  the  execution 
of  this  jiarticular  commission,  therefore, 
by  the  brancli  house  of  the  defendants  in 
Germany,  it  appears  that  tlie  order  was 
made  on  the  solicitation  or  consent  of  the 
house  in  New  York.  Any  obstacle  tlirown 
in  the  way  of  the  taking  of  this  testimony 
by  the  German  government  amounts  to 
a  refusal  to  permit  two  parties  to  ascer- 
tain the  truth  to  be  used  for  tiieir  mutual 
benefit  in  a  legal  proceeding.  It  is  confi- 
dently believed  tliat  an  explanation  of  the 
matter  will  be  entirely  satisfactory  to  the 
German  government.  The  United  States 
has  no  desire  to  obtain  for  its  consuls  in 
Germany  any  authority  or  functions  ex- 
cept such  as  rightly  belong  to  tliem  ;  and 
at  the  same  time  this  government  will  be 
extremely  reluctant  to  admit  tiiat  a  per- 
son becoming  a  consul  of  the  United 
States  is  thereby  excludeil  from  privileges 
which  are  allowed  to  unofficial  persons,  or 
becomes  disqualified  for  the  discharge  of 
duties  to  his  fellow-citizens  whii'h  may  be 
performed  by  any  other  reputable  person, 
of  whatever  nationality,  but  which  are 
likely  to  be  asked  of  him  by  reason  of  his 
official  position,  making  him  more  likely 
than  others  to  be  known  to  those  needing 
siuh  services.  You  will  fully  explain  this 
matter  to  the  minister  of  foreign  afl^airs, 
and  it  is  confidently  hoped  and  expected 
that  on  this  full  explanation  all  olijection 
to  the  action  of  the  consuls  in  question 
will  be  withdrawn,  and  that  the  German 
government    will   view    it   as    an    act  of 


526 


EVIDENCE    AT    LAW    AND    IN    EQUITY. 


[CIIAT. 


or  the  commissioner  to  whom  it  is  directed,  it  shall  be  returned 
by  such  court  or  commissioner  to  the  minister  or  consul  of  the 
United   States  nearest  the  place  where  it  is  executed.     On  re- 


comity,  and  in  aid  of  the  proper  ailiniiiis- 
tratiuii  of  government  and  justice,  to 
facilitate  tiie  ascertainment  of  tlie  facts 
in  the  case  now  at  issue  between  this 
government  and  the  Messrs.  Woltf.  A 
continued  objection  or  obstruction  to  sucli 
ascertainment  wouhl  be  the  cause  of  very 
serious  reyret  to  tliis  government. 

•'  You  may,  in  your  discretion,  read 
and  give  a  copy  of  tliis  despatcli,  to  this 
point,  to  the  minister  of  foreign  affairs, 
for  the  purpose  of  explanation. 

"  Under  tiie  circumstances  set  out  in 
your  No.  9,  your  action  in  intimating  to 
tlie  several  consuls  the  difficulties  whicii 
might  arise  from  action  on  their  part  un- 
til the  matter  should  be  adjusted,  was  a 
wise  precaution,  and  is  approved. 

•'  Should  the  German  government 
witlidraw  the  olijections  now  raised,  you 
will  so  inform  the  several  consuls,  and  in- 
form this  Department  by  telegrapli.  You 
will  also  instruct  the  consuls,  in  executing 
any  such  commission,  to  assume  no  au- 
thority as  consuls,  and  to  be  careful  in 
their  actiou  to  give  as  little  offence  to  tiie 
German  government  and  to  its  subjects 
as  possible."  (Mr.  Fisli,  Sec.  of  State,  to 
Jlr.  N.  Fisli,  Aug.  18,  1874,  MSS.  Inst. 
Germ.,  For.  Hel.,  1874.) 

"Your  No.  3o,  under  date  of  the  20th 
of  October  last,  narrating  your  interview 
with  Mr.  voii  Bulow  at  the  foreign  office 
in  relation  to  the  objection  interposed  by 
tlie  German  government  to  allowing  con- 
suls of  the  United  States  to  serve  as  com- 
missioners to  take  testimony  to  be  used 
in  judicial  proceedings  pending  in  this 
country,  has  been  received.  Your  repre- 
sentations to  the  minister  are  approved. 
Although  Mr.  von  Bulow  st.ited  to  you 
that  instructions  on  the  subject  had  been 
sent  to  Mr  von  Schlozera  fortnight  prior 
to  your  interview  and  conversation,  notli- 
ing  has  been  heard  from  that  gentleman  in 
this  connection.  The  objection  interposed 
by  the  (jerman  government  to  tiie  obtain- 
ing of  testimony  in  German}^  to  be  used 
in  the  courts  of  this  country  is  much  to 
be  regretted,  and,  as  appears  from  the  ad- 
mission made  to  you  by  Mr.  von  Bulow, 


the  Germans  wliose  interests  led  tliem  to 
resist  the  taking  of  tlie  testimony,  and 
wlio  invoked  the  interposition  of  their 
government  to  prevent  it,  are  now  known 
to  liave  been  in  tlie  wrong.  It  would 
have  been  quite  as  satisfactory  to  this 
government  had  the  reply  of  the  German 
government  on  a  subject  presented  to 
their  consideration,  through  tiie  repre- 
sentative of  tins  government  at  Berlin, 
been  communicated  also  through  him, 
and,  as  is  shown,  some  delay  wliicli  has 
occurred  might  iiave  been  avoided.  As 
Mr.  von  Sclilozer  has  not  communicated 
tiie  answer  of  his  government,  it  will  not 
be  amiss  tiiat  you  inform  Mr.  von  Bulow 
that  we  are  still  without  any  reply.  You 
will  call  his  attention  to  the  fact  that  the 
suit  in  wliicii  the  testimony  is  sougiit  is 
one  in  wliich  the  government  of  the 
United    States   is  itself  a  party. 

"  I  inclose  herewitii  copies  of  existing 
statutes  (winch  are  embodied  in  Sections 
4071,  4072,  4073,  and  4074  of  the  Kevised 
Statutes  of  the  United  States)  enacted 
by  this  government  to  insure  to  other 
powers  tiie  opportunity  of  obtaining  tes- 
timony in  this  country  in  any  suit  for 
the  recovery  of  money  or  property  de- 
pending in  any  court  in  any  foreign  coun- 
try with  wiiicii  tlie  United  States  are  at 
peace,  and  in  whicli  tiie  government  of 
sucii  foreign  country  shall  be  a  party  or 
sliall  have  an  interest.  In  tiiese  enact- 
ments, which  have  long  been  in  force  in 
this  country,  this  government  has  mani- 
fested its  friendsiiip  to  other  powers,  as 
well  as  its  desire  to  aid  in  the  administra- 
tion of  justice  in  all  foreign  countries 
witli  which  it  may  be  at  peace.  It  is 
hoped  that  the  answer  of  the  German 
government  may  soon  be  communicated, 
and  tiiat  it  will  be  such  as  sliall  evince  a 
williimness  to  reciprocate  the  very  liberal 
and  efficient  provisions  made  in  this  coun- 
try to  enable  Germany  in  case  of  need  to 
obtain  the  evidence  of  witnesses  m  this 
country  in  any  suit  in  whicli  that  govern- 
ment may  be  mterested,  and  that  the 
facilities  whicli  Mr.  von  Bulow  snys  that 
Germany  will  afford  in  this  direction  may 


§  290.] 


LETTERS    ROGATORY. 


527 


cciving  the  same,  the  said  minister  or  consul  shall  indorse  there- 
on a  certificate,  stating  when  and  where  the  same  was  received, 
and  that  the  said  deposition  is  in  the  same  condition  as  when  he 


prove  ample  and  efficacious."  (Mr.  Fisli, 
Sec.  of  State,  to  Mr.  Davis,  Nov  11, 1874. 
MSS.  Inst.  Germ.,  For.  Hel  ,  1874.  See 
fiirtiier,  Mr.  Fish  to  Mr.  Davis,  April  7, 
1875) 

"On  tlic  IGtli  of  November  last  I  had 
the  honor  to  receive  your  note  of  the  13th 
of  tliat  montli,  communicating  an  instruc- 
tion which  the  imperial  f(n-eign  office  had 
directed  to  you,  in  reference  to  tiie  objec- 
tions which  had  been  interposed  by  the 
German  government  to  the  obtaining  of 
tiie  testimony  of  certain  parties  resident 
in  Germany,  to  be  used  in  a  suit  pending 
in  this  country  in  beiialf  of  the  govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  against  tiie 
German  house  of  S.  N.  Wolff  &  Co.  Al- 
though the  instruction  amounts  to  a 
courteous  but  practical  denial  to  the  cus- 
tomary practice  under  the  legal  system  of 
the  United  States  of  the  facilities  whereby 
their  courts  are  accustomed  to  seek  the 
evidence  on  which  they  are  to  determine 
the  contested  rights  submitted  to  them  in 
the  administration  of  justice,  still  I  am 
bound  to  recognize  tiie  rigiit  of  a  sov- 
ereign State  to  deny  such  facilities,  within 
its  limits,  to  the  courts  of  another  State. 
At  the  same  time  it  is  hoped  that,  on  a 
review  of  the  question,  it  will  be  perceived 
that  no  invasion  of  tlie  sovereign  rights 
of  a  government,  no  harm  to  its  dignity, 
and  no  inconvenience  to  its  citizens  or  to 
its  officers  or  its  tribunals  can  result  from 
an  e.xtension  of  comity  that  will  allow  to 
the  judicial  system  prevailing  in  this 
(!ountry  and  in  KnQ;land  the  exercise  of 
that  mode  of  seekinsr  the  facts  involved 
in  a  litigation  pending  in  their  courts 
which  the  experience  of  a  long  series  of 
years  has  shown  to  be  the  more  conveni- 
ent, the  less  expensive,  and  wholly  free 
from  interference  with  the  supreme  rights 
of  a  State.  Tlie  instruction,  substantially 
but  not  perfectly,  presents  the  system 
prevailing  in  this  country,  derived  mniiily 
from  t'e  'common-law'  system  of  Eng- 
land, for  the  attainment  of  the  facts  and 
the  trutli  of  any  case  to  be  judicially  de- 
cided Tiie  government  with  us  lends  its 
aid,  so  far  as  it  can  do  it  practically,  to 


the  eliciting  of  the  facts  of  every  case 
with  respect  to  whicii  its  courts  are  called 
upon  to  determine  and  administer  justice  ; 
and  believing  that  a  full  knowledge  of  the 
truth,  as  contested  between  litigants,  is 
essential  to  the  administration  of  justice, 
it  grants  as  an  act  of  courtesy,  as  well  as 
of  justice,  the  power  to  compel  the  at- 
tendance of  witnesses,  and  requires  them 
to  testify  under  oath  in  any  suit  lor  the 
recovery  of  money  or  property  depending 
in  any  court  in  any  foreign  country  with 
whicli  the  United  States  are  at  peace, 
and  in  which  the  government  of  such 
foreign  country  shall  be  a  party  or  shall 
have  an  interest.  It  allows  the  testimony 
to  be  taken  either  under  a  commission  or 
letters  rogatory,  as  the  judicial  procedure 
of  such  foreign  country,  or  its  policy,  may 
dictate  and  prescribe,  in  its  own  forms  of 
tlie  administration  or  pursuit  of  justice, 
and  in  either  case  it  affords  to  such 
friendly  government  the  means  wluieliy 
to  obtain  the  evidence  which  is  sought 
from  witnesses  within  its  limits.  Its  own 
citizens  equally  with  resident  aliens  are 
made  amenable  to  its  process,  in  aid  of 
sucii  friendly  power  seeking  to  recover 
what  it  may  consider  to  be  due  to  it,  in 
money  or  property,  by  the  evidence  which 
those  citizens  or  aliens  may  be  supposed 
able  to  furnish.  I  subjoin  hereto  an  ab- 
stract from  tlie  statutes  of  the  United 
States  on  this  point.  These  facilities 
have  been  voluntary  extended  by  the 
United  States  to  the  governments  with 
whicli  it  is  in  amity,  in  full  knowledge 
and  because  of  the  fact  so  correctly  and 
forcibly  presented  in  the  despatch  of  Mr. 
von  Rulow,  that  they  cannot  be  enjoyed 
except  under  such  limitations  and  restric- 
tions as  may  be  provided  by  treaty  stipu- 
lations, or  (as  in  the  case  with  the  United 
States)  are  prescribed  by  the  legal  system 
in  force  in  each  country.  They  are  a 
voluntary  contribution  on  the  part  of  the 
United  States  to  the  comity  of  nations 
and  to  the  administration  of  lustui,  ami 
toward  the  attainment  of  the  rights  of 
every  other  power  with  which  they  n'-e  at 
peace.  The  faciUt'es  thus  given  to  fiie"d- 


528 


EVIDENCE   AT   LAW    AND   IN   EQUITY. 


[CIIAP.  XIX 


received  it ;  and  he  shall  thereupon  transmit  the  said  letter  or 
commission  so  executed  and  certified  by  mail,  to  the  clerk  of  the 
court  from  which  the  same  issued,  in  the  manner  in  which  liis 


ly  powers,  in  suits  in  wliicli  such  powers 
are  parties  or  are  interested,  are,  by  the 
jiiJicial  praciice  of  tliese  several  States, 
generally  or  largely  accorded  also  in 
suits  in  wliicli  individuals,  citizens,  or 
subjects  of  such  States  are  parties,  and 
have  been  and  are  constantly  availed  of 
by  Germans  as  well  as  inchviduals  of 
other  nationalities.  With  regard  to  the 
proceedings  in  the  case  in  which  the 
United  States  were  endeavoring  to  ob- 
tain testinionj'  in  a  suit  wherein  it  was 
seeking  to  recover  a  large  amount  sup- 
pjsed  to  have  been  fraudulently  withheld 
l)y  a  German  house,  the  commission  was 
addressed  to  consuls,  not  in  their  official 
capacity  as  consuls,  but  because  of  their 
being  known,  and  of  the  assurance  of  a 
probability  of  their  presence  at  or  near 
the  points  where  the  witnesses  were  re- 
siding. They  had  no  authority  to  attempt 
the  compulsory  atten(lan(;e  of  any  witness. 
The  commission  was  issued  with  the  ex- 
pressed assent  of  the  counsel  representing 
tlie  defendants  in  the  suit  ;  there  was  no 
attempt  to  extend  what  are  termed  '  tlie 
excejjtiona!  privileges  granted  to  consuls 
of  the  United  States  by  the  consular 
treaty  between  Germany  and  America,' 
nor  '  to  limit  the  operation  of  the  laws  ' 
of  tlie  country  in  whicli  the  commission 
was  to  be  executed  ;  and  the  assent  of  the 
attorneys  of  tlie  defendants  to  tlie  issuing 
of  the  commission,  and  the  provision  for 
taking  testimony  on  behalf  of  the  defend- 
ants, and  for  the  presence  of  the  counsel 
of  the  parties  if  desired,  anticipated  the 
objection  stated  by  Mr.  von  Bulow,  that 
German  law  allows  the  parties  to  be  re}> 
resented  at  the  examination.  I  observe 
that  Mr.  von  Bulow  remarks  that  they 
'  objected  not  so  much  to  the  taking  of 
sworn  testimony  by  American  consuls  in 
their  official  capacity,  as  on  general  prin- 
ciples to  the  actual  enuinnatlon  of  iritncss 
by  American  commissioners  within  the 
limits  of  the  German  empire.'  I  have 
stated  tiiat  there  was  no  desire  or  attempt 
to  take  testimony  'by  American  consuls 
in  their  official  capacity.'  Mr.  von  Bulow 
states    lliat,   in    the    prcscni    case,  'now 


pen<ling  in  the  southern  district  court  at 
New  York,  the  German  courts,  in  whose 
districts  the  persons  to  be  examined  as 
witnesses  reside,  will  immediately  comply 
with  any  request  that  may  be  addressed 
to  them  by  the  aforesaid  American 
court,  and  American  commissiotiers,  or 
any  other  duly  authorized  representative 
of  the  parties,  will  be  at  liberty  to  be 
present  at  all  times  fixed  by  the  compe- 
tent German  courts,  and  to  put  to  the 
witnesses,  through  the  presiding  judges, 
any  questions  to  which  an  answer  under 
oath  may  be  important  or  desirable  for 
the  decision  of  the  court  of  New  York.' 
"  This  is  confined  to  one  pending  suit  ; 
wliereas  the  previously  cited  objection 
was  '  on  general  principles  to  the  actual 
examination  of  witnesses  by  American 
commissioners,'  and  makes  it  desirable  to 
know  wlietlier  the  objection  '  on  general 
principles '  will  be  enforced  in  case  the 
administration  of  justice  in  the  courts  of 
the  United  States  shall  in  some  other 
case  find  itself  in  need  of  the  evidence  of 
witnesses  residing  in  Germany.  The  in- 
telligent minister  of  Germany  to  the 
United  States  is  aware  of  the  multitu- 
dinous cases  arising  from  the  intimate 
commercial  and  social  relations  happily 
existing  between  the  two  countries,  and 
of  t!ie  consequent  freqtiency  of  cases  in 
which  the  testimony  of  parties  residing  in 
eitlier  country  is  essential  to  the  deter- 
mination of  rights  in  the  other,  and  will 
therefore  appreciate  the  importance  of  an 
understanding  of  the  limitations  which 
either  State  may  impose  upon  the  other 
in  the  attainment  of  legal  evidence.  He 
is  aware,  also,  of  the  promptness  and  of 
the  facility  witli  which  legal  evidence  is 
furnished  b}-  the  Ignited  States,  in  re- 
sponse to  the  frequent  requests  made 
tlierefor  by  all  foreign  powers,  to  deter- 
mine the  fact,  tlie  date,  or  the  circum- 
stances of  the  death  of  parties  in  the 
United  States,  to  determiiu-  successions 
or  other  questions  of  interest  to  the  citi- 
zens or  subjects  of  such  powers,  or  to 
the  powers  themselves.  The  agents  and 
officers  ol  the  governnuMit  are  freely  and 


§  290.] 


LETTERS  ROGATORY. 


529 


official  despatches  are  transmitted  to  the  government.  And  the 
testimony  of  witnesses  so  taken  and  returned  shall  be  read  as 
evidence  on  the  trial  of  the  suit  in  which  it  was  taken,  without 


clieerfuUy  employerl  to  obtain  the  evi- 
dence desired,  which  is  furuislied  as  an 
act  of  international  comity;  and  in  no  in- 
stance lias  the  application  been  (tbstructed 
on  the  ground  that  it  must  be  made 
ttirougli  tiie  courts  of  this  country, or  has 
any  internal  legal  system  been  interposed 
as  an  objection  to  the  request  niide.  If 
tlie  German  government  decide  that  in  no 
other  form  than  that  of  'requisitions,' 
analogous  to  the  cumbrous  forms  known 
to  the  ctnnmon  law  of  England  as  '  letters 
r(»gat(»ry  '  (which  are  recognized  by  the 
laws  of  tiie  United  St^ites  be(.'ause  of  their 
being  known  totlie  laws  and  the  practice 
of  some  other  countries),  will  it  allow  the 
evidence  of  witnesses  residing  in  the  Ger- 
man empire  to  be  taken  for  use  in  suits 
pending  ui  the  United  States,  the  latter 
do  not  contest  the  right  to  impose  such 
limitation.  It  siems^  however,  lo  the 
United  States  tiiat  such  limitation  is  in 
restraint  of  the  administration  of  justice, 
by  a  constrained  subjectictn  of  the  pro- 
ceedings in  the  courts  of  one  country  to 
the  judicial  system  of  another  perhaps  at 
entire  variance  in  its  forms  of  procedure, 
and  especially  in  its  niode  of  examining 
witnesses;  and  tliat  the  principle  s(»  aptly 
stated  by  Mr.  von  Bulow,that '  the  courts 
of  all  the  countries  are  bound  to  assist 
each  other  in  the  execution  of  law  and 
the  attainment  of  justice,'  is  but  partially 
enforced  wiien  tlie  legal  system  of  one 
co'intri/  limits  and  confines  the  search  for 
only  the  truth  in  tlie  administration  of 
justice  under  the  judicial  system  of  an- 
other, to  the  technical  formalities  of  its 
own.  The  experience  of  the  United 
States  since  its  existence  as  an  indepen- 
dent power,  of  the  practical  working  of 
the  system  which  prevails  in  this  coun- 
try, and  also  in  England,  of  affording 
every  facility  for  the  obtaining  of  the  evi- 
dence of  witnesses  when  witiiout  the  ac- 
tual jurisdiction  of  the  court  in  which  is 
pending  the  suit  wherein  their  testimony 
18  important,  by  means  of  commissions 
rather  than  by  letters  rogatory,  attests 
the  greater  convenience  of  the  former, 
and  the  entire  absence  of  any  resulting 
VOL.  I.  —  34 


danger  to  the  parties  litigant,  to  the  wit- 
nesses, or  to  tiie  State.  The  evidence 
thus  obtained  is  taken  in  the  form  suited 
to  the  judicial  system  of  the  court  which 
is  to  pass  u{K>n  it,  while  much  expense 
and  delay  is  generally  avoided.  It  is 
hoped  that  the  German  government  may 
see  fit  to  relax  (what  is  recognized  as 
within  the  abstract  right  of  every  gov- 
ernment) the  rigid  rule  of  confining  the 
courts  of  the  United  States,  in  search  of 
testimony  needed  from  witnesses  in  Ger- 
many, to  its  own  tribunals  as  the  only 
channel  through  vvJiich  it  is  to  lie  ob- 
tained. Should  it,  however,  be  desired 
to  adhere  to  the  course  indicated  by  Mr. 
von  IJulow,  the  courts  in  the  United 
States  should  be  apprised  of  the  rigidness 
of  the  rule,  which  will  (as  in  the  case 
which  has  given  rise  to  tiiis  correspon- 
dence) be  apt  to  arrest  the  course  of  jus- 
tice, owing  to  the  unadvised  adoption  of 
tiie  svstem  of  consniissions  which  obtain 
so  generally,  and  which  lias  hitherto  been 
supposed  to  bo  free  from  the  objections 
of  any  government."  (.Mr.  Fish,  Sec.  of 
State,  to  Mr.  Sclilozer,  Dec.  0,  1874,  MSS. 
Notes,  Germany,  For.  Ilel.,  1875.) 

"  While  under  our  practice,  both  in  the 
Federal  and  State  courts,  it  is  certainly 
true  tiiat  a  commission  is  the  usual,  per- 
haps the  imiversal,  means  in  general  use 
of  obtaining  the  testimony  of  a  witness 
in  a  tbreign  country,  it  is  probably  too 
broad  a  statement  to  say  tliat  none  of  our 
courts  can  make  use  of  letters  rogatory. 
Such  question  ma^'  in  many  cases  be 
regulated  by  statute  in  tlie  States,  but 
it  is  true  that  letters  rogatory  are  both 
executed  by  and  issued  from  the  Federal 
courts  from  time  to  time,  and  probably 
also  from  the  State  courts.  Letters  roga- 
tory have,  I  think,  been  actn.ally  issued 
from  the  district  courts  in  New  York  m 
the  case  of  Wolff,  which  gave  rise  to  this 
question,  and  since  the  question  arose. 
Sections  875,  4071,  4072,  407o,  4074,  of 
the  Revised  Statutes,  contnin  provisions 
on  the  question."  (.Mr.  Fish,  Sec.  of 
State,  to  Mr.  Davis,  June  8,  1875,  MSS. 
Inst.,  Gtrui.) 


530  EVIDENCE    AT    LAW    AND    IN    EQUITY.  [CHAP.  XIX. 

objection  as  to  the  method  of  returning  the  same."  ^  Tlie  stat- 
utes further  provide  for  the  taking  of  testimony  under  a  com- 
mission or  in  pursuance  of  letters  rogatory  issued  from  a  court  in 
a  foreign  country,  with  which  the  United  States  are  at  peace,  to 
take  the  testimony  of  a  witness  residing  within  tlie  United  States, 
in  any  suit  for  the  recovery  of  money  or  property  depending  in 
such  foreign  court  in  which  the  government  of  sucli  foreign  coun- 
try is  a  party  or  has  an  interest,  as  follows :  — 

"The  testimony  of  any  witness  residing  within  the  United 
States,  to  he  used  in  any  suit  for  the  recovery  of  money  or  prop- 
erty depending  in  any  court  in  any  foreign  country  with  which 
the  United  States  are  at  peace,  and  in  which  the  government  of 
such  foreign  country  shall  be  a  party  or  shall  have  an  interest, 
may  be  obtained,  to  be  used  in  such  suit.  If  a  commission  or 
letters  rogatory  to  take  such  testimony,  together  with  specific 
written  interrogatories,  accomi)anying  the  same  and  addressed  to 
such  witness,  shall  have  been  issued  from  the  court  in  which 
such  suit  is  pending,  on  producing  the  same  before  the  district 
judge  of  any  district  where  the  witness  it'sides  or  shall  be  found, 
and  on  due  i)roof  Ijcing  made  to  such  judge  that  the  testimony  of 
any  witness  is  material  to  the  party  desiring  the  same,  such 
judge  shall  issue  a  summons  to  such  Avitness  requiring  him  to 
appear  before  the  officer  or  commissioner  named  in  such  commis- 
sion or  letters  rogatory,  to  testify  in  such  suit.  And  no  witness 
shall  be  compelled  to  appear  or  to  testify  under  this  section  ex- 
ce]>t  for  the  purpose  of  answering  such  interrogatories  so  issued 
and  accompanying  such  commission  or  letters  :  Provided .,  That 
when  counsel  for  all  the  parties  attend  the  examination,  they 
may  consent  that  questions  in  addition  to  those  accompanying 
the  commission  or  letters  rogatory  may  be  \mt  to  the  witness, 
unless  the  commission  or  letter  rogatory  exclude  such  additional 
interrogatories.  The  summons  shall  specify  the  time  and  place 
at  which  the  witness  is  required  to  attend,  whicli  place  shall  be 

As  to  letters  ro^atorj'  from  a  Unifpfl  Morton,     Dec.     19,     1884     (MSS.    Inst, 

States  Court  to  a  Rrazilian  court,  see  Mr.  France). 

Cadwalader,  Assistant  Secretary  of  State,  As  to  letters  ropatorj' from  abroad  to 

to    Mr.   Partridire,    Aug.   3,    1875  (MSS.  take  the  testimony  of  persons  in  prison  in 

Inst.,  Brazil)     See  furtlier,  Mr.  Freling-  the  United  States,  see  Mr.  Frelinghuysen, 

huysen,    Secretary  of  State,  to  Mr.  von  Secretary  of  State,  to  I^Ir.  Sargent,  June 

Schaeffer,   March"  20,  1883  (MSS.  Notes,  27,  1883  (MSS.  Inst.,  Germ.). 

Austria)  ,     Mr.    Frelinghuysen    to    Mr.  »  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  875. 


§  290.]  LETTERS    ROGATORY.  531 

within  one  hundred  miles  of  the  place  where  the  witness  resides 
or  shall  be  served  with  such  summons."  ^  It  has  been  held  that 
criminal  proceedings,^  and  "  proceedings  relating  to  the  investi- 
gation as  to  the  smuggling  of  some  cases  of  cotton,"*^  do  not 
come  within  this  statute. 

"  No  witness  shall  be  required,  on  such  examination  or  any 
other  under  letters  rogatory,  to  make  any  disclosure  or  discovery 
which  shall  tend  to  criminate  him  either  under  the  laws  of  the 
State  or  Territory  within  which  such  examination  is  had,  or  any 
other,  or  any  foreign  state."  '' 

"  If  any  person  shall  refuse  or  neglect  to  appear  at  the  time 
and  place  mentioned  in  the  summons  issued  in  accordance  with 
section  forty  hundred  and  seventy-one,  or,  if  upon  his  appearance 
he  shall  refuse  to  testify,  he  shall  be  liable  to  the  same  penalties 
as  would  be  incurred  for  a  like  offence  on  the  trial  of  a  suit  in 
the  district  court  of  the  United  States."^ 

"  Every  witness  who  shall  so  appear  and  testify  shall  be  allowed, 
and  shall  receive  from  the  party  at  whose  instance  he  shall  have 
been  summoned,  the  same  fees  and  mileage  as  are  allowed  to 
witnesses  in  suits  depending  in  the  district  courts  of  the  United 
States."  9 

"  When  letters  rogatory  are  addressed  from  any  court  of  a 
foreign  countr\^  to  any  circuit  court  of  the  United  States,  a  com- 
missioner of  such  circuit  court  designated  by  said  court  to  make 
the  examination  of  the  witnesses  mentioned  in  said  letters,  shall 
have  power  to  compel  the  witnesses  to  appear  and  depose  in  the 
same  manner  as  witnesses  may  be  compelled  to  appear  and 
testify  in  courts."  ^^ 

*  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  4071.  ''  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  4072. 

5  Matter  of  the  Spanish  Consul,  1  Ben-  ^  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  4073. 
erlict,  225.  9  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  4074. 

6  In  re  Letters  Rogatory,  36  Fed.  R.  w  u.  S.  R.  S.  §  875,  as  amended  by  19 
306.  St.  at  L.  241  (U.  S.  R.  S.  1  Supp.  2GG). 


532      DISMISSING  BILLS  OTHEKWISE  THAN  AT  A  HEARING.       [CHAP.  XX. 


CHAPTER  XX. 

DISMISSING   BILLS    OTHERWISE   THAN    AT    A    HEARING. 

§291.  Dismissal  of  Bills  by  the  Plaintiff. — The  plaintiff  may 
dismiss  his  bill  without  costs  at  any  time  before  the  defendant's 
appearance.^  He  may  obtain  the  order  for  the  dismissal  as  of 
course  upon  motion  or  petition,  usually  by  the  latter ;  ^  but  if  the 
dismissal  is  a  violation  of  an  agreement  between  him  and  the 
defendant,  the  order  granting  it  may  be  subsequently  vacated.^ 
After  appearance  and  before  a  decree  or  decretal  order,  a  plaintiff 
can  usually  obtain  a  dismissal  upon  ])ayment  of  the  costs  of  such 
of  the  defendants  as  have  ap))eared;^  but  not,  if  they  or  any  of 
them  would  be  injured  thereby.^  Leave  to  dismiss  may  be  re- 
fused where  tlie  defendant  claims  affirmative  relief  Ijy  cross-bill, 
or  by  answer  in  a  case  where  he  is  entitled  to  affirmative  relief 
on  an  answer.''  For  example,  where  the  l)ill  was  filed  to  enforce 
a  false  claim  to  property  or  an  instrument,  which  the  evidence 
showed  had  been  obtained  by  fraud,  in  which  case  the  defendant 
Avithout  filing  a  cross-bill  would  be  entitled  if  successful  to  a 
decree  declaring  the  plaintiff's  claim  unfounded,  and  enjoining 
him  from  again  setting  it  up;"  or  where  the  Ijill  was  filed  to  set 
aside  a  patent  on  the  ground  of  interference,  when  the  defendant 
may  oljtain  affirmative  relief  l)y  answer.^  Leave  may  be  granted 
upon  terms,  as  for  example,  that  the  complainant  stipulate  to 
allow  defendant's  evidence  to  be  used  in  any  subsequent  suit.^ 
An  executor  or  other  person,  who  has  filed  a  bill  in  a  representative 

§  291.     1  Tliompson  v.  Thompson,  7  ^  Electrical  Accumulator  Co.  r.  Briisl: 

Beav.  ouO.  Electric  Co.,  44  Fed.  K.  G02 ;  C.  &  A.  K. 

2  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (oth  Am.  cd.)  7'.)0,  R.  Co.  r.  Rolling  IMill  Co.,  109  U.  S.  702; 
791.  Stevens  r.  The  Railroads,  4  Fed.  R.97; 

3  Betts  r.  Barton,  .J  flur.  (x.  9.)  154.         Hat   Sweat   Manuf.   Co.   v.   Waring,   46 
*  C.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Union  Rolling     Fed.  R.  87. 

.Mill  Co.,  109  U.  S.  702 ;  Conn.  &  P.  R.  R.  "  Stevens  r.  The  Railroads,  4  Fed.  R. 

Co.  r.  Ilendee,  27  Fed.  R.  678.  97  ;   Hat   Sweat  Manuf.    Co.   v.  Waring, 

"^  Cooper  V.  Lewis,  2  Phil.  178  ;  Ainslie  40  Fed.  R.  87  ;  siijmi,  §  171. 

i\  Sims,  17  Beav.  174;  Booth   v.  Leyces-  ^  Electrical  Accumulator  Co.  r.  Brush 

ter,  1  Keen,  247  ;  Bank  of  South  Carolina  Electric  Co.,  44  Fed.  R.  002  ,  sujim,  §  171. 

r.  Rose.  1  Rich.  Eq    (S.  C.)  292;  Stevens  ^  American  Zylonite  Co.  r.  Celluloid 

V.  The  Railroads,  4  Fed.  R.  97.  Manuf.  Co.,  32  Fed.  H.  809. 


§  291.]  DISMISSAL   OF   BILLS    BY    THE    PLAI^'TIFF.  533 

capacity  in  good  faith  with  reasonable  grounds  for  so  doing,  may 
be  excused  payment  of  costs. ^"^  Tlie  motion  for  such  an  order 
should  be  upon  notice.^^  These  rules  apply  when  a  plaintiff  sues 
in  behalf  of  himself  and  others,  provided  that  no  one  has  previously 
joined  with  liim  as  co-plaintiff,^^  unless,  perhaps,  others  have  con- 
tributed to  the  expenses  of  the  suit  and  wish  it  continued.^^ 
After  other  members  of  the  class  have  joined  as  co-plaintiffs  in 
the  suit,  the  plaintiff  cannot  dismiss  the  bill  without  their 
consent.^*  The  majority  of  the  stockholders  in  a  corporation 
cannot  always  have  a  suit  discontinued  against  the  wishes  of 
its  directors. ^^  After  a  decree  or  decretal  order,  the  plaintiff  may 
not  discontinue  without  the  consent  of  all  parties  who  have 
acquired  rights  by  the  decree. ^"^  The  usual  course  pursued  by 
one,  in  whose  name  without  his  consent  a  bill  has  been  filed,  is 
to  move  to  have  it  taken  off  the  file.^''  Upon  this  being  done,  he 
may  recover  from  the  solicitor  who  filed  the  bill,i^  his  costs,  as 
well  as  any  costs  he  may  have  been  compelled  to  pay  a  defendant. 
A  plaintiff  cannot,  it  seems,  dismiss  a  part  only  of  his  bill.  The 
proper  course  is  for  him  to  amend  by  omitting  it.^^  When  there 
is  more  than  one  plaintiff,  one  of  them  may  by  special  leave  of 
the  court  have  the  bill  dismissed  with  costs  so  far  as  concerns 
himself,  provided  that  no  injury  will  thereby  result  to  any  other 
party.-*'  If  there  are  several  defendants,  a  plaintiff  may  obtain  an 
order  dismissing  his  bill  as  to  some  of  them,  provided  that  no 
injury  will  be  thereby  done  the  rest.'-^^  A  dismissal  at  the  plain- 
tiff's request  before  a  hearing  is  usually  without  prejudice,^ 
unless  evidence  has  been  taken  and  the  cause  set  down  for  a 
hearing,  when  it  may  be  only  granted  by  a  decree  dismissing  the 
bill  upon  the  merits.^'^     The  entry  of  an  order  of  discontinuance 

^^  Arnoux    v.    Steinbrenner,    1   Paige  ^~  Palmer  y.  Walesbv,  L.  R.  3  Cli.  App. 

(N.  Y.),  82.  732. 

11  American  Zylonite  Co.  v.  Celliiloitl  i**  Palmer  r.  Walesby,  L.  R.  3  Cli.  App, 

Manuf.  Co.,  82  Fed.  R.  809.  732;  Wright  v.  Castle,  3  Meriv.  12. 

1-  Handford  r.  Stoi  ie,  2  Sim.  &  S.  196  ;  i^  Camden    &    Amboy    R.    R.  Co.   v. 

Armstrong  v.  Storer,  9  Beav.  277.  Stewart,  4  C.  E.  Green  (N.  J.),  69. 

li  Ex  parte  Railroad  Co.,  95  U.  S.  221  ;  ->  Holkirk    v.    Holkirk,  4  Madd.    50  ; 

Mdler  v.  Liggett  &  M.    Tobacco   Co.,  7  Wintlirop  v.  Murraj',  7  Hare,  150. 

Fed   R.  91.  -'1  Baily  r.  Lambert,  5  Hare,  178. 

"  Belmont  Nail   Co.  v.   Columbia  Iron  '--  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (5th  Am.  ed.)  793. 

&  Steel  Co.,4G  Fed.  R.  336.  But  see  Stevens  r.  The  Railroads,  4  Fed. 

15  Railway  Company  v.  Ailing,  99  U.  S.  R.  97  ;  and  §  300. 

463.  "  •-■'  Rumbly   v.   Stainton,    24  Ala.  712; 

16  Guilbert  r    Hawles,  1  Ch.  Cas.  40;     Rocliester  r.  Lee,  1  Macn.  &  G.  467.     See 
Carrington  c.  Holly,  1  Dickens,  280.  Stevens  v.  The  Railroads,  4  Fed.  R.  97. 


634      DISMISSING  BILLS  OTHERWISE  THAN  AT  A  HEARING.       [CHAP.  XX. 

upon  consent  of  both  parties  amounts  in  effect  to  a  dismissal  of 
the  bill.-^  The  dismissal  of  a  bill  or  of  part  of  a  bill  does  not 
authorize  the  removal  of  tlie  paper  from  the  clerk's  office  unless 
the  order  so  directs  ;  and  such  a  direction  will  rarely  be  given.^ 
Otherwise,  the  paper  remains  a  part  of  the  record,  and  may  be 
used  as  evidence  of  any  admission  therein  contained.-*' 

§  292.  Dismissal  of  Bills  for  want  of  Prosecution.  —  A  defendant 
is  entitled  to  an  order  dismissing  the  plaintiff's  bill :  if  the  plain- 
tiff does  not  reply  to  any  plea,  or  set  down  any  plea  or  demurrer 
for  argument  on  the  rule-day  when  the  same  is  filed,  or  on  the 
next  succeeding  rule-day,  unless  the  time  within  which  to  do 
either  of  those  things  has  been  enlarged  by  a  judge  of  the  court ;  ^ 
if  the  plaintiff  does  not  reply  to  that  defendant's  answer  on  or 
before  the  next  succeeding  rule-day  after  its  filing,  provided  that 
no  exceptions  have  been  taken  to  the  answer,  or  that  any  excep- 
tions filed  are  still  undecided,  or  that  the  cause  is  not  set  down 
for  a  hearing  on  bill  and  answer  i^  and  possibly  if  no  testimony 
is  taken  by  tlie  plaintiff  within  three  months  after  the  cause 
is  at  issue,^  or  within  any  shorter  time  that  may  be  assigned  by 
the  court ;  ^  although  it  might  be  held  that  in  such  a  case  the 
defendant  must  first  set  the  cause  down  for  a  hearing.  The 
plaintiff's  time  for  doing  any  of  tliese  things  may,  however, 
be  enlarged,  either  before  or  after  it  has  expired,  by  the  court 
or  by  consent  at  any  time;°  and  the  taking  of  any  subsequent 
step  by  the  defendant  in  the  cause,  before  attempting  to  take 
advantage  of  the  default,  will  usually  be  deemed  a  waiver  of  it.*^ 

§  293.  Dismissal  for  want  of  Jurisdiction.  —  The  Judiciary  Act 
of  1875  provides  that  "  if,  in  any  suit  commenced  in  a  circuit  court 
or  removed  from  a  State  court  to  a  circuit  court  of  the  United 
States,  it  shall  appear  to  the  satisfaction  of  said  circuit  court,  at 
any  time  after  such  suit  has  been  brought  or  removed  thereto, 
that  such  suit  does  not  really  and  suljstantially  involve  a  dispute 

24  Pictet  Artificial  Ice  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  Ice  Gaz.  264.  For  the  practice  in  tlie  South- 
Machine  Co.,  12  Fed.  K.  816.  ern  District  of  New  York,  see  infni,  §  296. 

25  Lyster  v.  Stickney,  12  Fed.  R.  609,  For  a  case  where  the  delay  was  held  e.x- 
610.  cusahle,  see  Beirne  r.  Wadsworth,  oG  Fed. 

2'i  Lyster  v.  Stickney,  12  Fed.  R.  GOD,  R.  G14. 
610.     '  •*  Amendment  of  1869  to  Rule  67. 

§  292.     1  Rule  38.  ^  Rules  38,  66,  69;  Ex  parte  Poullney 

2  Rule  66.     Reynolds  v.  First  National  v.  City  of  Lafayette,  12  Pet.  472. 
Bank,  1 12  U.  S.  405.  «  Allen  v.  Mayor,  7  Fed.  R.  483  ;  Jack- 

3  Rule  69;  Adams  v.  Howard,  21  Off.  son  v.  Ivimey,  L.  R.  1  Eq.  693. 


§  293.]  DISMISSAL   FOR   WANT   OF   JURISDICTION.  535 

or  controversy  properly  within  the  jurisdiction  of  said  circuit 
court,  or  that  the  parties  to  said  suit  have  been  improperly  or 
collusivcly  made  or  joined,  either  as  plaintiffs  or  defendants,  for 
the  purpose  of  creating  a  case  cognizable  or  removable  under 
this  Act,  the  said  circuit  court  shall  proceed  no  fui'ther  therein, 
but  shall  dismiss  the  suit  or  remand  it  to  the  coui't  from  which 
it  was  removed,  as  justice  may  require,  and  shall  make  such  order 
as  to  costs  as  shall  be  just."  ^  The  court  should  do  this  of  its  own 
motion,  as  soon  as  it  discovers  its  want  of  jurisdiction  or  the  im- 
proper or  collusive  joinder.^  The  Supreme  Court  has  said  that  this 
provision  of  the  Act  of  1875  is  salutary,  and  that  it  is  the  duty 
of  the  Circuit  Courts  to  exercise  their  power  under  it  in  all  proper 
cases.'^  Neither  party  has  the  right,  however,  without  pleading 
it  within  the  time  allowed  for  that  purpose,  to  introduce  evidence 
to  contradict  averments  of  the  jurisdictional  facts.*  If,  however, 
from  any  source  the  court  is  led  to  sus])ect  that  its  jurisdiction 
has  been  imposed  upon  by  the  collusion  of  the  parties  or  in  any 
other  way,  it  may  of  its  own  motion  cause  the  necessary  inquiry 
to  be  made,  either  by  having  the  proper  issue  joined  and  tried, 
or  by  some  other  appropriate  form  of  proceeding,  and  act  as 
justice  may  require  for  its  own  protection  against  fraud  or 
imposition.^  In  such  a  case  the  party  that  sought  the  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  Federal  court  should  have  an  opportunitv  to  be 
heard  on  the  motion,  and  to  meet  it  by  appropriate  evidence.^ 
A  judge  cannot  thus  dismiss  or  i-emand  a  case  upon  his  personal 
conviction,  although  it  amounts  to  a  moral  certainty ;  the  collu- 
sion or  lack  of  jurisdiction  must  be  legally  proved.''  If  there 
is  no  collusion  and  an  original  defect  in  the  jurisdiction  has  been 
cured  before  the  objection  is  raised,  it  seems  that  tlie  suit  will 
be  retained.^  Before  the  Act  of  1875,  it  was  held  that  a  defend- 
ant, between  whom  and  the  complainant  the  requisite  difference 
of  citizenship  existed,  could  not  raise  an  objection  on  account  of 
the  citizenship  of  another  defendant.'^     It  has  been  said,  that  a 

§  29.3.     1  Actof  March.3,  1875,cli.  l.ST,  &  Hartog  ?•.   Memory,  IIG  U    S.    688, 

§  5  (18  St.  at  L.  472).     See  supra,  §  18,  .590-592. 

and //(/;■«,§  :]!)3.  "  Ilartog  v.  Memory,   110  U.  S.    588, 

2  Williams  r.  Nottawa,  104  U.  S.   209.  590-592. 

3  Williams   v.  Nottawa,  104  U.  S.  209,  "  Barry  v.   Edmunds,   IIG   U.  S.  550, 
212.  559. 

*  riartng  v.  Memory,   116   U.   S.    588,         **  Pacific  Railroad  v.   Kctchum,  101  U. 
590-592 ;  Deputron  v.  Young,  134  U.  S.     S.  289,  299. 
241.  ^  Harrison  i'.  Urann,  1  Story,  04;  Pond 


03G      DlaMI^SING  BILLS  OTHEKWISE  THAN  AT  A  HEARING.       [CHAF.  XX. 

defect  ill  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Circuit  Court  for  the  Southern 
District  of  New  York,  because  the  cause  of  action  arose  in  the 
Northern  District  of  that  State,  may  be  tal^en  by  answer  as  well 
as  by  plea,  but  unless  raised  somewhere  in  the  pleadings  will 
be  waived.'^  If  the  record  does  not  show  ailirmatively  that 
tlie  court  has  jurisdiction,  the  case  may  be  dismissed  at  any 
time  after  as  well  as  before  judgment ;  and  the  objection  may  be 
taken  for  the  first  time  in  the  appellate  court. ^^  No  party  can 
offer  evidence  to  controvert  an  allegation  of  a  jurisdictional  fact 
in  a  pleading  or  petition  for  removal,  unless  he  has,  by  plea  or 
answer,  preferably  by  plea,  denied  such  allegatioii-^"'^  Consent 
cannot  confer  jurisdiction  ;  ^^  but  it  has  been  held  that  consent 
may  bind  the  jjarties  and  waive  a  previous  lack  of  jurisdiction,  if, 
when  the  attention  of  the  court  is  called  to  the  defect,  jurisdic- 
tion has  been  obtained.^*  The  court  may  of  its  own  motion,  at 
any  time,  irrespective  of  the  pleadings,  direct  an  inquiry  as  to 
whether  the  jurisdictional  facts  exist.^'^  Upon  such  an  inquiry 
the  plaintiff  or  a  defendant  who  has  removed  the  case  is  entitled 
to  appear  by  counsel,  and  offer  evidence  in  support  of  the  juris- 
diction.^'' No  judge  has  the  right  to  dismiss  a  suit  under  this 
statute  upon  Ins  personal  conviction,  however  strong,  unless  the 
facts  on  which  his  conviction  is  based  appear  upon  the  record, 
and  create  a  legal  certainty  of  the  conclusion  derived  from 
them.^"  Where  a  plaintiff  had  acquired  the  causes  of  action 
which  he  sought  to  enforce,  solely  for  the  purjjose  of  collection 
in  the  Federal  courts  under  an  agreement  to  pay  back  a  certain 
proportion  of  the  net  proceeds  to  his  assignors,  who  could  not 
have  sued  therein,  it  was  held  that  the  suits  should  be  dis- 
missed.''^    When  after  all  the  pleadings  are  filed  in  a  suit  which 

V.  Vermont  Valley  R.  li.  Co.,  12  Blatchf.  i^  narto,<r  r.  Memory,   110  U.  S.  588; 

280.  Morris  r.  Gilmer,  129  U.  S.  315. 

M  Black  V.  Thome,  10  Blatchf.  66.  i«  Hartog  i:  Memory,  116   U.  S.  588, 

^1  Grace    v.    American   ('entral   Insur-  5U0-5U2;  Barry  e;.  Edmnnds,  116  U.S.  550. 

ance  Company,  109   U.  S.  278;    Bors  v.  i"  Barry  r.  Edmunds,  116  U.    S.   550, 

Preston,  111  U.  S.  252;  Mansfield,  C.  &  559;  Dcputron  r.  Young,  134  U.  S.  241. 

L.  M.  Ky.  Co.  V.  Swan,  111  U.  S.  379.  252. 

J-  Hartog  i:  Memory,  IIG  U.  S.   588;  '■'*  Farmington  ;•.  Pillslniry,   114  U.  S. 

Davics  V.  Lathrop,  13  Fed.  H.  505;  Cutli-  188;  Williams  r.  Nottawa,  104  U  8.209; 

bert  V.   Galloway.  35  Fed.  R.  460;  Depu-  Bernards  Township  i'.  Stebbins,  109  U.  S. 

tron  v.  Young,  134  U.  S  241.  341  ;  New  Providence  >:  Halsey,  117  U.  S. 

13  Peoj)le's  Bank  r.  Caliioun,  102  U.  S.  336;  Little   r.  (Jiles,  118  U.  S.  596;  Nor- 

2-56.  ton  t'.   European  &  N.  Am.   Ry.  Co.,  32 

'<  Pacific  Railroad  r.  Ketclium,  101  U.  Fed.  It.  805. 
S.  289,  298. 


§  294.]      DISMISSAL  FOIi  FAILURE  TO  PERFECT  OR  REVIVE  A  SUIT.     537 

was  brought  in  or  removed  to  a  Federal  court,  on  the  claim  that 
it  is  a  case  arising  under  the  Constitution  and  laws  of  the  United 
States,  it  appears  that  the  averments  upon  which  tlic  jurisdiction 
is  claimed  arc  immaterial,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  court  to  dismiss 
or  remand  the  cause. ^^  To  justify  a  dismissal  under  this  statute, 
the  court  must  be  satisfied  that  the  object  Avas  to  create  a  case 
cognizable  in  the  Federal  courts.^o  Where  a  collusive  transfer 
of  the  cause  of  action  was  evidently  made  for  another  purpose, 
it  was  held  that  the  jurisdiction  should  be  rctained.^i  Admis- 
sions by  the  defendant  after  a  suit  is  brought  cannot  by  reducing 
the  matter  in  dispute  divest  the  court  of  jurisdiction.^'-^  A  dis- 
missal upon  this  ground  should  be  without  prejudice.^  A  motion 
to  dismiss  for  want  of  equity  can  only  be  made  at  a  hearing.-* 
A  motion  to  dismiss  for  want  of  jurisdiction  of  tlic  Federal  court 
may  be  made  at  any  time.-^  "  Such  an  objection  ought  to  be 
raised  at  the  first  opportunity,  and  delay  in  its  presentation 
should  be  considered  in  examining  into  the  grounds  upon  which 
it  is  alleged  to  rest."^^ 

§  294.  Dismissal  for  Failure  to  perfect  or  revive  a  Suit.  —  A\  hen 
a  suit  has  abated  or  become  otherwise  defective  before  a  decree, 
the  party  or  parties  against  whom  it  can  be  continued  may,  upon 
notice  served  upon  the  person  or  persons  entitled  to  revive  or 
supply  the  defect  in  the  same,  move  for  and  obtain  an  order, 
directing  that  these  revive  or  supjtly  the  defect,  within  a  certain 
limited  time  to  be  fixed  by  the  court,  or  that  else  the  bill  be  dis- 
missed.^ If  the  suit  abate  by  the  death  of  one  of  several  co- 
plaintiffs,  the  order  may  be  obtained  against  the  survivors  ;  and 
it  seems  that  tlie  objection  that  there  is  no  personal  representa- 
tive of  the  deceased  plaintiff  will  not  ])revent  the  court  from 
granting  such  an  order.^  It  is  irregular  in  such  cases  to  move  to 
dismiss  a  hill  for  want  of    prosecution ;    and  an    order   to   that 

1^  Robinson  r.  Anderson,  121  U.  S.  522.         -^  La  Vega  v.  Lapsley,  1  Woods,  428; 

See  in/rn,  §  :;0;].  Betts  v.  Lewis,  19  How.  72  ;  Fuller  i-.  Met- 

-»  Lanier  v.  Nasli,  121  U.  S.  404,  410;  ropolitan  Life  Lis.  Co  ,  31  Fed.  R.  696. 
Manliattan  Life  Ins.   Co.   i-.   Broughton,         -''  La  Vega  v.  Lapsley,  1  Woods,  428. 

109  U.  S.  121.  But  see  Fuller  v.   Metropolitan  Life  Ins. 

21  Lanier  v.  Nash,  121  U.  S.  404.  Co.,  31  Fed.  R.  606 

22  Fuller  V.  Met.  Life  Ins.  Co.,  37  Fed.  -''  Deputron  v.  Young,  134  U.  S.  241, 
R.  163.  251. 

2''  Thompson  v.  Railroad  Companies,  6  §  204.     i  Adanison  i\  Hall,  1  Turner  & 

Wall.  134;  Kendig  r.  Dean,  97  U.  S.423;  Riiss.  258;  Bolton  v.  Bolton,  2   Sim.&  S. 

Van  Norden   v.   Morton,   99   U.   S.   378  ;  371. 

Williams  v.  Nottawa,  104  U.  S.  209.  -  Ilindo  i:  Morton,  2  II.  oi  M  368. 


538      DISMISSING  BILLS  OTHERWISE  THAN  AT  A  HEARING.      [CHAP.  XX. 

effect,  if  obtained,  will  be  discharged  for  irregularity .-^  A  bill 
may  be  dismissed  at  a  defendant's  motion  for  the  plaintiff's  fail- 
m'e  to  serve  with  process  another  defendant  named  in  the  bill  who 
is  a  necessary  party  to  the  suit."^ 

§  295.  Election.  —  When  the  plaintiff  is  suing  both  at  law  and 
in  equity,  at  the  same  time,  for  the  same  matter,  the  defendant 
is  entitled  to  an  order  that  the  plaintiff  elect  whether  he  will 
proceed  in  equity  or  at  law.^  The  case  of  a  mortgagee  is  an  ex- 
ception to  this  rule  ;  for,  in  the  absence  of  any  statutory  restric- 
tion, he  can  proceed  at  the  same  time  to  foreclose  his  mortgage 
in  equity  and  sue  on  the  bond  at  law.^  This  exception,  however, 
it  has  been  held  in  England,  does  not  extend  to  the  case  of  a 
vendor  seeking  to  enforce  his  lien  and  sue  at  law  for  his  debt.^ 
In  a  special  case,  the  plaintiff  may  be  allowed  to  proceed  par- 
tially at  equity  and  partially  at  law,  and  compelled  to  make  a 
special  election.'^  The  principle  of  election  has  been  extended  to 
a  case  where  the  plaintiff  sued  at  once  in  both  a  foreign  and  a 
domestic  court.^  The  defendant  cannot  move  for  the  order  until 
after  he  has  answered,  and  the  time  for  exceptions  has  expired 
without  one  being  taken,  or  the  answer  has  been  adjudged  suffi- 
cient.^ A  joint  plea  and  answer  is  not,  it  seems,  sufficient  to 
enable  a  defendant  to  obtain  such  an  order.'  The  order  should 
allow  the  plaintiff  a  reasonable  time  within  which  to  make  his 
election.^  The  plaintiff  may  move  to  discharge  the  order  for 
irregularity  in  obtaining  it,  or  upon  the  merits  confessed  in  the 
answer  or  proved  in  an  affidavit.'^  If,  upon  such  a  motion,  any 
doubt  arises  as  to  whether  the  suit  in  equity  and  the  action  at 
law  are  for  the  same  matter,  it  is  customary  to  direct  an  inquiry 
into  that  fact;^*^  during  the  progress  of  which,  all  proceedings  in 

3  Robinson    v.   Norton,   10  Beav.  484;  Anon.,  1  Vern.  104;  Franklin  v.  Herscli, 

Boddy  I'.   Kent,  1  Meriv.   361  ;  Sellers  r.  0  Tonn.  Ch.  467. 
Dawson,  2  Dickens,  738.  ^  Pieters  v.  Thompson,  G.  Cooper,  294. 

■«  Jessup    c'  Illinois   Cent.    R.   Co.,  36         e  Mitford's  PI.  (Tyler's  ed.)  340;  Lei- 
Fed.  R.  735  ;  Picquet  r.  Swan,  5  Mason,  ccstor  v.  Leicester,  10  Simons,  87. 
iJUl.  ''  Fisher  r.  Mee,  3  Meriv.  45 ;  Sonle  f. 

§  295.    1  Mitford's  PI.  (Tyler 'sed.)  340;  Corning,  11  Paige  (N.  Y.),  412. 
Carlisle   r.  Cooper,  '■'>  C.  E.  Green  (N.  .1 ),         ^  Bracken  v.   Martin,  3   Yerg.  (Tenn  ) 

241  ;  Livingston  v.  Kane,  3  J.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  55;  Rogers  r.  Vosburgh,  4  J.  Ch.  (N.  Y.) 

224.  84. 

2  Booth  V.  Booth,  2Atk.  .343;  Dunkley        »  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (2d  Am.  ed.)  817. 

V.  Van  Rurcn,  3J.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  .330.  '''  Mouseley  v.   Basnett,   1   Ves.  &  B. 

3  Barker  v.  Smark,  3  Beav.  64.  382  n. 

4  Barker  v.  Dumaresque,  2  Atk.  119; 


§  295.]  ELECTION.  539 

both  courts  are  usually  stayed,'^  unless  the  plaintiff  can  show 
that  justice  will  be  better  done  by  permitting  proceedings  to  some 
extent,  when  he  may  by  special  leave  continue  in  one  or  both,  at 
the  court's  discretion. '^  If  the  plaintiff  require  further  time 
within  which  to  make  his  election,  he  should  apply  for  it  to  the 
court  by  motion  upon  notice. ^^  At  the  exijiratioii  of  the  time 
allowed  him  he  must  make  his  election,  which  is  usually  done  by 
liling-  a  written  statement  of  it  signed  by  him  or  his  solicitor  in 
the  clerk's  office  ;  ^^  or  else  his  bill  will  be  dismissed.^^  If  he 
elect  to  proceed  in  equity,  his  proceedings  at  law  are  stayed  by 
the  order,^*^  and  either  the  defendant  will  be  allowed  to  recover 
the  costs  of  the  action,  or  the  plaintiff  will  be  directed  by  the 
court  of  equity  to  pay  them.i"  If  the  plaintiff  elect  to  proceed 
at  law,  his  bill  in  equity  will  be  dismissed  with  costs. ^^  Such  a 
dismissal  will,  however,  be  no  bar  to  a  subsequent  suit.''^ 

"  Mills  V.  Fry,  3  Ves.  &  B.  9;  Anon.,  2  i«  Daniell's  Cli.  Pr.   (5tli  Am.  ed.)  816- 

Madd.  39-5;  Daniell's  Cii.  Pr.  817.  i'  Simjjson   v.    Sadd,  IG  C.  B.  26;  Car- 

1-  Aniory     r.     Brodrick,    Jacob,    -530;  vvick  v.  Young,  2  Swanst.  239. 

Carwick  r.  Young,  2  Swanst.  239.  '8  Jones  v.  Earl  of  Strafford,  3  P.  Wms. 

13  Daniell's  Cli.  Pr.  (5th  Am.  ed.)  817.  70,  90,  n.  B. 

"  Daniell's  Cli.  Pr.  (.5th  Am.  ed.)  817.  la  Countess  of  Plymoutli   r.   Bladon,  2 

15  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (utii  Am.  ed.)    816;  Vern   32;    Livingston  v.   Kane,  3  J.  Ch. 

Boyd  v.  Heinzelman,  1  Vescy  &  Beanies,  (N.  Y.)  224 ;  Rogers  v.  Vosburgh,  4  J.  Ch. 

381.  (N.  Y.)  84. 


540  THE   HEAKING.  [CHAP.  XXI. 


CHAPTER  XXI. 

THE    HEARING. 

§  296.  Bringing  a  Suit  to  a  Hearing.  —  The  old  practice  of  bring- 
ing a  suit  to  a  hearing  was  by  the  plaintiff's  procuring  an  order 
to  set  it  down  for  hearing  within  four  weeli;s  after  the  closing  of 
the  evidence  ;  upon  his  failure  to  do  which  a  defendant  might 
either  set  it  down  himself,  or  move  to  dismiss  the  bill  for  want 
of  prosecution.  The  party  setting  it  down  was  obliged  to  sue 
out  a  subpoena  to  hear  judgment,  and  have  the  same  served  upon 
the  solicitors  of  the  other  parties.^  If  a  plaintiff  wished  to  set  a 
cause  down  for  a  hearing  upon  bill  and  answer,  he  was  obliged 
to  do  so  within  the  time  allowed  iiim  for  liling  the  replication.^ 
The  practice  upon  this  subject  in  tlie  United  States  courts  is, 
however,  very  loose,  —  some  circuits  following  the  analogy  of  the 
English  practice ;  some  regulating  the  matter  by  rule ;  and  some 
adopting  by  custom  a  practice  very  similar  to  that  of  the  courts 
of  the  State  wliere  the  circuit  is  hcld.^  Calendar  practice  in  the 
several  circuits  is  usually  modelled  on  the  State  practice  in  that 
respect.  Tn  the  Southern  District  of  New  York,  the  rules  pro- 
vide that,  '•  Issues,  whether  of  law  or  fact,  and  appeals,  in  this 
court,  may  be  noticed  for  trial  or  hearing,  and  placed  upon  the 
calendar,  by  either  party  ;  and  either  party  noticing  the  same 
may,  when  the  cause  shall  be  called,  move  the  trial  or  hearing, 
and  take  verdict  or  judgment,  or  order  to  dismiss  the  suit  for  not 
going  to  trial,  as  the  court  shall  direct."  *  "  When  no  proceed- 
ings are  taken  by  either  party  within  thirty  days  after  replication, 
for  the  examination  of  witnesses  out  of  court,  either  party  may 
set  the  cause  down  for  hearing  upon  the  pleadings."  ^  If  an  ori- 
ginal and  a  cross  cause  have  been  set  down  for  hearing  at  differ- 

§  296.     1  DanieU's   Ch.  Pr.  (5th  Am.  of  a  State  is  enjoineil.     U.  S.  R.  S   §  049 ; 

ed.)  963-971  ;  3  Bl.  Com   450.  Ward  v.  Tlie  State,  12  Wall.  1G3  ;  Hoge 

■i  Daiiiell's  Ch.  Pr.  (5th  Am.  ed.)  964,  v.  K.  &  D.  R.  R.  Co.,  93  U.  8   1  ;  Daven- 

9B5  port  City  v.  Dows,  15  Wall.  390;  Miller 

^  By  statute,  a  prefemu'e  is  fiiven  in  v.  The  vState,  12  Wall.  159. 
all  circuits  and  in  the  Supreme  Court  to  *  U.  S.  C.  C,  S.  D.  N.  Y.,  Rule  of  Jan. 

actions  in  which  a  State  is  a  piirty  or  in  14,  1871. 
which  the  execution  of  the  revenue  laws  ^  jj.  g   c.  C,  S.  D.  N.  Y.,  Rule  109. 


§  297.]  MANNER    OF   HEAKINGA   CAUSE.  541 

eiit  times,  and  other  causes  intervene,  the  phxintiff  in  whichever  of 
them  is  below  the  other  will  usually  upon  motion  obtain  leave  to 
bring  it  forward,  so  that  both  causes  may  be  heard  together.^ 
Where  one  defendant  has  demurred  and  another  filed  a  plea,  it 
is  the  usual  practice  to  postpone  the  hearing  upon  the  plea  until 
the  demurrer  has  been  determined.'^  A  hearing  will  not  be  given 
upon  an  agreed  statement  of  facts  without  pleadings,^  even  if  a 
State  statute  authorizes  such  a  practice.^ 

§  297.  Manner  of  hearing  a  Cause.  —  The  formal  mode  of  hear- 
ing a  cause  where  all  parties  appear  upon  its  being  called  on,  has 
been  thus  described.  "  The  leading  counsel  for  the  plaintiff  opens 
the  plaintiff's  case,  and  in  so  doing  states,  first  the  l>ill,  and  then 
tlie  answers,  if  any  :  pointing  out  the  matters  in  issue,  and  the 
(lucstions  in  equity  arising  therefrom;  after  which  the  plaintiff's 
evidence  is  read,  cither  by  his  leading  or  his  junior  counsel,  and 
their  arguments  in  support  of  the  case  are  adduced.  The  counsel 
for  the  defendant  are  then  heard,  in  support  of  the  defendant's 
case,  and  his  evidence  is  read  by  them ;  and  the  plaintiff's  senior 
counsel  is  then  heard  in  reply.  When  all  are  heard,  the  court 
pronounces  the  decree,  either  immediately  or  at  a  subsequent 
day."  1  It  is  usual  here,  however,  to  waive  the  reading,  and  for 
counsel  to  state  merely  the  substance  of  the  pleadings  and  testi- 
mony, which  are  submitted  to  the  judge  at,  or  shortly  after,  the 
conclusion  of  the  oral  arguments,  with  written  arguments  upon 
the  law  and  the  facts,  called  briefs  or  points.  The  course  is  much 
the  same  where  the  cause  is  set  down  for  a  hearing  upon  Ijill  and 
answer.  The  pleadings  only  are  then  read,  and  the  answer  is 
admitted  to  be  true  in  all  its  allegations  of  fact,^  even  when  not 
stated  positively,  and  the  defendant  only  avers  that  he  believes 
and  hopes  to  be  able  to  prove  such  facts.'^  But  the  plaintiff 
does  not  thereby  admit  conclusions  of  law,  nor  allegations  as  to 
matters  concerning  which  the  court  takes  judicial  notice.*  No 
other  evidence  is  permitted  except  matters  of  record  to  which  the 

0  Hinde's  Pr.  415 ;  3  Blackstone's  Com-  §  297.  ^  Daniell's  Cli.  Pr.  (5th  Am.  ed. ) 

iDcntaries,  451.  1988. 

'  Campbell  v.  Mayor  of  New  York,  33         '-  3  Bl.   Com.   1448  ;  Tainter  v.  Clark, 

IVd.  R.  795.  5  Allen  (Mass.),  66;  Parker  i-.  Town  of 

8  Nickerson  v.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Concord,  39  Fed.  R.  718. 

R.  Co.,  30  Fed.  R.  85;  s.c.  1  McCrary,  »  Brinckerhoff  ;,•.    Brown,    7    J.    Ch. 

333.  "       (N  Y.)217;  Dale  f.   McEvers,  2  Cowen 

9  Nickerson   r.   Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.     (N.  Y.),  118. 

R.  Co.,  30  Fed.  R.  85;   3.  c.  McCrary,  ■*  Taylor  v.   Barclay,  2  Simons,  213. 

383 ;  supra,  §  6.  See  supra,  §  lOG. 


542  THE   HEARING.  [CHAP.  XXI. 

answer  refers.^  It  has  been  said  that  a  judge  may  hear  a  cause 
in  which  he  was  retained  before  he  received  his  judicial  appoint- 
ment;'^ but  the  ahnost  universal  practice  is  for  a  judge  to  refuse 
to  sit  in  such  a  case. 

§  298.  Rules  of  Decision  upon  a  Hearing.  —  All  decisions  made 
in  a  former  stage  of  the  cause  are  open  for  review  upon  the 
final  hearing.^  But  if  the  evidence  is  unchanged,  a  judge  will 
rarely  refuse  to  follow  a  ruling  made  by  one  of  his  colleagues  in 
the  same  ^  or  a  similar  ^  case.  Greater  i-espect  is  paid  to  a  ruling 
by  the  Circuit  Justice  tlian  to  one  by  the  Circuit  Judge  ;*  and  a 
ruling  by  the  Circuit  Judge  has  more  weight  than  one  by  a 
District  Judge.  In  matters  of  substantive  as  distinguished  from 
adjective  law,  that  is,  of  the  law  creating  rights  but  not  of  that 
merely  regulating  practice,  the  Federal  courts  are —  certainly  so 
far  as  property  in  land  is  affected  thereby,  and  probably  alto- 
gether —  bound  by  and  will  follow  the  statutes  of  the  State 
within  whose  jurisdiction  is  the  property  that  is  the  subject  of 
the  suit.^  A  State  statute,  however,  which  is  merely  declaratory 
of  the  law  cannot  affect  the  rules  applying  to  causes  of  action 
which  arose  before  its  enactment.^  Whether  a  State  statute  has 
been  properly  passed  so  as  to  take  effect,  is  a  question  of  law,  in 
determining  which  the  courts  of  the  United  States  will  follow 
the  decisions  in  the  State  wherein  it  is  claimed  to  be  in  force." 
So,  too,  in  construing  a  statute  or  the  Constitution  of  a  State, 
the  Federal  courts  will  in  general  follow  the  construction  put 
upon  it  by  the  State  courts,  "  when  that  construction  has  been 
settled  by  the  decisions  of  -its  highest  tribunal."  ^     Even  if,  be- 

5  Anon  ,  1  Barb   Cli.  (N.  Y.)  73.  ^  Watts  i'.   Waddle,  6  Pet.  389;  Mc- 

6  Thelusson  v.  Kendlesliam,  7  H.  L.  C.  Goon  o.  Scales,  9  Wail.  23;  Gaines  v. 
429;  Tlie  Hic.liniond,  9  Fed.  R.  SGo  ;  and  Fiientes,  92  U.  S.  10;  Brine  v.  Insurance 
citations.  Co  ,  96  U.  S.  027  ;  Pulliam  v.  Pnlliam,  10 

§  298.   1  Fourniquet  v.  Perkins,  16  How.  Fed.  R.  53,  77.     See  infra,  §  375. 
82;  Pulliam  v.  Pulliam,  10  Fed.  R.  53.    But  ^  Town  of  Koshkonong  v.  Burton,  104 

see  Coupe  r.  Weatherhcad,  37  Fed.  R.  16.  U.  S.  G68. 

2  Cole  Silver  Mining  Co.  r.  Virginia  &  ^  Town  of  South  Ottawa  v.  Perkins, 94 

Gold  Hill  Water  Co.,  1  Saw.  085  ;  Wake-  U.  S.  260  ;  Post  r.  Supervisors,  105  U.  S. 

lee  t:  Davis,  44  Fed.  R.  532.  667 ;  Leeper  v.  Texas,  139  U.  S.  462. 

8  Worswick    Manuf.    Co    v.   City   of         8  Polk's   Lessee  v.  Wendal,  7  Crancli, 

Philadelpliia,  30  Fed    R.  6.'5.     But  see  87;  Nesniith    v.  Sheldon,    7    IIow.   812; 

Northern  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Sanders,  47  Fed.  Walker  v.  State   Harbor  Commissioners, 

R.  504.  17  Wall.  648;  Township  of  Elmwood  v. 

i  Preston   r.  Walsh,   10  Fed.   R.  815.  Marcy,  92  U.  S    289;  Township  of  East 

But  see  United  States  i'.  Huggell,  40  Fed.  Oakland  v  Skinner,  94  U.  S.  255;  Louis- 

R  636,  044.  ville,  N.  0.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  c.  Mississippi,  133 


§  298.]  RULES    OF   DECISION    UPOX    A    HEARING.  543 

fore  the  State  courts  liave  construed  it,  a  State  statute  is  given 
one  construction  by  a  Federal  court,  and  subsequently  the 
highest  court  of  the  State  construes  it  differently;  or  if  the 
Federal  court  have  first  construed  it  in  ignorance  of  its  con- 
struction by  the  highest  tribunal  of  the  State,  —  the  Federal 
courts  will,  in  subsequent  cases,  disregard  their  former  ruling 
and  follow  that  of  the  State  court.^  It  has  been  even  held  that 
the  Federal  courts  will  not  investigate  the  claim  that  the  decision 
of  the  State  court  was  obtained  by  collusion  between  the  parties 
to  the  case  in  which  it  was  obtained.^^  The  courts  of  the  United 
States  are  not  bound  by  a  decision  of  a  State  court  construing 
a  statute  which  is  claimed  to  be  a  contract  by  the  State ;  since 
otherwise  the  clause  in  the  national  Constitution  forbidding  a 
State  to  pass  a  law  im{)airing  the  obligations  of  contracts  miglit 
be  violated  with  impunity. ^^  And,  for  a  similar  reason,  if  differ- 
ent constructions  have  been  given  to  the  same  statute  or  consti- 
tutional provision  by  tlie  courts  of  a  State  at  different  times,  the 
Federal  courts  are  not  "  bound  to  follow  the  later  decisions,  if 
thereby  contract  rights  which  have  accrued  under  earlier  rulings 
will  be  injuriously  affected."  ^^  Otherwise,  said  Chief  Justice 
Taney,  "  the  provision  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States, 
which  secures  to  the  citizens  of  another  State  the  right  to  sue  in 
the  courts  of  the  United  States,  might  become  utterly  useless 
and  nugatory."  ^^  It  seems  that  the  Federal  courts  will  give  to 
a  right  created  by  a  well-recognized  local  custom  established  and 
acquiesced  in  within  a  State,  the  same  force  as  if  it  had  been 
created  by  a  State  statute.^*  In  deciding  questions  of  general 
commercial  law,  however,  upon  which  the  statutes  of  a  State  are 
silent,  the  Federal  courts  are  not  bound  by  the  decisions  of  the 
State  courts,  but  decide  according  to  their  own  views  of  what 
the  law  is  and  should  be.^^     In  one  case,  where  the  rule  of  the 

U.  S.  587;  Peters  v.  Bain,  loo  U.  S.  670  ;  also  Kowan  v.  Runnels,  5  How.  134;  Oliio 

Case  V.  Kelly,  138  U.  S.  21.  Life  Ins.  &  Tr.  Co.  r.  Debolt,  16  How. 

9  Fairfield  f.   County  of  Gallatin,  100  416;  Gelpcke  y.  Dubuque,  1   Wall.  175, 

U.  S  47.     But  see  Burgess  v.  Seligman,  Thompson  v.  Perriiie,  103  U.  S.  806. 

107  U  S.  20;  and  infra,  §  375.  i-^  Rowan  r.  Runnels,  6  How.  134. 

"  Townsliip  of  East  Oakland  v.   Skin-  '*  Swift  v.  Tyson,  16  Pet.  1, 18  ;  Gainos 

ner,  94  U.  S.  '255.  v.  Fuentes,  92  US    10  ;  Railroad  Co.  v. 

11  Jefferson   Branch  Bank  r.  Skelly,  1  National  Bank,  102  United  States,  14,  29. 

Black,  480.     See  Railroad  Co.  c  Falconer,  See  supra,  §  7. 

103  U.  S.  821,  822.  i*  Swift  v  Tyson,  16  Pet.  1  ;  Carpenter 

1-  Chief  Justice  Waite  in   Douglass  v.  v.  The   Providence  Washington  Ins.  Co , 

County  of  Pike,  101  U.  S.  677,  686.      See  16  Pet.  495  ,  Gates  c  National  Bank,  100 


544  THE    HEARING.  [CHAP.  XXI. 

Federal  was  different  from  that  of  the  State  courts,  Judge  McCrary 
foHowed  the  hitter,  since  otherwise  there  was  a  probability  that  a 
party  to  the  suit  would  be  subjected  to  a  double  payment.^'^ 

§  299.  Objections  •which  cannot  be  made  at  the  Hearing. — As 
the  provisions  of  the  equity  rules  and  the  other  regulations  of 
practice  are  chiefly  designed  to  facilitate  the  speedy  and  orderly 
progress  of  a  cause  to  a  hearing,  after  a  cause  has  been  brought 
to  a  hearing  it  is  a  general  rule  that  no  objections  as  to  form  or 
the  delay  in  taking  a  previous  proceeding  will  be  allowed  to  be 
taken  then  for  the  first  time.^  Thus,  the  rules  provide  that  "  if 
a  defendant  shall,  at  the  hearing  of  a  cause,  object  that  a  suit  is 
defective  for  want  of  parties,  not  having  by  plea  or  answer  taken 
the  objection,  and  tlierein  specified  by  name  or  descri|)tion  the 
parties  to  wliom  tlie  objection  applies,  the  court  (if  it  shall  think 
fit)  shall  be  at  liberty  to  make  a  decree  saving  the  rights  of  the 
absent  ])arties."  ^  "  Wliere  the  defendant  shall,  by  his  answer, 
suggest  that  the  bill  is  defective  for  want  of  parties,  the  plaintiff 
shall  I}e  at  liberty,  within  fourteen  days  after  answer  filed,  to  set 
down  the  cause  for  argument  upon  that  objection  only  ;  and  the 
purpose  for  which  the  same  is  so  set  down  shall  be  notified  by 
an  entry,  to  be  made  in  the  clerk's  order-book  in  the  form  or  to 
the  effect  following,  (that  is  to  say)  ;  'Set  down  upon  the  de- 
fendant's ol)jection  for  want  of  parties.'  And  where  the  plain- 
tiff shall  not  so  set  down  his  cause,  but  shall  proceed  therewith 
to  a  hearing,  notwithstanding  an  objection  for  want  of  parties 
taken  by  the  answer,  he  shall  not,  at  tlie  hearing  of  tlie  cause,  if 
the  defendant's  objection  shall  then  be  allowed,  be  entitled  as  of 
course  to  an  order  for  liberty  to  amend  liis  bill  by  adding  parties. 
But  the  court,  if  it  thinks  fit,  shall  be  at  liljerty  to  dismiss  the 
bill.'"  3  An  amended  bill  filed  without  leave  upon  the  day  of  the 
hearing  may  be  disregarded  by  the  court.'*  It  seems  that  a  plea 
stating  a  mere  conclusion  of  law  or  a  plea  unaccompanied  by 
the  proper  certificate  of  counsel  and  affidavit  of  the  defendant, 
may  also  be  disregarded.^     Advantage  may,  however,  be  taken  of 

U  S   230  ;  Uailroad  Company  '-.  National         ^  T{ule  53. 

Bank,  102  U.  S.  U;  Butler  y.'Douplass,  3         3  Rule  52. 

Fed.  R.  G12.     See  Burgess  v.  Seligman,  *  Terry  t-.  McLure,  103  United  States, 

107  U   S   20.     Sec  nifra,  §  375.  442. 

1"  Sonstiby  r   Kecley,  7  Fed   R.  447.  ^  National  Bank  v.  Insurance  Co.,  104 

§  299.     i"  Allen  v.  Mayor,  &c.  of  N.  Y.,  U.  S.  54. 
18  Blatuhf.  239. 


§  300.]  ACTION   OF   TUE    COURT   UPOX   A   HEAEING.  545 

the  laches  of  the  plaintiff  by  a  defendant  who  has  not  pleaded  it.® 
The  olijcction  that  the  allegations  in  the  bill  show  no  gronnd  for 
the  interference  of  a  court  of  equity  may  be  taken  at  any  time/ 
The  objection  that  the  plaintiff  has  an  adequate  remedy  at  law 
is  waived  by  the  defendant  unless  raised  in  a  demurrer,  plea,  or 
answer ;  but  may  be  taken  by  the  court  at  any  tiaic.^ 

§  300.  Action  of  the  Court  upon  a  Hearing.  —  The  COUrt  may 
upon  the  hearing  of  a  cause  either  decide  ail  the  questions  raised 
therein  and  make  a  final  decree,  or  merely  dispose  of  some  of 
them  and  give  directions  to  facilitate  the  decision  of  those  which 
remain.  If  the  court  inclines  in  favor  of  the  defendant,  it  will 
usually  render  a  final  decree  dismissing  the  bill.  The  dismissal 
may  be  absolute  or  without  prejudice.  An  absolute  decree  of 
dismissal  is  an  absolute  bar  to  any  subsetiuent  suit  brought  for 
the  same  causc.^  A  dismissal  without  prejudice  is  no  bar  to 
another  suit  brought  for  the  same  cause  of  action,  provided  that 
the  defects  on  account  of  which  the  bill  was  dismissed  are  rem- 
edicd.2  A  dismissal  without  prejudice  is  usually  ordered  when 
a  bill  is  dismissed  for  want  of  parties,^  or  for  want  of  jurisdiction 
in  a  Federal  court,*  or  for  multifariousness,^  or  for  "  a  slip  or  mis- 
take in  the  pleadings  or  in  the  proof." ^  The  Supreme  Court  will 
reverse  a  decree  which  dismissed  a  bill  absolutely  when  the  dis- 
missal should  have  been  without  prejudice.'  If  on  the  other  hand 
the  court  inclines  in  favor  of  the  plaintiff,  unless  the  bill  pray 
merely  for  a  perpetual  injunction,  it  rarely  renders  a  final  decree 
at  the  first  hearing  of  the  cause.  It  often  directs  a  reference  to 
a  master  to  take  accounts  or  assess  damages  ;  ^  and  it  not  infre- 
quently gives  leave  to  either  party  to  api)ly  for  further  orders  or 


6  Baker  v  BuVWe,  Rnldwin,  394.  ^  Williams  r.  Jackson,  107  U.  S    478, 

"i  Raker  i-.  Riddle,  Baldwin,  3!)4  ;  Quir-  484. 

olo  V.  Ardito,  1  Fed.  R.  GIO.  6  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  ('id   Am.  ed.)  904, 

8  Reynes  v.  Diimont,  130  U.  S.  352;  99',,    M'Neill   f.   Cahill,    2    Bligli,    228, 

Kilburn    v.    Sunderland,   130   U.   S.   505.  Woollam  r.  Hearn,  7  Yes.  211,  222  ;  Rosse 

See  supra,  §  110.  o   Rust,  4  J   ('!i.  (N.  Y.)  300.     For  exam- 

§  300     1  Case  I'.  Beauregard,  101  U  S.  pie,  when  the  bill  showed  a  good  ground 

688  ;  Durant  v.  Essex  Company,  7  Wall,  of  equitable  relief  as  to  one  plaintiff,  but 

107.  failed  to  show  what  interest  the  otlier  had 

-  Walden  r.  Bodley,  14  Pet.  15G,  IGl  ;  in    the  subject-matter  of  the  litigation. 

Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (5th"  Am.  ed.)  994,  995  ;  House  v    Mullen,  22  Wall.  42.     But  see 

Rosse  r.  Rust,  4  J.  Ch.  (N.  Y  )  300.  Ogsbury  v.   LaFarge,   2  N.  Y.   113;  and 

3  Kendig  v.  Dean,  97  U.  S.  423.  §  291. 

*  Kartell  v.  Tilgham,  99  U.  S.  547  .  ^  House  v.  Mullen.  22  Wall.  42. 

Gaylords  v.  Kelshaw,  1  Wall.  81.  8  gee  Chapter  XXIII. 

VOL.  I.  —  35 


546  THE   HEARING.  [CHAP.  XXI. 

directions  "  at  the  foot  of  the  decree  "  which  it  orders  entered.^ 
Under  such  a  clause  the  court  will  usually  listen  to  no  further 
applications,  except  as  to  matters  concerning  which  directions 
were  contained  in  the  decree  first  entered.  Thus,  it  has  been 
held  that  it  will  not  under  such  a  clause  entertain  an  application 
to  set  aside  a  sale  made  under  a  decree.^^  If  the  court  is  in 
doubt  concerning  the  facts,  it  may  direct  a  feigned  issue,  or  an 
action  at  law,  or  a  reference  to  a  master,  to  aid  it  in  determining 
the  same.  In  one  case,  when  a  bill  had  been  filed  by  a  bond- 
holder praying  for  the  appointment  of  a  receiver  of  a  canal 
company,  the  court  at  the  hearing  denied  the  application  for  a 
receiver,  but  retained  the  bill  so  far  as  to  compel  the  corporation 
to  file  an  annual  account.^^ 

9  Legrand  v.  Whitehead,  1  Russ.  309  ;  lo  Wetmore  v.  St.  Paul  &  P.  R.  R.  Co., 

Wetmore  v.  St.  Paul  &  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  3  3  Fed.  R.  177. 

Fed.  R.  177.    But  see  Hughes  v.  Jones,  3  "  Stewart  v.  Chesapeake  &  Ohio  Canal 

De  G.  F.  &  J.  307.  Co.,  5  Fed.  R.  149. 


§  301.]         POWER   OF   COURTS   TO   DIRECT   ISSUES   AT   LAW.  547 


CHAPTER    XXII. 

ISSUES    AT    LAW. 

§  301.  Power  of  Courts  to  direct  Issues  at  Law.  —  When  the 
chancellor  was  in  doubt  concerning  any  (juestion  of  fact  arising 
in  the  cause,  the  evidence  in  regard  to  which  was  conflicting  or 
insufficient,^  it  was  his  custom  to  compel  its  trial  before  a  jury 
upon  a  feigned  issue  ;  and,  if  their  vci'dict  was  satisfactory  to 
him,  to  assume  the  truth  of  the  facts  established  by  the  same  as 
the  basis  of  his  decree.^  This  power  of  the  chancellor  is  also 
vested,  independently  of  any  special  statute,  in  all  the  courts  of 
the  United  States  which  have  equitable  jurisdiction  ;'^  but  in  cases 
arising  under  the  patent  laws  it  has  been  increased  by  a  recent 
statutory  enactment,  providing  that  the  Circuit  Courts  of  the 
United  States,  "  when  sitting  in  equity  for  the  trial  of  patent 
causes,  may  impanel  a  jury  of  not  less  than  five  and  not  more 
than  twelve  persons,  subject  to  such  general  rules  in  the  prem- 
ises as  may  from  time  to  time  be  made  by  the  Supreme  Court,* 
and  submit  to  them  such  questions  of  fact  arising  in  such  cause 
as  such  circuit  court  shall  deem  expedient;  and  the  verdict  of 
such  jury  shall  be  treated  and  proceeded  upon  in  tlie  same  man- 
ner and  with  the  same  effect  as  in  the  case  of  issues  sent  from 
chancery  to  a  court  of  law  and  returned  with  such  findings."^ 
The  court  may  at  any  time  decide  a  cause  without  a  trial  of  an 
issue  which  it  has  ordered,  and  even  without  revoking  its  previous 
order  directing  one.^  The  order  of  a  judge  directing  an  issue  at 
law  is  discretionary,  and  it  is  doubtful  whether  or  not  it  may  be 
reviewed  upon  appeal.''  It  was  formerly  an  almost  invariable 
custom  to  direct  an  issue  when  the  question  to  be  determined  was 

§  301.   1  Moons  r.  Do  Bernales,  1  Riiss.  5  18  vSt.  at  L.  cb.  77.  p.  ol5  ;  1st  Rupp. 

.301  ;  Burkett  v.  Randall,  8  Mer.  4GG.  U  S.  R.  S.  130  ;  Watt  r  Starke,  101  U.  S. 

2  P>  Bl.  Com.  452.  247. 

3  Harding  i:  Handy,  11  Wheat.  103;  «  Field  v.  Holland,  6  Cranch,  8;  Cook 
Goodyear  v.   Providence   Rubber  Co.,  2  v.  Bay,  4  How.  (Miss.)  485. 

Cliff.  351  ;  Johnson  v.  Harmon,  94  U.  S.  ^  See  Black  v.  Lamb,  1  Beasley  (N.  J.), 

371,878.  108;  Ward  r    Hill,  4  Gray  (Mass.).  503; 

*  No   rules    upon    this    subject    have  Crittenden  v.  Field,  8  Gray  (Mass  ),  021. 
hitherto  been  made. 


548  ISSUES   AT   LAW.  [CHAP.  XXII. 

the  validity  of  a  will  as  against  an  heir,  or  the  true  heir-at-law  of  a 
decedent,  or  the  right  of  a  rector  to  tithes.^  It  was  very  common, 
moreover,  when  an  allegation  in  a  sworn  answer,  the  .plaintiff  not 
having  \\raived  answer  under  oath,  was  only  controverted  by  the 
testimony  of  a  single  witness  supported  by  corroborating  circum- 
stances ;  ^  or  when,  by  determining  in  the  way  he  inclined,  the 
judge  would  find  a  person  guilty  of  forgery.^*'  It  seems  to  be  the 
opinion  of  Judge  Hammond  that  it  is  the  duty  of  a  Federal  court 
of  equity  to  direct  an  issue  at  law  of  a  common-law  claim  against 
a  reeeiver.^i  An  issue  may  be  directed  notwithstanding  a  report 
of  auditors  upon  tlic  facts. ^^  The  court  sometimes  directs  only  a 
single  issue,  and  sometimes  several,  according  to  the  number  of 
substantial  points  upon  which  it  deems  it  necessary  to  take  the 
opinion  of  a  jury ;  and  it  will,  when  the  question  to  be  decided 
embraces  several  disputed  circumstances,  direct  an  issue  upon 
each  of  them.^^  If  the  parties  cannot  agree  upon  the  form  of  an 
issue,  it  will  be  settled  either  by  the  judge  or  by  a  master,  as  the 
court  deems  most  expedient.!^  By  going  to  trial  upon  an  issue 
neither  party  is  precluded  from  any  right  he  may  have  to  after- 
Avards  appeal  from  the  order  directing  it.^'^ 

§  302.  Matters  concerning  ■which  an  Issue  is  directed.  —  No  party 
will  be  permitted  to  take  an  issue  in  a  different  form  from  that 
whicli  he  has  stated  in  his  pleadings;^  but  the  court  may  upon  its 
own  motion  direct  an  issue  to  try  a  matter  not  in  issue  arising 
upon  the  hearing,  and  which  it  thinks  should  be  determined  before 
a  final  decree  is  rendered.^  An  issue  also  may  be  directed  upon 
claims  brought  in  under  a  decree  by  persons  not  upon  the  record.^ 
An  issue  will  not,  however,  be  directed  to  establish  a  point  whicli 
a  party  set  up  in  his  pleading  but  omitted  in  his  proof.^ 

8  3  Bl.  Com.  452;  Lord  Fingal  r.  Bailey  r  Scwell,  1  Russ.  239;  Earl  of  New- 
Blake,  1  MoUoy,  113  ;  Vaigneur  v.  Kirk,     burgh  v.  Countess,  5  Madtl.  3G4. 

2  Desaus.  (S.  C.)  G40  ;  Williams  r.  Price,         '^  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  eh.  xxvi.  §  1. 

4  Price,  1.5(5,  IGO.  i^  White  v.  Lisle,  3  Svvanst.  342;  Le- 

9  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  ch.  xxvi.  §  1.  gare  >:  Daly,  1  Ves.  Sen.  192;  De  Tastet 
1'^  Bishop  of  Winchester  r.  Fournier,  2  v.  Bordcnave,  Jacob,  510. 

Ves.  Sen.  445,  446;  Apthorp  r.  Comstock,  §  302.    i  St.  Paul's  v.  Kettle,  2  V.  & 

2  Paige  (N.  Y.),  482.     But  see  Peake  v.  B.   1  ;    Bennett  v.  Neale,   Wightw.   324  ; 

Highfield,  1  Russ.  559.  Savage  v.  Carroll,  1  Ball  &  B.  548. 

11   Atkyns  v.  Wabash  Ry.  Co.  (Ward,  '^  Balch  r.  Tucker,  2  Ch.  Cas.  40. 

Intervenor),    41    Fed.    R.    193;    quoted,  ^  Price  c.  Price,  cited  in  2  Smith's  Ch. 

supra,  §  251.  Pr.  76. 

1-  Field  V.  Holland,  0  Crancli,  8.  ^  Savage  v.  Carroll,  1  Ball  &  B.  548  ; 

^^  Bryan  v.  Parker,  1  Younge  &  C.  170;  Price  v.  Berrington,  3  Macn.  &  G.  4bG. 


§  304.]  MANNER   OF   TRYING   AN   ISSUE.  549 

§  303.  Time  •when  an  Issue  is  directed.  —  According  to  the  old 
practice  an  issue  was  rarely  directed  before  the  original  hearing 
of  a  cause. 1  Instances  have  occurred,  however,  wlien  this  has 
been  done  before  that  time  upon  motion,^  and  even  to  deter- 
mine the  facts  upon  a  motion  for  an  injunction  or  a  receiver, 
when  the  affidavits  for  or  against  the  motion  were  conflicting. -"^ 
An  issue  has  been  often  granted  after  the  original  hearing  at  a 
hearing  for  farther  directions;^  and  even  afterwards.^  It  has 
been  said  that,  in  the  Federiil  courts,  an  order  for  an  issue  should 
not  be  made  until  all  the  proofs  have  been  taken  and  publica- 
tion has  passed.**  Under  the  statute  providing  for  the  direction 
of  issues  in  patent  causes,  it  would  seem  that  one  can  now 
be  directed  by  an  interlocutory  order  more  frequently  than 
formerly.' 

§  304.  Manner  of  trying  an  Issue.  —  The  manner  of  trying  a 
feigned  issue  is  thus  described  by  Blackstone.  "  But,  as  no  juiy 
can  be  summoned  to  attend  this  court,  the  fact  is  usually  directed 
to  be  tried  at  the  bar  of  the  court  of  King's  bench,  or  at  the 
assizes  upon  a  feigned  issue.  For  (in  order  to  bring  it  there, 
and  have  the  point  in  dispute,  and  that  only,  put  in  issue)  an 
action  is  brought,  wherein  the  plaintiff,  by'  a  fiction,  declares 
that  he  laid  a  wager  of  5/.  with  the  defendant  that  A  was  heir  at- 
law  to  B  ;  and  then  avers  that  lie  is  so  ;  and  therefore  demands 
the  bl.  The  defendant  admits  the  feigned  wager,  but  avers  that 
A  is  not  the  heir  to  B,  and  thereupon  that  issue  is  joined,  which 
is  directed  out  of  chancery  to  be  tried  ;  and  thus  the  verdict  of 
the  juror  at  law  determines  the  fact  in  the  court  of  equity. 
These  feigned  issues  seem  borrowed  from  the  sponsio  judicialis 
of  the  Romans  :  and  are  also  frequently  used  in  the  courts  of 
law,  by  consent  of  the  parties,  to  determine  some  disputed  right 
without  the  formality  of  pleading,  and  thereby  to  save  much 
time  and  expense  in  the  decision  of  a  cause."  '  The  legal  fiction 
is,  however,  now  practically  out  of  use  ;  and  issues  are  tried  upon 

§  303.   1  FuUagary.  Clark,  18  Ves.  481.  5  Prjce  v.  Price,  cited  in  2  Smith's  Ch. 

2  Middleton  v.  Sherburne,  4  Y.  &  C.     Pr.  76. 

358;    Kent  v.  Burgess,  11   Simons, -361 ;  ^  Goodyear  r-.  Providence  Rubber  Co., 

Townley   v.    Deare,  3   Beav.  213;    Lan-  2  Fisher's  Pat.  Cas.  409. 

cashire  v.  Lancashire,  9  Beav.  2.3U.  ^  18  St.  at  L.  ch.  77,  p.  315;  1st  Supp. 

3  Gardiner  v.  Rowe,  4  .Madd.  2.30  ;  De-  U.  S.  K.  S.  ].3(i. 

Tastet  V.  Bordenave,  Jacob,  516  §  304.   '  3  Bl.  Com.  452. 

4  New    Orleans,   G.    L.    &   B.    Co.    v. 
Dudley,  8  Paige  (N  Y.),  452. 


550  ISSUES   AT   LAW.  [cHaP.  XXII. 

the  common-law  side  of  a  Circuit  or  District  Court  frequently 
by  the  same  judge  that  directed  them.^  Tlie  course  of  proceed- 
ing upon  the  trial  of  an  issue  is  substantially  the  same  as  that  in 
ordinary  trials  at  common  law,  unless  the  judge  who  directed  it 
has  given  special  directions  upon  the  subject.^  When,  however, 
a  will  was  sought  to  be  proved  against  an  heir-at-law,  at  the  suit 
of  a  devisee,  it  was  necessary  by  the  former  practice  to  prove  the 
execution  of  the  will  by  examining  all  the  witnesses  who  were 
alive  and  capable  of  giving  testimony.^  If  the  order  for  an 
issue  direct  that  a  number  of  witnesses  be  examined,  but  the 
plaintiff  declines  to  call  some,  the  judge  himself  will  call  and 
examine  the  rest.^  It  seems,  too,  that  the  jury  should  be  sworn 
in  the  words  of  the  order  of  issue.'^  The  order  of  issue,  however, 
usually  contains  directions  as  to  admissions  to  be  made  and  doc- 
uments to  be  produced  by  tlie  parties."  No  admission  of  any 
fact  not  clearly  admitted  b}'  the  pleadings  will,  however,  be 
required.'^  If  such  directions  are  omitted  in  the  order  for  the 
issue,  they  may  be  obtained  afterwards  upon  motion.^  The  party 
upon  whom  the  bnrden  of  proof  rests,  whether  he  be  plaintiff  or 
defendant  in  the  original  suit,  is  directed  by  the  order  to  act  as 
plaintiff  in  the  issue.^*^  It  is  the  del'endant's  duty  to  name  an 
attorne}^  to  appear  for  him  at  the  trial  of  the  issue.  If  he  fail  to 
do  so,  it  has  been  held  that  an  order  may  be  obtained  directing 
tliat  he  name  an  attorney  in  four  daj's,  or  else  that  the  issue  be 
taken  as  tried  and  a  verdict  given  for  the  plaintiff. ^^  The  decree 
or  order  for  the  issue  should  specify  a  time  when  it  is  to  be  tried. ^^ 
If  the  plaintiff  make  default  in  having  the  case  ready  for  trial  at 
the  appointed  time,^^  or  either  party  fail  then  to  appear,  the 
court  will  order  the  issue  taken  pro  eonfesso  against  him,  unless 
he  can  show  a  reasonable  ground  for  a  postponement.^*    It  seems, 

•2  See  Wilson  v.  Riddle,  12-3  U.  S.  608.  (N.  Y.),  482  ;  Cart  v.  Hodgkin,  3  Svvanst. 

^  See  Kerr  v.  South  Park  Commission-  101. 

ers,  117  U.  S.  379 ;  Wilson  v.  Riddle,  123  »  Duke  of  Beaufort  v.  Morris,  2  Phil. 

U.  S.  608.  G83. 

*  Townsend    v.   Ives,   1   Wilson,  21G :  »  Marsh  v.  S.bbald,  2  V.  &  B.  375. 

Offle  r.  Cook,  1  Ves.  Sen.  177  ;  Bullen  v.  i»  Parker  v.  Morrell,  2  Phil.  453. 

Mifhel,  2  Price,  399  ;  Bootle  v.  BlundcU,  "  Wilson  v.  Ginger,  2  Dick.  521 ;  Hart- 

19  Ves.  494.  land  r.  Danc'ocks,  5  De  G.  &  Sni.  561. 

5  Groom  v.  Chambers,  2  Mont.  &  Avr.  i-  Daniell's  Cli.  Pr.  ch.  xxvi.  §  1. 

742  '■'  Bearblock  v.  Tyler.  1  J.  &  W.  225 ; 

«  Wilson  r.  Barnum,  1  Wall.Jr.  342.  Casborne  r.  Barsham,  5  M.  &  C.  113. 

7  Duke  of  Beaufort  v.  Morris.  2  Phil.  "  Casborne  r.  Barsham,  5  M.  &  (\  ll:j; 

683  ;    Apthorp    v.    Comstock,    2    Paige  Ilargrave  v.  llargrave,  b  Beav.  2b'J. 


I  305.]      EFFECT   OF   THE   FINDING   OF  A   JUKY   UPON   AN   ISSUE.       551 

that  an  application  for  a  postponement,^^  or  for  a  special  jury,  if 
one  be  desired,^^  should  be  made  to  the  judge  who  directed  the 
issue.  A  person  interested  in  the  result  of  an  issue,  but  who 
refuses  to  be  a  party  to  it,  may  be  allowed  to  attend  the  trial  by 
counsel,  in  which  case  he  may  be  compelled  to  produce  docu- 
ments material  to  the  case  and  in  his  possession. i''  After  the 
trial,  the  trial  judge  certifies  how  the  verdict  was  found,  but 
judgment  should  not  be  entered  upon  it.^^  If  any  special  cir- 
cumstances have  occuried  at  the  trial  which  he  thinks  it  right  to 
report  to  the  court,  he  indorses  the  postea.^^  He  may  also  furnish 
to  the  court  of  equity  a  description  of  the  trial.^'^  An  irregu- 
larity or  omission  in  this  respect  may,  however,  be  corrected  or 
disregarded.-^ 

§  305.  Effect  of  the  Finding  of  a  Jury  upon  an  Issue.  —  "  The 
verdict  of  a  jury  upon  an  issue  out  of  chancery  is  only  advisory 
and  never  conclusive  upon  the  court.  It  is  intended  to  inform 
the  conscience  of  the  Chancellor.  It  may  be  disregarded,  and  a 
decree  rendered  contrary  to  it."  ^  If,  therefore,  either  party  be 
dissatisfied,  he  must  move  for  a  new  trial  on  the  equity  and  not 
on  the  common-law  side  of  the  court  ;^  "and  for  that  purpose 
the  party  applying  for  a  new  trial  must  procure  notes  of  the 
proceedings  and  of  the  evidence  given  at  the  trial  for  the  use 
of  the  Chancellor.  This  is  done  either  by  moving  the  Chancel- 
lor to  send  to  the  judge  who  tried  the  issue,  for  his  notes  of  trial ; 
or  procuring  a  statement  of  the  same  in  some  other  proper  way. 
The  Chancellor  then  has  before  Inm  tlie  evidence  given  to  the 
jury,  and  the  proceedings  at  the  trial,  and  may  be  satisfied,  by 
an  examination  thereof,  that  the  verdict  ought  not  to  l)e  dis- 
turbed. The  evidence  and  proceedings  then  become  a  part  of 
the  record,  and  go  up  to  the  court  of  appeal  if  an  appeal  is 
taken."  ^  Unless  such  a  motion  is  made,  no  error  committed 
in  the  course  of  the  trial  of  the  issue   can  be  reviewed   upon 

15  Rebel  v.  Philpot,  9  Simons,  614.  21  Wilson  v.  Ridrllo,  12-3  U.  S.  608. 

1"  Anon.,  2  P.  Wms.  68.     As  to  depo-  §  ."05.   1  Mr.  Justice  Bradley  in  Watt 

sitions,  see  Calioon  I'.  King,  1  Clifford,  592.  v.  Starke,  101  U.  S.  247,  252.     See  also 

1'  Pindar  v.  Smith,  INIad   &  Geld.  48.  Basey  v.  Gallagher,  20  Wall.  670  ;  Allen 

18  Kerr  v.  S.  Park  Comni.,  117  U.  S.  379.  v.  Blunt,  3  Story,  742,  746. 

i»  White  V.  Lisle,  3  Swanst.  342  ;  Tren-  '^  Watt  v.  Starke,  101  U.  S.  247,  250 ; 

ton  Baking  Co.  v.  Russell,  1  Green  Ch.  Jolinson  v.  Harmon,  94  U.  S.  371.  378. 
(N.  J.)  492.  3  Mr.    Justice    Bradley    in    AVatt    v. 

2"  Bassett    v.    Johnson,    1    Green   Ch.  Starke,  101  U.  S.  247,  250,  251.     See  also 

(N.  J.)  154.  Jolinsou  t:  Harmon,  94  U.  S.  371. 


552  ISSUES   AT   LAW.  [CHAP.  XXII. 

appeal.*  Such  an  application  should  be  made  by  motion  or  pe- 
tition before  the  cause  comes  on  for  liearing  upon  further  direc- 
tions.^ The  form  of  an  issue  cannot,  however,  be  changed  in  this 
manner.  A  party  desiring  to  alter  it  must  do  so  by  presenting  a 
petition  for  a  rehearing  of  the  decree  or  order  directing  it.°  The 
manner  in  which  the  verdict  is  reviewed  in  equity  is  thus  described 
by  Lord  Eldon  :  "  In  considering  whether,  in  such  a  case  as  this, 
the  verdict  ought  to  be  disturbed  by  a  new  trial,  allow  me  to  say 
that  this  court,  in  granting  or  refusing  new  trials,  proceeds  upon 
very  different  principles  from  those  of  a  court  of  law.  Issues  are 
directed  to  satisfy  the  judge,  which  judge  is  supposed,  after  he  is  in 
possession  of  all  tl^at  passed  upon  the  trial,  to  know  all  that  passed 
there  ;  and  looking  at  the  depositions  in  tlie  cause,  and  the  pro- 
ceedings both  here  and  at  law,  he  is  to  see  whether,  on  the  whole, 
they  do  or  do  not  satisfy  him.  It  has  been  ruled  over  and  over 
again,  that  if,  on  the  trial  of  an  issue,  a  judge  reject  evidence  which 
ought  to  have  been  received,  or  receive  evidence  which  ought  to 
have  been  refused,  though  in  that  case  a  court  of  law  would  grant 
a  new  trial,  yet  if  this  court  is  satisfied,  that  if  the  evidence 
improperly  received  had  been  rejected,  or  the  evidence  improp- 
erly rejected  had  been  received,  the  verdict  ought  not  to  have 
been  different,  it  will  not  grant  a  new  trial  merely  upon  such 
grounds."''  The  usual  grounds  for  directing  a  new  trial  of  an 
issue  are,  "1st,  the  alleged  improper  summing  up  of  the  judge  ; 
2dly,  because  the  weight  of  evidence  is  against  the  verdict  ; 
and  3dly,  because  of  an  informality  in  the  evidence."  ^  Surprise 
and  fraud  are  also  reasons  for  granting  a  new  trial.^  Wlicn  the 
dispute  concerns  the  title  to  land,  in  imitation  of  courts  of  law 
two  trials  of  the  issue  have  often  been  granted,  when  the  first 
verdict  was  satisfactor}'  upon  the  evidence  ;^'^  and  sometimes  the 
court  has  directed  a  second  trial  for  the  solemn  determination  of 
the   matter,  without  setting  aside   the   first  verdict,  the   effect 

4  Brockett  v.  Brockett,  3  How.  C91  ;  494  ;  Tatham  v.  Wrislit,  2  Russ.  &  M.  1 ; 
Johnson  v.  Harmon,  94  U.  S.  371  ;  Watt     Watt  v.  Starke,  101  U.  S.  247,  252. 

V.  Starke,  101  U.  S.  247.  »  Smitli's  Ch.  Pr.  (Pliila.  ed.)  vol.  ii. 

5  Attorney-General  v.  Montgomery,  2  p.  84.  See  also  Tatham  v.  Wright,  2 
Atk.  378  ;  Van  Alst  v.  Hunter,  5  J.  Ch.  Russ  &  M.  1  ;  Watt  v.  Starke,  101  U.  S. 
(N.  Y.)  148,  152.  247,  253. 

c  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (3d  American  eJ.)  »  Exton  r.  Turner,  2Cii.  Cas.  80;  Stan- 

1114.  den  v.  Edwards,  1  Ves.  Jr.  133. 

7  Lord  Ehlon  in  Barker  v.  Ray,  2  Russ.  ''  Earl  of  Dariintjton  v.  Bowes,  1  Eden, 

63.     See  also  Bootle  v.  Blundell,  19  Ves.  271 ;  Stace  v.  Mabbot,  2  Ves.  Sen.  5"::. 


§  306.]  PROCEEDINGS   AFTER   THE   TRIAL   OF   AN   ISSUE.  553 

of  which  was  that  the  first  verdict  was  admitted  in  evidence 
upon  the  second  trial,  and  had  its  weight  with  the  jury.^^  In 
such  case,  the  court  usually  made  it  a  condition  of  granting  a 
second  trial,  that  the  applicant  should  pay  to  the  other  party  the 
costs  of  the  first. ^2 

§  306.  Proceedings  after  the  Trial  of  an  Issue.  —  After  tliC  trial 
of  an  issue  and  the  completion  of  the  record  by  the  addition  of 
the  posted^  the  cause,  unless  a  new  trial  is  obtained,  should  be 
set  down  for  hearing.^  This  may  be  done  in  the  usual  manner; 
but  it  seems,  not  before  the  expiration  of  tlie  first  four  days  of 
the  term  following  the  trial,  in  order  that  the  party  against 
whom  the  verdict  has  been  found  may  have  an  opj)ortunity  of 
moving  for  a  new  trial.-  The  cause  then  comes  on  in  the  regular 
course,  when  such  final  or  other  deci-ee  as  is  proper  is  pronounced. 
The  costs  of  an  issue  do  not  follow  the  verdict  as  a  matter  of 
course,  but  are  in  the  discretion  of  the  court  which  directed  the 
issue ;^  though  they  are  usually  given  to  the  party  in  whose  favor 
the  verdict  was  rendered.*  In  one  case  the  court  ordered  an 
advance  out  of  a  fund  in  its  possession,  in  order  to  enable  the 
parties  to  try  an  issue  directed  by  it.^ 

11  Baker  v.  Hart,  3  Atk.  542.  s  Decker  v.  Caskey,  2  Green  Ch.  (X.  J.) 

1-  Baker  v.  Hart,  3  Atk.  542  ;  Edwin  v.  44G. 
Tliomas,  1  Vern.  489.  *  Corporation  of  Roeliester  v.  Lee,  2 

§  306.   1  Allen  v.  Blunt,  8  Story,  742  ;  De  G.  M.  G.  427. 
Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  cli.  xxvi.  '•'  Coombs  c.  Brooks,  3  UeG.  &  S.  45i 

2  1  Newland's  Ch.  Pr.  357. 


554  PROCEEDINGS   IN   A   MASTER'S   OFFICE.        [CHAP.  XXIII. 


CHAPTER   XXIII. 

PROCEEDINGS   IN    A   MASTER'S   OFFICE. 

§  307.  References  to  Masters  in  General. —  The  labors  of  a  judge 
of  a  court  of  equity  are  often  matei-ially  lightened  by  referring 
the  consideration  of  matters  of  fact  to  a  master  in  chancery,  who 
is  directed  by  it  to  investigate  the  same  and  report  his  opinion 
thereon  to  the  court.  Certain  ministerial  acts  which  a  court  of 
equity  undertakes  are  also  performed  by  it  through  a  master. 
Tlie  matters  which  are  ordinarily  referred  to  masters  in  chaneeiT 
are  inquiries,  as  to  whether  pleadings  or  other  proceedings  in  a 
suit  in  equity  contain  impertinence  or  scandal ;  as  to  who  are 
the  heirs,  next  of  kin,  creditors,  or  members  of  a  particular  class 
of  legatees  of  a  person  whose  estate  is  in  the  liands  of  the  court 
for  distribution  ;  as  to  whether  the  title  to  real  estate  is  good  ; 
as  to  the  state  of  the  law  of  a  foreign  country  ;  as  to  whether 
one  of  two  books  or  other  publications  is  })irated  from  the  other; 
as  to  the  amount  of  damage  suffered  by  the  granting  or  with- 
holding of  an  injunction;  the  taking  of  accounts;  the  coniim- 
tation  of  interest  ;  the  settlement  of  conveyances,  and  other 
deeds  ;  the  selling  of  property  ;  the  appointment  of  trustees, 
receivers,  and  guardians  ;  and  the  superintendence  of  the  per- 
formance of  their  duties  by  receivers.  The  extent  of  a  master's 
authority  is  limited  by  the  decree  or  order  appointing  him  ;  ^  and 
it  has  been  said  that  it  cannot  be  extended  even  by  consent.^ 
The  rules  provide  that  ''every  decree  for  an  account  of  the 
personal  estate  of  a  testator  or  intestate  shall  contain  a  direction 
to  the  master  to  whom  it  is  referred  to  take  the  same  to  inquire 
and  state  to  the  court  wdiat  parts,  if  any,  of  such  personal  estate 
are  outstanding  undisposed  of,  unless  the  court  shall  otherwise 
direct."  ^ 

§  007.  1  Lonsdale  Co.  v.  Moies,  2  Clifl.  R.  R.  of  Iowa,  2  Fed.  R.  G5G  ;  Gordon  v. 
538.  Ilohart,  2  Story,  213. 

-  Farmers'   L.  &   Tr.    Co.   v.   Central  ^  Rule  73. 


§  309.]  BRINGING   ON   A   EEFERENCE.  555 

§  308.  Who  may  be  appointed  Master.  — -  The  Circuit  Courts, 
"both  the  judges  concurring  in  tlie  appointment,"  have  the  power 
to  appoint  standing  masters  in  chancery  in  their  respective  dis- 
tricts.^ A  Circuit  Court  may  also  appoint  a  master  pro  hac  vice 
in  any  particuhir  case.^  A  recent  statute  provides  that  "no 
clerk  of  the  district  or  circuit  courts  of  the  United  States,  or 
their  deputies,  sliall  be  appointed  a  receiver  or  master  in  any  case, 
except  where  a  judge  of  said  court  shall  determine  tliat  special 
reasons  exist  therefor,  to  be  assigned  in  the  order  of  appoint- 
ment."^ It  has  been  held  at  circuit  that  this  statutory  prohibi- 
tion is  for  the  benefit  of  the  parties  to  the  litigation,  and  may  be 
waived  by  their  consent  to  an  order  appointing  such  an  officer 
master  in  a  particular  case  ;  and  that  after  such  an  order  or 
decree  has  thus  been  entered  and  the  parties  have  proceeded 
before  the  master,  it  may  be  amended  by  the  insertion  of  a  clause 
stating  that  the  court  has  determined  "that  such  consent  is  a 
sufficient  special  reason  for  such  appointment."  *  Another  stat- 
ute provides  that  "  no  person  related  to  any  justice  or  judge  of 
any  court  of  the  United  States  by  afhnity  or  consanguinity, 
within  the  degree  of  first  cousin,  shall  liereafter  be  appointed 
by  such  court  or  judge  to  be  employed  by  such  court  or  judge 
in  any  office  or  duty  in  any  court  of  which  such  justice  or  judge 
may  be  a  member."  ^ 

§309.  Bringing  on  a  Reference.  —  The  rules  provide  that, 
whenever  a  reference  is  made,  the  party  at  whose  instance  or  for 
whose  benefit  it  was  directed  must  bring  the  same  to  a  hearing 
on  or  before  the  rule-day  next  succeeding  the  date  of  the  order 
for  a  reference.^  Otherwise,  the  adverse  party  ma}'-  forthwith 
cause  proceedings  to  be  had  before  the  master  at  the  costs  of  the 
party  who  procured  the  reference.'-^  The  master  need  not  report 
evidence  unless  required  by  either  party.^  It  is  the  master's 
duty,  as  soon  as  he  reasonably  can  after  the  matter  referred  to 
him  is  brought  before  him,  to  assign  a  time  and  place  for  pro- 
ceeding, and  to  give  due  notice  thereof  to  each  of  the  parties,  or 
their  solicitors.'^    Notice  may  be  served  by  mail  or  otherwise.^    It 

§  308.    1  Rule  82.  "  Rule  82.  ^  Union  Supar  Refinery  v.  Mathiessoii, 

3  20  St.  at  L.  eh.  183,  p.  415.  3  Cliff    146,  140.     See   Kerosene  Lamp 

*  Fiseher  v.  Hayes,  22  Fed.  H.  02.  Heater  Co.  v.  Fisher,  1  Fed.  R.  91. 

5  24    St.   at   L.   p.  552,  eh.  ST.;,  §  7.  •»  Rule  75. 

§300.    1  Rule  74.  ■'  Kerosene  Lamp  Heater  Co  i-.  Fisher, 

^  Rule  74.  1  Fed.  li.  01. 


556  PEOCEEDINGS   IN    A   MASTER'S    OFFICE.        [CHAP.  XXIII. 

need  not  be  served  by  the  marshal.^  By  the  old  English  practice 
parties  interested  in  the  subject-matter  of  a  reference  were  brouglit 
before  the  court  by  the  service  of  a  warrant.  This  was  a  memo- 
randum, upon  a  slip  of  paper  entitled  in  the  cause,  and  signed  by 
the  master,  appointing  a  day  and  hour  for  all  parties  concerned  to 
attend  him  on  the  matter  of  the  reference.'  It  was  in  substan- 
tially the  following  form :  "  By  virtue  of  an  order  of  reference, 
I  do  appoint  to  consider  the  matters  thereby  to  me  referred,  on 
next,  at of  the  clock,  in  tlie noon,  at  my  Cham- 
bers in ,  at  which  time  and  place  lAl  parties  concerned  are 

to  attend.     [Signature.]      Dated  the  day  of  ,  .'"  ^ 

It  is  a  better  practice,  however,  for  the  warrant  to  contain  a  state- 
ment of  the  nature  of  the  reference.^  This  warrant  is  often  called 
a  "summons."^**'  There  was  required  to  be  at  least  one  clear  day 
between  the  day  of  issuing  the  warrant  and  the  di\^'  appointed 
by  it  for  the  attendance  of  the  parties  thereon.^^  The  warrant 
was  obtained  from  the  master's  clerk  by  the  solicitor  applying 
for  it;  and  the  latter  underwi-ote  a  memorandum  expressing  its 
object,  and  saw  that  due  service  of  it  was  made.^-  Whenever 
a  document  of  any  kind  was  left  at  the  master's  office  by  the 
solicitor  of  either  of  the  parties,  he  usually  took  out  a  warrant, 
which  he  underwrote,  "on  leaving  the,"  &c.^^  This  was  termed 
a  "  warrant  on  leaving,"  and  was  served  in  the  usual  manner, 
but  was  considered  a  mere  formal  notice,  to  afford  tlie  opposite 
party  an  opportunity  of  obtaining  a  copy  of  the  document  left 
that  he  misfht  either  admit  or  contest  the  circumstances  there 
stated,  as  he  might  be  advised.^* 

§  310.  Parties  entitled  to  attend  a  Reference  before  a  Master.  — 
The  general  rule  appears  to  be,  that  all  parties  beneficiall}'  inter- 
ested, either  in  the  estate  or  in  the  fund  or  matter  in  question, 
are  entitled  to  attend  before  the  master  on  all  those  proceedings 
which  may  affect  their  interests,  or  increase  or  diminisli  their 
proportion  in  the  fund.^  The  only  exception  to  this  rule  is  said 
to  be  the  case  of  a  reference  to  a  master  of  the  title  to  an  estate 

<'  Kerosene  Lamp  Heater  Co.  I'.  Fisher,  ^M    Ncwland's   Chan.    Pr.    324.      See 

1  Fed.  R  91.  Berniec.  Vandever,  10  Ark.  G16. 

"  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  ch.  xxvi.  i-  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  ch.  xxvi. 

8  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  ch.  xxvi.  ^^  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  ch.  xxvi. 

^  Manhattan  Co.  r.  Evertson.  4  Pai;,'e,  '*  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  ch.  xxvi.    See  Ma n- 

(N.  Y.)  270.  hattanCo.r.Kvertson.4Paip:e(N.Y.),276. 

•'  Manhattan  Co.  r.  Evertson,  4  Paige,  §  :'1*^>.    '    Daniell's    Ch.    Pr.    ch.    xxvL 

(N.  V.J  27(>.  See  Johnson  v.  Waters,  111  U.  S.  040. 


§  oil.]  PROCEEDINGS    EEFOKE    A    MASTER    IN    GENERAL.  557 

purchased  under  a  decree,  when  the  vendor's  solicitor  only  has 
the  riglit  to  appear  before  the  master  on  the  iiKpairw^     An  exec- 
utor, as  the   legal  representative  of  liis  testat(jr,  is  entitled  to 
attend  on  all  proceedings  relating  to  the  charges  of  creditor.s 
seeking  payment  out  of  the  personal  estate;  but  after  there  has 
been  a  report  of  debts,  if  all  the  persons  interested  in  the  pci- 
sonal  estate  are  before  the  court  the  executor  is  onlj'-  entitled  to 
attend  on  those  proceedings  in  which  he  is  personally  interested 
as  an  accounting  party.^     Trustees   \\ere  formerly  not  allou'ed 
(except  in  proceedings    carried    on    by   themselves)    to    attend 
before  the  master  in  cases  where  all  the  beneficiaries  were  before 
the  court ;  but  if  there  were  any  pei-sons  in  esse,  or  who  might 
"come  into  esse"  who  might  become  interested  and  whose  in- 
terests were  only  represented  by  the  trustees,  and  were  not  too 
remote,  the   trustees   were  entitled   to  attend    the    proceedings 
affecting  those  interests.^      The  rule  that  all  parties  interested 
in  the  resnlt  are  entitled  to  attend  before  the  master  applies  not 
only  to  those  who  are  parties  to  the  record,  but  to  those  who  are 
"  quasi  parties,"  by  having  come  in  under  the  decree  and  estab- 
lished a  claim.^    A  party  who  has  appeared,  but  allowed  a  decree 
to  be  taken  against  him  by  default  for  want  of  an  answer,  is,  it 
seems,  entitled  to  notice  of  the  proceedings  against  him  under 
the  decree  in  the  master's  office  ;^  but  cannot  appear  upon  such 
notice  before  the  master  without  previously  obtaining  an  order 
for  that   purpose,   which   is   usually   only  granted   upon   termsJ 
The    proper   course    to    test   a    party's   right    to   attend    before 
a  master  is,  after  the  latter's  refusal,  to  apply  to  the  court  by 
petition    for   an   order   permitting    the    party  to    attend   before 
him.^ 

§  311.  Proceedings  before  a  Master  in.  General.  —  The  rules 
give  the  master  authority  to  regulate  all  the  proceedings  upon 
a  reference  to  him.^  In  case  of  an  abuse  of  his  discretion  by  a 
master,  any  party  aggrieved  may  apply  to  the  court  for  an  order, 
requiring  the  master  to  act  properly  ;2  but  such  applications  are 

-  DanicU's  Ch.  Pr.  ch.  xxvi.  ^  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  ch.  xxvi. 

3  Daniell's  Cli.  Pr.  ch.  xxvi.  §  311.    i  Rule  77. 

*  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  ch.  xxvi.  -  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  ch.  xxvi  ;   Bate  Re- 

&  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  ch.  xxvi.  friajerating  Co.  v.  Gillette,  28  Fed.  R.  673  ; 

G  King  V.  Bryant.  3  M.  &,  C.  191 ;  Dan-     Rule  75.     See  Re  Thomas,  35   Fed.  R. 

iell's  Ch.  Pr.  ch.  xxvi.  337,  340. 

^  Ileyn  v.  Heyn,  Jacob,  49 ;  Daniell's 
Ch.  Pr.  ch.  xxvi. 


358 


PROCEEDIXGS    IN    A    MASTER'S    OFFICE.        [CHAP.  XXIII. 


not  encouraged,^  and  are  only  granted  in  extraordinary  cases.* 
If  any  party  fail  to  appear  at  the  appointed  time  and  place,  the 
master  may  either  proceed  ex  i^arte^  or,  in  his  discretion,  may 
adjourn  the  proceedings.^  In  the  latter  case,  he  should  give  notice 
of  the  adjournment  to  the  party  who  failed  to  ap[)ear,  or  to  his 
solicitor.^  It  is  the  master's  duty  to  proceed  iu  the  reference 
with  all  reasonable  diligence  and  with  the  least  practiciihle 
delay."  Otherwise,  either  party  may  apply  to  the  court  or  a  judge 
thereof,  for  an  order  requiring  the  master  to  speed  the  proceed- 
ings and  to  make  his  report,  and  to  certify  to  the  court  or  judge  the 
reasons  for  any  delay .^  There  is  no  necessity  for  the  master's  tak- 
ing any  oath,  unless  the  order  of  reference  especially  re(]^uires  him 
to  do  so.^  All  parties  who  are  required  to  account  before  a  master 
must  bring  in  their  accounts  in  the  form  of  debtor  and  creditor.^'' 
Should  a  party  fail  to  do  so,  the  master  may  make  an  order 
requiring  him  to  furnish  such  an  account. ^^  Tlie  order  should 
not  be  granted  till  tlie  first  hearing  of  the  reference.^^  The  order 
must  be  served  personally  with  a  copy  of  this  order  and  a  notice 
of  the  day  to  which  the  hearing  is  adjourned.^^  Service  may  be 
made  by  any  disinterested  person.^*  If  the  defendant  then  fails 
to  appear  and  account,  he  is  in  contempt. ^^  If  any  of  the  other 
parties  is  dissatisfied  with  the  accounts  rendered,  he  may  exam- 
ine the  accounting  party  either  orally  or  by  interrogatories  or  by 
deposition,  as  the  master  directs. ^"^  By  the  English  practice,  the 
time  for  a  single  hearing  before  a  master  did  not  usually  exceed 
one  hour,  unless  the  master  continued  the  hearing  longer,  when 
an  increased  fee  might,  it  seems,  be  charged. i"  It  was  the  duty 
of  the  master  or  his  clerk  to  mark  in  the  master's  book  the 
names  of  the  solicitors  who  attended,  and  no  other  attendance 
than  tliose  so   marked   was  allowed   in   taxing  costs. ^^      In  the 


3  Lull  V.  Clark,  20  Fed.  R.  454  ;  ^Yoo8- 
ter  r.  Gumbirnner,  20  Fed.  R.  167 ;  Bate 
Refrigerating  Co.  v.  Gillette,  28  Fed.  R. 
673. 

4  Lull  1-.  Clark,  20  Fed.  R.  454;  Wooster 
V.  Gumbirnner,  20  Fed.  R.  167  ;  Bate  Re- 
frigerating Co.  V.  Gillette,  28  Fed.  R.  673. 

»  Rule  75. 
«  Rule  75. 

7  Rule  75. 

8  Rule  76. 

9  Thompson  v.  Smith,  2  Bond,  320. 
■0  Rule  79. 


"  Kerosene  Lamp  Heater  Co. 
Fisher,  1  Fed.  R.  01. 

i-'  Kerosene  Lamp  Heater  Co. 
Fisher,  1  Fed.  R.  91. 

15  Kerosene  Lamp  Heater  Co. 
Fisher,  1  Fed.  R.  91. 

'■*  Kerosene  Lamp  Heater  Co. 
Fisher,  1  Fed.  R.  91. 

15  Kerosene  Lamp  Heater  Co. 
Fisher,   1  Fed.  R.  91. 

16  Rule  79. 

1"  T^anicirs  Ch.  Pr.  ch.  xxvi. 
IS   l)aiiii.ir»  Cli.  I'r.  cli.  xxvi. 


§  312.]  A  STATE  OF  FACTS.  559 

Southern  District  of  New  York,  a  master  is  forbidden  to  adjourn 
a  reference  for  more  than  ten  days  without  the  written  consent 
of  all  the  parties  or  the  authorization  of  one  of  the  judges.^^ 

§  312.  A  State  of  Facts.  —  By  the  English  practice  a  party 
w^io  intended  to  examine  witnesses  before  a  master  under  a 
decree  was  obliged  to  carry  in  a  state  of  facts  detailing  the  cir- 
cumstances which  he  desired  to  prove. ^  This  was  also  the  general 
form  by  which  the  prosecution  of  every  reference  to  a  master 
was  commenced.^  "A  state  of  facts,  as  its  name  imports,  is  a 
statement  in  writing,  made  by  a  party  who  wislies  to  prosecute 
or  resist  any  inquiry  before  a  master,  of  the  facts  and  circum- 
stances upon  w^hich  he  relies,  either  in  support  of  his  own  cause, 
or  in  contradiction  or  defeasance  of  that  of  his  adversary.  It 
is,  in  effect,  the  pleading  of  the  party  before  the  master,  and  is 
governed  by  nearly  the  same  rules  and  principles  as  pleadings  in 
the  Court,  although,  not  being  signed,  nor,  in  general,  prepared 
by  counsel,  they  are  not  always  so  strictly  observed.  A  state 
of  facts,  however,  must  be  pertinent  to  the  matter,  and  must 
not,  any  more  than  any  other  proceeding  in  the  cause,  contain 
any  scandal,  and  if  it  is  either  scandalous  or  imperiinent,  the 
scandalous  or  impertinent  matter  may  be  expunged,  in  the  man- 
ner which  will  be  presently  pointed  out.  A  state  of  facts  is 
intituled  in  the  cause,  and  contains  a  detail  of  the  facts  and 
circumstances  intended  to  be  relied  upon  by  the  jjarty  :  when 
the  party  carrying  in  the  state  of  facts,  makes  any  claim  upon  the 
fund  in  Court,  it  is  usual  to  conclude  the  statement  with  the  par- 
ticulars of  the  claim,  in  the  manner  of  a  prayer  for  relief  to  the 
bill,  as  follows: — 'And  the  said  A.  B.,  therefore,  claims,  &c.,' 
in  such  case  the  proceeding  is  called  '  a  state  of  facts  and  claims.' 
When  the  object  of  the  party  is  to  charge  another  with  the 
receipt  of  money,  &c.,  the  state  of  facts  concludes  with  a  charge 
in  the  following  form  :  — '  and  the  said  A.  B.,  therefore,  charges, 
&c.,'  in  such  case  the  proceeding  is  called  '  a  state  of  facts  and 
charge.'  It  may  be  remarked,  that  a  charge  is  not  always  pre- 
ceded by  a  state  of  facts,  but  if  the  matter  appears  from  any 
admissions  in  any  account,  or  examination  or  proceeding  in  the 
master's  office,  and  requires  no  other  proof  in  sui)port  of  it,  it  is 
usual  to  make  '  a  charge '  only.      When  a  state  of  facts  is  pre- 

19  Rule   115  of   United  States  C   C,         §312.   '  D;uii<!rs  Cli   Pr.  di.  xxvi. 
S.  D.  N.  Y.  2  Daiiiell's  Cli.  Pr.  ch.  x.xvi. 


560  PROCEEDINGS   IN    A   MASTER'S    OFFICE.        [CHAP.  XXIII. 

pared,  it  is  carried  in  to  the  master's  office  and  a  warrant  '  on 
leaving '  must  be  served  upon  the  other  parties,  who  may  then 
apply  for  and  obtain  copies  from  tlie  master's  clerk,  and  if  they 
have  a  counter  state  of  facts  to  leave,  they  must  ])roceed  in  the 
same  manner.  It  is  usual  to  add  to  a  state  of  facts,  a  sort  of 
petition,  that  the  party  may  be  at  liberty  to  add  to,  alter,  or  var}' 
the  state  of  facts,  as  he  may  be  advised  ;  and  it  is  presumed,  that 
such  form  was  originally  considered  necessary,  to  enable  the 
party  to  amend  his  state  of  facts,  after  it  has  been  delivered  in. 
It  is,  however,  now  an  unnecessaiy  form,  as  a  state  of  facts  may 
be  amended  at  an}'  time,  or  a  further  state  of  facts  carried  in, 
upon  leaving  which,  a  warrant,  '  on  leaving,'  should  be  taken 
out  and  served,  as  when  an  original  state  of  facts  is  left."*^ 

§  313.  Evidence  before  a  Master.  —  "-All  affidavits,  depositions, 
and  documents  wiiich  have  been  previously  made,  read,  or  used 
in  the  court  upon  any  proceedings  in  any  cause  or  matter  may 
be  used  before  the  master."  ^  These  should,  however,  be  regu- 
larly offered  in  evidence,  so  that  the  other  party  may  have  an 
opportunity  to  exjjhiin  or  rebut  them.^  Otherwise,  they  cannot  be 
referred  to  upon  the  argument,  or  used  in  support  of  the  report.^ 
The  master  has  power  to  examine  under  oath  the  parties  in  the 
cause,  and  any  witnesses  produced  by  them,*  and  any  creditor 
or  other  person  coming  in  to  claim  before  him.^  The  evidence 
should  be  taken  down  in  writing  by  the  master,  or  some  one 
in  his  presence,  so  that  the  court  may  use  the  same.^  Witnesses 
who  live  in  tlie  district  may,  upon  due  notice  to  the  opposite 
party,  be  summoned  to  appear  before  a  master,  by  a  subpoena 
issued  from  tlie  clerk's  office  in  blank  and  filled  by  the  party 
applying  for  the  same,  or  by  the  master,  requiring  the  attendance 
of  the  witnesses  at  a  time  and  place  therein  specified.''^  Such 
witnesses  are  entitled  to  the  same  compensation  as  for  attend- 
ance in  court.^  A  refusal  to  appear  in  obedience  to  such  a 
subpoena  is  a  contempt  punishable  by  the  court  or  a  judge  thereof 
by  an  attachment  issued  upon  the  master's  certificate.^    Upon  the 

8  Danicll's  Ch.  Vr  cli.  xxvi.  *  TJnle  77. 

§313.   1  Rule  80    Rut  see  Hammacher  &  T^ulc  81. 

V.  Wilson,  32  Fed.  R.  796.  «  Rule  81. 

2  Bell  V.  U.  S.  Stamping  Co.,  32  Fed.  7  T?„ie  78. 
R.  549.  «  Hnle  78. 

3  Bell  V.  U.  S.  Stamping  Co.,  32  Fed.  R.  ^  Rule  77. 
549. 


§  314.]  master's  reports  axd  compensation.  561 

master's  certificate  a  commission  issues  from  the  clerk's  office  to 
take  the  depositions  of  witnesses  according  to  the  acts  of  Con- 
jrress  or  equity  rules.^'*  Under  extraordinary  circumstances,  a 
master  may  take  testimony  beyond  the  territorial  jurivsdiction  of 
the  court.^^  A  master  has  power  to  direct  the  mode  in  which 
matters  requiring  evidence  shall  be  proved  before  him.^  The 
court  ^^  may  but  rarely  will  interfere  with  the  master's  ruling 
in  this  respoL't  before  his  report  is  brought  before  it  for  review.^* 

§  314.  Masters'  Reports  and  Compensation.  —  The  final  decision 
of  a  master  upon  the  matters  referred  to  him  is  embodied  in  his 
rei)ort  to  the  court.  He  is  forbidden  by  the  rules  to  recite  at 
length  any  part  of  any  paper  or  deposition  brought  in  or  used 
before  him.^  He  is,  however,  required  to  refer  to  and  identify 
every  state  of  facts,  charge,  affidavit,  deposition,  examination,  or 
answer  used  before  him,  so  as  to  inform  the  court  concerning 
the  pleadings  and  evidence  which  he  considered  in  reaching  the 
conclusions  embodied  in  his  report.'^  It  is  the  better  practice 
for  a  master  before  making  his  report  to  prepare  and  serve  on 
the  parties  a  draft  of  the  same,  with  notice  of  a  time  and  place 
when  and  where  he  will  hear  their  objections  thereto.^  At  the 
appointed  time,  counsel  should  appear,  make  their  objections  to 
the  proposed  report,  and  see  that  tlicse  objections  are  noted  in 
writing  and  filed  M'ith  the  master.*  This  is  the  ])ractice  in  the 
Second  Circuit.^  The  practice  is,  however,  in  some  circuits  very 
loose  in  this  respect.^  A  master  cannot  retain  his  report  as 
security  for  his  compensation."  His  compensation  is  fixed  by  the 
court  in  its  discretion  with  regard  to  tlie  circumstances  of  each 
particular  case.^  This  compensation  is  charged  upon  and  borne 
by  such  of  the  parties  to  the  cause  as  the  court  shall  direct.^  A 
master's  compensation  upon  an  accounting  is  usually  imposed  in 

1"  Tiule  77.  *  Fisclier  v.  Hayes,  16  Fed.  R.  460 ; 

"  Bate    Refrigerating   Co.   v.   Gillette,  Story  v.  Livingston,  13  Pet.  3o0. 
28Fed.  R.  673.  5  Fischer  v.  Hayes,    10  Fed.  R.  469; 

1-  Rule  77.  Jennings  i'.  Dolan,  29  Fed.  R.  861. 

13  Webster  Loom  Co.  r.  Higgins,  43  Fed.         ♦>  Hatch  r.  Indianapolis  &  Springfield 

R.  673.  R.  R.  Co.,  9  Fed.  R.  856. 

1*  Lull    V.    Clark,    20    Fed.    R.    454 ;  "  Rule  82. 

Wooster  r.  Gumhirnner,  20  Fed.  R.  167.  «  Rule  82;  Erie  Ry.  Co.  v.  Heath,  10 

§  314.  1  Rule  76.  Blatchf.   214 ;    Middleton  i'.   Bankers'  & 

2  Rule  76.     See  In  re  Thomas,  35  Fed.  Merchants'  Tel.  Co.,  32  Fed.  R.  624. 
R.  337,  339.  »  Rule  82, 

8  Fischer  v.  Hayes,  16  Fed.  R.  469; 
Jennings  r.  Dolan,  29  Fed.  R  861. 

VOL.  I.  —  36 


562  PROCEEDINGS   IN    A   MASTER'S    OFFICE.        [CIIAP.  XXHI. 

the  first  instance  upon  tlic  accounting  party. ^'^  The  order  ad- 
justing a  master's  compensation  should  name  the  party  who  is 
required  to  pay  it,  and  a  time  within  wliich  payment  is  to  be 
made.i^  Failure  to  comply  with  the  order  is  punishable  by  at- 
tachment for  contempt  of  court. ^^  It  seems,  however,  that  pay- 
ment pending  a  suit  can  only  be  compelled  on  the  application  of 
the  master  or  his  representative,  not  at  the  request  of  a  party .^^ 
As  soon  as  the  report  is  ready,  the  master  should  file  the  same  in 
the  clerk's  office  ;  and  the  clerk  should  enter  the  day  of  the  return 
in  the  order  book,^"^  If  no  exceptions  are  filed  within  one  month 
from  the  time  of  filing,  the  report  is  considered  as  confirmed  on 
the  next  rule-day  after  the  month  has  expired.^^ 

§  315.  Exceptions  to  Masters'  Reports.  —  Excej^tions  to  the  re- 
port of  a  master  must  l)e  filed  within  one  month  fi-om  the  day 
when  it  was  filed. ^  No  exception  will  lie  to  any  matter  which 
was  not  objected  to  before  the  master.^  In  circuits,  where  it  is 
not  the  practice  for  masters  to  serve  drafts  of  their  reports,  an 
exception  to  the  report,  but  not  an  exception  to  a  ruling  in  evi- 
dence, can  be  filed  without  a  preliminary  objection.^  Such  an 
exception  has  also  been  permitted  after  a  draft  of  the  report  had 
been  served,  and  no  objection  made  thereto.*  Objections  in  sup- 
port of  exceptions  may  be  allowed  to  be  filed  nunc  pro  tmic.^  Ex- 
ceptions should  specifically  point  out  the  errors  of  which  they 
complain,  and  if  they  rely  on  any  part  of  the  testimony,  it  is  the 
safer  practice  to  have  them  either  state  the  same  or  refer  thereto, 
so  that  the  court  can  without  difficulty  find  it.^     "  All  that  is  ne- 

15  Urner  v.  Kayton,  17  Fed.   R.  539;  Springfield   R.   K.  Co.,   9   Fed.    R.  856; 

s.  c.  17  Fed.  R.  845.  Jennings  c.  Dolan,  20  Fed.  R   861. 

11  Rule  82.  3  Hatch    v.  Indianapolis  &  Springfielil 

1-  Rule  82.  R.  R.  Co.,  9  Fed.  R.  850  ;  Fidelity  Ins.  & 

13  Mallory  Manuf  Co.  v.  Fox,  20  Fed.  Safe  Deposit  Co.  v.  Siienandoah  Iron  Co., 

R.  400.  42  Fed.  R  372.     See  Jennings  v.  Dolan, 

1*  Rule  83.  29  Fed.  R.  861. 

IS  Rule  83;    Burns  v.  Rosenstein,  135         *  Jennings  v.  Dolan,  29  Fed   R.  861. 
U.  S.  449,  455.  5  Fischer  v.  Hayes,  16  Fed   R.  469 

§315    1  Rule  83;  Fidelity  Ins.  &  Safe         e  Harding  r.  Handy,  11  Wheat.  103; 

Deposit  Co.  V.  Shenandoah  Iron  Co.,  42  Foster  o.  Goddard,  1  lilack,  506;  Greene 

Fed.  R.  372      But  see  Central  Trust  Co.  v.  Bishop,  1  Cliff.   186;  Stanton  v.  Ala- 

I'  Wabash,  St.  L  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Hamilton  bania  &  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  2  Woods,  506 ;  Cut- 

Intervenor,  27  Fed.  R,  175.  ting  /■.  Florida  Ry.  &  Nav.  Co.,  43  Fed.  R. 

2  Troy  Iron  &  Nail  Factory  v.  Corn-  743,  747.      In  Duden  c.  Maloy,   43  Fed. 

ing,  6  Blatchf.  328;  Fischer  r.  Hayes,  16  R.  407,  410,  the  following  e.xception  was 

Fed.  R.  460;  Story  r  Livingston,  13  Pet.  held  to  he  insufficient  according  to   the 

359.     But  see   Hatch  v.  Indianapolis   &  practice  in  tlie  Second  Circuit,  and  was 


§  315.]         EXCEPTIONS  TO  MASTERS'  REPORTS.  563 

cessary  is  that  the  exception  should  distinctly  point  out  the  find- 
ing and  the  conclusion  of  the  master  which  it  seeks  to  reverse."  " 
Exceptions  to  the  report  of  a  master  upon  a  reference  to  compute 
damages  for  tlie  infringement  of  a  patent,  which  raised  the  points 
that  the  infringement  was  not  wilful,  that  the  reduction  of 
plaintiff's  jjrolits  was  not  solely  due  to  the  infringement,  and  that 
the  master  should  have  reported  nominal  damages,  were  held 
suflicient  to  l)i-ing  before  the  court  the  whole  sul)ject  of  the  com- 
putation of  damages.'^  It  has  been  held  that  the  jioint  that  a 
statute  is  unconstitutional  need  not  be  specifically  stated  in  the 
exception.^  Exceptions  to  the  admission  or  exclusion  of  evidence, 
taken  upon  the  liearing  before  the  master,  need  not  be  restated 
in  the  exceptions  filed  to  this  report.^''  If  the  court  is  in  ses- 
sion when  exceptions  are  filed,  they  are  argued  at  that  session;  ^^ 
otherwise,  at  the  next  session. ^^  Every  presumption  is  in  favor 
of  the  cori'ectness  of  the  decision  of  a  master.^^  If  the  testimony 
is  conflicting,  the  court  will  rarely  interfere  with  the  master's 
decision  on  the  facts,  provided  he  made  no  erroi's  in  law  which 
affected  the  result.^*  Where  after  a  master's  report  had  been  filed 
a  judgment  finding  facts  ojjposite  to  those  found  by  the  master 
had  been  entered  in  a  ►State  court,  in  a  suit  between  the  same 
parties,  it  was  held  that  the  judgment  of  the  State  court  must 
be  followed  on  the  hearing  of  the  exceptions  to  the  report  of  the 
master. ^^  Trifling  errors  in  a  master's  statement  of  an  account 
will  be  disregarded.^*^  Exceptions  to  a  master's  report  are  only 
proper  when  he  has  made  an  erroneous  decision  ujion  the  matters 
referred  to  him.^"  The  remedy  for  an  irregularity  in  his  proceed- 
ing, or  for  his  neglect  to  report  upon  all  of  the  matters  referred 
to  him,  is  a  motion  to  set  aside  the  report,  or  to   refer  the  same 

consequently  disregarded;  "  For  tliat  tlie  ^-  Rule  83. 

master  lias  found  contrary  to  the  prelim-  ^'^  Med>ker  r.  Hcinebrake,  108  \J.  S.  Hfi  ; 

inary   requisitions  and  ohjei'tions  of  de-  Tilirlnnan  r.  Proctor,  125  U.  S.  l;](j ,   CaU 

fendant  to  his  proposed  draft  report,  and  lafjhan    ;;.    Myers,    128    U.    S.   617,  006; 

which  requisitions  and  objections  he  iiere  Kiniherly  v.  Arms,  129  U.  S.  512,  524. 

repeats,  and  contends  that  fresh  evidence  ^*  Welling  );.  La  Han,  .'jI  Fed.  R.  40; 

should  he  taken  thereon."  Mason  v.  Crosby.  3  W.  &  M    258,  Gott- 

"  Foster  v.  Goddard,  1  Black,  500,  500,  fried  v.  Crescent  Brewing  Co.,  22  Fed.  R. 

/)c/  Mr.  Justice  Swayne.  4:W  ,  Jaffrey  v   Brown,  20  Fed.   R.  476; 

»  Boesch  f.  Graff,  VV^j  U.  S.  097.  Central  Trust  Co.  r.  Te.xas  &  St.  L   Ry. 

9  Fidelity  Ins.  &  S.  D.  Co.  r.  Shenan-  Co.,  .^2  Fed.  R.  448. 

doah  Iron  Co.,  42  Fed.  R.  .372,  374.  ^^  Duden  *;.  .Maloy,  4-3  Fed.  R.  408. 

1'  Marks  /•.  Fo.\,  18  Fed.  R.  713.  ^^  Taylor  r.  Robertson,  27  Fed.  K.  537. 

"   Rule  83.  ^"  Taylor  c   Robertson,  27  Fed.  K.  537 


564  PROCEEDINGS   IX    A   MASTER'S    OFFICE.        [CHAP.  XXIII. 

back  to  the  mastcr.^^  A  report  of  a  master  may  be  corrected 
Avithout  a  re-reference,  from  facts  appearing  in  the  case  aside  from 
the  evidence  taken  before  him.^^  It  has  been  held  in  the  Second 
Circuit  that  if  the  master  errs  by  an  improper  rejection  of  evi- 
dence his  error  should  be  corrected  by  an  immediate  motion  to 
compel  him  to  receive  the  evidence,  and  is  not  the  proper  subject 
of  an  exception  to  his  report.-'^  The  party  who  files  exceptions  is 
obliged  to  pay  costs  for  each  exception  overruled,  and  is  entitled 
to  costs  for  each  exception  allowed.-^  The  amount  of  costs  is 
fixed  by  the  court  in  accordance  with  a  standing  rule  in  each 
circuit.^^  By  leave  of  the  court  exceptions  may  be  amended.-'^ 
The  review  of  a  master's  report  upon  a  receiver's  account  is 
described  in  a  preceding  section.^^ 

§  316.  Sales  by  Masters.  —  In  a  proper  case,  a  court  of  equity, 
having  the  possession  by  a  receiver  of  the  property  of  an  insol- 
vent railway  company,  may  make  an  interlocutory  order  for  the 
sale  of  the  property  Ijcfore  the  rights  of  the  parties  under  the 
several  mortgages  have  been  fidly  ascertained  and  determined.^ 
In  such  a  case  an  appeal  may  be  taken  at  once  from  the  order 
for  the  sale,  provided  the  sale  is  to  take  place  immediately  ;^  but 
not  if  any  subsequent  proceedings  and  order  must  precede  the 
sale.^  A  court  of  equity  will  not  make  an  interlocutory  order 
for  an  immediate  sale  of  mortgaged  property  u])on  terms  dis- 
charging the  lien  of  a  mortgage  not  yet  due,  unless  it  clearly 
appears  that  in  the  end  there  must  be  not  only  a  sale  of  the  prop- 
erty, but  a  sale  upon  those  terms.^  When  property  is  ordered 
to  be  sold  by  a  master,  it  must  be  sold  at  puljlic  auction,  unless 
the  court  otherwise  directs.^  Such  a  sale  is  conducted  under  the 
superintendence  of  the  solicitor  for  the  party  at  whose  prayer  the 
sale  is  made,  and  in  all  questions  which  subsequently  arise  be- 
tween the  buver  and  the  seller  it  is  said  that  he  is  considered  as 


13  Tyler  !>.  Simmons,  G  Paige  Ch.(N.Y.)  §316.    i  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  iv  Alle- 

127.  plieny  Val.  R.  Co.,  42  Fed.  R.  82,  85,  per 

1"  Witters  v.  Soule,  43   Fed.   K.  4l>5 ;  Aclieson,    J.;    First  National    Bank    v. 

Kelsey  v.  Hobby,  16  Pet.  2GU  ;  Parks  r.  iScliedd,  121  U.  S.  74. 
Booth,  102  U.  S.  90.  -i  First  National  Bank  ;•.  Scliedd,  121 

^^  Celluloid    Manuf.    Co.    v.    Cellonite  U.  S.  74. 
Maniif.  Co.,  40  Fed.  R.  476,  478.  s  Burlington   C.   R.  &  N.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

•-'  Uule  84.  Simmons,  12.3  U.  S.  52,  55. 

2-  Kule  84.  ■»  Pennsylvania   R.    Co.  v.   Allegheny 

23  Jones  V.  Lamar,  39  Fed.  R.  585.  Val.  R.  Co',  42  Fed.  R.  82,  86. 

2*  §  256.  &  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  ch.  x.xvi. 


§  316.]  SALES  BY  MASTERS.  565 

the  agent  of  all  the  parties  to  tlie  suit.*'  The  particulars  and  con- 
ditions of  the  sale  are  prepared  by  him.  They  should  be  enti- 
tled in  the  cause,  and  should  contain  a  general  description  of  the 
nature  and  situation  of  the  property ;  and  if  land,  should  state  in 
whose  possession  it  is  or  has  lately  been."  The  conditions  of  the 
sale  should  be  in  general  similar  to  those  annexed  to  ordinary 
sales  of  similar  property  in  the  vicinity.^  A  sale  by  a  receiver 
is  not  invalidated  by  his  announcement  at  the  sale  that  the  pur- 
chaser will  have  the  option  also  to  buy  other  i)ropcrty  not  cov- 
ered by  the  order  of  sale  but  acquired  by  him  in  the  due  course 
of  his  receivership.^  The  sale  should  be  advertised  at  least  twice, 
and  should  give  such  a  desci-iption  of  the  property  as  clearly  to 
indicate  and  identify  it.^^  i'\^^  master  has  power  to  adjourn  the 
sale,  even  after  the  auction  has  begun  and  bids  have  been  made.^i 
The  sale  is  conducted  in  substantially  the  following  manner :  The 
master,  his  clerk,  or  a  person  appointed  by  him,  is  present  with 
a  paper  upon  which  the  biddings  for  the  different  lots  are  to  be 
marked. ^^  Tiic  lots  are  successively  put  up  at  a  price  offered  by 
any  person  present ;  such  person,  according  to  the  English  prac- 
tice, signing  his  name  to  the  sum  which  he  offers  on  the  paper. ^-^ 
If  the  property  to  be  sold  consists  of  a  railroad  and  its  appur- 
tenances, it  is  usually  sold  as  a  single  thing.^^  It  has  been  said 
that  railroad  ])roi)crty  cannot  be  thus  sold  })iccemeal  except  bv  the 
consent  of  all  the  parties  expressed  in  open  court  or  in  writing. ^^ 
The  court  may  make  a  condition  of  the  sale  that  no  bid  shall 
be  considered  unless  each  bidder  first  dei)0sit  a  specified  sum  in 
cash,  —  in  one  instance,  twenty-five  thousand  dollars,i^  —  and  that 
no  bid  be  considered  unless  it  exceed  a  specified  amount.^'    Every 


6  Dalby  1-.  Pullen,  1  K.  &  M.  206.     But  Fed.  R.  315;  Jones  on  Kailroad  Securi- 

see  Blossom  r.  liailroad  Co.,  o  Wall.  I'M,  ties,  §g  G25-G28. 

207.  1"   Bound  ;,'.  South  Carolina  Jly.  Co.,  46 

"  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  eh.  xxvi.  Ped.  R.  315,  316,  ptr  Sinionton,  J. 

^  Daniell's  Ch.  Fr.  ch.  xxvi.  i*j  Farmers'  L.  &  'iV.  Co.  r.  Green  Bay 

8  Lake  Superior  Iron  Co.  v.   Brown,  &  Minn.  R.  R.  Co.,  10  Biss.  203. 

Bonnell  &  Co.,  44  Fed.  R.  539.  ^"  Farmers'  Loan  &Tr.  Co.  v.  Houston  & 

1'  Kauffman    r.    Walker,   9    Md.    229;  Texas  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  Pardee  &  Sabin, 

Merwin   c.    Smith,  1    Green   Ch.  (N.  J)  JJ.,  May,  1888;  Hervey  v.  Illinois  Mid- 

182  ;  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  ch.  xxvi.  land  Ry"Co.,U.S.  C.  C,  S.  D.  Illinois,  June 

11  Blossom    IK    Railroad    Co.,   3    Wall.  10th,  1880;  Roosevelt  w.  Columbus,  C.  & 

196.  I.  C.  Ry.  Co.,  U.  S.  C.  C,  N.  1).  Illinois, 

1-  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  ch.  xxvi.  Drummond,  J.,  Nov.  15th,  1882  ;  Jesup  r. 

13  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  ch.  xxvi.  AVabash,  St.  L.  &  P.  Ry.  Co  ,  IJ.  S.  C.  C, 

"  Bound  c.  South  Carolina  By.  Co.,  40  N.  1)   111.,  Gresham  &  Jackson,  JJ.,  1889. 


566  PROCEEDINGS    IN   A  MASTEH's    OFFICE.        [CHAP.  XXIIL 

subsequent  bidder  must  do  like  tlie  first  until  no  person  will  ad- 
vance on  the  last  bidder^  when  the  latter  is  declared  the  pur- 
chaser ;^^  unless  there  has  been  a  reserved  bidding  fixed,  when  if 
the  last  bidding  does  not  reach  the  reserved  one  tke  person  con- 
ducting the  sale  declares  that  the  lot  has  not  been  sold,  but  has 
been  bought  in  by  the  persons  interested  in  the  estate. ^^  It  seems 
that  the  court  may  direct  that  the  sale  be  made  for  cash,  in  u 
suit  under  a  railroad  mortgage  which  provides  that  the  purchase- 
money  may  be  paid  in  bonds.^  A  bid  may  be  revoked  any  time 
before  the  hammer  falls.-^  A  party  to  the  suit  has  the  right  to 
buy  at  the  sale.-^  The  sale  does  not  take  effect  until  confirmed 
by  the  court.'-^^  Before  the  confirmation  of  the  sale,  a  party  to 
the  suit,  or  even  a  stranger,  may  intervene  and  have  the  sale  set 
aside  on  })aying  the  purchaser's  expenses  and  offering  a  sufficient 
advance  in  price.-^  The  confirmation  may  be  upon  terms.^^  The 
purcl^aser  may  be  required  to  assume  responsibility  for  obligations 
of  the  receiver  as  a  condition  of  tlie  confirmation  of  the  sale.-*^ 
Should  the  purchaser  fail  to  pay  the  money  promised,  a  resale  will 
be  ordered,  provided  the  rights  of  third  persons  have  not  inter- 
vened ;'^'  and  he  may  be  compelled  by  attachment  issued  upon  a 
rule  or  order  to  show  cause  without  a  new  suit,  to  pay  the  differ- 
ence between  his  bid  and  the  amount  realized  from  the  second 
sale,  even  though  the  sale  has  not  been  confirmed.^^  Sucli  a  re- 
sale may  be  ordered  by  a  summary  ]>roceeding  upon  the  return  of 
an  order  to  show  cause  served  upon  the  purchaser,^  and  upon  the 
parties  at  wliose  suit  the  sale  was  madc."''^ 

The  purchaser  at  the  sale  and  those  who  purchase  from  him 
take  the  property  subject  to  the  right  of  the  court  to  modify  the 
decree  or  the  terms  of  the  sale,  on  appeal,  or  at  the  same  or  the 

18  Danicll's  CIi.  Pr.  cli.  xxvi.  -*  Blackburn  r.  Selma  R.  Co.,  3  Fed. 

19  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  ch.  xxvi.  R.  089. 

2"^  Farmers'  L.  &  Tr.  Co.  v.  G.  B.  &  M.  -^  Farmers'  L.  &  Tr.  Co.  v.  Green  Ba> 

R.  R.  Co.,  10  Biss.  203  ;  s.  c  6  Fed.  R.  100.  &  Minn.  R.  R.  Co  ,  10  Diss.  203  ;  s.  c.  G 

-1  Bh.ssoni  r.  Railroad  Co.,  3  Wall.  I'.tC,.  Fed.  R.  100  ;  F.  L.  &  Tr.  Co.  v.  Central 

See  Mayhew  >:  West  Virginia  Oil  &  Oil  R.  R.  of  Iowa,  17  Fed.  R.  758. 

Land  Co.,  24  Fed    R.  205,  215.  -''  F.  L.  &  Tr.  Co.  v.  Central  R.  R.  ol 

-2  Smith  /'.  Blaek,  115  U.  S.  308.  Iowa,  17  Fed.  R.  758. 

'-^3  Mayhew  v.  West  Virj,Mnia  Oil  &  Oil  -''  Stuart  v.  Gay,  127  U.  S.  518. 

Land  Co,  24  Fed.   R.  205,  215.     For  a  -^  Stuart  r.  Gay,  127  U.  S.  518;  Camden 

case  where  the  amount  of  the  price  was  v.  Mayhew,  129  U.  S.  73. 

considered  and  held  adequate,  see  Lake  -"  Stuart  ;;.   Gay,   127  U.  S.  518.     See 

Superior  Iron  Co.  v.  Brown,  Bonnell  &  Jaffroy  i\  Brown,  29  Fed.  R.  476. 

Co.,  44  Fed.  R.  539.  ^>  ferbcll  v.  Lee,  40  Fed.  R.  40. 


§  316.]  SALES  BY  MASTERS.  567 

succeeding  terra  of  the  court/'^^  A  material  change  of  the  terms 
may  be  a  ground  of  relieving  them  from  the  purchase,^^  ^  party 
bidding  at  a  foreclosure  sale  makes  himself  thereby  a  party  to 
the  suit,  and  subject  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  for  all  orders 
necessary  to  compel  the  perfecting  of  his  purchase.^  He  has  the 
right  to  be  heard  on  all  questions  thereafter  arising  affecting  his 
bid,^'*  which  are  not  foreclosed  by  the  terms  of  the  decree  of  sale, 
or  expressly  reserved  to  him  by  such  decree.^  Where  not  con- 
cluded by  the  terms  of  the  decree,  any  subsequent  proceedings  to 
determine  in  what  securities,  of  diverse  value,  his  bid  shall  be 
made  good,  are  matters  affecting  his  interests  on  which  he  has 
tlie  right  to  be  heard ;  ^  and  from  the  rulings  thereupon,  and  on 
all  matters  whereby  his  interests  are  injuriously  affected,  he  has 
the  right  to  appeal  after  the  final  decree.^^ 

31  Olcott  V.  Hendrick,  12  S.  C.  Rep.  81 ;  35  Kneelatid  >:  American  L.  &  Tr.  Co., 

141  U.  S.  54;J,  547  ;  irifra,  §  352.  130  U.  S.  89,  95;  Swann  v.  Wright's  Ex- 

3^  Olcolt  V.  Heiulrick,  12  S.  C.  Rep.  81 ;  ecutors,  110  U.  S.  590. 

141  U.  S.  543,  547.  so  Kneelaiul  v.  American  L.  &  Tr.  Co., 

33  Kneelaixl  v.  American  L.  &  Tr.  Co.,  13G  U.  S.  89,  95. 

136  U.  S.  89,  95;  Stuart  v.  Gay,  127  U.  S.  37  Kneeland  v.  American  L.  &  Tr.  Co., 

518.  136  U.  S.  89,95;  Blossom  v.  Milwaukee 

3*  Kneeland  v.  American  L.  &  Tr.  Co.,  &  C  Rd.  Co.,  1  Wall.  655;  Williams  v. 

136  U.  S.  89,  95;   Williams  v.  Morgan,  Morgan,  111  U.  S.  084. 
Ill  U.  S.  684. 


568  DECREES.  [CHAr.  XXIV. 


CHAPTER  XXIV. 

DECEEES. 

§  317.  Definition  and  Classification  of  Decrees.  —  A  decree  is  a 
sentence  or  order  of  a  court  of  equity  pronounced  after  a  hearing 
of  the  points  of  issue,  and  corresponds  to  a  judgment  of  a  court 
of  law.  A  decree  should  be  distinguished  from  a  decretal  order. 
A  decretal  order  is  an  order  in  the  nature  of  a  decree,  made  upon 
motion  or  petition,  either  before  or  after  the  hearing,  or  in  an 
independent  proceeding.^  According  to  the  different  standpoints 
from  which  they  may  be  regarded,  decrees  are  classified,  as  final 
or  interlocutory  ;  as  in  personam  or  in  rem  ;  as  absolute,  con- 
ditional, decrees  nhi.,  or  decrees  in  the  nature  of  decrees  nisi. 

§  318.  Final  and  Interlocutory  Decrees.  —  Decrees  arc  cither  final 
or  interlocutory.  These  terms  are  used  with  dift'erent  meanings 
in  the  English  practice  and  in  that  in  the  courts  of  the  United 
States.  A  final  decree  in  the  English  Chancery  was  a  complete 
determination  of  every  question  arising  in  a  cause.^  An  inter- 
locutory decree  was  one  which  reserved  the  further  consideration 
of  any  question  arising  in  a  cause  till  a  future  hearing.^  Jn  strict- 
ness, moreover,  every  decree  was  said  to  be  interlocutory  until  it 
was  signed  and  enrolled.^  In  England,  an  appeal  lay  from  an 
interlocutory  as  well  as  from  a  final  decree  ;'*  but,  under  the  Judi- 
ciary Acts,  before  that  of  March  3,  1891,  only  final  decrees  of  a 
Federal  court  could  be  brought  to  a  court  of  apiieal  for  revision.'^ 
On  account  of  the  inconvenience  which  would  have  followed,  had 
the  old  definition  been  applied  to  the  term  used  in  this  statute, 
the  Federal  courts  have  refused  to  follow  the  English  Chancery 
in  this  respect.  As  far  as  appeals  are  concerned,  a  decree  is  con- 
sidered final  which  decides  the  right  to  property,  and  orders  that 
it  be  sold  or  delivered  to  a  party ;  or  creates  a  lien  upon  property 

§  .'517.    1  Barbour's    Chancery    Prac-         ^  Forum  Romanum,  183;  Seton's  De- 

tice,  337.  crees  (4th  ed.),  2. 

§  318.    1  Seton's  Decrees  (4th  ed.),  2.  •*  Forcay  r.  Cdnrnd,  G  How.  201,  205. 

2  Seton's  Decrees  (4th  ed.),  2.  ^  u.  S.  K.  S.  §§  031,  692. 


318.] 


FINAL    AND    INTEKLOCUTORY    DECREES. 


569 


by  the  issue  of  receiver's  certificates  or  otherwise  ;  or  directs  a 
specific  sum  of  money  to  be  paid  to  a  party  either  by  another  per- 
son or  out  of  a  fund  in  court,  provided  that  the  successful  party 
is  entitled  to  compel  its  immediate  execution,^  even  though  tlie 
consideration  of  other  matters  arising  upon  the  pleadings  is  re- 
served "  for  further  consideration "  in  it."  A  decree  is  final 
Avliich  settles  all  the  rights  of  the  parties  involved  in  the  plead- 
ings, though  it  gives  leave  to  eitiier  one  of  them  to  api)ly  at  the 
foot  of  the  decree  "  in  relation  to  any  matter  not  finally  deter- 
mined by  it."  ^  A  decree  dismissing  a  bill  with  costs  to  be  subse- 
quently taxed  was  held  to  be  a  final  decree,  although  a  judgment 
for  the  costs  was  subsequently  entered  after  their  taxation.^  A 
decree  dismissing  a  bill  as  to  all  matters  except  one  severable 
from  the  rest  was  held  to  be  a  final  decree  as  regards  the  mat- 
ters which  it  then  determined. ^"^  All  other  decrees  which  reserve 
any  question  for  the  court's  further  decision,  even  though  they 
direct  money  to  be  paid  into  court,^^  or  property  to  be  delivered 
to  a  [•eceiver,^2  or  to  a  new  trustee  appointed  by  the  conrt,'^  q^  ([[^_ 
solve  an  injunction,^*  or  punish  a  party  for  contempt,^^  or  direct 
a  sale,  but  do  not  sufticiently  specifically  determine  the  property 
to  be  sold  to  warrant  an  immediate  sale,^'^  or  direct  a  sale,  but  do 
not  appoint  the  time  of  salc,^'  are,  it  seems,  interlocutory  decrees 
from  wliich  no  appeal  can  under  the  Judiciary  Acts  be  taken  ; 


•i  Chief  Justice  Taney  in  Forgay  v. 
Conrad,  6  How.  201,  204;  Miclioud  v. 
GiroJ,  4  How.  503 ;  Ray  v.  Law,  3  Crancli, 
179;  Whiting  r.  Bank  of  tiie  United 
States,  18  Pet.  6  ;  Wabash  &  E.  Canal 
Co.  V.  Beers,  1  Black,  54  ;  Bronson  v. 
Railroad  Co.,  2  Black,  524 ;  Milwaukie 
&  .\L  U.  11.  Co.  V.  Soutter,  2  Wail.  440 ; 
Tiiomson  v.  Dean,  7  Wall.  342  ;  Railroad 
Co.  V.  Bradleys,  7  Wall.  575 ;  Stovall  v. 
Banks,  10  Wall.  583;  French  v.  Slioe- 
niaker,  12  Wall.  80;  Ahirin  r.  Lalley,  17 
Wall.  14;  Trustees  v.  Greenougli,  105 
U.  S.  527;  Fanners'  L.  &  Tr.  Co.,  Peti- 
tioner, 129  U  S.  206  ;  Lewisburg  Bank  r. 
Sheffey,  140  U.  S.  445. 

'  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  R.  Co.  i: 
Southern  Express  Co  ,  108  U.  S.  24  ;  Mo. 
K.  &  T.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Dinsmore.  108  U.  S. 
30;  Lewisburg  Bank  v.  Sheffev,  140  U.  S. 
445. 

8  Frencli  i-.  Shoemaker,  12  Wall.  86. 

9  Fowler  v.  Haniiil,  130  U.  S.  549. 


1^  HilU-.  Chicago  &  E.  R.  R.  Co.  140 
U.  S.  52.  But  see  Keystcjne  Iron  Co.  c. 
Martin,  132  U.  S.  01. 

1^  Forgay  ?•.  Conrad,  0  How.  201 ; 
Beebe  r.  Russell,  19  How.  283  ;  Louisiana 
Bank  r.  Whitney,  121  U.  S.  284.  But  see 
Wabash  &  Erie  Canal  v.  Beers,  1  Black, 
54. 

1-  Forgay  v.  Conrad.  6  How.  201 ;  Beebe 
v.  liussell,  10  How.  283;  Hentig  v.  Page, 
102  U.  S.  219.  But  see  Wabash  &  Erie 
Canal  v.  Beers,  1  Black,  54. 

13  Pulliani  V.  Christian,  6  How.  209. 

1^  Young  V.  Grundy,  C>  Cranc;h,  51  ; 
Moses  V.  Mayor,  15  Wall.  387  ;  Verden  v. 
Coleman,  18  How.  86  ;  Kno.v  County  i'. 
Harshman,  132  U.  S.  14. 

15  Hayes  v.  Fischer,  102  U.  S.  121. 

1'  Railroad  Co.  v  Swasey,  23  Wall.  405. 

1"  Par,«ons  v.  Robinson,  122  U.  S.  112  ; 
Burlington,  C.  R.  &  N.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Sim- 
mons, 123  U.  S.  52. 


570  DECREES.  [chap.  XXIV. 

although,  if  the  decision  of  the  court  in  making  them  was  erro- 
neous, the  final  decree  may  be  reversed  on  that  account  upon  an 
appeal  b\'  a  party  who  was  thereby  injured. ^^ 

§  319.  Decrees  in  personam.  —  Decrees  are  either  in  personam 
cr  in  rem.  Decrees  in  persoriam  are  those  which  contain  a  com- 
mand to  one  of  the  parties  to  a  suit  in  equity.  Decrees  in  rem 
are  such  as  without  containing  command  to  either  of  the  parties 
transfer  the  title  to  property.  Decrees  in  personam  may  direct  the 
performance  of,  or  the  abstention  from  an  act  or  acts.  The  or- 
dinary decree  of  a  court  of  equity  is  a  decree  in  personam.  Such 
a  decree  may  be  made  even  though  it  directs  the  performance 
of  or  abstention  from  an  act,  or  directs  a  transfer,  or  otherwise 
affects  the  title  to  property  beyond  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court. ^ 
By  statute  when  a  Federal  court  of  equity  awards  an  injunction 
against  the  infringement  of  a  patent,  it  may  assess  the  dam- 
ages the  complainant  has  sustained  by  the  injunction,  as  well  as 
compel  an  account  of  the  profits ;  ^  and  has  the  power  to  award 
treble  damages"^  but  not  to  award  treble  profits."*  A  statute  pro- 
vides that  '"the  original  jurisdiction  of  the  circuit  court  for  the 
Southern  District  of  New  York  shall  not  be  construed  to  extend 
to  causes  of  action  arising  within  the  Northern  District  of  said 
State."  ^  Where  in  order  to  obtain  the  relief  sought  it  would 
be  necessary  for  the  court  to  take  possession  by  its  officers  of 
land  beyond  its  territorial  jurisdiction,  it  has  been  said  that  such 
a  decree  should  not  be  granted.^  TIius,  it  seems  that  the  court 
will  not  decree  a  partition  of  land  beyond  the  jurisdiction,  since 


18  Buokingliam  v.   McLean,   13    How.  244  ;  Peek  d.  Frame, 9  Blatclif.  104  ;  Saun- 

150.  ders  c  Logan,  2  Fislier,  107  ;    Schwanzel 

§  .310.     1  Arglasse    v.    Muscliamp,    1  r.   Ilolenshade,  3    Fisher,  106 ;  Brodie  c. 

Verii.  75;  Carron  Iron  Co.   v.   Maclaren,  Orphir  Silver  Mining  Co.,  4  Fislier,  . '17. 

5  H.  L   C.  416  ;  Muller  v.  Dows,  94  U.  S.  •*  Covert  c.  Sargent,  42  Fed.   K.  208  ; 

444  ;  Wiieeler  v.  McCormack,  4  Fislier's  Campbell  v.  James,  5  Fed.  R.  807. 

Pat.  Cas.  433  ;  s.  c.  8  Blatclif.  267.      For  ^  U.  S.  R  S.  §  657  ;  Hodge  ;;.  Hudson 

an  excellent  review  of  tlie  authorities,  see  River    Railroad  Co.,  3  Fisher's  Pat.  Cas. 

the    learned     opinion    of    Judge,    subse-  410;  s.  c.  0  Blatclif.  85;  Locomotive  E. 

quently  Chief  Judge  Davies,  in  (iardner  v.  S.  T.  Co.  r.  Erie  Railway  Co.,  10  Blatclif. 

Ogden,22\.  Y.  327.  See  also  Carpenter  r.  202;  Black  c.  Thorne,  10  Blatclif.  <JG.    See 

Strange,  141  U.  S.  87.  §  23. 

-  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  4021.  "^  Muller  v.  Dows,  94   U.  S.  444,  440; 

3  U.  S.  R.S.§§  4021,  4017  ;  Livingston  Macgregor  v.    Macgregor,   9    Iowa,    05; 

V.   Woodworth,  "io    How.    540;    Zine    v.  Glen   v.    Gibson,  9    Barb.   (N.    Y.)   ^34; 

I'eck,  13Fed.  R.475;  Lyon  y.  Donaldson,  Story's   Eq.   Jur.  §  1202;    2    Spence,  8, 

34    Fed.   R.  780;  Welling  v.  La  Bau,  35  n  (d) ;    Smith's   Eq.   30;   Bispham's  Eq. 

Fed.  R.  302  ;  Guyon  v.  Serrell,  1  Blatchf.  §  47. 


§  320.]  DECKEKS    IX   KEM.  571 

no  commission  appointed  by  it  could  have  authority  to  act  there;" 
but  it  will  decree  specific  performance  of  a  contract,  or  the  fore- 
closure of  a  mortgage  affecting  land  no  matter  where  it  may  be 
situated.^  It  has  been  held  in  England  that  the  court  will  make 
no  decree  in  a  suit  between  two  foreigners  not  residents  of  the 
country  concerning  a  contract  made  or  land  situated  elsewhere.^ 
And  a  Georgian  case  holds  that  a  court  of  equity  will  not  compel 
a  corporation  to  perform  a  contract  to  open  ditch.es  and  keep 
fences  in  repair  in  a  State  where  it  has  no  corporate  existencc.^^ 
It  often  happens,  however,  that  the  court  can  do  a  thing  itself 
more  easily  and  effectively  than  it  can  compel  it  to  be  done  by 
the  party  concerned,  as,  for  example,  when  it  wishes  to  sell 
property  or  to  cancel  an  instrument  in  writing,  and  it  then  will 
perform  that  duty  by  moans  of  a  master  or  receiver.!^  When  all 
the  defendants  are  within  the  jurisdiction,  such  a  decree  is  usually 
accom[»anied  by  a  command  to  them  to  confirm  the  sale  or  other 
action  of  the  court,  or  to  assist  in  the  transaction  directed  by  the 
decree.  When  a  defendant  is  beyond  the  jurisdiction,  the  court 
sometimes  acts  by  a  decree  in  rem. 

§  320.  Decrees  in  rem.  — A  decree  hi  rem  is  one  that  determines 
the  title  to  or  an  interest  in  real  or  personal  property  within  the 
territorial  jurisdiction  of  the  court,  without  having  any  other 
effect  upon  a  defendant  who  dwells  beyond  that  jurisdiction  and 
has  not  been  served  with  process  within  it.  Such  an  equitable 
decree  must  be  distinguished  from  the  decrees  in  rem  of  a  court 
of  admiralty,  which  establish  a  title  conclusively  against  all 
the  world ;  whereas  it  is  only  binding  upon  the  jiarties  to  the 
action  in  which  it  is  rendered.  Sucli  decrees  were  formerly  very 
rare,i  and  are  in  the  Federal  courts  of  equity  purely  statutory,  and 
the  power  of  these  courts  to  make  them  depends  entirely  upon  a 
strict  compliance  witli  the  provisions  of  the  statute  allowing 
them.2     Whether  or  not,  under  this  statute  or  otherwise,  a  decree 

■^  2  Spcnce,  8,  n  (d)  ;  Story's  Eq.  Jiir.  "  Port  Royal  R.  R.  Co.  v.    Hammond, 

§  12'.t2;  Smith's   Eq.  80  ;  IJispham's  Eq.  58  Ga.  523. 

§  -IT.  11  LangdeH'G  Eq.  PI.  §  44.     See  vifra, 

^  Perm  v.  Lord  Baltimore,  1  Ves   Sen.  §  o49. 

444;    Massie   v.   Watts,  6  Cranch,    148;  §  .'520.     i  But  see  Anon  ,  1  Atk.  18. 

Muller  V.  Dows,  94  U.   S.  444  ;  McElrath  2  u.  S.  R.  S.  §  7:58;  Act  of  March  3, 

1-.  The  Pittshurg&SteubenviileR.  R.  Co.,  1875,    ch.    137,  §  8  (18   St.   at    L.   472). 

5  Pa.  St.  189.  See  supra,  §  97. 

9  Matthaei  v.    Galitzin,  L.  R.  18  Eq. 
340  ;    Blake  v.  Blake,  18  \V.  U.  944. 


572  DECREES.  [CHA?.  XXIV. 

can  be  made  and  enforced  which  requires  the  specific  perform- 
ance of  a  contract  for  the  conveyance  of  property  within  the 
court's  jurisdiction  against  a  person  not  served  there  with  process, 
has  never  been  decided.^ 

§  321.  Absolute  and  Conditional  Decrees.  —  Decrees  are  either 
absolute,  conditional,  nisi,  or  in  the  nature  of  decrees  nisi.  An 
absolute  decree  is  one  that  takes  effect  immediately  upon  its 
entry  and  is  dependent  for  its  enforcement  upon  no  condition, 
and  is  not  subject  to  be  defeated  by  the  occurrence  of  any  subse- 
quent event.  A  conditional  decree  is  one  that  by  its  terms  is 
not  to  take  effect  unless  something  shall  be  done  by  the  party 
to  wliom  relief  is  given  by  it.  Under  the  i)resent  state  of  the 
authorities,  it  would  be  rash  to  attempt  to  lay  down  a  rule  as 
to  when  a  conditional  decree  will  be  granted,  and  when  the 
plaintiff'  will  be  denied  relief  unless  he  has  made  a  specific  offer 
or  waiver  in  his  bill.^  The  following  are  a  few  of  the  cases  when 
a  conditional  decree  alone  has  been  granted.  An  express  com- 
pany has  been  granted  a  decree  compelling  a  railroad  company 
to  carry  freight  for  it,  upon  condition  that  it  should  give  the 
latter  a  bond  to  pay  sucli  charges  as  the  court  should  subse- 
quently consider  reasonable."-^  A  decree  for  the  redcmjition  of 
a  mortgage  is  upon  condition  that  the  plaintiff"  pay  the  balance 
reported  due  from  him  within  six  months,  which  it  seems  must  be 
lunar  not  calendar  months,  after  the  report,  in  default  whereof 
the  plaintiff's  bill  against  the  defendant  is  from  thenceforth  to 
stand  dismissed  out  of  court  with  costs.^  Upon  default,  a  final 
order,  which  will  be  granted  as  of  course,  is  necessary  to  dismiss 
the  bill.*  A  decree  allowing  a  junior  incumbrancer  to  redeem 
may  be  upon  condition  that  he  pay  oft'  a  prior  incumbrance, 
and  repay  to  its  holder  money  })aid  by  him  in  discharging  still 
prior  incumbrances,  and  for  taxes,  repairs,  and  insurance  upon 
the  mortgaged  promises.-''  Similarly,  a  decree  upon  a  bill  by 
a  purchaser  for  the  specific  performance  of  an  agreement  for 
the  sale  of  an  estate  may  appoint  a  time  and  i)lace  for  the  pay- 

3  See  VVard  c.  Arredomlo,  Hopkins  Ch.  '^  Southern  Express   Co  v  St.  Louis, 

(N.  Y.)  R  2i:l,  Anon  .  1  Atk.  18  ,  Rourke  I.  M  &  S.  R  R   Co  .  10  Fed   R.  210  ,  re 

/'.  McL,ui,i;hlin,  38  Cal   106;  Matteson  v.  Tersed  Express  Cases,  117  U.  S   1 

Seofield,   27   Wis   671.  Story's  Eq    Jur.  ^  Seton   on    Decrees,    140;  Waller  v. 

§  741.  n.  :].  Harris,  7  Paige  (NY),  1G7. 

§  :)21.     1  See  Moore  r  Crawford,  130  *  Seton  on  Decrees,  178 

U  S.  122,  140.  5  McCorniick  t.   Knox,  105  U.  S.  122. 


§  322.]  DECREES   NISI.  573 

mcnt  of  the  pnrcliase-money,  witli  interest  if  any  be  due,  and 
direct  that  in  default  of  payment  tlie  bill  be  dismissed  with  costs.** 
A  decree  for  an  accounting  should  always  contain  a  submission 
by  the  plaintiff  to  account.'  It  has  been  made  a  condition  prece- 
dent to  the  entry  of  a  decree  to  enjoin  the  infringement  of  a 
))atent,  that  the  complainant  first  file  in  the  Patent  Office  a  dis- 
claimer of  those  of  the  claims  in  the  patent  to  which  he  is  not 
entitled.^  For  conditions  of  sale  in  suits  to  foreclose  railway 
mortgages  see  the  preceding  section  upon  sales  by  masters.^ 

§  322.  Decrees  nisi.  —  A  decree  )iisi  is  one  giving  a  defendant 
a  certain  specified  time  within  which  to  show  cause  against  a 
decree  or  to  perform  some  other  act  in  I'elation  thereto,  in  default 
whereof  it  shall  be  absolute  against  him.  Such  a  decree  is 
made  against  an  infant  or  a  mortgagor,  or  the  latter's  assigns. 
According  to  the  English  rule,  all  decrees  against  an  infant 
defendant  which  rerjuire  some  act  to  be  performed  by  him,^  or 
direct  a  conveyance  or  a  foreclosure  of  his  interest  in  any  real 
estate,  must  contain  a  clause  giving  him  an  opportunity  to  show 
cause  against  it  after  he  has  come  of  age.^  When  a  sale  of  land 
is  directed  by  such  a  decree,  it  usually  contains  a  direction  that, 
in  the  mean  time,  a  purchaser  under  the  sale  shall  hold  and 
enjoy  the  estate  against  the  infant  until  he  attains  full  age;-^  and 
the  court  so  far  protects  a  purchaser  that  it  will  not  permit  his 
title  to  be  affected  by  a  mere  irregularity  in  the  decree.'*  When 
a  decree  directs  a  conveyance  by  both  adult  and  infant  par- 
ties, as  in  a  partition  suit,  it  seems  that  it  should  not  direct  a 
conveyance  by  any  till  the  infant  is  of  age  and  has  had  an  oppor- 
tunity to  show  cause  against  the  decree,  and  in  the  mean  time 
should  only  extend  so  far  as  to  give  possession  in  accordance 
with  the  court's  decision,  and  order  enjoyment  accordingly  till 
effectual  conveyances  can  be  made.-^     It  seems  that  in  no  other 

6  Lowtlier  '•.    Antlover,  1  Bro.  C.  C.  Diicliess   of  Biickingliam,  1    West,  682; 

806  Tlioroton  v.  Blackbnrne,  2  W.  Kel.vnge,  7 ; 

'  Fowler  v  Wyatt,  24  Beav.  2-32;    So-  Setoti  on  Decrees  (4tli  ed  )  712,  713. 

tmi  on  Decrees  (4th  ed  ),  775.  -  Williamson  v.  Gordon,  19  Ves.  114; 

8  Sessions  t'.  Romadka,21  Fed.  R.  124,  Mallack  v.  Gallon,  3  P  Wms.  352  ;  New- 
1  ;:>.  Hake  v.  Brown,  37  Fed.  U.  783:  bury  v.  Marten,  15  Jur.  166;  Mills  r. 
l.lL'ctrical  Accumulator  Co.  v.  Julien  El-  Dennis,  3  J  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  367;  Seton  on 
ectric  Co., 38  Fed.  R.  117.  Decrees  (4th  ed.)  714.     ButseeCroxon  r. 

9  §  316.  Lever,  12  W.  R.  237. 

§  322.   1  Walsli  V.  Trevannion,  16  Sim-         3  Powell  v.  Powell,  Mad.  &  Geld.  53. 
ons,  i78  ;  Eyre  i-  The  Countess  of  Shafts-         ■»  Bennet  v.  Hamill,  2  Sch.  &  Lcf  5r.6. 
bury,  2  P.   Wms.  102,  Sheffield  v.  The         ^  Agar   v.  Fairfax,  17  Ves.  533,  554; 


574  DECREES.  [CIIAP.  XXIV. 

instances  will  a  decree  nisi  be  entered  against  an  infant  defend- 
ant, although  there  is  some  doubt  upon  tliis  point.''  In  a  few 
exceptional  cases,  when  an  infant  plaintiff  in  his  bill  exercised  an 
election  between  two  conflicting  claims,  the  court  has  allowed 
him  a  day  after  he  became  of  age  in  which  to  show  cause  against 
it."  I'he  usual  form  of  the  '?i,isi  clause  in  such  a  decree  is  as  fol- 
lows:  "And  this  decree  is  to  be  binding  on  tlie  defendant,  tlie 
infant,  unless  on  being  served,  after  he  shall  have  attained  the 
age  of  twenty-one  years,  with  subpoena  to  show  cause  against 
tliis  decree,  he  shall  within  six  months  from  tlie  service  of  such 
subpoena  show  unto  this  court  good  cause  to  the  contrary."  ^ 
Such  a  clause  should  be  inserted  in  the  order  for  making  a  decree 
of  foreclosure  absolute,  as  well  as  in  the  decree.^  The  omission 
of  a  similar  clause  in  such  a  decree  is  error.^*^  The  six  months 
after  the  service  of  process  within  which  cause  must  be  shown 
must  be,  it  seems,  lunar  not  calendar  months. ^^  At  the  expiration 
of  them  and  upon  proof  of  the  requisite  facts,  an  order  making 
the  original  decree  absolute  should  be  entered. ^^  A  decree  for  a 
foreclosure  should  also  be  nisi,  providing  for  either  a  strict  fore- 
closure or  a  foreclosure  sale,  unless  the  whole  amount  due  shall 
be  paid  within  a  reasonable  time,  usually  six  lunar  months,  from 
the  time  of  the  conclusion  of  the  accounting  and  the  certificate 
of  what  is  due  under  the  mortgage. ^"^  An  omission  of  such  a 
clause  is  error. ^^  At  the  expiration  of  the  allotted  time,  if  the 
debt  be  still  unpaid,  the  jilaiutiff  should  obtain  an  order  confirm- 
ing the  foreclosure  or  directing  the  sale.^^  The  time  for  payment 
may  always  be  enlarged,  even  after  a  peremptory  order  for  a 
sale,^*^  upon   terms,  which   usually  are  that  the   defendant    give 

Attorney-General  c.   Hamilton,  1  Madd.  ^-  Seton  on  Decrees  (4tli  eil  ),  711. 

214.  ^'^  Clark    r.    Reyhurn,    8    Wall.    318; 

0  Seton  on  Decrees  (4th  cd.), 714  ;  Eyre  Iloweli  r.   Western    R.  R.  Co.,  94  U.    S. 

V.   Tlie   Countess    of    Sliaftsbury,    2    V.  4Pio ,  Cliicago  &  V.  R.  R.  Co    r.  Fosdick, 

Wms.  102;  Sheffield   r.  The   Duchess  of  lOG  U.  S.  47,  Ferine  v.   Dunn,  4  J.  Ch. 

Buckingham,!  West,  082.  See  Kingsbury  (X.  Y  )  140. 

V.  Buckner,  134  U.  S    650.  "  Clark  t-   Reyburn,  8  Wall.  .''^18. 

'  Gregory  f.  Molesworth,  .3  Atk.  020;  is  Seton    on    Decrees  (4th  ed.),  1001  ; 

Sir  John    Napier  r.    Lady   Effingiiam,  2  Chicago  &  V    R.  R.  Co.   r.   Fosdick,  106 

P.  Wms.  401  :  Lord  Bronk  r.  Lord    Hert-  U    S.  47,  71  ;  Sheriff'-  Sparks,  West,  130; 

ford,  2  P.  Wms.  518  ;  Taylor  r.  Fhilii)s,2  Senhouse    r.     Earl,    2    Ves.     Sen     450; 

Ves.  Sen.  23,  Whiting  r.   Bank  of    United    States,    13 

^  Seton  on  Decrees  (4th  ed.),  711.  Pet.  0. 

''  Williamson  r.  Gordon,  19  Ves.  114.  i'>  Edwards    r.  Cunliffe.  1  Madd.  287; 

1 '  Coffin  ' .  ITeatli.  0  Met.  (Mass.)  76.  Seton  on  Decrees  (4th  ed.),  1088. 

"   Sftor  on   Decrees  (4th  ed.),  711. 


§  323.]     DECREES  IN  THE  NATURE  OF  DECREES  XISI.        575 

good  security  to  pay  the  amount  due,  with  interest  and  costs  in 
full.^''  It  has  also  been  held  that  a  decree  of  foreclosure  absolute 
may  also  be  reopened  ;  ^^  but  it  has  been  said  that  this  can  only 
be  done  when  it  has  been  obtained  by  fraud  or  under  circum- 
stances of  oppression.^9  The  Supreme  Court  has  held  that  "  what 
is  indispensable  to  such  a  decree  is,  that  there  should  be  declared 
the  fact,  nature,  and  extent  of  the  default  which  constituted  the 
breach  of  the  condition  of  the  mortgage,  and  which  justified  the 
complainant  in  filing  his  bill  to  foreclose  it,  and  the  amount  due 
on  account  thereof,  which,  with  any  further  sums  subsequently 
accruing,  and  having  become  due,  according  to  the  terms  of  the 
security,  the  mortgagor  is  required  to  pay  within  a  reasonable 
time,  to  be  fixed  by  the  court,  and  which  if  not  paid,  a  sale  of 
the  mortgaged  premises  is  directed."  -^  By  rule,  "  in  suits  in 
equity  for  the  foreclosure  of  mortgages  in  the  Circuit  Courts  of 
the  United  States,  or  in  any  court  of  the  Territories  having  juris- 
diction of  the  same,  a  decree  may  be  rendered  for  any  balance 
that  may  be  found  due  to  the  complainant  over  and  above  the 
proceeds  of  the  sale  or  sales,  and  execution  may  issue  for  the 
collection  of  the  same,  as  is  provided  in  the  eighth  rule  of  the 
Supreme  Court  regulating  the  equity  practice,  Avhen  the  decree  is 
solely  for  the  payment  of  money."  -^  Tliis  rule  does  not  authorize, 
on  tlie  foreclosure  of  a  mortgage  for  the  failure  to  pay  interest, 
the  entry  of  a  decree  for  the  balance  of  principal  not  due.-^  A 
State  statute  giving  mortgagors  a  right  of  redemption  within  a 
certain  time  after  a  mortgage  sale,  will  in  all  cases  be  followed 
by  the  Federal  courts,  since  it  establishes  a  rule  of  property .^^  In 
the  absence  of  such  a  statute  there  is  no  right  of  redemption  after 
the  sale  under  a  decree  of  foreclosure  has  been  confirmed.-* 

§  323.    Decrees   in  the  nature   of  Decrees  nisi.  —  Decrees  in  the 
nature  of  deci'ees  nisi  are  decrees  takintr  a  bill  against  a  defend- 


17  Monkliouse    v.  Corporation  of    Bed-  ^i  Rule  92. 

fonl,  17  Ves.  380 ;  Geldanl   v.  Hornby,  1  2-  Oliio  Central  R.   R.  Co.  v.  Central 

Hare,  251  ;    Holford  v.   Yate,   1    K.  &  J.  Trust  Co.,  133  U.  S.  83. 

677  ;  (^oonibe  v.  Stewart,  13  Bcav.  11.  -^  Brine  v.  Insurance  Co  ,  96  U.  S.  627  ; 

18  Campbell  r.  Hoiyland,  L.  R.  7  Cli  D.  Orvis  v.  rowell.  98  U   S.  176  ;   Hiinunock 
166;  Seton  on  Decrees  (4tb  ed.),  1088.  r.  Loan  &  Trust  Co.,  105  U.  S.  77 ;  Mason 

19  Patcli  r.  Ward,  L.  R.  3  Cli.  203,212;  v  Nortliwestcrn   Ins.   Co.,  106  U.  S.  163; 
Seton  on  Decrees  (4th  ed.),  1098.  Conn.  Mutual  Life  Ins,  Co.  !.'.  Cushman, 

2:'  Chicago  &  Vincennes  Railroad  Com-  108  U.  S.  51. 

pany   v.  Fosdick,  106   U.   S.   47,  70,  per  24  Parker  c.  Dacres,  130  U.  S.  43. 
Matthews,  J. 


576  DECREES.  [chap.  XXIV. 

ant  as  confessed,  and  decrees  under  the  statute  affecting  property 
within,  and  against  a  defendant  without  the.  jurisdiction  of  the 
court.  Decrees  taking  bills  as  confessed  are  described  in  Chap- 
ter YII.  The  cases  when  a  decree  against  a  defendant  not 
served  with  process  can  be  entered  under  the  Act  of  March  3d, 
1875,  have  been  already  described. ^  Any  defendant  or  defend- 
ants to  such  a  statutory  decree  "  not  actually  personally  notified  " 
of  tlie  suit,  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  statute,  may, 
at  any  time  within  one  year  after  final  decree,  enter  his  appear- 
ance in  said  suit,  and  thereupon  the  court  must  make  an  order 
setting  aside  the  decree  therein,  and  permitting  such  defendant 
to  plead  on  payment  of  such  costs  as  the  court  shall  deem  just; 
and  thereupon  the  suit  is  proceeded  with  to  final  judgment  accord- 
ing to  law.2 

§  324.  Time  of  Entry  of  Decree.  —  A  decree  can  regularly  be 
entered  only  during  a  term  of  the  court. ^  The  court  has  power 
to  allow  a  decree  to  be  entered  even  in  vacation  as  of  a  previous 
term,  mmc  pro  tunc?  Such  leave  will  always  be  granted  when 
the  delay  was  caused  by  the  action  of  the  court/^ 

§325,  Frame  of  Decree.  —  Decrees  originally  always  consisted 
of  three,  and  sometimes  of  four,  parts.  These  were :  the  date 
and  title ;  the  recitals  ;  the  declaratory  part,  if  that  were  re- 
quired ;  and  the  ordering  part.^  A  decree  usually  begins  with 
a  recital  of  the  day  of  the  month  and  year  when  it  was  pro- 
nounced,^  and  of  the  title  of  the  cause,  in  which  the  parties 
should  have  the  same  designations  that  were  given  them  in  the 
bill.'^  Next  always  followed,  formerly,  a  recital  of  the  pleadings, 
evidence,  and  former  proceedings  in  the  cause.'*  The  equity 
rules,  however,  provide  that  "  In  drawing  up  decrees  and  orders, 
neither  the  bill  nor  answer,  nor  other  i)leadings,  nor  any  part 
thereof,  nor  the  report  of  any  master,  nor  any  other  prior  pro- 
ceeding, shall  be  recited  or  stated  in  the  decree  or  order ;  but 
the  decree  and  order  shall  begin,  in  substance,  as  follows : 
'This  cause  came   on  to  be  heard  (or  to  be  further  heard,  as 

§  .32.3.    1  See  §  07.  3  Gray  v.  Brignanlello,  1  Wall.  627. 

2  U.  S.  R.  S  §  7-J8;   Act  of  Mnrcli  .3,  §  82o."    i  Daniell's  Cli.  Pr.  cli.  xxv. 

187.5,  fli.   1.37,  §  8  (18  St.  at  L.  472),  1st         2  Wliitney  v.  Relden,  4  Paige  (N.  Y.), 

Supp.  U.  S.  II.' S.  17fi.  140;  Barclay  v.  Brown,  7  Paige  (N.  Y.), 

§.324.    1  GriswoM  ('.  Hill,  I  Paine,  483.  246. 

2  Gray  v.  Brignardello,  1   Wall    627 ;         «  Daniell's  Cli.  Pr.  ch.  .\xv. 
Grisvvold  r.  Hill,  1  Paine,  483.  *  Scton  on  Decrees  ( Itli  cd.),  9-19. 


§  325.]  FRAME   OF   DECREE.  577 

the  case  may  be)  at  tliis  term,  and  was  argued  by  counsel ;  and 
thereupon,  upon  consideration  thereof,  it  was  ordered,  adjudged, 
and  decreed  as  follows,  viz.'"^  When  a  decree  is  entered  by 
consent,  the  fact  that  consent  was  given  should  be  stated.  The 
proper  place  for  such  a  statement  is  ordinarily  in  the  recitals, 
unless  consent  be  only  given  to  certain  directions,  when  the  state- 
ment of  the  consent  should  immediately  precede  such  directions.^ 
it  has  been  said  also  that  it  should  appear  affirmatively  upon  the 
face  of  the  decree,  that  the  defendant  was  properly  served  with 
process."  The  declaratory  part  of  a  decree,  which  if  desired  at  all 
should  be  next  inserted,  contains  a  declaration  of  matters  of  fact, 
or  of  the  rights  of  one  or  more  of  the  parties  to  the  cause,  or  a 
statement  of  the  reason  for  the  decree  or  any  part  thereof.  This 
statement  of  reasons  is  not  usual,^  although  its  utility  has  been 
noticed,^  and  it  is  sometimes  adopted. ^"^  Instances  of  declara- 
tions of  matters  of  fact  are,  the  existence  and  validity  of  a  will  or 
other  instrument, ^^  and  the  validity  of  a  patent.^  So,  whenever 
there  are  interfering  patents,  and  a  suit  is  brought  by  any  person 
interested  in  any  one  of  them,  or  in  the  working  of  any  one  of 
them,  to  obtain  relief  against  the  interfering  patentee,  the  court, 
on  notice  to  advei'se  parties,  and  other  due  proceedings  had  ac- 
cording to  the  course  of  equity,  may  adjudge  and  declare  either 
of  the  patents  void  in  whole  or  in  part,  or  inoperative,  or  invalid 
in  any  particular  part  of  the  United  States,  according  to  the 
interest  of  the  parties  in  the  patent  or  the  invention  patented. 
But  no  such  judgment  or  adjudication  can  affect  the  right  of 
any  person,  except  the  parties  to  the  suit  and  those  deriving 
title  under  thom  subsequent  to  the  rendition  of  such  decree.^^ 
And  where  a  party  establishes  his  right  to  property,  the  direc- 
tion to  transfer  it  to  him  is  often  preceded  by  a  declaration  of 
his  title.^*     The  court  will  not  thus   decide  rio-hts  as  between  co- 


5  Rule  86.  G.  591,   GOT;  Austin   v.  Austin,  11  Jur. 

^  Seton    on    Dec'rees  (4tli   ed.)    1535;  n.  s.  Soft. 

Bartletti;.  Wood.O  W.  11.  817.  n  Seton  on  Decrees  (4th  ed.)  19,  20. 

7  Allen  V.  Blunt,  1   Blatclif.  C.  C.  480.  i-  Union  Sugar  Refinery  v.  Matliiesson, 

3  ^.r  parte  Earl    of  Ilciiester,  7    Ves.  3  Cliff.  14(5 

348,  373;  Seton  on  Decrees  (4th  ed.),  19.  i'^  U.   S.  11.  S.  §  4918.      See  Foster  v. 

9  Bax  V.  Whilbrcad,  IG  Ves.  16,24;  Lindsay,  3  Dili.  126;  Pentlarg^e  v.  Pent- 
Gordon  V.  Gordon,  3  Swanst.  400,  478.  larjre,  19  Fed.   R.  817  ;  s.  c.  22   Fed.   R. 

1'  Gordon  v.    Gordon,  3  Swanst.  400,  412. 

478;  Jenour  i\  Jenour,  10  Ves.  573;  At-  i»  Jenour  v.  Jenour,  10  Ves.   6G2;    Se- 

torney-General  v.  Clapham,  4  De  G.  M.  &  ton  on  Decrees  (4th  ed.),  20. 

VOL.   I.  —  37 


578  DECEEES.  [chap.  XXIV. 

defendants  unless  a  cross-bill  have  been  filed  for  that  purpose,^^ 
or  it  be  necessary  in  order  to  determine  the  rights  of  the  plain- 
tiff, or  possibly  when  the  evidence  is  clear  and  the  case  between 
them  ripe  for  decision  ;  ^^  and  lantruagc  in  a  decree  broad  enough 
to  determine  such  rights  will  usually  be  construed  as  merely  de- 
termining rights  as  between  the  plaintiff  and  the  defendants,  if 
no  controversy  between  the  defendants  appear  upon  the  plead- 
ings.^" The  court  will  not  make  a  declaration  of  mere  future 
rights,^^  nor  as  to  the  rights  of  i)arties  upon  a  contingency  that 
has  not  happened,^^  nor,  it  was  formerly  held,  as  to  mere  legal 
rights ;  -^  unless  sucb  a  determination  is  indispensable  to  the  dec- 
laration of  the  present  equities  of  the  parties.  A  declaration 
that  a  deed  to  i)ropcrty  beyond  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  is 
fraudulent  and  void  is  of  no  effect  unless  accompanied  by  a  di- 
rection that  a  party  to  the  suit  execute  a  reconveyance  or  de- 
liver up  the  deed  for  cancellation,  and  compliance  is  made  with 
such  dircction.'^^  It  seems  that  the  court  will  not  make  a  decla- 
ration of  the  rights  of  the  ])arties  in  a  decree  taken  jrro  confesso 
or  upon  a  defendant's  default  at  the  hearing.22  The  conclusion 
of  a  decree  is  its  ordering  or  mandatory  part,  which  contains 
the  specific  directions  of  the  court  upon  the  matter  before  it.^^ 
As  these  directions  vary  according  to  the  nature  of  the  case  be- 
fore the  court,  it  would  be  impossible  to  lay  down  any  definite 
rule  concerning  them.  Nothing  is  more  elastic  and  less  arbitrary 
than  this  part  of  a  decree  in  equity.  The  directions  to  the  differ- 
ent parties  may  be  separate,  reciprocal,  direct,  or  inverted,  as  long 
as  they  are  not  inconsistent.-*  If  there  be  several  plaintiffs 
suing  jointly,  the  decree  may  be  joint  or  several,  in  conformity 
with  their  respective  rights,  as  finally  determined ;  and  if  a  num- 

"  Thomas   v.    Lloyrl,    25    Beav.  620;        19  Dowling  r.  Dowling,  L.  R.  1  Cli.612  ; 

Graliam   r.    Railroad   Co.,   3    Wall.    704,  Seton  on  Decrees  (4th  ed),  20. 
Seton  on  Decrees  (4th  edition),  20.     See        ^'  Birkenliead  Docks  v.  Laird,  4  De  G. 

§§  170,  171.  M.  &  G.  732  ;  Webl)  r.  Byng,  8  De  G.  M.  & 

'  *  io  Jolly  '•.  Arbutlinot,  4  De  G.  &  J.  224,  G.  683  ;  Seton  on  Decrees  (4th  ed  ),  20. 
245  ;  Gresley  v.  Mousley,  4  De  G.  &  J.  78,        '-i  Carpenter  v.  Strange,  141   U.  S.  87, 

99;  Cottinghani  r.   Earl  of  Slirevvshiiry,  100. 

3  Hare,  627;  Seton  on  Decrees  (4th  ed.),        22  Jennings  v.  Simpson,  1  Keen,  404. 
20.  23  Daniell's  Chancery   Practice,  chap. 

1^  Graham  v.  Railroad  Co.,  3  Wall.  704.  xxv. 

1**  Cro.ss  V.  De  Valle,  1  Wall.   5;  Lady        21  f.ingan  v.  Henderson,  1  Bland  (Md.), 

LangdMlec  Briegs,  4  W.  R.  703;  Fletcher  286,  275;    Hodges  v.   Mullikin,   1   Bland 

r.  Bealey.  33  W.   R.   745;  Seton  on  De-  (Md  ),  503,    507;  Owings' Case,   1   Bland 

crees  (4th  ed  ),  20.  (Md.),  370,  404. 


§  325.]  FRAME   OF  DECREE.  579 

bcr  of  defendants,  a  single  direction  may  be  given  to  all,  or  a. 
separate  direction,  or  even  a  separate  decree  against  each.^^  Cer- 
tain general  rules  governing  particular  kinds  of  decrees  may, 
however,  be  stated.  If  the  decree  be  for  the  performance  of  any 
specific  act  except  the  payment  of  money,  as,  for  example,  for 
the  execution  of  a  conveyance  of  land  or  the  delivering  up  of 
deeds  or  other  documents,  the  decree  must  prescribe  the  time 
within  which  the  act  must  be  done.^^  Decrees  for  an  account 
should  always  specify  the  time  from  which  the  account  is  to  be 
taken.-"  "  Every  decree  for  an  account  of  the  pci'sonal  estate  of 
a  testator  or  intestate  shall  contain  a  direction  to  the  master  to 
Avhom  it  is  referred  to  take  the  same,  io  inciuirc  and  state  to  the 
court  wliat  parts,  if  any,  of  such  pei'sonal  estate  are  outstanding 
or  undisposed  of,  unless  the  court  shall  otherwise  direct."  ^^  The 
old  form  of  a  decree  to  set  aside  a  forged  instrument  was  that 
the  document  "  be  cut,  damned,  and  cancelled."  ^o  In  suits  in 
equity  for  the  foreclosure  of  mortgages,  a  decree  may  be  rendered 
for  any  balance  that  may  be  found  due  to  the  complainant  over 
and  above  the  proceeds  of  the  sale  or  sales,  and  execution  may 
issue  for  the  collection  of  the  same  as  is  provided  in  the  eighth 
equity  rule.^^  Where  Bradley  was  trustee  under  two  deeds  of 
trust,  a  decree  appointing  Johnson  a  trustee  in  his  place  "  in  the 
deed  of  trust,"  without  specifying  which  deed  of  trust,  was  held 
void  for  uncertainty .^1 

25  Linsran  >:  Henderson.  1  Bland  (Md.),  ^8  Rule  73. 

236,  256  ;    Hodges   r.  Miillikin,    1   Bland  -'■*  Bishop  of   Winchester  ?•.  Fonrnier,  2 

(Md.),    503,   507;    Quarles  v.  Quarles,  2  Ves.  Sen.  445 ;  Fitton  r.  Earl  of  Maccles- 

Munford    (Va.),    321;    Elliott    i-.  Pell,  1  field,  1  Vern.  287,  2<,)2 ;  Seton  on  Decrees 

Pai,a:e  (N.  Y.),  26.3.  (4th  ed.).  1346. 

2'  Rule  8.  30  Rule  92. 

'^'  Cummins  i'.  Adams,  2  Irish   Eq.  393.  3i  Shepherd  v.  Peffer,  133  U.  S.  626. 


580  COSTS   AT   LAW   AND   IN   EQUITY.  [CHAP.  XXV. 


CHAPTER  XXV. 

COSTS   AT   LAW   AND    IN    EQUITY. 

§  326.  Definition  of  Costs  and  Distinction  between  Costs  at  Law 
and  in  Equity.  —  Costs  is  the  term  given  to  the  sum  of  money 
which  is  paid  to  the  successful  party  to  a  litigation,  to  reimburse 
him  for  his  expense  and  trouble  in  the  same.  The  costs  of  an 
action  at  law  are  governed  by  fixed  and  arbitrary  rules. ^  In 
equity,  the  award  or  denial  of  costs  is  always  in  the  discretion 
of  the  court  ;'^  and  so  very  frequently  is  their  amount  when 
awarded.^  When,  however,  it  is  said,  as  it  often  is,  that  the 
award  of  costs  in  equity  is  purely  discretionary,  it  should  not  be 
supposed  that  courts  of  equity  are  governed  by  no  fixed  princi- 
ples in  their  decisions  relative  to  the  costs  of  proceedings  before 
them.  All  that  is  meant  by  the  expression  is  that,  in  awarding 
costs,  they  will  take  into  consideration  the  circumstances  of  the 
cases  before  them  and  the  situation  or  conduct  of  the  parties,  and 
exercise  with  reference  to  these  points  a  discretion  governed  by 
certain  reasonably  definite  rules,  the  enforcement  of  which  is  not 
dependent  upon  the  caprice  of  the  judge  by  whom  each  cause  hap- 
pens to  be  heard,  but  is  often  a  ground  of  review  by  an  appellate 
tribunal.'* 

§  327.  Who  are  given  Costs.  —  Courts  of  common  law  invariably 
award  costs  to  the  successful  party,  except  in  the  cases  hereafter 
stated.^  Courts  of  chancery  in  general  follow  the  rule  of  the  civil 
law,  vietus  victori  in  cxpensis  condemnatus  est,  and  decree  the 
j)ayment  of  costs  by  tlie  unsuccessful  to  the  successful  parties  to 
a  suit  before  it.^     It  often  happens,  however,  that  they  depart  so 

§  326.   1  Hathaway  v.  Roacli,  2  W.  &        §  .327.   i  Hathaway  v.  Koacli,  2  W.  & 

M.'63.  M.'63. 

•^  Kiddle  y.  Mandeville,  6  Cranch,  86.  -^  Wooster  v.   IIand.y,  23  Fed    ]?.40; 

•^  Trustees   v.   Greennugh,   10.5   U.   S.  Am.  Diamond  Rock   Co.  v.  Sheldon,  28 

•  •■21  \  Central  Railroad  r.  I'cttus,  113  U-  S.  Fed.  R.  217;  Vancouver  r.  Bliss,  11  Ves. 

1 10.  458  ;  Staines  v.  Morris,  1  V.  &  B.  8  ;  Mil- 

4  Brooks  V.  Byam,  2  Story,  563  ;  Tnis-  lii  gton  v.  Fox,  3  M.  &  C.  3.38,  .^58  ;  Hunter 

tees  t).  (ireenough,  10.'')  U  S.  .527 ;  Central  r.  Town  of  Marlboro',  2   W.  &  M.    1G8; 

R.  R.  V.  Pettus,  113  U.  S.  116.  Ilovey  v.  Stevens,  3  W.  &  M.  17. 


§  327.]  WHO   ARE    GIVEN   COSTS.  581 

far  from  this  rule  as  to  deny  costs  to  the  successful  party,  and,  in 
certain  classes  of  cases,  they  will  even  compel  him  to  pay  costs 
to  those  against  whom  he  obtains  a  decree.^  In  some  cases  the 
costs  may  be  apportioned.^  Under  no  circumstances,  however, 
will  a  court  dismiss  the  plaintiff's  bill  and  award  him  costs 
against  a  defendant,^  although  under  sjiccial  circumstances  it 
might  then  allow  him'  costs  out  of  a  fund  in  court.^  If  a  plaintiff 
begins  or  continues  a  suit  after  he  has  received  formal  notice 
of  a  full  and  unconditional  offer  of  all  that  he  is  entitled  to,  he 
may  be  denied  costs,  not  only  of  all  the  [)roceed.ings  taken  by  him 
after  such  an  offer,"  but  also  of  the  whole  suit.^  This  principle 
applies  to  bills  for  an  accounting;  when,  although  on  account  of 
the  uncertain  state  of  the  account  the  defendant  may  not  be  able 
to,  and  so  does  not,  make  a  tender  of  the  balance  due  from  him, 
yet  if  he  has  shown  a  willingness  to  account,  the  court  may  re- 
lieve him  from  paying  costs.^  K  a  plaintiff  charge  fraud  which, 
though  he  establishes  his  case  on  other  grounds,  he  fails  to 
prove ;  ^'^  or,  in  some  cases,  if  he  claims  relief  more  extensive 
than  that  to  which  he  is  entitled ; "  or  if,  on  account  of  public 
policy  or  otherwise,  he  is  allowed  to  obtain  relief  in  a  matter 
wherein  he  himself  acted  unlawfully  or  dishonorably;^  or  if  he 
have  been  guilty  of  laches,^'^  which  do  not  bar  his  claim  entirely, 
—  he  will  be  denied  costs.  A  defendant  will  also  be  denied  costs 
when  successful  under  similar  circumstances  ;  ^*  for  instance,  when 
the  plaintiff's  bill  is  clearly  bad  and  he  answers  instead  of  demur- 
ring.i^     The  English  rule  seems  to  be  that  it  is  beneath  the  dig- 

3  Grattan  v.  Appleton,  3  Story,  7u5  ;  ^  Parrot  r.  Treby,  Prec.  in  Ch.  254; 

Brooks  r.  Byam,  2  Story,  55o.  Bennett  v.  Attkins,  1  Y.  &  C.  247  ;  Asli- 

*  Farwell  r.  Kerr,  28  Fed.  R.  345 ;  Lip-  burnham  v.  Thompson,  13  Yes.  402.     But 

pincott  t'.  Shaw  Carriage  Co.,  34  Fed.  K.  see  Daniell's  Cli.  Pr.  (5tli  Am.  ed.)  1396, 

570.  1397. 

5  Barns  v.  Omally,  4  McLean,  57G ;  i»  Wriglit  v.  Howard,  1  Sim.  &  S.  190; 
Hobbs  V.  McLean,  117  U.  S.  567.  But  Scott  v.  Dunbar,  1  Molloy,  442.  See 
see  Fechheimer  v.  Baum,  43  Fed.  R.  710,  Fislier  r.  Boody,  1  Curtis,  200,  223. 

730,  and  m/ra,  §  335.  "  Baldwin  v.  Ely,  9  How.  580. 

6  Fechheimer  r.  Baum,  43  Fed.  R.  719,  i-  Debcnham  v.  Ox,  1    Yes.  Sen.  276; 
734,  infni,  §  33-5.     But  sec  Hobbs  v.  Mc-  Davis  v.  Symonds,  1  Cox  Eq.  402. 
Lean,  117   U.  S.  -567.  '3  Anon.,  2  Atk.  14;  Lee  r.  Brown,  4 

"  Millington    v.  Vox,  3  M.  &  0.  .338,  Yes.  362. 

352;  Loveridge  (•   Larned,  7  Fed.  R.  294  ;  ^*  Attorney-General   i'.    Brewers'    Co., 

Calkins  r.  Bortrand,  8  Fed.  R.  75-5.     But  1    P    Wms.  37G ;  Bunker  v.  Stevens,  26 

see  Inhabitants  of  New  Providence  Town-  Feii.  R.  245. 

sliip  0.  Halsey,  117  U.  S.  3.36.  '•'  Mronks  r.  Byam,  2  Story,  5-53;  Har- 

»  Millington  v.  Fox,  3  M.  &  C.  338,  land  ,-.  Bankers' &  M.  Tel.  Co.,  32  Fed.R. 

352.  305. 


582  COSTS   AT   LAW   AND   IN   EQUITY.  [CHAP.  XXV. 

nity  of  a  sovereign  to  demand  costs,  and  that,  therefore,  when  he 
is  successful  in  a  suit,  his  counsel  will  waive  all  claim  for  any.^ 
Instances  when  costs  have  not  been  given  to  a  successful  party, 
because  the  situation  of  his  adversary  appealed  to  the  sympathy 
of  the  court,  were  when  the  decision  of  the  case  involved  the 
decision  of  a  difficult  and  doubtful  question  of  la\v,i"  especially  in 
suits  brought  for  the  specific  performance  of  a  contract  affecting 
the  sale  of  land ;  ^^  when  the  court  enforced  a  contract  made  u[)on 
a  very  inadequate  consideration  ;  ^^  and  in  other  cases  of  peculiar 
hardship.^*^  A  change  of  the  law  by  a  ruling  of  the  Supreme 
Court  subsequent  to  the  filing  of  the  bill  has  been  held  no  ground 
for  refusing  the  defendant  costs.-^  Costs  are  usually  included  in 
a  decree  for  a  perpetual  injunction  against  the  infringement  of  a 
trademark,  although  no  demand  that  he  cease  using  the  trade- 
mark was  made  on  the  defendant  before  the  suit  was  brought.^ 

The  Revised  Statutes  provide  that  when  in  a  Circuit  Court  a 
plaintiff  in  an  action  at  law  originally  brought  there,  or  a  peti- 
tioner in  equity  other  than  the  United  States,  recovers  less  than 
the  sum  or  value  of  five  hundred  dollars,  exclusive  of  costs,  in  a 
case  which  cannot  be  brought  there  unless  the  amount  in  dispute 
exclusive  of  costs  exceeds  said  sum  or  value,  he  shall  not  be 
allowed  costs,  and  the  court  may  in  its  discretion  award  costs 
against  him.^s  This  statute  applies  when  by  the  allowance  of  a 
counterclaim  the  amount  recovered  by  the  plaintiff  is  reduced  to 
less  than  five  hundred  dollars.^*  The  statute  does  not  apply  to  a 
suit  removed  from  a  State  court.-^  If  the  amount  recovered  is 
less  than  two  thousand,  but  more  than  five  hundred  dollars,  the 
statute  does  not  apply,  although  the  jurisdictional  amount  is  now 
the  former  sum.^*^  If  there  was,  when  the  suit  was  brought,  a 
reasonable  expectation  of  the  recovery  of  more  than  five  hundred 
dollars,  costs  will  not  be  awarded  against  the  plaintiff."'^'' 

16  Emperor  of  Austria  v.  Day,  2  Giff.  -  Sawyer  v.  Kellogg,  9  Fed.  R.  601. 

628;  s.  c.  .3  De  G.  F.  &  J.  217.  -^  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  %8. 

IT  Grattan  v.  Appleton,  3  Story,  755;  -■*  Hamilton  r.  Baldwin,  41  Fed.  R.429. 

Rose  V.  Calland,  5  Ves.  186.  -^  Field  r.  Schell,  4  Blatchf.  435  ;  Kills 

i»  Rose  V.  Calland,  5  Ves.  186  ;  White  v.  Jarvis,  3  Mason,  457  ;  Krcager  v.  Judd, 

V.  Foljambe,  11  Ves.  387;  Willco.x  i-.  Bel-  5  Fed.  R.  27. 

laers,  T.  cS:  R.  491.  -''  Eastman  v.  Sherry,  37  Fed.  R.  844; 

19  Burro wes  v.  Lock,  10  Ves.  470.  Johnson  v.  Watkins,  40  Fed.  R.  187. 

^^  Lilliay.  Airey.  1  Ves.  Jr.  277 ;  Shales  -'  Gibson   ;•.   Men)i)liis,  i.<:c.  R.  Co.,  31 

I'.  Barrington,  1  r.  Wms.  481  ;  Drybutter  Fed.    R.    553.     For   the   rule    under   tie 

V.  Bartholomew,  2  P.  Wms.  127.  practice   at  common   law   in    Tennes.see, 

"1  Fargo  r.  South  Eastern  Ry.  Co.,  28  see  Johnson  v.  Mississippi  &  T.  R.  Co.,  31 

Fed.  R.  906.  Fed.  R.  551. 


§  327.]  WHO    ARE   GIVEN   COSTS.  583 

111  suits  to  adjust  claims  against  the  United  States,  costs  can- 
not be  allowed  unless  the  government  puts  in  issue  the  I'ight  of 
the  plaintiff  to  recover ;  and  then  only  in  the  discretion  of  the 
court.-^  Costs  in  such  a  suit  include  only  "  what  is  actually  in- 
curred for  witnesses  and  summoning  the  same,  and  fees  paid  to 
the  clerk  of  the  court."  -^  No  costs  are  allowed  against  the  United 
States  in  a  suit  to  recover  a  penalty  or  forfeiture  accruing  under 
any  law  providing  for  the  internal  revenue,  when  the  suit  was 
brought  by  the  government  on  information  received  from  any  per- 
son other  than  a  collector,  deputy  collector,  or  inspector  of  inter- 
nal revenue.^^  No  costs  are  awarded  for  or  against  the  United 
States  in  the  Supreme  Court  or  in  the  Circuit  Courts  of  Appeals.^^ 

When  upon  a  reference  the  master  reports  in  favor  of  the  plain- 
tiff for  nominal  damages,  the  award  of  costs  is  in  the  discretion 
of  the  court,  and  depends  upon  the  peculiar  circumstances  of 
each  case.'^^ 

The  successful  party  to  a  suit  may  also  be  obliged  to  pay  costs  to 
an  opponent  who  has  not  acted  unconscientiously,  in  three  classes 
of  cases :  when  the  successful  party  has  acted  unconscientiously  in 
the  suit  or  in  the  matters  which  gave  rise  to  it ;  ^^  when  a  defendant 
has  been  necessarily  made  a  party  to  a  suit  in  which  he  has  no  direct 
personal  interest, —  for  example,  an  heir-at-law,  who  is  a  passive 
defendant  to  a  suit  to  prove  a  wiU;^*  and  when  a  bill  is  filed  to 
redeem  a  pledge  or  relieve  an  estate  from  the  burden  of  a  mort- 
gage or  other  incumbrance.^^  In  cases  where  the  finally  success- 
ful party  is  obliged  without  his  fault  to  pay  costs  to  one  of  the 
others,  if  the  suit  was  made  necessary  by  the  misconduct  of  one 
of  the  defendants,  the  latter  is  obliged  to  repay  the  amount  of 
those  costs  to  tlie  fi rst.^*^  Thus,  the  costs  paid  out  of  the  fund  to 
the  plaintiff  in  a  suit  of  interpleader  are  usually  decreed  to  be 
repaid  by  the  unsuccessful  defendant.'^^     In  suits  founded  upon 

28  24  St.  at  L.  ch.  359,  p.  508,  §  15.  34  Crew  r.  Joliff,  Prec.  in  Cli.  93 ;  Lux- 

29  24  St.  at  L.  ch.  :Wy,  p.  508,  §  15.  ton  r.  Stephens,  3  P.  Wnis.  373. 

2«  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  '.)(■)',).  35  Taner  v.  Ivie,  2  Ves.  Sen.  400,  408. 

»i  Supreme   Court    Rule   24  ;    Circuit         «6  Martinius  r.  Helniuth,  2  V.  &  B.  412, 

Court  of  Appeals  Rule  'M.  note.     vSee  Brodie  r.  St.  Paul,  1  Ves.  Jr. 

Si  Calkins  v.  Bertrand.  8  Fed.  R.  755;  .326;    Badeaa    v.    Rogers,   2    Paige   Ch. 

F.verest  v.   Buffalo  Luhrieating   Oil  Co.,  (N.  Y.)  209. 

31  Fed.  R.  742;  Hill  v.  Smith,  32  Fed.  R.         37  Martinins  v.  Helmuth,2  V.  &  B.  412, 

753;   Kirk  i".  DuBois,  46  Fed.  R.  480.  note:    Badeau    r.    Rogers,   2    Paige    Ch. 

33  Wright   V.   Howard,    1    Sim.   &    S.  (\.  Y)20;).     But  see  Ferguson  !,-.  Dent, 

190.  46  Fed.  R  88;  infra,  §  3.34. 


584  COSTS    AT   LAW   AND   IN   EQUITY.  [CIIAP.  XXV. 

letters-patent  for  inventions,  when  the  patentee  has  claimed  in 
his  specification  that  he  was  the  original  inventor  of  more  than 
he  did  first  invent,  he  cannot  recover  costs  unless  he  has  filed  a 
proper  disclaimer  in  the  Patent  Office  before  the  commencement 
of  the  suit.-"^  When  an  action  at  law  or  suit  in  equity  is  dis- 
missed in  the  court  of  first  instance  for  want  of  jurisdiction  over 
the  person  of  the  defendant  or  over  the  subject-matter,  or  for  a 
lack  of  the  requisite  difference  of  citizenship,  no  costs  are  al- 
lowed.s^  When  a  case  removed  from  a  State  court  is  remanded 
for  want  of  jurisdiction  in  the  Circuit  Court,  the  rig-ht  to  costs  is 
secured  by  the  bond  filed  with  the  petition  for  the  removal.^^ 
Wlien  a  case  was  begun  in  a  State  court  and  afterwards  removed, 
in  the  districts  of  Michigan  costs  accrued  in  the  State  court  before 
the  removal  may  be  taxed-''^  In  the  Second  Circuit  such  costs 
are  not  allowed.'*"'^  No  costs  are  usually  granted  in  a  case  in  the 
Circuit  Court  where  the  judges  are  divided.'*-^  In  an  appellate 
court,  when  a  judgment  or  decree  is  reversed  for  want  of  jurisdic- 
tion in  the  court  below,  costs  are  imposed  upon  the  party  who 
sought  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  below,  cither  by  original  pro- 
cess or  by  removal,  whether  he  is  respondent  or  ajipcllant.*^  When 
an  appeal  or  writ  of  error  is  dismissed  for  want  of  jurisdiction, 
costs  of  the  motion,  including  the  clerk's  fee  for  printing  and 
supervising  the  record,  may  be  taxed.^'^  When  both  parties  ap- 
peal, and  the  decree  is  in  all  respects  affirmed,  usually  no  costs 
of  the  appeal  are  allowed.*^ 

§328.  Classification  of  Costs.  —  Different  principles  regulate 
the  amount  of  costs  according  as  they  are  decreed  to  be  paid  by 
one  party  to  another,  or  out  of  a  fund  in  court. ^     In  the  former 

3S  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  4022;  Proctor  i'.  Brill,  ^°  Veazie  i;.  WilliaiDs,  3  Story, 611, 632. 

16  FimI,  R.  791.  ^*  IMan.-^field  C.  &  L.  M   Ry.  Co.  v.  Swan, 

3«  Biirnham   v.  Kangeley,  2   W.  &  M.  Ill  U.  S.  371> ;  Continental  Insurance  Co. 

417  ;  Pentlarge  v.  Kirby,  20  Fed.  R.  898.  v.  Rlioads,  119  U.  S.  237;  Pepcr  v.  For- 

But  see   U.  S.  V.  Treachvell,  15    Fed.  R.  dyce,  110  U.  S.  400,  Everliart  i'.  Huiits- 

532;  Cooper  i-.  New   Haven   Steamboat  ville  College,  120  U  S  223;  King  Bridge 

Co..  18  Fed.  R.  588.  Co.  ;•.  Otoe  County,  120  U.  S.  225  ;  Penin- 

•»"  See  §  3  of  .Judiciary  Act  of  1875,  as  sula    Iron   Co.  v.   Stone,   121   U.  S.  631  ; 

amended  in  1887  ;  24  St.  at  L.  cli.  373.  Chapman  v.  Barney,  129  U.  S.  077. 

^1  Wolf  V.  Insurance    Co.,   1    Flippin,  ''•''  Bradstrect  Company  v.  Iliggins,  114 

.377  ;  Cleaver  r.  Trader's  Ins.  Co.,  40  Fed.  U.  S.  262;  Circuit  Court  of  Appeals  Rule 

R.  803.     See  Central  Trust  Co.  v.  Central  23 

Iowa  Ry.  Co.,  38  Fed.  R.  863.  ^''>  Tbe  William  Co.v,  9  Fed.  R.  672. 

*2  Cliadbourne    v.   German    American  §  328.     •  Trustees   v.    Greenougb,    105 

Ins.    Co.,  31  Fed.   R.   025;  Clare  v.   Na-  U.  S.  527;  Central  R.   R.  v.  Peltus,  113 

tional  Citv  B:uik,  14  Blatchf.  445.  U.  S.  116.' 


§  330.]  attoeney's  fees.  585 

case  costs  are  said  to  be  taxed  as  between  party  and  party,  in  the 
latter  as  between  solicitor  and  client.^ 

§  329.  Costs  as  between  Party  and  Party.  —  Costs  as  between 
party  and  party  are  rcg'ulated  by  statute.  They  are  the  amount 
of  the  "  bill  of  fees  of  the  clerk,  marshal,  and  attorney,  and  the 
amount  })aid  printers  and  witnesses,  and  lawful  fees  for  exempli- 
fications and  copies  of  papers  necessarily  obtained  for  use  on 
trials."  1 

§  330.  Attorney's  Fees.  —  The  Revised  Statutes  fix  the  follow- 
ing sums  to  be  taxed  as  attorney's  fees  in  a  bill  of  costs  between 
party  and  party :  "  On  a  trial  before  a  jury,  in  civil  or  criminal 
causes,  or  before  referees,  or  on  a  final  hearing  in  equity  or  ad- 
miralty, a  docket  foe  of  twenty  dollars,  provided  that  in  cases  of 
admiralty  and  maritime  jurisdiction,  where  the  libellant  recovers 
less  than  fifty  dollars,  the  docket  fee  of  his  proctor  shall  be  but 
ten  dollars.  In  cases  at  law,  when  judgment  is  rendered  with- 
out a  jury,  ten  dollars.  In  cases  at  law,  when  the  cause  is  dis- 
continued, five  dollars.  For  scire  facias  and  other  proceedings 
on  recognizances,  five  dollars.  For  eacli  de])osition  taken  and 
admitted  in  evidence  in  a  cause,  two  dollars  and  fifty  cents.  For 
services  rendered  in  cases  removed  from  a  District  to  a  Circuit 
Court  by  writ  of  error  or  appeal,  five  dollars."  ^ 

It  has  been  held  that  a  docket  fee  can  be  taxed  for  each  hear- 
ing before  the  court  after  bill,  answer,  and  replication  have  been 
filed,^  but  not  for  a  hearing  upon  a  demurrer  which  is  overruled, 
when  the  defeudant  has  leave  to  answer  and  an  answer  is  filed.^ 
When  a  demurrer  is  sustained,  a  docket  fee  is  allowed.^  When 
a  motion  to  remind  is  granted,  a  docket  fee  is  allowed.^  To  con- 
stitute "  a  fiuul  hearing  in  equity  or  admiralty,"  there  must  be  a 
hearing  of  the  cause  upon  its  merits.*^  No  docket  fee  is  allowed 
for  a  hearing  upon  an  interlocutory  application.'     When  a  bill  is 

2  Trustees   r.   Creenough,    105   U.    S.  »  McLean  v.  Clark,  23  Fed.  R.  8G1. 

527;  Central   R.  U.  v.  Pettus,  ll.>  U.  S.  4  Price  v.  Coleman,  '22  Fed.  R.  604. 

116.  -  Josslyn  v.  Phillips,  20  Fed.  R.  481. 

§320.   1  U.   S.   R.  S    §  983.     But  see         ^  Wooster  v.  Handy,  23  Fed.  R.  49; 

Spaulding  v.  Tucker,  2  Sawyer,  50.  Goodyear  D.  V.  Co.  v.  Osgood,  2  B.  &  A. 

§  330.   1  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  824.     The  same  Pat.  Cas   520;  Coy  v.  Perkins,  13  Fed.  R. 

and  the  three  following  sections  also  rog-  111 ;  Yale  Lock  Manuf.  Co    r.  Colvin,  14 

ulate  the  fees  of  district  attorneys.     Be-  Fed.  R.  260.     Coufra,  Goodyeiir  v.  Snwyev, 

sides    the    cases     elsewhere    cited,    see  17  Fed.  R.  2. 

Bashaw  v.  U.  S..  47  Fed.  R.  40.  '^  Doucrhty  v.  West.  B  &  C  IManuf.  Co., 

2  American  Diamon.l  Hock  Boring  Co.  8  Blatchf.  107  :  Central  Trust  Co.  r.  Wa- 

V.  Sheldon,  28  Fed.  R.  217.  bash,  St.  L.  &  P.  R.  Co.,  32  Fed.  R.  084. 


586 


COSTS   AT   LAW   AND    IN    EQUITY. 


[chap.  XXV. 


dismissed  without  a  hearing-  no  docket  fee  is  allowed.^  When  a 
bill  is  taken  as  confessed,  there  must  be  a  hearing  before  the  de- 
cree, and  consequently  the  complainant  is  entitled  to  tax  a  docket 
fee.^  It  has  been  held  that  no  docket  fee  will  be  allowed  on  the 
dismissal  of  a  bill  for  want  of  prosecution  ;  ^^  nor  for  a  reference 
upon  a  motion  for  an  interlocutory  injunction  ;  ^^  nor  for  a  hearing 
upon  a  jjetition  for  leave  to  intervene  ;  ^^  nor  when  the  complain- 
ant has  the  bill  dismissed  upon  his  own  motion  before  a  final  hear- 
ing ;^'^  nor  for  a  trial  at  which  the  jury  disagreed.^"*  It  has  been 
said  that  "  the  fee  is  taxable  whenever  the  trial  is  entered  upon  by 
the  swearing  of  a  jury  in  a  common-law  case,  or  by  the  introduc- 
tion of  testimony  or  the  final  opening  of  the  argument  upon  a  final 
hearing  in  equity  or  admiralty.  The  fee  is  not  made  by  the  statute 
to  depend  upon  a  judgment  or  decree,  but  is  taxable  on  a  trial  or 
final  hearing.  As  the  labor  for  which  the  docket  fee  is  supposed 
to  be  a  compensation  is  performed  on  or  before  the  trial,  equitably 
the  party  ought  not  to  lose  the  benefit  of  it  by  a  discontinuance 
entered  after  the  trial  or  hearing  has  begun."  ^^  In  a  case 
where,  after  an  interlocutory  decree  requiring  the  defendant  to 
account,  the  plaintiff  moved  for  a  dismissal  of  his  bill,  he  was 
obliged  to  pay  the  defendant  a  docket  fee  as  well  as  other  costs. ^"^ 
Where  several  suits  by  the  same  plaintiff's  against  different  defend- 
ants were  submitted  and  tried  together  before  referees,  a  docket 
fee  in  each  case  was  allowed.^''  It  has  been  said  that  no  docket 
fee  should  be  allowed  when  the  attorney  who  appeared  and  acted 


8  Wonster  r.  Handy,  23  Fed.  R  40  ; 
Goodyear  I).  V.  Co.  v.  Osgood,  2  B.  &  A. 
Pat.  Cas.  520 ;  Coy  v.  Perkins,  13  Fed.  R. 
Ill ;  Yale  Lock  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Colvin,  14 
Fed.  R.  269.  Contra,  Goodyear  v.  Saw- 
yer, 17  Fed.  R.  2. 

s  Andrews  r.  Cole,  20  Fed.  R.  410. 

w  Wooster  ?-.  Handy,  23  Fed.  R.  49  ; 
Wijrliton  V.  Brainord.  28  Fed.  R.  29. 

11  Douslity  ;•.  W.  B.  &  C.  Manuf.  Co., 
8  Blatchf  107. 

1-  Central  Trust  Co.  v.  Wabash,  St.  L. 
&  P.  Ry.  Co.,  .32  Fed.  R.  684;  Mo.  Pac. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co  ,  .38  Fed. 
R.  775. 

1^  Coy  V.  Perkins,  13  Fed.  R.  Ill  ;  Yale 
Lock  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Colvin,  14  Fed.  R. 
2t)9;  Wooster  v.  Handy,  23  Fed.  R.  49; 
Calm  V  Qun<j  Wah  L-uhi,  28  Fed.  R.  390  ; 
Ryan  r.  (lutild,  32  Fed.  R.  754;   N.  Y.  B. 


6  P.  Co.  r.  N.  J.  C.  S.  &  R.  Co.,  .32  Fed. 
R  755.  Contra,  Goodyear  v.  Sawyer,  17 
Fed.  R.  2. 

1*  Cleaver  r.  Traders'  Ins.  Co.,  40  Fed. 
R.  803;  Dedi'kam  v.  Vose,  3  Blatclif.  77, 
153  ;  Troy  Iron  &  Nail  Factory  v.  Corning, 

7  Blatchf.  IG;  Strafer  r.  Carr,  6  Fed.  R. 
460  ;  Huntress  i'.  Town  of  Epsom,  15  Fed. 
R.  732.  But  see  Schniieder  v.  Barney,  19 
Blatchf.  143  ;  s.  c.  7  Fed.  H.  451  ;  Wooster 
V.  Handy,  23  Fed.  R.  49.  It  has  been  held 
that  in  such  a  case  a  district  attorney 
may  collect  the  docket  fee  from  the  United 
States.  Van  Hoorebeke  v.  U.  S.,  40  Fed. 
R.  450. 

15  The  Bny  City,  3  Fed.  R.  47,  per  Mr. 
Justice  Brown. 

i*"'  Goodyear  v.  Sawyer,  17  Fed.  R.  2. 

n  Switzer  v.  Home  Ins.  Co ,  40  Fed. 
R.  50. 


§  330]  attorney's  fees.  587 

for  the  successful  party  throughout  the  case  was  not  admitted  to 
practise  in  the  court  where  the  case  was  pending,  nor  admitted 
to  ])ractise  in  the  Sujjreme  Court  of  the  United  States  before 
the  filing  of  the  general  replication. ^^  Xo  docket  fee  is  allowed 
to  a  party,  not  an  attoi-ney,  who  conducts  his  own  case.^'^ 

The  fee  for  taking  a  dc{)Ositi()n  is  only  allowed  for  a  deposition 
taken  de  bene  esse  for  use  in  the  final  hearing  ;"-^'^  not  for  oral  testi- 
mony in  court  ;''^^  nor,  perhaps,  for  a  dejiosition  taken  before  a 
master  or  examiner;-'^  nor  for  a  deposition  taken  for  use  upon 
an  interlocutory  application,  such  as  an  application  for  leave  to 
intervene  or  a  hearing  upon  the  intervenor's  claim,^'^  or  an  apjjli- 
cation  for  an  interlocutory  injunction,^*  or  an  ajiplication  to  pun- 
ish a  person  for  a  contempt.^-^  In  a  case  where  the  deposition  of  a 
witness  who  lived  more  than  one  hundred  miles  from  the  place  of 
trial  had  been  taken  de  bene  esse  by  the  plaintiff,  and  subsequently 
the  defendant  persuaded  him  to  appear  upon  the  trial,  so  that  the 
deposition  was  not  read  in  evidence  ;  the  fee  for  and  the  ex])ense 
of  taking  the  deposition  were  allowed  to  be  taxed  by  plaintiff.^s 
When  the  testimony  of  several  witnesses  is  taken  by  the  same 
officer  and  returned  to  court  under  the  same  enclosure,  the  testi- 
mony of  each  witness  is  considered  as  a  separate  deposition.-"  As 
to  the  taxation  of  the  fee  for  taking  a  deposition  Avhich  is 
admitted  in  evidence  in  several  suits,  the  decisions  are  not 
harmonious.  It  seems  settled  that  when,  by  stipulation,  a  depo- 
sition is  taken  once  for  use  in  several  suits,  in  each  of  which  it  is 
entitled,  and  in  each  of  which  the  witness  is  sworn,  a  deposition 
fee  may  be  taxed  in  each  suit.^^  Where,  however,  a  deposition 
taken  in  one  suit  is  by  stipulation  read  in  another,  the  rule,  except 

,     18  Goorl3'ear  D.  V.  Co.  i:  Osgood,  13  Brown,   44   Fed.    TJ.    734 ;    Fercruson    v. 

Off.  Gaz.  ;i25.  Dent,  46  Fed.  R.  88. 

"  Gorse  c.  Parker,  36  Fed.  R.  840.  -3  Central  Trust  Co.  r.  Wabasli,  St.  L. 

20  Wooster  v.  Handy,  23  Fed.  R.  4!),  57;  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  32  Fed.   R.  684;   Mo.  Pac. 

hi  re  Strauss  v.  Meyer,  22  Fed.  R.  467  ;  Ry.  Co.  v.  Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  38  Fed.  R. 

Tuck  r.  Olds,  29  Fed.  R.  883  ;  Troy  Iron  775. 

6  Nail    Factory    v.   Corning,  7   Blatclif.  -^  Simpson  r  Brooks,  3  Blatclif.  456. 
16.  25  Spill  V.  Celluloid  Manuf.  Co.,  28  Fed. 

->   Troy  Iron  &  Nail  Factory  v.  Corning,     R.  870. 

7  Blatclif  16.  •-';  Hunter  r.  International  Ry.  Imp.  Co., 
•^■-  In  re  Strauss  v.  Meyer,  22  Fed.  R.     28  Fed.  R.  842. 

467,-  Tuck  V.  Olds,  29  Fed.  R.  883  ;  Mo.  -'   Broyles  v.  Buck,  37  Fed.  R.  137. 

Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  .'38  Fed.  2«  Wooster  v.  Handy.  23  Fed.  R  40,  63  ; 

R.  775.     In  the  Second  and  Si.xtli  Circuits  Archer  i-.  Hartford  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  31  Fed. 

such   deposition  fees    are   taxable.     Ing-  R.660;   Green   v.  French,  5  N.  J.  L.  J. 

ham  V.  Pierce,  37  Fed.  R.  047 ;  Hake  c.  228. 


58S  COSTS    AT    LAW   AND    IN   EQUITY.  [CHAP.  XXV. 

in  the  district  of  Tennessee^  and  perhaps  in  that  of  New  Jersey,'^'' 
would  seem  to  be  that  the  fee  can  only  be  taxed  in  the  first  suit.^^ 
The  expenses  of  taking  the  deposition  cannot  be  deducted  from 
the  attorney's  fee.^^  It  has  been  held  that  the  fee  cannot  be 
taxed  in  favor  of  a  party  who  did  not  appear  by  an  attorney  at 
the  taking  of  the  deposition .^'^  The  attorney's  costs  belong  to  the 
party,  not  to  his  attorney,  and  proceedings  to  collect  them  should 
be  taken  in  the  name  of  the  party .^*  In  the  absence  of  a  special 
agreement,  however,  the  value  of  the  attorney's  services  to  his 
client  will  be  considered  as  worth  at  least  the  taxable  costs. ^^ 

The  Revised  JStatutes  further  provide  that  there  shall  be  allowed 
to  a  district  attorney  fees  from  the  United  States  as  follows  :  "  For 
examination  by  a  district  attorney,  before  a  judge  or  commissioner 
of  persons  charged  with  crime,  five  dollars  a  day  for  the  time  neces- 
sarily employed.  For  each  day  of  his  necessary  attendance  in  a 
court  of  the  United  States  on  the  business  of  the  United  States, 
when  the  court  is  held  at  the  place  of  his  abode,  five  dollars ;  and 
for  his  attendance  when  the  court  is  held  elsewhere,  five  dollars 
for  each  day  of  the  term.  For  travelling  from  the  place  of  his 
abode  to  the  place  of  holdiug  any  court  of  the  United  States  in  his 
district,  or  to  the  place  of  any  examination  before  a  judge  or  com- 
missioner, of  a  person  charged  Avith  crime,  ten  cents  a  mile  for 
going  and  ten  cents  a  mile  for  returning.  When  an  indictment 
for  crime  is  tried  before  a  jury  and  a  conviction  is  had,  the  district 
attorney  may  be  allowed,  m  addition  to  the  attorney's  fees  herein 
provided,  a  counsel  fee,  in  proportion  to  the  importance  and  diffi- 
culty of  the  cause,  not  exceeding  thirty  d<dlars."26  "  There  shall 
be  taxed  and  paid  to  every  district  attorney  two  per  centum  upon 
all  moneys  collected  or  realized  in  any  suit  or  proceeding  arising 
under  the  revenue  laws,  and  conducted  by  him,  in  which  the  United 
States  is  a  party,  which  shall  be  in  lieu  of  all  costs  and  fees  in 
such  proceedings."  ^^ 

''  Xo  fee  shall  accrue  to  any  district  attorney  on  any  bond  left 

23  .Jet-man  r.  Stewarf,  12  Fed.  R.  271  ;  3-  Broyles  v.  Buck,  37  Fed.  R.  137. 

Arelier  v.  Hartford  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  31  P'ed.  3^^  Wiiiejiar  v.  Calm,  29  Fed.  R.  676. 

R.  600.  34  Broyles  v.  Buck,  37  Fed.  R    137. 

3^  Green  r.  French,  5  N.  J.  L.  J.  228.  35  Celluloid  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Chandler,  27 

31  Wooster  v   Ilandv,  23  Fed.  R.  49, 5S  ;  Fed.  R.  9. 

Am.  Diamond   R.  B.  Co.  v.  Sheldon,  28  3;  u.  S.  R.  S.  §  824. 

Fed.  R.  217  ;  Winegar  v.  Calm,  20  Fed.  37  u.  S.  R.  S.  §  825. 
R    n7fi;   Cary  v.  Lovell  Manuf.  Co.,  39 
Fed.  R.  103. 


§  330.]  attorney's  fees.  589 

with  him  for  collection,  oi*  in  a  suit  commenced  on  any  bond  for 
the  renewal  of  which  provision  is  made  by  law,  unless  the  party 
neglects  to  apply  for  such  renewal  for  more  than  twenty  days  after 
tlie  maturity  of  the  bond."  ^^  "  When  a  district  attorney  appears  by 
direction  of  the  Secretary  or  Solicitor  of  the  Treasury,  on  behalf 
of  any  officer  of  the  revenue  in  any  suit  against  such  officer,  for 
any  act  done  by  him,  or  for  the  recovery  of  any  money  received 
by  him  and  paid  into  the  Treasury  in  the  performance  of  his  offi- 
cial duty,  he  shall  receive  such  compensation  as  may  be  certified 
to  be  proper  by  the  court  in  which  the  suit  is  brought,  and  ap- 
proved by  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury."  ^^  "  The  district  attor- 
ney and  prize-commissioners,  except  the  naval  officer,  shall  be 
allowed  a  just  and  suitable  com[)ensation  for  their  respective  ser- 
vices in  each  prize-cause,  to  be  adjusted  and  determined  by  the 
court,  and  to  be  paid  as  costs  in  the  cause."  ^'^ 

"  Each  district  attorney  and  prize-commissioner,  except  the 
naval  officer,  shall  render  to  the  Attorney-General  an  annual 
account  of  all  sums  he  shall  have  received  for  all  services  in 
prize-causes  within  the  previous  year  ;  and  the  district  attorney 
sliall  be  allowed  to  retain  therefrom  a  sum  not  exceeding  three 
thousand  dollars  a  year,  in  addition  to  the  maximum  compen- 
sation allowed  to  be  retained  by  him,  under  the  provisions  of 
Title  xiii.,  '  The  Judiciary,'  or  in  addition  to  any  salary  he  may 
receive  in  lieu  of  such  maximum  compensation ;  and  each  such 
prize-commissioner  shall  be  allowed  to  retain  a  sum  not  exceed- 
ing three  thousand  dollars  a  year,  which  shall  be  in  full  for  all 
his  official  services  in  prize-causes  ;  and  any  excess  over  those 
respective  amounts  shall  be  paid  by  the  officer  receiving  the  same 
into  the  Treasury  of  the  United  States,  and  shall  be  credited  to 
the  fund  for  paying  naval  pensions."  '^^ 

"  The  court  may  allow  such  compensation  as  it  deems  just 
under  the  circumstances  of  each  case  to  any  special  counsel  for 
captors,  not  being  the  district  attorney  or  any  of  his  assistants, 
whether  appointed  by  an  Executive  Department  or  by  captors, 
for  services  actually  rendered  in  the  cause,  to  be  paid  as  costs, 
in  whole  or  in  part,  either  from  the  entire  fund  or  from  the  por- 
tion awarded  to  the  captors  ;  but  no  such  allowance  shall   be 

38  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  826.  *i  U.    S.    R.    S.   §   4647;    The   Anna, 

89  U.  S.  R.  S  §  8'27.  Blatch.  Prize  Cases,  337. 

*'>  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  4646. 


590  COSTS   AT   LAW   AND   IN    EQUITY.  [CHAP.  XXV. 

made  except  for  services  rendered  on  matters  as  to  which  the 
party  the  counsel  represents  has  an  adverse  interest  to  the  United 
States,  or  an  interest  otherwise  proper  in  the  opinion  of  the  court 
to  be  I'cpresented  by  special  counsel,  or  for  services  rendered  in 
a  contestation  between  parties  claiming  to  participate  in  the  dis- 
tribution of  the  proceeds."  ■*- 

"  Fees  of  special  counsel  in  })rize-cases,  incurred  or  authorized 
by  any  Department,  or  for  the  defence  of  captors,  against  de- 
mands for  damages  made  by  claimants  in  the  district  court,  not 
paid  l)y  claimants,  nor  from  the  prize-fund  in  the  particular 
cause,  and  audited  and  allowed  by  the  Department  incurring  or 
authorizing  them,  and  by  the  Solicitor  of  the  Treasury,  shall  be 
a  charge  upon,  and  paid  out  of,  the  funds  appropriated  for  de- 
fraying the  expenses  of  suits  in  which  the  United  States  is  a 
party  or  interested."  *3 

"  The  Attorney-General  shall,  whenever  in  his  opinion  the  pub- 
lic interest  requires  it,  employ  and  retain,  in  the  name  of  the 
United  States,  such  attorneys  and  counsellors-at-law  as  he  may 
think  necessary  to  assist  the  district  attorneys  in  the  discharge 
of  their  duties,  and  shall  stipulate  with  such  assistant  attorneys 
and  counsel  the  amount  of  compensation,  and  shall  have  super- 
vision of  their  conduct  and  proceedings."  ^* 

"  Every  attorney  or  counsellor  who  is  specially  retained,  under 
the  authority  of  the  Department  of  Justice,  to  assist  in  the  trial 
of  any  case  in  which  the  Government  is  interested,  shall  receive 
a  commission  from  the  head  of  such  Department,  as  a  special 
assistant  to  the  Attorney-General,  or  to  some  one  of  the  district 
attorneys,  as  the  nature  of  the  appointment  may  require  ;  and 
shall  take  the  oath  required  by  law  to  be  taken  by  the  district 
attorneys,  and  shall  !)e  subject  to  all  the  liabilities  imposed  upon 
them  by  law."  *^ 

"  No  comi)ensation  shall  hereafter  be  allowed  to  any  person, 
besides  the  respective  district  attorneys  and  assistant  district  at- 
torneys, for  services  as  an  attorney  or  counsellor  to  the  United 
States,  or  to  any  branch  or  Department  of  the  Government  thereof, 
except  in  cases  specially  authorized  by  law,  and  then  only  on  the 
certificate  of  the  Attorney-General  that  such  services  were  actu- 
ally rendered,  and  that  the  same  could  not  be  performed  by  the 

42  U.  R.  R.  S.  §  4648.  "  U.  S.  R.  S   §  3G3. 

43  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  4649.  **  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  366. 


§  330.]  attorney's  fees.  591 

Attorney-General,  or  Solicitor-General,  or  the  officers  of  the  De- 
partment of  Justice,  or  by  the  district  attorneys."  "^^^ 

"All  suits  and  proceedings  arising  out  of  the  provisions  of  law 
governing  national  banking  associations,  in  wliich  the  United 
States  or  any  of  its  olliccrs  or  agents  shall  be  parties,  sliall  be 
conducted  by  the  district  attorneys  of  the  several  districts  under 
the  direction  and  supervision  of  the  Solicitor  of  the  Treasury."  4" 

"  Whenever  the  head  of  a  Department  or  Bureau  gives  the 
Attorney-General  due  notice  that  the  interests  of  the  United 
States  require  the  service  of  counsel  upon  the  examination  of 
witnesses  touching  any  claim,  or  upon  the  legal  investigation  of 
any  claim,  pending  in  such  Department  or  Bureau,  the  Attorney- 
General  shall  provide  for  such  service."  *^ 

"  It  shall  be  [the]  duty  of  every  district  attorney  to  whom  any 
collector  of  customs,  or  of  internal  revenue,  shall  report,  accord- 
ing to  law,  any  case  in  whicli  any  line,  penalty,  or  forfeiture  has 
been  incurred  in  the  district  of  such  attorney  for  the  violation  of 
any  law  of  the  United  States  relating  to  the  revenue,  to  cause  the 
proper  proceedings  to  be  commenced  and  i)rosecuted  without  de- 
lay, for  the  fines,  penalties,  and  forfeitures  in  such  case  provided, 
unless,  upon  inquiry  and  examination,  he  shall  decide  that  such 
proceedings  cannot  probably  be  sustained,  or  that  the  ends  of  pub- 
lic justice  do  not  require  that  such  proceedings  should  be  insti- 
tuted ;  in  which  case  he  shall  report  the  facts  in  customs  cases 
to  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  and  in  internal  revenue  cases  to 
tlie  Commissioner  of  Internal  Revenue,  for  their  direction.  And 
for  the  expenses  incurred  and  services  rendered  in  all  such  cases, 
the  district  attorney  shall  receive  and  be  paid  from  the  Treasury 
such  sum  as  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  shall  deem  just  and 
reasonable,  upon  the  certificate  of  the  judge  before  whom  such 
cases  are  tried  or  disposed  of :  Provided,  That  the  annual  compen- 
sation of  such  district  attorney  shall  not  exceed  the  maximum 
amount  prescribed  by  law,  by  reason  of  such  allowance  and 
payment."  ^^ 

"  No  per  diem  or  otlier  allowance  shall  be  made  to  any  district 
attorney,  clerk  of  a  Circuit  Court,  clerk  of  a  District  Court,  mar- 

<6  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  365.  ^s  u.  S.  R.  S.  §  364. 

"  U   S.  R.  S.  §  380;  Freliiiffhuysen  v.  «  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  838;  Re  District  At- 

Baldwin,  12   Fed.   R.   395;    Kennedy  v.  torney,  23  Fed.  R.  20;  Bashaw  r.  U.S., 

Oihson,  8  Wall.  498  ;  Gibson  r.  Peters,  35  47  Fed.  R.  40. 
Fed.  R.  721  ;  s.  c.  36  Fed.  R.  487. 


592  COSTS   AT   LAW   AND   IN   EQUITY.  [CHAP.  XXV. 

slial  or  deputy  marshal,  for  attendance  at  rule-days  of  a  Circuit  or 
District  Coui't  ;  and  when  the  Circuit  and  District  Courts  sit  at  the 
same  time  no  greater  per  diem  or  other  allowance  shall  be  made 
to  any  such  officer  than  for  an  attendance  on  one  court."  ^^ 

"  No  district  attorney  shall  be  allowed  by  the  Attorney-General 
to  retain  of  the  fees  and  emoluments  of  his  office  which  he  is  re- 
quired to  include  in  his  semi-annual  return,  for  his  personal  com- 
pensation, over  and  above  the  necessary  expenses  of  his  office, 
including  necessary  clerk  hire,  to  be  audited  and  allowed  by  the 
proper  accounting  officers  of  the  Treasury  Department,  a  sum  ex- 
ceeding six  thousand  dollars  a  year,  or  exceeding  that  rate  for  any 
time  less  than  a  year."  ^^ 

"  There  shall  be  paid  to  the  district  attorney  for  the  Southern 
District  of  ^c\y  York,  in  addition  to  his  salary,  at  the  rate  of  six 
thousand  dollars  a  year,  such  sum  as  shall  be  necessary,  to- 
gether with  the  costs  and  fees  allowed  him  by  law,  to  pay  such 
amount  as  may  be  hxed  by  the  Attorney-General  for  the  proper 
expenses  of  his  office.  But  nothing  in  this  or  the  other  section 
shall  forbid  the  allowance  of  additional  compensation  for  services 
in  prize-causes,  as  provided  in  title  '  Prize.'  "  ^^ 

'^The  district  attorneys  and  marshals  for  the  District  of  Oregon 
and  Nevada  shall  be  entitled  to  receive,  for  the  like  services, 
double  the  fees  hereinbefore  provided  ;  but  neither  of  tlicm  shall 
be  allowed  to  retain  of  such  fees  any  sum  exceeding  the  aggregate 
compensation  of  such  officer  as  hereinbefore  provided."  ^^ 

Counsel  fees  allowed  by  the  court  to  a  district  attorney  cannot 
be  reduced  by  the  Attorney-General  or  by  the  accounting  officers.^^ 
A  district  attorney  is  not  entitled  to  fees  for  obtaining  warrants 
for  the  removal  of  prisoners  arrested  in  one  district  and  triable  in 
another.^5  A  district  attorney  is  entitled  to  a  j^er  diem  for  attend- 
ance before  a  commissioner  to  examine  poor  convicts  applying 
for  discharge,  and  for  attendance  before  a  commissioner  on 
days  when  recognizances  are  taken  though  no  witnesses  are 
examined.^''' 

The  allowance  for  travel  and  court  attendance  are  designed  to 

6«  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  881.  V.  U.  S.,  45  Fe.l.  K.  110  ;  Tutliill  v.  U.  S., 

81  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  8%.  38  Ferl.  R.  oSB  ;  U.  S  v.  Tnthill,136  U.  S. 

s-^  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  8.3G  ,  11  A.  G.  Opinions,  G52  ;  Van  Hoorebeke  v.  U.  S.,  4G  Fed.  R. 

77.  450. 

s''  U.  R.  R.  S.  §  837.  65  Bird  v.  U.  S.,  45  Fed,  R.  110. 

5^  U.  S.  V.  Waters,  133  U.  S.  208 ;   Bird  &<=  Bird  r.  U.  S.,  45  Fed.  U.  110. 


§  330]  attorney's  fees.  593 

reimburse  court  expenditures,  not  to  compensate  for  services.^' 
Consequently  a  district  attorney  cannot  charge  for  travel  done  by 
his  assistants  and  for  their  attendance  before  court  commissiou- 
ors  although  he  paid  such  exj3enditures.°^  Unless  they  otherwise 
agree  with  the  Attorney  General,  the  assistant  district  attorneys 
must  pay  their  travelling  expenses  out  of  their  salaries.^ 

Where  a  judgment  is  satisfied  by  deducting  a  judgment  against 
the  United  States  in  another  action,  the  money  is  "  collected  or 
realized"  within  the  meaning  of  the  statute.'''*  The  percentage  is 
allowed  not  only  in  cases  arising  under  the  customs  revenue  laws, 
but  also  in  those  growing  out  of  the  internal  revenue  laws;  and 
the  district  attorney  is  entitled  to  two  per  centum  of  the  sum 
which  the  government  receives  under  a  compromise  with  a  person 
who  has  been  prosecuted  by  him.^^  A  suit  against  a  surety  upon 
a  collector's  bond  to  recover  moneys  due  for  customs  duties  from 
the  revenue  officer  to  whom  they  were  paid,  is  a  suit  arising  under 
the  revenue  laws,  and  the  district  attorney  who  prosecuted  it  is 
entitled  to  his  percentage.^^  If  a  proceeding  in  rem  under  the 
internal  revenue  laws  is  discontinued  by  direction  of  the  proper 
authority,  on  the  payment  of  costs  by  the  claimant  the  district 
attorney  is  not  entitled  to  a  percentage  on  the  value  of  the 
property.--'^ 

For  prosecuting  an  action  to  enforce  a  statutory  lien  for  internal 
revenue  taxes,  the  district  attorney  is  entitled  to  ten  per  centum 
of  the  amount  collected  or  realized.^'*  How  much  will  be  collected 
or  realized  cannot  be  told  until  it  is  done,  and  the  percentage 
cannot,  therefore,  be  taxed  when  a  judgment  is  entered  against  a 
defendant.^ 

Under  Section  838  of  the  Revised  Statutes,  providing  that  it 
shall  be  the  duty  of  every  district  attorney  to  institute  the  proper 
proceedings  for  any  fines,  penalties,  and  forfeitures  which  may 
have  been  incurred  by  reason  of  the  violation  of  the  internal  rev- 
enue laws,  unless  he  shall  decide  that  the  ends  of  justice  do  not 
require  such  proceedings,  in  which  case  he  shall  report  the  facts, 

57  Townsend  v.  U  S..  22  Ct.  of  CI.  207.        gi  U.  S.  v.  -500  Barrels  of  Whiskey,  2 

58  Townsend  v.  U.  S.,  22  Ct.  of  CI.  207.  Bond,  7. 

59  Townsend  v.  U.  S.,22  Ct.  of  CI.  207,         "i  Beckwith  v.  U.  S.,  16  Ct.  of  CI.  250. 
21.3  ;  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  36.3.  "^  n  a.  G.  Op.  329. 

^  U.   S.   V.   One   Horse,  7   Ben.   405 ;  «*  Bliss  v.  U.  S..  37  Fed.  R.  101. 

Beckwith  v.   U.   S.,  10  Court  of  Claims  «^  Kin?  r.  U.  S.,  99  U.  S.  229,  234;  11 

250.  A.  G.  Op.  393. 
VOL.  I.  —  38 


594  COSTS   AT   LAW   AND    IN    EQUITY.  [cHAP.  XXV. 

and  that  for  the  expenses  incurred  and  services  rendered  in  all 
sucli  cases  he  shall  be  paid  as  therein  provided.  The  district 
attorney  is  not  entitled  to  recover  for  services  unless  prosecutions 
have  been  commenced. *^^ 

Under  Section  824  of  the  Revised  Statutes,  providing  for  the 
compensation  of  district  attorneys  for  the  examinati<jn  before  a 
judge  or  commissioner  of  persons  charged  witli  crime,  the  district 
attorney  is  entitled  to  his  "  per  diem  "  fee  for  time  necessarily 
spent  in  the  investigation  of  an  offense  in  co-operatiun  with  the 
commissioner  before  the  arrest  is  actually  made  and  witnesses 
are  sworn.^"  The  district  attorney  is  entitled  to  compensation 
for  time  actually  and  nee  ssarily  spent  upon  an  arraignment  be- 
fore the  commissioner,  though  no  witnesses  are  examined,  the 
magistrate  having  adjourned  the  hearing  on  motion  of  tlic  ac- 
cused.^^  Compensation  is  recoverable  for  the  actual  examination 
of  the  accused  upon  an  application  to  take  the  jjoor  convict's 
oath.^^  A  district  attorney  is  entitled  to  a  j^er  diem  fee  for  at- 
tendance before  a  commissioner  to  examine  poor  convicts  apply- 
ing for  discharge,  and  for  attendance  before  a  commissioner  on 
days  when  recognizances  are  taken,  though  no  witnesses  are  exam- 
ined.™ A  district  attorney  is  not  entitled  to  fees  for  obtaining 
warrants  for  the  removal  of  prisoners  arrested  in  one  district  and 
triable  in  another."^  A  district  attorney  who  does  two  days'  work 
in  one  is  not  entitled  to  a  double  fee.'^  For  services  resulting  in 
a  discontinuance  before  a  commissioner  the  district  attorney  is  to 
be  paid  under  the  '•''  per  diem  "  clause  of  the  statute,  and  not  under 
the  clause  prescribing  the  fee  for  a  discontinuance."^  Where  the 
accused  is  boimd  over  by  the  commissioner  to  the  District  Court, 
and  the  commissioner's  record  is  sent  to  that  court  and  docketed, 
a  fee  is  recovernblo  for  a  discontinuance,  although  no  information 
has  been  filed.'*  Where  the  commissioner  s  record  and  bail-bond 
are  returned  to  court,  and  an  indictment  is  di-awn,  but  rejected 
by  the  grand  jury,  a  fee  is  recoverable  for  a  discontinuance.'^ 
For  services  rendered  by  a  district  attorney  in  securing  a  compro- 
mise of  a  civil  suit  brought  in  favor  of  the  United  States,  whereby 
the  suit  is  dismissed  without  trial,  he  is  only  entitled  to  the  fee  of 

c«  Stanton  v.  U.  S.,  37  Fed.  U  2o2.  Ii  Bird  v.  U.  S.,  45  Fed.  R.  110. 

6"  Stanton  v.  U.  S.,  37  Fed   R.  252.  '-'  Stanton  v.  U.  S  ,  87  Fed.  R.  252. 

68  Stanton  v.  U.  S.,  .'57  Fed.  H.  252.  "■'  Stanton  r.  U.  S.,  37  Fed.  R.  252. 

69  Stanton  >:  IT.  S  ,  37  Fed   R.  2.52.  "♦  St.-mton  i>.  U.  S.,  37  Fed.  R.  252. 
'0  Bird  V.  U.  S.,  45  Fed.  R.  IIU.  "^  Stanton  r.  U.  S.,  37  Fed.  R.  252. 


§  330.]  attorney's  fees.  595 

five  dollars  allowed  for  a  discontinuance."^  An  order  remittiijg  a 
criminal  case  from  the  Circuit  Court  to  the  District  Court,  on 
motion  of  the  district  attorney,  is  not  a  judgment  within  the 
meaning  of  Section  824  of  the  Revised  Statutes." 

Under  Section  824  of  the  Revised  Statutes,  providing  that 
where  an  indictment  "  is  tried  before  a  jury,  and  a  conviction 
is  had,  the  district  attorney  may  be  allowed,  in  addition  to  the 
attorney's  fees  herein  provided,  a  counsel  fee  in  proportion  to 
the  importance  and  dilliculty  of  the  case,  not  exceeding  thirty 
dollars,"  the  attorney  is  entitled  to  a  counsel  fee  in  a  case  where 
the  defendant  pleads  not  guilty,  and  the  prosecution  produces  its 
evidence,  even  though  the  defendant  offers  no  evidence,  or  then 
consents  to  a  verdict  of  guilty."^  A  district  attorney  may  recover 
the  docket  fee  of  twenty  dollars  in  a  case  where  the  jury  disagree.^^ 
An  attachment  for  a  contempt  is  an  independent  proceeding  in 
which  the  statutory  fees  are  allowed.^° 

When  a  district  attorney  goes  from  the  place  where  he  is  en- 
gaged in  court  to  a  hearing  before  a  commissioner  he  is  entitled 
to  his  mileage  for  the  whole  distance,  if  such  distance  is  less 
than  that  from  his  home  to  the  place  where  the  commissioner 
sits;?i 

A  district  attorney  is  entitled  to  recover  for  clerk  hire  and  for 
necessary  expenses  of  the  office,  such  as  telegrams  and  printing 
and  stationery  ;^'^  and  stenographers'  charges  for  taking  and  tran- 
scribing the  testimony  in  a  criminal  case  ;  ^-^  but  he  cannot  recover 
fees  paid  by  him  to  the  clerk  of  a  coui-t  of  the  United  States.®* 
Such  clerk  must  collect  his  fees  from  the  Treasury  Department.®' 
Under  Section  84(3  of  the  Revised  Statutes,  providing  that  where 
tlie  ministerial  officers  of  the  United  States  shall  incur  extraor- 
dinary expense  in  executing  the  laws  thereof,  the  payment  of 
which  is  not  speciiically  provided  for,  the  President  is  autliorized 
to  allow  the  payment  tlicreof,  an  action  will  not  lie  for  money  paid 
out  by  a  district  attorney  to  prevent  the  escape  of  an  alleged 
criminal,  where  no  allowance  has  been  made  by  the  President.®*' 

76  Stanton  v.  U.  S.,  37  Fed.  "R  252.  ^i  Van  Hoorebcke  r.  U.  S.,  40  Fed.  R. 

■^  Stanton  v.  U.  S.,  37  Fed.  U.  252.  456. 

"8  Tutliill  r.  U.  S  ,  38  Fed.  R.  538  ;  U.  S.  »-  Stanton  v.  U.  S.,  37  Fed.  U.  252. 

V.  TuthiU,  136  U.  S.  0.32,  mem.  8.3  Fisli  v.  U.  S.,  36  Fed.  K.  677. 

'3  Van    Iloorebeke    v.  U.   S.,  46    Fed.  »*  Stanton  i-.  U.  S.,  37  Fed.  K  252. 

R.  456.  85  Stanton   v.   U.   S.,  37   Fed.    K.  252. 

'■•'  Van    Hoorebeke  v.  U.  S.,  40  Fed.  U.  See  infra,  §  331. 

450.  ^"  Stanton  v.  U.  S  ,  37  Fed.  R.  252. 


596  COSTS   AT   LAW  AND   IN   EQUITY.  [CHAP.  XXV. 

The  Act  of  March  3,  1887,  provides  that  no  district  attorney, 
clerk,  or  marshal  shall  receive  any  per  diem  compensation  for 
attendance  in  court  "  except  for  days  when  the  court  is  open  by 
the  judge  for  business,  or  business  is  actually  transacted  in  court, 
and  when  they  attend  under  Sections  583,  58-1,  671,  672,  and 
2013  of  the  Revised  Statutes,  which  fact  shall  be  certified  in 
the  approval  of  their  accounts."  ^"  The  method  of  adjusting  the 
accounts  of  district  attorneys  is  described  in  the  following  Sec- 
tion on  Clerk's  Fces.^^ 

§331.  Clerks  Fees. — The  fees  of  the  clerk  of  the  Supreme 
Court  are  fixed  by  rule  as  follows :  "  For  docketing  a  case  and 
filing  and  indorsing  the  transcript  of  the  record,  five  dollars. 
For  entering  an  appearance,  twenty-five  cents.  For  entering  a 
continuance,  twenty-five  cents.  For  filing  a  motion,  order,  or 
other  paper,  twenty-five  cents.  For  entering  any  rule,  or  for 
making  or  copying  any  record  or  other  paper,  twenty  cents  per 
folio  of  each  one  hundred  words.  For  transferring  each  case  to 
a  subsequent  docket  and  indexing  the  same,  one  dollar.  For 
entering  a  judgment  ov  decree,  one  dollar.  For  every  search  of 
the  records  of  the  court,  one  dollar.  For  a  certificate  and  seal, 
two  dollars.  For  receiving,  keeping,  and  paying  money  in  pur- 
suance of  any  statute  or  order  of  court,  two  per  cent,  on  the 
amount  so  received,  kept,  and  paid.  For  an  admission  to  the 
bar  and  certificate  under  seal,  ten  dollars.  For  preparing 
the  record  or  a  transcript  thereof  for  the  printer,  indexing  the 
same,  supervising  the  printing,  and  distributing  the  printed 
copies  to  the  justices,  the  reporter,  the  law  library,  and  the  par- 
ties or  their  counsel,  fifteen  cents  per  folio.  For  making  a  man- 
uscript copy  of  the  record,  when  required  under  Rule  10,  twenty 
cents  per  folio,  but  nothing  in  addition  for  supervising  the  print- 
ing. For  issuing  a  writ  of  error  and  accompanying  papers,  five 
dollars.  For  a  mandate  or  other  process,  five  dollai's.  For  filing 
briefs,  five  dollars  for  each  party  ap])earing.  For  every  copy  of 
any  opinion  of  the  court,  or  any  justice  thereof,  certified  under 
seal,  one  dollar  for  every  printed  page,  but  not  to  exceed  five 
dollars  in  the  whole  for  any  copy."  ^  Upon  moneys  paid  into 
court  the  clerk  is  allowed  a  commission  of  one  per  centum.^     The 

87  24  St.  atL.  809.  §  3:11.   i  Supreme  Court  Rule  24;  22 

S8  Infra,  §  331  nott^s,  141-153,    U.  S.     St.  at  L.  ch.  443,  p.  631. 
R.  S.  §§  839-846;  18  St.  at  L.  333.  ^  Florida  v.  Anderson,  91  U.  S.  683. 


§  331.]  clerk's  fees.  597 

compensation  of  the  clerk  of  the  Supreme  Court  is  limited  to  six 
thousand  dollars  a  year.  The  balance  of  his  fees  and  disburse- 
ments over  and  above  his  necessary  clerk  hire  and  incidental 
expenses,  as  certified  by  the  Supreme  Court  or  a  justice  thereof 
appointed  by  it  for  the  purpose,  must  be  paid  into  the  Treasury .^ 

In  cases  where  a  manuscript  copy  of  the  record  is  not  furnished 
the  printer,  the  fee  of  the  clerk  for  his  service  under  the  last 
preceding  paragraph  is  one  half  the  rates  allowed  by  law  for 
making  a  manuscript  copy,  which  is  charged  to  the  party  bringing 
the  cause  into  court,  unless  the  court  otherwise  directs.  When 
a  manuscript  copy  is  required  to  be  made,  full  fees  for  a  copy 
may  be  charged,  but  nothing  in  addition  for  the  other  services 
required.*  In  all  cases  the  clerk  must  deliver  a  copy  of  the 
printed  record  to  each  party  without  extra  charge. 

In  cases  of  dismissal,  reversal,  or  affirmance  with  costs,  the  fee 
allowed  in  the  last  paragraph  is  taxed  against  the  party  against 
whom  the  costs  are  given.  In  cases  of  dismissal  for  want  of 
jurisdiction,  such  fees  are  taxed  against  the  party  bringing  the 
cause  into  court,  unless  the  court  otherwise  directs.^  The  plain- 
tiff in  error  or  appellant,  on  docketing  a  case  and  filing  the  record, 
must  enter  into  an  undertaking  to  the  clerk,  with  surety  to  his 
satisfaction  for  the  payment  of  his  fees,  or  otherwise  satisfy  him 
in  that  behalf.'^  Wiien  a  party  has  printed  the  transcrii»t  of  the 
record  at  his  own  expense,  ho  may  docket  the  case  without  giving 
security  for  the  clerk's  fees;  but  before  the  printed  copies  are 
delivered  to  the  justices  or  the  parties  for  use  on  the  final  hear- 
ing, or  on  any  motion  in  the  progress  of  the  cause,  the  clerk  can 
require  the  payment  of  fifteen  cents  a  folio  for  attending  to  the 
correctness  and  proper  indexing  of  the  printed  copies  of  tlie  rec- 
ord.' If  the  clerk  demand  the  fees  in  advance,  they  must  be 
paid.^  The  proper  method  of  collecting  such  costs  from  the  {par- 
ties or  their  sureties,  is  to  issue  an  attachment  against  them, 
respectively,  to  compel  payment  of  fces.^  When  the  clerk  has  no 
security  for  fees  dtie  to  him  from  a  party  entitled  to  a  mandate, 
he  may  withhold   the   mandate  until  his  fees  are  paid,  or  he  is 

3  22   St.  at  L.  603.     See  U.  S.  K.  S.  ^  Supreme  Court  Rule  10. 

844.  •  Bean  v.  Patterson,  110  U.  S.  401. 

•»  Re  Amendments  to  Rules,  108  U.  S.  »  Steever  v.  Rickman,  109  U.  S.  74. 

1,  4.  ^  Supreme  Court  Rule  10. 

^  lie  Amendments  to  Rules,  108  U.  S. 
1.4. 


598  COSTS    AT   LAW    AND   IN    EQUITY.  [CHAP.  XXV. 

otherwise  satisfied  in  that  behalf.^'^  The  salaries  of  the  clerks  of 
the  Circuit  Courts  of  Appeals  are  three  thousand  dollars  a  year, 
payable  in  equal  quarterly  instalments. i'  The  fees  and  costs  in 
the  Circuit  Courts  of  Appeal  are  the  same  as  the  fees  and  costs 
in  the  Superior  Court. ^^ 

The  fees  of  the  clerks  of  Circuit  and  District  Courts  are  fixed 
by  statute  as  follows  :  — 

"For  issuing  and  entering  every  process,  commission,  sum- 
mons, capias,  execution,  warrant,  attachment,  or  other  writ, 
except  a  writ  of  venire,  or  a  summons  or  subpoena  for  a  witness, 
one  dollar."  ^^  In  scire  facias  on  a  forfeited  appearance  bond  in 
a  criminal  case,  a  separate  notice  must  issue  to  each  obligor. 
This  is  in  the  nature  of  a  writ,  and  the  clerk  is  entitled  to  his 
allowance  for  the  same.^^ 

"For  issuing  a  writ  of  summons  or  sul>poena,  twenty-five 
cents."  ^^  Section  829  of  the  Revised  Statutes  requires  that 
the  clerk  shall  insert  in  each  writ  of  subpoena  the  names  of  as 
many  witnesses  in  a  cause  as  convenience  in  serving  will  permit. 
Where  the  clerk  makes  the  copies  of  the  subpoenas  or  the  sub- 
pcena  tickets,  and  furnishes  them  to  the  marshal  for  service,  at 
the  request  or  by  the  acquiescence  of  the  district  attorney,  the 
clerk  is  entitled  to  charge  the  government  for  making  such 
copies. 1^  The  clerk  may  issue  separate  subpoenas  for  witnesses 
in  criminal  cases  when  necessary  to  secure  their  immediate 
attendance.^' 

"  For  filing  and  entering  every  declaration,  plea,  or  other  paper, 
ten  cents."  ^^  No  paper  is  considered  filed  unless  it  has  the 
proper  indorsement  by  the  clerk.^^  Merely  placing  a  paper  in 
the  court  papers  is  no  filing.^^  When  it  is  necessary  to  enter  on 
the  calendar  a  note  of  such  filing,  an  additional  fee  of  fifteen 
cents  is  allowed.'-^^     The  clerk  is  entitled  to  ten  cents  for  every 

w  Osbnrn  v.  United  States,  131   U.  S.  i"  Jones  v.  United   States,  39  Fed.  R. 

CXXXVII.  410. 

11  20  St.  at  L.  cii.  517,  §  2,  p.  820.  i^  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  828. 

12  20  St.  at  L.  ch.  h\l,  §  2,  p.  827.  '^  Erwin  r.  U.  S.,  37  Fed.  R.  470,  484 ; 

13  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  828.  See  Goodrich  v.  Henry  Amy  &  Co.  v.  Siielby  Connty,  1 
U.  S.,  47  Fed.  R.  207.  Flippin,  104. 

1*  Jones   V.  United   States,  39  Fed.  R.  2'  Erwin  v.  U.  S.,  87  Fed.  R  470,  484; 

410.  Henry  Amy  &  Co.  v.  Slielhy  County,  1 

15  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  828.  Flippin,  104. 

ic  Erwin  v.  United  States,  37   Fed   R.  21  Erwin  v.  U.  S.,  37  Fed.  R.  470,  484; 

470 ;  United    States   v.  Van   Duzee,  140  Henry   Amy   &  Co.  v.  Shelby  County,  1 

U.  S.  169,  170.  Flippin,  104. 


§  331.]  clerk's  fees.  599 

separate  voucher  filed  by  him,  thoiigli  such  vouchers  are  filed 
with  his  report  of  moneys  on  hand."'^'^  Charges  for  filing  ijroi- 
cipes  for  bench-warrants  are  proper,  since  it  is  the  practice  for 
the  clerk  to  wait  for  instructions  from  the  district  attorney,  in  the 
form  of  a  pnecipe,  before  issuing  such  warrants,  and  to  file  the 
ptrcecipcs?'^  After  sentence,  no  prcecipe  for  commitment  is  neces- 
sary, and  no  allowance  should  be  made  for  filing  thcm.^^  The  clerk 
is  entitled  to  fees  from  the  United  States  for  filing  each  separate 
voucher  covered  by  the  marshal's  account  with  the  govcrnmeut.'^-^ 
The  clerk  is  entitled  to  a  fee  of  ten  cents  for  filing  each  separate 
voucher  returned  by  the  marshal  with  his  accounts.-^  It  is  the 
clerk's  duty  to  lile  the  appointments  of  deputy-marshals,  and 
record  their  oaths  of  office,  and  he  is  entitled  to  receive  the  fees 
therefor  from  the  government,  whether  or  not  the  government 
can  reimburse  itself  from  the  officers.^'^  Though  the  expense  of 
taking  the  oaths  and  executing  the  bonds  of  deputy-marshals, 
jury  commissioners,  bailiffs,  district  attorneys,  and  their  assist- 
ants must  be  ])aid  by  themselves,  the  fees  for  filing  them  are 
chargealtle  against  the  government.-'^  The  expense  of  aj:)proving 
their  accounts  must  be  paid  by  the  United  States,  and  the  clerk 
may  collect  from  the  United  States  his  fees  for  entering  the  orders 
of  approval,  and  for  certified  copies  of  the  same  when  required.-^ 
"  Discharged  tickets,"  issued  out  of  the  district  attorney's  office, 
officially  notifying  the  clerk  that  certain  government  witnesses 
are  no  longer  required,  are  properly  filed  by  the  clerk  as  "  other 
papers,"  within  Section  828  of  the  Revised  Stntntes,  and  he  is 
entitled  to  collect  the  specified  fee  therefor.-"'^  The  clerk  of  the 
District  Court  is  entitled  to  fees  from  the  government  for  filing 
scpnratcly,  in  criminal  cases,  the  ])rocess  or  copy  of  process,  the 
bail  bond,  and  the  recognizance  of  witnesses  sent  up  by  the  com- 
missioner,^^ for  entering  an  order  for  trial  and  recording  a  ver- 
dict in  a  criminal  casc.-'^^  The  clerk  can  charge  for  filing  each 
separate  j)aper  sent  up  l)y  the  commissioners  after  the  hearing 
in  criminal  cases,  and  for  filing  each  separate  account  of  deputy- 

22  Gno(lrii:li  r   U.  S  ,  05  Fc<l.  R.  193.  --^^  U.  S.  >:  V.-xn  Duzeo,  140  U.  S.  169. 

25  Van  Duzee  v.  U.  S.,  41  Fe.l.  H.  571  ;         -«  U.  S.  v.  Van  Duzee,  140  U.  S.  169. 
U   S.  r.  Van  Dnzee,  140  U  S.  ICO.  30  Taylor  >:   U.   S.,    45   Fed.    R.   531; 

-i  U.  S   V.  Van  Dnzee,  MO  U.  S.  1G9.  Goodrich  v.  U.  S.,  47  Fed.  R.  2G7. 
25  Jones  V.  U.  S.,  39  Fed    U  410.  si  jo„es  ,-.  U.  S  ,  39  Fed.  R.  410. 

2S  Marvin  !.'  U.  S.,  44  Fed,  R.  405.  ''■-'  U.    S.    i-.    Van    Duzee,    110    U.    S. 

2'  Van  Duzee  r.  U.  S.,  41  Fed.  R.  571.  109. 


600  COSTS   AT   LAW   AND   IN   EQUITY.  [CHAP.  XXV. 

marshals,  which  are  the  vouchers  to  accounts  current  of  the 
marshal.*^  Under  section  828  of  the  Revised  Statutes,  allnwing- 
the  clerk  of  the  Circuit  Court  ten  cents  for  "  liling  and  enterhit;' 
every  declaration,  plea  or  other  paper,"  the  clerk  is  not  required 
to  fasten  together  all  the  papers  in  a  case  sent  up  by  the  com- 
missioner, aud  (ile  the  bundle  as  one  paper,  but  may  file  them  as 
received  ;  Jior  is  he  required  to  enter  every  paper  that  he  files  on 
the  court  docket,  but  may  make  the  entry  on  any  proper  book  ke[)t 
for  the  purpose.^*  The  clei-k  may  charge  for  filing  the  oaths,  Ijonds, 
and  appointments  of  deputy-marshals,  jury  commissioners,  bailiffs, 
district  attorneys  and  their  associates,  attoi'neys  to  defeud  accused 
persons  and  supervisors  of  elections,  when  required  to  be  entered 
in  his  office.*^  Under  Section  1014  of  the  Revised  Statutes,  ])ro- 
viding  for  the  examination  of  persons  accused  of  offences  against 
the  United  States,  before  a  commissioner  of  the  Circuit  Court,  or 
other  magistrate  of  any  State,  agreeal)ly  to  the  usual  mode  of 
process  in  such  State,  and  that  copies  of  the  process  shall  be 
returned  into  the  clerk's  office,  together  with  recognizances  of 
witnesses  for  their  appearance,  the  clerk  is  entitled  to  a  filing  fee 
for  each  separate  paper,  and  not  to  one  fee  only  in  each  case.^^ 
The  clei-k  of  the  District  and  Circuit  Courts  and  the  Chief  Super- 
visor of  Elections  should  file  and  indorse  each  paper  that  comes 
into  his  possession  officially,  although  jicrtaining  to  the  same  case 
or  matter,  and  not  simjjly  the  outside  paper  or  wrapper,  and  he 
is  entitled  to  fees  for  each  paper  filed.  He  is  also  entitled,  as 
supervisor  of  elections,  to  fees  for  indexing  and  entering  records 
of  elections,  as  required  by  law.-^'  If  two  or  more  depositions 
are  embraced  in  a  single  paper,  or  a  series  of  sheets  attached 
together,  they  form  but  a  single  paper,  within  the  meaning  of 
the  law.^^ 

"For  administering  an  oath  of  affirmation,  except  to  a  juror, 
ten  cents."  ^  Affidavits  of  service  by  government  witnesses  are 
properly  administered  l)y  the  clerk,  and  he  is  entitled  to  charge 
therefor.-*o     When  blanks  furnished   by   the   department  for  ab- 

3'i  Erwin  V.  U.  S.,  37  Fed.  K.  470  ;  U.  S.  ■'"'  Taylor  v.  U.  S.  45  Fe.l  K.  5:31  ;  U.  S. 

V.  Van  Duzee,  140  U.  S.  169.  v.  Van  i)iizee,  140  U.  S.  ICO. 

31  Van  Dnzeo  /•.  U.  S..  41  Fed.  li.  571 ;  ^  Dimmic-k  ?•.  U.  S.,  36  Feil.  R.  82. 

U.  S.  r.  Van  Duzee.  HO  U.  S.  ICf)  as  u.  S.  r.  Barber,  140  U.  S.  104,  168; 

'^  U.  S.  V.  Van   Duzee,   140  U.  S.  109  ;  jnr  Mr  Justice  Brown. 

Goodrich  v.  U.  S.,  47  Federal  Reporter,  ^y  u.  S.  K.  S.  §  828. 

267.  ^''  Taylor  r.  U.  S.,  45  Fed.  R.  531. 


§  331.]  clerk's  fees.  •  601 

stracts  of  payment,  of  witnesses,  etc.,  contain  jurats,  the  clerk  is 
entitled  to  a  fee  of  twenty-five  cents  for  each  jurat.'^^  The  clerk 
may  not  charge  for  administering  the  oaths  of  office  to  deputy- 
marshals,  jury  commissioners,  bailiffs,  district  attorneys,  and 
their  assistants,  or  preparing  their  official  bonds,  but  he  may 
charge  for  filing  their  oaths,  bonds,  and  appointments.*- 

"  For  taking  an  acknowledgment,  twenty-five  cents." '*^  It  has 
been  held  that  the  acknowledgment  of  the  principal  and  sureties 
to  a  recognizance  in  a  criminal  case  is  a  single  act,  and  that  the 
commissioner  can  charge  but  a  single  fee  for  the  same.** 

"For  taking  and  certifying  depositions  to  file,  twenty  cents  for 
each  folio  of  one  hundred  words."  '^^  Where  a  suit  is  voluntarily 
dismissed  by  the  complainant,  without  a  submission  or  hearing, 
on  a  settlement  of  the  case  at  complainant's  costs,  with  consent 
of  the  defendant  and  the  attorneys  of  both  parties,  the  solicitor's 
fees  for  taking  depositions  are  not  allowable  ;  but  the  clerk's  fees 
are  a  proper  charge  under  a  decree  dismissing  the  case  at  com- 
plainant's costs.*'^ 

"  For  a  copy  of  such  deposition  furnished  to  a  party  on  request, 
ten  cents  a  folio." '^'  A  party  may  tax  the  fee  ])aid  for  a  copy  of 
his  own  deposition,  for  use  in  printing  the  evidence,  as  required 
by  a  rule.'*^ 

"  For  entering  any  return,  rule,  order,  continuance,  judgment, 
decree,  or  recognizance,  or  drawing  any  bond,  or  making  any  rec- 
ord, certificate,  return,  or  report,  for  each  folio,  fifteen  cents."  *^ 
"When,  by  order  of  the  court,  the  clerk  enters  upon  the  minutes 
a  proceeding  in  a  court  of  official  character,  such  as  a  memorial 
concerning  the  death  of  a  public  man,  the  fee  for  entering  is 
properly  chargeable  to  the  government.^'^  Where  tlie  number  of 
words  is  less  than  one  hundred,  they  arc  counted  a  folio ;  and  as 
such  entry  is,  in  fact,  a  record,  the  departmental  construction  is 
the  proper  one,  which  gives  the  clerk  ten  cents  for  fding  a  paper, 
and  liftecn  cents  for  the  record  entry  in  the  calendar.^^  The  clerk 
may  charge  fees  in  an  e(iuity  cause,  as  to  absent  defendants,  as  to 

"  Marvin  v.V.  S.,  44  Federal  Reporter,  '•o  Calm  r.  Qnng  Wah  Lung,  28  Fed.  R. 

405.  30G. 

i-  U.  S.  V.  Van  Duzee,  140  U.  S.  1G9.  <'  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  828. 

43  U.  S.  R.  S.,  §  828.  48  Brewster  I'.'simler,  .38  Fed.  R.  549. 

**  U.  S.  V.  Barber,  140  U.  S.  177.     But  *^>  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  828. 

see  Taylor  v.  U.  S.,  45  Fed.  R.  531.  ^o  Y.rsvui  v.  U.S.,  ."7  Fed.  R.  470. 

••£  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  828.  51  Amyi-.  Shelby  County,  1  Flippin,  104. 


602  ♦    COSTS    AT   LAW   AND   IN   EQUITY.  [CHAP.  XXV. 

whom  the  cause  is  continued.''^  Where  a  cause,  after  behig  re- 
ferred to  an  auditor,  is,  with  the  sanction  of  the  court,  settled  by 
the  parties,  and  entry  made,  "  Dismissed,  at  defendant's  costs,  by 
consent,"  the  process  and  pleadings  in  the  State  court,  together 
with  the  proceedings  for  removal  sent  up  in  the  transcript,  and 
the  proceedhigs  in  the  Federal  court,  should  be  entered  upon  the 
final  record ;  and  the  clerk  may  properly  charge  fifteen  cents  per 
folio  for  such  entry .^^  A  judgment  is  an  order  of  the  court  within 
the  meaning  of  the  fee  bill.'^*  For  entry  of  the  return  of  a  grand 
jury  the  clerk  is  entitled  only  to  the  statutoi'y  folio  fces.^^  Orders 
made  by  the  court  upon  the  marshal  to  bring  to  court  for  trial 
prisoners  who  have  been  committed  by  commissioners  to  jails  of 
other  counties  are  not  within  the  ]>rovision  of  Section  1030  of  the 
Revised  Statutes,  that  no  writ  is  necessary  to  bring  into  court  any 
prisoner  or  person  in  custody,  but  that  it  shall  be  done  uj)on  order, 
and  that  no  fee  can  be  charged  therefor  by  the  clerk  or  marshal. 
That  statute  relates  solely  to  prisoners  and  witnesses  while  in 
attendance  on  court,  and  the  clerk  is  entitled  to  charge  the  proper 
fees  for  making  and  authenticating  such  ordcrs.^^  The  ju'ovision 
of  Section  828  of  the  Revised  Statutes,  giving  certain  fees  for 
making  dockets  and  indexes  taxing  costs,  etc.,  in  any  "  cause," 
applies  to  proceedings  by  the  United  States  against  witnesses  for 
contempt,  and  such  fees  are  a  legitimate  charge  by  the  clerk.°'^ 
The  clerk  is  entitled  to  fees  for  entering  orders  of  the  approval 
of  clerk's  and  district  attorney's  and  marshal's  and  commission- 
er's accounts,  and  filing  the  papers  with  same,  for  swearing  bail- 
iffs, for  filing  venires  and  precepts  to  distribute,  and  other  jiapers, 
and  for  making  the  acknowledgments  of  sureties  on  recogni- 
zances.^s  The  clerk's  fees  for  entering  orders  approving  accounts 
of  commissioners  and  the  district  attorney,  for  entering  reports  of 
money  paid  into  court,  and  filing  vouchers  pursuant  to  a  standing- 
order  of  the  court  and  Section  708  of  the  Revised  Statutes,  for 
making  transcripts  required  by  24  St.  at  Large,  p.  507,  §  10,  when 
ordered  by  the  district  attornoy,  and  for  entering  an  oi'der  ap- 
pointing an  attorney  to  dcfciid  a  poor  [)erson,  are  all  chargealjlo 
to  the  United  States.^''-'     Under  the  Act  of  Feb.  22,  1876,60  the 

^■^  F.xpnrtp  Leo,  4  rraiicli  C.  ('.  107.  "  Taylor  r.  U.  S..  4.')  Fed.  ^\   W?,\. 

»J  r.lain   r.  Home  Ins.  Co.,  m  l-Vd.   M.         "'   Taylor  v.  U.  S.,  40  I<V(1    li.  .^:'.l. 
CG7.  5«  Davis  v.  U.  R.,  45  Fi-d    H.  lC.t2. 

i-*  Blake  r.  Hawkins.  1<)  Fed.  H.  204.  '"'^  Goodrich  ,.\  V,    S.,  42  Fed.  H.  :;n2. 

"i  Van  Duzce  v.  U.  S.,  41  Fed.  R.  57L  G'  xT.  S.  W.  S.  1  Sn;.;.!,  1  1.". ,  18  St.  at  L. 

p.  33.3,  cli.  95. 


§  331.]  clerk's  fees.  603 

clerk  of  the  Circuit  or  Distriet  Court  is  entitled  to  his  legal 
charges  for  the  entry  of  orders,  and  other  legitimate  expenses 
of  approving  the  accounts  of  deputy-marshals,  jury  commission- 
ers, bailiffs,  district  attorneys,  and  assistant  district  attorneys.^^ 
Fees  are  properly  allowed  for  entering  orders  for  trial,  and  re- 
cording the  verdict  in  criminal  cases,  as  for  '•  making  a  record," 
and  these  services  are  not  covered  by  the  docket  fee.^^  Orders  of 
continuance  from  day  to  day  in  criminal  trials  are  within  Section 
828  of  the  Revised  Statutes,  giving  the  clerk  for  entering  any 
order,  ontiuuance,  etc.,  for  each  folio  fifteen  cents.*^"^  The  clerk 
should  keep  a  record  of  an  affidavit  chai-ging  a  crime,  and  a  pi'e- 
liminary  hearing,  a  finding  probable  cause,  and  the  fixing  of  rea- 
sonable bail  by  the  committing  uiagistrate,  and  is  entitled  to  a  fee 
therefor.'^'*  The  clerk  of  the  United  States  Circuit  Court  for  the 
District  of  New  Jersey  is  entitled  to  collect  from  the  plaintiff,  in 
an  action  at  law,  fees  for  recording  the  proceedings  and  judg- 
ments therein  in  favor  of  plaintiff.  Section  91-1  of  the  Revised 
Statutes  provides  that  the  pleadings  and  forms  and  modes  of  pro- 
ceedings in  civil  causes,  other  than  e({uity  and  admiralty,  in  the 
Circuit  and  District  Courts  of  the  United  States,  shall  conform  as 
nearly  as  may  be  to  the  forms  and  modes  of  procedure  in  like 
causes  in  the  States  where  such  courts  are  held.  Section  76  of 
the  New  Jersey  statutes  provides  that  when  any  civil  action  shall 
have  been  deteruiiued,  the  clerk  of  court  shall  enter  all  the  pro- 
ceedings, including  the  judgment,  in  a  book  of  records  to  be  kept 
for  that  purpose.*^^  The  final  record  to  he  made  by  the  clerk  of 
all  the  proceedings  embraces  the  final  commitment  in  a  criminal 
case,  but  not  the  preliminary  bail-bond  and  justification  of  sureties 
taken  before  the  ommissioner,  as  these  are  proceedings  of  the 
magistrate,  and  not  of  the  court.'^^  Under  a  rule  of  court  that  in 
all  criminal  cases,  unless  otherwise  specially  ordered,  the  final 
record  shall  include  the  order  made  by  the  commissioner  binding 
the  party  to  a})pear  before  the  grand  jury,  the  clerk  is  entitled  to 
an  allowance  for  incorporating  in  the  final  record  the  ti'ansci'ipt 
from  the  commissioner.^'     A  clerk  of  a  Circuit  or  Distriet  Court 


^1  U.  S.   V.  Van  Duzee,  140  U.  S.  100,  ''*  Morrison  ?•.  Bernard's  Towiisliip,  .35 

171.  Fed.  K.  400. 

62  U.  S  V.  Van  Duzee,  140  U.  S.  199.  eo  Jones  v.  U.  S.,  39  Fed.  K.  410. 

8»  Taylor  v.  U.  S.,  45  Fed.  R.  -531.  6T  Van  Duzee  v.  U.  S.,  41  Fed.  K.  571; 

6*  Erwin  r   U.  S  ,  "'  Fed.  \\.  470.  U.  S.  v.  Van  Duzee,  140  U.  S.  109. 


604  COSTS   AT   LAW   AND   IN   EQUITY.  [CHAP.  XXV. 

of  the  United  States  is  entitled  to  compensation  for  revising  the 
jury-box,  at  the  rate  of  five  dollars  per  day  for  a  period  not  ex- 
ceeding three  days  for  a  term  of  the  court.  The  clerk  is  entitled 
to  charge  fifteen  cents  per  folio  for  recording  the  names,  resi- 
dences, etc.,  of  jurors  on  a  record  which  he  is  required  to  make 
by  a  rule  of  court.^^  Sections  846  and  855  of  the  Revised  Statutes 
require  that  jurors  and  witnesses  shall  be  paid  upon  the  orders  of 
the  court.  When  the  clerk  states  the  accounts  of  jurors  and  wit- 
nesses, taking  their  affidavits  as  to  travel  and  attendance,  and  pre- 
sents the  accounts  stated  in  a  report  to  the  court  for  its  approval, 
he  is  entitled  to  the  fee  prescribed  by  the  statute  "  for  making 
any  report."  The  original  orders  signed  by  the  judge  sliould  be 
entered  of  record,  and  placed  upon  file  by  the  clerk,  and  he  is 
entitled  to  a  fee  of  ten  cents  for  filing  each.®  The  clerk  is  not 
entitled  to  fees  as  for  reports,  for  letters  transmittiug  receipts  of 
the  depository  for  moneys,  and  stating  the  nature  of  the  case,  as 
the  commissions  of  such  moneys  were  intended  to  ])ay  for  these 
services.'^  The  clerk's  fees  for  final  records  in  criminal  cases 
should  be  in  accordance  with  the  folios  which  are  contained  in 
the  record,  and  not  be  limited  to  four  folios  ;  but  he  is  not  entitled 
to  a  separate  fee  for  entering  the  oral  appearances  of  attorneys  in 
criminal  cases,  as  this  is  included  is  the  doelvct  fee.'*  In  deter- 
mining the  number  of  folios  in  a  final  record  each  se})arate  and 
distinct  order,  notice,  or  other  paper,  is  to  be  counted  se|)arately, 
according  to  the  statute,  providing  that  when  there  are  over  fifty, 
and  under  one  hundred,  words,  it  sliall  be  counted  as  a  folio,  and 
the  aggregate  of  the  folios  so  found  is  the  number  of  folios  in  the 
record."-  The  clerk  is  entitled  on  orders  of  the  court  to  pay  the 
accounts  of  the  marshals  and  officers,  other  than  commissioners, 
as  follows :  Entering  order,  forty-five  cents ;  copy,  thirty  cents ; 
certificate,  fifteen  cents;  seal,  twenty  cents ;  filing  duplicate,  ten 
cents.''^  The  statute  requires  that  only  one  copy  of  the  commis- 
sioner's account  shall  be  ))resentcd,  which  is  forwarded  to  the 
Treasury  Department.  It  has  been  held  that  a  certified  co])y  of 
the  order  of  court  approving  it  should  accompany  it,  and  that  the 


c»  Erwin  r.  U.  S.,  37  Fed.  R.  470.  "  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  854 ;  Erwin  r.  U.  S.,  37 

«5  Erwin  v.  U.  S.,  37  Fed.  R.  470.  Fed.  R.  470. 

■^»  Marvin  v.  U.  S.,  44  Fod.  K  405.    But  "•'  24  St.  at  L.  505  ;  Marvin  v.  U.  S.,  44 

see  Ooodricl)  r.  U.  S.,  47  Fed.  R.  2t)7.  Fed.  R.  405. 
■1    Marvin  r.  U.  S.,  44  Fe<].  R.  405. 


§  331.]  clerk's  fees.  605 

fees  should  be  as  follows :  Entering  the  order  of  approval,  forty- 
five  cents  ;  filing  same,  ten  cents  ;  copy,  thirty  cents ;  certificate 
and  seal,  thirty-five  cents.'* 

"  For  a  cupy  of  any  entry  or  record,  or  of  any  paper  on  file, 
for  each  folio,  ten  cents."  '^  The  clerk  is  entitled  to  ten  and  not 
fifteen  cents  per  folio  for  transcripts  of  a  record."*^  A  transcript 
is  but  a  copy ; ""  and  where  the  clerk  makes  the  copy  of  subpoenas 
or  subpQina  tickets,  and  furnishes  them  to  the  marshal  for  service, 
at  the  request  or  by  the  acquiescence  of  the  district  attorney,  the 
clerk  is  entitled  to  charge  the  government  ten  cents  each,  as  for 
one  folio,  for  making  such  copies.'^  In  the  Southern  District  of 
New  York  it  has  been  held  in  several  cases,  not  reported,  that 
tiiis  authorizes  the  clerk  to  forbid  an  attorney  or  party  to  himself 
copy  a  paper  in  a  suit,  or  even  an  opinion,  without  payment  of  the 
same  fees  as  if  the  clerk  made  the  copy.  Dut  the  propriety  of 
such  a  practice,  which  compels  a  citizen  to  pay  a  fee  Ixifore  he 
can  learn  the  Inw,  for  disobedience  to  which  he  may  be  punished, 
is  very  doubtful.  The  clerk  is  not  entitled  to  charge  the  United 
States  for  making  for  his  office  files,  copies  of  reports  required  by 
department  regulations  to  be  made  to  the  Solicitor  of  the  Treasury, 
nor  for  keeping  a  record  of  witness  certificates  separate  from  his 
subpoena  record.'^  Though  Section  829  of  the  Revised  Statutes, 
fixing  the  marshal's  fee  for  service  of  subpoenas,  forbids  him  to 
make  a  further  charge  for  copy,  the  clerk,  being  required  by  rule 
of  court  to  make  copies  to  be  left  with  witnesses,  is  entitled  to  an 
allowance  therefor.^^  When  the  court  orders  the  clerk  to  furnish 
a  copy  of  an  indictment  t(j  a  defendant  free  of  charge,  the  clerk 
may  recover  from  the  Unitt^d  States  his  fee  for  the  same.^^  It  has 
been  said  that  it  is  erroneous  for  the  accounting  officers  to  as- 
sume, as  they  often  do,  that  unless  some  section  of  the  Revised 
Statutes,  or  of  the  Statutes  at  Large,  specifically  requires  work  to 
be  done,  no  compensation  should  be  allowed  for  doing  it.  The 
court  has  full  power  and  right  to  adopt  rules  regulating  its  pro- 
cedure in  criminal  cases,  and  when,  in  the  exercise  of  this  uu- 

■*  24  St.  at  L.  505;  Marvin  c.  U.  S.,  44        '»  Erwin  v.  U.  S.,  37  Fed.  R.  470,  490. 
Fed.  R.  405.  ''^  Jones  v.  U.  S.,  39  Fed.  H.  410. 

75  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  828.  *'  Van  Duzee  v.  U.  S  ,  41  Fed.  R.  571 ; 

'6  Cavender  v.  Cavender,  3  McCrarv,  U.  S.  v.  Van  Duzee,  140  U.  S.  169. 
383.                                                          "  ^'  Van    Duzee    v.    U.   S.,    140   U.   S. 

■"  Cavender  v.  Cavender,  3  McCrary,  169. 
383. 


606  COSTS   AT   LAW   AND    IN    EQUITY.  [CHAP.  XXV. 

doubted  right,  it  adopts  rules  requiring  the  clerk  to  furnish  copies 
of  indictments,  copies  of  subpoenas,  to  include  certain  matters  in 
the  final  record,  and  other  lilce  requirements,  tlie  legal  duty  and 
obligation  of  the  clerk  to  perform  such  services  is  as  well  estab- 
lished as  though  such  rules  formed  part  of  the  Revised  Statutes. 
If,  then,  the  work  thus  done  in  obedience  to  the  rule  of  court  falls 
within  the  character  of  services  for  which  the  fee-bill  allows  com- 
pensation, the  clerk  is  justly  and  legally  entitled  to  the  statutory 
compensation  therefor.^^  ^he  clerk  of  the  District  Court  for  Mas- 
sachusetts has  been  allowed  certain  special  fees  for  services  in 
naturaHzation.^'^ 

"  For  making  dockets  and  indexes,  issuing  venire,  taxing  costs, 
and  all  other  services,  on  the  trial  or  argument  of  a  cause  where 
issue  is  joined  and  testimony  is  given,  three  dollars."^*  An  at- 
tachment against  a  defaulting  witness  or  juror,  for  contempt  of 
court  is  an  independent  suit,  and  a  "■  cause  "  for  which  a  docket 
fee  is  chargeable  under  the  fee-bill.^^  The  clerk  is  required  to 
make  a  final  record  of  the  proceedings  in  such  case.^^  The 
allowance  to  the  clerk  of  three  dollars  "  for  making  dockets  and 
indexes,  issuing  venire,  taxing  costs,  and  all  other  services  on  the 
trial  or  argument  of  a  cause,"  does  not  include  entering  the  order 
for  trial  and  recording  the  verdict.®"  Fees  for  entries  on  the 
jackets  in  whicli  the  papers  are  inclosed,  showing  the  date  of  the 
disposition  of  tlie  cases,  and  the  pages  of  the  record  where  the 
proceedings  will  be  found,  are  covered  by  the  general  charges  for 
indexing.®^ 

"  For  making  dockets  and  indexes,  taxing  costs,  and  all  otlier 
services,  in  a  cause  where  issue  is  joined,  but  no  testimony  is 
given,  two  dollars."  ^^  It  has  been  held  in  the  Ninth  Circuit  that 
the  petitioner  in  an  a])plication  for  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  may 
be  obliged  to  pay  eleven  dollars  for  all  services  in  the  proceeding; 
but  that  the  court  has  discretion  to  allow  no  costs  or  fees  in  such 


a  case 


90 


''  For   making  dockets   and    indexes,   taxing  costs,  and  other 
services,  in  a  cause  which  is  dismissed  or  discontinued,  or  where 

82  Van  Duzee  v.  U.  S.,  41  Fed.  R.  571,  '^^  Erwin  v.  U.  S.,  37  Fed  Ix.  470. 

578;    per   Sliiras,  J.     See   U.   S.  v.    Van  **«  Erwin  r.  U.  S.,  37  Fed.  H.  470. 

Duzee,  140  U.  8.  lt)9.  ^'  U.  S.  v.  Van  Duzee,  140  U.  S.  109. 

^3  U.  S.  V.  Hill,  120  U.  S.  160;  affirm-  ''^  Van  Duzee  c.  U.  S.,  41  Fed.  K.  571. 

in-  25  Fed.  H.  375.  »"  U.  S.  K.  S.  §  828. 

f*  U.  S.  \l.  S.  §  828.  '•*"  /"  '■(  Moy  Ciiee  Kee,  33  Fed.  R.  377 


§  331.]  clekk's  fees.  607 

judgment  or  decree  is  made  or  rendered  without  issue,  one  dol- 
lar." ^^  The  act  allowing  a  fee  for  making  "  dockets,  and  indexes, 
taxing  costs,  and  for  other  services  in  a  cause  which  is  dismissed 
or  discontinued,"  docs  not  entitle  the  clerk  to  an  allowance  for 
docketing,  indexing,  and  taxing  costs  in  cases  sent  up  from  the 
commissioner,  in  which  defendant  was  bound  over  to  the  grand 
jury,  but  where  the  grand  jury  fails  to  find  an  indictment.  The 
cases  should  not  be  docketed  until  the  grand  jury  or  district  at- 
torney has  taken  afTirmativc  action.^^  Where  a  case  is  removed 
from  one  division  of  the  district  to  another,  the  clerk  cannot  re- 
cover the  fee  allowed  for  "  services  in  a  cause  which  is  dismissed 
or  discontinued."  '-^^ 

"  For  making  dockets  and  taxing  costs,  in  cases  removed  by 
writ  of  error,  or  appeal,  one  dollar."  ^*  The  clerk's  fee  of  one 
dollar  for  filing  the  note  of  issue  when  placing  an  appeal  in  ad- 
miralty on  the  calendar,  is  taxable,  and  the  clerk  may  charge  for 
including  tlie  evidence  in  the  record  on  the  final  decree  in  admi- 
ralty.^^ The  clerk  is  entitled  to  a  docket  fee  for  a  hearing  by  the 
court,  on  an  a])j)lication  for  a  warrant  for  the  transportation  of  a 
defendant  to  another  district,  under  the  provisions  of  section  101-1 
of  the  Revised  Statutes.^*^ 

"  For  afiixing  the  seal  of  the  court  to  any  instrument,  when 
required,  twenty  cents."  ^"  The  copy  of  an  order  directing  the 
marshal  under  section  855  of  the  Revised  Statutes  to  pay  the  fees 
of  witnesses  and  jurors,  or  of  writs  of  mittimus,  should  be  authen- 
ticated by  seal  and  certificate  for  which  the  clerk  must  be  allowed 
his  fees.^^  The  clerk  is  entitled  to  fees  for  coi)ics  of  orders  to  pay 
jurors  and  for  seals  for  the  same.^^  When  the  Treasury  Depart- 
ment rerpiires  copies  of  orders  for  the  payment  by  the  marshal  of 
sums  due  jurors  and  witnesses  to  be  authenticated  by  the  seal  of 
the  court,  the  clerk  is  entitled  to  his  fee  for  affixing  the  seal,  but 
not  otherwise. ^'^'^ 

"  For  every  search  for  any  particular  mortgage,  judgment,  or 
other  lien,  fifteen  cents."  '^^^     The  clerk  is  entitled  to  a  fee  of  ten 

91  U.  S.  K.  S.  §  828.  96  Erwin  r.  U.  S.,  37  Fed.  R.  470. 

S'i  U.  S.  V.  Van  Duzee,  140  U.  S.  160,  ^^  U.  S.  M.  S.  §  828. 

173,  174.  98  Taylor  v.  U.  S.,  45  Fed.  R.  531. 

93  Van  Duzee  v.  U.  S.,  41  Fed.  R.  571.  99  ]\iarvin  v.  U.  S.,  44  Fed.  H.  405. 

^  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  828.  i"»  U.  S.  V.  Van  Duzee,  140  U.  S.  169, 

95  Tlie  Alice  Tainter,  14  Blatclif.  225,  174. 

227.  1"  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  828. 


60S  COSTS    AT   LAW    AND    IN    EQUITY.  [CHAP.  XXV. 

cents  for  filing  a  requisition  for  such  a  search. ^"^^  For  the  annual 
statement  to  the  Attorney-General  of  the  judgments,  etc.,  for  the 
preceding  year,  the  clerk  is  entitled  to  compensation  for  the  final 
abstract  at  fifteen  cents  per  folio,  and  not  to  the  regular  fees  for 
searches. ^"^^ 

"  For  searching  the  records  of  the  court  for  judgments,  decrees, 
or  other  instruments  constituting  a  general  lien  on  real  estate, 
and  certifying  the  result  of  such  search,  fifteen  cents  for  each 
person  against  whom  such  search  is  required  to  be  made."  ^^'^  As 
the  statutes  do  not  expressly  provide  for  com])ensation  to  the 
clerk  for  searching  for  petitions  in  bankruptcy,  it  has  been  held 
that  a  reasonable  compensation  for  such  service  is  fifteen  cents 
for  each  name  against  which  search  is  made.^*^^  The  clerk  of  the 
Circuit  Court,  instead  of  certifying  the  result  of  a  search  for  liens 
on  the  original  requisition  delivered  to  him,  may,  and  })erhaps 
should  file  such  requisition,  and  give  the  certificate  of  the  result 
of  the  search  on  another  paper.  A  charge  of  ten  cents  for  filing 
such  paper  is  proper,^^^*^  and  so  also  is  a  charge  of  fifteen  cents  for 
each  person  against  whom  a  search  is  required  to  be  made,  as 
compensation  for  making  the  search,  and  for  the  act  of  signing 
the  certificate  and  certifying  the  result. i'^'  A  compensation  of 
fifteen  cents  per  folio  for  making  the  certificate  is  projjcr;  but 
not  a  charge  for  affixing  the  seal  of  the  court  to  such  certificate, 
unless  required. ^'^^ 

"  For  receiving,  keeping,  and  paying  out  money,  in  pursuance 
of  any  statute  or  order  of  court,  one  per  centum  on  the  amount 
so  received,  kej)t,  and  paid."  ^•'^  This  charge  has  been  held  to 
include  money  collected  by  the  marshal  on  executions. ^^^  Where 
an  assignee  in  bankruptcy  files  a  bill  in  the  Circuit  Court  to  settle 
conflicting  claims  to  the  proceeds  of  a  sale,  it  is  not  his  duty  to 
])ay  the  proceeds  into  the  registry  of  the  court ;  and  consequently 
the  clerk  is  not  entitled  to  commissions  on  such  money. ^^^  It  has 
been  held  that  the  fact  that  the  money  is  subject  to  the  decree 
of  the  court,  it  not  being  in  the  court's  registry,  is  not  enough 


1^^  In  re  Petition  of  Woodbury,  7  Fed.        ''"  Fx  parti-  Woodlmn-,  7  Fe<l.  R.  705. 
R.  705.  108  Ex  parte  Woodbury,  7  Fed,  R.  705; 

i'3  Marvin  v.  U.  S.,  44  Fed.  R.  405.  U.  S.  >\  Van  Duzee,  140  U.  S,  109, 
1*  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  828.  1'  y  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  828. 

1  5  Matter  of  Vernieulo,  10  Ben.  1.  "'^  Pagan  v.  Cullen.  28  Fed.  R.  843. 

i'^*''  Ex  parte  Woodbury,  7  Fed,  R.  705.  m  Leach  i:  Kay,  2  Fiiiipin  C.  C.  690. 


§  331.]  clerk's  fees.  609 

to  give  the  clerk  a  right  to  commissions."^  But  a  subsequent 
decision  holds  that  money  deposited  in  a  bank,  under  a  decree  of 
the  court,  and  subject  to  its  order,  is  within  the  meaning  of 
Chapter  20,  of  the  Acts  of  1793,  which  provides  that  the  clerk 
shall  be  entitled  to  a  percentage  on  "  all  money  deposited  in 
court."  "^  The  money  must  either  actually  or  constructively 
pass  through  the  clerk's  hands."*  Money  received  by  a  master 
in  chancery  in  payment  of  property  sold  upon  the  foreclosure 
of  a  mortgage,  may,  in  pursuance  of  section  995  of  the  Re- 
vised Statutes,  be  deposited  with  a  designated  depositary  of  the 
United  States,  and  the  clerk  is  then  entitled  to  his  commissions 
thereon  ;^^^  but  money  paid  by  a  bidder  at  such  a  sale  as  security 
for  his  compliance  with  his  bid  may  by  order  of  the  court  be  paid 
in  a  certified  check  on  a  bank,  and  deposited  in  a  trust  company, 
and  then  the  clerk  is  not  entitled  to  a  commission  thereon."*'  So 
a  clerk  who  receives,  keeps,  and  pays  out  money  under  a  judgment 
is  entitled  to  a  commission  of  one  per  cent  on  the  amount  so  re- 
ceived, the  same  to  be  paid  by  the  defendant  as  a  part  of  the 
costs."' 

"For  travelling  from  the  office  of  clerk  where  he  is  required  to 
reside  to  the  place  of  holding  any  court  required  by  law  to  be 
held,  five  cents  a  mile  for  going,  and  five  cents  a  mile  for  return- 
ing, and  five  dollars  a  day  for  his  attendance  on  the  court  while 
actually  in  session."  "^  A  circuit  court  opened  at  the  time  and 
place  appointed  by  law  is  in  actual  session  within  the  meaning  of 
this  statute,  although  no  suitors  appear,  and  the  court  be  ad- 
journed to  a  future  day  without  transacting  any  business  what- 
ever, and  the  clerk  is  entitled  to  his  per  diem  fee  of  five  dollars.^^^ 
Under  Sections  2011-2014  of  the  Revised  Statutes,  providing  for 
the  opening  of  the  Circuit  Court  not  less  than  ten  days  prior  to  a 
registration  for  election  or  prior  to  the  election  for  member  of 
Congress,  and  continuing  court  until  the  day  following  the  elec- 
tion, and  Section  828,  allowing  the  clerk  five  dollars  for  attend- 
ance on  the  court  while  actually  in  session,  the  clerk  is  entitled  to 
such  fee  for  every  day  the  court  is  in  session,  under  those  sec- 


112  Ex  parte  Plitt,  2  Wall.  Jr.  4-53,  "«  Easton  v.  Houston  &  T.  C.  Ry.  Co., 

"3  Ex  parte  Prescott,  2  Gall.  146.  44  Fed  R.  718. 

"*  Leech  v.  Kay,  4  Fed.  R.  72.  i'"  Blake  r.  Hawkins,  19  Fed.  R.  204. 

"5  Thomas  v.  Chicago  &  C.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  "s  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  828. 

37  Fed.  R.  548.  "9  Jones  v.  U.  S.,  21  Ct.  CI.  1. 

VOL.  I 39 


610  COSTS   AT   LAW    AND    IN    EQUITY.  [CHAP.  XXV. 

tions,  and  for  his  record  of  its  proceedings.^^o  When  his  deputy 
attends  a  session  of  the  court,  the  clerk  is  entitled  to  a  per  diem  fee 
for  such  attendance,  even  though  the  clerk  has  received  Si  per  diem 
fee  for  his  personal  attendance  the  same  day  at  a  session  of  the 
court  at  another  place.^^^  The  proviso  relative  to  compensation 
for  attendance  of  court  officers  in  Act  of  August  4,  1886,^22  ^r^g 
repealed  by  the  proviso  covering  the  same  subject-matter  in  the 
Act  of  March  3,  1887,^^^  providing  for  a  per  diem  fee  where  "  the 
court  is  opened  by  the  judge  for  business,  or  business  is  actually 
transacted."  And  since  the  passage  of  the  latter  act  it  is  sufficient, 
to  entitle  the  clerk  to  his  per  diem,  if  the  court  be  opened  for 
business  by  the  judge. ^^^  Under  Act  of  August  4, 1886,^^^  provid- 
ing that  none  of  the  money  thereby  appropriated  shall  be  used  to 
pay  clerk's  per  diem  for  attendance  in  court  except  for  days  when 
business  was  actually  transacted,  the  burden  is  on  the  clerk  to 
show  that  business  was  actually  transacted  by  the  court  on  the 
days  for  which  he  claims  his  'per  diem  for  attendance.^-^  The 
clerk  of  a  Federal  court  is  entitled  to  his  per  diem  fee  for  attend- 
ing court  on  a  day  when  it  is  adjourned,  on  the  written  order  of 
a  judge.^^'  The  clerk  is  not  entitled  to  a  fee  for  keeping  a  list  of 
tbe  names  and  residences  of  jurors,  as  this  is  part  of  tbe  duties 
of  a  jury  commissioner.^-^  A  clerk  who  is  also  a  commissioner 
may  charge  a  per  diem  fee  for  his  attendance  at  court  and  a  per 
diem  fee  for  hearing  a  cause  as  commissioner  on  the  same  day.^^g 
Where  a  deputy  clerk  acts  with  the  jury  commissioner  in  drawing 
juries  while  the  court  is  not  in  session,  he  is  entitled  to  the  same 
compensation  allowed  the  jury  commissioner  for  like  services, 
where  such  compensation  is  shown  to  be  a  reasonable  charge  for 
the  work  performed.^^*^ 

Under  the  Act  of  June  30,  1879,^^^  appointing  the  clerk  a 
jury  commissioner  ex  officio,  he  is  entitled  to  a  jury  commis- 
sioner's compensation  for  services  performed  as  such.^^^  For 
the    annual    statement   to    the   Attorney-General    of    the    judg- 


120  Pleasants  v.  U.  S.,  .35  Fed.  R.  270.  i^s  Marvin  v.  U.  S.,  44  Fed.  R.  405. 

121  Erwin  v.  U.  S.,  37  Fed.  R.  470.  i29  Goodrich  ?;.  U.  S  ,  42  Fed.  R.  392 ; 

122  24  St.  at  L.  253.  Erwin  v.  U.  S.,  37  Fed.  R.  470. 

123  24  St.  at  L.  541.  i3)  Goodrich  v.  U.  S.,  42  Fed.  R.  392; 

124  Erwin  v.  U.  S.,  37  Fed.  R.  470.  Erwin  v.  U.  S.,  37  Fed.  R.  470. 

125  24  St.  at  L.  258.  i^i  21  St.  at  L.  43. 

126  Marvin  r.  U.  S  ,  44  Fed.  R.  405.  182  Marvin  v.  U.  S.,  44  Fed.  R.  406. 

127  Pitman  v.  U.  S.,  45  Fed.  R.  159. 


§  331.]  clerk's  fees.  611 

ments,  <fec.,  for  the  preceding  year,  the  clerk  is  entitled  to  com- 
pensation for  the  final  abstract  at  fifteen  cents  per  folio,  and 
not  to  the  regular  fees  for  searches.^^  Where  a  judge  erred  in 
his  construction  of  the  law,  and  improperly  ordered  the  appoint- 
ment of  supervisors  of  election,  the  clerk  is  still  entitled  to  com- 
pensation for  services  rendered  in  respect  to  such  appointment.^"^ 
Under  the  act  making  appropriations  for  the  expenses  of  the  gov- 
ernment for  the  year  ending  June  30, 1884  (22  St.  at  L.  681),  tlie 
clerk  of  the  United  States  Supreme  Court  is  required  to  })ay  into 
the  treasury  the  fees  of  his  office  over  and  above  expenses,  and 
his  fees  should  be  paid  in  advance  if  demanded. ^^^  The  disallow- 
ance by  the  First  Comptroller  of  the  Treasury  of  fees  claimed  by  a 
clerk  of  the  court  is  not  conclusive  against  the  clerk  on  a  petition 
by  him  for  the  recovery  of  such  fees.^^^  Fees  earned  by  the  clerk 
in  the  District  Court  cannot  be  transferred  by  the  comptroller  to 
his  account  as  clerk  of  the  Circuit  Court.^'^^  All  books  in  the 
offices  of  the  clerks  of  the  Circuit  and  District  Courts  contain- 
ing the  docket  or  minute  of  the  judgments,  or  decrees  thereof, 
must  during  office  hours  be  open  to  the  inspection  of  any  per- 
son desiring  to  examine  the  same,  without  any  fees  or  charges 
therefor.^2^ 

"  No  j3er  diem  or  other  allowance  shall  be  made  to  any  district 
attorney,  clerk  of  a  Circuit  Court,  clerk  of  a  District  Court,  mar- 
shal or  deputy-marshal,  for  attendance  at  rule-days,  of  a  Circuit  or 
District  Court ;  and  when  the  Circuit  and  District  Courts  sit  at 
the  same  time,  no  greater  jter  diem  or  other  allowance  shall  be 
made  to  any  such  officer  than  for  an  attendance  on  one  court."  ^^ 
When  both  Circuit  and  District  Courts  are  in  session  on  the  same 
davs,  the  clerk  may  charge  his  jyer  diem  fee  in  eitlier.  and  the 
department  has  no  discretion  to  transfer  his  charges  to  the  ac- 
count of  the  other  court,  to  lessen  the  whole  amount  due  him  by 
force  of  the  rules  as  to  the  maximum  of  allowance.^^*^ 

"  Every  district  attorney,  clerk  of  a  District  Court,  clerk  of  a 
Circuit  Court,  and  marshal,  shall,  on  the  first  days  of  January 
and  July,  in  each  year,  or  witliin  thirty  days  thereafter,  make 


138  Marvin  r.  U.  S.,  44  Fed   K.  405.  "^  u.  S,  R.  S.  §  828;  Re  McLean,  9 

i»*  Goodrich  i-.  U.  S.,  35  Fed.  R.  19:1  Cent.  L.  J.  425. 

185  steever  v.  Rickman,  109  U.  S.  74.  i39  U  S.  R.  S.  §  831. 

136  Davis  V.  U.  S.,  45  Fed   R.  102.  "^  Goodrich  v.  U.  S.,  36  Fed.  R.  193. 

137  Goodrich  r.  U.  S.,  42  Fed.  R.  392. 


612  COSTS   AT   LAW   AND   IN   EQUITY.  [CHAP.  XXV. 

to  the  Attorney-General,  in  such  form  as  he  may  prescribe,  a 
written  return  for  the  half  year  ending  on  said  days,  respectively, 
of  all  the  fees  and  emoluments  of  his  office,  of  every  name  and 
character,  and  of  all  the  necessary  expenses  of  his  office,  in- 
cluding necessary  clerk-hire,  together  with  the  vouchers  for  the 
])ayment  of  the  same  for  such  last  half  year.  He  shall  state 
separately  in  such  returns  the  fees  and  emoluments  received  or 
payable  under  the  Bankrupt  Act ;  and  every  marshal  shall  state 
separately  therein  the  fees  and  emoluments  received  or  payable 
for  services  I'cndercd  by  himself  personally,  those  received  or 
payable  for  services  rendered  by  each  of  his  deputies,  naming 
him,  and  the  proportion  of  such  fees  and  emoluments  which,  by 
the  terms  of  his  service,  each  deputy  is  to  receive.  Said  returns 
shall  be  verified  by  the  oath  of  the  officer  making  them."  ^^^  In 
an  action  on  the  bond  of  a  clerk  of  a  United  States  District  Court, 
it  was  held  that  he  was  not  liable  for  fees  received  by  him  for 
the  naturalization  of  aliens,  which  had  not  been  included  by  him 
in  the  returns  of  the  "  fees  and  emohiments  of  his  office,"  re- 
quired to  be  made  by  section  833  of  the  Revised  Statutes  ;  it 
a[)pcaring  tliat  it  had  been  the  custom  in  the  district  for  not  less 
than  forty-five  years  for  the  clerks  to  charge  a  fee  in  natural- 
ization cases,  although  no  fee  is  provided  in  the  fee  bill  estab- 
lished by  the  Act  of  February  26,  1853 ;  '"^^  and  that  it  had  never 
been  customary  to  account  for  such  fees ;  and  that  defendant's 
accounts,  during  his  term  of  office,  had  been  duly  certified  by  the 
judge,  with  knowledge  of  the  omission,  and  audited  and  adjusted 
by  the  proper  accounting  officers  of  the  government.'^^ 

"  No  clerk  of  a  District  Court,  or  clerk  of  a  Circuit  Court,  shall 
be  allowed  by  the  Attorney-General,  except  as  provided  in  the 
next  section  and  in  section  eight  hundred  and  forty-two,  to  retain 
of  the  fees  and  emoluments  of  his  office,  or,  in  case  both  of  the 
said  clerkships  are  held  l)y  the  same  ])erson,  of  the  fees  and  emol- 
uments of  the  said  offices,  respectively,  for  his  personal  com- 
pensation, over  and  above  his  necessary  office  expenses,  including 
necessary  clerk  hire,  to  be  audited  and  allowed  by  the  proper 
accounting  officers  of  the  Treasury,  a  sum  exceeding  three  thou- 
sand five  hundred  dollars  a  year  for  any  such  district  clerk  or 


1"  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  833.  "3  u.  S.  V.  Hill,  120  U.  S.  169 ;  affirm- 

i«  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  828.  ing  25  Fed.  R.  375. 


§  331.]  clerk's  fees.  613 

for  any  such  circuit  clerk,  or  exceeding  that  rate  for  any  time 
less  than  a  year."  "^ 

"  The  clerks  of  the  several  Circuit  and  District  Courts  in  Cali- 
fornia, Oregon,  and  Nevada  shall  be  entitled  to  charge  and  re- 
ceive double  the  fees  hereinbefore  allowed  to  clerks,  and  shall 
be  allowed,  respectively,  by  the  Attorney-General,  to  retain  of  the 
fees  so  received  by  them,  for  their  personal  compensation,  over 
and  above  the  necessary  expenses  of  their  offices,  including  the 
salaries  of  deputy  clerks,  and  necessary  clerk  hire,  to  be  audited 
by  the  proper  accounting  officers  of  the  Treasury  Department,  any 
sum  not  exceeding  seven  thousand  dollars  a  year,  nor  exceeding 
that  rate  for  any  time  less  than  a  year :  Provided,  That  whenever, 
in  either  of  the  said  districts,  the  same  person  holds  the  office  of 
clerk  of  both  the  Circuit  and  District  Courts,  he  shall  be  allowed 
by  the  Attorney-General  to  retain  for  his  personal  compensation, 
as  aforesaid,  only  such  sum  as  is  herein  allowed  to  be  retained 
by  a  person  holding  the  office  of  clerk  of  only  one  of  the  said 
courts."  ^*5 

"  Clerks  and  marshals  may  be  allowed  to  retain,  for  all  official 
services  in  prize  causes,  an  additional  compensation  not  exceed- 
ing in  amount  one  half  of  the  maximum  compensation  allowed  to 
them,  resj)ectively,  by  the  three  preceding  sections."  ^^^ 

"The  allowances  for  personal  compensation  of  district  attor- 
neys, clerks,  and  marshals,  for  each  calendar  year,  shall  be  made 
from  the  fees  and  emoluments  of  that  year,  and  not  otherwise."  ^*^ 

"  Every  district  attorney,  clerk,  and  marshal  shall,  at  the  time 
of  making  his  half-yearly  return  to  the  Attorney-General,  pay 
into  the  Treasury,  or  deposit  to  the  credit  of  the  Treasurer,  as  he 
may  be  directed  by  the  Attorney-General,  any  surplus  of  the  fees 
and  emoluments  of  his  office  which  said  return  shows  to  exist 
over  and  above  the  compensation  and  allowances  authorized  by 
law  to  be  retained  by  him."  ^^^ 

"  In  every  case  where  the  return  of  a  district  attorney,  clerk, 
or  marshal  shows  that  a  surplus  may  exist,  the  Attorney-General 
shall  cause  such  returns  to  be  carefully  examined,  and  the  ac- 
counts of  disbursements  to  be  regularly  audited  by  the  |)roj)er 
officer  of  his  Department,  and  an  account  to  be  opened  with  such 
officer  in  proper  books  to  be  provided  for  that  purpose."  ^*^ 

1"  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  8:39.  "'  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  843. 

"'  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  840.  "?  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  844. 

"6  U.  S  R.  S.  §  842.  "9  U.  S  R.  S.  §  845. 


614  COSTS   AT   LAW   AND   IN   EQUITY.  [CHAP.  XXV. 

"  The  accounts  of  district  attorneys,  clerks,  marshals,  and  com- 
missioners of  Circuit  Courts  shall  be  examined  and  certified  by 
the  District  judge  of  tiie  district  for  which  they  are  appointed, 
before  they  are  presented  to  the  accounting  officers  of  the  Treas- 
ury Department  for  settlement.  They  shall  then  be  subject  to 
revision  upon  their  merits  by  said  accounting  officers,  as  in  case 
of  other  public  accounts :  Provided,  That  no  accounts  of  fees  or 
costs  paid  to  any  witness  or  juror,  upon  the  order  of  any  judge 
or  commissioner,  shall  be  so  re-examined  as  to  charge  any  mar- 
shal for  an  erroneous  taxation  of  such  fees  or  costs.  (That 
where  the  ministerial  officers  of  the  United  States  have  or  shall 
incur  extraordinary  expense  in  executing  the  laws  thereof,  the 
payment  of  which  is  not  specifically  provided  for,  the  President 
of  the  United  States  is  authorized  to  allow  the  payment  thereof 
under  the  special  taxation  of  the  District  or  Circuit  Court  of  the 
district  in  which  the  said  services  have  been  or  shall  be  ren- 
dered, to  be  paid  from  the  appropriation  for  defraying  the  ex- 
penses of  the  judiciary.)"  '^^ 

"  Before  any  bill  of  costs  shall  be  taxed  by  any  Judge  or  other 
officer,  or  any  account  payable  out  of  the  money  of  the  United 
States  shall  be  allowed  by  any  officer  of  the  Treasury,  in  favor  of 
clerks,  marshals,  or  district  attorneys,  the  party  claiming  such 
account  shall  render  the  same,  with  the  vouchers  and  items 
thereof,  to  a  United  States  Circuit  or  District  Court,  and,  in 
presence  of  the  district  attorney  or  his  sworn  assistant,  whose 
presence  shall  be  noted  on  the  record,  prove  in  open  court,  to  the 
satisfaction  of  the  court,  by  his  own  oath  or  that  of  other  persons 
having  knowledge  of  the  facts,  to  be  attached  to  such  account, 
that  the  services  therein  charged  have  been  actually  and  neces- 
sarily performed  as  therein  stated ;  and  that  the  disbursements 
charged  have  been  fully  paid  in  lawful  money ;  and  the  court 
shall  thereupon  cause  to  be  entered  of  record  an  order  approving 
or  disapproving  the  account,  as  may  be  according  to  law,  and  just. 
United  States  Commissioners  shall  forward  their  accounts,  duly 
verified  by  oath,  to  the  district  attorneys  for  their  respective  dis- 
tricts, by  whom  they  shall  be  submitted  for  approval  in  open 
court,  and  the  court  shall  pass  upon  the  same  in  the  manner 
aforesaid.  Accounts  and  vouchers  of  clerks,  marshals,  and  dis- 
trict attorneys  shall  be  made  in  duplicate,  to  be  marked,  respcc- 

160  U.  S.  K.  S.  §  84G. 


§  331.]  clerk's  fees.  615 

tively,  '  original '  and  '  duplicate.'  xVnd  it  shall  be  the  duty  of 
the  clerk  to  forward  the  original  accounts  and  vouchers  of  the 
officers  above  specified,  when  approved,  to  the  proper  accounting 
officers  of  the  Treasury,  and  to  retain  in  his  office  the  duplicates, 
where  they  shall  be  open  to  public  inspection  at  all  times.  Noth- 
ing contained  in  this  act  shall  be  deemed  in  any  wise  to  diminish 
or  affect  the  right  of  revision  of  the  accounts  to  which  this  act 
applies  by  the  accounting  officers  of  the  Treasury,  as  exercised 
under  the  laws  now  in  force."  ^^^  "  If  any  clerk  of  any  District  or 
Circuit  Court  of  the  United  States  shall  wilfully  refuse  or  neglect 
to  make  any  report,  certificate,  statement,  or  other  document 
required  by  law  to  be  by  him  made,  or  shall  wilfully  refuse  or 
neglect  to  forward  any  such  report,  certificate,  statement,  or  doc- 
ument to  the  department,  officer,  or  person  to  whom  by  law  the 
same  should  be  forwarded,  the  President  of  the  United  States  is 
empowered,  and  it  is  hereby  made  his  duty,  in  every  such  case, 
to  remove  such  clerk  so  offending  from  office,  by  an  order  in 
writing  for  that  purpose.  And  upon  the  presentation  of  such 
order,  or  a  copy  thereof,  authenticated  by  the  Attorney-General 
of  the  United  States,  to  the  judge  of  the  court  whereof  such 
offender  is  clerk,  such  clerk  shall  thereupon  be  deemed  to  be  out 
of  office,  and  shall  not  exercise  the  functions  thereof.  And  such 
district  judge,  in  the  case  of  the  clerk  of  a  District  Court,  shall 
appoint  a  successor ;  and  in  the  case  of  the  clerk  of  a  Circuit 
Court,, the  circuit  judge  shall  appoint  a  successor.  And  such 
person  so  removed  shall  not  be  eligible  to  any  appointment  as 
clerk  or  deputy  clerk  for  the  period  of  two  years  next  after  such 
removal."  ^^^ 

"  If  any  clerk  mentioned  in  the  preceding  section  shall  wilfully 
refuse  or  neglect  to  make  or  to  forward  any  such  report,  certifi- 
cate, statement,  or  document  therein  mentioned,  he  shall  be 
deemed  guilty  of  a  misdemeanor,  and  shall  be  punished  by  a  fine 
not  exceeding  one  thousand  dollars,  or  by  imprisonment  not 
exceeding  one  year,  in  the  discretion  of  the  court ;  but  a  con- 
viction under  this  section  shall  not  l)e  necessary  as  a  condition 
precedent  to  the  removal  from  office  provided  for  in  this  act."  ^^^ 

151  1  Siipp.  U.  S  R.  S.  §  1,  pp.  145,  153  1  supp.  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  0,  p.  147 ;  18 
146 ;   18  St.  at  L.  333.  St.  at  L.  333. 

152  1  Supp.  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  5,  pp.  146, 147; 
18  St.  at  L.  333. 


61  ti  COSTS   AT   LAW   AND   IN   EQUITY.  [CHAP.  XXV. 

§  331  a.  Commissioners'  Fees.  —  The  fees  of  United  States  com- 
missioners are  fixed  by  statute  as  follows  :  "  For  administering  an 
oath,  ten  cents."  ^  When  a  complaint  in  a  criminal  prosecution 
is  sworn  to  and  filed,  the  commissioner  is  entitled  to  the  fee  of 
ten  cents  in  addition  to  the  fee  for  filing  a  paper  in  a  cause.^  He 
may  also  charge  ten  cents  for  administering  an  oath  required  by 
the  State  law  to  be  administered  to  sureties  on  a  bail  bond.'^  A 
commissioner  may  charge  ten  cents  for  each  witness  to  wliom  he 
administers  an  oath  in  proof  of  his  mileage  and  attendance.*  A 
commissioner  who  acts  as  Chief  Supervisor  of  Elections  may 
charge  for  drawing  the  oaths  of  the  supervisors,  for  administering 
them,  and  for  the  jurat  to  each  oath  ;^  for  drawing  the  affidavits 
of  each  supervisor  as  to  his  services  for  which  compensation  is 
claimed ;  ^  for  copies  of  the  same  when  required  by  the  Department 
of  Justice  ;'  for  administering  oaths  to  voters  ;^  for  filing  recom- 
mendations for  appointments  of  supervisors,  but  not  for  recording 
and  indexing  the  same  ;  ^  for  indexing  appointments,  but  not  for 
recording  them  ;  i°  for  preparing  and  printing  general  and  special 
instructions  to  supervisors,  but  not  to  a  charge  per  folio  for  each 
copy  furnished  to  a  supervisor.^i  Such  a  commissioner  may 
charge  for  certificates  to  the  accounts  of  supervisors  and  deputy 
marshals  ;  ^^  for  stationery  and  for  printing  forms  and  blanks  ;  ^^ 
but  not  for  a  j^er  diem  fee,  or  mileage  for  his  attendance  in  court ;  ^* 
nor  for  notifying  supervisors  of  their  appointments. ^^ 

"  For  taking  an  acknowledgment,  twenty-five  cents."  ^^  A 
commissioner  may  charge  fifteen  cents  a  folio  for  drawing  a  bail 
bond,^'  and  he  may  charge  twenty-five  cents  for  an  acknowledg- 
ment to  a  bail  bond.^^  He  can  ordinarily  charge  but  a  single  fee 
for  taking  the  acknowledgment  of  principal  and  sureties  to  a  bail 
bond.^^ 

§  831  a.    '  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  847.  »  U.  S.  v.  McDermott,  140  U.  S   151. 

2  U.  S.  V.  McDermott,  140  U.  S.  151;  9  U.  S.  v.  Poinier,  140  U.  S.  IGO. 
U.  S.  V.  Barber,  140  U.  S.  104 ;  Strong  v.        i"  U.  S.  c.  Poinier,  140  U,  S.  160. 

U.  S.,  U  Fed  R.  17  ;  McKinistry  v.  U.  S.,         "  U.  S.  v.  McDermott,  140  U.  S.  151  ; 

34  Fed.  R.  211.     See  U.  S.  v.  Ewing,  140  U.  S.  r.  Poinier,  140  U.  S.  160. 

U.  S.  142.  1-  U.  S.  V.  McDermott,  140  U.  S.  151. 

3  U.  S.  V.  Barber,  140  U.  S.  164;  Strong         13  U.  S.  l'.  Poinier,  140  U.  S.  160. 

V.  U.  S.,  34  Fed.   R.  17;  McKinistry  v.         »  U.  S.  i-.  McDermott,  140  U.  S.  151; 

U.  S.,34Fed.  R.211.     See  U.  S.  i-.  Ewing,  U.  S.  v.  Poinier,  140  U.  S.  160. 

140  U.  S.  142.  15  U.  S.  V.  McDermott,  140  U.  S.  151. 

4  U.  S.  V.  Barber,  140  U.  S.  164.  i"!  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  847. 

5  U.  S.  I'.  McDermott,  140  U.  vS.  151.  i'  Marvin  v.  U.  S.,  44  Fed.  R.  -105. 

6  U.  S.  V.  McD.rmott.  140  U.  S.  151.  i«  Strong  v.  U.  S.,  34  Fed.  R.  17. 

'  U.  S.  V.  McDermott,  140  U.  S.  151.  i9  U.  S.  i'.  Ewing,  140  U.  S.  142,  14G. 


§  331  a.]  commissioner's  fees.  617 

"  For  hearing  and  deciding  on  criminal  charges,  five  dollars  a 
day  for  the  time  necessarily  employed."  ^"^  A  commissioner  has 
judicial  discretion  to  grant  a  continuance,  and  may  charge  a  per 
diem  fee  for  a  day  on  which  a  continuance  is  had.-^  He  may 
charge  a  per  diem  fee  for  time  spent  in  hearing  and  deciding  a 
motion  for  bail,  and  the  sufficiency  of  bail.--^  A  commissioner 
cannot  charge  a  per  diem  fee  of  five  dollars  for  merely  clerical 
services.  Such  services  do  not  involve  "  a  hearing  and  deciding."  ^ 
A  commissioner  is  entitled  to  a  per  diem  fee  for  time  actually 
spent  by  him  in  his  judicial  character  as  commissioner  on  crimi- 
nal cases  after  the  accused  Avere  arrested,  though  their  cases  were 
continued,-*  and  the  commissioner's  ]jer  diem  for  services  per- 
formed as  such,  though  lie  performed  services  as  clerk,  and 
received  compensation  therefor  on  the  same  day.-^  The  pro- 
vision of  the  Act  of  August  4,  1886,^*^  which  is  an  appropriation 
bill,  that  commissioners  may  be  paid  the  same  compensation  as 
is  allowed  clerks  for  like  services,  but  "  shall  not  be  entitled  to 
any  docket  fees,"  applies  not  merely  to  that  appropriation,  but  is 
still  in  force.2" 

"For  attending  to  a  reference  in  a  litigated  matter,  in  a  civil 
cause  at  law,  in  equity,  or  in  admiralty,  in  pursuance  of  an  order 
of  the  court,  three  dollars  a  day."28  jf  the  commissioners  are 
required  by  the  court  to  forward  to  the  clerk  a  transcript  of  the 
proceedings  in  a  case  examined  by  them,  they  are  entitled  to  be 
paid  for  a  copy  of  the  proceedings  as  entered  on  their  docket  at 
the  rate  of  ten  cents  a  folio,  and  for  the  certificate  annexed 
thereto  at  the  rate  of  fifteen  cents  a  folio.^^ 

"  For  taking  and  certifying  depositions  to  file,  twenty  cents  for 
each  folio."  ^o  Under  this  clause  a  fee  may  be  charged  for 
drawing  the  complaint  on  a  criminal  charge,'^^  cv^n  if  more 
than  three  folios  in  length,^-  and  although  more  than  one  com- 

2"  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  847  ;  U.  S.  v.  Jones,  1.34  2"  U.  S.  r.  Ewincr,  140  U.  S.  142  ,  Mar- 

U.  S.  483.  vin  v  U.  S.,  44  Fed.  R.  40-5. 

21  U.  S.  V.  Ewing.  140  U   S.  142,  150.  '^^  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  847. 

22  U.  S.  V.  Jones,  134  U.  S.  483.  29  u.  S.  R.  S.  §  847,  par.  7,  and  §  828, 
28  Rand  r.  U.  S.,  36  Fed.  R.  671  ;  Har-  par.  8,  9  ;  McKinistry  v.  IT.  S.,  .34  Fed.  R. 

per  V.  U.  S.,  21  Ct.  of  CI.  56.  211  ;  Strong  v.  U.  S  .  34  Fed.  R.  17. 

2*  Marvin  r.  U.  S.,  44  Fe<l.  R.  405  ;  U.  S.        ^ii  u.  S.  R.  S  §  847. 
V.  Jones,  134  U.  S.  483;  U.  S.  v.  Ewing,         3i  u.  S.  v.  Ewinji,  140  U.  S.  142.  145; 

140  U.  S.  142.  U   S.  V.  MfDermott,  140  U.  S.  151  ;  U.  S. 

25  Marvin  v.  U.  S.,  44  Fed.  R.  405.  v.  Barber,  140  U.  S.  164. 

26  24  St.  at  L.  274.  32  u,  s.  v  Barber,  140  IT.  S.  177,  178. 


618  COSTS   AT   LAW   AND    IN    EQUITY.  [CHAP.  XXV. 

plaint  is  made  against  the  same  party  for  a  violation  of  the 
same  statute ;  ^^  and  for  writing  down  the  testimony  of  wit- 
nesses.^^  Any  State  officer  who  is  authorized  to  take  depositions 
will  usually  be  allowed  the  same  fees  for  such  services  as  are 
allowed  to  a  clerk  of  a  court  or  a  court  commissioner,  though 
no  Federal  statute  makes  any  provision  for  such  fees.^^ 

"  For  each  copy  of  the  same,"  certified  depositions  on  file,  "  fur- 
nished to  a  party  on  request,  ten  cents  for  each  folio."  ^^ 

"  For  issuing  any  warrant  or  writ,  and  for  any  other  service 
the  same  compensation  as  is  allowed  to  clerks  for  like  services."  ^7 

So  much  of  this  clause  as  allows  a  commissioner  a  docket  fee  is 
held  to  have  been  repealed  by  the  Act  of  August  4,  1886,  where 
a  proviso  expressly  declared  that  commissioners  shall  not  be  en- 
titled to  any  docket  fees.^^  The  provision  that  for  any  other  ser- 
vice such  compensation  shall  be  given  as  is  allowed  to  clerks  for 
like  services,  entitles  a  commissioner  to  a  docket  fee  only  when 
he  actually  performs  such  services  as  he  is  required  to  jjerform  by 
law  or  by  an  order  of  the  court.^^  "  Like  services  "  do  not  neces- 
sarily mean  the  same  services,  but  similar  services.*"  A  commis- 
sioner is  entitled  to  a  fee  for  issuing  a  warrant  and  subpojna  and 
filing  the  same  when  returned,*^  and  for  entering  the  return.'^^  j^ 
commissioner  may  charge  ten  cents  for  filing  a  complaint.''^  He 
is  entitled  to  a  charge  per  folio  for  jury  rolls  of  witnesses  ;  **  to  a 
charge  per  folio  for  the  transcripts  of  his  proceedings  returned  to 
the  clerk's  office;*^  to  a  separate  charge  for  the  oath  of  each 
surety  to  a  bail  bond  or  recognizance,  and  for  the  jurat  to  such 
oaths  ;  and  to  a  single  charge  for  the  acknowledgment  of  the 
execution  of  a  bail  bond  or  recognizance  by  the  principal  and  all 
the  sureties.'*^  Each  deposition  is  not  a  separate  paper,  for  filing 
which  a  fee  of  ten  cents  may  be  charged."*"     When  several  depo- 

33  U.    S     V.    Barber,    140   U.    S.    177,  Kinistry  r.  IT.  R.,  34  Fed.  R.  211  ;  U.  S, 

170.  V.  Kvviiiff,  140  U.  S.  142. 

31  U.  S.  V.  Ewinsr.  140  U.  S.  142,  147;        *'^  U.  S.  v.  Knox,  128  U.  S.  230,  233; 

U.  S.  r.  Barber,  140  U.  S.  164.  U.  S.  v.  Wallace,  116  U.  S.  398. 

35  Jcrman  v.  Stewart,  12  Fed.  R.  '•i  Strnna;  v.  U.  S.,  34  Fed.  R.  17  ;  Mc- 
271.  Kinistry  v.  U.  S.,  34  Fed.  R  211. 

36  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  847.  .  ■^^  U.  S.  V.  Ewing,  140  U  S.  142. 

37  U.  S.  R.  S.  §§  828,  847;  U.  S.  v.  «  u.  S.  v.  Barber,  140  U.  S.  164,  16& 
Wallace,  116  U.  S.  398.  «*  U.  S.  v.  Barber,  140  U.  S.  164,  167. 

38  24  Stat.  pp.  250,274  ;  U.  S.  v.  Ewing,  "6  U.  S.  v.  Barber,  140  U.  S.  164.  167. 
140  U.  S.  142.  ^6  TJ.  s.  V.  Barber,  140  IT.  S.  164,  167. 

39  Strong  V.  U.  S.,  34  Fed.  R.  17;  Mc-        "  U.  S.  v.  Barber,  140  U.  S.  164,  168. 


§  331  a.]  commissioner's  fees.  619 

sitions  are  attached  together,  they  are  considered  as  the  same 
paper.*^  A  commissioner  may  charge  fifteen  cents  a  folio  for 
drawing  a  bail-bond.'*^  Where  a  commissioner  is  ordered  by  the 
court  to  make  a  monthly  report  in  duplicate  of  all  cases  instituted 
or  examined  before  him,  he  may  charge  for  furnishing  the  same  at 
the  rate  of  fifteen  cents  a  folio.^'^  In  the  District  of  Tennessee  a 
warrant  or  other  writ  requires  a  seal,  and  a  commissioner  may  tax 
a  fee  of  twenty  cents  for  affixing  his  seal  thereto.^^  A  commissioner 
is  entitled  to  ten  cents  a  folio  for  copies  of  the  "  })roccss  "  returned 
by  him  into  the  clerk's  office  of  the  court,  as  required  by  Section 
1014  of  the  Revised  Statutes.  By  copies  of  process  is  meant  the 
warrant  or  writ  by  which  the  defendant  is  brought  to  answer  the 
charge  preferred  against  him.^^  The  provision  of  Section  1030 
of  the  Revised  Statutes,  that  no  writ  is  necessary  for  remanding 
a  prisoner  from  the  court  into  custody  applies  where  the  accused 
is  in  custody  under  a  warrant  from  the  court,  and  not  where  he 
is  arrested  on  the  first  warrant  of  the  commissioner  to  arrest  and 
bring  before  him,  and,  at  least  in  the  District  of  Tennessee,  the 
commissioner  is  entitled  to  a  fee  for  a  mittimus  upon  the  first 
continuance,  if  the  })risoncr  is  to  be  lield.'^'^  The  commissioner  is 
entitled  to  fees  for  the  affidavit,  warrant,  &c.,  in  the  case  of  an 
accused  person  who  was  not  arrested,  because  he  left  the  State.^* 
Under  the  provision  of  the  statute  that  "  copies  of  the  process 
shall  be  returned  to  the  clerk's  office,"  fees  should  be  allowed  for 
transcripts  of  the  record.'^'' 

"  For  issuing  any  warrant  under  the  tenth  article  of  the  treaty 
of  August  nine,  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  forty-two,  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  the  Queen  of  the  United  Kingdom  of 
Great  Britain  and  Ireland,  against  any  person  charged  with  any 
crime  or  offence  set  forth  in  said  article,  two  dollars."  ^'^ 

"  For  issuing  any  warrant  under  the  provision  of  tlie  conven- 
tion for  the  surrender  of  criminals,  between  the  United  States 
and   the    King   of   the    French,    concluded   at  Washington,  No- 

48  U.  S.  V.  Barber,  140  U.  S,  164,  168 ;  52  u.  S.  R.  S.  §§  828.  847,  1014  ;  Mc- 
Scliell's  Ex'rs  v.  Touche,  138  U.  S.  562.  Kinistry  r.  U.  S.,  34  Fed.  R.  211 ;  Strong 

49  U.  S.  R.  S.  §§  828,  847  ;  Strong  v.  v.  U.  S.,  34  Fed.  R.  17 ;  U.  S.  i:  Ewing, 
U.  S.,  .34  Fed.  R.  17  ;  McKinistry  v.  U.  S.,  140  U.  S.  142. 

34  Fed.  R.  211.  53  u.  s.  v.  Ewing,  140  U.  S.  142;  Mar- 
s' U.  S.  R.  S.  §§  828,   847 ;  Strong  v.  vin  r.  U.  S.,  44  Fed.  R.  400. 

U  S  ,  .34  Fed.  R.  17 ;  McKinistry  v.  U.  S.,         54  Marvin  v.  U.  S.,  44  Fed.  R.  405. 

34  Fed.  R.  211.  ^''  Marvin  v.  U.  S.,  44  Fed.  R.  405. 

51  Clough  V.  U.  S.,  47  Fed.  R.  701.  5^  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  847. 


620  COSTS   AT   LAW   AND   IN   EQUITY.  [CHAP.  XXV. 

vember  nine,  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  forty  three,  two 
dollars."  5' 

*'  For  hearing  and  deciding  upon  the  case  of  any  person  charged 
with  any  crime  or  offence,  and  arrested  under  the  provisions  of 
said  treaty,  or  of  said  convention,  five  dollars  a  day  for  the  time 
necessarily  employed."  ^^  A  commissioner  cannot  charge  a  fee 
for  drawing  criminal  complaints,^^  but  he  may  for  filing  them.^^ 

"  For  the  examination  and  certificate  in  cases  of  applications 
for  discharge  of  poor  convicts,  imprisoned  for  non-payment  of  a 
fine,  or  fine  and  costs,  five  dollars  a  day  for  the  time  necessarily 
employed."  ^^ 

A  commissioner  is  entitled  to  fifteen  cents  a  folio  for  every  order 
or  certificate  given  by  him  to  a  witness  or  olhcer,  and  on  which  the 
witness  or  officer  is  paid.^^ 

It  has  been  held  that  under  the  Chinese  Exclusion  Act^^  a 
commissioner  can  charge  a  docket  fee  of  twenty  dollars,  but  no 
fee  for  any  other  services.^ 

332.  Marshal's  Fees.^  —  "  The  marshal  of  the  Supreme  Court  of 
the  United  States  shall  be  entitled  to  receive  for  the  service  of 
any  warrant,  attachment,  summons,  capias,  or  other  writ,  except 
execution,  venire,  or  a  summons,  or  subpa?na  for  a  witness,  one 
dollar  for  each  person  on  whom  such  service  may  be  made.  His 
fees  for  all  other  services  shall  be  the  same  as  are  herein  allowed  to 
other  marshals  ;  but  he  shall  pay  into  the  Treasury  of  the  United 
States  all  fees  received  by  him,  and  render  a  true  account  thereof 
at  the  close  of  each  term  to  the  Attorne3'-Gcneral."  ^  The  fees  of 
the  other  United  States  marshals  are  fixed  by  statute  as  follows : 

"For  service  of  any  warrant,  attachment,  summons,  capias,  or 
other  writ,  except  execution,  venire,  or  a  summons  or  subpoena  for 
a  witness,  two  dollars  for  each  person  on  whom  service  is  made."  ^ 
The  marshal  has  a  right  to  demand  in  advance  the  payment  of 
fees  for  the  service  of  process,*  and  may  have  an  attachment  to 

*■?  U.  S.  K.  S.  §  847.  *^3  23  St.  at  L.  115,117,  118. 

58  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  847.  64  Carr  v.  U.  S.  -23  Ct.  of  CI.  118. 

69  Strong  V.  U."  S.,  34  Fed.  K.  17.  §  3.32.     i  By  T.  M.  Rowlette,  Esq.,  of 

«»  McKinistry  v.  U   S.,  34  Fed.  R.  211.  the  New  York  bar,  and  S.  Lewis  Moody, 

61  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  847.     See  also  §  1042.  Esq.,  of  tlie  Maine  liar. 

6-^  Strong  I'.  U.  S.,  34  Fed.  R.  17 ;  Me-  -^  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  832. 

Kinistry  r.  U.  S.,  34  Fed.  R.  211  ;  U.  S.  »  u.  S.  R.  S.  §  829. 

t'.  Ewinsi,  140  U.  S.  142;  U.  S.  v.  McDer-  *  Ray  r.  Knowiton,  11  Diss.  C.  C.  3G0; 

mntt.  140  U.  S.  151 ;  U.  S.  r.  Barber,  140  Duy  v.  Knowiton,  14  Fed.  R.  107. 

U.  S.  104. 


§  332.]  marshal's  fees.  621 

enforce  payment  against  suitors  in  the  court,^  or  against  an  in- 
dorser  on  the  writ  who,  by  local  law,  is  liable  to  respond  for  the 
costs.^  Where  the  marshal  by  mistake  arrests  the  wrong  person, 
or  arrests  the  right  person,  but  beyond  his  jurisdiction,  he  cannot 
be  allowed  fees  of  any  kind."  The  marshal  is  not  entitled  to  a 
fee  for  arrest,  when  he  allows  the  prisoner  to  go  free  on  his 
promise  to  attend  court ;  nor  when  the  arrest  is  not  authorized 
by  warrant.^  Charges  for  "  aid  "  or  assistance  are  allowed  where 
the  nature  of  the  case  renders  it  proper,  and  the  amount  claimed 
is  shown  to  be  reasonable.^  When  writs  issued  before  the  mar- 
shal who  served  them  qualified  for  office  are  turned  over  to  him 
by  his  predecessor  under  arrangement  that  he  should  have  the 
fees  therefor,  and  the  writs  are  served  by  him  after  he  qualifies, 
he  is  entitled  to  fees  for  such  service. ^^  The  marshal  is  not  en- 
titled to  fees  for  the  custody  and  guard  of  prisoners  under  bail. 
The  sureties  on  the  bond  are  a  sufficient  guard. ^^  An  appearance 
bond  is  evidence  to  commissioners  of  a  due  arrest.^^  By  Act  of 
March  3,  1887,  it  was  provided,  "  That  hereafter  no  part  of  the 
appropriations  made  for  the  payment  of  fees  for  United  States 
marshals  or  clerks  shall  be  used  to  pay  the  fees  of  United  States 
marshals  or  clerks  upon  any  writ  or  bench  warrant  for  the  arrest 
of  any  person  or  persons  who  may  be  indicted  by  any  United 
States  grand  jury,  or  against  whom  an  information  may  be  filed, 
where  such  person  or  persons  is  or  are  under  a  recognizance 
taken  by  or  before  any  United  States  commissioner  or  other  offi- 
cer authorized  by  law  to  take  such  recognizance,  requiring  the 
appearance  of  such  person  or  persons  before  the  court  in  which 
such  indictment  is  found  or  information  is  filed,  and  when  such 
recognizance  has  not  been  forfeited  or  said  defendant  is  not  in 
default,  unless  the  court  in  which  such  indictment  or  information 
is  pending  orders  a  warrant  to  issue ;  nor  shall  any  part  of  any 
money  appropriated  be  used  in  payment  of  a  per  diem  compensa- 
tion to  any  attorney,  clerk,  or  marshal  for  attendance  in  court, 
except  for  days  when  the  court  is  open  by  the  judge  for  business 
or  business  is  actually  transacted  in  court,  and  when  they  attend 

6  Anonymous,  2  Gall.  101.  i"  Fletcher  v.  U.  S.,  45  Ferl.  R.  '213. 

6  Anonymous,  2  Gall.  101.  "  U.  S.  v.  Ebbs,  10  Fed.  R.  369;  s.  c. 

T  Matter  of  Crittenden,  2  Flippin,  212.  4  Hughes,  473. 

«  U.  S.  V.  Ebbs,  10  Fed.  R.  369;  s.  c.  i-  U.  S.  v.  Ebbs,  10  Fed.  R.  369;  8.  c 

4  Hughes,  473.  4  Hughes,  473. 
9  Ex  parte  Paris,  3  W.  &  M.  227. 


622  COSTS   AT   LAW   AND   IN   EQUITY.  [CHAP.  XXV. 

under  Sections  five  hundred  and  eighty-three,  five  hundred  and 
eighty-four,  six  hundred  and  seventy-one,  six  hundred  and  seventy- 
two,  and  two  thousand  and  tliirteen,  of  the  Revised  Statutes,  which 
fact  shall  he  certified  in  the  approval  of  their  accounts."  ^^ 

"For  the  keeping  of  personal  property  attached  on  mesne  pro- 
cess, such  compensation  as  the  court,  on  petition  setting  forth  tlio 
facts  under  oath,  may  allow."  ^^  The  marshal's  fees  for  the  cus- 
tody of  goods  in  cases  of  seizure,  and  other  proceedings  in  rem,  are 
not  discretionary,  but  are  dependent  upon  the  precise  regulations 
of  law,  or,  in  the  absence  of  such  regulations,  are  to  be  allowed 
upon  the  principle  of  a  quantum  meruit,  graduated  by  the  ordinary 
value  of  similar  services,  and  dependent  upon  the  circumstances 
of  each  particular  case.  Where  such  fees  are  not  regulated  hy 
law,  an  auditor  should  pass  upon  them.^^  The  marshal  is  entitled 
to  be  paid  his  fees  at  the  time  he  delivers  up  the  property  to  the 
person  entitled  to  receive  it.^*^  The  court  will  not  allow  pay  for 
extra  men  employed  by  the  marshal  to  preveut  the  collector  of 
customs  from  taking  by  force  property  from  his  custody.^" 

"  For  serving  venires  and  summoning  every  twelve  men  as 
grand  or  petit  jurors,  four  dollars,  or  thirty-three  and  one-third 
cents  each.  In  States  where,  by  the  laws  thereof,  jurors  are 
drawn  l>y  lot,  by  constables,  or  other  officers  of  corporate  places, 
the  marshal  shall  receive,  for  each  jury,  two  dollars  for  the  use  of 
the  officers  employed  in  drawing  and  summoning  the  juroi's  and 
returning  each  venire,  and  two  dollars  for  his  own  services  in  dis- 
tributing the  venires.  But  the  fees  for  distributing  and  serving 
venires,  drawing  and  summoning  jurors  by  township  officers,  in- 
cluding the  mileage  chargeable  by  the  marshal  for  each  service, 
shall  not  at  any  court  exceed  fifty  dollars."  '^  Where  the  jurors 
are  drawn  by  State  officers,  the  marslial  is  still  entitled  to  his  fees 
for  serving  the  venires  on  such  officers  ;^^  where  the  venires 
are  served  by  a  State  officer,  the  marshal  is  not  entitled  to  a  trav- 
elling fee.^ 

"  For  holding  a  court  of  inquiry  or  other  proceedings  before  a 
jury,  including  the  summoning  of  a  jury,  five  dollars."  ^^ 

13  24  St.  at  L.  c.  362,  p.  641.  ^8  u.  S.  R.  S.  §  829. 

"  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  829.  1^  U.  S.  V.  Coggswell,  3  Sumner,  204; 

15  Bottomley  i-.  U.  S.,  1  Story  (Mass.),  U.  S.  v.  Smith,  1  W  &  M.  184. 
136,  153.  ••«>  U.  S.  V.  Smith,  1  W.  &  M.  184. 

16  The  Georgeanna,  31  Fed.  R.  405.  21  u.  S.  R.  S.  §  829. 
"  The  IVrscvorance,  22  Fed.  R.  462. 


§  332.]  marshal's  fees.  623 

"  For  serving  a  writ  of  subpoena  on  a  witness,  fifty  cents  ;  and 
no  furtlicr  compensation  shall  be  allowed  for  any  copy,  summons, 
or  notice  for  a  witness."  ^ 

The  marshal  cannot  charge  mileage  for  the  service  of  a  writ  of 
subpoena  issued,  at  the  same  time  and  in  the  same  cause,  upon 
witnesses  residing  in  the  same  locality  with  one  for  whom  a  writ 
of  arrest  is  issued  in  a  criminal  cause.  The  service  of  such  sub- 
poena does  not  require  another  "  actual  and  necessary  "  travel.^'^ 

"  For  serving  a  writ  of  possession,  partition,  execution,  or  any 
final  process,  the  same  mileage  as  is  allowed  for  the  service  of  any 
other  writ ;  and  for  making  the  service,  seizing  or  levying  on  prop- 
erty, advertising  and  disposing  of  the  same  by  sale,  set-off,  or 
otlierwise  according  to  law,  receiving  and  paying  over  the  money, 
the  same  fees  and  poundage  as  are  or  shall  be  allowed  for  similar 
services  to  the  sheriffs  of  the  States,  respectively,  in  which  the 
service  is  rendered."  ^^  Where  a  marshal  who  levied  the  execu- 
tion has  received  his  half  commissions,  his  successor  will  be  enti- 
tled to  no  more  than  his  half  commissions  for  completing  and 
paying  it  over.^^  The  marshal  is  not  entitled  to  fees  where  no 
property  is  sold  nor  any  money  received  under  an  execution.^^ 
Otherwise  where  money  is  paid,  though  no  sale  is  necessary ,2" 
The  marshal  cannot  charge  interest  on  his  fees,  although  he  may 
on  his  disbursements.^^ 

If  the  State  court  compensates  services  similar  to  those  per. 
formed  by  a  marshal,  although  not  performed  there  by  a  like  offi- 
cer, the  marshal  is  entitled  to  the  same  compensation.^^  When 
an  execution  against  the  person  was  issued  in  the  county  of  New 
York,  the  defendant  held  under  arrest  for  some  time,  and  the  ac- 
tion subse(|uently  settled  by  a  compromise,  the  defendants  paying 
a  smaller  sum  than  that  specified  in  the  execution,  it  was  licld 
that  the  marshal  was  entitled  to  poundage  on  the  whole  amount 
for  which  the  execution  issued ;  and  that  the  rate  of  poundage 
should    be   that   allowed   the    sheriffs   in  the   different   counties 


2i!  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  829.  25  15  Op.  Atty.-Gen.  346. 

23  U.  S.  V.  Ralston,  17  Fed.  R.  895;  15  26  jrwin  r.  Cummins,  Hempst.  703. 

Atty.-Gen.    Opinions,    108.      But    see   3  "-7  jJo,ueroy  y.  Harter,  1  McLean  (Ind.), 

Atty.-Gen.     Opinions,   496  ;    Harmon   v.  448. 

U.  S.,  43  Fed.  R.  560  ;   Fletcher  v.  U.  S.,  ■»  /?e  Donahue,  8  Bankr.  Reg.  453. 

45  Fed.  R.  213.  29  Pomeroy  v.  Barter,  1  McLean  (Ind.), 

2*  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  829;  Pomeroy  v.  Har-  448;  The  Trial,  1  Blatciif.  &  H.  94. 
ter,  1  McLean  (Ind.),  448. 


624  COSTS   AT   LAW    AND   IN   EQUITY.  [CHAP.  XXV. 

througliout  the  State,  and  not  the  special  rate  allowed  in  the 
county  of  New  York.^*'  When  the  marshal  extends  an  execution 
on  real  estate  for  the  government  he  is  entitled  to  his  fees  for  the 
same,  though  the  land  is  not  yet  sold  or  redeemed,  nor  in  any  way 
converted  into  money .^^  The  fees  for  services  of  a  deputy  marshal 
belong  legally  to  the  marshal,  and  he  controls  them,  and  his  re- 
ceipt must  operate  as  a  discharge  of  the  fees.^^  No  fee  is  allowed 
for  service  of  a  writ  or  warrant  unless  actually  executed.^^  Mile- 
age is  to  be  computed  from  the  place  where  the  process  is  returned 
to  the  place  of  service.  The  "  place  of  return"  is  the  place  where 
the  process  is  issued.'^*  The  marshal  may  charge  poundage  on  the 
debt,  if  authorized  by  State  laws,  where  an  insolvent  is  discharged 
from  imprisonment  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  on  payment 
of  costs.^'5  The  marshal's  duty  to  serve,  and  right  to  compensation 
for  the  service  of  precepts,  which  are  agreed  to  have  been  duly 
issued  by  the  court  or  a  commissioner  in  accordance  with  estab- 
lished usage,  cannot  be  affected  by  the  opinion  of  the  comptroller 
that  the  issue  of  such  precepts  was  unnecessary  .^6 
"  For  each  bail-bond,  fifty  cents."  -5' 
"  For  summoning  appraisers,  fifty  cents  each."^^ 
"  For  executing  a  deed  by  a  party  or  his  attorney,  one  dollar."  ^^ 
"  For  drawing  and  executing  a  deed,  five  dollars."  ^^  The  mar- 
shal cannot  object  to  the  purchaser  drawing  his  own  deed  if  he 
choose.*^ 

"  For  copies  of  wi'its  or  papers  furnished  at  the  request  of  any 
party,  ten  cents  a  folio."  *-  When  tlie  marshal  has,  with  the  proper 
sanction  of  the  Attorney-General,  provided  blank  indictments  and 
informations  for  the  necessary  use  of  the  district  attorney,  he  is 
entitled  to  be  reimbursed  for  such  expenditures.^^ 

"  For  every  proclamation  in  admiralty,  thirty  cents."** 

"  For  serving  an  attachment  in  rem  or  a  libel  in  admiralty,  two 

30  U.  S.  v.  Haas,  5  Fed.  R.  29.  3  Cranch  C.  C.  403;  Ringgold  v.  Lewis, 

«i  U.  S.  V.  Smith,  44  Fed.  R.  405.  3  Cranch  C   C.  367,   Swann  v.  Ringgold, 

82  Wintermute  v.  Smith,  1  Bond,  210.  4  Cranch  C.  C.  288. 

33  Ex  parte  Paris,  3  W.  &  M.  227.  36  Harmon  v.  U.  S.,  43  Fed.  R   560. 

8*  Matter  of  Crittenden,  2  Flippin,  212.  37  u.  S.  R.  S.  §  829. 

3^  Townsend  i-'.   U.    S.,  1   U.  S.  L.  J.  88  u.  g.  R.  S.  §  829. 

534  b ;  and  for  cases  in  which  the  mar-  ^9  u.  8.  R.  S.  §  829. 

shal  is  entitled  to  poundage,  see  U.  S.  v.  *"  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  829. 

Ringgold,  8  Pet.  150;  Causin  v.  Chubb,  *i  The  John  E.  Mulford,  18  Fed.  R.  455. 

1  Cranch  C.  C.  207  ;  Ringgold  v.  Glover,  *-  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  829. 

2  Cranch  C.  C.  427;   U.  S.   v.  Smith,  3        *3  Harmon  r.  U.  S,  43  Fed.  R.  560,  565. 
Cranch  C.  C.  66;   Mason  v.  Muncaster,        "  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  829. 


§  332.]  marshal's  fees.  625 

dollars."  ^^  Where  process  in  rem  is  issued  against  u  vessel,  but 
before  process  is  served  the  claimant,  waiving  service,  gives  a 
bond  under  section  941  of  the  Revised  Statutes,  and  the  case  pro- 
ceeds to  final  decree,  no  actual  seizure  having  been  made  bj  the 
marslial,  he  is  still  entitled  to  his  fees  on  the  settlement  of  the 
case.**^  It  is  not  necessary  that  there  should  be  a  sale  in  order  to 
entitle  him  to  his  fees.*'' 

"  For  the  necessary  expenses  of  keeping  boats,  vessels,  or  other 
property  attached  or  libelled  in  admiralty,  not  exceeding  two  dol- 
lars and  fifty  cents  a  day."  ^^  On  delivering  up  the  property  the 
marshal  may  demand  his  fees  of  the  person  entitled  to  recover 
it.*^  He  must  take  actual  possession  of  the  vessel,  or  he  is  not 
entitled  to  fees.^^  He  may  take  such  possession  as  to  render  him 
liable  to  the  parties,  and  yet  not  be  entitled  to  fees.^^  The  mar- 
shal's actual  expenses  for  ship-keeping  must,  by  vouchers,  etc.,  be 
established  to  be  necessary  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  court.^^  And 
the  approval  by  the  district  attorney  of  the  employment  of  extra 
keepers  will  not  be  sufficient  to  establish  the  right  of  the  marshal 
to  an  allowance  for  the  employment  of  such  extra  keepers. ^^  Not- 
withstanding the  limit  named  in  this  clause,  the  marshal  will  be 
allowed  the  extra  cost  of  dockage  of  a  vessel  seized  while  on  a 
marine  railway  from  which  she  could  not  be  removed  without 
danger  of  sinking.^"^  The  libellant  must  get  an  order  from  the 
court  directing  the  withdrawal  of  tlie  keeper,  if  he  would  not  be 
liable  for  keeper's  fees  should  he  lose  the  suit.  Mere  notice  to 
the  marshal  is  not  enough.^^  If  the  parties  agree  that  the  vessel 
should  be  four  months  in  the  marshal's  charge,  the  sum  actually 
paid  a  watchman  by  him  is  taxable  as  part  of  the  costs,  even 
though  the  claimant  also  had  a  keeper  on  the  vessel.^^  Entry 
by  the  marshal  into  the  bonded  warehouse  where  the  goods  are 
stored,  and  levying  of  process  against  and  affixing  a  notice  of 
seizure  upon  such  property,  is  an  attachment  upon  the  property 
within  the  meaning  of  the  statute,  and  the  custody  fees  of  a 
keeper  who  visited  the  storehouse  three  times  a  day,  though  he 

<5  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  829.  51  Tlie  Hibernia,  1  Sprague,  78. 

«  The  City  of  Washington,  13  Blatchf.  "  The  Free  Trader,  1  Brown  Adra.  72. 

410.  58  The  Captain  John,  41  Fed.  R.  147, 

^'^  The  Captain  John,  41  Fed.  R.  147.  149;  The  Perseverance,  22  Fed.  R.  462. 

48  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  829.  54  The  Novelty,  9  Ben.  195. 

*9  The  Georgeanna,  31  Fed.  R.  405.  ^5  The  Independent,  9  Ben.  489. 

5^  The  Hibernia,  1  Sprague,  78.  56  The  San  Jacinto,  30  Fed.  R.  266. 
VOL.  I.  —  40 


626  COSTS    AT   LAW    AND    IN    EQUITY.  [CIIAP.  XXV. 

did  not  enter,  are  taxable  as  costs.^'^  The  court  will  not  allow 
pay  for  extra  men  emploj^ed  by  the  marshal  to  prevent  the  col- 
lector of  customs  from  taking  by  force  property  from  his  cus- 
tody.^^  Nor  will  the  court  allow  the  marshal  five  dollars  a  day 
on  the  ground  that  two  men  were  employed  to  watch,  —  one  by 
day  and  one  by  night.°^  But  two  dollars  and  fifty  cents  a  day  is 
not  the  absolute  limit,  and  more  will  be  allowed  in  the  case  of 
danger  from  thieves,  and  in  other  emergencies  requiring  more 
than  one  man  to  guard  the  property,  since  the  marshal  is  bound 
to  protect  from  damage  a  vessel  in  his  custody. ^^  But  when  a 
marshal  has  done  work  in  a  defective  manner,  and  additional 
labor  becomes  necessary  in  consequence,  no  compensation  for  the 
latter  should  be  allowed.^^  A  marshal,  being  the  party  served,  is 
not  entitled  to  fees  for  serving  a  warrant  for  the  delivery  of  a  ves- 
sel to  the  claimant  issued  upon  a  stipulation  of  the  parties ;  but 
he  is  entitled  to  be  reimbursed  for  any  expenses  he  is  put  to  on 
account  of  having  been  served  with  such  warrant.'^^  The  cost  of 
pumping  out  a  vessel  in  charge  of  the  marshal  is  properly  allowed 
against  the  claimants  in  admiralty.^^  If,  in  the  estimation  of  the 
court,  it  was,  under  the  circumstances,  prudent  for  the  marshal  to 
remove  and  insure  property  in  his  possession,  he  will  be  allowed 
the  expenses  necessarily  incurred  thereby .^^  And  he  should  in- 
sure it  with  reference  to  its  actual  market  value,  irrespective  of 
its  original  cost.*^^  The  marshal  is  also  entitled  to  be  reimbursed 
for  his  expenses  in  hiring  wharfage  for  a  vessel  in  his  custody, 
when  such  a  course  appears  to  have  been  necessary .*^^  If  several 
processes  are  issued  against  one  vessel,  and  the  marshal  has  pos- 
session under  all  the  processes,  the  per  diem  custody  fees  should 
be  apportioned  equally  among  the  claimants,  saving  to  the  mar- 
shal, in  case  any  party  fails  to  pay  his  proper  proportion,  a  remedy 
against  the  other  j)arties  for  the  amount.^^ 

"  When  tlie  debt  or  claim  in  admiralty  is  settled  by  the  parties 
without  a  sale  of  the  property,  the  marshal  shall  be  entitled  to  a 

57  Jorgensen  r.  Casks   of   Cement,  40        ''*  U.  S.  v.  Tliree  Hundred  Barrels  of 
Fed.  R.  006.  Alcohol,  1  Ben.  72. 

58  The  Perseverance,  22  Fed.  R.  462.  '''^  U.  S.  r.  Three  Hundred  Barrels  of 
69  The  Perseverance,  22  Fed.  R.  4r)2.        Alcohol,  1  Ben.  72. 

6'>  The  Perseverance,  22  Fed.  R.  4r.2.  s*"'  The   Novelty   (Steamhoat),   0   Ben. 

61  The  Nellie  Peck,  25  Fed.  R  4fi3.  195.     But  see  Tlie  F.   Merwin,  10   Ben. 

62  The  Jeanie  Landles,  17  Fed.  R.  01.        403. 

fi3  Tlie  Captain  John,  41  Fed.  Reporter        "The   Circassian,   6   Ben.   512;    The 
147.  John  Walls,  Jr.,  1  Sprague,  178. 


§  332.]  marshal's  fees.  627 

commission  of  one  per  centum  on  the  first  five  hundred  dollars  of 
the  claim  or  decree,  and  one-half  of  one  per  centum  on  the  excess 
of  any  sum  thereof  over  five  hundred  dollars :  Provided^  that, 
when  the  value  of  the  property  is  less  than  the  claim,  such  com- 
mission shall  be  allowed  only  on  the  appraised  value  thereof."  ^^ 
The  word  "  claim  "  as  here  used  applies  equally  to  "  a  claim  of 
forfeiture  to  the  United  States,  in  a  proceeding  in  rem  against  a 
vessel,"  as  well  as  to  cases  where  the  demand  or  claim  is  personal 
in  its  naturc.^^  Tlie  sum  paid  a  libelhmt  in  settlement  of  his 
claim,  and  not  the  amount  claimed  in  tlic  libel,  is  the  basis  upon 
which  the  marshars  commissions  are  to  be  determined J*^  The 
issuing  of  a  process  and  the  giving  of  a  bond  under  section  941  of 
the  Revised  Statutes  to  the  marshal  will  entitle  him  to  his  com- 
missions in  a  suit  in  rem  against  a  vessel  under  this  clause, 
although  the  service  of  the  process  be  waived  and  seizure  of  the 
vessel  be  not  actually  made.  If  the  amount  of  the  final  de- 
cree is  paid  before  execution,  that  is  such  a  settlement  of  the 
claim  as  will  entitle  the  marshal  to  his  commissions.'^  So  if  part 
of  the  goods  are  sold  or  there  is  a  part-payment  in  settlement,  the 
marshal  will  be  entitled  to  his  commissions  pro  rataJ^  Where  a 
vessel  is  sold  by  a  trustee  under  the  limited  liability  act,  the  mar- 
shal is  not  entitled  to  a  commission.'^ 

"  For  sale  of  vessels  or  other  property  under  process  in  admir- 
alty or  under  the  order  of  a  court  of  admiralty,  and  for  receiving 
and  paying  over  the  money,  two  and  one-half  per  centum  on  any 
sum  under  five  hundred  dollars,  and  one  and  one-quarter  per  cen- 
tum on  the  excess  of  any  sum  over  five  hundred  dollars."  ''^  The 
marshal  is  not  authorized  by  law  to  employ  an  auctioneer  to  make 
sales  under  process  or  decree  in  admiralty  ;  and  if  he  employs  one, 
ho  can  make  no  charge  for  the  services  of  sucli  auctioneer  which 
he  could  not  otherwise  have  charged.  Nor  can  lie  make  such 
charge  by  a  notice  prior  to  the  sale,  that  an  auctioneer's  fee  will  be 
required  of  the  purchaser  in  addition  to  his  bid.'^     Where  a  nvdv- 

68  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  829.  Robinson   v.  Bags  of  Sugar,  35  Fed.  R. 

es  The  Captain  John,  41   Fed.  R.  147,  00:'.. 

IT)]  7-  Swann   r.  Ringgold,   Cranch   C.   C 

''*  Robinson  r.  Bags  of  Sugar,  o-5  Fed.  240. 

R  00:5 ;  The  Clintonia,  11  Fed   R.  740.  "^  The  Vernon,  .SO  Fed.  R.  113. 

'i  The  City  of  Washington,  13  Bhitclif.  "^  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  829. 

410.     Compare  Bone /'.The  Norma,  Newb.  "^  The  John  C.    Mulford,   18  Fed.  R. 

Adm.  533;  and  see  The  CMntonia,  11  Fed.  455;  Crofut  v.  Brandt,  13  Abb.  Pr.  (n.  s.) 

R    740,  citing  The   Russia,  6   Ben.  84;  132. 


628  COSTS   AT   LAW   AND   IN   EQUITY.  [CHAP.  XXV. 

shal  has  been  paid  liis  fees  and  commissions  on  the  sale  of  a  ves- 
sel under  decree,  and  a  claimant  files  a  petition  on  which  monition 
is  issued,  asking  that  the  balance  of  the  proceeds  be  paid  to  him, 
and  the  court  so  orders,  the  marshal  cannot  claim  an  additional 
commission  on  the  amount  paid  by  the  claimant.'^  Upon  an  in- 
terlocutory sale  of  prize  property,  the  marshal  is  entitled  to  full 
commissions."  So  if  the  property  is  removed  to  and  sold  in 
another  district."^  The  marshal's  title  to  commissions  accrues  at 
the  time  of  the  sale,  and  he  is  entitled  to  deduct  his  fees  at  the 
time  when  he  pays  the  proceeds  into  court.'^  If,  by  agreement 
of  parties,  the  vessel  is  sold  outside  of  the  territorial  limits  of  the 
marshal's  authority,  he  is,  nevertheless,  entitled  to  his  fees.^ 

"  For  disbursing  money  to  jurors  and  witnesses,  and  for  other 
expenses,  two  per  centum."  ^^  The  comptroller  may  not  object  to 
the  recovery  of  witness  fees  disbursed  by  the  marshal  in  accord- 
ance with  a  court  order.^^ 

"  For  expenses  while  employed  in  endeavoring  to  arrest,  under 
process,  any  person  charged  with  or  convicted  of  a  crime,  the  sum 
actually  expended,  not  to  exceed  two  dollars  a  day,  in  addition  to 
his  compensation  for  service  and  travel."  ^^  Part  of  the  expense 
in  serving  a  writ  in  a  criminal  case  is  the  per  diem  paid  the  mar- 
shal's deputy.^  Where  a  marshal,  acting  as  the  deputy  of  the 
marshal  of  another  district,  arrests  criminals  in  that  district,  and 
such  marshal  relinquishes  to  him  all  claim  for  fees  for  such  arrest, 
the  marshal  is  entitled  to  compensation  for  his  services  in  pursu- 
ing, arresting,  and  bringing  back  such  fugitives  from  justice.^^  The 
marshal  is  entitled,  as  expenses,  to  a  jyer  diem  paid  his  deputy,  not 
to  exceed  two  dollars  a  day.*' 

"For  every  commitment  or  discharge  of  a  prisoner,  fifty  cents."  ^' 
A  fee  may  be  properly  allowed  the  marshal  when  the  prisoner  is 
released  entirely  from  custody,  but  not  when  brought  into  court 
for  trial  or  testifying.^  No  fee  should  be  allowed  the  marshal  for 
a  commitment  made  in  any  other  case  than  under  an  order  of  the 
court  or  in  the  execution  of  a  mittimus.^^ 

■?«  The  Colorado.  21  Fed.  R.  592.  ^^  u.  S.  R.  S.  §  829. 

T7  The  A  very,  2  Gall.  308.  ^^  U.  S.  v.  Harker,  3  Sawyer,  237. 

"8  The  San  Jose  Indiano,  2  Gall.  311.  85  Fletcher  r.  U.  S.,  45  Fed.  R.  213. 

"9  The  Avery,  2  Gall.  .308.  »«  U.  S.  v.  Harker,  3  Sawyer,  237. 

83  The  San  Jose  Indiano,2  Gall.  311.  87  u.  S.  R.  S.  §  829. 

«  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  829  88  Ex  parte  Paris,  3  W.  &  M.  227. 

82  Harmon  v.  U.  S.,  43  Fed.  R.  560,  567.  ^  Ex  parte  Paris,  3  W.  &  M.  227. 


§  332.]  marshal's  fees.  629 

"  For  transporting  criminals,  ten  cents  a  mile  for  himself,  and 
for  each  prisoner  and  necessary  guard  ;  except  in  the  case  pro- 
vided in  the  next  paragraph."^'*  Expenses  for  transporting  guards 
for  prisoners  will  be  allowed  though  they  were  also  summoned  as 
witnesses  and  paid  mileage.^^  If  expense  of  a  guard  is  charged, 
it  must  be  shown  to  be  necessary.^ 

"  For  transporting  criminals  convicted  of  a  crime  in  any  dis- 
trict or  Territory  where  there  is  no  penitentiary  available  for  the 
confinement  of  convicts  of  the  United  States,  to  a  prison  in  an- 
other district  or  Territory  designated  by  the  Attorney-General, 
the  reasonable  actual  expense  of  transportation  of  the  criminals, 
the  marshal,  and  the  guards,  and  the  necessary  subsistence  and 
hire."  ^^  The  Attorney-General  has  held  that  the  Act  of  June 
16,  1874,  chapter  285,  Section  1  (18  Stat,  at  Large,  72),  super- 
sedes the  provision  of  this  clause  allowing  mileage  to  marshals, 
and  that  the  expense  of  guards  employed  by  the  marshal  for 
transporting  the  prisoners  are  a  part  of  the  actual  expenses  of  the 
marshal.^* 

"  For  attending  the  Circuit  and  District  Courts,  when  both  are 
in  session,  or  either  of  them  when  only  one  is  in  session,  and  for 
bringing  in  and  committing  prisoners  and  witnesses  during  the 
term,  five  dollars  a  day."  '^^  The  fact  that  the  fifth  day  of  July 
was  generally  celebrated  as  Independence  Day,  the  fourth  falling 
on  Sunday,  did  not  deprive  a  marshal  of  his  per  diem  fee  for 
attending  court  on  that  day,  where  the  record  showed  that  the 
court  was  open  and  transacted  business  on  that  day.^^  The  mar- 
shal may  not  charge  a  joer  diem  allowance  for  days  occurring  be- 
tween sessions  though  within  the  term.^"  The  hire  of  hacks  to 
transport  prisoners  to  and  from  the  court,  when  shown  to  be  in 
accordance  with  the  usual  practice,  will  be  allowed.^"  Compensa- 
tion will  not  be  allowed  to  a  marshal  for  the  inspection  or  keep- 
ing of  state  jails,  unless  he  acts  under  the  direction  of  a  United 
States  court  for  the  purpose  of  determining  their  fitness  for  hold- 
ing United  States  prisoners.^ 

»o  U.  S.  \\.  S.  §  829.  509,  cited  mpra,  §  .330,  note  87,  and  §  333, 

81  Matter  of  Crittenden,  2  Flippin,  212.  note  12.S. 

82  Matter  of  Crittenden,  2  Flippin,  212.         ^g  Fletcher  r.  U.  S.,  45  Fed.  R.  213. 
<»3  U.  S   R.  S.  §  829.  97  McMulIen  v.  U.  S.,  24  Ct  of  CI.  .-594. 
»^  14  Op.  Atty.-Gen.  681.  n*  Harmon  v.  U.  S..  48  Fed.  R.  -560. 

»6  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  829.     See  24  St.  at  L.        a^  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  8.S0;  U.  S.  v.  Smith,  1 

W.  &  M.  184. 


630  COSTS   AT   LAW   AND   IN   EQUITY.  [CHAP.  XXV. 

"  For  attending  examinations  before  a  commissioner,  and  bring- 
ing in,  guarding,  and  returning  prisoners  charged  with  crime,  and 
witnesses,  two  dollars  a  day,  and  for  each  deputy,  not  exceeding 
two,  necessarily  attending,  two  dollars  a  day."  ^^^  When  the  com- 
missioner hears  the  case  of  a  prisoner,  and  decides  that  he  must 
give  bail  for  his  appearance  in  court  to  answer  an  indictment,  and 
commits  him  to  the  custody  of  the  marshal  or  his  deputy,  if  either 
happens  to  be  present,  until  the  required  bail  is  given,  the  marshal 
is  entitled  to  a  fee  for  attendance  at  the  court  and  for  the  service 
of  a  guard,  if  such  service  is  rendered  and  was  necessary  ;  and  the 
marshal,  not  the  commissioner,  is  the  judge  of  such  necessity.^^^ 
The  number  of  officers  necessary  to  preserve  order,  not  exceeding 
the  marshal  and  two  deputies,  is  a  matter  to  be  decided  by  the 
commissioner  in  the  honest  exercise  of  his  discretion. ^^^  Neither 
the  marshal  nor  his  deputy  is  entitled  to  a  per  cUetn  fee  for  at- 
tendance before  a  commissioner  on  days  for  which  he  has  received 
a  per  diem  allowance  for  attendance  before  the  court.^^ 

*'  For  travelling  from  his  residence  to  the  place  of  holding  court 
to  attend  a  term  thereof,  ten  cents  a  mile,  for  going  only."  ^^  The 
mileage  allowance  here  granted  api)lics  to  every  trip  the  marshal 
takes  from  his  residence  to  the  court,  and  he  is  not  restricted  to 
one  such  trij>  for  each  term ;  but  where  the  court  adjourns  over 
for  one  or  more  days,  he  may  return  home,  and  charge  travel 
for  going  to  attend  the  term  at  the  days  to  which  it  is  adjourned. 
He  may  also  charge  travel  for  going  to  each  special  term.^^^ 

"  For  travel,  in  going  only,  to  serve  any  process,  warrant,  at- 
tachment, or  other  writ,  including  writs  of  subpoena  in  civil  or 
criminal  cases,  six  cents  a  mile,  to  be  computed  from  the  place 
where  the  process  is  returned  to  the  place  of  service,  or  when 
more  than  one  person  is  served  therewith,  to  the  place  of  service 
which  is  most  remote,  adding  thereto  the  extra  travel  which  is 
necessary  to  serve  it  on  the  others.  But  when  more  than  two 
writs  of  any  kind  required  to  be  served  in  behalf  of  the  same 
party  on  the  same  person  might  be  served  at  the  same  time,  the 
marshal  shall  be  entitled  to  compensation  for  travel  on  only  two  of 
such  writs  ;  and  to  save  unnecessary  expense,  it  shall  be  the  duty 
of  the  clerk  to  insert  the  names  of  as  many  witnesses  in  a  cause 

i'50  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  829.  105  Fletcher  v.  U.  S  ,  45  Fed.  R.  213. 

101  U.  S.  V.  Ebbs,  10  Fed.  R.  369.  i"*  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  829. 

102  Harmon  v.  U.  S.,  43  Fed.  II.  5G0.  lO^  Harmon  v.  U.  S.,  43  Fed.  R.  560. 


§  332]  marshal's  fees.  631 

in  such  subpoena  as  convenience  in  serving  the  same  will  per- 
mit." ^'^'^  The  clause  of  the  fee-bill  allowing  for  travel  in  going 
only,  as  a  compensation  for  actual  travel  in  going  and  return- 
ing, being  independent  of  the  clause  allowing  fees  for  trans- 
portation of  officer  and  prisoner  only  while  the  officer  has  the 
prisoner  in  custody,  he  is  entitled  both  to  transportation  for 
himself  and  prisoner,  and  to  travel  in  going  to  serve  a  warrant  of 
removal  or  warrant  to  commit.^'^''  Notwithstanding  the  Acts  of 
1853  and  1875,  Section  829  of  the  Revised  Statutes  will  be  ad- 
hered to  as  the  true  rule  for  computation  of  mileage. ^^^  By  the  Act 
of  June  16,  1874,^"^  it  was  provided  "  that  only  actual  travelling 
expenses  shall  be  allowed  to  any  person  holding  employment  or 
appointment  under  the  United  States,  and  all  allowances  for  mile- 
age and  transiiortation  in  excess  of  the  amount  actually  paid  are 
hereby  declared  illegal ;  and  no  credit  shall  be  allowed  to  any  of  the 
disbursing  officers  of  the  United  States  for  payment  or  allowances 
in  violation  of  this  provision."  The  Act  of  Congress  of  February 
22, 1875,  ch.  95,  §  7,  after  making  certain  provisions  for  the  allow- 
ance of  the  accounts  of  attorneys,  marshals,  and  clerks,  further 
provides  that  "  no  such  officer  or  person  shall  become  entitled  to 
any  allowance  for  mileage  or  travel  not  actually  and  necessarily 
performed  under  provisions  of  existing  law."  ^^^  It  was  held  that 
the  act  did  not  preclude  a  marshal  from  full  mileage  on  each  of 
two  or  more  writs  served  at  the  same  time  and  place  on  different 
persons,  but  applied  only  to  cases  in  which  there  was  no  actual 
travel,  as  where  a  w^'it  was  sent  through  the  mail  to  be  served  by 
a  deputy  near  the  place  of  service. ^'^  Tn  one  case  it  was  held 
that  the  marshal  was  entitled  to  but  one  mileage  fee  for  serving 
several  writs  in  the  same  locality,  though  they  were  for  different 
purposes.^^2  But  the  later  decisions  seem  to  hold  differently.  ^^^ 
The  marshal  is  entitled  to  mileage  for  actual  travel  in  enabling 
him  to  make  a  return  of  7iulla  hona.^^^  He  is  not  entitled  to  con- 
structive mileage,  and  his  actual  travelling  expenses  must  be 
divided  among  the  causes  in   his  hands   to  serve  at  the  same 


i"fi  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  829.  560  ;  Fletcher  v.  United  States,  45  Fed.  R. 

107  Harmon  v.  U.  S.,  43  Fed.  R.  560.  213. 

1^3  Matter  of  Crittenden,  2  Flippin,  212.  "2  U.  S.  v.  Rolston,  17  Fed.  R.  895. 

109  18  St.  at  L.  72  (1  Suppl.  U.  S.  R.  S.  "^  H;irmon  v.  U.  S.,  43  Fed.  R.  560 ; 

37).  Fletcher  r.  U.  S.,  45  Fed.  R.  213 

iw  18  St.  at  L.  338.  i"  Anon.,  Henipst.  450. 
Ill  Harmon  v.  United  States,  43  Fed.  R. 


632  COSTS   AT  LAW   AND   IN   EQUITY.  [CHAP.  XXV. 

time.^^^  Should  the  marshal  arrest  the  wrong  person,  he  is  not 
entitled  to  fees  of  any  kind ;  nor  will  he  be  allowed  additional 
mileage  for  transporting  a  prisoner  to  a  particular  place  by  any 
other  than  the  usual  route  of  travel  to  that  place. ^^^  He  may 
charge  actual  expenses  for  serving  a  monition,  instead  of  the 
statutory  mileage.^^^ 

"  In  all  cases  where  mileage  is  allowed  to  the  marshal  lie  may 
elect  to  receive  the  same  or  his  actual  travelling  expenses,  to  be 
proved  on  his  oath  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  court."  ^^^  Under 
Section  5438  of  the  Revised  Statutes  a  deputy  is  liable  to  punish- 
ment for  presenting  a  false  claim  for  fees  to  the  marshal,^^^ 
or  false  vouchers,  false  affidavits,  or  other  false  proof  as  to  the 
number  of  miles  travelled. ^'^'^  Generally  the  marshal  should  not 
be  allowed  any  charges  that  are  not  expressly  granted  by 
statute.^-^  The  marshal  cannot  claim  compensation  for  estab- 
lishing and  settling  his  claims  against  the  government.^^^  But 
when  in  an  admiralty  proceeding  a  reference  is  ordered  to  de- 
termine the  amount  of  a  marshal's  fees,  the  expense  must  be 
borne  by  the  claimant,  even,  it  has  been  held,  though  the  ref- 
eree awards  a  sum  less  than  the  marshal's  claim,  and  one  which 
the  claimant  was  at  all  times  willing  to  pay.^-'^  The  Attorney- 
General  is  authorized  to  exercise  general  supervision  over  the  ac- 
counts of  marshals  as  well  as  other  officers  of  the  United  States 
courts. ^'^^  A  deputy  marshal  is  entitled  to  full  compensation  for 
eleven  days'  attendance  at  the  polls,  notwitlistanding  a  notice  from 
the  Attorney-General  to  such  deputy  before  his  appointment  as 
supervisor  of  the  election,  that  he  would  be  paid  for  the  number 
of  days  he  should  serve,  not  exceeding  five  days.^^^  The  Attorney- 
General's  regulations  as  to  the  length  of  service  and  compensation 
of  special  deputy  marshals  cannot  invalidate  a  claim  for  services 
as  such  rendered  before  those  regulations  were  in  existencc^^*^  A 
deputy  marshal  has  no  claim  against  the  United  States  for  services 

115  Re  Donalnio,  8  Bankr.  Reg.  453.  12-^  U.  S.  v.  Smitli,  1  W.  &  M.  184 ;  U.  S. 

116  Matter  of  Crittenden,  2  Flippin,  212.     v.  Cogswell,  3  Sumner,  204. 

1"  The  Wavelet,  25  Fed.  R.  733.  i'-^^  Tlie  Captain  John,  41  Fed.  R.  147. 

118  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  829.  i'-^"  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  3G8 ;   U.  S.  v.   Waters, 

119  U.  S.  V.  Strohach,  4  Woods,  592.  133  U.  S.  208,  214. 

120  U.  S.  r.  Wallace,  40  Fed.  R.  144.  i-^  Stocksdale  v.  U.  S.,  30  Fed.  R.  62. 

121  The  John  K.  Mulford,  18  Fed.  R.  i-^«  U.  S.  v.  Davis,  132  U.  S.  334;  s.  C. 
455  ;  Crofiit  r.  Brandt,  13  Abb.  Pr.  (n  s.)  10  Sup.  Ct.  R.  105  ;  U.  S.  v.  Schofield,  132 
132;  Bottoniley  r   U.  S.  ,   1  Story,  153;  U   S.  337;  s.  c.  10  Sup.  Ct.  R.  106. 

9  Op.  Atty.-(ien.  98. 


§  332.]  marshal's  fees.  633 

rendered  as  deputy  marshal,  but  only  against'  the  marshal.^27  jf 
the  marshal  cannot  obtahi  his  disbursements  for  taking  the  census 
from  the  proper  department,  though  he  makes  repeated  applica- 
tions, he  may  retain  the  amount  out  of  the  public  moneys  in  his 
hands. 1-*^  The  marshal  must  pay  to  his  deputies  and  assistants 
employed  in  taking  the  census  the  same  funds,  or  their  equiva- 
lent, which  ho  has  received  from  the  government. ^^^ 

"  There  shall  be  paid  to  the  marshal  his  fees  for  services  ren- 
dered for  the  United  States,  for  summoning  jurors  and  witnesses 
in  behalf  of  the  United  States,  and  in  behalf  of  any  prisoner  to 
be  tried  for  a  capital  offence,  for  the  maintenance  of  prisoners 
of  the  United  States  confined  in  jail  for  any  criminal  offence ; 
also  for  his  reasonable  actual  expense  for  the  transportation  of 
criminals,  and  of  the  marshal  and  guards,  to  prisons  designated  by 
the  Attorney-General,  and  for  hire  and  subsistence  in  that  behalf, 
as  hereinbefore  provided  ;  also  his  fees  for  the  commitment  or 
discharge  of  prisoner  ;  his  expenses  necessarily  incurred  for  fuel, 
lights,  and  other  contingencies  that  may  accrue  in  holding  the 
court  within  this  district,  and  providing  the  books  necessary  to 
record  the  proceedings  thereof :  Provided,  that  he  shall  not 
incur,  or  be  allowed,  an  expense  of  more  than  twenty  doHars  in 
any  one  year  for  furniture,  or  fifty  dollars  for  rent  of  a  building, 
and  making  improvements  thereon,  without  first  submitting  a 
statement  and  estimates  to  the  Attorney-General  and  getting  his 
instructions  in  the  premises."  ^^^  A  marshal's  clerk  is  not  an  officer 
of  the  court,  and  is  entitled  to  fees  and  mileage,  if  he  is  used  as  a 
witness  for  the  government.^^^  A  deputy  marshal  is  an  officer  of 
the  court,  and  is  entitled  to  a  j)er  diem  allowance  and  mileage  if 
he  is  summoned  as  a  witness  for  the  government  when  he  is  not 
in  attendance  at  court.^-'^^  Where  the  marshal's  fees  and  com- 
pensation for  services  rendered  the  United  States  are  fixed  by 
some  positive  statutory  rule,  whether  for  enumerati'd  or  non- 
enumerated  services,  they  must  be  certified  to  and  paid  out  of 
the  Treasury,  and  cannot  lawfully  constitute  any  part  of  the 
judgment  or  decree  in  the  cause.^^^  No  per  diem  allowance  can 
properly  be  made  to  any  marshal  or  deputy  marshal  for  attend- 

127  Wallace  v.  Douglas,  103  N.  C.  19.  I3i  /rj.  parte.  Simons,  .32  Fed.  Rep.  681. 

128  U.  S.  V.  Ten  Eyek,  4  McLean,  119.  132  j^^-^  p„r,p  Biinlell,  :12  P\-(l.  Hop.  (381. 

129  U.  S.  V.  Patterson,  3  McLean,  53.  is^  The  Antelope,  12  Wheat.  510. 
is»  U.  S.  R.  S  §  8.30. 


634  COSTS   AT   LAW   AND    IN    EQUITY.  [CHAP.  XXV. 

ance  at  rule-days  of  a  Circuit  or  District  Court ;  and  when  the 
Circuit  and  District  Courts  sit  at  the  same  time,  no  greater  per 
diem  or  other  allowance  shall  he  made  to  any  such  officer  than 
for  attendance  on  one  court.^^* 

Every  mai'shal  must,  on  the  first  days  of  January  and  July 
in  each  year,  or  within  thirty  days  thereaftei",  make  to  the  Attor- 
ney-General, in  such  form  as  he  may  prescribe,  a  written  return 
for  the  half  year  ending  on  said  days  respectively  of  all  the  fees 
and  emoluments  of  his  office,  of  every  name  and  character,  and  of 
all  the  necessary  expenses  of  his  office,  including  necessary  clerk 
hire,  together  with  the  vouchers  for  the  payment  of  the  same  for 
such  last  half  year.  And  every  marshal  shall  state  separately 
therein  the  fees  and  emoluments  received  or  payable  for  services 
rendered  by  himself  personally,  those  received  or  payable  for  ser- 
vices rendered  by  each  of  his  deputies,  naming  him,  and  the  pro- 
portion of  such  fees  and  emoluments  which,  by  the  terms  of  his  ser- 
vice, each  deputy  is  to  receive.  Said  returns  must  be  verified  by  the 
oath  of  the  officer  making  them.^^^  A  marshal  must  account  for 
all  fees  which  he  has  earned  whether  he  has  collected  them  or  not. 
The  words  "  fees  and  emoluments  "  are  held  to  include  those  earned, 
and  not  collected.  But  if  the  marshal  shows  that  after  a  reason- 
able effort  he  cannot  collect  them,  it  seems  that  he  will  be  cred- 
ited with  such  as  he  is  unable  to  collect ;  ^^^  but  one  Attorney- 
General  decided  that  a  marshal  should  not  be  credited  in  his 
accounts  for  fees  which  he  has  not  collected  because  the  parties 
were  insolvent  or  non-residents. ^s"  All  fees,  charges,  and  emolu- 
ments to  wliicli  a  marshal  is  entitled,  by  reason  of  the  discharge 
of  the  duties  of  his  office,  or  in  any  case  in  which  the  United 
States  will  be  bound  by  a  judgment  rendered  therein,  whether 
prescribed  by  statute  or  allowed  by  a  court,  or  a  judge  thereof, 
should  be  included  in  the  semi-annual  return  required  of  said 
marshal. ^-^^  The  marshals  for  the  districts  of  Oregon,  Nevada, 
New  Mexico,  and  Arizona  are  "  entitled  to  receive  for  the  like 
services,  double  the  fees  hereinbefore  provided ; "  but  they  shall 
not  be  allowed  to  retain  of  such  fees  any  sum  exceeding  the  ag- 
gregate compensation  of  such  officer  as  hereinbefore  provided.^^^ 

i»i  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  831.  "8  u.  S.  R.  S.  §  834. 

135  u.  S.  U.  S.  §  83:3.  139  u.  S.  R.  S.  §  837  ;  Act  of  August  7, 

138  9  A.-G.  Op.  176 ;  11  A.-G.  Op.  455.  1882,  ch.  43G  (22  St.  at  L.  344). 

13'  11  A.-G.  Op.  455. 


§  332.]  marseial's  fees.  635 

The  marshals  of  the  Territories  of  New  Mexico  and  Arizona 
respectively  shall  be  allowed  to  retain  of  their  fees  and  emolu- 
ments such  sum  as  shall  be  necessary  to  make  their  whole  com- 
pensation including  salary  six  thousand  dollars  per  year  each,  if 
such  fci's  and  emolumeuts  shall  be  sullicient  therefor.^'^o 

"No  marshal  shall  be  allowed  by  the  Attorney-General,  except 
as  provided  in  the  next  section,  to  retain  of  the  fees  and  emolu- 
ments which  he  is  required  to  include  in  his  semi-annual  return, 
as  aforesaid,  for  his  personal  compensation,  over  and  above  the 
necessary  expenses  of  his  office,  including  necessary  clerk-hire,  to 
be  audited  and  allowed  by  the  proper  accounting  officers  of  the 
Treasury  Department,  and  a  proper  allowance  to  his  deputies, 
any  sum  exceeding  six  thousand  dollars  a  year,  or  exceeding  that 
rate  for  any  time  less  than  a  year.  Tiie  allowance  to  any  deputy 
shall  in  no  case  exceed  three-fourths  of  the  fees  and  emoluments 
received  or  payable  for  the  services  I'cndcred  by  him,  and  may  be 
reduced  below  that  rate  by  the  Attorney-General,  whenever  the 
returns  show  such  rate  to  be  unreasonable."  ^*^  But  "  marshals 
may  be  allowed  to  retain,  for  all  official  services  in  prize  causes, 
an  additional  compensation  not  exceeding  in  amount  one-half  of 
the  maximum  compensation  allowed  to  them  "  by  Section  841  of 
the  Revised  Statutes.^'^^  The  Attorney-General  cannot  fix  a  dcp- 
nty's  salary ;  he  can  only  reduce  the  rate  of  his  compensa- 
tion ;  ^*3  and  under  Section  841  has  limited  the  earnings  of  a 
deputy-marshal  to  three  thousand  dollars  a  year.""*  Marshals 
are  entitled  to  retain  fees  received,  until  the  limit  fixed  as  the 
maximum  of  their  compensation  is  exceeded.^^^  Allowances  to 
marshals  for  personal  compensation,  for  each  calendar  year,  must 
be  made  from  the  fees  and  emoluments  of  that  year,  and  not 
otherwise.^*''  Every  marshal  must,  at  the  time  of  making  his 
lialf-yearly  return  to  the  Attorney-General,  pay  into  the  Treasuiy, 
or  deposit,  to  the  credit  of  the  Treasurer,  as  he  may  be  directed 
by  the  Attorney-General,  any  surplus  of  the  fees  and  emolmnents 
of  his  office  which  said  returns  show  to  exist  over  and  above  the 
compensation  and  allowances  authorized  by  law  to  be  retained  by 

i"  26  St.  at  L.  ch.  G50;  Act  of  July  2,  "*  Soliloss  r.  Hewlett,  81  Ala.  260,  2G0; 

1890.  Res-  Dept,  of  Justice  {187(3).  p.  202. 

"1  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  841,  "^  U,  S.  V.  Cigars,  2  Fed.  R.  491 ;  U,  S, 

1*2  U,  S.  R.  S.  §  842;  U.  S.  v.  Averill,  R.  S,  §§  842,  844. 

130  U.  S.  335,  3S9.  i«  U.  S,  R,  S.  §  843. 

1*3  Phillips  V.  U.  S.,  11  Ct.  of  CI.  570. 


636  COSTS   AT   LAW   AND   IN  EQUITY.  [CHAP.  XXV. 

him ;  ^^^  and  in  every  case  where  a  marshal  shows  that  a  surplus 
may  exist,  the  Attorney-General  must  cause  such  returns  to  be 
carefully  examined,  and  the  accounts  and  disbursements  to  be 
regularly  audited  by  the  proper  officer  of  his  department,  and  an 
account  to  be  open  with  such  officer  in  proper  books  to  be  pro- 
vided for  that  purpose. 1*^  The  accounts  of  marshals  must  be 
examined  and  certified  by  the  district  judge  of  the  district  for 
which  they  are  appointed  before  they  are  presented  to  the  ac- 
counting officers  of  the  Treasury  Department  for  settlement. 
They  shall  then  be  subject  to  revision  upon  their  merits  by  said 
accounting  officers,  as  in  case  of  other  public  accounts.  But  no 
accounts  of  fees  or  costs  paid  to  any  witness  or  juror,  upon  tlie 
order  of  any  judge  or  commissioner,  shall  be  so  re-examined  as 
to  charge  any  marshal  for  an  erroneous  taxation  of  such  fees  or 

COStS.149 

"  Before  any  bill  of  costs  shall  be  taxed  by  any  judge  or 
other  officer,  or  any  account  payable  out  of  the  money  of  the 
United  States  shall  be  allowed  by  any  officer  of  the  Treasury, 
in  favor  of  clerks,  marshals,  or  district-attorneys,  the  party 
claiming  such  account  shall  render  the  same,  with  the  vouchers 
and  items  thereof,  to  a  United  States  circuit  or  district  court, 
and,  in  the  presence  of  the  district-attorney  or  his  sworn  assist- 
ant, whose  presence  shall  be  noted  on  the  record,  prove  in  open 
court,  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  court,  by  his  own  oath  or  that  of 
other  persons  having  knowledge  of  the  facts,  to  be  attached  to 
such  account,  that  the  services  therein  charged  have  been  actually 
and  necessarily  performed  as  therein  stated ;  and  that  the  dis- 
bursements charged  have  been  fully  paid  in  lawful  money ;  and 
the  court  shall  thereuj)on  cause  to  be  entered  of  record  an  order 
approving  or  disapproving  the  account,  as  may  be  according  to 
law  and  just."  ^^^  "  Accounts,  and  vouchers  of  clerks,  marshals, 
and  district-attorneys,  shall  be  made  in  duplicate,  to  be  marked 
respectively  'original'  and  '  duplicate.' "  ^^^  The  certificate  is  a 
prima  facie  evidence  of  the  legality  and  correctness  of  the  ac- 
count, but  the  proper  department  may  require  further  evidence  in 
support  of  it.^^^ 

"^  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  844.  ^^  Act  of  February  22,  1875  (1  Suppl. 

"8  U.  S    R.  S.  §  845.  U.  S.  K.  S.  14.-))  ;  18  St.  at  L.  333. 

"9  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  840;  Act  of  October  2,        i"  Act  of  February  22,  1875 ;  18  St.  at 

1888,  cb.  lOr.O  (25  St.  at  L.  545)  ;   U.  S.  v.  L.  33.T  (1  Snppl    U.  S.  R.  S.  145). 
Kno.\,  128  U.  S.  230,  233.  i"  U.  S.  v.  Smith,  1  Wood.  &  M.  184. 


§  333.]  witnesses'  fees.  637 

§  333.  Witnesses'  Fees.  —  A  witness'  fces  are,  "  for  each  day's 
attendance  in  court,  or  before  any  officer  pursuant  to  law,  one 
dollar  and  fifty  cents,  and  five  cents  a  mile  for  going  from  his 
]Aace  of  residence  to  the  place  of  trial  or  hearing,  and  five  cents 
a  mile  for  returning."  ^  When  a  witness  is  subpoenaed  in  more 
than  one  cause  between  the  same  parties,  at  the  same  court,  only 
one  travel  fee  and  one  per  diein  compensation  are  allowed  for  at- 
tendance.^ Both  are  taxed  in  the  case  first  disposed  of,  after 
which  the  per  diem  attendance  fee  alone  is  taxed  in  the  other 
cases  in  the  order  in  which  they  are  disposed  of.^  When  a  wit- 
ness is  detained  in  prison  for  want  of  security  for  his  ai)pearance, 
he  is  entitled,  in  addition  to  his  subsistence,  to  a  compensation 
of  one  dollar  a  day."*  A  witness  can  be  subpoenaed,  and  must  be 
allowed  mileage  from  and  to  his  residence,  in  any  part  of  a  dis- 
trict, to  attend  a  court  held  within  that  district,^  or  from  another 
district  if  he  does  not  reside  more  than  one  hundred  miles  from 
the  place  of  trial.^  If  a  witness  in  a  civil  case  resides  more  than 
one  hundred  miles  from  the  place  of  trial  and  voluntarily  attends, 
according  to  the  ruling  in  the  Second  Circuit,  mileage  for  only 
one  hundred  miles  can  be  taxed  J  It  was  held  by  the  District 
Court  for  South  Carolina  that  a  witness  for  the  United  States, 
voluntarily  coming  to  and  attending  court  on  the  verbal  instruc- 
tions of  the  district  attorney,  is  entitled  to  the  per  diem  and 
mileage  fees,  although  his  residence  is  out  of  the  district,  and 
more  than  one  hundred  miles  from  the  place  at  which  the  court  is 
held.^  According  to  the  rulings  in  the  First  Circuit,^  a  witness  is 
entitled  to  mileage  from  his  residence,  no  matter  how  far  distant 
it  may  be.  The  Circuit  Court  for  Iowa  lays  down  the  rule  as 
follows :  "  The  general  rule,  therefore,  is  that  as  testimony  by 
deposition  can  be  taken  when  the  wntness  resides  more  than  one 
hundred  miles  from  the  place  of  trial,  mileage  for  a  greater  dis- 
tance is  not  ordinarily  chargeable  against  the  party  not  summon- 

§  333.     1  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  848.  Fed.  R.  113;  Haines  i-.  McLaughlin,  29 

2  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  848.  Fed.  R.  70  ;  Buffalo  Ins.  Co.  v.  Prov.  & 

8  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  848.  Stonington  S.  S.  Co.,  29  Fed.   R.  237 ; 

*  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  848.  Wooster  v.  Hill,  44  Fed.  R.  819. 

5  The  Syracuse,  36  Fed.  R.  830  ;  Sims  »  In  re  Williams,  37  Fed.  R.  325. 

f.  Schult,  40  Fed.  R.  14.3.  »  Frouty   v.    Draper,    2    Story,    199; 

«  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  876;  The  Syracuse,  36  Wliipple  r.  Cumberland  Cotton '.Manuf. 

Fe<l.  R.  830.  Co.,  3  Story,  84;  Hathaway  v.  Roao!i,  2 

T  Anon.,   5  Blatchf.  1.34;  Eastman  r.  W.  &  M.  63 ;  U.  S.   v.   Sanborn,  28  Fed. 

Sherry,  37  Fed.  R.  844  ;  The  Vernon,  -30  R.  299. 


638  COSTS   AT   LAW   AND   IN   EQUITY.  [CHAP.  XXV. 

ing  the  witness."  ^^  And  this  it  holds  to  be  the  rule,  whether  the 
witness  resides  within  or  without  the  district,^^  and  that,  as  be- 
tween the  witness  and  tlie  party  summoning  him,  the  witness  is 
entitled  to  the  mileage  and  per  diem  fees,  whatever  tlie  distance 
travelled.^^  The  Circuit  Court  for  the  Eastern  District  of  Missouri 
holds  that  a  witness  residing  within  the  district  may  be  allowed 
mileage  for  more  than  one  hundred  miles. ^^  It  has  been  held  by 
the  District  Court  for  South  Carolina,  that  a  person  is  entitled  to 
mileage  from  his  place  of  residence,  when,  under  a  subpoena  as  a 
witness  of  the  United  States,  he  attended  court,  and  the  case  was 
continued,  and  the  witnesses  were  verbally  instructed  to  attend  at 
the  next  term,  even  though  in  the  mean  time  he  has  removed  his 
residence  into  another  State,  and  without  further  summons  attends 
court  and  is  used  as  a  witness  by  the  United  States.^*  In  the  First 
Circuit,  when  a  witness,  without  having  been  summoned,  has 
travelled  from  and  to  the  place  of  his  residence,  which  is  more 
than  one  hundred  miles  from  the  jjlace  of  trial  and  in  another 
State  and  district,  mileage  is  allowed  for  the  whole  distance. ^^  A 
witness  docs  not  lose  his  right  to  his  fees  merely  because  he  was 
not  subpoenaed,  if  his  attendance  and  examination  were  procured 
in  good  faith.^^  Nor  if  he  attend,  but  is  not  examined  ;  ^^  nor,  it 
seems,  if  he  is  required  to  attend  at  the  hearing  after  his  deposi- 
tion has  been  taken  ;  ^^  nor  does  he  suffer  any  abatement  of  them, 
because  he  is  summoned  to  attend  at  the  same  time  to  testify  in 
several  suits,  whenever  some  but  not  all  the  parties  are  the  same  ;  ^^ 
not  even  if  both  suits  are  tried  together  and  the  witness  is  exam- 
ined but  once,  provided  no  order  consolidating  the  suit  has  been 
obtained.^"^  When  the  hearing  is  postponed  on  account  of  the  ill- 
ness of  counsel,  and  the  witnesses  are  required  to  remain  during 

1''  Smith  V.  Chicngo&  N   \V.  T?y.  Co.,  ^'^  Antlerson  r.  Moe,  1  Abb.  (U.S.)  209; 

38  Fed.  R.  .321.     See  Manufacturing  Co.  United  States  r.  Sanborn,  28  Fed.  R.  299; 

V.  Saiiers,  6  Cent.  L.  J.  82.  Tiie  Vernon,  36  Fed.  R.  113  ;  The  Syra- 

11  Smith  V.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  cuse,  3G  Fed.  R.830;  Eastman  v.  Sherry, 
38  Fed.  R.  321.  37  Fed.  R.  844. 

12  Smith  V.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  i^  Hathaway  v.  Roach,  2  W.  &  JI.  6.3. 
38  Fed.  R.  321.  '^  Beekwith  v.  Easton,  4  Benedict,  .357; 

13  Sims  V.  Schult,  40  Fed.  R.  143.     See  Anderson  v.  Moe,  1  Abb.  (U.  S.)  299. 
Holmes  r.  Sheridan,    1   Dill.   421,    note.  i^  Parker  i?.  Bigler,  1  Fislier,  28.5 ;  The 
See  Manufacturing  Co.  v.  Saiiers,  6  Cent.  Vernon,  -SO  Fed.  R.  113;  Archer  v.  Hart- 
L.  J.  82.  ford  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  31  Fed.  R.  fiOO. 

1*  Jn  re  Williams,  37  Fed.  R.  325.  20  Tlie  Vernon,  36  Fed.  R   113  ;  Archer 

15  United  States  i--.  Sanborn,  28  Fed.  R.     r.  Hartford  Fire  Ins.   Co.,  31  Fed.  Rep. 
399.  660. 


§  333.]  witnesses'  fees.  639 

the  postponement,  they  must  be  paid  for  the  intervening  time.^i 
So,  also,  when  the  witnesses  are  required  to  remain  after  their 
examination  to  the  end  of  tlic  hearing.^^  It  has  been  held  that 
when  a  person  has  been  served  with  a  subpoena  and  has  received 
money  for  travelling  expenses,  lie  cannot  refuse  to  obey  such  sub- 
jxDcna  because  the  proper  amount  of  mileage  has  not  been  paid.23 
And  persons  subpoenaed  as  witnesses  in  the  courts  of  the  United 
States,  if  they  have  the  means,  are  obliged  to  obey  whether  their 
fees  are  advanced  or  not.^*  If  a  witness  is  subpoenaed  at  the 
place  of  trial  on  the  day  when  the  subpoena  requires  him  to  at- 
tend, he  is  not  entitled  to  any  mileage.^  Fees  for  travel  of  wit- 
nesses in  going  and  returning  can  only  be  taxed  once  for  each 
occasion  of  taking  testimony,  although  each  occasion  embraces  a 
number  of  days ;  ^^  unless  his  second  attendance  was  required  by 
an  adjournment  caused  by  the  fault  of  the  unsuccessful  party, 
when  his  travelling  fees  may  be  taxed  for  his  attendance  at  such 
adjourned  day  if  incurred.^^  It  is  not  necessary  that  a  witness 
should  actually  be  called  and  sworn  on  the  trial  in  order  to  entitle 
him  to  fees.^^  A  witness  subpoenaed  by  the  prevailing  party  to  the 
suit  cannot  upon  his  own  motion  have  his  fees  that  remain  un- 
paid taxed  in  the  bill  of  costs  against  the  losing  party ;  and  it 
seems  that  a  party  cannot  have  such  fees  taxed  until  he  has  paid 
the  witness,  either  before  or  after  the  service  has  been  rendered, 
and  before  judgment  for  costs.^^  Witnesses  do  not  lose  their 
right  to  mileage  and  per  diem  fees  by  not  insisting  upon  prepay- 
ment ;  nor  by  the  fact  that  they  were  in  attendance  on  the  court 
in  another  cause  between  different  parties,  and  received  2yer  diem 
and  mileage  fees  therefor.^*'  And  witnesses  summoned  and  at- 
tending court  are  entitled  to  their  mileage  and  per  diem  fees  if 
the  cause  was  docketed  and  could  have  been  tried  at  the  term  at 
which  the  witnesses  attended.^i  Where  witnesses  were  subpoenaed 
to  testify  to  a  particular  point,  though  the  opposite  party  admitted 

21  Wliipple      (•      Cumberlanil     Cotton  -7  Hake  v.  Brown,  44  Fed  K.  7o4. 

Manuf.  (;o.,  3  Story,  84.  28  dark  v  Am.  Dock  &  Improvement 

--  \Vliipi)le     V.     Cumberland     Cotton  Co.,  25  Fed.  R.  G41  ;  Ilalliawav  r.  Hoacli, 

Manuf.  Co.,  3  Story,  84.  3  W.  &  M.  63. 

23  Norris    r.    Hassler,  28  Fed.   R.  581;  '-0  O'NeiU-.  Kansas  City  S.  &  M.  R.  Co., 

U.  S.  V.  Durlm.c,  4  Biss.  509.  31  Fed.  R.  663. 

2*  Norris  r.    Hassler,  23  Fed.  R.  581  ;  ^i  Young   v.   Merchants'    Ins.  Co.,   29 

U.  S.  I'.  Durling;,  4  Biss.  509,  510,  Hake  v.  Fed.  R.  273. 

Brown,  44  Fed.  R.  734.  ^^  Young'  v.    Merchants'  Ins.   Co.,    29 

-5  The  SuniiyMdc,  5  Benedict,  162.  Fed.  R.  273. 

26  Spill  c.  Celluloid  Manuf.  Co.,  28  Fed. 
R.  870. 


640  COSTS   AT   LAW   AND   IN   EQUITY.  [CHAP.  XXV. 

the  point,  mileage  and  jjer  diem  fees  up  to  the  time  of  such  ad- 
mission were  allowed  ;32  and  a  second  trial  being  had,  and  no 
stipulation  or  entry  made  on  the  record  that  the  point  would  be 
admitted  at  such  second  trial,  such  j'^er  diem  and  mileage  fees  were 
allowed  for  attendance  at  that  trial  also.^^  But  it  is  held,  on  the 
other  hand,  that  a  party  may  not  tax  the  fees  of  a  witness  whom 
he  has  subpoenaed,  but  whose  testimony  is  either  abandoned  or 
stricken  out  ;^  nor  may  he  tax  the  fees  of  more  than  three  wit- 
nesses to  a  single  fact ;  ^^  nor  fees  and  mileage  for  himself  when 
he  testifies  in  his  own  behalf, ^'^  nor  fees  which  he  has  not  paid.-^^ 
Where  a  defendant  corporation  was  ordered  to  account  before  a 
master  in  a  suit  for  an  infringement  of  a  patent,  the  officers 
thereof  attending  as  witnesses  were  lield  not  entitled  to  mileage 
and  per  diem  fees  upon  the  taxation  of  costs  by  such  defendant.^s 
Only  the  necessary  expenses  of  a  government  clerk  sent  away 
from  his  place  of  business  as  a  witness  for  the  government  will 
be  paid,  and  nothing  can  be  taxed  in  the  bill  of  costs  for  his 
travel  or  attendance.^^  The  same  rule  applies  to  deputy-clerks, 
as  they  are  also  officers  of  the  court.'*''  But  clerks  employed  by 
the  marshal  in  his  office,  keeping  his  accounts,  are  not  officers  of 
the  court,  and  are  entitled  to  fees  and  mileage.*^  A  deputy- 
marshal  is  an  officer  of  the  court ;  but  unless  he  is  actually  en- 
gaged in  attendance  upon  the  court,  he  is  entitled  to  j^er  diem 
fees  and  mileage,  if  summoned  as  a  witness  by  the  government.*^ 
§334.  Miscellaneous  Disbursements. — The  Federal  courts  are 
not  absolutely  limited  in  the  taxation  of  costs  to  such  items  as 
are  specifically  named  in  the  statute.^  Disbursements  for  print- 
ing the  record,  evidence,  and  other  papers  in  a  suit  in  equity  in  a 
Circuit  Court,  when  required  by  rule,  are,  at  least  in  the  First  and 
Second  Circuits,  taxable  as  costs.^  Disbursements  for  printing 
testimony  and  other  papers  for  the  court,  when  not  required  by 

32  Young  I'.  Merchants'    Ins.  Co.,  29        3^  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  850;  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  849; 
Fed.  R.  -273.  United  States  v.  Sanborn,  28  Fed   R.  299. 

33  Young    V.  Merchants'  Ins.  Co.,  29        *''  .£:.r /;«/•/(•  Burdell,  .S2  Fed.  R.  681. 
Fed.  R.  27:3.  *'  Ex  parte  Burdell,  32  Fed.  R.  681. 

3^4  Troy  Iron  &  Nail  Factory  i'.  Corning,  *-  Ex  parte  Burdell.  32  Fed.  H.  681. 

7  Blatchf.  16.  §  334.     1  Spaulding  v.  Tucker,  2  Saw- 

35  Bussard  r.  Catalino,  2  Cranch  C.  C.  yer,   50;  Gunther  r.  Liverpool,  L.  &   G. 
521.  Ins.  Co.,  10  Fed.  R.  830. 

36  Nichols  V.  Brunswick,  3  Cliff.  88.  2  Jordan  v.  Agawan  Woollen  Co.,  3 
3^  Leary  IV  Miranda.  40  Fed.  607.  Cliff.  239;  Dennis  v.  Eddy,  12  Blatchf. 
88  Am.  Diamond  Drill  Co.  i;.  Sullivan     195;   Hake  v.  Brown,   44  Fed.    R    734. 

Mach.  Co.,  32  Fed.  R.  552.  Contra,  Lee  v.  Simpson,  42  Fed.  R.  434. 


§  334.]  .  MISCELLANEOUS   DISBURSEMENTS.  641 

rule  or  special  order,  cannot  be  thus  taxcd.^  The  appellant  or 
plaintiff  in  error,  Avhuu  allowed  costs,  may  tax  his  disbursements 
for  clerk's  fees  and  for  printing  the  record.*  Where,  upon  an  ap- 
peal from  a  decree  dismissing  a  bill  which  was  affirmed  with  costs, 
the  defendant  had  taken  a  cross  appeal  from  the  dismissal  of  his 
cross-bill,  which  appeal  was  dismissed,  the  cross  appellant  was 
allowed  to  tax  the,  fees  paid  for  one  half  the  cost  of  printing  the 
record.'^  Where  the  costs  of  printing  the  record  on  an  appeal 
had  been  paid  bv  a  receiver  under  an  order  out  of  the  fund  in  his 
hands,  the  defendant  who  finally  succeeded  was  allowed  to  tax 
these  disbursements,^  but  not  the  receiver's  fees  and  tlic  necessary 
disbursements  incidental  to  the  receivership."  Disbursements 
for  printing  objections  to  a  petition  to  the  Supreme  Court  in  its 
original  jurisdiction,  for  a  writ  of  mandamus,  are  taxable.^  Dis- 
bursements for  printing  briefs  on  appeal,  in  error,  or  in  original 
proceedings  in  the  Sujn-eme  Court,  are  not  taxable.^  Disburse- 
ments for  printing  briefs  which  the  rules  require  to  be  printed  are 
taxable  in  the  Circuit  Court  of  Appeals  and  the  Circuit  Courts  in 
the  Second  Circuit,*  even  when  the  brief  is  printed  after  the  argu- 
ment.^'' If  copies  of  papers,  necessarily  obtained  for  use,  are  put 
in  evidence,  and  no  order  is  made  rejecting  them  as  evidence,  it  is 
the  duty  of  the  clerk  to  allow,  on  taxation,  the  disbursements  paid 
for  the  various  copies  put  in  evidence  and  forming  part  of  the  rec- 
ord for  final  hearings.^^  It  has  been  held  that  fees  paid  for  certified 
copies  of  a  party's  own  muniments  of  title  cannot  be  taxed,  since 
he  is  presumed  to  have  the  originals  in  his  possession,  unless  he 
proves  the  contrary  ;  but  that  he  may  tax  fees  paid  for  transcripts 
of  records  of  suits  and  other  papers  on  which  he  relied  to  defeat 
his  adversary's  claim  of  title.^^  Copies  of  papers  obtained  for 
use  on  interlocutory  or  preliminary  or  incidental  motions  or  hear- 
ings are  not  obtained  for  use  on  trials,  and  disbursements  in  pro- 
curing them  have  been  disallowed.^^     Disbursements  taxable  in  a 

3  Spaulding  v.  Tucker,  2  Sawyer,  50.  i"  Sackett  v.  Smith,  46  Fed.  R.  SO. 

*  Supreme    Court    Rule   10;    Circuit  "  Woostcr  r.  Handy,  23  Fed.  U.  49. 

Court  of  Appeals  Rule  23.  12  Ford  v.  Louisville,  N.  O.  &  T.  Ry. 

6  Nichols,  Shepard  &  Co.  i;.  Marsh,  131  Co.,  45  Feil.  R.  210. 

U.  S.  401.  13  Wooster  v.  Handy,  23  Fed.  R.  49.  In 

^  Ferguson  v.  Dent,  45  Fed.  R.  88,  94.  the  Second  Circ\iit  fees  paid  for  copies  of 

■f  Ferguson  v.  Dent,  45  Fed.  R.  88,  96.  opinions  for  use  in  preparing  orders  are 

8  Ex  parte  Hughes,  114  U.  S.  548.  usually  ta.\cd. 

9  Hake  v.  Brown,  44  Fed.  R.  734;  Den- 
nis V.  Eddy,  12  Blatchf.  195. 

VOL.   I.  —  41 


642  COSTS    AT   LAW   AND   IN    EQUITY.  .  [CHAF.  XXV. 

State  court  may  when  made  be  taxed  in  an  action  at  common 
law  in  a  Federal  court  held  in  the  same  State.^^  For  taking  and 
certifying  depositions  the  Federal  court  will  tax,  in  favor  of  a 
clerk  of  the  court  or  of  a  commissioner,  the  same  fees  as  are 
allowed  by  Congress  for  that  service  to  any  State  oflficial  taking 
the  deposition,  and  not  the  fees  allowed  by  the  State  law  for  a 
similar  service. ^^  Fees  paid  an  attorney  for  the  examination  of 
a  witness  before  a  master  or  special  examiner,i^  payments  to  an 
attorney  for  travelling  expenses,^"  payments  to  messcngers,^^ 
payments  to  witnesses  for  services  in  examining  property  con- 
cerning which  tliey  afterwards  testified,^^  cannot  be  taxed.  Dis- 
bursements for  surveys  and  plans  necessitated  by  an  order  to 
make  a  pleading  more  definite  and  certain,  cannot  be  taxed.^^ 
Disbursements  for  copies  of  models  in  the  Patent  Office  used  as 
evidence  are  taxable,^^  but  not  disbursements  for  other  models.^^ 
It  has  been  held  that  notarial  fees  for  presentment  and  protest  of 
a  note,  though  paid  before  suit  was  brought,  are  considered  as 
costs,  not  as  daraages.^^  When  the  defendant  finally  prevailed,  and 
a  decree  directing  him  to  account  was  set  aside,  he  was  allowed 
to  include  in  his  bill  of  costs  the  fees  which  he  had  been  obliged 
to  pay  the  master.-**  A  defendant  who  finally  prevails  cannot 
tax  the  costs  he  has  paid  upon  the  overruling  of  his  demurrer  to 
the  bill  .25 

§  335.  Costs  out  of  the  Fund.  Costs  are  paid  out  of  a  fund  or 
estate  in  the  course  of  distribution  by  a  court  of  equity,  to  trus- 
tees who  have  been  obliged  to  engage  in  litigation  for  the  benefit 
of  the  estate,  and  to  persons  who  have  been  successful  in  suits 
brought  by  them  on  behalf  of  themselves  and  others  similarly  sit- 
uated.^ The  expression  "  trustees  "  is  used  here  in  the  broadest 
sense  of  the  word,  as  including  not  only  those  appointed  by  a 
deed  of  trust,  ])ut  also  agents,  receivers,^  and  personal  represen- 

1*  Huntress  r.  Epsom,  15  Fed.  R.  732.  24  American  Diamond  Drill  Co.  v.  Sul- 

15  Jerman  v.  Stewart,  1'2  Fed.  R.  271.  livan  M.  Co..  o2  Fed.  R.  552. 

18  Strauss  v.  Meyer,  22  Fed.  R.  4r)7.  -*  N.  Y.  Belting  &  Packing  Co.  v.  N.  J. 

n  Wooster  r.  Handy,  23  Fed.  R.  49.  Car  Spring  &  Rubber  Co.,  32  Fed.  R.  755. 

18  Wooster  r.  Handy,  23  Fed.  R.  49.  §  335.     i  Cowdrey  v.  Galveston,  H.  & 

19  Tuck  V.  Olds,  20  Fed.  R.  883.  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  93  U.  S.  352;   Trustees  v. 

20  New  Hampshire  Land  Co.  v.  Tilton,  Greenough,  105  U.  S.  527 ;  Central  R.  R. 
29  Fed.  R.  764.  &  B.  Co.  v.  Pettus,  113  U.  S.  116. 

21  Wooster  v.  Handy,  23  Fed.  R.  49.  -  Attorney-General  ?;.  The  City  of  Lon- 

22  Wooster  v.  Handy,  23  Fed.  R.  49.  don,  1  Ves.  Jr.  243;  s.  c.  3  Rro.  C.  C  171  ; 

23  Baker  r.  Howell,  44  Fed.  R.  113;  Cartels  i-.  Candler,  Mad.  &  Geld.  123; 
tupra,,^  16.  Stuart  v.  Bouhvare,  133  U.  S.  78. 


§  335.]  COSTS  OUT  OF  THE  FUND.  643 

tatives.'  All  of  these,  when  under  a  bill  for  an  accounting  they 
account  fairly  and  pay  the  balance  due  from  them  into  court,  are 
entitled  to  their  costs,*  provided  that  they  have  not  acted  uncon- 
scientiously  in  the  suit^  or  in  the  previous  administration  oE  their 
trust.^  The  same  is  true  when  a  suit  is  honestly  commenced  by 
one  of  them  for  the  directions  of  the  court  concerning  his  trus- 
teeship.'' But  in  suits  brought  by  or  against  any  of  them,  except 
possibly  receivers,  to  which  a  stranger  is  a  party,  they  are,  if  un- 
successful, liable  personally  to  him  for  the  costs  as  between  party 
and  party ,^  which  costs,  together  with  the  expenses  of  the  suit, 
will  be  allowed  them  upon  their  accounting,^  if  the  suit  was 
prosecuted  or  defended  in  good  faith  for  the  benefit  of  their 
trust.^'^  Costs  will  also  be  paid  out  of  a  fund  under  the  control 
of  a  court  of  equity  to  persons  who  have  been  successful  in  a  suit 
concerning  it,  brought  by  them  in  behalf  of  themselves  and  others 
similarly  situated  with  them.^^  Instances  of  this  arc  a  suit 
brought  by  a  single  creditor  for  a  general  administration  of 
assets,^^  and  by  a  single  beneficiary  of  a  trust  to  prevent  a  loss  to 
the  trust  estate.^^  Costs  have  been  allowed  in  a  similar  case  to  a 
party  who  by  his  litigation  had  benefited  the  fund,  although  he 
eventually  failed  to  establish  his  claim  against  it.^*  Such  costs 
are,  in  the  distribution  of  the  fund,  paid  before  all  claims  against 
it,  except  those  of  trustees  who  have  not  been  guilty  of  miscon- 
duct.i'^  The  same  rule  applies  to  a  suit  brought  by  a  single  cred- 
itor of  the  estate  against  an  executor  or  administrator  for  the 

3  Kaslileigh  v.  Master,  1  Ves.  Jr.  201 ;  i^  Henley  v.  riiilips,  2  Atk.  48;  Lloyd 

Samuel  v.  Jones,  2  Hare,  246.  v.  Spillat,  3  P.  Wms.  344,  346. 

*  Attorney-General    i-.   Tlie   City    of  ^^  Trustees   v.    Greenougli,  lOo   U.  S. 

London,  1  Ves.  Jr.  243  ;  8.  c.  3  Bro.  C.  C.  527 ;  Central  R.  R.  &  B.  Co.  v.  Pettus,  113 

171  ;  Rashleigh  v.  Jlaster,  1  Ves.  Jr.  201 ;  IT.  S.  11(3 ;  Ex  pnrie  Jaffray,  In  re  Waite 

Samuel  i\  Jones,  2  Hare,  246  ;  Cartels  i'.  &  Crocker,  1  Lowell,  ;521 ;  Ex  parte  Plltt, 

Candler,  Mad.  &  Geld.  123.  2  Wall.  Jr.  453 ;    Stewart  v.  Cliesapeake 

°  Henley  v.  Philips,  2  Atk.  48  ;  Llovd  &  Oiiio  Tanal  Co.,  5  Fed.  R.  149. 

V.  Spillat,  3  P.  Wms.  344,  346..  i-  Bennet    v.    Going,    1    Molloy,   527 ; 

6  Howard   i-.   Rhodes,    1    Keen,   581;  Hare  r.  Rose,  2  Ves.  Sen.  558.     Sec,  liow- 

O'Callaghan  v.  Cooper,  5  Ves.  117,  129;  ever.  Mason  v.  Codwise,  6  J.  Ch.  (N.  Y.) 

Hide  V.  Haywood,  2  Atk.  126.  183. 

T  Hicks  V.  Wrench,  Mad.  &  Geld.  93;  '■'  Trustees  r.  Greennugh,  105  U.  S.  527; 

Henley  v.  Philips,  2  Atk.  48.  Stewart  r.  Chesapeake  &  Ohio  Canal  Co., 

8  Edwards  v.  Harvey,  G.  Cooper,  40 ;  5  Fed.  R.  149. 

Poole  r.  Franks,  1   Molloy,  78;   Westley  "  Ex  parte  Plitt,2  Wall.  Jr.  4-53  ;  Fech 

V.  Williamson,  2  Molloy,  4.58.     See  §  251.  heimcr  v.  Baum.  4:5  Fed  R.  710,  730. 

9  Cowdrey  v.  Galveston,  TI.  &  H.R.R.  16  Bennet  v.  Going,  1  Molloy,  529. 
Co.,  93  U.  S.  352;  Humplirys  v.  Moore, 

2  Atk.  108. 


644  COSTS   AT   LAW   AND   IN   EQUITY.  [CHAP.  XXV. 

satisfaction  of  his  own  claim.^^  In  sucli  a  case  the  personal 
representative  can  only  recover  his  costs  from  that  part  of  the 
estate  which  remains  after  the  complainant  has  been  paid  the  full 
amount  of  his  claim  with  costs,  even  though  the  creditor  thus 
sweeps  away  the  entire  estate.^'  Not  so,  however,  when  a  bill  is 
filed  by  one  creditor  in  behalf  of  himself  and  the  rest  for  a  gen- 
eral administration  of  assets ;  in  which  case  the  personal  repre- 
sentative is  always  entitled  to  his  costs  out  of  the  fund  unless  he 
has  forfeited  them  by  his  misconduct.^^ 

§  336.  Costs  as  between  Solicitor  and  Client.  —  Costs  payable 
out  of  a  fund  in  court  are  termed  costs  as  between  solicitor  and 
client.^  Costs  as  between  solicitor  and  client  include  all  reason- 
able expenses  and  counsel  fees,  and  are  not,  like  costs  as  between 
party  and  party,  confined  to  tlie  amount  named  in  the  statute.- 
Five  per  centum  of  the  fund  collected  was  held  a  reasonable  coun- 
sel fee  in  such  a  case,  when  the  fund  was  large,  —  that  is,  more 
than  seventy-five  thousand  dollars.^  Ten  per  centum  of  the  fund 
collected  was  held  a  reasonable  counsel  fee  in  such  a  case,  when 
the  fund  was  small,  —  that  is,  less  than  five  thousand  dollars.'*  In 
no  case,  however,  will  the  personal  expenses  and  compensation  for 
the  personal  services  of  a  person,  not  a  trustee,  who  has  engaged 
in  litigation  in  behalf  of  himself  and  others,  be  included  in 
them.^ 

§  337.  Taxation  of  Costs.  —  Costs  as  between  party  and  partj^ 
are  taxed  by  a  judge  or  clerk  of  the  court  upon  notice  to  the 
adverse  party,  and  are  included  in  and  form  a  portion  of  the 
judgment  or  decree.^  To  each  bill  of  costs  should  be  attached 
an  affidavit  by  some  person  acquainted  with  the  facts,  stating 
that  the  services  for  which  fees  are  charged  were  performed.^ 
It  has  been  said  that  the  court  will  not  on  the  taxation  enforce  a 
stipulation  that  disbursements  not  allowed  by  rule  or  statute  may 

1*5  Humplirys    v.    Moore,   2    Atk.   108;  Crocker,  1  Lowell,  o21  ;   E.r  parte  Plitt, 

Davy  V.  Se>s,  Moseley,  204.  2  WalL  Jr.  453. 

17  Adair  r.  Sliaw,  1  Scli.  &  Lef.  243,  280 ;  3  Fecliheimer  v.  Baum,  4-3  Fed.  K.  719  ; 
Uvedale  r.  Uvedale,  3  Atk.  117.  Central  11.  R.  &  Banking  Co.  v.  Pettus, 

18  Bennet    v.   Goin^,    1    Molloy,   529;  113  U.  S.  116,  128. 

Young  V.  Everest,  1  R.  &  M.  426 ;  Minuse  *  Adams  v.  Kepler  Milling  Co.,  38  Fed. 

V.  Cox,  5  J.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  441.  R.  281. 

§336.     1  Trustees  v.  Greenough,   105  ^  Trustees 'j.  Greenough,  105  U.  S.  527. 

U.  S.  627.  §  337.     i  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  983. 

■^  Trustees  v.  Greenough,  105  U.  S.  527  ;  2  u.  S.  R.  S.  §  984  ;  Jerman  i-.  Stewart, 

Cowdrey  v.  G.  H.  &  H.  K.  R.  Co., 93  U.  S.  12  Fed.  R.  27L 
352 ;   Ex  parte   Jaffray,  In   re   Waite   & 


§  338.]  SECURITY  FOR  COSTS.  645 

be  included  in  the  bill  of  costs.^  The  bills  when  taxed  must  be 
filed  with  the  papers  in  the  cause.'*  When  the  taxation  is  by  the 
clerk,  a  motion  for  a  retaxation  of  the  costs  may  be  made  before, 
or  an  ai)peal  taken  to,  a  judp;c  of  the  court.^  A  party  who  objects 
to  a  charge  in  lump  should  demand  a  specification  of  the  items  of 
which  it  is  composed.*^  Where  there  is  a  dispute  as  to  a  question 
of  fact,  material  to  the  taxation  of  a  bill  of  costs,  a  reference  may 
be  had  to  an  auditor."  Costs  as  between  solicitor  and  client  are 
taxed  by  the  court,  usually  by  means  of  a  reference  to  a  mas- 
ter.^ An  appeal  from  a  decree  containing  an  erroneous  al- 
lowance of  such  costs  can  be  made,  provided  that  their  amount 
is  sufficient  to  give  the  appellate  court  jurisdiction.^  Upon  such 
an  appeal,  that  court  may  reverse  the  decree  if  the  costs  have 
been  awarded  upon  erroneous  principles  :  ^^  but  will  very  rarely 
do  so  merely  because  it  considers  the  sum  allowed  for  a  counsel 
fee  too  large.^^ 

§  338.  Security  for  Costs.  —  A  complainant  who  docs  not  reside 
within  the  district  may  be  compelled  to  give  security  for  costs.^ 
Such  security  may  also  be  required  of  a  non-resident  defendant 
to  a  bill  of  interpleader  when  he  takes  aggressive  action.^  In 
order  to  obtain  an  order  compelling  such  security,  the  defendant 
must  move  for  it  as  soon  as  he  ascertains  the  plaintiff's  resi- 
dence.^ If  he  takes  after  such  discovery  any  step  in  the  cause 
before  moving,  it  seems  that  he  thereby  waives  his  right  to  se- 
curity,^ unless  a  necessity  for  unforeseen  disbursements,  such  as 
the  expense  of  a  reference,  subsequently  arises.^     Upon  a  failure 

3  Lee  V.  Simpson,  42  Fed.  R.  434.  §  3.38.     i  Lyman  Ventilating  &  Eefri- 

*  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  983.  gerator   Co.  Southard,   12   Blatchf.  405. 

6  Re  Strauss  v.  Mej'er,  22  Fed.  R.  1C7;  But  see  Woodworth  v.  Sherman,  3  Story, 

Tuck  V.  Olds,  28  Fed.  R.  883.  171. 

6  Dedekam  v.  Vose,  3  Blatchf.  153.  2  Gross  &  Phillips  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Ger- 

7  Bottomley  v.  U.  S.,  1  Story,  153.  hard,  8  Reporter,  136. 

8  Trustees  i\  Greenough,  105  U.  S.  527  ;  ^  Migliorucci  v.  Migliorucci,  1  Dickens, 
Central  R.  R.  &  B.  Co.  i\  Pettus,  113  U.  S.  147;  Foster  r.  Swasey,  2  W.  &  I\r.  217  ; 
116  ;  Cowdrey  ".  G.  H.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  93  Bliss  v.  Brooklyn,  10  i?latch.  217  ;  Prince 
U.  S.  352.  V.  Towns,  33  Fed.  R.  161. 

9  Trustees  v.  Greenough,  105  U.  S.  527  ;  *  Migliorucci  v.  Migliorucci,  1  Dickens, 
Angell  V.  Davis,  4  Myl.  &C.  360.  147  ;   Foster  v.  Swasey,  2  W.  &  M.  217  ; 

1'  Trustees  v.  Greenough,  105  U.  S.  527  ;  Bliss  v.  Brooklyn,  10  Blatchf.  217  ;  Prince 

Central  R.  R.&  B.  Co.  y.  Pettus,  113  U.S.  i-.    Towns,    33'  Fed.    R.    101.      But    see 

116.  Stewart  v.  The  Sun,  3G  Fed.  R.  307. 

11  Trustees  ?-.  Greenough,  105  U.  S.  527;  ^  Uhle  v.  Burnham,  46  Fed.  Reporter 

Stuart  V.   Boulware,  133    U.  S.  78.     But  500. 
see  Central  R.  R.  &  B.  Co.  v.  Pettus.  113 
U.  S.  116. 


646  COSTS  AT  LAW   AND   IN   EQUITY.  [CHAP.  XXV. 

to  file  security  when  required,  the  plaintiff's  proceedings  will  be 
stayed.^  The  plaintiff's  proceedings  may  be  stayed  until  he  pays 
the  costs  of  another  suit  between  the  same  parties  upon  the 
same  cause  of  action  in  which  he  was  unsuccessful,  even  if 
that  other  suit  was  in  a  State  court.'^  When  one  of  several 
plaintiffs  is  a  resident  of  the  district,  it  seems  that  no  security 
for  costs  will  be  required.^  If  the  defendant  do  not  demand 
security  for  costs  within  a  reasonable  time  ;  that  such  security 
has  not  been  given  will  not,  when  the  cause  is  called  for  trial, 
be  a  ground  for  a  continuance.^  Where  a  plaintiff  has  recov- 
ered judgment  against  a  solvent  defendant,  and  process  is  out- 
standing in  the  nature  of  an  execution  to  collect  the  same,  it  is 
not  proper  to  require  the  plaintiff  to  make  a  deposit  to  secure 
costs  due  a  commissioner.^*^  It  was  held  in  New  York,  by  Clian- 
cellor  Kent,  that  a  person  who  sued  in  another's  right,  as  an  ex- 
ecutor or  administrator,  could  not  be  compelled  to  give  security 
for  costs.^i 

6  Fox  V.  Blew,  5  Madd.  147.  »  Hawkins  v.  Willbank,  4  Wash  285. 

7  Buckles  i:  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  i»  U.  S.  v.  St.  Charles  Co.,  31  Fed.  R. 
Co.,  47  Fed.  R.  424.  442. 

8  Winthrop  i\  Royal  Exch.  Ass.  Co.,  "  Goodrich  v.  Pendleton,  .3  J.  Ch.  (N. 
1  Dickens,  282 ;  Walker  v.  Easterby,  6  Y.)  520.  See  Cathcart  v.  Hewson,  1 
Ves.  612  ;   Gilbert  v.  Gilbert,  2  Paige'cii.  Hayes,  173., 

(N.  Y.)  00.3. 


§  340.]  EXECUTIONS.  647 


CHAPTER   XXVI. 

ENFORCEMENT  OF  DECREES  AND  ORDERS. 

§  339.  Enforcement  of  Decrees  and  Orders  in  General.  —  Decrees 
and  orders  are  enforced  in  six  ways :  by  writ  of  execution,^  by 
attaclimcnt,-  by  writ  of  scqnestration,^  by  writ  of  assistance,"*  by 
the  action  of  the  court  itself  through  the  medium  of  a  master^  or 
receiver,^  and  by  bills  to  carry  decrees  into  execution."  Ecjuity 
Rule  10  provides  as  follows  :  "  Every  pei'son,  not  being  a  party 
in  any  cause,  who  has  obtained  an  order,  or  in  whose  favor  an 
order  shall  have  been  made,  shall  be  enabled  to  enforce  obedi- 
ence to  such  order  by  the  same  process  as  if  he  were  a  party  to 
the  cause;  and  every  person  not  being  a  party  in  any  cause, 
against  whom  obedience  to  any  order  of  the  court  may  be  enforced, 
shall  be  liable  to  the  same  process  for  enforcing  obedience  to  such 
orders  as  if  he  were  a  party  in  the  cause." 

§  340.  Executions.- — The  rules  provide  that  "final  process  to 
execute  any  decree  may,  if  the  decree  be  solely  for  the  payment 
of  money,  be  by  a  writ  of  execution,  in  the  form  used  in  the 
circuit  court  in  suits  at  common  law  in  actions  of  assumpsit."  ^ 
A  decree  for  a  deficiency  after  a  sale  of  mortgaged  property  in  a 
foreclosure  suit  is  enforced  in  the  same  manner.^  By  a  statute 
passed  June  1,  1872,  and  re-enacted  December  1,  1873,  "the 
party  recovering  a  judgment  in  any  common-law  cause  in  any 
circuit  or  district  court,  shall  be  entitled  to  similar  remedies 
upon  the  same,  by  execution  or  otherwise,  to  reach  the  property 
of  the  judgment  debtor,  as  arc  now  provided  in  like  causes  by 
the  laws  of  the  State  in  which  such  court  is  held,  or  by  any  such 
laws  hereinafter  enacted  which  are  adopted  by  general  rules  of 
such  circuit  or  district  court ;  and  such  courts  may,  from  time  to 
time,  by  general  rules,  adopt  such  State  laws  as  may  hereafter  be 

§  339.     1  §§  340,  380.  ^  chapter  XVII. 

2  §§  .341-346.  "  §  34y  a. 

8  §  .347.  §  340.     1  Rule  8.     See  §  380. 

*  §  348.  2  Rule  92. 

6  §  349. 


648  ENFOECEMENT   OF  DECREES  AND  OEDERS.      [CHAP.  XXVI. 

in  force  in  such  State  in  relation  to  remedies  upon  judgments,  as 
aforesaid  by  execution  or  otherwise."  ^  In  cases  wlicrc  an  appeal 
lies  to  or  a  writ  of  error  may  issue  from  the  Supreme  Court,  the 
execution  cannot  issue  till  the  expiration  of  ten  days  from  the 
entry  of  the  decree  or  judgment.*  The  writ  may,  however,  be 
previously  prepared  l)y  the  clerk.^  The  marshal  in  the  courts 
of  the  United  States  has  duties  analogous  to  those  of  the  sheriff 
in  the  diflerent  States.*^  It  is  his  duty  "to  attend  the  district 
and  circuit  courts  when  sitting  in  his  district,  and  to  execute 
throughout  the  district  all  lawful  precepts  directed  to  him,  and 
issued  under  the  authority  of  the  United  States  ;  and  he  shall 
have  power  to  command  all  necessary  assistance  in  the  execu- 
tion of  his  duty."  ''  They  have  the  right  under  the  direction  of 
the  Attorney-General  to  protect  judges  of  the  courts  of  the  United 
'  States  while  in  the  discharge  of  their  official  duties,  and  while  on 
their  way  to  hold  court,  and  if  necessary,  to  take  luunan  life  in 
their  defense.*^  "  The  marshals  and  their  deputies  have,  in  each 
State,  the  same  powers  in  executing  the  laws  of  the  United 
States,  as  the  sheriffs  and  their  deputies  in  such  State  have  by 
law,  in  executing  the  laws  thereof."  ^  Under  these  provisions 
of  the  Revised  Statutes,  the  marshal  or  his  deputy,  if  resisted 
when  in  the  performance  of  his  duty,  may  call  to  his  aid  a  suffi- 
cient force  from  his  district,  called  the  j^osse  eomitatus,  or  power 
of  his  county,  from  the  corresponding  force  which  the  sheriff 
or  county  officer  has  at  his  command,^*^  —  that  is,  such  number  of 
men  as  are  necessary  for  his  assistance  in  the  execution  of  the 
writs  of  the  United  States ;  and  herein  every  person  above  the 
age  of  fifteen  and  able  to  travel  is  bound  to  be  aiding,  and  if 
they  refuse  to  assist,  may  be  punished  by  fine  and  imprisonment.^^ 
It  has  been  said,  that  this  force  by  the  common  law  included  all 
persons,  whatever  might  be  their  occupation,  whether  civilians  or 
not ;  and  including  the  military  of  all  denominations,  —  militia, 
soldiers,  marines,  —  all  of  whom  were  alike  bound  to  obey  the  com- 
mands of  a  sheriff  or  marshal.     "  The  fact  that  they  are  organized 

8  U.   S.   R.    S.  §  fll6.     See  Lamaster  "  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  787. 

V.  Keeler,  123  U.  S.":]7t) ,  and  infra,  §  380.  »  In  re  Neagle,  135  U.  S.  1  ;   s.  c.  39 

«  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  1008.              "  Fed.  R.  833. 

5  Board  of  Commissioners  i\  Gorman,  '•'  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  788;  In  re  Neagle,  135 
19  Wall.  661.  U.  S.  1,  68. 

6  In  re  Neagle,  135  U.  S.  1  ;  s.  c  39  i"  6  Op.  Att'yGen   466,  469. 
Fed.  R.  833;  U.  S.  K.  S.  §  788.  ii  Bac   Al.r.  Sheriff  (11). 


§  341.]  CONTEMPTS.  649 

as  military  bodies,  under  the  immediate  command  of  their  own 
officers,  does  not  in  any  wise  affect  their  legal  character.  They 
are  still  the  posse  comitatus.''^  ^^  A  recent  act  of  Congress  has, 
however,  ])rovided,  that  "  From  and  after  the  passage  of  this  act  it 
shall  not  be  lawful  to  employ  any  part  of  the  army  of  the  United 
States  as  a  posse  comitatus,  or  otherwise  for  the  p"r!rpose  of  exe- 
cuting the  laws,  except  in  such  cases  and  under  such  circum- 
stances as  such  employment  of  said  force  may  be  expressly 
authorized  by  the  Constitution  or  by  Act  of  Congress."  ^^  Under 
this  act,  it  seems  that  aid  of  the  army  cannot  be  obtained  by  a 
marshal  unless  the  President  shall  employ  it  to  suppress  insur- 
rection after  a  proclamation  commanding  the  insurgents  to 
disperse.^*  Tlie  marshal  and  his  deputies  may  carry  arms  and 
use  force  in  the  execution  of  their  official  duty  although  a  State 
statute  forbids  carrying  concealed  weapons  ;^^  but  they  may  not 
make  arrests  nor  carry  arms  outside  of  the  districts  for  which 
they  are  appointed. ^^  All  writs  of  execution  upon  judgments  or 
decrees  obtained  in  a  Circuit  or  District  Court,  in  any  State  which 
is  divided  into  two  or  more  districts,  may  run  and  be  executed 
in  any  part  of  such  State ;  but  must  be  issued  from  and  made 
returnable  to  the  court  wherein  the  judgment  was  obtained.^'  In 
such  a  case,  the  writ  may  be  executed,  by  the  marshal  of  the 
district  from  which  it  was  issued,  in  the  other  district  without 
any  independent  writ  being  directed  to  him  for  that  purpose. ^^ 
All  writs  of  execution  upon  judgments  obtained  for  the  use  of 
the  United  States,  in  any  court  thereof,  in  one  State,  may  run 
and  be  executed  in  any  other  State  or  in  any  Territory,  but  must 
be  issued  from,  and  made  returnable  to,  the  court  wherein  the 
judgment  was  obtained. ^^  A  suit  against  a  marshal  for  an  alleged 
failure  to  comply  with  the  laws  of  tlie  State  in  levying  an  execu- 
tion arises  under  the  Constitution  and  laws  of  the  United  States.^*^ 
§  341.  Contempts.  —  An  attachment  is  the  projjcr  process  to 
compel  obedience  to  a  decree  or  order  requiring   the    perform- 


12  G  Op.  Att'y-Gen.  466,  473.  le  Walker  v.  Lea,  47  Foil.  K.  G45. 

13  Act  of  June  18,  1878,  §  15 ;  20  St.  at        i^  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  985.     See  pt-.  58-63. 
L.  145;  1  Sup.  U.  S.  R.  S.  363.  i^  Prevost  v.  Gorrell,  5  W.  N.  C.  (Pa.) 

1*  10  Op.  Att'y-Gcn.  1G2;  U.  S.  R.   S.  151. 
§§  52'J8,  5300.  !'•  U    S.  R.  S  §  Of^C. 

15  U.  S.  er  rel.  McSweeney  v.  FulUiart,        '^^  Sowles  v.   Witters,  4G  Fed.  R.  497. 

47  Fed.  R.  802 ;    Sifford's  Case,  5   Am.  See  §  17. 
Law  Reg.  659. 


650         ENFORCEMENT  OF  DECEEES  AND  ORDEKS.   [CHAP.  XXVI. 

ance  of  a  specific  act  other  than  the  payment  of  money ,^  or  to 
punish  a  contempt  of  court.^  It  seems,  that  in  districts  held 
in  States  where  imprisonment  for  debt  has  been  abolished,  dis- 
obedience to  a  decree  or  order  for  the  payment  of  money  cannot 
be  punished  by  attachment;^  unless  the  defaulting  party  is  an 
officer  of  the  court,  as  an  attorney,^  or  has  bid  in  property  at 
a  judicial  sale;^  or  the  motion  is  made  by  a  master  or  the 
clerk  of  the  Supreme  Court  to  compel  payment  of  his  fees.^ 
The  older  cases  both  in  the  English  Chancery  and  the  Federal 
courts  hold  that  it  is  a  contempt  to  criticise  in  the  press  the 
conduct  of  the  court,'  and  to  publish  anything  which  may  .create 
prejudice  against  either  party  to  a  pending  cause.^  A  case  in 
which  punishment  was  inflicted  by  Judge  Peck  for  a  criticism 
pul)lished  upon  one  of  his  decisions  led  to  his  impeachment 
trial  before  the  Senate  ;  and  although  he  was  acquitted,  a  stat- 
ute was  enacted  which  materially  diminished  the  powers  of  the 
Federal  courts  to  punish  for  contempt.'^  The  courts  of  the 
United  States  have  power  "  to  punish  by  fine  or  imprisonment, 
at  the  discretion  of  the  court,  contempts  of  their  authority : 
Provided,  That  such  power  to  punish  contempts  shall  not  be 
construed  to  extend  to  any  cases  except  the  misbehavior  of  any 
person  in  their  presence,  or  so  near  thereto  as  to  obstruct  the 
administration  of  justice,  the  misbehavior  of  any  of  the  officers 
of  said  courts  in  their  official  transactions,  and  the  disobedience 
or  resistance  by  any  such  officer,  or  by  any  party,  juror,  witness, 
or  other  persons,  to  any  lawful  writ,  process,  order,  rule,  decree, 
or  command  of  the  said  courts."  ^^  Beyond  this  the  Circuit  and 
District  Courts  have  no  such  power.^^  The  act,  just  quoted  in 
terms,  applies  to  all  courts.  Whether  it  can  be  held  to  limit  the 
authority  of  the  Supreme  Court,  which  derives  its  existence  and 
powers  from  the  Constitution,  is  doubtful.^^     It  has  been  held 

§  341.     i  Rule  8;  Mallory  Manuf.  Co.  «  Kule  82;    Supreme  Court  Rule  10. 

V.  Fox,  20  Fed.  R.  400.     *  "  See  the  language  of  Lord  Cliancellor 

2  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  725  ;  Re  Chiles,  22  Wall.  Hardwicke  in  2  Atk.  400,  471.     Hollings- 
157.  worth    V.   Duanc,  Wall.    C.   C.   77,   100; 

3  Mallory  Manuf.  Co.  ?•.  Fox,  20  Fed.  U.  S.  v.  Duane,  Wall.  C.  C.  102. 
R.  409.  «  2  Atk.  4G9. 

«  Jeffries   v.  Laurie,  27  Fed.  R.  195,  »  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  725. 

lie   Pitman,    1    Curtis,    186;     Bagley    v.  "  U   S.  R.  S.  §  725. 

Yates,  3  McLean,  465;  The  Laurens,  1  ^  Ex  parte   Robinson,    19   Wall    505, 

Abb.  Adm.   508;    Re   Paschal,  10  Wall.  510. 

483  ;  U.  S.  r.  Mann,  2  Brock.  9.  '-  Mr.  Justice  Field  in  Ex  parte  Robin- 

^  Camden  v.  Mayhew,  120  U.  S.  73.  son,  19  Wall.  505,  510. 


§  341.]  CONTEMPTS.  651 

at  circuit  that  a  United  States  commissioner  has  no  power  to 
punish  for  contempt.^^  It  was  held  to  be  a  contempt  of  court 
to  sue  in  a  court  of  another  State  a  party  while  there  for  the  i)ui- 
pose  of  attending-  the  taking  of  a  deposition  ;  and  a  fine  of  the 
expenses  of  such  suit  inchiding  the  counsel  fees  therein,  was 
imposed  u])on  the  party  who  brought  it.^'*  JMisbehavior  of  a  per- 
son in  the  i)rescnee  of  the  court  may  consist  in  an  assault,^^ 
or  in  abusive  language  addressed  to  the  court  ^*^  or  one  of  its 
officers  1'  or  any  person  there.^^  Similar  conduct  in  an  ante- 
room of  the  conrt  or  so  near  the  court-room  as  to  be  heard  there- 
in is  also  punishable  as  a  contempt.^^  It  has  been  said  to  be  a 
contempt  for  an  attorney  to  carry  a  pistol  into  court.-*^  A  hear- 
ing before  a  master  in  chancery  or  examiner  is,  for  this  purpose, 
treated  as  a  proceeding  in  court.^^  The  cases  affecting  receivers 
have  been  cited  in  the  chapter  on  Receivers.-^  Proceedings  before 
a  grand  jury  are  considered  to  be  in  the  presence  of  the  court ;  -^ 
and  an  attempt  in  the  hall  adjoining  the  room  where  a  grand 
jury  is  in  session  to  bribe  a  witness  summoned  before  it  is  a  con- 
tempt of  court.2^  It  has  been  held  in  Ohio,  under  a  statute  simi- 
lar to  that  limiting  the  powers  of  the  Federal  courts  to  punish 
for  contempts,  that  the  publication  of  charges  of  misconduct 
against  a  judge  holding  court,  in  a  newspaper  which  the  writer 
had  reason  to  believe  would  be  circulated  and  read  in  the  court- 
room, and  which  was  thus  circulated  and  read,  is  "  misbehavior 
in  the  presence  of  or  so  near  the  court  or  judge  as  to  obstruct 
the  administration  of  court  or  justice."  ^^  It  is  not  a  contempt  to 
serve  a  suitor  with  a  summons  while  he  is  in  attendance  on  a 
term  of  court,  provided  he  is  not  served  in  the  court's  presence.'^^ 
An  officer  of  the  court  may  be  punished  by  attachment  for  his 
misbehavior  in  office  after  his  term  of  office  has  expired  by  res- 
is  In  re  Mason,  43  Fed.  R.  510;  Re  is  U.  S.  r.  Emerson,  4  Cranoli  C.C.  188; 
Perkins,  cited  43  Fed.  R.  515;  Ex  parte  U.  S.  i'.  Carter,  3  Cranch  C.  C.  428. 
Doll,  7  Phila.  595.  la  U.  S.  v.  Emerson,  4  Crancli  C.  C.  188. 

1*  Bridges  v.   Sheldon,   7  Fed.   R.    17,        -"  Sharon  v.  Hill,  '24  Fed.  K.  726. 
45-47.  21  Sharon  v.  Hill,  24  Fed.  R.  720. 

15  Sharon  v.  Hill,  24  Fed.  R.  720  ;  Ex       '"  See  §  249. 

jmrte  Terry,  128  U.  S.  289;  In  re  Terry,  -^  Savin,  Petitioner,  131  U.  S.  267. 

36  Fed.  R.  419;   U.  S.  v.  Patterson,  20  2*  Savin,  Petitioner,  131  U.  S.  207. 

Fed.  R.  509.  25  j^fyers    i-.    State,    21    Weekly    Law 

16  Ex  parte  Terry,  128  U.  S.  289;  In  re  Bulletin,  404  ;  s.  c.  22  N.  E.  R.  43.     See 
Terry,  36  Fed.  R.  419.  Cooper  r.  People,  13  Colorado,  337. 

17  Ex  parte  Terry.  128  U.  S.  289  ;  In  re  -''  Blight  r.  Fisher,  Peters'  Circuit  Court 
Terry,  30  Fed.  R.  419.  Reports,  41. 


652         ENFORCEMENT  OF  DECREES  AND  ORDERS.   [CHAP.  XXVI. 

ignation  or  otherwise.^"  An  attorney-^  or  other  officer--^  of  the 
court  may  be  thus  compelled  to  pay  to  a  person  named  in  the 
order  money  received  by  him  in  his  official  capacity.  Where, 
however,  there  is  room  for  a  reasonable  doubt  as  to  how  much 
is  due  from  the  officer,  the  court  will  usually  refuse  to  proceed 
against  him  summarily,  and  require  the  complaining  part}'  to 
begin  a  suit.^^  A  juror  has  been  punished  for  contempt  because 
he  had  talked  about  the  case  in  violation  of  the  court's  direction 
to  the  contrary.^'  It  has  been  held,  that  a  person  enjoined  from 
the  infringement  of  a  patent  is  in  contempt  if  he  contributes  to 
a  fund  to  defray  the  expenses  of  another  who  is  contesting  the 
validity  of  the  patent.-^^  It  has  been  held,  that  a  defendant  cor- 
poration which,  when  enjoined  from  selling  a  certain  cordial  in 
certain  bottles  with  a  particular  label,  sold  its  entire  stock  of 
cordials  with  such  bottles  and  labels  to  a  third  person,  under  an 
arrangement  that  he  would  fill  all  orders  for  the  cordial  which 
the  defendant  should  receive,  was  guilty  of  contempt,  although  it 
did  not  share  in  the  profits  of  such  sales,  and  although  it  acted 
under  advice  of  counsel.-^'^  It  has  been  said  to  be  a  contempt  of 
court  to  bring  before  it  a  collusive  suit.'^^  It  has  been  held  that 
it  is  a  contempt  to  represent  by  words  and  by  printed  circulars 
that  a  sale  under  an  execution  is  invalid,  and  that  any  one  who 
buys  will  become  involved  in  litigation.^^  A  person  is  not  relieved 
from  punishment  for  contempt  because  he  acted  in  good  faith 
under  the  advice  of  counsel  that  he  was  not  infringing  the  court's 
order.^^  If,  however,  the  question  as  to  whether  he  is  in  contempt 
is  doubtful,  the  court  will  not  punish  him.^'  A  domestic  or 
foreign  corporation,  as  well  as  an  individual,  may  be  fined  for  a 
contempt.^ 

2^  Tlie  Laurens,  1  Abb.  Adm.  508.  Fecamp  i'.  Western  Distilling  Co.,  42  Fed. 

28  In  re  Paschal,  10  Wall.  483 ;  Jeffries  R.  96. 
V.  Laurie,  27  Fed.  R.  195.  34  Lord  v.  Veazie,  8  How.  251 ;  Cleve- 

-9  Re  Pitman,  1  Curt.  180;  Bagley  v.  land  r.  Chamberlain,  1  Black,  il'.t. 
Yates,  3  McLean,  465;  The  Laurens,  1  ^5  /„  ,-e  Sowles,  41  Fed.  R.  752. 
Abb.  Adm.  508.  ^^  Atlantic  Giant  Powder  Co.  v.  Ditt- 

3'  See   In    re    Paschal,   10  Wall.  4^:3  ;  man  Powder  Manuf.  Co.,  9  Fed.  R.  316. 
U.  S.  (?.  Mann,  2  Rrock.9.  -'?  California   Paving   Co.    v.    Molitor, 

31  Re  May,  1  Fed.  R.  737  ;  U.  S.  i:  De-  113   U.   S.  609;  Onderdonk   v.   Fanning, 

vaughan,  3'Craiich  C.  C.  84.  2  Fed.  R.  568;  Lilienthal  v.  Wallach,  37 

«•-  Bate    Refrigerating    Co.    v.    Gillett,  Fed.  R.  241  ;  Trua.x  r.  Detweiler,  46  Fed. 

30  Fed.  R.  683.  R.  117. 

3^  Societe  Anonyme  dc  la  Distillerie  de        ^8  United  States  v.  Memphis  &  L.  R.  R. 

la  Liqueur  Benedictine  de  la  Abbaye  de  Co.,  6  Fed.  R.  237. 


§  343.]        HEARING   UPON    APPLICATIONS   FOR   ATTACHMENTS.  653 

§  342.  Notice  of  Applicatiou  for  Attachmeut.  —  The  rulos  pro- 
vide that  if  a  decree  be  for  the  performance  of  a  specific  act, 
other  than  the  payment  of  money,  it  must  prescribe  the  time 
within  which  the  act  shall  be  done,  "  of  which  the  defendant 
shall  be  bound  without  further  service  to  take  notice  ; "  ^  and  that, 
"  except  in  cases  where  personal  or  other  notice  is  specially  re- 
quired or  directed,"  an  entry  of  an  order  in  the  order-book  is  suf- 
ficient notice  thereof  to  the  parties  to  the  suit.^  It  is,  however, 
the  safer  practice,  if  not  indispensable,  to  make  personal  service 
of  a  certified  copy  of  a  decree  or  order,  disobedience  to  which  it 
is  desired  to  punish  by  an  attachment.^  In  case  of  disobedience 
to  a  decree  for  the  performance  of  a  specific  act,  other  than  the 
payment  of  money,  the  rules  direct  the  issue  of  an  attachment 
ex  ijarte  by  the  clerk,  upon  the  filing  of  an  affidavit  that  the  act 
has  not  been  performed  within  the  required  time.^  It  is,  however, 
the  usual  practice  to  give  notice  to  the  delinquent,  of  an  applica- 
tion for  an  attachment,  either  by  an  order  to  show  cause  or  other- 
wise.^ An  attachment  may  be  issued  at  the  request  of  a  person 
not  a  party  to  the  cause  in  whose  favor  an  order  has  been  made, 
or  against  a  person  not  a  party  to  the  cause  against  whom 
obedience  to  an  order  can  be  enforced.^  Notice  of  the  applica- 
tion, when  required,  should  be  served  personally  upon  the  person 
tliereby  affected."  If  a  party  conceals  himself  to  avoid  personal 
service  of  the  notice,  perhaps  notice  may  be  served  upon  an 
attorney  who  has  appeared  for  him  in  the  proceeding  in  Avhich 
the  contempt  was  committed.^  The  proceeding  is  in  its  nature 
criminal,  not  civil.^ 

§  343.  Hearing  upon  Applications  for  Attachments.  —  When  the 
contempt  was  committed  in  the  presence  of  the  court,  no  notice 
nor  trial  of  any  disputed  question  of  fact  is  necessary. ^     It  has 

§  342.     1  Rule  8.  Wonlw.  6.S  ;    HoUingsworth    v.    Dunne, 

2  Rule  4.  Wall.  C.  C.  141. 

3  In  re  Gary,  10  Fed.  R.  622;  In  re  »  Eureka  L.  &  Y.  C.  Co.  i-.  Superior 
Lloyd,  10  Beav.  451.  But  see  Ee  Feeny,  Court  of  Yuba  County,  116  U.  S.  410, 
1  Hask.  304;  s.  c.  4  N.  B.  R.  [70]  2o3 ;  418. 

ISkip  V.   Harwood,  3  Atk.  564;  Hearn   i'.  »  Er  parte   Kearney,  7  Wheaton,  38; 

Tenant,  14  Ves.  136 ;  People  v.   Brower,  In  re  Pitman,  1    Curtis,  186  ;    Fischer   v. 

4  Paige  (N.  Y.),  405.  Hayes,  6  Fed.  R.  63;  Hayes  v.  Fischer, 

1  Rule  8.  102  U.  S.  21 ;  New  Orleans  v.  Steamship 

5  Worcester  v.  Truman,  1  McLean,  Co.,  20  Wall.  387 ;  Re  Manning,  44  Fed. 
483 ;  Fischer  v.  Hayes,  6  Fed.  R.  63.  R.  275. 

6  Rule  10.  §  343.  i  Er  parte  Terry,  128  U.  S.  289; 
^  Gray  c.  Chicago,  I.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  1    In  re  Terry,  36  Fed.  R.  4i9. 


654         ENFORCEMENT  OF  DECREES  AND  ORDERS.   [CHAP.  XXVI. 

been  held  at  circuit  that  in  any  other  case,  at  least  when  an 
attachment  has  been  issued,  a  person  charged  with  contcmjjt  may 
demand  that  interrogatories  be  filed  concerning  the  facts  which, 
it  is  claimed,  constitute  his  offence  ;  and  that,  if  he  denies  the 
facts  charged  under  oath,  he  cannot  be  punished,  —  the  only 
remedy  being  an  indictment  against  him  for  perjury :  ^  but  a 
recent  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  seems  contrary  to  these 
rulings.^  He  cannot  be  compelled  to  answer  interrogatories.'^ 
Otherwise,  when  at  the  argument  of  the  motion  for  an  attach- 
ment tl;e  party  accused  of  disobedience  denies  the  charge,  the 
court  may  either  determine  the  disputed  question  of  fact  upon 
such  affidavits  as  are  then  presented  to  it,  or  refer  the  question  to 
a  master.^  If  the  court  find  the  charge  proved,  or  the  master  so 
report  and  his  report  be  confirmed,  the  court  may  then  punish 
the  offender  by  fine  or  imprisonment,  and,  if  a  fine  be  imposed, 
direct  him  "  to  stand  committed  till  it  be  paid."^  The  court  may 
make  a  preliminary  order  directing  that  lie  be  fined ;  determining 
the  principles  with  regard  to  which  the  amount  of  the  fine  should 
be  estimated ;  and  directing  either  the  submission  of  the  amount 
to  the  court  upon  affidavits,  or  a  reference  to  a  master  for  that 
purpose."  Wiien  an  injunction  against  the  infringement  of  a 
patent  has  been  violated,  the  fine  may  include  the  profits  made  by 
the  defendant  by  his  contemptuous  acts;  and  in  that  case  the  order 
may  direct  that  that  part  of  the  fine  be  paid  to  the  complainant.^ 
"When  the  contempt  consisted  in  the  institution  of  a  suit,  the  fine 
should  include  the  expenses  of  the  defense  of  such  suit  including 
reasonable  counsel  fees,  which  must  be  paid  to  the  party  against 
whom  the  contemptuous  suit  was  brought.^  In  these  cases  the 
writ  o£  attachment  does  not  issue  till  after  the  final  order.  "In 
proceedings  in  equity  between  parties  to  a  suit  for  contempt  in 
not  obeying  the  process  of  the  court,  or  any  order  or  decree  in 
the  cause,  the  proceedings  in  equity  between  parties  to  a  suit  for 

2  U.  S.  V.  Dodge,  2  Gall.  313  ;  Hnllinps-  contempt.    See  Wnodruff  v.  North  Bloom- 
worth  V.  Dnane,  Wall.    C.    C.    77.     See  field  Gravel  Min    Co.,  45  Fed.  R.  129. 
U.  S.  V.  Duanc,  Wall.  0.  C.  103.  «  Fischer  v.  Hayes,  6  Fed.  R.  63;  U. 

8  Savin,  Petitioner,  131  U.  S.  2R7.  S.  R.  S.  §  725- 

*  Hntlin<r,<!\vnrth  v.    Duane,    Wall.  C.  "  Fischer  v.  Hayes,  6  Fed.  R.  63. 

C.  77.     See  U.  S.  r.  Duane,  Wall.  C.  C.  '  Searls  v.  Worden,  13  Fed.  R.  716; 

102.  s.  c.  as  Worden  v.  Searls,  121   U.  S.  14  , 

5  Fischer  v.  Hayes,  G  Fed.  R.  63.    Tn  In  re  IMullee,  7  Blatchf.  23  ;  Doubleday  f. 

a  recent  interesting  case  it  was  held  that  Sherman,  8  Blatchf.  45. 
the  evidence  was  insufficient  to  prove  a         ^  Bridges  v.  Sheldon,  7  Fed.  R.  747. 


§  344.]  ORDER   OF   COMMITMENT,  655 

contempt  in  not  obeying  the  process  of  the  court,  or  any  order  or 
decree  in  the  cause,  the  proceedings  on  the  attachment  may  be, 
and  usually  are,  entitled  as  in  the  original  suit,  though  it  is  not 
irregular  to  entitle  them  in  tlie  name  of  TJie  People,  on  the 
relation  of  the  person  prosecuting  the  attachment  against  the 
defendant  or  party  proceeded  against.  Where  the  attachment 
proceeding  for  a  contempt  is  against  a  witness,  or  a  person  not  a 
j)arty  to  the  suit,  the  practice  is  to  entitle  the  order  for  attach- 
ment, and  all  subsequent  proceedings  thereon,  in  the  name  of 
The  People,  on  the  relation,  <tc."^^  On  a  motion  for  a  commit- 
ment for  contempt  when  served  with  a  subpoena,  it  was  held  that 
two  witnesses  must  be  produced  to  prove  contemptuous  words, 
but  that  one  was  sufficient  to  prove  a  battery  upon  the  process- 
server.ii  A  State  statute  regulating  the  practice  in  contempt 
proceedings  does  not  affect  the  practice  in  the  Federal  court. '- 

§  344.  Order  of  Commitment.  —  It  is  better  practice  for  the 
order  committing  a  person  for  contempt  to  recite  the  offense 
charged,  although  it  seems  that  this  is  not  necessary  if  it  de- 
scribes the  same  by  reference  to  other  proceedings. ^  It  has  been 
said  that  an  order  committing  a  person  for  contempt  cannot  be 
altered  at  a  subsequent  term  of  the  court  ;2  that  the  court  cannot 
subsequently  discharge  the  party  committed  upon  proof  of  his 
inability  to  comply  Avith  the  order,  his  remedy  being  an  applica- 
tion to  the  President  for  a  pardon  ; '^  and  that  such  an  order  is 
void  if  it  does  not  express  or  limit  the  term  of  imprisonment.* 
No  appeal  will. lie  from  an  order  committing  a  person  for  con- 
tempt.^ If  such  an  order  is  void,  the  prisoner  may  be  discharged 
on  habeas  corpus^  but  not  for  irregularities,  when  the  court  had 
jurisdiction  to  grant  the  order."  Upon  an  appeal  from  the, final 
decree  so  much  of  an  order  fining  a  party  for  contempt  as  gave 
indemnity  to  his  antagonist  may  be  reviewed ;  ^  but  not  so  much 

JO  Judge,  now  Mr.  Justice,  Blatcliford  »  j^^  MuHee,  7  Blatchf.  2o. 

in  Fisclier  ('.  Hayes,  6  Yed.  R.  63.     See         *  Matter  of  Marsh,    MacArth.   &   M. 

also  The  People  v.  Craft,  7  Paige  (N.  Y.),  (D.  C.)  .32. 

2:35;  Stafford  o.  Brown,  4  Paige  (N.  Y.),  °  Hayes  v.  Fischer,  102  U.  S.  121. 

86);  U.  S.ex.rel.  Southern  Express  Co.  **  Ex  parte.  Fisk,  113   U.  S.  713;  Ex 

V.  Memphis  &  Little  Rock  R.  R.  Co.,  6  parte  Terry,  128  U.  S.  289.     See  §§  366, 

Fed.  R.  237.     But  see  U.  S.  v.  Wayne,  367,  Infm. ' 
Wall.  C.  C.  134.  '  Savin.  Petitioner,  1-31  U.  S.  267,  279  ; 

"  Anon.,  3  Atkyn.s,  219.  Stevens  v   Fuller,  136  U.  S.  468,  478.   See 

12  Searls  r.  Worden,  13  Fed.  R.  716.  §§  366-3')7.  infra. 

§  344     1  Fisclier  >•.  Hayes.  6  Fed  R.  63.  8  Worden  v.  Searls,  121  U.  S.  14,  26. 

^  Fischer  v.  Hayes,  6  Fed.  R.  63. 


656         ENFORCEMENT  OF  DECREES  AND  ORDERS.   [CHAP.  XXVI. 

of  the  fine  as  was  imposed  solely  by  way  of  punishiueiit  to 
vindicate  the  dignity  of  the  court.^  A  prisoner  committed  for 
a  contempt  is  not  entitled  to  any  credit  for  good  beliavior.i'^ 

§  345.  Writ  of  Attachment.  —  An  attachment  is  a  writ  directed 
to  the  marshal  of  the  court,  sealed  and  bearing  teste  in  the  same 
manner  as  a  writ  of  subpoena/  directing  him  to  attach  the  body 
of  the  person  named  therein,  and  to  safely  keep  the  same,  so  that 
he  can  produce  the  person  or  persons  thus  attached  in  court  at  a 
certain  day  termed  the  return  day  of  the  writ,  or  until  the  further 
order  of  the  court.'*^  The  writ  must  be  indorsed  with  the  sj^ecial 
reason  for  which  it  is  issued,  and  also  with  the  name  and  address 
of  the  solicitor  of  the  party  issuing  it.^  The  writ  may  be  issued 
either  in  vacation  or  in  term ;  and  may  be  returnable  immedi- 
ately ;  provided,  at  least,  that  the  party  against  whom  it  is  issued 
then  dwells  or  is  within  twenty  miles  of  the  \)\q.q,q  of  holding  the 
court.  Otherwise,  a  period  of  fifteen  days  between  the  teste  and 
the  return  might  be  required.* 

§  346.  Execution  of  Writ  of  Attachment.  —  The  first  thing  to 
be  done  after  the  writ  has  been  issued  is  to  deliver  it  to  the 
marshal  to  whom  it  is  directed,  or  to  one  of  his  deputies  author- 
ized by  him  to  receive  such  writs. ^  Although  the  writ  is  always 
directed  to  the  marshal  of  the  judicial  district  within  which  it  is  to 
be  executed,'-^  it  is  usually  executed  by  one  of  his  deputies.  The 
marshal  and  his  deputy  can  only  execute  the  writ  within  the 
district  for  which  he  has  been  appointed  \^  and  not  then  against 
a  person  who  has  been  brought  there  by  force  or  fraud,  or  under 
such  circumstances  as  would  make  it  improper  to  serve  a  sub- 
poena upon  him;*  and  probably  not  upon  Sunday,^  nor  usually 
in  the  court-room.^  If  a  writ  is  to  be  executed  in  a  different 
district  from  that  within  which  the  court  issuing  it  is  situated,  it 
should  be   directed  to  the  marshal  of  that  district."     This  has 

9  New  Orleans   v.  Steamship  Co.,  20  Cranch  C.  C.  3.31  ;  Sommerville  !•.  French, 

Wall.  387.  1  Cranch  C.  C.  474. 

1'^  In  re  Terry,  .37  Fed.  R.  G49.  *  In  the  Matter  of  Allen,  13  Blatchf. 

§  345.     1  See  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  911.  271  ;  and  see  authorities  cited  under  §§  98, 

2  Braithwaite's  Pr.  159-161.  277.     Cf.    Wroe   v.  Clayton,   10   Simons, 

8  Braithvvaite's  Pr.  159.  183. 

4  Acts  of  11  Geo.  IV.  &  1   Wm.  IV.  5  29   Car.   IT.   ch.    12,   §   6  ;   and   see 

c.  36,  §  15,  note  3.  authorities  cited  under  §  84. 

§  346.     1  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  787.  «  United  States  i-  Scholfield,  1  Cranch 

2  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  787.  C    C.  l.iU;  Davis   v.  Sherron,  1  Cranch 

3  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  787  ;  In  the  Matter  of  C.  V.  287 

Allen,  13  Blatchf.  271;  Voss  v    Luke,  1  '  Voss  c    Luke,  1  Cranch  C.  C.  331; 


§  3-iG.]  EXECUTION    OF    WRIT   OF   ATTACHMENT.  657 

been  held  proper,  when  the  writ  issues  to  attach,  for  disobedience 
to  a  subpoena,  a  witness  who  lives  within  a  hundred  miles  of  the 
place  of  holding  the  court.^  It  has  been  held  that  in  other  cases 
this  cannot  be  done ;  ^  but  that,  on  presentation  of  a  certified  copy 
of  the  contempt  proceedings  and  of  the  writ  of  attachment,  the 
district  attorney  of  the  district  where  the  delinquent  is,  may 
obtain  from  a  commissioner  of  that  district  a  warrant  for  the  ar- 
rest of  the  party  in  contempt,  who  is  then  entitled  to  an  examina- 
tion, pending  which  he  may  be  discharged  .on  bail ;  and  that  if 
the  commissioner  decides  to  hold  the  party  in  contempt,  the 
judge  of  that  district  may  issue  a  warrant  for  his  removal  as  in 
other  criminal  cases.'^  If  the  delinquent  be  already  in  custody, 
either  upon  criminal  sentence  or  civil  process,  no  further  arrest 
is  necessary  ;  but  the  marshal  should  give  notice  of  the  attach- 
ment, which  notice  is  called  a  detainer,  to  the  keeper  or  jailer  in 
whose  custody  he  is.^^  If  a  return  day  be  appointed  in  a  writ, 
and  it  be  issued  to  enforce  obedience  to  an  interlocutory  order, 
the  marshal  may,  but  is  not  obliged  to  allow  the  delinquent  to 
go  at  large  with  or  without  security  for  his  surrender  to  him 
upon  the  return  day.^^  If  the  delinquent  do  not  then  surrender 
himself  to  the  marshal's  custody,  the  latter  and  his  bondsmen 
are  responsible  for  all  damages  which  the  court  shall  determine 
have  resulted  therefrom  to  the  party  at  whose  instance  the  writ 
was  issued.^^  It  seems,  however,  that  this  cannot  be  done  when 
the  writ  is  issued  for  a  refusal  to  perform  a  specific  act  in  obedi- 
ence to  a  decree.^^  According  to  an  old  writer,  it  seems  that 
when  the  marshal  "  has  taken  up  the  body  he  has  paid  obedience 
to  the  writ,  though  he  does  not  actually  bring  him  up  to  the 
court;  because  the  contempt  only  induces  a  commitment,  which 
is  satisfied  by  imprisonment  in  the  county  gaol."^^  If,  how- 
ever, he  be  specially  ordered  so  to  do,  he  must  obey.  Upon  the 
return  day  of  the  writ  the  marshal  should  make  a  return  thereto. 

Sommerville  v.  French,  1   Cranch  C.  C.  "  Trotter  v.  Trotter,  Jacob,  533. 

474.  1-  Morris  r.  Hayward,  6  Taunton,  569; 

8  Voss  V.  Luke,  1   Cranch  C.  C.  331.  Studd  i-.  Acton,  IH.  Bhickstone,  468. 
But   see    Henry   v.   Ricketts,   1    Cranch  i3  Moore  v.  Moore,  25  Beav.  8 ;  U.S. 
C.  C.  580.  R.  S. §§  783-786. 

9  Ex  parte  Graham.  3  Wash.  C.  C.  456,  i*  Rule  8  ;  Cowdray  v.  Cross,  24  Beav. 
462  ;  Re  Manning,  44  Fed.  R.  275.  445. 

10  United  States  i-.  Jacobi,  4  Am.  L.  T.        i^  Gilbert's  Chan.  83. 
Rep.  148,  151,  152;  A'e  Manning,  44  Fed. 
R.  275. 

VOL.  I.  —  42 


658  ENFORCEMENT   OF   DECREES   AND    ORDERS.      [CHAP.  XXVI. 

He  cannot  detain  the  party  named  in  the  writ  after  the  return 
day,  unless  by  the  court's  order.^^  There  are  three  ordinary 
returns  upon  a  writ  of  attachment :  First,  if  the  delinquent 
cannot  be  arrested,  the  marshal  returns,  "  The  within-named 
John  Stiles  is  not  found  in  my  bailiwick,"  —  this  is  termed  a 
non  est  inventus,  and  upon  it  further  process  of  contempt  is 
grounded ;  second,  if  the  delinquent  has  been  arrested,  but  the 
marshal  has  either  accepted  bail  for  his  appearance  or  keeps  him 
in  his  own  custody,  the  return  is,  "  I  have  attached  the  within 
named  John  Stiles,  as  within  I  am  commanded,  whose  body  I 
have  ready,"  —  this  is  called  accept  corjnis  ;  third,  if  the  marshal 
has  arrested  the  delinquent  and  lodged  him  in  jail,  or,  finding  him 
there  has  lodged  a  detainer  against  him,  the  marshal  returns,  "  I 
have  attached  the  within-named  John  Stiles,  whose  body  remains 
in  [naming  the  jail  or  prison]  in  my  custody."  ^''  Although  the 
return  is  regularly  made  by  the  marshal,  no  matter  by  whom  the 
writ  has  been  executed,  it  will  not  be  void  if  made  by  his  deputy.^^ 
If  the  marshal  refuse  to  make  any  return  he  may  be  compelled 
to  do  so,  by  means  of  an  order  to  show  cause  followed  by  an 
attachment  against  himself.^^  When  the  marshal  or  his  deputy 
is  a  party  to  a  cause,  or  probably  when  a  writ  of  attachment  is 
issued  against  either  of  them,  the  writs  and  precepts  therein 
must  be  directed  to  guch  disinterested  person  as  the  court  or 
any  justice  or  judge  thereof  may  appoint,  and  the  person  so 
appointed  may  execute  and  return  them.^*^  In  such  a  case  the 
person  serving  the  process  should  make  affidavit  thereof.^^ 

§  347.  Sequestration.  —  The  process  of  sequestration  is  a  writ 
or  commission  issuing  under  the  seal  of  the  court,  directed  either 
to  the  marshal  or  to  certain  persons  of  the  plaintiff's  nomination, 
empowering  him  or  them  to  enter  upon  and  sequester  the  real 
and  personal  estate  of  a  defendant  (or  some  particular  parcel  of 
his  lands),  and  to  take,  receive,  and  sequester  the  rents,  issues, 
and  profits  thereof,  and  keep  the  same  in  their  hands,  or  pay  the 
same  in  such  manner  and  to  such  persons  as  the  court  shall  in 
its  discretion  appoint,  until  such  defendant  shall  have  performed 
some   matter,   previously  ordered   by   the    court,  in  the  process 

16  Ex  parte  Burford,  1  Cranch  C.  C.  ^^  United  States  v.  Scroggins,  3  Woods, 
456.  629  ;,  Daniells'  Cli.  Pr.  470. 

17  Braithwaite's  TV.  272,  281.  2)  u.  S.  R.  S.  §  923 ;  Rule  15. 
»8  Spafford  v.  Goodell,  3  McLean,  97.  21  Rule  15. 


§  348.]  WRIT   OF   ASSISTANCE.  659 

Specifically  mentioned,  for  not  doing  Avhereof  lie  is  in  contempt.^ 
This  is  one  of  the  oldest  writs  of  the  court  of  chanceiy,  and  has 
been  the  cause  of  many  conflicts  between  the  English  chancel- 
lors and  the  courts  of  common  law.^  Much  curious  history  and 
learning  upon  the  subject  invite  the  attention  of  the  antiquarian  ; 
but,  as  it  is  now  rarely  used,  little  space  will  be  devoted  to  it  in 
this  work.  By  the  Equity  Rules,  whenever  the  marshal  has  re- 
turned 7ion  est  inventus  under  a  writ  of  attachment,  a  writ  of 
sequestration  may  issue  to  compel  obedience  to  a  decree  or  order 
of  the  court. ^  The  writ,  when  not  issued  to  the  marshal,  appoints 
two  or  more  sequestrators.'*  The  usual  number  is  four.^  The 
sequestrators  are  officers  of  the  court,  and  as  such  are  subject  to 
new  directions  during  their  discharge  of  their  functions,*^  may  be 
attached  for  disobedience  or  misconduct,'^  and,  if  resistance  be 
made  to  them,  may  be  aided  by  the  court  with  the  exercise  of 
its  process  of  contempt,^  or  by  a  writ  of  assistance.^  Sequestra- 
tors must  from  time  to  time  account  for  what  comes  into  their 
hands,  and  pay  into  court  such  money  as  they  receive. ^^ 

§  348.  Writ  of  Assistance.  —  The  Equity  Rules  provide  that 
"  when  any  decree  or  order  is  for  the  delivery  of  possession, 
upon  proof  made  by  affidavit  of  a  demand  and  refusal  to  obey  the 
decree  or  order,  the  party  prosecuting  the  same  shall  be  entitled 
to  a  writ  of  assistance  from  the  clerk  of  the  court.*'  ^  This  is 
a  writ  commanding  the  marshal  to  eject  the  defendant  from 
the  land  and  put  the  plaintiff  in  possession  ;  and  is  executed  in 
the  same  manner  as  a  writ  of  habere  facias  jjossessione^n  is  ex- 
ecuted in  favor  of  a  successful  plaintiff  in  the  action  of  eject- 
ment ;2  "in  the  execution  of  which  the  sheriff  may  take  with 
liiai  the  posse  comitatus,  or  power  of  the  county,  and  may  justify 
breaking  open  doors,  if  the  possession  be  not  (luietly  delivered. 

§  347.     1  Hinde's   Ch.   Pr.   127;    Hoff-  "  Lord    Pelliam    r.    Lord    Unrloy,    .3 

man's  Ch.  Pr  ch.  iii.  §  10 ,  Daniell's  Cli.  Swaiist  291,  n 

Pr.  ch   XXV.  §  7  '^  Angel  v.   Smith,   9   Ves.   3"G  ;  Lord 

2  Gilbert's  Forum  Romanum,  78;  Dan-  Pelham  v.  Duchess  of  Newcastle,  3 
iell's  Ch.  Pr.  ch.  xxv.  §  7  Swanst.  293,  n.  ,  Rule  0. 

3  Rules  7  and  8.  See  Shainwald  i".  ^  Lord  Pelham  ?;.  Duchess  of  New- 
Lewis,  6  Fed.  R.  766,  777.  castle,  3  Swanst.  289,  n. ;  Rule  9. 

4  Hoffman's  Ch.  Pr.  ch.  iii.,  §  10;  i"  Howell  c.  Lord  Coningsby,  1  Fowl, 
Daniell's  Ch.^Pr.  ch.  xxv.  §  5.  Ex.  Pr.  161 ;  Deshrow  iv  Crommie,  Runb- 

6  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  ch.  xxv.  §  5.  272. 

6  Hinde's  Ch.  Pr    138;  Daniell'*  Ch.  §  348.     i  Rule  9. 

Pr.  ch.  xxv.  §7;  Hoffman's  Ch.  Pr.  ch.  -  Hunter's   Suit   in  Equity   (6th   ed  ), 

iii.  §  10.  168. 


660         ENFOECEMENT  OF  DECREES  AND  ORDERS.   [CHAP.  XXVI. 

But,  if  it  be  peaceably  yielded  up,  the  delivery  of  a  twig,  a  turf, 
or  the  ring  of  a  door  in  the  name  of  seisin,  is  sufficient  execu- 
tion of  the  writ."  ^  This  writ  is  often  used  to  put  into  possession 
receivers'*  and  sequestrators.^  It  is  not  issued  without  an  order 
for  that  purpose.^  It  cannot  issue  against  any  but  a  party  to 
the  suit,  or  his  representative,  or  one  who  came  into  possession 
under  him  since  the  suit  was  begun."  The  grantee  of  the  pur- 
chaser at  a  foreclosure  sale  where  the  court  has  ordered  the  re- 
ceiver to  put  him  in  possession  of  the  purchased  property,  and 
where  the  court  has  retained  jurisdiction  of  the  suit,  may  obtain 
a  writ  of  possession.^ 

§  349.  Action  by  Court  itself.  —  In  the  year  1830,  an  act  was 
passed  in  England,  at  the  instance  of  Sir  Edward  Sugdcn,  the 
author  of  Sugden  on  Powers,  afterwards  Lord  St.  Leonards, 
providing :  "  That  when  any  person  shall  have  been  directed  by 
any  decree  or  order  to  execute  any  deed  or  other  instrument,  or 
make  a  surrender  or  transfer,  or  to  levy  a  fine  or  suffer  a  recov- 
ery, and  shall  have  refused  or  neglected  to  execute,  make  or 
transfer,  or  levy  or  suffer  the  same,  and  shall  have  been  com- 
mitted to  prison  under  process  for  such  contempt,  or,  being  con- 
fined in  prison  for  any  other  cause,  shall  have  been  charged  with 
or  detained  under  process  for  such  contempt,  and  shall  remain  in 
such  prison,  the  court  may,  upon  motion  or  petition,  and  upon 
affidavit  that  such  person  has  after  the  expiration  of  two  cal- 
endar months  from  the  time  of  his  being  committed  under  or 
charged  with,  or  detained  under  such  process,  again  refused  to 
execute  such  deed  or  instrument  or  make  such  surrender  or 
transfer,  or  levy  or  suffer  such  fine  or  recovery,  order  or  appoint 
one  of  the  masters  in  ordinary,  or  if  the  act  is  to  be  done  out  of 
London,  then,  if  necessary,  one  of  the  masters  extraordinary,  to 
execute  such  deed  or  other  instrument  or  to  make  such  sur- 
render or  transfer,  for  and  in  the  name  of  such  person,  and  to 
levy  such  fine  or  suffer  such  recovery,  in  his  name,  and  to  do  all 
acts  necessary  to  give  validity  and  operation  to  such  fine  and 

3  Bl.  Com.  412.  ^  Terrell  v.  Allison,  21  Wall.  280 ;  How- 

*  Sharp   V.   Carter,   3   P.   Wms.   .375,  arcl  v.  Railway  Co.,  101  U.  S.  837,  849; 

379,  n. ;  Seton  on  Decrees  (4th  ed.),  441,  Thompson  v.  Smith,  1  Dill.  458. 

15(33.  8  Farmers'  L  &  Tr.  Co.  y.  Chicago  &  A. 

5  Lord  Telham  v.  Duchess  of  New-  Ry.  Co.,  44  Fed.  R.  653,658.  But  see  Van 
castle,  3  Swanst.  289,  n. ;  Seton  on  De-  Hook  r.  Tiirockmorton,  8  Paifie  (N.  Y.), 
crees  (4th  ed.),  1562.  33,  People  r.  Grant,  45  Cal.  97  ;  Stanley 

6  Seton  on  Decrees  (4th  ed.),  1562.  v.  Sullivan,  71  Wis   585. 


§  349.]  ACTION  BY  COURT  ITSELF.  6G1 

recovery,  and  to  lead  or  declare  the  uses  thereof :  and  the  execu- 
tion of  the  said  deed  or  other  instrument,  and  the  surrender  or 
transfer  made  by  the  said  master,  and  the  fine  or  recovery  levied 
or  suffered  by  him,  shall  in  all  respects  have  the  same  force  and 
validity  as  if  the  same  had  been  executed  or  made,  levied  or 
suffered,  by  the  party  himself;  and  within  ten  days  after  the 
execution  or  making  of  any  such  deed  or  other  instrument  or  sur- 
render or  transfer,  or  levying  or  suffering  such  line  or  recovery, 
notice  thereof  shall  be  giveu  by  the  adverse  solicitor  to  the  party 
in  whose  name  the  same  is  executed  or  made ;  and  such  party, 
as  soon  as  the  deed  or  other  instrument  or  surrender,  transfer, 
fine  or  recovery  shall  be  executed,  made,  levied,  or  suffered, 
shall  be  considered  as  having  cleared  his  contempt,  except  as  far 
as  regards  the  payment  of  the  costs  of  the  contempt,  and  shall 
be  entitled  to  be  discharged  therefrom,  under  any  of  the  pro- 
visions of  this  act  applicable  to  his  case ;  and  the  court  shall 
make  such  order  as  shall  be  just,  touching  the  payment  of  the 
costs  of  or  attending  any  such  deed,  surrender,  instrument, 
transfer,  fine,  or  recovery."  ^  "  That  where  a  person  sliall  be 
committed  for  a  contempt  in  not  delivering  to  any  person  or 
persons  or  depositing  in  court  or  elsewhere,  as  by  any  order  may 
be  directed,  books,  papers,  or  any  other  articles  or  things,  any 
sequestrator  or  sequestrators  appointed  under  any  commission  of 
sequestration  shall  have  the  same  power  to  seize  and  take  such 
books,  papers,  writings,  or  other  articles  or  things,  being  in  the 
custody  or  power  of  the  person  against  whom  the  sequestration 
issues,  as  they  would  over  his  own  property  ;  and  thereupon 
such  articles  or  things  so  seized  and  taken  shall  be  dealt  with 
by  the  court  as  shall  be  just ;  and  after  such  seizure  it  sliall  be 
lawful  for  the  court,  upon  the  application  of  the  prisoner,  or  of 
any  other  person  in  the  cause  or  matter,  or  upon  any  report  to 
be  made  in  pursuance  of  this  act,  to  make  such  order  for  the 
discharge  of  the  prisoner,  upon  such  terms,  ami,  if  it  shall  see 
fit,  making  any  costs  to  the  cause,  as  to  the  court  shall  seem 
proper."  '^  How  far  these  acts  will  ])e  followed  by  the  Fcdci'al 
courts  is  a  matter  for  future  decision.^  The  Supreme  Court  of 
the  District  of  Columbia  has   power  to   appoint  a  trustee  to  exe- 

§  349.   1  Acts  of  1  Wm.   IV.   cli.   .10,  3  See  TJuIe  00;  Slicpliord  v.  Comm'rs 

§  15,  R.  15,  passed  in  18-30.  of  Ross  Cnuntv.  7  Ohio,  271;  Carpenter 

2  Act  of  1  Wm.  IV.  cli   .36,  §  15,  R.  10.    v.  Strange,  141  U.  S.  787. 


662        ENFORCEMENT  OF  DECREES  AND  ORDERS.   [CHAP.  XXVI. 

cute  an  assig-nment  of  a  patent-right,  if  the  defendant  refuses  to 
do  so  after  a  sale  of  the  patent-right  under  a  creditor's  bill,  and 
the  decree  for  the  sale  may  contain  a  provision  for  the  appoint- 
ment of  the  trustee  in  case  of  such  refusal  together  with  a  di- 
rection that  the  defendant  execute  the  assignment.^  A  Circuit 
Court  of  the  United  States  has  power  to  direct  its  marshal  to 
remove  buildings  from  land  over  which  a  complainant  has  a  right 
of  way.^ 

§  349  a.  Bills  to  carry  Decrees  into  Execution.  —  A  bill  to 
carry  a  decree  into  execution  is  proper  where,  after  a  decree  has 
been  pronounced,  it  has  happened  that  owing  to  some  neglect 
of  the  parties  to  proceed  upon  the  decree,  their  rights  have  be- 
come so  embarrassed  by  subsequent  events  that  no  ordinary  pro- 
cess of  the  court  upon  the  first  decree  will  serve,  and  it  is 
therefore  necessary  to  have  another  decree  of  the  court  to  as- 
certain and  enforce  them  ;i  or  where  a  person  who  was  not 
a  party  nor  claims  under  a  party  to  the  original  decree,  claims 
in  a  similar  interest,  or  is  unable  to  obtain  the  determination  of 
his  own  right  until  the  decree  has  been  carried  into  execution ;  ^ 
or  by  or  against  a  person  claiming  as  assignee  of  a  party  to  the 
original  decree;^  or  to  carry  into  execution  the  judgment  of  an 
inferior  court  of  equity.^  A  bill  of  this  description  is  generally 
partly  an  original  bill,  though  not  strictly  original  ;  and  some- 
times it  is  likewise  a  bill  of  revivor  or  a  supplemental  bill,  or 
both  ;  and  the  frame  of  the  bill,  and  the  course  of  proceedings 
upon  it  vary  accordingly.^  Such  a  bill  is  treated  as  ancillary  to 
the  principal  suit,  and  the  Federal  court  in  which  the  original 
decree  was  entered  will  take  jurisdiction  of  the  same  irrespective 
of  the  citizenship  of  the  parties.*^  Upon  a  bill  to  carry  a  decree 
into  execution  the  court  is  at  liberty  to  examine  into  the  grounds 
of  the  original  decree,  and  if  such  decree  appears  to  have  been 

4  Ager  V.  :Murray,  105  U.  S.  126,  132.      Organ  r.  Gardiner,  1  Cli.  Cases,  2:^1  ;  Lord 

5  Gormley  v.  Clark,  .34  U.  S.  338.  Carteret    v.   Pasclial,   3  I'eere  Williams, 
§  .340  a.      1  Mitford's  PI.  ch.    i.  §  3 ;     197;  Binks  v.  Binks,   2  Bligh  P.  C.  593; 

Daniell's   Ch.    Pr.   (1st   Am.   ed.)   1089;  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (1st  Am.  ed.)  1691. 

.Tolinson   ?•.  Nortliley,  Prec.  in  Ch.  1-34;  "*  Morgani-. ,  1  Atk.  408  ;  Mitford's 

s.  c.  2  Vernon,  407.  PI.  ch.  i.  §  3;  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (1st  Am. 

•^  Mitford's  PI.  ch.  i.  §  3  ;  Daniell's  Ch.  ed.)  1691. 
Pr.  (1st  Am.  ed.)  1089-1690;   Rylands  v.  &  Mitford's  PI.  ch.  i.  §  3;  Daniell's  Ch. 

Latouche,  2  Biigli,  TjOG  ;  Dldham  r.  Eboral,  Pr.  (1st  Am.  ed.)  1093. 
Cooper  Sel.  Cases,  t<>mp.  Brougham,  27.  ^  Railroad  Companies  v.  Chamberlain, 

3  Lawrence     Manufacturing     Co.     v.  6  Wall.  748. 
Janesville  Cotton  xMills,   138  U.  S.  552; 


§  349  a.]         BILLS  TO  CAEKY  DECREES  INTO  EXECUTION.        6C3 

erroneous,  to  refuse  to  enforce  it,  even  when  the  original  decree 
was  entered  hy  consent.''  Where  a  decree  is  capable  of  being 
executed  by  the  ordinary  process  and  forms  of  the  court,  what- 
ever the  iniquity  of  the  decree  may  be,  till  it  is  reversed  the 
court  is  bound  to  assist  it  with  the  utmost  process  the  course  of 
the  court  will  bear  ;  but  where  the  common  process  of  the  court 
will  not  serve,  and  things  come  to  be  in  such  a  state  and  condi- 
tion after  a  decree  made,  that  it  requires  a  new  bill  and  a  second 
decree  upon  that  before  the  first  decree  can  be  executed ;  if  the 
first  decree  is  unjust,  the  court  desires  to  be  excused  in  making 
it  its  own,  and  to  build  upon  such  foundations,  and  charging  its 
conscience  with  promoting  an  apparent  injustice  ;  and  this  ob- 
liges the  court  to  examine  the  grounds  of  the  first  decree  before 
it  makes  the  same  decree  again.^ 

'  Lawrence     Manufacturing     Co.    v.  Mitford's  PI.  ch.  i.  §  3;  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr. 

Janesville  Mills,  138  U.  S.  552,  562  ;  Gay  (1st  Am.  ed.)  1G91-1G92. 
V.  Parprat,   106   U.  S.  679  ;  Lawrence  v.         ^  Lawrence  i;.  Berney,  2  Ch.  Rep.  127  ; 

Berney,  2  Rep.  in  Ch.  127.     Johnson  v.  Lawrence  Manufacturing   Co.    )•.   Janes- 

Northey,  Prec.  in  Ch.   134;  s.  c.  2  Ver-  vilie  Mills,  138  U.  S.  552,562;   Mitford's 

non,   407;    Attorney-General   v.  Day,   1  PI.  ch.  i.  §3;  Daniell's  Ch.  Pr.  (1st  Am. 

Vesey,  218  ;  Wert  v.  Skip,  1  Vesey,  218 ;  ed  )  1091-1692. 
Hamilton  v.  Houghton,  2  Bligh  P.  C.  169  ; 


G64  COKKECTION   OF  DECREE.  [CHAP.  XXVII. 


CHAPTER   XXVII. 

COERECTION   OF   DECREE   OTHERWISE  THAN   BY  APPEAL,. 

§  350.  Correction  of  Decrees  in  General.  —  When  a  party  to  a 
suit  in  equity,  or  his  representative,  feels  himself  aggrieved  by  a 
final  decree  of  the  court,  there  are  eight  ways  in  which  he  can 
apply  to  have  such  decree  reversed,  set  aside,  or  varied :  by  peti- 
tion for  a  mere  clerical  or  accidental  error,^  by  a  petition  for  a 
rehearing,^  by  a  bill  of  review,^  by  a  bill  in  the  nature  of  a  bill 
of  review,"*  by  a  supplemental  bill  in  the  nature  of  a  bill  of  re- 
view,^ by  a  bill  to  set  aside  a  decree  on  account  of  fraud,  mis- 
take, accident,  or  surprise,^  by  a  bill  to  suspend  or  avoid  the 
operation  of  a  decree,''  and  by  an  appeal.^  An  interlocutory 
decree  can  be  corrected  at  the  entry  of  the  final  decree.^ 

§  351.  Amendment  upon  Petition  •v7ithout  a  Rehearing.  —  The 
rules  provide  that  "  clerical  mistakes  in  decrees  or  decretal  or- 
ders, or  errors  arising  from  any  accidental  slip  or  omission,  may, 
at  any  time  before  an  actual  enrolment  thereof,  be  corrected 
by  order  of  the  court  or  a  judge  thereof,  upon  petition,  without 
the  form  or  expense  of  a  rehearing."  ^  Decretal  orders  may  be 
corrected  in  the  same  manner.-  In  this  way,  corrections  have 
been  permitted  of  errors  in  the  title  of  a  decree  or  order ;  ^  of  an 
omission  in  a  decree  for  specific  performance  of  a  direction  to  set- 
tle the  conveyance,^  or  of  a  reference  as  to  title  ;  ^  of  an  omission 
in  a  decree  in  a  creditor's  suit  of  a  direction  to  take  the  accounts 
of  the  personal  estate  ;  ^  and  of  other  defects  or  redundancies  in 
respect  to  which  a  decree  did  not  conform  to  the  directions  of  the 

§  350.    1  §  351.  §  351.  1  Rule  85.  See  Witters  v.  Sowlcs, 

2  §  352.  32  Fed.  R.  130 ;  Hop  Bitters  Manuf.  Co. 

3  §§  354-356.  r.  Warner,  28  Fed.  R.  577. 

4  §357.  ^  Union  Sugar  Refinery  r.  Mathiesson, 
s  §  .353.  3  Cliff.  140. 

6  §  .358.  3  Spearing  v.  Lynn,  2  Vern.  37G. 

7  §  .359.  *  Trevelyan  ;•.  "ciiarter,  9  Beav.  140. 

8  Cliapter  XXX.  ^  Hughes  v.  Jones,  2G  Beav.  24. 

9  Henry  r.  Travelers'  Ins.  Co.,  34  Fed.  «  Pickard  v.  Mattheson,  7  Ves.  293. 
R.  258;  Clark  r.  Blair,  14  Fed.  R.  812. 


§  352.]  PETITIONS   FOR   A   REHEARING.  665 

written  opinion  of  the  courtJ  An  order  or  decree  entered  by 
consent  cannot  be  varied  or  modified  in  a  material  part  without 
the  assent  of  all  the  parties  to  the  same  ;  but  the  court,  it  seems, 
may  give  such  further  directions  as  are  necessary  to  carry  it 
"  into  effect,  according  to  its  spirit  and  intent."  ^  The  former 
English  practice  occasionally  though  rarely  allowed  similar  cor- 
rections in  what  were  manifestly  mere  clerical  errors  after  a  de- 
cree had  been  enrolled  ;^  and  in  one  case  in  the  Federal  courts,  it 
has  been  said  that  an  error  in  calculating  the  amount  ordered  by 
the  decree  to  be  paid  may  be  corrected  after  enrolment,  upon 
motion  or  petition,  by  entering  a  credit  as  for  its  payment.^^ 

§  352.  Petitions  for  a  Rehearing. — A  petition  for  a  rehearing  is 
the  pro])cr  method  of  correcting  before  enrolment  errors  in  a  decree 
which  arc  not  evidently  clerical  or  accidental.  A  j)etition  for  a  re- 
hearing could  formerly  in  England  have  only  been  made  to  a  judge 
before  whom  the  cause  was  heard,  or  to  the  Lord  Chancellor.^  In 
the  Federal  courts  a  petition  for  a  rehearing  will  usually  be  enter- 
tained only  by  the  judge  or  justice  before  whom  the  cause  was 
heard.2  The  rules  provide  that  "  No  rehearing  shall  be  granted 
after  the  term  at  which  the  final  decree  of  the  court  shall  have 
been  entered  and  recorded,  if  an  appeal  lies  to  the  Supreme  Court. 
But  if  no  appeal  lies,  the  petition  may  be  admitted  at  any  time  be- 
fore the  end  of  the  next  term  of  the  court,  in  the  discretion  of  the 
court."  3  Whether  a  petition  filed  within  the  time  prescribed  by 
the  rules  may  be  heard  and  granted  subsequently  is  unsettled.*    A 

7  Gage   V.   Kellogg,  26  Fed.  R.  242;  174;  Beekman  v.  Peck,  3  J.  Ch.  (N.  Y.) 

Rogers  i'.  Riessner,  34  Fed.  R.  270  ;  Tufts  415 ;  Clark  v.  Hall,  7  Paige  (N.  Y  ),  382  ; 

V.  Tufts,  3  W.  &  M.  429  ;  Pfanschmidt  v.  Thompson  v.  Goulding,  5  Allen  (Mass.), 

Kelly    Mercantile   Co.,  -32  Fed.   R.  067;  81. 

Witters  v.  Sowles,  32  Fed.  R.  76.5  ;  Burd-  lo  xMassie  v.  Graham,  3  McLean,  41. 

sail  1-.  Curran,  31  Fed.  R.  918;  Albany  y.  §352.    i  Daniell's   Ch.    Pr.    (5th    Am. 

Steam   Trnp  Co.,  26  Fed.  R.  318  ;  Dor-  ed.)  1471. 

sheimer  v.  Rorback.y  C.  E.  Green  (N  .!.),  -  Giant  Powder  Co.  v.  California  Vig- 

33;  Sprague   r.  Jones,  9  Paige  (N.  Y.),  orit  Powder  Co.,  5  Fed.  R.  197,  202. 
395 ;  Jarmon  r.  Wiswall,  9  C^  E.  Green  3  Rule  88.     See  McMicken  r.  Perrin, 

(N.  J.),   «8.     But  .see   R'y   Reg.  Manuf.  18  How.  507;  Bank  of  Lewisburg  r.  Shef- 

Co.  V.  No.  Hudson  Co.  R.  Co.,  2G  Fed.  R.  fey,  140  U.  S.  145. 
411.  *  In  Glenn  )•.  Noonan,  4.3  Fed.  R.  403; 

»  Chancellor  Walworth    in    Leitch    v.  s.  c   43  Fed.  R.  550,  Judge  Thayer  IieM 

Cumpston,  4  Paige  (N.  Y.),  476  ;  Gage  r.  that  it  cannot.     Cnntra  is  a  dictum  of  Mr. 

Kellogg,  26  Fed.  R.  242  ;  Rogers  v.  Riess-  Justice   Field    in    Giant    Powder   Co.    >: 

ner,  34  Fed.  R.  270.  California  Vigorit  Powder  Co  ,  5  Fed.  R. 

9  Weston  V.   Ilaggerston.  G    Cooper,  197,  202.      See    Clarke   v.   Threlkeld,   2 

134 ;  Yow  V.  Townsend,  1   Dickens.  .59  ;  Cranch  C.  C.  408. 
Attorney-General  v.   Grcenhill,  34   Beav. 


666  CORRECTION   OF   DECREE.  [CHAP.  XXVII. 

rehearing  in  England  was  formerly  allowed  almost  as  of  course, 
upon  the  filing  of  a  petition  signed  by  two  counsel,  of  whom  one  at 
least  must  have  been  concerned  in  the  original  hearing  ;  the  rule 
having  been  stated  by  Lord  Hardwicke,  that  "  such  credit  is  given 
by  the  court  to  their  opinion  that  the  cause  ought  to  be  reheard, 
that  it  will  in  general,  order  the  cause  to  be  set  down"  for  that 
purpose,  as  a  matter  of  course.^  This  rule,  however,  has  not  been 
adopted  in  the  courts  of  the  United  States,  where  a  rehearing  is 
discretionary  with  the  judge  to  whom  the  application  is  made.^ 
Unless  the  judge  acts  of  his  own  motion,  a  rehearing  will  be 
granted  only  for  errors  of  law  apparent  upon  the  record  and  arising 
upon  questions  which  were  not  argued  at  the  original  hearing,  or 
upon  newly  discovered  evidence  of  such  a  character  that  it  would 
have  authorized  a  new  trial  in  an  action  at  law.'^  "  A  rehearing 
should  not  be  granted  for  newly  discovered  evidence  where  the 
evidence  could  have  been  obtained  by  reasonable  diligence  on  the 
first  hearing,  nor  when  it  is  merely  cumulative  to  that  previously 
received,  nor  when,  if  presented,  it  would  not  have  changed  the 
result."  ^  "A  new  hearing  should  not  be  had  simply  to  allow  a 
rehash  of  old  arguments."  ^  "  If  rehearings  are  to  be  had,  until  the 
counsel  on  both  sides  are  entirely  satisfied,  I  fear,  that  suits  would 
become  immortal,  and  the  decision  be  postponed  indefinitely."  ^^ 
A  rehearing  can  only  talvc  place  for  the  purpose  of  altering  a 
decree  upon  grounds  which  existed  at  the  time  when  the  decree 
was  pronounced,  and  will  not  be  allowed  to  remedy  a  grievance  con- 
sequent upon  a  decree  resulting  entirely  from  cii'cumstances  that 
have  occurred  subsequent  to  its  entry.^^  The  rules  provide  that 
"every  petition  for  a  rehearing  shall  contain  the  special  matter  or 

6  Cunyngham  r.  Cunyngham,  Ambler,  Tufts,  3  VV.  &  M.  426;  Hicks  v.  Otto,  22 
89.  See  Attorney  General  v.  Brooke,  18  Blatelif.  122  ;  Page  v.  Holmes  Burglar 
Ves.  319,  325  ;  East  India  Co.  v.  Boddam,  Alarm  Telegraph  Co.,  2  Fed.  R.  330  ;  The 
13  Ves.  421.  Collins  Co.  v.  Coes,  8  Fed.  R.  517  ;  Wit- 

•^  Mr.  Justice  Field  in   Giant  Powder  ters  r.  Sowles,  31  Fed.  R.  5  ;  Ptansclmiidt 

Co.  V.  Califordia  Vigorit  Powder  Co.,  5  v.  Kelly  Mercantile  Co.,  32  Fed.  R.  G67, 

Fed.  R.  97.  and  cases  cited  in  the  opinions  in  these 

7  Daniel  v.  Mitchell,  1  Story,  198 ;  cases.  But  see  Webster  Loom  Co.  v. 
Jenkins  ;•.  Eldredge,  3  Story,  2'.»0  ;  Emer-  Higgins,  43  Fed.  R.  673. 

son   V.   Davies,   1   W.  &  M.  21  ;  Tufts   v.  9  Mr.  Justice  Field  in  Giant  Powder 

Tufts,  3  W.  &  M.426;  Giant  Powder  Co.  Co.  v.  California  Vigorit  Powder  Co.,  5 

V.  California  Vigorit  Powder  Co.,  5  Fed.  Fed.  R.  197,  201. 

II.  197.  1"  Mr.   Justice  Story  in  Jenkins  v.  El- 

8  Giant  Powder  Co.  r.  California  Vig-  dredge,  3  Story,  299,  805. 

orit  Powder  Co.,  5  Fed.  R.  197,  201  ;  Jen-  "  Bowyer  v.  Bright,  13  Price,  31G  ; 
kins  c.  Eldredge,  3  Story,  299;  Tufts  v.     Hurlburd  v.  Freelove,  3  Wis.  537. 


§  352.]  PETITIONS   FOR   A   EEHEARING.  667 

cause  on  which  such  rehearing  is  applied  for,  shall  be  signed  by 
counsel,  and  the  facts  therein  stated,  if  not  apparent  on  the 
record,  shall  be  verified  by  the  oath  of  the  jtarty  or  by  some  othur 
person."  ^^  The  allegations  must  be  full,  precise,  and  certain.  It 
seems  that  they  will  be  insuthcient  if  sworn  to  merely  upon  infor- 
mation and  belief.^^  It  has  been  held  that  when  evidence  of  new 
facts  not  already  in  issue  is  to  be  given,  the  petition  should  be 
accompanied  by  a  supplemental  bill  in  the  nature  of  a  bill  of 
review,  pleading  these  facts  ;  in  wliich  case,  if  the  petition  be 
granted,  the  hearing  upon  that  bill  will  take  place  at  the  same 
time  as  the  rehearing  of  the  original  suit.^^  The  usual  proceedings 
to  obtain  a  rehearing  are  for  the  party  desiring  it  to  file  his  peti- 
tion in  the  clerk's  office,  and  then  to  procure  an  order  directing 
his  opponent  to  show  cause  why  his  prayer  should  not  be  granted.^^ 
The  adverse  party  may  then  answer,  controverting  or  setting  up 
new  matter  in  avoidance  of  allegations  in  the  petition  ;  or  i)rob- 
ably  may  show  cause  against  granting  the  rehearing  on  the  return 
day  of  the  order  by  an  affidavit.!^  If  there  be  any  irregularity  in 
the  petition,  it  may  be  taken  off  the  file  at  the  respondent's  mo- 
tion.^' Upon  the  return  day  of  the  order  to  show  cause,  if  no 
adjournment  be  had,  the  matter  is  argued  before  the  judge,  by 
whose  direction  the  decree  or  order  complained  of  was  made,  unless 
he  be  absent,  when  the  papers  and  the  briefs  of  counsel  should  be 
filed  with  the  clerk,  who  will  mail  them  to  him.^^  The  petition  will 
not  be  granted  without  notice  to  the  adverse  parties,  and  an  oppor- 
tunity for  their  presence  afforded  them.^^  A  rule  of  the  Circuit 
Court  for  the  Southern  District  of  New  York  provides  that  when 
a  "  motion  for  a  rehearing  is  made  during  the  term  at  which  a  de- 
cree has  been  rendered,  the  enrolling  or  recording  of  such  decree 
shall  be  suspended  imtil  the  final  disposition  of  such  motion  by  the 
court."  ^"^  Upon  a  rehearing  the  cause  or  matter  is  proceeded  in  as 
if  it  were  heard  for  the  first  time.     All  depositions  taken  before 


12  Rule  88.  1®  Giant   Powder  Co.  v.  California  Vig- 

13  Page  »'.  Holmes  Burglar  Alarm  Tel-  orit  Powder  Co.,  5  Fed.  R.  lUT. 
egraph  Co.,  2  Fed.  R.  330.  i'  Wood  r.  Griffitli.  1  Mvnv.  .35. 

"  Baker    v.    Whiting,    1    Story,   218 ;         i^  Giant  Powder  Co.  v.  California  Vig- 

Perry  v.  Phelips,  17  Ves.  173,  178;  Head  orit  Powder  Co.,  5  Fed.  R.  1!».">. 
V.  Godlee,  Johns.  .536,  579  ;  Jopp  v.  Wood,         "  Giant  Powder  Co.  v.  California  Yig- 

2  De  G.  J.  &  S.  3-23.  orit  Powder  Co.,  5  Fed.  R.  197. 

15  Giant  Powder  Co.  v.   Cnlifornia  Vig-         ^J  U.  S.  C.  C,  S.  D.  N.  Y.,  Rule  114. 
orit  Powder  Co.,  5  Fed.  K.  197. 


668  CORRECTION   OF   DECREE.  [CHAP.  XXVII. 

the  original  hearing,  though  not  then  used,  may  be  read,^^  and  the 
plaintiff  may  withdraw  from  evidence  any  portion  of  the  answer 
read  before.^^  No  new  evidence  can  be  used,  unless  a  supplemental 
bill  has  been  filed ;  ^  but  exhibits  not  previously  used  may  be  pro- 
duced ;  ^  and  if  a  witness  has  since  the  former  hearing  been  con- 
victed of  perjury ,25  or  admitted  receiving  a  bribe  to  influence  his 
testimony ,26  that  may  be  proved  to  the  court.  After  one  rehearing, 
a  petition  for  another  can  only  be  filed  by  special  leave  of  the 
court,  and  may  be  taken  off  the  file  if  presented  without  such 
leave.-''  It  has  been  held  that  an  order  granting  a  rehearing 
after  the  time  prescribed  by  the  rules  has  expired  is  void,  not 
merely  voidable ;  and  that  a  party  does  not  by  taking  a  subse- 
quent step  in  the  cause,  waive  his  right  to  move  to  vacate  the 
same.28  The  grant  or  refusal,  absolute  or  conditional,  of  an 
application  for  a  rehearing,  which  has  been  made  in  due  time, 
rests  in  the  discretion  of  the  court  where  the  cause  is  first  heard, 
and  is  not  a  subject  of  appeal.^^ 

§  353.  Supplemental  Bills  in  the  nature  of  Bills  of  Review.  —  A 
supplemental  bill  in  the  nature  of  a  bill  of  review  is  a  bill  that 
brings  to  the  attention  of  the  court  new  matter,  which  has  arisen 
or  been  discovered  since,  and  could  not  by  the  exercise  of  due  dil- 
igence have  been  discovered  before,  the  time  for  taking  testimony 
in  a  cause  expired,  and  which  the  party  filing  the  bill  alleges  as  a 
reason  why  a  decree  made  and  passed  therein,  but  not  signed  and 
enrolled,  should  be  reversed  or  modified. ^  Such  a  bill  cannot  be 
filed  after  a  decree  has  been  signed  and  enrolled. ^  The  proper 
remedy  in  a  similar  case  then  is  a  bill  of  review.^  A  supplemental 
bill  in  the  nature  of  a  bill  of  review  cannot  be  used  to  obtain  a  re- 
versal or  modification  of  a  decree  for  errors  in  law  apparent  upon 
its  face.*  That,  before  enrolment,  can  only  be  done  by  means  of  a 
petition  for  a  rehearing.^    Matter  of  revivor  and  supplement  may 

■^1  Cun^'ngham  u.  Cunynjiham,  Ambler,  100;  Steines  t'.  Franklin  rounty,  14  Wall. 

89,  00.  15,  22;   Railway  Company  r.  Heck,  102 

■^■^  Allfrcy  V.  Allfrey,  1   Macn.  &  G.  87 ;  U.  S.  120;  Kennon  v.  Gilmer,  1.31   U.  S. 

Ojile  V.  Morgan,  1  l)e  G.  M.  &  G.  359.  22,  24 ;   Boesch  v.  Graff,  1-33  U.  S.  607, 

23  Jenkins  v.  EWredge,  8  Story,  299.  699. 

21  Herring  v.  Clobery,  Or.  &  Ph.  251.  §  35:1    i  Perry  r.Phelips,  17  Ves.  173; 

25  Needliam  v.  Smith,  2  Vern.  46.3.  Mitford's  PI.  cli.  1,  §  2  ;  Moore  v.  Moore,  2 

2G  Needham  r.  Smith,  2  Vern.  46-3.  Ves.  Sen.  506  ;  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §§  422, 423. 

27  Moss  V.  Baldock,  1  Phill.  118.  2  Beames'  Orders,  1. 

2a  Glenn  v.  Lucas,  43  Fed.  R.  5-50.  3  See  §§  354-3.-,6. 

29  Roemer  v.  Bernheim.  132  V   S.  10.3,  4  Perry  v.  Phelips,  17  Ves.  173. 

106;   Buffington  v.  Harvey,  05  U.  S.  99,  5  gge  §  352. 


§  353.]  BILLS   IN   THE   NATURE   OF   BILLS   OF   KEVIEW.  669 

be  incorporated  in  such  a  supplemental  bill.^  An  English  chan- 
cery order  made  on  the  17th  of  October,  1841,  and  wliich  should 
probably  be  followed  here,  the  clerk  taking  the  place  of  the  regis- 
trar and  five  dollars  being  reckoned  as  a  pound  sterling,  provides  : 
"  That  no  su{)pleniental  bill,  or  bill  in  the  nature  of  a  bill  of  re- 
view, grounded  upon  new  matter  discovered,  or  pretended  to  be 
discovered,  since  the  pronouncing  of  any  decree  of  tiiis  Court,  in 
order  to  the  reversing  or  varying  of  such  decree,  shall  be  exhib- 
ited without  the  special  leave  of  the  Court  first  obtained  for  that 
purpose,  and  unless  the  party  exhibiting  the  same  do  first  deposit 
with  the  registrar  of  this  Court  so  much  money  as  together  with 
the  deposit  by  the  rules  of  this  Court  required  to  be  made  on 
obtaining  a  rehearing  of  the  cause  or  causes  wherein  such  decree 
was  pronounced  will  make  up  the  sum  of  50/.,  as  a  pledge  to  an- 
swer such  costs  and  damages  as  shall  be  awarded  to  the  adverse 
party,  in  case  the  court  shall  think  fit  to  award  any  at  the  liear- 
ing  of  the  cause  on  such  supplemental  or  new  bill." '  A  supple- 
mental bill  in  the  nature  of  a  bill  of  review  should  state  the  facts 
which  it  is  desired  to  prove,  and,  if  they  had  then  occurred,  the 
reason  why  they  were  not  discovered  and  given  in  evidence  before 
publication,  and  it  seems  should  state  positively  that  the  decree 
has  not  been  enrolled,  and  not  in  the  alternative,  praying  one  sort 
of  relief  as  upon  a  bill  of  review,  if  the  decree  has  been  enrolled, 
and  if  not  enrolled,  then  to  have  the  benefit  of  it  as  upon  a  supple- 
mental bill  in  the  nature  of  a  bill  of  review.^  Such  a  bill  should 
conclude  with  a  prayer  that  the  cause  may  be  reheard.  It  should 
be  signed  by  counsel,  and  in  other  respects  conform  to  the  require- 
ments of  a  bill  of  review  upon  newly  discovered  facts.^  Like  that, 
it  can  only  be  filed  by  leave  of  the  court,  which  is  obtained  in  the 
same  way,  and  upon  the  same  grounds  as  that  to  file  such  a  bill 
of  review  ;  ^"^  and  the  proceedings  upon  the  two  kinds  of  bills  are 
also  substantially  tlie  same.^^  But  according  to  Lord  Redesdale, 
'•  Bills  in  the  nature  of  bills  of  review  do  not  appear  subject  to 
nny  peculiar  cause  of  demurrer,  unless  the  decree  sought  to  be  re- 
versed does  not  affect  the  interest  of  the  person  filing  the  bill."  ^^ 

6  Perry  i'.  Plielips,  17  Ves.  176-178.  9  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §§  422,425.    See  infra, 

'  Order  of  17th  October,  1741 ;  Beanies'  §  355. 
Orders,  368.  lo  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  422. 

8  Story's  Eq.  PL  §  425.     See  tlie  Ian-        "  Story's  Eq.  PL  §§  422-425. 
guage  of  Lord  Eldon  in  Perry  v.  Plielips,        i-  Mitford's  PI.  cli.  1,  §  3,  pt.  3. 
17  Ves.  173-178. 


670  COEEECTION    OF   DECREE.  [CHAP.  XXVII. 

Laches  may  be  a  ground  for  refusing  leave  to  file  a  supplemental 
bill  in  the  nature  of  a  bill  of  review,  unless  such  laches  is  exten- 
uated by  laches  on  the  part  of  the  defendant  to  it.^-^  Such  a  bill 
cannot  be  heard  unless  accompanied  by  a  petition  for  a  rehearing, 
when  the  rehearing  of  the  original  and  the  hearing  of  the  supple- 
mental cause  will  be  set  down  together.^'* 

§  354.  Bills  of  Review.  —  A  bill  of  review  is  a  bill  filed  to  re- 
verse or  modify  a  decree  that  has  been  signed  and  enrolled  for 
error  in  law  apparent  upon  the  face  of  such  decree,  or  on  account 
of  new  facts  discovered  since  publication  was  passed  in  the  origi- 
nal cause,  and  which  could  not  by  the  exercise  of  due  diligence 
have  been  discovered  or  used  before  the  decree  was  made.^  A  bill 
of  review  can  only  be  filed  to  impeach  a  final,  not  to  impeach  an 
interlocutory  decree.^  For  an  interlocutory  decree  can  always  be 
modified  or  reversed  by  the  court  without  any  bill  for  that  pur- 
pose.3  But  the  expression  "  final  decree  "  is  here  used  with  the 
meaning  given  it  when  spealcing  of  appeals.*  The  errors  of  law 
for  which  a  decree  may  be  reversed  or  modified  must  be  clearly 
apparent  upon  the  record,  that  is,  "  only  such  as  arose  upon  the 
pleadings,  proceedings,  and  decree,  without  reference  to  the  evi- 
dence in  the  cause  ; "  ^  as,  for  example,  the  disregard  of  a  statute,'' 
or  want  of  jurisdiction,'  or  the  finding  of  a  fact  contrary  to  an  alle- 
gation in  a  defendant's  answer  when  no  evidence  was  taken  ;  ^  not 
errors  in  drawing  conclusions  from  evidence,^  nor  errors  in  cast- 
ing accounts,^^,  nor  it  seems  in  matters  of  abatement,^^  nor  in  the 


13    Story's   Eq.    PI.   §   423;     Sheffield  v.   Bank  of   United    States,    13  Pet.  6; 

Canal  Co.  v.  Sheffield  &  R.   Uy.  Co.,  1  Putnam  v.  Day,  22  Wall  60;  Thompson 

Phillips,  484.  v.  Maxwell,  95  U.  S.  391. 

1*  Moore  v.   Moore,  2  Ves.   Sen.   590,         *"  Story's   Eq.   PI.   §   405;    Gregor  v. 

598;  Perry  i-.  Phelips,  17  Ves.  173.  Molesworth,  2  Ves.  Sen.  109. 

§  354.   1  Mitford's  PI.  ch.  1,  §  3,  pt.  3;  ^  Ketchum  v.  Farmers'  L.  &  T.  Co., 

Story's    Eq.    PI.    §§   403-420  ;    Irwin    v.  4  McLean,  1. 

Meyrose,  7  Fed.  R.  533;  Nickle  v.  Stuart,         «  Clark  v.  Killian,  103  U.  S.  766. 
Ill  U.  S.  776.  9  Whiting  v.  Bank  of  United  States, 

■-  Jenkins  v.  Eldredge,  3  Story,  299  ;  13  Pet.  6  ;  De.xter   v.  Arnold,  5  Mason, 

Story's  Eq.  PI    §  408  a.  303;     Putnam    v.   Day,    22    Wall.     60; 

3  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  408  a.    See  supra,  Bufflngton  v.  Harvey.  95  U.  S.  99;  Kim- 

§  20.3.  berley  v.  Arms,  40  Fed.  R.  548 ;  s.  c.  136 

*  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  408  a  ;  Whiting  p.  U.  S.  629. 
Bank  of  United   States,   13  Pet.  6,  15;        i"  Massie  v.  Graham,  3   McLean,  41; 

Ray  r.  Lvw,  3  Cranch,  179;  Jenkins  v.  Beames'  Ord.  1  ;  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  405. 

Eldredge,  3  Story,  299.  -    n  Story's  Eq.  PI,  §  411;    Hartwell  v. 

6  Mr.  Justice  Bradley  in  Buffington  r.  Townsend,  6  Bro.  Pari.  R.  107;  Slingsby 

Harvey,  95  U  S    99.     See  also  Whiting  v.  Hale,  1  Ch.  Cas.  122. 


§  354.]  BILLS    OF   REVIEW.  671 

exercise  of  discretion,^^  nor  matters  of  form,^^  —  among  which, 
however,  the  omission  of  a  clause  giving  an  infant  defendant  a 
day  in  which  to  show  cause  against  a  decree  is  not  included,  and 
on  that  ground  a  bill  of  review  may  be  sustained.^*  It  has  been 
held  to  be  no  sufficient  ground  for  a  bill  of  review  that  since  the 
decree  a  State  court  has  given  to  the  Constitution  of  the  State  a 
construction  different  from  that  put  upon  it  by  the  Federal  court 
in  its  decree  ;^^  nor  that  since  the  decree  the  Supreme  Court  has 
changed  its  ruling  upon  a  question  of  law  or  fact.^^  In  England, 
where  the  mandatory  part  of  a  decree  was  usually  preceded  by  a 
statement  of  the  facts  upon  which  it  was  founded,  only  the  decree 
itself  could  be  examined  for  such  errors ;  ^^  but  in  the  Federal 
courts  where  this  custom  does  not  exist,  the  whole  record  except 
the  evidence  may  be  thus  corrected.^^  Bills  of  review  for  errors 
apparent  upon  the  record  can  only  be  filed  within  the  time  limited 
for  an  appeal.^^  The  time  within  which  the  control  of  the  Circuit 
Court  over  the  case  is  suspended  by  an  appeal  subsequently  dis- 
missed, is  not  included  in  the  computation  of  time;^*^  but  not  the 
period  between  the  entry  of  a  void  order  vacating  the  order  sought 
to  be  reviewed  and  the  vacation  of  such  void  order.^i  Laches  for 
a  shorter  period  of  time  might  be  a  ground  for  dismissing  a  bill  of 
review.22  After  a  decree  has  been  affirmed  by  the  appellate  court, 
it  cannot  be  reviewed  for  any  reason  without  the  leave  of  that 
court ;  "^  and  leave  will  rarely,  if  ever,  be  granted  them  to  file  a 
bill  of  review  for  errors  in  law.^*  Leave  of  court  is  not  needed 
to  enable  a  party  to  file  a  bill  of  review  for  errors  apparent  upon 

12  BuflBngton  v.  Harvey,  95  U.  S.  99 ;     How.  586  ;  Clark  i-.  Killian,  103  U.   S. 
Irwin  V.  Meyrose,  7  Fed.  R.  633.  766  ;   Story's   Eq.   PI.  §  410.     See  also 

13  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  411.  Massle  v.  Graham,  3  McLean,  41;  Mc- 
»   Story's   Eq.   PI.   §    407;    Perry   v.     Donald  r.  Wliitney,  39  Fed.  R.  466. 

Phelips,   17  Ves.  173;   Gregor  v.  Moles-  ^o  Ensminger    v.    Powers,    108   U.   S. 

worth,   2  Vesey,  Sen.  109.      See  supra,  292. 

§  322.  -1  Central  Trust  Co.  r.  Grant  Locorno- 

15  King  V.  Dundee  Mortgage  &  Tr.  I.  tive  Works,  135  U.  S.  207. 

Co.,   28   Fed.    R.    33.      Contra,   Knox   v.  '--  Farmers'  Loan  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Green 

Columbia  Liberty  Iron  Co.,  42  Fed.  R.  Bay  &  M.  R.  Co.,  16  Fed.  R.  100,  113. 

878.  -3  Southard  v.   Russell,  16  How.  547; 

i«  Tilghman  v.  Werk,  39  Fed.  R.  680.  Kingsbury  v.  Buckner.   134  U.   S.  6.54  ; 

1'  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  407.  Kimberly  v.  Arms,  40  Fed.  R.  548 ;    s.  c. 

18  Whitins  r.  Bank  of  United  States,  136  U.  S.  629;  Story's  Equity  Pleading, 

13  Pet.  6 ;  Buffington  v.  Harvey,  95  U.  S.  §  408. 

99;  Clark  v.  Killian,  103  U.  S.  766.  -^  Southard  r.  Russell,  16    How,  547; 

13  Thomas  v.  Harvie's  Heirs,  10  Wheat.  Kingsbury  v.   Buckner,   134  U.   S.  C50, 

146;   Kennedy   v.   Georgia   State   Bank,  671;  Story's  Eq   PI.  §  408. 


G72  COKRECTION   OF   DECREE.  [CHAP.  XXVII. 

the  face  of  the  record.^^     A  bill  defective  as  a  bill  of  review  may 
be  sustained  as  a  cross-bill.^*^ 

§  355.  Provisions  peculiar  to  Bills  of  Review  for  Matters  of  Fact 
newly  discovered.  —  Bills  of  review  Upon  matters  of  fact  newly 
discovered  can  only  be  filed  by  express  leave  of  the  court.i  Leave 
should  be  obtained  by  a  petition  praying  for  leave  to  file  the  bill, 
and  supported  by  an  affidavit  showing  that  the  new  matter,  which 
it  is  desired  to  prove,  was  not  known  to  the  petitioner,  and  could 
not  have  been  discovered  by  him,  with  the  exercise  of  due  dili- 
gence, in  time  to  prove  it  before  the  entry  of  the  decree  sought  to 
be  reviewed,^  It  seems  that  the  affidavit  must  be  positive,  and 
not  merely  upon  information  and  belief.^  Previous  knowledge 
of  it  bv  tlie  petitioner's  attorney  or  other  agent  while  acting  in 
tliat  capacity,  is  equivalent  to  knowledge  by  the  petitioner,  and 
will  be  a  reason  for  refusing  to  allow  him  to  file  the  bill.*  If 
the  newly  discovered  facts  are  proved  by  documents  tliat  were 
under  the  control  of  the  petitioner,  very  good  reasons  for  his  not 
discovering  and  producing  them  before  must  be  shown  in  order 
to  entitle  him  to  file  a  bill  of  review  founded  upon  them.^  The 
affidavit  should  also  state  the  nature  of  the  new  matter,  and  the 
evidence  desired  to  be  given  in  its  support,  in  order  that  the  court 
may  judge  of  its  relevancy  and  materiality.^  It  is  said  that  the 
matter  must  be  not  only  new,  but  material,  and  such  as,  if  un- 
answered in  point  of  fact,  would  clearly  entitle  the  plaintiff  to 
a  decree,  or  would  raise  a  question  of  so  much  nicety  and  diffi- 
culty as  to  be  a  fit  subject  of  judgment  in  the  cause."  The  new 
matter  may  be  concerning  a  point  not  in  issue  in  the  original 
cause,^  provided  that  it  be  connected  with  the  subject-matter  of 
the  bill.^    A  bill  of  review  will  not  lie  on  the  ground  of  newly 

25  Ross  V.  Prentiss,  4  McLean,  106.  ^  Page  v.  Holmes  Burglar  Alarm  Tele- 

'■^8  Houghton  V.  West,  2  Bro.  Pari.  Rep.  graph  Co.,  2  Fed.  R.  J]30. 

by  Tomlins,  88 ;  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §   -401,  *    Norris    v.    Le    Neve,   3    Atk.    26  ; 

n.  5.  Greenlee  v.  McDowell,  4  Ireil.  Eq.  (S.  C.) 

§355.       1  Anon.,    2   P.   Wms.    283;  481 ;  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §§  413,  414. 

Perry  v.  Phelips,  17  Ves.  173 ;   Ross    v.         ^  Forum  Romanum,  187. 

Prentiss,  4  McLean,  106;  Story's  Eq.  PI.  6  U.  S  v.  Sampeyreac,  Hempst.  118; 

§  412.  Dexter  v.  Arnold,  5  Mason,  303  ;  Massie 

2  Wortley  v.   Birkhead,  2  Ves.    Sen.  v.  Graham,  3  McLean,  41  ;  Story's   Eq. 

571  ;    Young    r.  Keighly,    16    Ves.  348  ;  PI.  §  412. 

PurccU  r.  Miner,  4  Wall.  519;  Dexter  v.         "  Ord  v.  Noel,  6  Madd.  127. 

Arnold,  5  Mason,  303;  Massie  v.  Graham,  ^  Partridge  v.  Osl)orne,  (J  Russ.  195. 

3  McLean,  41;  Itoss  v.   Prentiss,  4  Mc-         ^  U.  S.  v.  Sampeyreac,  Hempst.  118. 

Lean,  106  ;  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §§  412,  413. 


§  356.]  PROVISIONS   COMMON   TO   ALL   BILLS   OF   REVIEW.  673 

discovered  evidence  which  is  merely  cumulative,  or  goes  to  im- 
peach the  character  of  witnesses.^*^  It  has  been  held  that  a  bill 
of  review  will  not  lie  on  the  ground  that  a  decree  offered  in  evi- 
dence in  the  original  suit  and  there  held  to  be  res  adjudicata  has 
since  been  set  aside  for  want  of  jurisdiction,  unless  it  is  shown 
that  the  defect  in  the  jurisdiction  could  not  have  been  known  or 
discovered  by  the  exercise  of  reasonable  diligence  when  the  decree 
was  offered  in  evidence.^^  It  has  been  said  that  the  matter  upon 
the  discovery  of  which  a  bill  of  review  is  based,  if  previously 
known  to  the  other  party,  must  be  of  such  a  nature  that  he  was 
not  in  conscience  obliged  to  have  discovered  it  to  the  court ;  for 
if  it  was  known  to  him  and  such  as  in  conscience  he  ought  to 
have  discovered,  he  obtained  the  decree  by  fraud,  and  it  ought  to 
be  set  aside  by  an  original  bill.^^  Permission  to  file  such  a  bill 
of  review  is  always  in  the  discretion  of  the  court ;  ^^  and  lapse 
of  time  since  the  discovery  of  the  new  matter  will  always  have 
great  weight  in  inducing  the  court  to  look  with  disfavor  upon 
an  application  for  leave  to  file  such  a  bill  of  review.^*  It  has 
been  said  that  if  the  decree  impeached  has  been  affirmed  by  an 
appellate  court,  such  a  bill  of  review  can  only  be  filed  by  leave 
of  tliat  court.^^  A  bill  of  review  for  newly  discovered  matter,  if 
filed  without  leave,  may  upon  motion  be  dismissed  or  taken  off 
the  file.i<5 

§  356.  Provisions  common  to  all  Bills  of  Review.  — "  To  en- 
title a  person  to  bring  a  bill  of  review,  it  is  necessary  that  he 
should  have  obeyed  or  performed  the  decree  ;  as,  if  it  be  for  land, 
that  the  possession  be  yielded ;  if  it  be  for  money,  that  the  money 
be  paid  ;  if  it  be  for  evidences,  that  the  evidences  be  brought  in ; 
and  so  in  other  cases  which  stand  upon  the  strength  of  the  decree 
alone.  But  if  any  act  be  decreed  to  be  done,  which  extinguisheth 
the  party's  right  at  the  common  law,  as  making  of  assurance  or 
release,  acknowledging  satisfaction,  cancelling  bonds  or  evidences, 
and  the  like,  those  parts  of  the  decree  are  to  be  spared  until  the 

w  Soutliard  v.  Russell,  16  How.  547.  »  Blandy  v.  Griffith,  6  Fish.  Pat.  Cas. 

11  Vetterlein  v.  Barker,  45  Fed.  R.  741.  434  ;  Thomas  v.  Harvie,  10  Wheat.  146, 

12  Manaton  v.  Molesworth,  1  Eden,  18,  151  ;  Tilghman  i-.  Werk,  39  Fed.  R.680  ; 
25.  But  see  U.  S.  v.  Sampeyreac,  Hetnpst.  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  419. 

118;  s.  c.  as  Sampeyreac  v.  U.  S  ,  7  I'et.  i^  Southard  r.  Russell,  16  How.  547. 

222.  i«  Carroll  v.  Parran,    1   Bland  (Md.), 

13  Beames'  Orders,  1  ;  Massie  v.  Gra-  125,  note, 
ham,  3   M(;Lean,   41;    Story's    Eq.    PL 

§§  404,  417. 
VOL.  I.  —  43 


674  CORRECTION   OF   DECREE.  [CIIAP.  XXVII. 

bill  of  review  be  determined ;  but  such  sparing  is  to  be  warranted 
by  public  order  made  in  court."  ^  If,  however,  the  plaintiff  to  the 
bill  of  review  be  insolvent,^  or  for  any  other  reason  it  be  im- 
possible for  him  to  obey  the  original  decree ;  ^  or  if  it  directed 
him  to  perform  an  act  after  the  performance  of  another  act  l)y 
the  other  party,  and  that  other  have  omitted  to  perform  liis  part 
thereof;*  or  perhaps,  if  he  have  given  security  for  its  perform- 
ance,^—  his  disobedience  is  no  objection  to  the  bill  of  review. 
By  an  English  order  in  Chancery,  made  on  March  12, 1700,  it  was 
ordered  that  for  the  future  no  bill  of  review  should  be  allowed 
or  admitted  unless  the  party  who  preferred  it  first  deposited  the 
sum  of  X50  with  the  registrar  of  the  court,  as  a  pledge  to  answer 
such  costs  and  damages  as  the  court  should  award  to  the  adverse 
partv,  in  case  it  should  think  fit  to  dismiss  the  bill  of  review.^ 
■This  order  should  probably  be  followed  here,  five  dollars  being 
reckoned  as  the  equivalent  of  a  pound  sterling,  and  the  money 
being  deposited  with  the  clerk  of  the  court."  The  court  may, 
however,  dispense  with  this  requirement.^  A  decree  entered  by 
consent  cannot  be  impeached  by  a  bill  of  review.^  A  decree  entered 
by  consent  can  be  set  aside  only  by  an  original  bill  alleging  fraud 
or  surprise. ^^  It  is  no  objection  to  a  bill  of  review  that  the  party 
filing  it  has  entered  and  procured  the  enrolment  of  the  decree  ; 
"  because,"  said  Lord  Nottingham,  "  he  can  have  no  error  till  it 
be  enrolled,  and  perhaps  tlie  defendant  will  never  enroll  it;"" 
and  a  party  may  file  a  bill  of  review  to  a  decree  entirely  in  his 
favor,  claiming  that  it  is  less  beneficial  to  him  tlian  it  should 
have  bccn.^^  If  upon  a  bill  of  review  a  former  decree  has  been 
reversed,  another  bill  of  review  may  be  brought  to  reverse  the 
decree  of  reversal  ;^^  but  after  a  bill  of  review  lias  been  dismissed 

§  .S56.  1  Daniell's  Ch.Pr.  {M  Am.  erl.)  150;  Taylor  v.   Person,  2  Ilnwks  (N.  C), 

1634-l<J3o.     See  also  Beanies'  Orders,  4  ;  208. 

Massie  v.  Graham,  •'!  McLean,  41.     Tliis  ''•  Beanies'  Orders,  SIO ;    Anon,  2    P. 

rule  ai)plies  even  when  it  appears  on  tlie  Wms.  :1S8. 

face  of  tlie  former  decree  that  the  court  ^  Davis  r.  Speiden,  104  U.  S.  8:1 

liad  not  jurisdiction  of  the  subject-mat-  8  Davis  r.  Speiden,  104  U.  S.  8:1 

ter.     Miller  v.  Ckrk,  47  Fed.  R.  850.  '  Thompson  r.  Maxwell,  95  U.  S.  .301. 

2  Davis  V.  Speiden,  104  U.  S.  83.  «  Gilbert  ;•.  Endean,  9  (~'li.  D.  250,  2GG. 

3  Story's   Eq.    PI.    §   406;    Wiser    v.  See /n/"/Y/ §  .355. 

Blachly,  2  .J.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  488;  Davis  v.         ^  Cook  r.  Bamfield,  3  Swanst.  607. 
Speiden.  104  U.  S.  83.  J-  Cook   v.    Bamfield,  P,   Swanst.  607; 

*  Partridge  v.   Osborne,  5  Buss.   105,  Dexter  >•.  Arnold,  5  Mason,  30:3. 
251  ;  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  40G.  '^  Mitford   PI.  ch.   1,  §   3;  Stafford  v. 

5  Stallings    v.    Goodloe,    3    Murphey,  Bryan,  2  Page  (N.  Y.),  45. 


§  356.]  PKOVISIONS   COMMON    TO   ALL   BILLS    OF   KEVIEW.  675 

upon  demurrer  or  otherwise,  no  second  bill  of  review  will  be 
allowed  to  be  filed.^^  It  has  been  held  that  a  bill  of  review  cannot 
be  iiled  pending  an  appeal,  although  the  plaintiff  alleges  that  he 
does  not  intend  to  perfect  his  appeal. ^^  No  person  can  file  a  bill  of 
review  except  a  party  who  has  been  aggrieved  by  the  decree  com- 
plained of,^*^  or  the  assignee  by  operation  of  law  of  such  a  party. i" 
All  the  parties  to  the  original  decree  should  be  joined  either 
as  plaintiffs  or  as  defendants  to  the  bill  of  review.^^  Lord  Redes- 
dale  gives  the  following  rules  for  the  framing  of  a  bill  of  review : 
"  In  a  bill  of  this  nature  it  is  necessary  to  state  the  former  bill, 
and  the  proceedings  thereon ;  the  decree,  and  the  point  in  which 
the  party  exhibiting  the  bill  of  review  conceives  himself  aggrieved 
by  it ;  and  the  ground  of  law,  or  new  matter  discovered  upon  which 
he  seeks  to  impeach  it ;  and  if  the  decree  is  impeached  on  the  lat- 
ter ground,  it  seems  necessary  to  state  in  the  bill  the  leave  obtained 
to  file  it  and  the  fact  of  the  discovery,  though  it  may  be  doubted 
whether  after  leave  given  to  file  the  bill  that  fact  is  traversable.^^ 
The  bill  may  pray  simply  that  the  decree  may  be  reviewed  and 
reversed  in  the  point  complained  of,  if  it  has  not  been  carried 
into  execution.  If  it  has  been  carried  into  execution,  the  bill 
may  also  pray  the  farther  decree  of  the  court,  to  put  the  party 
complaining  of  the  former  decree  into  tlie  situation  in  which  he 
would  have  been  if  that  decree  had  not  been  executed.  If  the 
bill  is  brought  to  review  the  reversal  of  a  former  decree,  it  may 
pray  that  the  original  decree  may  stand.  The  bill  may  also,  if 
the  original  suit  has  become  abated,  be  at  the  same  time  a  bill  of 
revivor.  A  supplemental  bill  may  likewise  be  added,  if  any  event 
has  happened  which  requires  it ;  and  particularly  if  any  person 
not  a  i)arty  in  the  original  suit  becomes  interested  in  the  subject 
he  must  be  made  a  party  to  the  bill  of  review  by  way  of  supple- 
ment." ^^    The  plaintiff,  however,  cannot  put  his  case  in  the  alter- 

"  Pitt  V.  Earl  of  Ar^rlass,  1  Vera.  441  ;  is  Bank  of  the  United  States  v.  Wiiite, 

Dunnv  V.  Filmore,  1  Vern.  135.  8  Pet.  202. 

1^  Kiniberly  v.  Arms,  40  Fed.  R.  545  ^^  But   see  United   States  v.  Sanipey- 

550;  s.  c.  136  U.  S.  629;  Willian  y.  Wil-  reac,    Hempst.    118;    Dexter  t-.    Arnold, 

lian,  10  Ves.  72,  87.  5   Mason,   303 ;    Story's    Eq.   PI.    §   420, 

1'^  Whiting    V.    Bank    of    the    United  note  7. 

States,  13  Pet.  6  ;  Thompson  v.  Maxwell,  -^  Mitford's  PI.  ch.  1,  §  3,  pt.  o.      See 

95  U.  S.  391.      But  see  King  v.  Dundee  also  Wliiting  v.  Bank  of  United  States, 

Mortgage  &,  Tr.  I.  Co.,  28  Fed.  R.  33.  13  Pet.  6. 

J"  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  409;  Thompson  v. 
Maxwell,  95  U.  S.  391. 


676  COKRECTION   OF   DECREE.  [CHAP.  XXVII, 

native,  as  a  bill  of  review,  or,  if  the  court  shall  think  it  not  good 
as  such,  then  as  a  bill  of  revivor  and  supplement.^i  It  is  im- 
proper for  a  bill  of  review  on  account  of  errors  of  law  to  contain 
a  statement  of  the  evidence  in  the  original  cause.^  A  bill  of 
review  which  seeks  relief  because  the  original  decree  was  erro- 
neous for  errors  of  law  appearing  on  its  face,  and  because  of  the 
discovery  of  new  facts,  and  because  of  fraud,  has  been  held  multi- 
farious.^ A  bill  of  review  should  be  signed  by  counsel,  and  other- 
wise conform  in  general  to  the  requirements  of  an  original  bill.^^ 
If  the  court  had  jurisdiction  of  the  original  suit,  it  can  take  juris- 
diction of  the  bill  of  review,  even  though  it  would  have  none  were 
the  latter  regarded  as  the  beginning  of  a  new  suit.^^  It  has  been 
said  that  a  Federal  court  cannot  take  cognizance  of  a  bill  of  review 
to  a  decree  of  a  State  court.^^  The  service  and  the  appearance  of 
a  defendant  to  a  bill  of  review  is  made  and  enforced  in  the  same 
manner  as  to  an  original  bill.  But  if  the  defendant  be  beyond  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  court,  service  of  a  subpoena  upon  his  solicitor 
in  the  former  suit  may  be  allowed  by  the  court.^'  The  usual  de- 
fense to  a  bill  of  review  for  errors  apparent  upon  the  face  of  the 
decree  is  by  demurrer  ;  ^s  to  which  is  usually  joined  a  plea  setting 
forth  in  full  the  original  decree,  although  there  seems  to  be  no 
necessity  for  this  practice.^^  If  the  demurrer  is  overruled,  the 
decree  is  reversed  or  modified  and  the  errors  allowed,  and  no  fur- 
ther answer  or  hearing  is  necessary .^'^  If  the  demurrer  is  sus- 
tained, that  has  all  the  effect  of  confirming  the  decree,  and  puts 
an  end  to  the  suit.^^  The  rule  is  in  such  a  case  only  to  vary  the 
decree  upon  such  errors  as  are  complained  of,  except  as  to  con- 
sequential directions,  which  will  be  altered  to  conform  to  the 
changes  made.^^  If  a  bill  of  review  for  apparent  error  contain  a 
statement  of  the  evidence  taken  in  the  original  cause,  that  may  be 
stricken  out  of  the  bill  as  surplusage  on  motion ;  ^^  or  it  may  be  a 
ground  of  demurrer,  if  specially  assigned  ;2*  but  the  bill,  if  other- 

21  Perry  v.  Phelips,  17  Ves.  173.  ^  Mitford's  PI.  ch.  2,  §  2,  pt.  1,  5. 

22  Biiffington  V.  Harvey,  95  U.  S.  99.  29  Mitford's  PI.  ch.  2,  §  2,  pt.  1,  5. 

23  Kiiiiberly  v.  Arms,  40  Fed.  R.  548,  8'^  Cook  v.  Bamfield,  3  Swatist.  007. 
559  ;  s.  c.  136  U.  S.  (i29.  3i  Webb  v.  Pell,  3  Paige  (N.  Y.),  368. 

21  Mitford's  PI.  cli.  1,  §  2,  pt.  3.  '^^  Moore  v.  Moore,  2  Ves.   Sen.  596, 

25  Oglesby  v.  Attrill,V2  Fed.  R.  227.     698. 

See  §  21.  ^^  Mr.  Justice  Bradley  in  BufEngton  v. 

26  Mr.  Justice   Bradley   in   Barrow  r.     Harvey,  95  U.  S.  99. 

Hunton,  99  U.  S.  80,  83.  ^  Buffington  v.  Harvey,  95  U.  S.  99. 

2"  See  supra,  §  96. 


§  357.]  BILLS   IN   THE   NATURE   OF   BILLS   OF   EEVIKW.  677 

wise  good,  cannot  be  dismissed  for  that  reason  upon  a  general 
demurrcr,35  although  such  evidence  or  an  allegation  of  an  error 
of  fact  cannot  on  a  general  demurrer  be  used  in  support  uf  the 
bill.3^  According  to  Lord  Rcdesdale  :  "  When  any  matter  beyond 
the  decree  is  to  be  offered  against  opening  the  enrolment,  as 
length  of  time,  tliat  matter  must  be  pleaded  ;  otherwise  the 
plaintiff  will  not  have  the  benefit  of  exceptions,  as  infancy,  cover- 
ture, or  the  like."^"  "A  bill  of  review  upon  the  discovery  of  new 
matter  and  a  supplemental  bill  of  the  same  nature  being  ex- 
hibited only  by  leave  of  the  court,  the  ground  of  the  bill  is  gen- 
erally well  considered  before  it  is  brought ;  and  therefore  in  point 
of  substance  it  can  rarely  be  liable  to  a  demurrer.  But  if  brought 
upon  new  matter,  and  the  defendant  should  think  that  matter  not 
relevant,  probably  he  might  take  advantage  of  it  by  way  of  de- 
murrer, although  the  relevancy  ought  to  be  considered  at  the  time 
leave  is  given  to  bring  the  bill."  '^^  If  a  demurrer  to  such  a  bill  of 
review  or  supplemental  bill  be  overruled,  it  does  not  dispose  of 
the  cause  ;  and  the  defendant  must  answer,  because  fact  is  at 
issue.^^  If  the  demurrer  is  allowed,  however,  the  suit  is  at  an 
end.*''  The  defendant  may,  it  seems,  traverse,  and  attempt  to  dis- 
prove, the  allegations  concerning  the  discovery  of  the  new  facts.*^ 
Upon  the  argument  of  the  demurrer,  nothing  can  be  read  except 
the  bill  of  review  and  the  decree,*^  and,  in  the  Federal  courts, 
the  record*^  in  the  original  suit;  but,  after  the  demurrer  has 
been  overruled,  the  plaintiff  is  at  liberty  to  read  any  evidence 
that  was  submitted  therein,  as  at  a  rehearinij,  the  cause  beino- 
then  equally  open.**  Filing  a  bill  of  review  does  not  prevent  the 
execution  of  the  decree  impeached.*^  The  court  has  power,  when 
sustaining  such  a  bill,  to  set  aside  a  conveyance  made  in  })ursu- 
ance  of  the  decree.*'^ 

§  357.    Bills    in  the   Nature    of  Bills    of  Review.  —  As    has    been 
said  above,^  only  parties  to  the  decree  impeached  or  their  privies 

35  Buffington  v.  Harvey,  95  U.  S.  99.  *-^  Catterall  v.  Purcliiise,  1  Atk.  290. 

36  Shelton  v.   Van  Kleeck,  10(3  U.    S.         «  Whiting    v.    Bank    of    the    United 
532.  States,  13  Pet.  13  ;  Story's  p:q.  PI.  §  407. 

87  Mitford's  PI.  ch.  2,  §  2,  pt.  2.  «  Catterall  r.  Purchase,  1  Atk.  290. 

38  Mitford's  Pi.  ch.  2,  §  2,  pt.  2.  *^  Williams  v.  Mellisli,  1  Vern.  117,  n. 

39  Cook  V.  Bamfieid,  3  Svvanst.  007.  •*«  Bank  of  the  United  States  i:  Eitcliie. 
«  Mitford's  Pi.  ch.  2,  §  2,  pt.  2.  8  Pet.  128. 

«  Dexter    v.   Arnold,   5   Mason,  .303;  §357.     i  See  §  3-56. 

U.    S.    V.    Sampeyreac,    Hempst.     118; 
Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  420,  n.  7. 


678  CORRECTION   OF   DECREE.  [CHAP.  XXVII. 

by  operation  of  law,  as  heirs,  executors,  or  administrators,  are 
entitled  to  file  a  bill  of  review ;  but  other  persons  in  interest 
and  in  priority  of  estate,  who  are  aggrieved  by  the  decree,  can 
liave  tlie  same  relief  hy  means  of  a  bill  in  the  nature  of  a  bill  of 
roview.2  Such  are  assignees,  devisees,  and  remaindermen  of  the 
original  unsuccessful  parties.^  Lord  Redesdale  also  speaks  as 
follows  concerning  such  a  bill :  "  If  a  decree  is  made  against  a 
person  who  has  no  interest  at  all  in  the  matter  in  dispute,  or  had 
not  such  an  interest  as  was  sufficient  to  render  the  decree  against 
him  binding  upon  some  person  claiming  the  same  or  a  similar 
interest,  relief  may  be  obtained  against  error  in  the  decree  by  a 
bill  in  the  nature  of  a  bill  of  review.  Thus,  if  a  decree  is  made 
against  a  tenant  for  life  only,  a  remainderman  in  tail,  or  in  fee, 
cannot  defeat  the  proceedings  against  the  tenant  for  life,  but  by 
a  bill,  showing  the  error  in  the  decree,  the  incompetency  in  the 
tenant  for  life  to  sustain  the  suit,  and  the  accruer  of  his  own 
interest,  and  thereupon  praying  that  the  proceedings  in  the  origi- 
nal cause  may  be  reviewed,  and  for  that  purpose  that  the  other 
party  may  appear  to  and  answer  this  new  bill,  and  that  the  rights 
of  the  parties  may  be  properly  ascertained.  A  bill  of  this  nature, 
as  it  does  not  seek  to  alter  a  decree  made  against  the  plaintiff 
himself,  or  against  any  person  under  whom  he  claims,  may  be 
filed  without  the  leave  of  the  court."  ^  Otherwise,  the  frame  of 
and  proceedings  under  bills  in  the  nature  of  bills  of  review  are 
substantially  the  same  as  those  relating  to  bills  of  review, 

§  358.  Bills  to  impeach  Decrees  on  Account  of  Fraud.  —  "If  a 
decree  has  been  obtained  by  fraud,  it  may  be  impeached  by 
original  bill  without  the  leave  of  the  court ;  the  fraud  used  in 
obtaining  the  decree  being  the  principal  point  in  issue,  and  neces- 
sary to  be  established  by  proof  before  the  propriety  of  the  decree 
can  be  investigated.  And  where  a  decree  has  been  so  obtained 
the  court  will  restore  the  parties  to  their  former  situation,  what- 
ever their  rights  may  be."  ^  Such  a  bill  has  been  called  an  origi- 
nal bill  in  the  nature  of  a  bill  of  review.^     There  are  dicta  stating 


'^  Story's  Kq.  PI.  §  409.  See  also  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  426 ;  Riclimond 

'i  Story's   Eq.   PI.   §  409;    Wliiting  i'.  r.  Tayleiir,  1   P.   Wins.  784;  Barnesle  v. 

Bank  of  the   United   States,  13   Pet.  6;  Powell,  1  Ves.  Sen.  120 ;  Evans  r.  Bacon, 

Singleton  )'.  Singleton,  8  B.   Monr.  (Ky.)  90  Mass.  218  ;  Pacific;  R.  R.  of  Mo.  iv  Mo. 

340  ;  Turner  v.  Berry,  .38  111.  541.  Pacific  Ry.  Co.,  Ill  United  States,  505. 

4  Mitford's  PI.  ch.  1,  §  2,  pt.  3.  2  Mussel  v.  Morgan,  3  Bro.  Ch.  R.  74, 

§  358.     1  Mitford's  PI.  ch.  1,  §2,  pt.  3.  79;  Story's  Eq.  Pi.  §  426. 


§  358.]        BILLS  TO  DirEACII  DECREES  ON  ACCOUNT  OF  FKAUD.  679 

that  a  decree  obtained  by  fraud  may  be  set  aside  upon  petition ; " 
but  it  was  finally  settled  that  after  enrohnont  a  decree  could 
only  be  impeached  for  this  account  by  an  original  bill.*  This  is 
the  only  manner  in  which  a  decree  entered  by  consent  can  be 
impeached.^  Decrees  entered  by  collusion,^  or  surprise,'  may  also 
be  rectified  in  this  manner.  Certain  other  cases,  although  if 
logical  arrangement  solely  were  considered  they  should  be  con- 
sidered under  other  heads,  yet  as  they  are  usually  spoken  of  in 
this  connection  by  the  books,  may  be  here  referred  to.  Lord 
Rcdesdale  uses  the  following  language,  which  has  been  copied 
by  all  subsequent  text-writers :  "  Besides  cases  of  direct  fraud  in 
obtaining  a  decree,  it  seems  to  have  been  considered,  that  where 
a  decree  has  been  made  against  a  trustee,  the  cestui  que  trust  not 
being  before  the  court  and  the  trust  not  discovered  ;  or  against  a 
person  who  has  made  some  conveyance  or  incumbrance  not  dis- 
covered ;  or  when  a  decree  has  been  made  in  favor  of  or  against 
an  heir,  when  the  ancestor  has  in  fact  disposed  by  will  of  the 
subject-matter  of  tlie  suit;  the  concealment  of  the  trust  or  sub- 
sequent conveyance  or  incumbrance,  or  will,  in  tliese  several 
cases,  ought  to  be  treated  as  a  fraud.  It  has  been  also  said  that 
where  an  improper  decree  has  been  made  against  an  infant,  with- 
out actual  fraud,  it  ought  to  be  impeached  by  original  bill."  ^ 

A  bill  to  set  aside  a  decree  for  fraud  must  state  the  decree,  and 
the  proceedings  which  led  to  it,  with  the  circumstances  of  fraud 
on  which  it  is  impeached.^  All  the  parties  to  the  original  suit  or 
their  representatives  should  be  joined  as  parties  to  it.^*^  A  bill  to 
set  aside  a  judgment  or  decree  of  a  State  Court  oif  account  of  fraud 
may  be  filed  in  a  Federal  court,^^  and  if  originally  filed  in  a  State 
court,  may  be  removed  to  a  Federal  court,  when  the  requisite  dif- 
ference of  citizenship  exists. ^^     A  bill  to  set  aside  tlie  decree  of 

3  Sheldon  ?•.    Fortescne    Aland,  3    P.  9  Mitford's  PI.  cli.  1,  §  2,  pt.  3  ;  Story's 

Wms.  104,  111  :  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  426.  Eq.  PI.  §  470. 

*  Mnsscl  V.  Morjran,  3  Bro.  Ch.   R.  74,  '^  Ilarwood  v.   Paiiroad  Co.,  17   Wall. 

79 ;  Bennett  r.  Ilamill,  2  Sell.  &  Lefr.  566,  78. 

576  ;  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  420.  "  Gaines  r.  Fuentes,  92  U.  S.  10  ;  Bar- 

5  Buck  r.  Fawcett,  3  P.  Wms.  242  ;  row  v.  Ilunton,  09  U.  S.  80 ;  Jolinson  r. 
Davenport  7\  Stafford,  8  Beav.  503  ;  Gil-  Waters,  111  U.  S.  640;  Arrowsniitli  r. 
bert  V.  Endean,  L.  R.  9  Cli.  D.  259  ;  Se-  Gleasnn,  129  U.  S.  86,  101.  But  see  Non- 
ton  on  Decrees  (4th  ed.),  1536.  gud  ?•.  Clapp,  101  U.  S.   651  ;  Graham  v. 

G  Bnck  V.  Fawc-ett,  3  P.   Wms.  242  ;  Boston,  H.  &  E.  R;  R.  Co.,  118  U.  S.  161, 

Story's  Eq.  PI.  §§  420-428.  177. 

'Stevensr.  Guppy,  1  Turn  &Rns.l78.  i-  Marshall  v.  Holmes,  141   U.  S.  589. 

8  Mitford's  PI.  ch."  1,  §  2,  pt.  3.  See  supra,  §  21. 


680  CORRECTION   OF   DECREE.  [CHAP.  XXVII. 

a  Federal  court  on  account  of  fraud  may  be  filed  in  a  Federal 
coui-t  irresj)ective  of  the  citizenship  of  the  parties. ^^  A  bill  defec- 
tive as  a  bill  to  set  aside  a  decree  for  fraud  miuht  perhaps  be  sus- 
tained as  a  bill  of  review  for  matters  apparent  upon  the  record, 
but  not  unless  filed  within  the  time  allowed  for  an  appeal.^* 
Upon  an  application  for  leave  to  file  a  bill  of  review  for  matters 
of  fact  newly  discovered  which  were  insufficient  to  support  the 
bill,  the  court  refused  to  separate  from  such  allegations  other 
allegations  of  fraud  in  obtaining  the  original  decree,  and  to  per- 
mit the  bill  to  be  filed  as  a  bill  to  set  aside  the  decree  for  fraud.^^ 
A  bill  to  set  aside  a  decree  for  fraud  must  show  a  valid  and 
meritorious  defense  to  the  original  decree. ^^ 

§  359.  Bills  to  Suspend  or  Avoid  the  Operation  of  Decrees  and 
Judgments.  —  Lord  Redesdale  speaks  as  follows  concerning  bills 
to  suspend  the  operation  of  decrees :  "  The  operation  of  a  decree 
signed  and  enrolled  has  been  suspended  on  special  circumstances, 
or  avoided  by  matter  subsequent  to  the  decree,  npon  a  new  bill  for 
that  purpose.  Thus  during  the  troubles  after  the  death  of  Charles 
the  First,  upon  a  decree  for  a  foreclosure  in  case  of  non-payment 
of  principal,  interest,  and  costs  due  on  a  mortgage,  the  mortgagor 
at  the  time  of  payment  ])eing  forced  to  leave  the  kingdom  to 
avoid  the  consequences  of  his  engagements  with  the  royal  party, 
and  having  requested  the  mortgagee  to  sell  the  estate  to  the 
best  advantage  and  pay  himself,  which  the  mortgagee  appeared 
to  have  acquiesced  in  ;  the  court  upon  a  new  bill  enlarged  the 
time  for  performance  of  the  decree,  upon  the  ground  of  the 
inevitable  necessity  which  prevented  the  mortgagor  from  comply- 
ing with  the  strict  terms  of  it,  and  also  made  a  new  decree  on 
tbe  ground  of  the  matter  subsequent  to  the  former  decree."  ^ 
''  The  embarrassments  occasioned  by  the  civil  war  in  the  reign  of 
Charles  L,  and  the  state  of  affairs  after  his  death,  before  the 
restoration  of  Charles  II.,  occasioned  many  extraordinary  appli- 
cations to  the  court  of  Chancery  for  relief,  and  perhaps  induced 
the    court  to  go  far  in  extending  relief;    but  there  were  many 

13  Pacific  n.  n.  of  Mo.   V.  Mo.   Pacific        i^  Kimberly  v.  Arms,  40  Fed.   R.  548  ; 

Ry.  Co.,  Ill  United  States  585;  supra,  s.  c.  136  U.  S.  629. 
§21.  §359.    1  Mitford'sPl.  ch.  1,  §2,pt.  3; 

"  Dunlovy  v.  Dunlevy,  38  Fed.  R.  4G2.  Cocker  v.  Bevis,  1  Ch.  Cas.  61  ;  and  also 

See  si(i>rn,  §  351.  rcfcrrinfj  to  Vcnables  c.  Foyle,  1  Cli.  Cas. 

'^  Kimberly  v.   Arms,  40  Fed.  H.   548,  2;  Wliorewood  r.  Wiiorewood,  1  Ch.  Cas. 

558  ;  3.  c.  136  U.  S.  629.  250 ;  Wakeiin  v.  Waltlial,  2  Ch.  Cas.  8. 


§  359.]    BILLS  TO  SUSPEND  OK  AVOID  DECREES  AND  JUDGMENTS.        681 

cases  of  extreme  hardship,  in  which  it  was  deemed  impossible, 
consistently  with  established  principles,  to  give  relief;  and  all 
cases  determined  soon  after  the  restoration,  upon  circumstances 
connected  with  the  prior  disturbed  state  of  the  country,  ought 
to  be  considered  with  much  caution."  ^  No  instance  is  known  of 
the  maintenance  of  such  a  bill  in  a  Federal  court.  In  a  few  cases 
the  Federal  courts  have  sustained  bills  to  suspend  the  operation 
and  enjoin  the  enforcement  of  judgments  at  law  for  matters 
subsequent.^ 

2  Mitford's  PI.  ch.  1,  §  2,  pt.  3  Judges,  12  Wheat.  561.     See  Ballance  v. 

3  Johnson  v.  St.  Louis,  L  M.  &  S.  Ry.     Forsyth,  24  How.  183. 
Co.,  141  U.  S.  602,  610;  Parker  v.  The 


END    OF    VOL.    L 


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